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Artykuły w czasopismach na temat „Justice (Virtue)”

Autor: Grafiati

Data publikacji: 4 czerwca 2021

Data aktualizacji: 25 lipca 2024

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1

Huang, Yong. "Justice as a Personal Virtue and Justice as an Institutional Virtue: Mencius’s Confucian Virtue Politics". Yearbook for Eastern and Western Philosophy 2019, nr 4 (26.05.2020): 277–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/yewph-2020-0021.

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AbstractIt has been widely observed that virtue ethics, regarded as an ethics of the ancient, in contrast to deontology and consequentialism, seen as an ethics of the modern (Larmore 1996: 19–23), is experiencing an impressive revival and is becoming a strong rival to utilitarianism and deontology in the English-speaking world in the last a few decades. Despite this, it has been perceived as having an obvious weakness in comparison with its two major rivals. While both utilitarianism and deontology can at the same time serve as an ethical theory, providing guidance for individual persons and a political philosophy, offering ways to structure social institutions, virtue ethics, as it is concerned with character traits of individual persons, seems to be ill-equipped to be politically useful. In recent years, some attempts have been made to develop the so-called virtue politics, but most of them, including my own (see Huang 2014: Chapter 5), are limited to arguing for the perfectionist view that the state has the obligation to do things to help its members develop their virtues, and so the focus is still on the character traits of individual persons. However important those attempts are, such a notion of virtue politics is clearly too narrow, unless one thinks that the only job the state is supposed to do is to cultivate its people’s virtues. Yet obviously the government has many other jobs to do such as making laws and social policies, many if not most of which are not for the purpose of making people virtuous. The question is then in what sense such laws and social policies are moral in general and just in particular. Utilitarianism and deontology have their ready answers in the light of utility or moral principles respectively. Can virtue ethics provide its own answer? This paper attempts to argue for an affirmative answer to this question from the Confucian point of view, as represented by Mencius. It does so with a focus on the virtue of justice, as it is a central concept in both virtue ethics and political philosophy.

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Warne, Nathaniel A. "Institutional justice and the virtue of gratitude". Anglican Theological Review 103, nr 3 (22.06.2021): 286–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00033286211023902.

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This paper explores the relationship between justice, institutions, and the medieval virtue of gratitude. It does this by focusing on a thirteenth-century account of the virtue of gratitude in the work of Thomas Aquinas. It argues that institutions, both formal and informal, provide a helpful framework for considering the relationship between gratitude and a number of important benefactor and beneficiary relationships within the hierarchy of virtues that make up the cardinal virtue of justice. This paper first explores Thomas’ account of the virtues of justice and gratitude. It then looks at recent literature in theology and ethics of institutions showing how formal and informal institutions can help cultivate gratitude.

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Sheinman, Hanoch. "THE FIRST VIRTUE OF THE LAW COURTS AND THE FIRST VIRTUE OF THE LAW". Legal Theory 13, nr 2 (czerwiec 2007): 101–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1352325207070061.

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Justice, you might think, is the first virtue of the law. After all, we call our judges justices, the administration of law the administration of justice, and the government's legal department the Justice Department. We should reject this Priority of Justice for the Law in favor of the more moderate Priority of Justice for the Courts, the view that justice is the first virtue of the law courts. Under its comparative conception, justice is distinguishable by its concern with the relative positions of subjects. I claim that legal duties divide into primary and secondary, that primary legal duties are not essentially comparative, and that this impugns the Priority of Comparative Justice for the Law. Still, the bipolar structure of litigation appears to suggest that comparative justice is the first virtue of the courts. I explain why that is not so. I then introduce a desert-based conception of justice I dub requitative justice. I argue that the Priority of Justice for the Law cannot draw succor from this conception of justice because primary legal duties are no more requitative than they are comparative. However, the special affinity between law courts and secondary legal duties suggests that requitative justice is the first virtue of the courts. Finally, I concede that the Priority of Justice for the Courts gives us reason to accept the Priority of Justice for the Law after all, if we accept the common Priority of Courts for the Law, the view that the courts are the first institution of the law. We should not do so, however.

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Putman, Daniel. "The Compatibility of Justice and Kindness". Philosophy 65, nr 254 (październik 1990): 516–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100064731.

