Gotowa bibliografia na temat „Dilemmes sacrificiels”

"Sacrificial dilemmas" are the scenarios typically used to study moral judgment and human morality. However, these dilemmas have been criticized regarding their lack of ecological validity. The COVID-19 pandemic offers a relevant context to further examine individuals’ moral judgment and choice of action with more realistic sacrificial dilemmas. Using this context, the purpose of the present study is to investigate how moral responses are influenced by the contextualization of the dilemma (i.e., contextualized or not within the Covid-19 pandemic). By comparing two versions of one dilemma, Experiment 1 revealed that the more realistic version (the one contextualized within the Covid-19 pandemic) did not elicit more utilitarian responses than the less realistic version (the one not contextualized within the Covid-19 pandemic). In Experiment 2, we examined more specifically whether both the perceived realism of the dilemma and the plausibility of a utilitarian action influence moral responses. Results confirmed that the contextualization of the dilemma does not make any difference in moral responses. However, the plausibility of an action appears to exert an influence on the choice of action. Indeed, participants were more inclined to choose the utilitarian action in the plausible action versions than in the implausible action versions of the dilemma. Overall, these results shed light on the importance for future research of using mundane and dramatic realistic dilemmas displaying full information regarding a sacrificial action and its consequences.

Previous work has demonstrated that people are more willing to sacrifice one person to save five in a foreign language (FL) than in their native tongue. This may be due to the FL either reducing concerns about sacrificial harm (deontological inclinations) or increasing concerns about overall outcomes (utilitarian inclinations). Moreover, proficiency in a foreign language (FL) may moderate results. To test these possibilities, we investigated the moral foreign language effect (MFLE) in a novel sample of Russian L1/English FL speakers. We employed process dissociation (PD)—a technique that independently assesses concerns about rejecting harm and maximizing outcomes in sacrificial dilemmas, and we assessed measures of objective and subjective foreign language proficiency and of dilemma comprehension. Results replicated the pattern of increased acceptance of sacrificial harm in FL demonstrated in earlier studies, but a PD analysis showed no evidence of increased concerns for utilitarian outcomes in a FL; instead, this pattern was driven by reduced concerns regarding sacrificial harm. However, people who reported better dilemma comprehension in the FL demonstrated both stronger deontological and utilitarian responding, and people with higher objective proficiency displayed stronger utilitarian responding in the FL than those with lower proficiency. These findings show that utilitarian inclinations are affected by reading dilemmas in a foreign language mainly in low-proficiency speakers, and that while emotional concerns for sacrifice are reduced in FL, better comprehension can increase such concerns as well as concern for outcomes.

AbstractThe psychological correlates of utilitarian choices in sacrificial moral dilemmas are contentious. In the literature, some research (Greene, et al., 2001) suggested that utilitarianism requires analytic thinking while other research (Kahane et al., 2015) showed that utilitarianism is correlated with psychopathy. In the present research, we looked at the relation of several normative views with analytic cognitive style (ACS), psychopathy and real-world utilitarianism in three Turkish samples. In Study 1 (n = 269), we used four ethical dilemmas and asked participants to select one normative principle as the grounds for their judgment in the dilemma: fatalism, virtue ethics, utilitarianism, deontology and amoralism. The results showed that the majority selected the deontological principle. Additionally, there was a considerable amount of fatalistic and virtue ethical justifications. Utilitarianism and psychopathy had a significant positive correlation. In Study 2 (n = 246), we replicated Study 1 and showed a significant relation between ACS and moral minimalism (the view that the sacrificial act is permissible but not necessary). In Study 3, the results showed that the utilitarian option in the sacrificial dilemmas was positively correlated with both real-life utilitarianism and psychopathy, but the latter two variables were not correlated with each other. All in all, the results suggest that some people choose the utilitarian option in moral dilemmas from psychopathic tendencies (as Kahane argued), while others due to real-life utilitarian reasons (as Greene argued). The findings also indicate that virtue ethical and fatalistic justifications cannot be ignored in understanding lay people’s moral judgments.

