Gotowa bibliografia na temat „Inflation: external debt”

Inflation and unemployment rates are part of the macroeconomic factors affecting growth within Ghana's economy over the years. The continued rise in the country's gross domestic product and a high dependency on external debt for development projects have sparked a lot of controversies. This study investigates whether external debt, inflation, and unemployment rate stimulate economic development, intending to determine the causal relationship between the variables to serve as an important factor for policymakers. The econometrics methods include the stationarity test, Johansen cointegration test, and regression (ordinary least squares). The data used was from the World Bank from 1991-2021. The stationarity test showed that external debt, GDP, and unemployment were non-stationarity and integrated at the first-order difference, whereas inflation was stationary at the level. The Johansen cointegration test found a long-run relationship between selected variables, but only external debt positively impacted economic growth in the long term. In contrast, inflation and unemployment had a negative impact. The regression results found external debt to be positively correlated to growth in Ghana, but inflation and unemployment harm it with GDP as the explained variable. The findings also indicate that external debt increased inflation, whereas GDP reduced inflation, but unemployment did not influence inflation. The outcome further proves that external debt positively impacted the unemployment rate, and GDP negatively influenced it.

This paper highlights the role of external indebtedness and the presence of inflationary inertia in order to assess the effectiveness and sustainability of inflation targeting during disinflation episodes. As the recent Argentinian experience illustrates, a sluggish inflation rate and a significant current-account deficit may make the stabilization process difficult. To illustrate the point, we build a model that shows that, when inflation adjusts fast, the target may be achieved without building too much external debt. But if inflation adjusts slowly, an excessive build-up of external debt could lead to an increase in the risk premium, a sudden shortage of foreign exchange, and the eventual collapse of the inflation-targeting regime.

This paper highlights the role of external indebtedness and the presence of inflationary inertia in order to assess the effectiveness and sustainability of inflation targeting during disinflation episodes. As the recent Argentinian experience illustrates, a sluggish inflation rate and a significant current-account deficit may make the stabilization process difficult. To illustrate the point, we build a model that shows that, when inflation adjusts fast, the target may be achieved without building too much external debt. But if inflation adjusts slowly, an excessive build-up of external debt could lead to an increase in the risk premium, a sudden shortage of foreign exchange, and the eventual collapse of the inflation-targeting regime.

The non-developmental use of external debt creates macroeconomic instability which results in massive unemployment, poverty, inflation, and political instability in any country. The present study is focused on historical perspective of external debt in Pakistan. This study found that the leadership of Pakistan has heavily borrowed external debt without considering its sustainability and repayment capacity. On the basis of the systematic literature review of past studies, the key policy variables are highlighted to reduce the burden of external debt. The study indicated that external debt burden of Pakistan can be managed by lowering the consumption oriented imports, focusing targeted inflation, exchange rate and by promoting sustainable inclusive economic growth. The policy mix based on efficient management of macro-economic indicators are helpful in addressing external debt in Pakistan.

Indonesia is a country that carries an open economy. Various internal and external factors will contribute to influencing the changes in the exchange rate at the same time. The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of domestic inflation and external debt on the Rupiah exchange rate using secondary data from 2010.Q1 to 2021.Q1. Autoregressive Distributed Lag Analysis was used to analyze the data (ARDL). The study's findings confirmed the existence of a significant long-term relationship between the examined variables based on the analysis. It was found that both domestic inflation and external debt have a positive and significant effect on the Rupiah exchange rate over the long run, according to the long-run estimation results. Further, domestic inflation positively impacts the Rupiah exchange rate in the short-term estimation results, whereas external debt has a negative effect. Based on these findings, the government should maintain control over monetary variables such as inflation and the exchange rate through appropriate monetary policies and ensure that all external debt is prudently managed and directed toward more productive uses to mitigate exchange rate risk.

AbstractResearch background: Public debt arises mainly from debt-financed deficits. More and more countries are resorting to additional public indebtedness to raise additional financial resources to meet government funding needs, which are unattainable by the usual tax means. As a result, increasingly, government spending is rising faster than revenue is received, and the excess is financed mainly through domestic and external borrowings. Expensive borrowings by a government (in an environment of increasing interest rates) may be harmful to inflation and the macroeconomic stabilisation process. This trend is raising concerns among policymakers as it undermines macroeconomic stability, especially in developing economies with relatively weak and dependent monetary authorities in the formulation and implementation of monetary policies. Hence, the association between public debt and inflation is of importance in the inflationary process of an economy.Purpose: In this paper, theoretical and empirical literature on the link between public debt and inflation has been surveyed in detail. The focus of the paper was centred on the review of literature on the link between total public debt, external public debt, domestic public debt and inflation.Research methodology: This paper presents an extensive review of scholarly studies on the link between public debt and inflation based on their results. The paper analysed, synthesised, and critically evaluated previous studies on the relationship between public debt and inflation on both the theoretical and empirical fronts.Results: The literature reviewed revealed the association between public debt and inflation. The surveyed literature shows that the relationship between public debt and inflation varies from country to country, with either a positive or negative relationship. However, in the majority of the literature, the link between public debt and inflation tilts towards a positive relationship. This finding is more prominent in indebted countries with higher levels of public debt and a less-developed financial market. Although there is no consensus on the positive or negative relationship between public debt and inflation, the study found that a positive relationship between public debt and inflation tends to predominate among the studies reviewed.Novelty: The study provides an insight into the relationship between public debt and inflation based on a detailed review of literature on the subject in both developed and developing economies.