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In ‘Virtue and Character’ A. D. M. Walker claims that kindness and justice are incompatible in certain important ways and that a person can be kind or just without possessing the other virtue. Walker argues that virtues must lead to ‘effective and intelligent action’ and that a virtue ceases to exist if ‘it leads to violation of the minimal requirements of any other virtue’. On this view kindness and justice function independently to produce effective action. Kindness requires a direct caring for the individual in particular circumstances, while justice involves a commitment to impartiality that abstracts from an individual's situation. Walker argues that, as long as the minimal requirements of other virtues are met, one can be kind without weighing considerations of justice. He cites with approval kind behaviour which human beings learn as young children. Such behaviour may be a deeply engrained personality trait, and the individual passing through different situations in life may have no need to consider questions of justice. ‘He will merely need to be able to recognize and respond to certain types of considerations as overriding the values promoted by kindness’.

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5

Huang, Xianzhong. "Justice as a virtue: An analysis of Aristotle’s virtue of justice". Frontiers of Philosophy in China 2, nr 2 (kwiecień 2007): 265–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11466-007-0017-z.

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Ramsey, Shawn. "Honestas and the Angevin Queen: Eleanor of Aquitaine’s Letters and Their Classical Rhetorical Antecedents". Journal for the History of Rhetoric 25, nr 3 (listopad 2022): 329–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.5325/jhistrhetoric.25.3.0329.

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Abstract In 1193, King Richard I of England was taken captive by the Holy Roman emperor Henry VI. In several letters, the captive Richard’s mother, Eleanor of Aquitaine, exhorted Pope Celestine III to intercede on her son’s behalf. The specific topics on which she drew were ancient concepts within the topic of honestas, or virtue, and, more specifically, justice as one of the virtues. Justice occupied a preeminent place among the other virtues in medieval thought, and topics related to justice, as a species of honestas, were traditionally regarded as proper for deliberative argumentation. Eleanor’s letters set forth an argumentative schema regarding the nature of justice, asserting that it possesses an anatomy of subordinate parts that include friendship, pity, and the body politic of the kingdom. Her appeals illustrate the significance of ancient virtue theory in medieval political persuasion as an inheritance of Ciceronian thought, the place of virtue in geopolitical civic persuasion in her day, and how women implemented and conceived of social justice from classical rhetorical sources and employed them for civic ends.

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7

Öztürk, Emine. "The Comparision of Classical Ethical Theories in Ancient Greece Philosophy and Islamic Philosophy: The Example of Aristotle and Ibn Miskavayh, Tusi and Kinalizade". European Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies 6, nr 1 (9.10.2021): 41. http://dx.doi.org/10.26417/175dpd44w.

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In this study, I will make an analysis of the comparision of classical ethical theories in Ancient Greece Philosophy and Islamic Philosophy. The analysis of the comparision of classical ethical theories in Ancient Greece Philosophy and Islamic Philosophy depends on three philosophical and psychological concepts. These concepts are first of all, the thought in other words the ability of thinking, secondly the desire, in other words the ability of desire, as Freud said libido, and thirdly agression the ability of anger. These three abilities in one person reveals one virtue in society, this virtue is the virtue of justice. And this study will tells about how we can reveal the virtue of justice in one society by applying these three abilities and virtues in one person. Because these abilties corresponds three virtues in classical ethics. These three virtues are thinking, chastity and courage. And this study will analyze the thinking, chastity and courage in Ancient Greece Philosophy and Islamic Philosophy.

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8

Ghoreyshi, Marieh Seyyed, Ibrahim Nazhat i Ghodratallah Rezaee. "The Relationship between Ethical Justice & Practical Wisdom: Aristotle's and Ghazali's Viewpoints". Ciência e Natura 37 (21.12.2015): 437. http://dx.doi.org/10.5902/2179460x20875.

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The theory of justice is one of crucial principles of philosophical and rational principles in all Greek philosophical schools and then in Islamic morality and ethics. A large number of morality philosophers and exegetes use different concepts of justice interchangeably. They do not make any distinction between justice as a perfect virtue and justice as a component of virtues because they mix the true mediocrity with mediocrity of actions. Aristotle and Ghazali are of philosophers who concentrated on this crucial mixture. This study initially analyzes Aristotle's and Ghazali's mediocrity. Then, it highlights the practical wisdom status and examines justice as a perfect virtue from these scholars' viewpoints. Finally, ethical justice and practical wisdom identicality is evaluated.