AbstractIn the sacrificial moral dilemma task, participants have to morally judge an action that saves several lives at the cost of killing one person. According to the dual process corrective model of moral judgment suggested by Greene and collaborators (2001; 2004; 2008), cognitive control is necessary to override the intuitive, deontological force of the norm against killing and endorse the utilitarian perspective. However, a conflict model has been proposed more recently to account for part of the evidence in favor of dual process models in moral and social decision making. In this model, conflict, moral responses and reaction times arise from the interplay between individually variable motivational factors and objective parameters intrinsic to the choices offered. To further explore this model in the moral dilemma task, we confronted three different samples with a set of dilemmas representing an objective gradient of utilitarian pull, and collected data on moral judgment and on conflict in a 4-point scale. Collapsing all cases along the gradient, participants in each sample felt less conflicted on average when they gave extreme responses (1 or 4 in the UR scale). They felt less conflicted on average when responding to either the low- or the high-pull cases. The correlation between utilitarian responses and conflict was positive in the low-pull and negative in the high-pull cases. This pattern of data suggests that moral responses to sacrificial dilemmas are driven by decision conflict, which in turn depends on the interplay between an objective gradient of utilitarian pull and the moral motivations which regulate individual responsiveness to this gradient.

Sacrificial moral dilemmas, in which opting to kill one person will save multiple others, are definitionally suboptimal: Someone dies either way. Decision-makers, then, may experience regret about these decisions. Past research distinguishes affective regret, negative feelings about a decision, from cognitive regret, thoughts about how a decision might have gone differently. Classic dual-process models of moral judgment suggest that affective processing drives characteristically deontological decisions to reject outcome-maximizing harm, whereas cognitive deliberation drives characteristically utilitarian decisions to endorse outcome-maximizing harm. Consistent with this model, we found that people who made or imagined making sacrificial utilitarian judgments reliably expressed relatively more affective regret and sometimes expressed relatively less cognitive regret than those who made or imagined making deontological dilemma judgments. In other words, people who endorsed causing harm to save lives generally felt more distressed about their decision, yet less inclined to change it, than people who rejected outcome-maximizing harm.

The influence of dark humor on moral judgment has never been explored, even though this form of humor is well-known to push the boundaries of social norms. In the present study, we examined whether the presence of dark humor leads female participants to approve a utilitarian response (i.e., to kill one to save many) in sacrificial dilemmas. The effects of two types of humorous contexts were compared (i.e., dark vs. nondark) on dilemmas, which differed according to whom benefits from the crime (i.e., oneself and others vs. others only). In addition to collecting moral responses, individuals’ emotional states were assessed at three critical steps: Before and after reading the jokes and also after performing the moral judgment task. Our results revealed that dark and nondark humor similarly elicited a positive emotional state. However, dark humor increased the permissiveness of the moral violation when this violation created benefits for oneself. In self and other beneficial dilemmas, female participants in the dark humorous condition judged the utilitarian response more appropriate than those in the nondark condition. This study represents a first attempt in deepening our understanding of the context-dependent nature of moral judgment usually assessed in sacrificial dilemmas.

Objective:Persons with behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD) have been shown to exhibit altered morality, manifested as atypical utilitarian tendencies towards sacrificial moral dilemmas. This takes the form of endorsing harmful actions towards single individuals, including vulnerable or relationally close individuals (e.g. children, loved ones), in order to promote the greater good for the community or society as a whole. The dual process model of moral cognition interprets such tendencies as deriving from a lack of emotional engagement, whereas moral emotion theory views them as selective impairment in prosocial sentiments. We hypothesized that both the widespread neuropsychological practice of using sacrificial moral dilemmas to evaluate moral reasoning, and these tests' overreliance on quantitative results, inadequately represent how persons with bvFTD reason and feel while responding to moral dilemmas. To evaluate this hypothesis, we applied a mixed-methods approach to identify the reasoning, motivations, and emotional experiences of bvFTD persons during their deliberation about moral scenarios.Participants and Methods:We conducted semi-structured interviews with 14 participants: 7 persons with bvFTD & 7 older healthy controls. Transcripts were coded in Atlas 5.0 to characterize the underlying reasoning, emotions, response processes, and values that emerged when responding to a structured set of moral dilemmas. Our dilemmas measured utilitarian reasoning holistically by incorporating both sacrificial and impartial/altruistic components, as suggested by the 2-dimensional model of utilitarianism.Results:Unexpectedly, bvFTD persons articulated a prosocial compass when asked about their values, stating they were organizing their choices predominantly around kindness and altruism, even when they were making choices to harm loved ones or vulnerable individuals to promote the greater good. During moral deliberation, persons with bvFTD showed significantly less metacognition (bvFTD = 10%, HC = 90%) but reported more positive emotions (joy; bvFTD = 83%, HC = 17%) than negative (frustration; bvFTD = 30 %, HC = 70 %) compared to controls. Qualitatively, this observed emotional outlook was typically coupled with a more rigid, simplistic viewpoint (e.g., "I felt great, it was a no brainer"), suggesting a moral understanding lacking emotional nuance and complexity.Conclusions:Our data showed that bvFTD persons' utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas did not arise from an emotionally flat or antisocial cognitive perspective, but instead were guided by positive emotionality, simplistic reasoning, and prosocial values. These findings challenge the current understanding of the reasoning processes and experiences of persons with bvFTD and highlight the importance of incorporating mixed method approaches in dementia research that take into consideration the viewpoint of the cognitively compromised individual.