This article seeks to empirically assess the effect of inflation and external debt on economic growth in Morocco. The estimates cover the period from 1985 to 2019. The results from the ARDL model show that external debt negatively influences the country's growth in the short and long terms. Due to its direct effect, inflation slows down economic activity and leads to lower GDP growth. The econometric estimate indicates that the low level of inflation leads to difficulties in repaying debt and, consequently, reduced economic growth. Low inflation also hurts economic competitiveness among small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Although the inflation rate is lower than the interest rates, it reduces the profit margins of companies and leads to lower investment. The negative effect on economic competitiveness leads to decreased sectoral added value, reducing future economic growth rates. Based on the results, two main measures are proposed to mitigate the negative effect of inflation and debt on economic growth. First, we must develop better institutional and governance quality. The latter allows debt funds to be well spent on non-rent-producing sectors capable of reviving the Moroccan economy. Second, we have to look for good inflation, in other words, inflation that stimulates economic activity without creating economic distortions.

ABSTRACT Existing interest rates imply explosive debt dynamics for Brazil. It also faces rising inflation from earlier currency depreciations, which could trigger future depreciation. These conditions impose a policy contradiction. Brazil needs lower interest rates for debt sustainability, but tight monetary policy to avoid exchange rate depreciation and inflation. The paper develops a strategy to escape this contradiction. Policy must bolster investor confidence to lower external interest rates, lower domestic interest rates to reduce debt service burdens, and implement domestic credit creation controls to control inflation.

Indonesia is one of the developing countries in the Asian continent that uses foreign debt as aid to support the country's economic development, resulting in an increase in Indonesia's foreign debt every year. On the other hand, increasing foreign/external debt is one of the economic problems caused by world economic shocks or when an economic recession is occurring. This study aims to determine the relationship between the variabels of the level of exports, imports, and inflation rates on Indonesia's external debt. The analysis technique used is the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) with a research period from 1985 to 2020 and using the E-Views 10 application. The test results show that the variabels of exports, imports, and inflation have a significant relationship with external debt in the long term. While the relationship in the short term shows a less significant relationship between these variabels.

The final dissertation consists of four chapters, of which the provisional titles and abstracts are provided in the subsections below. 1 Inflation and Distributive Conflict The chapter reviews conflict inflation models, contrasting alternative theoretical perspectives underlying conflicting claims models. Conflicting claims models have stressed the race between prices and money wages, in the struggle among capitalists and workers as the main inflationary pressure. We discuss how conflicting-claims inflation models describe conflict inflation and the related outcome for income distribution. The chapter also explores criticism to the New-Keynesian Phillips curve. The relation between inflation and endogenous money theory is also presented. A deeper understanding of distributive conflict requires an analytical exposition of the relation between prices and distribution. In general, conflicting claims models rely on Kaleckian explanation of distribution, based on the notion of mark-up pricing according to the degree of monopoly. Conflict inflation allows wage bargaining to affect income distribution and, thus, the real mark-up level. However, this theory contains unsolved theoretical shortcomings, lacking an ultimate explanation for profits and overlooking input-output relations. An alternative theory of distribution can be found in modern appraisals of the Classical surplus approach. This approach has been extended to the study of inflation, providing a consistent relation between inflation and distributive conflict. 2 Inflation and conflicting claims in the open economy The evolution of prices and income distribution in open economies cannot be studied independently from international prices and exchange rates, especially in small open economies. Exchange rates and international prices are fundamental to explaining inflation in open economies. Conflict inflation models account for these variables by including imported inputs and, in some cases, a distributive impact of exchange rates. A different viewpoint emerges from the Classical-Keynesian distribution theory for a price-taker open economy. Thus, we explore this alternative by developing a conflict inflation model building on the Classical-Keynesian approach. The paper contributes to the literature by combining the conflicting claims approach with the Classical-Keynesian open economy framework. Including tradable prices, the model considers their direct impact on distribution. Therefore, it addresses a cause of inflation overlooked in the literature. Finally, conflict inflation affects the real exchange rate, which becomes an important distributive variable. 3 International inflation and trade linkages in Brazil under inflation targeting The chapter assesses the connection between global inflation and domestic inflation for the case of Brazil during the period 1999-2020 through a VAR model. The estimate includes the variables usually considered as relevant determinants of inflation. Additionally, it is included an index that combines the producer price index of Brazilian trade partners, weighted by the yearly average share of each country in Brazilian imports of Intermediate and Capital goods. The Foreign PPI index shows a positive effect on the Brazilian Consumer Price Index, consisting of a relevant explanation for domestic inflation in Brazil during the period 1999-2020. Impulse Response functions show that the Effective Exchange Rate is the main determinant of domestic CPI in Brazil. The importance of international prices and the exchange rate has fundamental implications for the operation of the inflation targeting regime. The results are in line with the literature’s empirical findings showing the overall relevance of international variables in the explanation of inflation. Further research may discuss the transmission channels of cross-border inflation as well as evaluate the implications of these results to inflation theory. 4 Growth and debt stability in a supermultiplier model with public expenditures and foreign trade The chapter extends the baseline Sraffian supermultiplier model for an open economy with the government, introducing two autonomous expenditures. The two sources of autonomous demand correspond to public expenditures and exports. We also analyze the stability conditions for public debt and foreign debt ratios. Public debt stability requires that the interest rate on public debt is smaller than the output growth rate, as in Domar (1944). Foreign debt is evaluated in proportion to exports, accounting for the availability of foreign currency required to service external liabilities. The foreign debt-to exports ratio converges to a stable value when the international interest rate is smaller than the growth rate of exports. However, this value may not be compatible with the availability of international capital flows. We examine the consequences of a constraint to foreign debt ratio, in line with Bhering et al. (2019), reiterating the importance of a long-term external constraint to economic growth (Thirlwall, 1979). A fiscal policy rule is proposed to keep the foreign debt ratio below an upper limit for this ratio. We simulate five experiments showing the conditions for stability of debt ratios, the execution of the fiscal policy rule, and the alternative of a structural change policy. Altogether, the chapter provides stability conditions for growth in an open economy paying its international liabilities in foreign currency. Simulations show that the fiscal policy successfully reduces the equilibrium foreign debt-to exports ratio by decreasing the share of public expenditures in autonomous demand. Experiments also show that industrial policies that cause structural change and increase exports’ growth keep the foreign debt ratio below the threshold with a better performance in terms of growth than the fiscal policy rule.