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Yasmin, Anila, i Riffat Iqbal. "THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JUSTICE AND RATIONALITY IN ANCIENT, MEDIEVAL AND MODERN ERA: A CRITICAL INVESTIGATION OF MACINTYRE’S CONCEPTION". International Journal of Research -GRANTHAALAYAH 7, nr 1 (31.01.2019): 251–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.29121/granthaalayah.v7.i1.2019.1052.

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The present study aims to explore the nature of justice and rationality and a relationship between them that how it has become a base for any society and culture in ancient, medieval and modern age. And how different thinkers present rival and compatible views about justice and rationality and how they both impact in our society. Any society benefits from having justice as a prevailing virtue. This helps ensure that wrongs will be ended and rights will be upheld thereby leading to a safer society for everyone. Its strong relation with virtues maintains that it cannot uphold without the presence of virtues. The most basic virtue is rationality without which no justice is possible. Different thinkers in ancient medieval and modern times give different views about the relationship between justice and rationality. But Macintyre holds that there is no neutral conception of justice but there are different standards of justice and rationality in every society.

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10

Barker, Derek W. M. "Deliberative Justice and Collective Identity". Political Theory 45, nr 1 (3.08.2016): 116–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0090591715609407.

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Drawing upon insights from virtue ethics, this essay develops a concept of collective identity specifically suited to deliberative democracy: a virtues-centered theory of deliberative justice. Viewing democratic legitimacy as a political phenomenon, we must account for more than the formal rules that must be satisfied according to deontological theories of deliberative democracy. I argue that common approaches to deliberative democracy are unable to account for the motivations of deliberation, or ensure that citizens have the cognitive skills to deliberate well. Next, I engage with critics of deliberative democracy who have moved toward broader and more humanistic concepts of deliberation but have stopped short of conceiving of justice as a virtue and, in their own way, neglected questions of collective identity. I reconstruct justice as a virtue from a deliberative perspective, combining virtue ethics’ emphasis on habituation with a weaker sense of collective identity that allows for value pluralism and disagreement, consistent with deliberative democracy. That is, deliberative democracy requires a shared and habituated civic culture of mutual understanding of differences. Finally, drawing from discourse on race in contemporary American politics, I conclude with brief illustrations of the need for a collective identity based on mutual understanding. Although deliberative democracy does not require a thick or intense sense of social solidarity, it does need citizens to share habits, inclinations, and capacities to engage in communication across their differences.

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Prokofyev, A. "Justice: Virtue or Principles?" Chelovek 31, nr 3 (2020): 25. http://dx.doi.org/10.31857/s023620070010035-5.

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Hayden, Patrick. "Towards Justice and Virtue". International Studies in Philosophy 36, nr 1 (2004): 232–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/intstudphil200436124.

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Holtman, Sarah Williams. "Towards Justice and Virtue". Journal of Philosophy 95, nr 6 (1998): 317–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jphil199895614.

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Foster, Susanne. "Justice is a virtue". Philosophia 31, nr 3-4 (październik 2004): 501–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02385198.

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Cameron, Miriam. "Justice, caring, and virtue". Journal of Professional Nursing 7, nr 4 (lipiec 1991): 206. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/8755-7223(91)90027-i.

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Moore, Eric. "Desert, Virtue, and Justice". Social Theory and Practice 26, nr 3 (2000): 417–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract200026311.

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Slote, Michael, i Onora O'Neill. "Towards Justice and Virtue". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59, nr 4 (grudzień 1999): 1103. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2653582.

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Hacker-Wright, John. "Moral Status in Virtue Ethics". Philosophy 82, nr 3 (lipiec 2007): 449–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819107000058.

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AbstractMy contention is that virtue ethics offers an important critique of traditional philosophical conceptions of moral status as well as an alternative view of important moral issues held to depend on moral status. I argue that the scope of entities that deserve consideration depends on our conception of the demands of virtues like justice; which entities deserve consideration emerges from a moral view of a world shaped by that conception. The deepest disputes about moral status depend on conflicting conceptions of justice. I advocate a conception of the virtue of justice that can account for the cases that pose problems for the legalistic views of moral status and discuss what ideal moral debate looks like on this view.

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19

Montmarquet, James A. "The Voluntariness of Virtue – and Belief". Philosophy 83, nr 3 (lipiec 2008): 373–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819108000739.

