Rozprawy doktorskie na temat „Anscombe”

Tesis para optar al grado de Doctor en Filosofía
Esta tesis tiene por objeto contribuir a una interpretación de la obra de la filósofa inglesa G.E.M. Anscombe. Propondremos tres ideas-claves para sostener que hay una filosofía unitaria tras sus diversos y variados trabajos, a pesar de las dificultades señaladas por varios interpretes. La unidad de la filosofía de Anscombe está, en nuestra opinión, en una intención ética, una unidad metafísica, una unidad epistemológica y una concep-ción de la racionalidad que se sigue de ésta. Su intención ética es mostrar que la filoso-fía moderna no puede establecer que lo injusto es malo y esto hace que ella sea llevada a conclusiones desastrosas. Los problemas filosóficos son enfrentados desde una perspectiva próxima de la de Wittgenstein, en la que se pone atención al lenguaje, esta filosofía fundamental, aunque no fundacional, la llamaremos “metafísica”. Mostraremos como esta manera de tratar los problemas es una constante en toda la obra y que, además, tiene una conexión esencial con la manera de tratar los problemas filosóficos. Al aplicar este método al análisis de la acción aparecerá la especificidad del conoci-miento práctico como modo propio del ser humano en tanto que agente racional. Las excelencias de las capacidades psicológicas o antropológicas de este agente racional, es decir, sus “virtudes”, estarán en la base de la filosofía moral.

Elizabeth Anscombe, une des grandes philosophes du vingtième siècle, a travaillé sur de nombreux sujets philosophiques. L'objectif de cette recherche est d'étudier sa philosophie morale, en particulier la manière dont elle est liée à ses travaux sur d'autres sujets. Cette recherche commence par les trois thèses présentées dans son article « Philosophie morale moderne », son article le plus connu en philosophie morale, en présentant d'abord que la discussion d'Anscombe sur la philosophie morale implique la théorie de l'action, la philosophie du langage, l'éthique de la vertu, etc. et en suggérant que sa philosophie morale devrait être étudiée dans le contexte historique dans lequel elle écrit. Après avoir présenté le cas de Truman, le conséquentialisme qui prévalait parmi ses contemporains, et ses amis pendant ses études et son travail à Oxford (chapitre 1), je discute de la manière dont les écrits d'Anscombe sur l'éthique de la vertu aristotélicienne (chapitre 2), la théorie de l'action (chapitre 3), et la philosophie du langage (chapitre 4) ont façonné différents points de vue de sa philosophie morale. Ensuite, j'examine le rôle de son article « philosophie morale moderne » en tant que renouveau contemporain de l'éthique de la vertu, afin de montrer que ni Anscombe ni ses disciples n'ont pris exclusivement Aristote comme ressource pour leur éthique, et que seuls les éthiciens qui se consacrent à expliquer comment les actions intentionnelles sont liées aux pensées sur le bien et le mal ont véritablement hérité des idées d'Anscombe. Enfin, je conclus que le travail d'Anscombe sur la philosophie morale ne forme pas un système, mais qu'il représente une perspective féminine de la philosophie (chapitre 5)
Elizabeth Anscombe, one of the greatest philosophers of the 20th Century, has worked on many topics in philosophy. The purpose of this work is to study her moral philosophy, especially how it relates to her work on other topics. This work starts with the three theses presented in her paper “Modern Moral Philosophy”, her most well-known paper in moral philosophy, first presenting that Anscombe's discussion of moral philosophy involves action theory, philosophy of language, virtue ethics, and so on, and suggesting that her moral philosophy should be studied in the historical context in which she writes. After introducing Truman's case, the consequentialism prevalent among her contemporaries, and her friends during her studies and work at Oxford (Chapter 1), I discuss how Anscombe's writings on Aristotelian virtue ethics (Chapter 2), action theory (Chapter 3), and philosophy of language (Chapter 4) shaped her moral philosophy from different perspectives. Then, I examine the role of “Modern Moral Philosophy” as a contemporary revival of virtue ethics, in order to show that neither Anscombe nor her followers have taken Aristotle exclusively as the resource for their ethics, and that only ethicists who devote themselves to explaining how intentional actions are linked to thoughts about good and bad have truly inherited Anscombe's ideas. At last, I conclude that Anscombe's work on moral philosophy does not form a system, but it represents a female perspective of doing philosophy (Chapter 5)

Pour Elizabeth Anscombe, tout effort de bonté est indissociablement une quête de vérité. La vigilance morale prend chez elle la forme d’un Daimôn rappelant à chacun la tâche d’examiner sa vie : « Peut-être que d’une manière que je ne vois pas, je me trompe désespérément sur une chose essentielle*. » Cette thèse défend l’idée qu’Anscombe élabore un type original de réalisme moral centré sur la notion d’intégrité et polarisé par une question : comment une personne parvient-elle à saisir, le plus rigoureusement possible, le sens et la gravité de ses actions ? Selon elle, trois conditions sont nécessaires afin d’évaluer correctement le poids de nos actes — elles donnent le plan de notre travail : on a besoin de savoir ce qu’on fait effectivement, on doit avoir une certaine idée des nécessités liées à sa nature d’humain et enfin, on doit reconnaître l’infinie valeur de cette nature.Pour savoir ce qu’elle fait, la personne doit pouvoir identifier les critères de « ce qui compte comme une description pertinente d’une action.» Or c’est précisément ce à quoi s’attèle Anscombe dans son étude de l’intention. Elle montre qu’il est possible d’isoler des types d’actions dont nous savons que, si nous la faisons intentionnellement, nous sommes dans le faux. La catégorie d’« acte intrinsèquement injuste » redevient disponible, offrant ainsi le point de départ d’une épistémologie morale réaliste.Pour être intègre, la personne a, par ailleurs, besoin de justifier ses évaluations en les fondant sur une compréhension approfondie de la forme de vie des humains. Là encore, Anscombe opère un déplacement majeur en donnant une nouvelle consistance au concept de nature humaine. Elle s’appuie sur l’idée que nous apprenons quelque chose sur la sorte d’être que sont les humains en dépliant la forme logique de leurs pratiques linguistiques. Sa méta-éthique gravite autour d’un axe souvent inaperçu, combinant le naturalisme d’Aristote et la grammaire logique de Wittgenstein.Enfin, une action ne sera vraie sur le plan moral qu’à la condition de manifester la valeur « mystique » de la nature humaine. La mise au jour de cet aspect constitue l’apport le plus novateur de cette thèse. L’étude approfondie des textes éthico-religieux permet de dégager le cœur de son anthropologie métaphysique : les humains sont non seulement des animaux rationnels, mais aussi des êtres spirituels, doués d’une dignité que nous pouvons connaître par « connaturalité » ou par « perception mystique ».L’exploration des différentes facettes du réalisme moral anscombéen permet, in fine, de préciser son rôle dans le débat éthique contemporain sur l’absolutisme. Certains actes sont-ils à refuser absolument, quoiqu’il en coûte du bien-être de la personne ou de la situation conséquente ? Pour Anscombe, la réponse est oui. Mais cela ne peut se faire ni au détriment du discernement personnel ni au prix d’une aliénation. Sa manière de concevoir l’humain permet de résoudre la tension en établissant que l’interdit n’a pas besoin d’être décrété par une autorité extérieure pour être absolu. Il peut s’imposer intérieurement à la personne, comme une évidence impérieuse, en raison de sa nature spirituelle.*G.E.M. Anscombe, « La philosophie morale moderne », traduit par G. Ginvert et P. Ducray, Klesis-Revue Philo-sophique. Actualité de la philosophie analytique, 2008, no 9, p. 25.Mots-clés : réalisme moral, intégrité, absolutisme, philosophie de l’action, épistémologie morale, méta-éthique, naturalisme, grammaire logique, perception mystique, connaturalité, anthropologie métaphysique, nature spirituelle
For Elizabeth Anscombe, every effort at goodness is also a quest for truth. Moral vigilance takes the form of a Daimôn reminding each person of the task of examining their life: ‘Perhaps in some way, I can’t see, I may be on a bad path, perhaps I am hopelessly wrong in some essential way*.’ This thesis argues that Anscombe is developing an original type of moral realism centred on the notion of integrity and polarised by one question: how does a person come to grasp, as rigorously as possible, the meaning and gravity of their actions? According to her, three conditions are necessary in order to correctly assess the weight of our actions – they provide the blueprint for our work: we need to know what we are actually doing, we need to have some idea of the necessities of our human nature and, finally, we need to recognise the infinite value of this nature.To know what they are doing, the person must be able to identify the criteria for ‘what counts as a relevant description of an action’. This is precisely what Anscombe sets out to do in her study of intention. She shows that it is possible to isolate types of action which we know that, if we do them intentionally, we are in the wrong. The category of "intrinsically unjust act" becomes available again, providing the starting point for a realist moral epistemology.The person also needs to justify their assessments by basing them on a thorough understanding of the human being. Here again, Anscombe makes a major shift by restoring consistency to the concept of human nature. She relies on the idea that we learn something about the kind of being that humans are by unfolding the logical form of their linguistic practices. Her meta-ethics revolves around an often-unnoticed axis, combining Aristotle’s naturalism and Wittgenstein’s logical grammar.Finally, an action will only be true on a moral level if it manifests the “mystical” value of human nature. Bringing this aspect to light is the most innovative contribution of this thesis. An in-depth study of the ethico-religious texts reveals the core of her metaphysical anthropology: humans are not only rational animals, but also spiritual beings, endowed with a dignity that we can know through “connaturality” or “mystical perception”.By exploring the various facets of Anscombean moral realism, we can ultimately clarify its role in the contemporary ethical debate on absolutism. Are certain acts to be rejected absolutely, whatever the cost to the well-being of the person or the consequent situation? For Anscombe, the answer is yes. But this cannot be done either at the expense of personal discernment or at the cost of alienation. Her way of conceiving the human makes it possible to resolve the tension by establishing that the prohibition does not need to be decreed by an external authority to be absolute. It can be imposed internally on the agent, as compelling evidence, due to their spiritual nature.*G. E. M. Anscombe, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ in Ethics, Religion and Politics, Collected Philosophical Pa-pers III, Oxford, Blackwell, 1981, p. 37.Keywords: moral realism, integrity, absolutism, philosophy of action, moral epistemology, meta-ethics, naturalism, logical grammar, mystical perception, connaturality, metaphysical anthropology, spiritual nature