The distinctive features of inflation targeting include the publishing of the formal (official) target band or point target for the rate of inflation at one or more time horizons and the explicit confirmation that low and steady inflation is the long-run objective of monetary policy. There are four main preconditions of inflation targeting: 1) an independent central bank that is free from fiscal and political pressures; 2) a central bank that has both the ability to forecast inflation and the capability to model inflation data; 3) the presence of fully deregulated prices and an economy that is affected by changes of commodity prices, as well as exchange rates; and 4) the presence of sound banking system and well developed capital markets. In most developing countries, the use of seigniorage revenues as a source of financing government debts, the lack of commitment by monetary authorities to low inflation as a primary goal, the absence of the central bank’s functional independence, and of powerful models to make domestic inflation forecasts, prevent the satisfaction of these preconditions. This dissertation investigates the extent to which Malawi meets the preconditions for inflation targeting by comparing the situation in that country to other developing countries, which have already adopted the framework. Malawi is committed to the central bank’s functional independence as well as the pursuit of prudent fiscal policy measures for the attainment of low inflation. Despite the failure to meet all the preconditions, this study recommends that Malawi should adopt an inflation targeting framework due to the strength of commitment of the monetary authorities in satisfying these preconditions.

Analyzing Turkey over 2005: Q1-2017: Q4 period by ARDL approach, the study examines the growth performance of export-led, FDI-led, consumption-led, FPI-led, and investment-led strategies. The study also examines the impact of these growth strategies on various macroeconomic indicators including inflation, unemployment, and exchange rates. Results indicate that consumption-led growth strategy increases growth and unemployment without exerting statistically significant effects on any other indicators. FDI-led growth strategy positively contributes to economic growth, employment, inflation, and trade deficit. Export-led growth strategy positively contributes to economic growth, employment, external debt, and inflation. Investment-led growth strategy does not affect economic growth and employment but positively affects trade deficit and external debt. FPI-led growth strategy decreases economic growth, does not generate employment, and decreases inflation, external debt, and trade deficit.

Economic difficulties manifested by the low GDP per capita, high unemployment, high rates of inflation, limited sources of foreign currency, mounting internal and external debts, and high subsidies have been facing Egypt for a long time. Despite the higher growth rates in Egypt in the first decade of the millennium, the persisting economic difficulties and political instability problems led to the 2011 uprising. Against expectations, the political instability, security issues, and unrest, which followed the uprising, and the world economic difficulties led to further deepening of the economic problems of Egypt due to the reduction in the limited sources of foreign currency and fragile economic structure. Egyptian dependence on income from remittances, the Suez Canal, and tourism as the main sources of foreign currency are inadequate. Egypt should diversify its economic activities by further engagements in the services sector, direct more effort to technological advances, and increase the added value to its products by empowering the large youth and educated population.