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AbstractThis paper examines the relative voluntariness of three types of virtue: ‘epistemic’ virtues like open-mindedness; ‘motivational’ virtues like courage, and more robustly ‘moral’ virtues like justice. A somewhat novel conception of the voluntariness of belief is offered in terms of the limited, but quite real, voluntariness of certain epistemic virtues.

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Prijic-Samarzija, Snjezana, i Inka Miskulin. "Epistemic justice as a virtue in hermeneutic psychotherapy". Filozofija i drustvo 28, nr 4 (2017): 1063–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/fid1704063p.

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The value turn in epistemology generated a particularly influential new position - virtue epistemology. It is an increasingly influential epistemological normative approach that opts for the intellectual virtues of the epistemic agent, rather than the truth-value of the proposition, as the central epistemic value. In the first part of this article we will attempt to briefly explain the value turn and outline the basic aspects of virtue epistemology, underlining the diversity of epistemic attitudes associated with this approach and their positive impact on expanding epistemological horizons. The second part will be focused on the virtues of epistemic responsibility and epistemic justice as particularly appropriate for evaluating social processes such as, for example, testimony and conversational practices in general. In the third section we will show how the psychiatric and psychotherapeutic communicational act can be more efficiently analyzed and evaluated from the perspective of the virtue of epistemic justice, than from the traditional epistemic approach based on a monist concept of truth. The fourth and fifth section synthesize the discussion by introducing the concept of hermeneutic psychotherapy as a therapeutically and epistemically favorable framework for evaluating communicational acts in psychotherapy.

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Darr, Ryan. "The Virtue of Justice and the Justice of Institutions". Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics 40, nr 1 (2020): 3–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/jsce202051925.

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Justice, according to Thomas Aquinas, is a personal virtue. Modern theorists, by contrast, generally treat justice as a virtue of social institutions. Jean Porter rightly argues that both perspectives are necessary. But how should we conceive the relationship between the virtue of justice and the justice of institutions? I address this question by drawing from Aquinas’s account of the role of the convention of money in mediating relations of just exchange. Developing Aquinas’s account, I defend two conclusions and raise one problem. The conclusions are: (1) Aquinas does presuppose the need for just institutions in just relations; (2) Aquinas highlights the importance of an underappreciated consideration: the way institutions mediate just or unjust relationships. The problem, which naturally arises from bringing together the virtue of justice and the justice of institutions, is whether and how individuals can act justly in a context of structural injustice.

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Pittman, Josh. "The Most Important Virtue?" Renascence 71, nr 1 (2019): 57–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/renascence20197114.

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The narrator of the Middle English Cleanness states that God punishes sexual sin more harshly than any other sin. This essay argues that the rest of the BL Cotton Nero A.x manuscript continues to develop the virtue of temperance, which governs sexual behavior, as a central theme. Pearl uses temperance to bring home the dreamer’s sin and God’s justice, while Patience and SGGK employ the interrelation between temperance and fortitude in ways that make temperance foundational. Interrogating the interdependence of the virtues allows the poet to challenge the traditional hierarchy of virtues, in which temperance is the lowest, thus making the case that temperance is paradoxically foundational to other virtues, like justice and fortitude. In this way, the poems not only make a case for the value of temperance, but they also expose ambiguities in orthodox accounts of the virtues.

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Sellés Dauder, Juan Fernando, i Gonzalo Alonso-Bastarreche. "Acquired Justice and Infused Justice according to Leonardo Polo". Cauriensia. Revista anual de Ciencias Eclesiásticas 18 (20.01.2024): 377–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.17398/2340-4256.18.377.

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This paper discusses the conception of Justice, both acquired and infused, in Leonardo Polo’s thought, in comparison with Aquinas’ view. It is widely assumed in Christian Thought that through the will effort, one acquires the virtue of justice, while infused justice comes from God’s grace. Acquired justice is a virtue of the will, and God’s infused justice is also received in the will. Inspired in Thomist systematization, Polo distinguishes justice’s integral elements, its subjective types, and its potential elements. The integral elements are two: to give each one her due when he lacks it, and not to take away one’s belongings, its subjective types are the commutative, legal, and distributive justice. Finally, justice potential elements have to do when one cannot pay what one owes, or when one is not obliged to satisfy the other’s right. We shall also see how infused justice improves each of these parts of acquired justice. In contrast with Aquinas, from Leonardo Polo’s anthropology the virtue of justice is superior to the virtue of prudence.