L’éthique néo-aristotélicienne développée à la suite du programme proposé par G.E.M. Anscombe en 1958 exclut-elle la notion de moralité ? Anscombe contestait la pertinence de la notion de « devoir moral ». Cela implique-t-il que l’on doive, pour la suivre, renoncer à toute distinction entre le « moral » et le « non moral » ? La défense d’un absolutisme moral motivait les analyses d’Anscombe concernant « l’intention ». Les critiques du légalisme, du conséquentialisme ou du subjectivisme qui sont menées dans le sillage de « La philosophie morale moderne » par les principaux représentants de l’éthique néo-aristotélicienne – Philippa Foot, Alasdair MacIntyre, Rosalind Hursthouse ou Martha C. Nussbaum – répondent au même type de préoccupation. Les néo-aristotéliciens cherchent à opposer aux conceptions modernes de la rationalité morale l’idée d’une rationalité pratique homogène. Mais c’est pour montrer qu’elle est intrinsèquement liée à la vertu. Dans le même esprit, ils opposent à l’anti-naturalisme de la morale britannique du XXème siècle un naturalisme non réductionniste. Sous ces différents aspects, leur réflexion bénéficie des liens qu’elle renoue avec l’inspiration originelle de la méthode de la « psychologie » anscombienne. C’est ce qui permet à certains d’entre eux de poser les jalons d’une éthique fondée sur les notions de vertu et de bonheur, que celle-ci revendique ou non son appartenance à « l’éthique de la vertu ». A travers sa définition de « l’action humaine », cette éthique qui possède certains traits caractéristiques de l’éthique des Anciens, implique bien néanmoins une définition exigeante et originale de la moralité
Does neo-Aristotelian ethics, which was developed according to the programme by G.E.M. Anscombe in 1958, exclude the notion of morality? Anscombe challenged the relevance of the concept of ‘moral duty’. Does this imply that, to follow her programme, one must give up any distinction between ‘moral’ and ‘non-moral’? The defence of moral absolutism motivated Anscombe's ‘intention’ analyses. Critics of legalism, consequentialism or the subjectivism that was conducted in the wake of ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ by the main representatives of neo-Aristotelian ethics—Philippa Foot, Alasdair MacIntyre, Rosalind Hursthouse and Martha C. Nussbaum—have responded to the same type of concern. The neo-Aristotelians, despite their disagreement on many points, seek to set the idea of a homogeneous practical rationality against modern conceptions of moral rationality; however, it is to show that rationality is intrinsically linked to virtue. In the same spirit, they set a non-reductionist naturalism against the anti-naturalist British ethics of the 20th century. Under these different aspects, their reflection benefits from a return to the original inspiration of Anscombe’s ‘psychology’ method. This return is also what allows some of them to lay the foundations for an ethical theory based on notions of virtue and happiness regardless of whether it claims to belong to ‘virtue ethics’ or not. Through its definition of ‘human action’, this ethical theory—which proposes to reconnect with certain characteristics of ancient ethics—implies, however, a demanding and original definition of morality

Ce travail a pour objectif d'éclaircir, par la voie d'une enquête sur le langage de l'action intentionnelle et la grammaire des concepts psychologiques, la nature de notre capacité ordinaire à assigner un sens aux actions humaines et les conditions de son exercice. À l'heure actuelle, les débats sont dominés par une conception causaliste de l'action et de son explication qui innerve des problèmes tels que celui de la causalité mentale, de la réalité des états mentaux ou du statut de la « psychologie populaire ». Le causalisme pose que la différence entre une action et un simple mouvement corporel tient au fait que la première est causée par certains antécédents mentaux, distincts du mouvement, qui rendent compte de son caractère intentionnel. Expliquer une action consisterait dès lors à donner des raisons référant à ces états. Renouant avec l'approche logico-grammaticale issue de Wittgenstein et développée par Anscombe, nous entendons montrer que cette conception est erronée. Son principal défaut est de succomber à une image mentaliste selon laquelle les prédicats psychologiques utilisés dans les explications ordinaires ont toujours pour fonction de dénoter des états, des processus ou des événements internes à l'agent, distincts de l'action et pouvant entrer dans des chaînes causales. Contre cela, nous voulons établir que la différence entre action et mouvement corporel est une différence entre deux modes de description. Le mode intentionnel dans lequel se disent les actions se caractérise de façon essentielle par l'asymétrie de la première et de la troisième personnes. Expliquer une action consiste à en donner une description qui l'identifie dans sa dimension téléologique. Notre démarche est la suivante. Le premier mouvement de notre étude est consacré à la clarification des liens conceptuels entre intention et action. Après avoir rappelé les origines modernes de la conception causaliste, nous critiquons les arguments proposés par Davidson en sa faveur. Récusant leur mentalisme sous-jacent, nous montrons que le caractère intentionnel d'une action ne dépend pas de la présence d'un « ingrédient » mental. Puis nous rendons compte de la force explicative des descriptions intentionnelles en les mettant en rapport avec la spécificité du raisonnement pratique et de la connaissance d'agent. Dans un second mouvement, nous revenons sur la nature de la capacité à formuler des jugements psychologiques au sujet d'autrui. Nous examinons successivement la thèse selon laquelle les agents possèdent une théorie de l'esprit et celle selon laquelle ils recourent à un principe de charité interprétative. Contre ces approches intellectualistes, nous soutenons que l'usage sensé des termes psychologiques est un savoir-faire qui doit être mis en relation avec l'expressivité naturelle du corps humain, la dimension intrinsèquement sociale et institutionnelle de la vie humaine et l'existence de formes d'action et d'expression partagées faisant autorité. Reconnaître les conditions actionnelles de l'intelligibilité d'autrui exige de se défaire de l'illusion moderne d'un « sujet désengagé »
My objective is to elucidate, by means of a grammatical inquiry into the language of intentional action and the use of psychological concepts, the nature of our ordinary capacity to make sense of human actions, as well as the conditions of its exercise. In contemporary debates prevails a causalist view of action and its explanation, which underlies the discussions about mental causation, the reality of mental states or the epistemic status of so-called folk psychology. Causalism holds that an action differs from a mere bodily movement by its being caused by some mental antecedents, distinct from movement, which account for its intentional character. Explaining an action would thus consist in giving reasons ultimately referring to those states. In line with the wittgensteinian logico-grammatical approach developed by Anscombe, I intend to show that this view is misconceived. Its main defect lies in its mentalism, i.e. the tendency to see psychological predicates as always functioning to denote internal episodes or events, distinct from action and liable to figure in causal chains as links bringing about the agent's behaviour. Against this, I want to establish that the distinction between action and mere movement is to be seen as a difference between two modes of description. The intentional mode in which are couched action descriptions is essentially characterized by the first/third-person asymmetry. Explaining an action consists in identifying it by a description exhibiting its teleological features. My plan is the following. The first main move is to clarify the conceptual relations between intention and action. Having brought to light the modern roots of causalism, I consider the arguments Davidson put forward in its favour, so as to refute their underlying mentalism. I show that for an action, being intentional does not depend on any occurrence of a separate mental component. Then I proceed to account for the explanatory force of intentional descriptions by relating them to the specificity of practical reasoning and agent knowledge. The second main move tackles the question to know what the capacity of making sense of others consists in. I successively consider the idea that agents possess a theory of mind and the thesis as to which they must rely on a principle of interpretative charity. Against those intellectualist views, I claim that sensible use of psychological concepts is a practical skill which is to be related to the sensibility to the natural expressivity of human body, the intrinsically social and institutional features of human life and the existence of shared standards of expression and action. Acknowledging the action-based conditions of others' intelligibility requires to dispose of the modern illusion of a « disengaged subject »