Economic difficulties manifested by the low GDP per capita, high unemployment, high rates of inflation, limited sources of foreign currency, mounting internal and external debts, and high subsidies have been facing Egypt for a long time. Despite the higher growth rates in Egypt in the first decade of the millennium, the persisting economic difficulties and political instability problems led to the 2011 uprising. Against expectations, the political instability, security issues, and unrest, which followed the uprising, and the world economic difficulties led to further deepening of the economic problems of Egypt due to the reduction in the limited sources of foreign currency and fragile economic structure. Egyptian dependence on income from remittances, the Suez Canal, and tourism as the main sources of foreign currency are inadequate. Egypt should diversify its economic activities by further engagements in the services sector, direct more effort to technological advances, and increase the added value to its products by empowering the large youth and educated population.

In this chapter, the author explains the trend lines, random walk, stationary, structural breaks, and volatility of FDI inflows in India during 1971-2015. Both log linear and exponential trends are significant. FDI inflows are stationary and showed four structural breaks in 1985, 1994, 2000, and 2006. The author found the relation among FDI inflows, growth rate, interest rate, inflation rate, exchange rate, fiscal deficit, external debt, and trade openness with the help of Granger causality, Johansen cointegration test, and vector error correction models. Trace statistic has four cointegrating equations, and Max Eigen statistic has three cointegrating equations. The speed of the vector error correction process is more or less slow except for change in interest rate and change in inflation rate, which are significant where VECM is stable and diverging. Limitations and future scope of research is added. Policy recommendations are also included.

This chapter discusses the military government and the belief in “developmentalism” which motivated the institutions put in place by the regime. Developmentalism rested on top-down technocratic planning and was a coalition between the military and the business community, both domestic and foreign. Import substitution policies along with state-led industrialization brought economic growth in the late 1960s and into the mid-1970s. But, the Brazilian miracle of the late 1960s and early 1970s began to sputter out, and, moreover, political rights became more constrained. The years of censorship and a closed political system sowed the seeds for a more open political order. Above all, the failure of the expansionist strategy of growth through import substitution accompanied by inflation and external debt became self-evident. Citizens also began to blame the government for not reducing economic and social inequality. The dominant belief that economic growth should precede social inclusion started losing political support.

Country risk analysis has become extremely important in contem­porary conditions. This paper briefly discusses concepts, definitions, basic components, and some quantitative methods used to address various issues related to country risk in selected CEFTA countries. The paper also presents the indicative calculation of some of the elements and indicators for the selected countries, based on relevant available data, and in order to make a comparative analysis. Having in mind that country risk is a specific and complex macroeconomic risk, its determination and analysis is additionally complicated in terms of contemporary global changes. In fact, that is a risk of a country as a whole, its macroeconomic policy and economic balance or unbalance, political stability or instability of a country, political disturbances and democratic processes, political system and legal system, etc. Therefore, country risk involves several kinds of risks, such as political risk, economic risk, foreign payments risk, financial transfers risk, etc. Globally, all those risks can be divided in three biggest groups: risks of macroeconomic unbalance of the country; risks of the political instability of the country; and risks of the system of the country (system risks). Due to its complexity, the paper will elaborate and quantify some of the basic indicators related to country risk, mostly re­lated to trade exchange between selected countries in the CEFTA agreement. The procedures and methods of country risk analysis and measurement have similarities with those used for individual economic entities, but techniques for the country risk analysis are less developed and there was no generally accepted analysis method. The final assessment may be a combination of many external and internal models that are not mutually exclusive, and in that process can be analyzed a number of different factors that determine country risk. Among the factors that condition the country risk and that are necessary to be included in the analyses can be: country’s foreign-financial position; external debt; debt management; assessment of the natural re­sources; the degree of technique and technology development, industrializa­tion and automation of production, and so on. The paper will stress as most important indicators in assessing country risk: The Debt Service Ratio, Import ratio, Investment Ratio, Domestic Money Supply Growth, etc., which will be calculated using selected macro-economic data such as: GDP, GDP per capi­ta, Real GDP grow, Inflation (CPI), Fiscal balance (% of GDP), Current account balance (% of GDP), Public debt/GDP (%), External debt/Exports of goods & services (%), Debt-service ratio (%), Foreign exchange reserves, Foreign direct investments (% of GDP), Exchange rate etc. The methodology of collecting and processing information and the degree of reliability of collected data greatly depends on the promptness and accuracy of the national institutions that present those data. The goal of the paper is: to point out the importance of country risk assess­ment, to determine and compute the basic indicators of country risk in some of the Southeastern Europe countries, to determine conditions and trends of country risk in selected countries, and to suggest some strategies for its re­duction in conditions of the unstable environment and crisis disturbances.