Depuis plusieurs décennies, les chercheurs et chercheuses en psychologie s'efforcent de percer les mystères de la morale humaine à travers l'étude des décisions morales. À ce jour, le paradigme de recherche dominant en psychologie morale repose sur l’analyse des réponses obtenues à partir de scénarios hypothétiques, tel le célèbre dilemme du tramway. Ces dilemmes, qualifiés de "sacrificiels", ont permis de fournir des apports majeurs à la compréhension de la morale humaine. Toutefois, ces outils ont récemment été critiqués pour leur manque de validité externe en raison (1) de leur caractère parfois involontairement humoristique et (2) de leur manque de réalisme. En effet, le caractère souvent absurde et incongru de ces dilemmes pourrait conduire les participants à les résoudre dans un cadre humoristique plutôt que sérieux. De plus, ces dilemmes manqueraient de réalisme, car les situations présentées ne reflètent pas des contextes auxquels les individus pourraient réellement être confrontés dans leur vie quotidienne et les actions permettant de résoudre ces dilemmes peuvent paraître peu plausibles. À travers sept études valorisées au sein de quatre articles scientifiques publiés dans des revues à comité de lecture, cette thèse vise à examiner les deux paramètres susceptibles de menacer la validité externe des dilemmes moraux sacrificiels : (1) leur caractère parfois incongru ou involontairement humoristique et (2) leur manque de réalisme. Ce travail de thèse s'attache par ailleurs à favoriser l’utilisation d’approches et d’outils complémentaires aux dilemmes pour une étude plus approfondie de la morale humaine. Dans l’ensemble, cette thèse offre une contribution significative au débat actuel sur l'utilisation et la pertinence des dilemmes moraux sacrificiels en psychologie. En explorant les paramètres susceptibles de menacer la validité externe des dilemmes sacrificiels, elle met en lumière l'importance de questionner les méthodes employées pour étudier la morale humaine. Ainsi, ce travail encourage non seulement à mener une réflexion critique sur les approches traditionnelles mobilisées pour sonder la morale humaine, mais incite également à l’exploitation d'outils complémentaires pour l’appréhender
For several decades, researchers in psychology have been trying to unravel the mysteries of human morality through the study of moral decisions. To date, the dominant research paradigm in moral psychology is based on the analysis of responses obtained from hypothetical scenarios, such as the famous trolley dilemma. These so-called ‘sacrificial’ dilemmas have made major contributions to our understanding of human morality. However, these tools have recently been criticized for their lack of external validity due to (1) their possible unintentionally humorous nature and (2) their lack of realism. Indeed, the often absurd and incongruous nature of these dilemmas could lead participants to solve them in a humorous rather than a serious context. In addition, these dilemmas lack realism, as the situations presented do not reflect contexts that individuals might actually face in their daily lives, and the actions used to resolve these dilemmas may seem implausible. Through seven studies presented in four scientific articles published in peer-reviewed journals, this thesis aims to examine the two parameters likely to threaten the external validity of sacrificial moral dilemmas: (1) their sometimes incongruous or unintentionally humorous nature and (2) their lack of realism. This thesis also aims to encourage the use of approaches and tools complementary to dilemmas for a more in- depth study of human morality. Overall, this thesis makes a significant contribution to the current debate on the use and relevance of sacrificial moral dilemmas in psychology. By exploring the parameters that may threaten the external validity of sacrificial dilemmas, it highlights the importance of questioning the methods used to study human morality. This work not only encourages critical reflection on the traditional approaches used to probe human morality, but also encourages the use of complementary tools to understand it