Ce travail aborde la philosophie de I'action d'E. Anscombe depuis la perspective du langage. Une thèse centrale de celle-ci est qu'une action est toujours envisagée sous une description dont l'action intentionnelle serait une des formes majeures. L'action serait indissociable du langage en tant que produit d'une pratique linguistique particulière consistant notamment à fournir des raisons d'agir. L'ancrage linguistique de I'action suggère I'impossibilité d'expliquer I'action en dehors des catégories de langage qui lui sont propres. Nous défendons cette approche à I'encontre des conceptions de l'action visant à sa naturalisation. Notre propos s'appuie sur I'idée de la possibilité de défendre une conception dite « extemaliste» des intentions qui ne les réduit pas a une donnée introspective invérifiable. Nous articulons deux idées: Ie caractère essentiellement linguistique de l'action et sa dépendance à une réalité extralinguistique, à laquelle on ne peut cependant la réduire.

Este trabalho tem como objetivo o desenvolvimento de um novo método para a simulação de redução da dose de radiação em imagens mamográficas clínicas. Assim, estudos sobre a influência da redução da dose de radiação no diagnóstico do câncer de mama podem ser realizados sem que o paciente se exponha a doses extras de radiação. Uma análise preliminar foi realizada para a caracterização do ruído produzido pelo equipamento mamográfico no processo de aquisição da imagem. Essa análise evidenciou a importância de um método local de simulação, uma vez que o ruído depende da posição ao longo do campo. O novo método proposto consiste em ajustar os níveis de cinza e adicionar uma máscara de ruído Poisson, dependente do sinal, nas imagens clínicas adquiridas com a dose de radiação padrão, simulando sua aquisição com doses de radiação reduzidas. A dependência entre ruído e sinal foi criada com o uso da transformada de Anscombe. O desempenho do método proposto foi avaliado utilizando-se imagens mamográficas de um phantom antropomórfico obtidas com diferentes doses de radiação. As imagens simuladas pelo método proposto foram comparadas com as imagens reais. A similaridade entre os espectros de ruído permitiu a comparação de métricas locais da imagem. O erro percentual entre os níveis de cinza das imagens reais e simuladas se manteve inferior a 1%. O ruído adicionado manteve um erro percentual inferior a 1%. Testes de t-Student mostraram que não existe diferença estatística significante (p < 0,05) entre as imagens reais e simuladas pelo método proposto.
This work aims to develop a new method for simulating reduction of the radiation dose in clinical digital mammography. Using such method, studies regarding the influence of dose reduction in cancer diagnosis can be performed without unnecessary exposure of patients to X-ray radiation. A preliminary study characterized the noise produced by the digital mammography equipment during the acquisition process. This analysis emphasized the importance of simulating noise locally, since noise is dependent on the spatial position of the pixel. Therefore, the proposed method consists of adjusting the gray levels and adding signal-dependent Poisson noise to images acquired at the standard radiation dose. Dependency between noise and signal was created using the Anscombe transformation. The performance of the proposed method was evaluated using mammographic images of an anthropomorphic phantom acquired at different radiation doses. Images simulated using the proposed method were compared to real images acquired using the clinical equipment. Similarity between noise power spectra and local metrics validated the similarity between images. The gray level of the simulated and real images were compared using local mean and reported averaged errors smaller than 1%. The added noise was also compared and the averaged error was smaller than 1%. Statistical Student\'s t-test tests showed no statistical difference (p < 0.05) between real images and the ones simulated using the proposed method.

The starting point of the dissertation is a special kind of intentional action -- Aristotelian praxis, or, in a more metaphysical register, energeia -- a kind whose agent's intention in acting must be expressible as the deliverance of one's prohairesis (``deliberate choice''), action that is the embodiment of one's conception of eupraxia (``acting well''), and, equivalently, of eudaimonia (``happiness''). It is special, since not all that we intentionally do can be intelligibly expressed as the deliverance of our conceptions of acting well. Recognition of the gaps between action in general and intentional action more specifically, and between intentional action and prohairetic action, sets the stage for a reinterpretation, not only of core aspects of Aristotle's Ethics, but also of central features of Aristotle's political recommendations. The interpretation defended here centers on the claim that, for Aristotle, defective political communities are often marked, not so much by an erroneous conception of human virtue, but by defective forms of action, forms in which agents fail to apply certain concepts to what they do. Importantly, such failures do not hang on the different failure to apply concepts correctly: the failure to act prohairetically need not come to the failure to grasp the correct conception of human virtue or of human happiness.
Government

Este trabalho tem por objetivo o desenvolvimento de uma nova técnica de pré-processamento de imagens mamográficas digitais para melhorar o desempenho dos esquemas computacionais de auxílio ao diagnóstico (CAD) e para auxiliar na detecção precoce do câncer de mama. O método proposto efetua uma restauração nas imagens mamográficas utilizando, em uma primeira etapa, a transformada de Anscombe e o filtro de Wiener para redução do ruído quântico. Posteriormente, é utilizado o filtro inverso da função de transferência de modulação (MTF) do sistema de imagem para realce das estruturas de interesse na mamografia, como as microcalcificações, que podem ser um indicativo de câncer de mama em seu estágio inicial. Imagens mamográficas restauradas pelo método proposto foram utilizadas na avaliação de um esquema CAD para detecção automática de microcalcificações. Os resultados mostraram que o desempenho do esquema CAD apresentou uma melhora significativa quando imagens restauradas foram utilizadas, mesmo para imagens de mamas densas, que resultam normalmente em baixa taxa de detecção devido ao baixo contraste.
This work aims to developing a new technique for pre-processing digital mammographic images in order to improve the performance of computer aided-diagnosis schemes (CAD) and to assist in early detection of breast cancer. The proposed method performs a restoration in mammographic images using in a first step, the Anscombe transform and Wiener filtering to reduce image quantum noise. Subsequently, it was used the inverse modulation transfer function filtering (MTF) considering the imaging system to enhance structures of interest in mammography, such as microcalcifications, which may be an indicative of breast cancer in its early stage. Mammographic images restored by the proposed method were used in the evaluation of a CAD scheme for automatic detection of microcalcifications. The results showed that the performance of the CAD scheme had a significant improvement when restored images were used, even for images of dense breasts, which often results in low detection rate due to low contrast.