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Gentry, Lonnie, i James W. Fleshman. "Leadership and Ethics: Virtue Ethics as a Model for Leadership Development". Clinics in Colon and Rectal Surgery 33, nr 04 (3.06.2020): 217–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1055/s-0040-1709437.

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AbstractLeaders are held to the highest of standards in both performance and ethics. The same is true for leaders in medicine. Thus, medical leaders must give attention to ethical development as well as performance development. Virtue ethics provide a way for the leader to develop ethically. Virtue ethics is the oldest form of ethics. Although other ethical approaches focus on external considerations, virtue ethics focuses on the inward development of character. Following the examples of virtuous people and developing habits of virtue are critical with this approach. The cardinal virtues of prudence, courage, temperance, and justice are considered the most important. Specific virtue lists have also been developed for medical practitioners. All of these virtues can contribute to the enhancement of leadership skills. The virtue approach is especially helpful for leaders because it motivates one to excel in whatever endeavor pursued, whether medicine, leadership, relationships, or life.

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Cooper, John M. "The Unity of Virtue". Social Philosophy and Policy 15, nr 1 (1998): 233–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052500003149.

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Philosophers have recently revived the study of the ancient Greek topics of virtue and the virtues—justice, honesty, temperance, friendship, courage, and so on as qualities of mind and character belonging to individual people. But one issue at the center of Greek moral theory seems to have dropped out of consideration. This is the question of the unity of virtue, the unity of the virtues. Must anyone who has one of these qualities have others of them as well, indeed all of them—all the ones that really do deserve to be counted as virtues? Even further, is there really no set of distinct and separate virtuous qualities at all, but at bottom only a single one—so that the person who has this single condition of “virtue” (and only he) is entitled also to the further descriptions “honest” and “well-controlled” and “just” and “friendly” and “courageous” and “fostering” and “supportive,” and so on, as distinguishable aspects or immediate effects of his unitary “virtue”?

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Rebard, Ted. "Justice: Moral Virtue in Society". Ethics & Medics 19, nr 12 (1994): 1–2. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/em1994191221.

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Münnix, Gabriele. "Against Prejudice: Justice as Virtue". Teaching Ethics 15, nr 1 (2015): 51–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/tej20151515.

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Smith, Tara. "Justice as a Personal Virtue". Social Theory and Practice 25, nr 3 (1999): 361–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract199925327.

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Kristjánsson, Kristján. "Justice, Desert, and Virtue Revisited". Social Theory and Practice 29, nr 1 (2003): 39–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract20032912.

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Burns, David P. "University Admissions, Justice, and Virtue". Philosophical Inquiry in Education 29, nr 3 (2022): 173. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1094134ar.

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Otteson, James R. "ADAM SMITH ON JUSTICE, SOCIAL JUSTICE, AND ULTIMATE JUSTICE". Social Philosophy and Policy 34, nr 1 (2017): 123–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0265052517000061.

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Abstract:Adam Smith argues that virtue falls into two broad categories: “justice,” which he calls a “negative” virtue because it principally comprises restraint from harming or injuring others; and “beneficence,” which he calls “positive” because it comprises the actions we ought to take to improve others’ situations. Smith’s conception of justice is thus quite “thin,” and some critics argue that it is indeed too thin, since it fails to incorporate substantive concerns for the well-being of others. In this essay, I lay out Smith’s conception of justice and offer a way to understand it that attempts to comprehend the various things he says about it. I then offer a cluster of objections drawing on criticisms that might fall under the heading of “social justice.” Finally, I suggest how Smith might respond to the criticisms by outlining a Smithian conception of what I call “ultimate justice.”

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Hossain, Mosaref. "Friendship as a Moral Virtue: A Philosophical Exploration". Praxis International Journal of Social Science and Literature 6, nr 8 (25.08.2023): 129–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.51879/pijssl/060815.

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Friendship is a relational, interpersonal, and loveable bond between two individuals; and the philosophers admit it as a moral virtue. The aim of the manuscript was to draw an attention to the philosophical thinking of friendship in context of moral virtues. Aristotle states that justice seems to be the highest kind of moral virtue; friendship transcends justice. Friendship is relational, so the concept of ‘other’ has a significant role. In this context, Aristotelian notions of shared values in human nature is captured my interest. According to Gadamer, Friendship has a trans-political nature which has been traced in the paper by exposing the hermeneutic of solidarity. There is also discussing about the moral friendship after Kant in the scenario of moral virtue. Here, the goal of my writing to assess the philosophical value of friendship in contemporary society and try to evaluate the urge of friendship especially the virtue friendship in this postmodern, self-oriented society.