1.1 Macroeconomic summary Economic recovery has consistently outperformed the technical staff’s expectations following a steep decline in activity in the second quarter of 2020. At the same time, total and core inflation rates have fallen and remain at low levels, suggesting that a significant element of the reactivation of Colombia’s economy has been related to recovery in potential GDP. This would support the technical staff’s diagnosis of weak aggregate demand and ample excess capacity. The most recently available data on 2020 growth suggests a contraction in economic activity of 6.8%, lower than estimates from January’s Monetary Policy Report (-7.2%). High-frequency indicators suggest that economic performance was significantly more dynamic than expected in January, despite mobility restrictions and quarantine measures. This has also come amid declines in total and core inflation, the latter of which was below January projections if controlling for certain relative price changes. This suggests that the unexpected strength of recent growth contains elements of demand, and that excess capacity, while significant, could be lower than previously estimated. Nevertheless, uncertainty over the measurement of excess capacity continues to be unusually high and marked both by variations in the way different economic sectors and spending components have been affected by the pandemic, and by uneven price behavior. The size of excess capacity, and in particular the evolution of the pandemic in forthcoming quarters, constitute substantial risks to the macroeconomic forecast presented in this report. Despite the unexpected strength of the recovery, the technical staff continues to project ample excess capacity that is expected to remain on the forecast horizon, alongside core inflation that will likely remain below the target. Domestic demand remains below 2019 levels amid unusually significant uncertainty over the size of excess capacity in the economy. High national unemployment (14.6% for February 2021) reflects a loose labor market, while observed total and core inflation continue to be below 2%. Inflationary pressures from the exchange rate are expected to continue to be low, with relatively little pass-through on inflation. This would be compatible with a negative output gap. Excess productive capacity and the expectation of core inflation below the 3% target on the forecast horizon provide a basis for an expansive monetary policy posture. The technical staff’s assessment of certain shocks and their expected effects on the economy, as well as the presence of several sources of uncertainty and related assumptions about their potential macroeconomic impacts, remain a feature of this report. The coronavirus pandemic, in particular, continues to affect the public health environment, and the reopening of Colombia’s economy remains incomplete. The technical staff’s assessment is that the COVID-19 shock has affected both aggregate demand and supply, but that the impact on demand has been deeper and more persistent. Given this persistence, the central forecast accounts for a gradual tightening of the output gap in the absence of new waves of contagion, and as vaccination campaigns progress. The central forecast continues to include an expected increase of total and core inflation rates in the second quarter of 2021, alongside the lapse of the temporary price relief measures put in place in 2020. Additional COVID-19 outbreaks (of uncertain duration and intensity) represent a significant risk factor that could affect these projections. Additionally, the forecast continues to include an upward trend in sovereign risk premiums, reflected by higher levels of public debt that in the wake of the pandemic are likely to persist on the forecast horizon, even in the context of a fiscal adjustment. At the same time, the projection accounts for the shortterm effects on private domestic demand from a fiscal adjustment along the lines of the one currently being proposed by the national government. This would be compatible with a gradual recovery of private domestic demand in 2022. The size and characteristics of the fiscal adjustment that is ultimately implemented, as well as the corresponding market response, represent another source of forecast uncertainty. Newly available information offers evidence of the potential for significant changes to the macroeconomic scenario, though without altering the general diagnosis described above. The most recent data on inflation, growth, fiscal policy, and international financial conditions suggests a more dynamic economy than previously expected. However, a third wave of the pandemic has delayed the re-opening of Colombia’s economy and brought with it a deceleration in economic activity. Detailed descriptions of these considerations and subsequent changes to the macroeconomic forecast are presented below. The expected annual decline in GDP (-0.3%) in the first quarter of 2021 appears to have been less pronounced than projected in January (-4.8%). Partial closures in January to address a second wave of COVID-19 appear to have had a less significant negative impact on the economy than previously estimated. This is reflected in figures related to mobility, energy demand, industry and retail sales, foreign trade, commercial transactions from selected banks, and the national statistics agency’s (DANE) economic tracking indicator (ISE). Output is now expected to have declined annually in the first quarter by 0.3%. Private consumption likely continued to recover, registering levels somewhat above those from the previous year, while public consumption likely increased significantly. While a recovery in investment in both housing and in other buildings and structures is expected, overall