Esse trabalho apresenta uma nova proposta do algoritmo de médias não-locais (NLM - Non-Local Means) para a filtragem do ruído quântico de imagens mamográficas digitais adquiridas com dose de radiação reduzida. A redução nas doses de radiação tem como objetivo principal minimizar os riscos de indução ao câncer de mama causado pela exposição do paciente à radiação ionizante no momento do exame. No entanto, a qualidade da imagem mamográfica diminui com a redução da dose de radiação e o ruído predominante nesse caso é o ruído quântico, que segue a distribuição de Poisson e é dependente do sinal. Como o algoritmo NLM foi originalmente desenvolvido para filtragem de ruído Gaussiano independente do sinal, a proposta desse trabalho foi de adaptar o algoritmo NLM original de modo que ele se tornasse mais adequado para filtragem do ruído encontrado nas imagens mamográficas digitais. Nessa nova abordagem, chamada de Variance Map Non-local Means (VM-NLM), a filtragem do ruído quântico é realizada no próprio domínio da imagem, levando-se em conta a variância do ruído em cada pixel da imagem, já que o ruído é dependente do sinal. Com isso, elimina-se a necessidade de realizar uma estimativa precisa dos parâmetros do ruído para o uso de uma transformada de estabilização de variância (como a transformada generalizada de Anscombe), antes do processo de filtragem. Essa estimativa normalmente requer medidas preliminares no equipamento mamográfico, cujo acesso nem sempre é viável na prática. A proposta foi avaliada em três bancos de imagens mamográficas adquiridas com diferentes doses de radiação. As avaliações de desempenho foram realizadas comparando objetivamente a qualidade das imagens mamográficas obtidas com a dose padrão de radiação com as adquiridas com doses reduzidas, após a filtragem do ruído. Os resultados obtidos com o algoritmo proposto mostraram que ele produz imagens mamográficas mais nítidas e com melhor preservação de bordas e pequenos detalhes do que o algoritmo NLM original.
This work presents a new proposal from the non-local means algorithm (NLM - Non-Local Means) for filtering the quantum noise of digital mammography images acquired with reduced radiation dose. The reduction in radiation doses aims to minimize the risk of inducing breast cancer caused by patient exposure to ionizing radiation during the examination. However, the mammographic image quality decreases with the reduction of the radiation dose and the predominant noise in this case is the quantum noise, which follows the Poisson distribution and it is dependent of the signal. As the NLM algorithm was originally developed for filtering additive Gaussian noise, the purpose of this study was to adapt the original NLM algorithm so that it becomes more suitable for filtering the noise found in digital mammographic images. In this new approach, called Variance Map Non-local Means (VM-NLM), the filtering of the quantum noise is performed in the image domain, considering the noise variance in each pixel of the image, since the noise depends on the pixel value. Thus, it eliminates the need for an accurate estimate of the noise parameters for the use of a variance stabilization transform (such as generalized Anscombe Transformation) before the filtering process. This estimate typically requires preliminary measurements in the mammographic equipment, which is not always viable in clinical practice. The proposal was evaluated in three databases of mammographic images acquired with different radiation doses. Performance evaluations were conducted comparing objectively the quality of mammographic images acquired with standard radiation dose and with reduced doses, after filtering the noise. The results obtained with the proposed algorithm showed that it produces sharper mammographic images with better preservation of edges and small details than the original NLM algorithm.

I deliver an account of 'practical knowledge'; the knowledge we have of our own intentional actions. Part One introduces the target notion by describing three philosophically interesting features it appears to have (Ch. 1) and dismisses two broad approaches to understanding it - a 'consciousness-based' and an 'inferentialist' approach (Ch. 2). A third approach is thus motivated: 'Intentionalist' accounts of practical knowledge see practical knowledge as somehow constituted by the agent's intention. Part Two considers and rejects a version of Intentionalism which I call Cognitivist Intentionalism - CI. Cognitivist Intentionalists think of intentions as a kind of belief. Practical knowledge is constituted by intention in whatever way ordinary knowledge is constituted by belief, but it is a special kind of knowledge because its constituting attitude is special. I dismiss two versions of CI, showing them to be internally problematic (Ch. 3). I then argue that intentions are not propositional attitudes (Ch. 4), thus ruling out any version of CI - if intentions were beliefs they would have to be propositional attitudes. Part Three considers the remaining options for Intentionalism. According to Non-Cognitivist Intentionalism - NCI - practical knowledge is constituted by intentions, which are not a kind of belief, just in case they are executed. NCI happily accommodates practical knowledge's philosophically interesting features. But it is hard to see why executing an intention should constitute knowing, and how a kind of propositional knowledge could be constituted by a non-propositional attitude, which Chapter Four argued intentions to be. Chapter Six develops NCI into the stronger NPI - Non-Propositionalist Intentionalism. In NPI the non-propositional character of intentions is central. Practical knowledge is a kind of propositional knowledge which is constituted by a non-propositional attitude; a kind of knowledge which is not constituted by belief. I explain how this can be.