The dual-process perspective of moral psychology posits the utilitarian and deontological thought processes conflict with one another in moral dilemmas. These two processes produce internal psychological conflict, which must be resolved to make moral choices. One process which may aide in reducing this conflict and in making moral choices, is emotion regulation. Emotion regulation is the process of managing emotional experience and expression to reach situational goals. Prior research has linked poorer emotion regulation with increased deontological responding in moral judgement. However, there is no research examining the relationship between emotion regulation and moral choice. The hypothesis of this study was that a weaker capacity to regulate emotions would predict lower rates of utilitarian responding. This effect would be more pronounced in high conflict, emotionally salient moral choice dilemmas. To investigate this hypothesis, 224 participants were recruited across two studies to look at individual differences in emotion regulation and utilitarian responding. Participants took an amended version of the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS) and were categorised based on their DERS score. Participants then responded to a battery of low and high conflict dilemmas where they had to make a choice on whether to act, which would be the utilitarian response, or not, which would be the deontological response. Using Bayesian analyses, the results of this study found no evidence for the hypothesis, meaning emotion regulation had no effect in moral choice.

Abstract Moral judgment often examines sacrificial dilemmas where causing limited harm will prevent greater harm. Such dilemmas entail a trade-off between moral concerns about avoiding harming others and concerns about maximizing overall well-being. Such dilemmas originated in philosophy, but research examines the psychological mechanisms that drive judgments. Yet, theorists often conflate philosophical theory with dilemma decisions and decisions with underlying mechanisms. This chapter discusses the origins of dilemma research and distinguishes between philosophical, judgment, and process levels of analysis. It considers the original “hard” dual-process model and a “softer” version that better meshes with evidence, as well as single-process models and social perception models. The chapter tours evidence obtained by examining judgments and via the process dissociation and consequences norms inaction modeling approaches. Finally, it considers the dangers of mixing levels of analysis and the utility of clarity for the goals of dilemma research.

This final chapter applies the notion developed early in the book of martyrdom as a “spotlight” that illuminates the contours of discipleship. Through a final sharpening of the criteria of martyrdom, it contends that the only violence that Christians should sanction as “justified” is violence congruent with martyrdom’s implicit argument about the faithful Christian life. This requires significant constraints on the “realism” and conceptions of military “necessity” that Christians can affirm, and thus points to a just war ethic with significant restraints (both ad bellum and in bello) that reflect the sacrificial texture of the following of Jesus. While the chapter focuses on Christian martyrdom in relation to the dilemmas of war, it also analyzes what a martyrdom-shaped sense of Christian responsibility looks like in other arenas of sword-bearing, especially policing.

A new semi-rigid beam-to-column, as well as bracing-to-frame, connection has been developed. In addition to its application in building structures, due to its special features and characteristics, it can best lend itself to offshore jackets, where fracture caused by fatigue has always been a major concern. The adverse effects of welding, material embrittlement, residual stresses, etc., pronounced by cyclic loading on such structures, can be overcome by using this new connection. Moreover, it can be easily used in the structure of various modules used in the topside of platforms and FPSOs. The particular feature of this connection is its geometry, which is so devised that it allows much higher rotations to be delivered than those normally used. Furthermore, it can work in a ‘sacrificial’ capacity with the ability to ‘contain’ the damage, preventing it from propagating through the jacket/frame members. This, together with its ‘replaceability,’ minimizes the cost of repair, if the structure is subjected to severe loading conditions, such as earthquakes, blast, or ship/ice impact. Being a separate entity, it is of a limited size, and can be easily housed in a heat treatment oven to be annealed and thereby to remove the adverse effects of welding. These features eliminate the need for taking additional measures to prevent the development of cracks in such joints, and can better guarantee the safety of the entire structure. Due to the use of high energy absorbing elements within this connection, it can dissipate high amounts of energy prior to its failure. The normal dilemma of not being able to provide high strength (moment capacity) together with large rotational capacity, presented by almost all conventional joints, is overcome in this new design. These two important features can be adjusted to the demand of the structure quite independently. A comprehensive experimental study of the comprising energy-dissipating elements showed the crucial role of annealing in eliminating the embrittlement effects of welding on the connections, in particular the developed cracks. Finally, the behaviour of two single-bay, single-storey, building frames, fitted with this connection, subjected to the ground acceleration records of four major earthquakes, was studied numerically. Various dynamic response parameters of these frames were worked out and compared with those of their rigidly-connected, as well as hinged-connected, counterparts.