investment levels in this case likely continued to be low, and gross fixed capital formation is expected to continue to show significant annual declines. Imports likely recovered to again outpace exports, though both are expected to register significant annual declines. Economic activity that outpaced projections, an increase in oil prices and other export products, and an expected increase in public spending this year account for the upward revision to the 2021 growth forecast (from 4.6% with a range between 2% and 6% in January, to 6.0% with a range between 3% and 7% in April). As a result, the output gap is expected to be smaller and to tighten more rapidly than projected in the previous report, though it is still expected to remain in negative territory on the forecast horizon. Wide forecast intervals reflect the fact that the future evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic remains a significant source of uncertainty on these projections. The delay in the recovery of economic activity as a result of the resurgence of COVID-19 in the first quarter appears to have been less significant than projected in the January report. The central forecast scenario expects this improved performance to continue in 2021 alongside increased consumer and business confidence. Low real interest rates and an active credit supply would also support this dynamic, and the overall conditions would be expected to spur a recovery in consumption and investment. Increased growth in public spending and public works based on the national government’s spending plan (Plan Financiero del Gobierno) are other factors to consider. Additionally, an expected recovery in global demand and higher projected prices for oil and coffee would further contribute to improved external revenues and would favor investment, in particular in the oil sector. Given the above, the technical staff’s 2021 growth forecast has been revised upward from 4.6% in January (range from 2% to 6%) to 6.0% in April (range from 3% to 7%). These projections account for the potential for the third wave of COVID-19 to have a larger and more persistent effect on the economy than the previous wave, while also supposing that there will not be any additional significant waves of the pandemic and that mobility restrictions will be relaxed as a result. Economic growth in 2022 is expected to be 3%, with a range between 1% and 5%. This figure would be lower than projected in the January report (3.6% with a range between 2% and 6%), due to a higher base of comparison given the upward revision to expected GDP in 2021. This forecast also takes into account the likely effects on private demand of a fiscal adjustment of the size currently being proposed by the national government, and which would come into effect in 2022. Excess in productive capacity is now expected to be lower than estimated in January but continues to be significant and affected by high levels of uncertainty, as reflected in the wide forecast intervals. The possibility of new waves of the virus (of uncertain intensity and duration) represents a significant downward risk to projected GDP growth, and is signaled by the lower limits of the ranges provided in this report. Inflation (1.51%) and inflation excluding food and regulated items (0.94%) declined in March compared to December, continuing below the 3% target. The decline in inflation in this period was below projections, explained in large part by unanticipated increases in the costs of certain foods (3.92%) and regulated items (1.52%). An increase in international food and shipping prices, increased foreign demand for beef, and specific upward pressures on perishable food supplies appear to explain a lower-than-expected deceleration in the consumer price index (CPI) for foods. An unexpected increase in regulated items prices came amid unanticipated increases in international fuel prices, on some utilities rates, and for regulated education prices. The decline in annual inflation excluding food and regulated items between December and March was in line with projections from January, though this included downward pressure from a significant reduction in telecommunications rates due to the imminent entry of a new operator. When controlling for the effects of this relative price change, inflation excluding food and regulated items exceeds levels forecast in the previous report. Within this indicator of core inflation, the CPI for goods (1.05%) accelerated due to a reversion of the effects of the VAT-free day in November, which was largely accounted for in February, and possibly by the transmission of a recent depreciation of the peso on domestic prices for certain items (electric and household appliances). For their part, services prices decelerated and showed the lowest rate of annual growth (0.89%) among the large consumer baskets in the CPI. Within the services basket, the annual change in rental prices continued to decline, while those services that continue to experience the most significant restrictions on returning to normal operations (tourism, cinemas, nightlife, etc.) continued to register significant price declines. As previously mentioned, telephone rates also fell significantly due to increased competition in the market. Total inflation is expected to continue to be affected by ample excesses in productive capacity for the remainder of 2021 and 2022, though less so than projected in January. As a result, convergence to the inflation target is now expected to be somewhat faster than estimated in the previous report, assuming the absence of significant additional outbreaks of COVID-19. The technical staff’s year-end inflation projections for 2021 and 2022 have increased, suggesting figures around 3% due largely to variation in food