Esse trabalho apresenta uma nova metodologia para a correção do espectro de potência do ruído no processo de simulação de aquisições de imagens de tomossíntese digital mamária (Digital Breast Tomosynthesis - DBT) com doses reduzidas de radiação. A simulação é realizada por meio da inserção de ruído quântico dependente do sinal em imagens previamente adquiridas com a dose padrão de radiação. A DBT utiliza a mesma tecnologia de raios X que a mamografia digital, porém com a capacidade de prover ao médico exames do volume tridimensional da mama, minimizando o problema de superposição de tecidos. Apesar de ser o sucessor da mamografia, estudos têm mostrado que a otimização da relação entre a dose de radiação e a qualidade da imagem adquirida ainda não está bem estabelecida na DBT. Devido à impossibilidade de realizar diversas exposições de radiação a uma mesma paciente para os estudos de otimização da dose de radiação, é desejável que exista um método capaz de simular com exatidão diversas exposições tendo como base uma imagem clínica de referência. Embora existam diversos métodos para a simulação da redução de dose em exames mamográficos, o mesmo não pode ser dito quanto a imagens de DBT. O método desenvolvido para simulação da redução da dose de radiação em imagens de DBT se baseia em uma abordagem de inserção de ruído por meio de uma transformada de estabilização de variância, que já foi utilizada para simulação da redução de dose em exames de mamografia digital. Porém, esse trabalho propõe a inclusão da correção do espectro de potência do ruído para otimizar o desempenho do método de inserção de ruído para exames de DBT. Os resultados obtidos mostraram que, quando comparando a imagens de referência, a as imagens simuladas apresentaram erro menores que 1% para a análise do valor médio e desvio padrão e erro próximo de 5% para a análise do espectro de potência, apresentado resultados até 64% melhores que métodos não otimizados para DBT.
This work presents a new methodology for noise power spectrum correction in the simulation of digital breast tomosynthesis (DBT) images with reduced dose of radiation. The simulation is performed by inserting a signal-dependent quantum noise into previously acquired images with the standard dose of radiation. Using the same X-ray technology as a standard mammography, the DBT is capable of reconstructing the inner tissues of the patients\' breasts as a three-dimensional volume, providing more resources for cancer detection than its bi-dimensional counterpart and minimizing tissue overlapping. Despite being the successor to mammography, studies have shown that the optimization of the relationship between radiation dose and image quality is not well established in DBT yet. Due to the impossibility of exposing the same patient to multiple exams with different doses each, a simulation method able to mimic clinical images with high reliability is desirable. Despite the number of methods proposed for dose reduction simulation in mammography, scarcely any may be used in DBT. The method developed for simulation of radiation dose reduction in DBT images is based on a noise insertion approach using a variance-stabilizing transformation, which has already been used to simulate dose reduction in digital mammography exams. However, this work proposes the inclusion of the noise power spectrum correction to optimize the performance of the noise insertion method for DBT exams. The results showed that, when compared with reference images, the simulated images achieved less than 1% error for mean and standard deviation values and close to 5% error for power spectrum analysis, improving in up to 64% when compared with non-optimized for DBT simulation methods.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2014.
ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis has two aims. The first is to assess the cogency of the three most influential theories of intention – namely those of Elizabeth Anscombe, Donald Davidson and Michael Bratman. I identify five requirements that a convincing account of intention must fulfil, and then assess each of these theories in light of these five requirements. In the course of this analysis, I demonstrate that, while each of these theories contributes to our understanding of intention, none of them meet all the specified requirements. This leads to the second aim of this thesis, which is to develop an account of intention capable of overcoming the problems inherent in the foregoing theories of intention and hence fulfilling the specified requirements. This account is built around the definition of intention as a complex mental entity, consisting of two components: a revisable pro-attitude and a belief that the agent will try to fulfil this pro-attitude. It must further be possible for the agent to reflexively reconstruct the belief component without external information. I begin by setting out the five requirements for a convincing account of intention. In each case, I explain why it is necessary for a theory of intention to meet the relevant requirement, and elaborate on what is needed for an account of intention to fulfil this requirement. The five requirements for a convincing account of intention are: 1) It must explain the unity of the three seemingly irreconcilable uses of intention; 2) it must explain the epistemic requirements for intention; 3) it must clarify the relationship between intention and motivation, intention and causes, and intention and reasons; 4) it must explain the relationship between intention and practical reasoning, and 5) it must clarify the relationship between intention and moral responsibility. Together, these five requirements form the yardstick against which I evaluate the different theories of intention. With this yardstick in mind, I am then able to assess each of the influential theories of intention developed by Anscombe, Davidson, and Bratman. In each case, I examine how the relevant theory of intention fares in meeting each of the five requirements. This analysis shows that, while each theory provides a number of important insights, none of them succeeds in meeting all five requirements. Such analysis further enables me to identify the specific difficulties that have stymied the attempts of all three thinkers to develop a convincing account of intention. Having identified the strengths and weaknesses of the three preceding accounts of intention, I then try to work out an alternative account of intention that would not fall prey to the same complications. Following the same modus operandi as before, I evaluate my proposed account against the five requirements for a convincing theory of intention. In each case, I show that my account not only succeeds in meeting the specified criterion, but also, crucially, that it is able to overcome the difficulties that have plagued previous attempts to fulfil this criterion. I conclude that, while this account is not necessarily conclusive, it does meet the conditions for a convincing account of intention and thereby casts some light into the conceptual darkness surrounding intention that Anscombe identified more than half a century ago.
AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis het twee oogmerke. Die eerste is om die oortuigingskrag van die drie mees invloedryke teorieë van intensie te beoordeel – naamlik die van Elizabeth Anscombe, Donald Davidson en Michael Bratman. Ek identifiseer vyf vereistes waaraan ‘n oortuigende verklaring van intensie moet voldoen en beoordeel dan elk van hierdie teorieë aan die hand van hierdie vyf vereistes. In die loop van hierdie analise wys ek dat, alhoewel elkeen van hierdie teorieë tot ons verstaan van intensie bydra, geeneen aan al die gespesifiseerde vereistes voldoen nie. Dit lei tot die tweede oogmerk van die tesis, wat die ontwikkeling van ‘n teorie van intensie behels wat daartoe in staat is om die probleme wat inherent aan die voorgenoemde teorieë is, te oorkom en wat dus aan die gespesifiseerde vereistes voldoen. Hierdie teorie berus op die definisie van intensie as ‘n komplekse mentale entiteit wat uit twee komponente bestaan: ‘n wysigbare pro-houding en ‘n oortuiging dat die agent hierdie pro-houding sal probeer vervul. Dit moet verder ook vir die agent moontlik wees om die oortuigingskomponent refleksief te rekonstrueer sonder eksterne inligting. Ek begin deur die vyf vereistes vir ‘n oortuigende verklaring van intensie uiteen te sit. In elke geval verduidelik ek hoekom dit nodig is vir ‘n teorie van intensie om aan die relevante vereiste te voldoen en werk ek uit wat nodig is vir ‘n verklaring van intensie om aan hierdie vereiste te voldoen. Die vyf vereistes vir ‘n oortuigende verklaring van intensie is: 1) Dit moet die ooreenstemming tussen die drie skynbaar onversoenbare gebruike van intensie verduidelik; 2) dit moet die epistemiese vereistes vir intensie verduidelik; 3) dit moet die verhouding tussen intensie en motivering, intensie en oorsake, en intensie en redes verhelder; 4) dit moet die verhouding tussen intensie en praktiese redenering verhelder; en 5) dit moet die verhouding tussen intensie en morele verantwoordelikheid verhelder. Gesamentlik vorm hierdie vyf vereistes die maatstaf waarvolgens ek die verskillende teorieë van intensie evalueer. Met hierdie maatstaf in gedagte is ek dan in staat daartoe om elkeen van die invloedryke teorieë van intensie, wat ontwikkel is deur Anscombe, Davidson en Bratman, te beoordeel. In elke geval ondersoek ek hoe die relevante teorie van intensie vaar in die voldoening aan elkeen van hierdie vyf vereistes. Hierdie analise wys dat, alhoewel elke teorie ‘n aantal belangrike insigte bied, geen van hul daarin slaag om aan al vyf vereistes te voldoen nie. So ‘n analise stel my verder in staat om die spesifieke probleme te identifiseer waardeur die pogings van al drie denkers om ‘n oortuigende verklaring van intensie te ontwikkel, gestuit is. Nadat ek die sterk en swakpunte van die drie voorafgaande verklarings van intensie geïdentifiseer het, probeer ek dan om ‘n alternatiewe teorie van intensie uit te werk wat nie aan hierdie selfde komplikasies onderhewig is nie. Deur dieselfde modus operandi as voorheen te volg, evalueer ek my voorgestelde verklaring aan die hand van die vyf vereistes vir ‘n oortuigende teorie van intensie. In elke geval wys ek dat my verklaring nie bloot daaraan slaag om aan die gespesifiseerde kriterium te voldoen nie, maar ook, van deurslaggewende belang, dat dit in staat daartoe is om die probleme te oorkom waardeur vorige pogings om die kriterium te vervul, geteister is. Ek kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat, alhoewel hierdie teorie nie noodwendig afdoende is nie, dit wel die voorwaardes vir ‘n oortuigende verklaring van intensie vervul en hierdeur lig werp op die konseptuele duisternis waarin intensie gehul is en wat meer as ‘n halfeeu gelede deur Anscombe geïdentifiseer is.

Qu'est-ce qu'une action intentionnelle? Quel est le rapport entre intentionnalité, rationalité et raisons d'agir? La discussion des causes et des raisons en philosophie de l'action est brouillée: la vraie question n'est pas la relation, causale ou non, entre intention et action ; mais savoir si ce qui rend une action intentionnelle est un fait naturel, ou une forme linguistique. Or on ne peut agir intentionnellement sans maîtriser la description de son action. L'intention doit être soigneusement distinguée de la volonté motrice: l'intention n'est pas l'initiation d'un mouvement mais une pensée d'action en première personne, une «connaissance pratique» (Anscombe). La véritable origine de l'antinomie des causes et des raisons est l'asymétrie des verbes psychologiques (Wittgenstein), dont les verbes d'action font partie. L'explication causale est un point de vue de troisième personne, alors que le point de vue des raisons est en première personne. Leur confusion mène à des erreurs massives sur la rationalité pratique. C'est surtout dans le domaine de la psychologie morale que la dispute des causes et des raisons prend sens: elle éclaire la question du rapport entre motivation et raison d'agir. Le raisonnement pratique débouche sur l'action donc motive, mais sa principale caractéristique est sa défaisabilité : aucune raison n'est absolue, donc pourquoi la suivre? Diverses formes de scepticisme sont envisagées. On aboutit à la conclusion qu'il y a bien une inférence pratique, dans laquelle raison et volonté viennent se tondre (Aristote). L'inférence pratique est matérielle et non tonnelle. On jette enfin les bases d'une théorie expressiviste du raisonnement pratique
What is an intentional action? How do intentionality, rationality and having a reason to act relate? The debate between reasons and causes is badly put: the real question is not whether the relationship between intention and action is causal or not, but whether what makes an action intentional is a natural fact, or a form of description (Anscombe). Acting intentionally does require possession of the description under which the action is intentional, so intentional action is best approached by reasons. Having an intention is not willing: the intention is not the start of action, but a first-personal action-thought or -'practical knowledge. " The antinomy between reasons and causes really stems from the asymmetry of psychological verbs (Wittgenstein). For action verbs too are psychological verbs, even though they relate to happenings that take place outside our bodies. Causal explanations of action are typically third-personal, whereas reasons are always first-personal. Confusions between theses two standpoints lead to tremendous errors on the nature of practical rationality. The distinction between reasons and causes really becomes insightful when applied to moral psychology: it sheds light on the question of reason and motivation. Practical reasoning leads to action, and therefore motivates; but it is also defeasible (or non-monotonic). If reasons for action never are complete, why act on them? Various forms of skepticism are envisioned. I conclude that practical reasoning is a genuine form of inference, but a material, not a formaI one, in which will and intelligence melt (Aristotle). I finally advocate an expressivist account of practical reasoning

The ultimate aim of this thesis is to explain how the theory of action found in Anscombe's Intention can be modified to deliver a plausible account of non-human animal agency (henceforth, animal agency). More specifically, it is an attempt to develop her account in a way that respects the Aristotelian insight that animals act in ways that differ, in certain fundamental respects, from the processes of growth and self-maintenance found in plants, on the one hand, and the self-conscious actions characteristic of mature human beings, on the other. The negative aim is to show that the theory of action that constitutes the received backdrop in the study of animal minds is ill-suited for the task. This is what I call the Standard Approach to Animal Agency and, despite its widespread acceptance in comparative psychology, cognitive ethology, and the philosophy of animal minds, I argue that it faces serious problems. This thesis divides roughly into two halves corresponding to these respective aims. In the first half I argue against the Standard Approach. Amongst other things, I suggest that the theory suffers from a tendency to take the notion of action for granted. The result is an oversimplified metaphysics that is ill-prepared to account for the fact that the activities characteristic of animal life are instrumentally structured processes. In the constructive half of the thesis I develop an Anscombean alternative that takes the structure of action as its starting point. On this view, expressions of animal agency are understood as a distinctive kind of material process. After explaining Anscombe's account of intentional action, I adapt and develop these ideas into a theory of animal agency.

L'idéalisme linguistique nous apprend que les conditions de sens de nos jugements sont fixées par nous et qu'il n'y a rien à chercher au-delà de ces conditions. La question se pose de savoir pourquoi ce postulat ne peut guère s'appliquer au domaine pratique, où nous sommes rarement certains du sens que nous donnons à nos jugements. Pourquoi avons-nous besoin de chercher de nouvelles déterminations du sens lorsque nous sommes confrontés à des questions pratiques" ? Il semble que le phénomène de la sous-détermination du sens soulève des doutes quant à l'étendue de notre capacité de juger (ou si J'on préfère, quant à l'usage ordinaire du concept de vérité). Nous tâcherons de montrer que, pour l'idéaliste linguistique, la sous-détermination cognitive est un problème sceptique relevant du domaine de la nécessité logique (ou théorique). Ce sera le cas de conceptions philosophiques du langage aussi différentes que la théorie de l'assertion de Dummett et la philosophie de la communication de Habermas et Appel. Or la sous-détermination du sens est un problème anthropologique - et dans un certain sens pratique -qui relève du domaine de la nécessité pratique. Le philosophe est appelé à défendre la pratique du jugement contre les doutes réels qui émanent du fait que nous sommes des êtres nécessiteux. Dans cette thèse, nous présenterons la philosophie anthropologique de Wittgenstein, la philosophie de l'action d'Anscombe, la théorie de l'enquête de Peirce et la philosophie des besoins de Wiggins comme des exemples de pensées qui réussissent à dépasser l'idéalisme linguistique pour atteindre un réalisme qualifié selon des critères pratiques. Notre objectif est de montrer comment la pensée de ces quatre philosophes met en lumière la richesse de la conception ordinaire de la vérité et contribue ainsi à une élucidation du concept de vérité
Linguistic idealism teaches us that the sense-conditions of our judgments have been fixed by us and that there is nothing to search for beyond these conditions. One is bound to ask why this postulate can hardly be applied to the practical domain, where we are merely absolutely certain of the meaning we give to our judgments. Why are we in need of new determinations of meaning when we are confronted with practical questions? The phenomenon of under determinacy of meaning seems to raise doubts about the extent of our judgment capacity (or, if we prefer, about the ordinary employment of the concept of truth). I will attempt to show that, for the linguistic idealist, cognitive undertemination is a skeptical problem belonging to the domain of logical (or theoretical) necessity. This will be shown through two different philosophical conceptions of language: Dummen 's theory of assertion, as well as Habermas's and Apel's philosophy of communication. Now underdeterminacy of meaning is an anthropological problem -and in a certain sense a practical problem -that relates to the domain of practical necessity. The philosopher is called upon to defend the practice of judgment against real doubts triggered by the human condition of being in need. Ln this thesis I will present Wittgenstein's anthropological philosophy, Anscombe's philosophy of action, Peirce's theory of inquiry and Wiggins's philosophy of needs as paradigms of thought that succeed in going beyond linguistic idealism so as to reach a realism qualified by practical criteria. My point is to show how the thought of these four philosophers illuminates the richness of the ordinary conception of truth and thus contributes to an elucidation of the concept of truth

There is a conceptual knot at the intersection of moral responsibility and action theory. This knot can be expressed as the following question: What is the relationship between an agent's openness to moral responsibility and the intentional status of her behaviour? My answer to this question is developed in three steps. I first develop a control-backed account of intentional agency, one that borrows vital insights from the cognitive sciences – in the form of Dual Process Theory – in understanding the control condition central to the account, and demonstrate that this account fares at least as well as its rivals in the field. Secondly, I investigate the dominant positions in the discussion surrounding the role of control in moral responsibility. After consideration of some shortcomings of these positions – especially the inability to properly account for so-called ambivalence cases – I defend an alternative pluralist account of moral responsibility, in which there are two co-extant variants of such responsibility: attributability and accountability. The latter of these will be shown to have a necessary control condition, also best understood in terms of a requirement for oversight (rather than conscious or online control), and in terms of the workings of the dual system mechanism. I then demonstrate how these two accounts are necessarily related through the shared role of this kind of control, leading to my answer to the original question: if an agent is open to moral accountability based on some activity or outcome, this activity or outcome must necessarily have positive intentional status. I then apply this answer in a consideration of certain cases of the use of the Doctrine of Double Effect.

The guiding question for this essay is: who is the learner? The aim is to examine and criticize one answer to this question, sometimes referred to as the theory of the learning brain, which suggests that the explanation of human learning can be reduced to the transmitting and storing of information in the brain’s formal and representational architecture, i.e., that the brain is the learner. This essay will argue that this answer is misleading, because it cannot account for the way people strive to learn in an attempt to lead a good life as it misrepresents the intentional life of the mind, which results in its counting ourselves out of the picture when it attempts to provide a scientific theory of the learning process. To criticize the theory of the learning brain, this essay will investigate its philosophical foundation, a theory of mind called cognitivism, which is the basis for the cognitive sciences. Cognitivism is itself built on three main tenets: mentalism, the mind-brain identity theory and the computer analogy. Each of these tenets will be criticized in turn, before the essay turns to criticize the theory of the learning brain itself. The focus of this essay is, in other words, mainly negative. The hope is that this criticism will lay the groundwork for an alternative view of mind, one that is better equipped to give meaningful answers to the important questions we have about what it means to learn, i.e., what we learn, how we do it and why. This alternative will emphasize the holistic and intentional character of the human mind, and consider the learning process as an intentional activity performed, not by isolated brains, but by people with minds that are extended, embodied, enacted and embedded in a sociocultural and physical context.

Questa tesi si occupa di analizzare il lavoro di Stanley Hauerwas, uno studioso di grande fama nel mondo accademico americano i cui testi sono molto letti in tutto il mondo. Tramite la lettura critica dell’intero corpus degli scritti di Hauerwas la tesi intende riflettere sul rapporto problematico tra Cristianesimo e liberalismo. A questo scopo, la tesi si concentra inizialmente sui presupposti filosofici che sono alla base delle argomentazioni di Hauerwas. In secondo luogo, riflette sulle idee ed istituzioni tipiche del liberalismo e sul loro rapporto con il Cristianesimo. Infine, descrive la proposta etica di Hauerwas e il modo con cui questa determina il tipo di politica che la chiesa e i cristiani dovrebbero avere. Seguendo l’ampiezza del lavoro di Hauerwas, la tesi si interessa di un gran numero di filosofi, teorici della politica e teologi, spaziando dagli scritti di Aristotele e Tommaso d’Aquino, alla filosofia del linguaggio di McCabe, Murdoch, e Wittgenstein, dalle riflessioni etiche di Kovesi, Anscombe, e MacIntyre, alle teorie politiche di Rawls, Stout e Coles. Grazie alla sottolineatura del ruolo delle virtù e della formazione morale, insieme all’enfasi posta sull’importanza che la tradizione della chiesa, le sue pratiche e il suo linguaggio hanno nel dare forma all’immaginazione e alle vite dei cristiani, Hauerwas descrive in maniera costruttiva e feconda una proposta politica genuinamente cristiana e ci aiuta a navigare le complessità del mondo contemporaneo.
The dissertation provides an in-depth analysis of the scholarship of Stanley Hauerwas, a very prominent figure in the American academy whose body of work is widely read in many countries. By providing a close reading of Hauerwas’ entire corpus, the dissertation aims at discussing the contested relationship between Christianity and liberalism. It does so first, by focusing on the philosophical presuppositions that shape Hauerwas’ overall argument. Second, it reflects on the main liberal commitments and institutions and their relationship with Christianity. Third, it describes Hauerwas’ ethical proposal and its bearings on the political commitments that the church and Christians ought to have. Following the breadth of Hauerwas’ work, the dissertation deals with a great number of philosophers, political theorists, and theologians, spanning from the writings of Aristotle and Aquinas, to the philosophy of language of McCabe, Murdoch, and Wittgenstein, to the ethical reflections of Kovesi, Anscombe and MacIntyre, and to the political theory of Rawls, Stout, and Coles. Through his stress on the role of virtues and moral formation, and by emphasizing the importance that the church’s tradition, language, and practices have in shaping the imagination and lives of Christians, Hauerwas gives a constructive and fruitful description of what a genuine Christian politics looks like and helps us navigate the complex world of today.