and regulated items prices. The projection for inflation excluding food and regulated items also increased, but remains below 3%. Price relief measures on indirect taxes implemented in 2020 are expected to lapse in the second quarter of 2021, generating a one-off effect on prices and temporarily affecting inflation excluding food and regulated items. However, indexation to low levels of past inflation, weak demand, and ample excess productive capacity are expected to keep core inflation below the target, near 2.3% at the end of 2021 (previously 2.1%). The reversion in 2021 of the effects of some price relief measures on utility rates from 2020 should lead to an increase in the CPI for regulated items in the second half of this year. Annual price changes are now expected to be higher than estimated in the January report due to an increased expected path for fuel prices and unanticipated increases in regulated education prices. The projection for the CPI for foods has increased compared to the previous report, taking into account certain factors that were not anticipated in January (a less favorable agricultural cycle, increased pressure from international prices, and transport costs). Given the above, year-end annual inflation for 2021 and 2022 is now expected to be 3% and 2.8%, respectively, which would be above projections from January (2.3% and 2,7%). For its part, expected inflation based on analyst surveys suggests year-end inflation in 2021 and 2022 of 2.8% and 3.1%, respectively. There remains significant uncertainty surrounding the inflation forecasts included in this report due to several factors: 1) the evolution of the pandemic; 2) the difficulty in evaluating the size and persistence of excess productive capacity; 3) the timing and manner in which price relief measures will lapse; and 4) the future behavior of food prices. Projected 2021 growth in foreign demand (4.4% to 5.2%) and the supposed average oil price (USD 53 to USD 61 per Brent benchmark barrel) were both revised upward. An increase in long-term international interest rates has been reflected in a depreciation of the peso and could result in relatively tighter external financial conditions for emerging market economies, including Colombia. Average growth among Colombia’s trade partners was greater than expected in the fourth quarter of 2020. This, together with a sizable fiscal stimulus approved in the United States and the onset of a massive global vaccination campaign, largely explains the projected increase in foreign demand growth in 2021. The resilience of the goods market in the face of global crisis and an expected normalization in international trade are additional factors. These considerations and the expected continuation of a gradual reduction of mobility restrictions abroad suggest that Colombia’s trade partners could grow on average by 5.2% in 2021 and around 3.4% in 2022. The improved prospects for global economic growth have led to an increase in current and expected oil prices. Production interruptions due to a heavy winter, reduced inventories, and increased supply restrictions instituted by producing countries have also contributed to the increase. Meanwhile, market forecasts and recent Federal Reserve pronouncements suggest that the benchmark interest rate in the U.S. will remain stable for the next two years. Nevertheless, a significant increase in public spending in the country has fostered expectations for greater growth and inflation, as well as increased uncertainty over the moment in which a normalization of monetary policy might begin. This has been reflected in an increase in long-term interest rates. In this context, emerging market economies in the region, including Colombia, have registered increases in sovereign risk premiums and long-term domestic interest rates, and a depreciation of local currencies against the dollar. Recent outbreaks of COVID-19 in several of these economies; limits on vaccine supply and the slow pace of immunization campaigns in some countries; a significant increase in public debt; and tensions between the United States and China, among other factors, all add to a high level of uncertainty surrounding interest rate spreads, external financing conditions, and the future performance of risk premiums. The impact that this environment could have on the exchange rate and on domestic financing conditions represent risks to the macroeconomic and monetary policy forecasts. Domestic financial conditions continue to favor recovery in economic activity. The transmission of reductions to the policy interest rate on credit rates has been significant. The banking portfolio continues to recover amid circumstances that have affected both the supply and demand for loans, and in which some credit risks have materialized. Preferential and ordinary commercial interest rates have fallen to a similar degree as the benchmark interest rate. As is generally the case, this transmission has come at a slower pace for consumer credit rates, and has been further delayed in the case of mortgage rates. Commercial credit levels stabilized above pre-pandemic levels in March, following an increase resulting from significant liquidity requirements for businesses in the second quarter of 2020. The consumer credit portfolio continued to recover and has now surpassed February 2020 levels, though overall growth in the portfolio remains low. At the same time, portfolio projections and default indicators have increased, and credit establishment earnings have come down. Despite this, credit disbursements continue to recover and solvency indicators remain well above regulatory minimums. 1.2 Monetary policy decision In its meetings in March and April the BDBR left the benchmark interest rate unchanged at 1.75%.

In the second quarter, annual inflation (9.67%), the technical staff’s projections and its expectations continued to increase, remaining above the target. International cost shocks, accentuated by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, have been more persistent than projected, thus contributing to higher inflation. The effects of indexation, higher than estimated excess demand, a tighter labor market, inflation expectations that continue to rise and currently exceed 3%, and the exchange rate pressures add to those described above. High core inflation measures as well as in the producer price index (PPI) across all baskets confirm a significant spread in price increases. Compared to estimates presented in April, the new forecast trajectory for headline and core inflation increased. This was partly the result of greater exchange rate pressure on prices, and a larger output gap, which is expected to remain positive for the remainder of 2022 and which is estimated to close towards yearend 2023. In addition, these trends take into account higher inflation rate indexation, more persistent above-target inflation expectations, a quickening of domestic fuel price increases due to the correction of lags versus the parity price and higher international oil price forecasts. The forecast supposes a good domestic supply of perishable foods, although it also considers that international prices of processed foods will remain high. In terms of the goods sub-basket, the end of the national health emergency implies a reversal of the value-added tax (VAT) refund applied to health and personal hygiene products, resulting in increases in the prices of these goods. Alternatively, the monetary policy adjustment process and the moderation of external shocks would help inflation and its expectations to begin to decrease over time and resume their alignment with the target. Thus, the new projection suggests that inflation could remain high for the second half of 2022, closing at 9.7%. However, it would begin to fall during 2023, closing the year at 5.7%. These forecasts are subject to significant uncertainty, especially regarding the future behavior of external cost shocks, the degree of indexation of nominal contracts and decisions made regarding the domestic price of fuels. Economic activity continues to outperform expectations, and the technical staff’s growth projections for 2022 have been revised upwards from 5% to 6.9%. The new forecasts suggest higher output levels that would continue to exceed the economy’s productive capacity for the remainder of 2022. Economic growth during the first quarter was above that estimated in April, while economic activity indicators for the second quarter suggest that the GDP could be expected to remain high, potentially above that of the first quarter. Domestic demand is expected to maintain a positive dynamic, in particular, due to the household consumption quarterly growth, as suggested by vehicle registrations, retail sales, credit card purchases and consumer loan disbursement figures. A slowdown in the machinery and equipment imports from the levels observed in March contrasts with the positive performance of sales and housing construction licenses, which indicates an investment level similar to that registered for the first three months of the year. International trade data suggests the trade deficit would be reduced as a consequence of import levels that would be lesser than those observed in the first quarter, and stable export levels. For the remainder of the year and 2023, a deceleration in consumption is expected from the high levels seen during the first half of the year, partially as a result of lower repressed demand, tighter domestic financial conditions and household available income deterioration due to increased inflation. Investment is expected to continue its slow recovery while remaining below pre-pandemic levels. The trade deficit is expected to tighten due to projected lower domestic demand dynamics, and high prices of oil and other basic goods exported by the country. Given the above, economic growth in the second quarter of 2022 would be 11.5%, and for 2022 and 2023 an annual growth of 6.9% and 1.1% is expected, respectively. Currently, and for the remainder of 2022, the output gap would be positive and greater than that estimated in April, and prices would be affected by demand pressures. These projections continue to be affected by significant uncertainty associated with global political tensions, the expected adjustment of monetary policy in developed countries, external demand behavior, changes in country risk outlook, and the future developments in domestic fiscal policy, among others. The high inflation levels and respective expectations, which exceed the target of the world's main central banks, largely explain the observed and anticipated increase in their monetary policy interest rates. This environment has tempered the growth forecast for external demand. Disruptions in value chains, rising international food and energy prices, and expansionary monetary and fiscal policies have contributed to the rise in inflation and above-target expectations seen by several of Colombia’s main trading partners. These cost and price shocks, heightened by the effects of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, have been more prevalent than expected and have taken place within a set of output and employment recovery, variables that in some countries currently equal or exceed their projected long-term levels. In response, the U.S. Federal Reserve accelerated the pace of the benchmark interest rate increase and rapidly reduced liquidity levels in the money market. Financial market actors expect this behavior to continue and, consequently, significantly increase their expectations of the average path of the Fed's benchmark interest rate. In this setting, the U.S. dollar appreciated versus the peso in the second quarter and emerging market risk measures increased, a behavior that intensified for Colombia. Given the aforementioned, for the remainder of 2022 and 2023, the Bank's technical staff increased the forecast trajectory for the Fed's interest rate and reduced the country's external demand growth forecast. The projected oil price was revised upward over the forecast horizon, specifically due to greater supply restrictions and the interruption of hydrocarbon trade between the European Union and Russia. Global geopolitical tensions, a tightening of monetary policy in developed economies, the increase in risk perception for emerging markets and the macroeconomic imbalances in the country explain the increase in the projected trajectory of the risk premium, its trend level and the neutral real interest rate1. Uncertainty about external forecasts and their consequent impact on the country's macroeconomic scenario remains high, given the unpredictable evolution of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, geopolitical tensions, the degree of the global economic slowdown and the effect the response to recent outbreaks of the pandemic in some Asian countries may have on the world economy. This macroeconomic scenario that includes high inflation, inflation forecasts, and expectations above 3% and a positive output gap suggests the need for a contractionary monetary policy that mitigates the risk of the persistent unanchoring of inflation expectations. In contrast to the forecasts of the April report, the increase in the risk premium trend implies a higher neutral real interest rate and a greater prevailing monetary stimulus than previously estimated. For its part, domestic demand has been more dynamic, with a higher observed and expected output level that exceeds the economy’s productive capacity. The surprising accelerations in the headline and core inflation reflect stronger and more persistent external shocks, which, in combination with the strength of aggregate demand, indexation, higher inflation expectations and exchange rate pressures, explain the upward projected inflation trajectory at levels that exceed the target over the next two years. This is corroborated by the inflation expectations of economic analysts and those derived from the public debt market, which continued to climb and currently exceed 3%. All of the above increase the risk of unanchoring inflation expectations and could generate widespread indexation processes that may push inflation away from the target for longer. This new macroeconomic scenario suggests that the interest rate adjustment should continue towards a contractionary monetary policy landscape. 1.2. Monetary policy decision Banco de la República’s Board of Directors (BDBR), at its meetings in June and July 2022, decided to continue adjusting its monetary policy. At its June meeting, the BDBR decided to increase the monetary policy rate by 150 basis points (b.p.) and its July meeting by majority vote, on a 150 b.p. increase thereof at its July meeting. Consequently, the monetary policy interest rate currently stands at 9.0% . 1 The neutral real interest rate refers to the real interest rate level that is neither stimulative nor contractionary for aggregate demand and, therefore, does not generate pressures that lead to the close of the output gap. In a small, open economy like Colombia, this rate depends on the external neutral real interest rate, medium-term components of the country risk premium, and expected depreciation. Box 1: A Weekly Indicator of Economic Activity for Colombia Juan Pablo Cote Carlos Daniel Rojas Nicol Rodriguez Box 2: Common Inflationary Trends in Colombia Carlos D. Rojas-Martínez Nicolás Martínez-Cortés Franky Juliano Galeano-Ramírez Box 3: Shock Decomposition of 2021 Forecast Errors Nicolás Moreno Arias