Questa tesi si occupa di analizzare il lavoro di Stanley Hauerwas, uno studioso di grande fama nel mondo accademico americano i cui testi sono molto letti in tutto il mondo. Tramite la lettura critica dell’intero corpus degli scritti di Hauerwas la tesi intende riflettere sul rapporto problematico tra Cristianesimo e liberalismo. A questo scopo, la tesi si concentra inizialmente sui presupposti filosofici che sono alla base delle argomentazioni di Hauerwas. In secondo luogo, riflette sulle idee ed istituzioni tipiche del liberalismo e sul loro rapporto con il Cristianesimo. Infine, descrive la proposta etica di Hauerwas e il modo con cui questa determina il tipo di politica che la chiesa e i cristiani dovrebbero avere. Seguendo l’ampiezza del lavoro di Hauerwas, la tesi si interessa di un gran numero di filosofi, teorici della politica e teologi, spaziando dagli scritti di Aristotele e Tommaso d’Aquino, alla filosofia del linguaggio di McCabe, Murdoch, e Wittgenstein, dalle riflessioni etiche di Kovesi, Anscombe, e MacIntyre, alle teorie politiche di Rawls, Stout e Coles. Grazie alla sottolineatura del ruolo delle virtù e della formazione morale, insieme all’enfasi posta sull’importanza che la tradizione della chiesa, le sue pratiche e il suo linguaggio hanno nel dare forma all’immaginazione e alle vite dei cristiani, Hauerwas descrive in maniera costruttiva e feconda una proposta politica genuinamente cristiana e ci aiuta a navigare le complessità del mondo contemporaneo.
The dissertation provides an in-depth analysis of the scholarship of Stanley Hauerwas, a very prominent figure in the American academy whose body of work is widely read in many countries. By providing a close reading of Hauerwas’ entire corpus, the dissertation aims at discussing the contested relationship between Christianity and liberalism. It does so first, by focusing on the philosophical presuppositions that shape Hauerwas’ overall argument. Second, it reflects on the main liberal commitments and institutions and their relationship with Christianity. Third, it describes Hauerwas’ ethical proposal and its bearings on the political commitments that the church and Christians ought to have. Following the breadth of Hauerwas’ work, the dissertation deals with a great number of philosophers, political theorists, and theologians, spanning from the writings of Aristotle and Aquinas, to the philosophy of language of McCabe, Murdoch, and Wittgenstein, to the ethical reflections of Kovesi, Anscombe and MacIntyre, and to the political theory of Rawls, Stout, and Coles. Through his stress on the role of virtues and moral formation, and by emphasizing the importance that the church’s tradition, language, and practices have in shaping the imagination and lives of Christians, Hauerwas gives a constructive and fruitful description of what a genuine Christian politics looks like and helps us navigate the complex world of today.

Os talentos de Elizabeth Anscombe como filósofa são universalmente reconhecidos no que diz respeito às obras que desenvolveu em áreas como a metafísica e a filosofia da acção. Quando se trata, contudo, do que escreveu sobre ética isto deixa de ser verdade. Embora o seu ensaio de 1958, “Modern Moral Philosophy”, tenha tido uma influência significativa na filosofia moral do seu tempo, considerando-se aliás que promoveu um interesse renovado no estudo das virtudes, os seus ensaios sobre questões práticas foram quase esquecidos. Quando referidos, são condenados e postos de parte como pregações. Defenderei que o facto de Anscombe ser Católica não influencia em nenhum aspecto essencial a sua ética: os pontos fortes que tem como filósofa estão tão à vista nesta área quanto em qualquer outra. Recorrerei a “Modern Moral Philosophy”, Intention e aos ensaios de ética aplicada. Quando conseguirmos compreender o ponto do primeiro e de ver a luz que o segundo deita sobre conceitos como os de ‘intenção’ e ‘voluntariedade’, seremos capazes de apreciar a profundidade e importância do que Anscombe tem para dizer sobre coisas como o aborto, a eutanásia ou o roubo.
Elizabeth Anscombe’s talents as a philosopher are universally recognised in what regards her works in such areas as metaphysics and the philosophy of action. When we come, however, to what she wrote on ethics this ceases to be true. Though her 1958 essay “Modern Moral Philosophy” had a significant influence on the moral philosophy of its time, being in fact credited with having promoted a renewed interest in the study of virtues, her essays on practical issues were almost forgot. When mentioned at all, they are condemned and dismissed as preaching. I shall argue that the fact that Anscombe was a Roman Catholic does not influence in any essential respect her ethics: her strengths as a philosopher are as much open to view in this area as in any other. In order to prove this I will draw on “Modern Moral Philosophy”, Intention and her applied ethics. Once we understand the point of the first and see the light the second sheds on such concepts as ‘intention’ and ‘voluntariness’ we will be able to appreciate the depth and importance of what she has to say on such things as abortion, euthanasia or theft.

碩士
華梵大學
哲學系碩士班
98
This essay criticizes by virtue of Anscombe’s conception of causality three reasons of determinism as well as three causes that incline people to believe determinism, and clarifies that even determinism still can not be overthrown, but also can not be affirmed. Three reasons of determinism are that causal connection is a necessary connection, that any happening always has its causes, and that physical laws determine anything's happening. Three causes inclining people to believe determinism are that Newton's mechanics gains great success in many areas, that caused events are regarded as determined and that any happening always having its causes even becomes the guiding principle for acquiring knowledge. Anscombe points out that the core of causality is derivativeness of an effect from its causes rather than constant or necessary connection between an effect and its causes. The proposition that any happening always has its causes is not logically necessary true because we can infer its counterexample from concepts of time and space. That one intends to do something cannot be reduced to a physical event, so that the difference between mental states and physical events cannot be resolved by Davidson's account. Furthermore, Newton's mechanics has its limits so that it does not support determinism, and the claim that events are caused does not entail that events are determined.

Cette étude porte sur la notion de raisonnement. L'hypothèse principale que je défends est que ce que l'on appelle communément un raisonnement comporte un aspect processuel et un aspect inférentiel. L'aspect processuel consiste dans le fait qu'un raisonnement est un enchaînement causal d'actes ou d'états mentaux, et l'aspect inférentiel consiste dans le fait que les états mentaux en question ont des contenus propositionnels qui peuvent entretenir entre eux des relations logiques. Lorsqu'on accepte cette distinction, il apparaît qu'une théorie adéquate du raisonnement doit expliquer comment ces deux aspects sont reliés. L'objectif de cette étude est d'examiner de quelle manière différentes approches du raisonnement traitent de la relation entre ces deux aspects. Cette thèse est divisée en quatre chapitres. Le premier chapitre, à caractère introductif, présente le contexte philosophique général dans lequel s'est posée la réflexion sur le raisonnement (pratique) au cours des dernières décennies. Le deuxième chapitre s'amorce par une analyse critique de la thèse d'Anscombe (1957) selon laquelle l'action est la conclusion de l'inférence pratique. J'y montre comment cette suggestion l'oblige à rendre compte du caractère processuel du raisonnement en termes inférentiels et qu'une telle solution conduit à une compréhension inadéquate de la relation entre les aspects processuel et inférentiel de ce type de raisonnement. Dans la section qui suit, je présente l'hypothèse qui est au coeur de cette étude: j'y explique ce qui distingue les aspects processuel et inférentiel du raisonnement en indiquant quelques conséquences qu'entraîne cette distinction dans l'étude du raisonnement. J'examine ensuite comment il serait plausible, à la lumière de la distinction introduite, de rendre justice à l'intuition d'Anscombe. Le troisième chapitre porte sur la conception du raisonnement de Harman (1986). Après avoir présenté sommairement l'esprit de sa théorie et les principes de révision qu'il identifie comme étant ceux que suivent ou doivent suivre les agents lorsqu'ils raisonnent (section 1), je tente ensuite de déterminer comment Harman conçoit cet aspect processuel, et si sa théorie permet d'expliquer de manière adéquate la relation entre les aspects processuel et inférentiel du raisonnement. J'examine d'abord quelle fonction il reconnaît aux notions d'implication et d'inconsistance, et montre ensuite que si le processus dans lequel s'engage celui qui raisonne peut être conçu à la manière de Harman, c'est-à-dire à la 3ème personne, il doit aussi être conçu du point de vue de l'agent qui raisonne, c'est-à-dire à la 1ère personne. Après avoir discuté des limites inhérentes au fait de concevoir l'aspect processuel du raisonnement d'un point de vue essentiellement externe, à la 3ème personne; j'identifie quelques conséquences que fait apparaître la perspective de la 1ère personne, dans le but de montrer pourquoi une théorie adéquate du raisonnement ne peut en faire l'économie. En dernière section, j'explore quelques conséquences de la distinction proposée, notamment quant à la question de savoir quelles notions pourraient être mises en parallèle à celles de prémisse, conclusion et validité lorsqu'il est question du raisonnement. Le quatrième chapitre porte sur la conception du raisonnement de John Broome. Après avoir exposé sommairement les thèses que défend Broome (1999, 2002) sur le terrain de la normativité puisqu'elles sont déterminantes dans sa théorie du raisonnement, je montre que la distinction qu'il établit entre un raisonnement de croyance et un raisonnement d'intention s'accorde (au moins en partie) avec la distinction raisonnement/argument suggérée (section 1). Je propose ensuite une analyse critique de la position qu'il défend dans Broome (2006b) en m'opposant à l'exigence de double expression qui est nécessaire, selon lui, pour pouvoir raisonner avec des attitudes autres que des croyances. Je montre qu'une telle conception du raisonnement est beaucoup trop exigeante, et qu'elle a le désavantage principal de faire en sorte que pour pouvoir raisonner avec des attitudes autres que des croyances, vous devez vous mettre en position de 3ème personne (section 2). Dans le cadre de la dernière section, je montre que la divergence entre nos conceptions respectives du raisonnement a son origine dans les thèses qu'il défend concernant la normativité de la rationalité et la normativité des raisons. J'identifie quelques-unes des conséquences de ces thèses pour une théorie du raisonnement. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Raisonnement, Argument, Inférence, Raisons, Rationalité, Normativité.

This is an essay about reasons for action. It begins with two rather ordinary observations. The first is that these two uses of the term ‘reason’ roughly correspond with the two main roles that a reason can play: the role of favoring a prospective course of action, and the role of explaining action. Each of these roles seems crucial to a philosophical account of reasons, and it is not obvious that either has claim to priority. The second observation is that accommodating each of these roles seems to place restrictions on what we can say about reasons for action, and those who lean toward giving priority to one role rather than the other tend also to give priority to the corresponding set of restrictions. They take that set as given, and then focus their efforts on finding a way to meet the other set if they can. Accommodating the explanatory role has seemed to many to require that a reason bear some relation to the motivations of the agent for whom it is reason. One might wonder: what sense could there be in calling something a reason for me to act if it were not in any way capable of explaining my being moved to act? I argue, however, that accepting this sort of internalist condition on something’s being a reason to act precludes accepting a condition of objectivity that is imposed on us if we wish to accommodate the favoring role: sometimes, at least, when we have a reason to act, we could not cease to have that reason simply by having a (perhaps radically) different set of attitudes. I then consider whether the reverse might be true of externalist theories. Does taking the favoring role as one’s starting point preclude a full account of the explanatory role of reasons? I argue that it does not. I show that an Anscombean conception of intentional action allows for a fairly clean solution to a pair of puzzles that motivate this worry. This approach relieves much of the pressure to think of reasons as being tied to motivational attitudes.
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The dissertation is an examination of obligation, which I argue is a mode of rational necessity that is proper to human agency. I begin from G. E. M. Anscombe’s celebrated attack against modern moral philosophy, and then sketch a positive theory of obligation as it figures in morality and in law, drawing upon the work of Aquinas and Aristotle. The first chapter explicates this idea of “practical necessity” and the second chapter shows that Aristotelian ethics, because it is not a theological law conception of ethics, has no place for a peculiarly moral conception of obligation. The third chapter examines Aquinas’s conception of moral law and argues that Aquinas vindicates Anscombe’s negative critique of the “moral ought.” The fourth chapter shows that the application of exceptionless moral norms (i.e. moral absolutes), which is one kind of obligation, requires attention to aspects of social practices. Attention to social practices allows the resolution of controverted problems about specifying intentions and applying the principle of double effect in a way that makes exceptionless moral norms workable. The fifth and final chapter defends the conception of intentional action assumed in the fourth chapter, and demonstrates that the scholastic ‘sub specie boni’ thesis is an integral part of action explanation, as well as Anscombe’s notion of “practical knowledge”. The upshot of the dissertation is an integrated investigation into how the ideas of good and necessity figure in ethics, law, and human action.
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This diploma thesis deals with the Aristotelian virtue ethics and its renaissance in the twentieth century. Ethics is first defined generally as a separate science which belongs to the practical sciences. Subsequently, the emphasis on virtue ethics as one of the directions of normative ethics. A key part of the thesis deals with the ethics of virtue in Aristotle and interpretation corresponding more or less to the interpretation of the work of Nicomachean Ethics. The emphasis is on concepts of virtue, bliss and goodness. The development of u virtue ethics from the time of Aristotle until the twentieth century is also mentioned. The last part deals with the form of virtue ethics in the twentieth century, including the process how the ethics of virtue acquired its present form. It is also compared to the interpretation of virtue ethics in Aristotle and in the works of modern moral philosophers, particularly the work of Alasdair MacIntyre After Virtue is emphasized.

Η “καθιερωμένη θεώρηση για την πράξη”, όντας δεσμευμένη σε ένα ευρύτερο νατουραλιστικό μοντέλο, κατανοεί την πράξη ως “επιμέρους συμβάν”, το οποίο προκαλείται αιτιακά από συγκεκριμένες νοητικές καταστάσεις. Σ’ αυτό το πλαίσιο, η αιτιακή επίδραση της πρόθεσης υπάγεται στο σύνηθες χιουμιανό μοντέλο της αιτιότητας μεταξύ συμβάντων. Ωστόσο, η εν λόγω θεώρηση αποτυγχάνει ουσιωδώς να ερμηνεύσει τις πράξεις στην εξέλιξή τους, πριν δηλαδή να διαμορφωθεί το απαιτούμενο (από το χιουμιανό μοντέλο) εξατομικευμένο συμβάν. Το γεγονός αυτό έχει ευρύτερες επιπτώσεις για τον τρόπο με τον οποίο αντιλαμβάνεται η εν λόγω προσέγγιση τόσο την έννοια της πρόθεσης, όσο και κατ’ επέκταση το ρόλο του δρώντος. Στην παρούσα εργασία και με αφορμή κυρίως πρόσφατες εργασίες από τους Hornsby και Crowther, επιχειρηματολογώ σχετικά με το ότι μπορούμε να υιοθετήσουμε μια εναλλακτική προσέγγιση, τόσο για την οντολογία της πράξης, όσο και για την πρόθεση, η οποία δίνει ικανοποιητικότερες απαντήσεις στις ανωτέρω προκλήσεις. Κεντρική θέση στα πλαίσια αυτής της προσέγγισης είναι η αναγνώριση της “δραστηριότητας” ως συγκροτησιακού στοιχείου της πράξης, κατά τη διάρκεια της οποίας η αιτιακή συμβολή του δρώντος παραμένει συνεχής, σε συμφωνία με μια αριστοτελικού τύπου προσέγγιση της αιτιότητας. Όι παραδοχές αυτές οδηγούν σε μια θεώρηση της πρόθεσης ως καθοδηγητικής της πράξης καθόλη τη διάρκεια εξέλιξής της.
The “standard story of action” being committed to a broader naturalistic model, understands action as a “particular event”, which is caused by certain mental states. In this context, the causal efficacy of intention is covered by the standard humean model of causality between events. Nevertheless, the story in question substantially fails to give an account for actions as they develop, that is, before the required (by the humean model) individuated event has been formed. That fact has broader effects on the way that the approach in question understands the concept of intention, and ultimately the role of the agent. In this thesis, following mainly on recent papers by Hornsby and Crowther, I argue that we can endorse an alternate approach regarding the ontology of action, as well as intention, that gives more adequate answers to the challenges mentioned above. The main thesis in this context is to recognize “activity” as a constitutional element of action, during which the causal efficacy of the agent remains ongoing, in accordance with an aristotelian type of approach to causality. These commitments result in recognizing intention as guiding action throughout the whole of its development.