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Roberts, Robert C. "Justice as an Emotion Disposition". Emotion Review 2, nr 1 (21.12.2009): 36–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1754073909345541.

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In this tribute to the work of Robert Solomon, I address a topic that occupied him frequently in the last 20 years of his life, and about which he wrote a book and several articles: the relation(s) between the emotions and justice as a personal virtue. I hope to clarify Solomon’s views using three distinctions that seem implicit in his writings, among (1) justice as general virtue and justice as a particular virtue, (2) objective justice and justice as a virtue, and (3) an emotion and a passion. Using these three distinctions and a fourfold schema of emotional objects that seems implied by the foregoing discussion, I argue that an account of emotions like Solomon’s, which construes emotions as in crucial ways like judgments, contains resources for grasping in some detail how particular emotions are related to the virtue of justice. Among these emotions, I pay special attention to compassion.

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ROGERS, TRISTAN J. "Justice as Lawfulness". Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4, nr 2 (2018): 262–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2018.22.

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AbstractWhat is the relationship between justice as an individual virtue and justice as an institutional virtue? The latter has been exhaustively explored by political philosophers, whereas the former remains underexplored in the literature on virtue ethics. This article defends the view that individual justice is logically prior to institutional justice, and argues that this view requires a conception of individual justice I call ‘justice as lawfulness’. The resulting view consists of three claims. First, just institutions are composed of the relations between just persons. Second, the just person has a disposition to act in accordance with the legal and social norms (collectively, thenomoi) of the existing political tradition. Third, departures from thenomoirequire that the just person act with practical wisdom to reform thenomoiaccording to an implicit standard of justice in the political tradition.

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Jeffries, Vincent. "Virtue and the Altruistic Personality". Sociological Perspectives 41, nr 1 (marzec 1998): 151–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1389357.

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This paper applies the concept of virtue to an analysis of theory and research pertaining to the altruistic personality. Five primary virtues are considered: temperance, fortitude, justice, charity, prudence. The virtues are presented as the personality structure underlying altruistic motivation and behavior. Available evidence indicating a possible relationship between each of the virtues and altruistic behavior is reviewed. Sorokin's scheme of five dimensions of love is used to analyze the relationship between each of the virtues and altruistic behavior in different social situations. The advantages of viewing the altruistic personality from the perspective of the virtues is discussed.

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Sato, Kunimasa. "From the Virtue of Testimonial Justice to a Transformative Virtue". Kagaku tetsugaku 56, nr 1 (15.11.2023): 37. http://dx.doi.org/10.4216/jpssj.56.1_37.

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Wilkin, Jerzy. "Justice: A Salient Virtue of Social Institutions". Wieś i Rolnictwo, nr 1 (198) (12.05.2023): 39–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.53098/wir012023/01b.

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Justice is an area of research and the subject of theoretical works, just like the categories of truth, beauty and rationality. Apart from some more general remarks on justice, the present text concentrates on issues of justice considered from the point of view of the interests and theoretical achievements of economics, and also on the problem of territorial justice. To the question: What is territorial justice?, I propose the following answer: Territorial justice is a form of social justice that, apart from the basic features of that notion, in relation to individuals and social groups takes into account their spatial circumstances, treating space (territory) as a potential and real-term barrier to accessing the principles of justice.

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Dwi Nitisari, Indah Lestari i Muhamad Bahtiar Reza. "VIRTUES CHARACTER IN EVA EVERGREEN SEMI-MAGICAL WITCH". Jurnal Sosial Humaniora dan Pendidikan 1, nr 1 (23.04.2022): 79–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.56127/jushpen.v1i1.219.

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Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk mengetahui dan mengklasifikasikan virtue dari Eva yang terdapat pada karakter Eva Evergreen dalam novel Eva Evergreen Semi-Magical Witch. Para peneliti menerapkan teori Peterson dan Seligman tentang virtue ethic dalam penelitian ini. Metode yang digunakan adalah metode deskriptif kualitatif. Hasil analisa menunjukkan enam virtue dari Eva Evergreen yaitu virtue kebijaksanaan dan kebajikan (wisdom and knowledge), virtue keberanian (courage), virtue kemanusiaan (humanity), virtue keadilan (justice), virtue kebajikan (temperance), dan virtue transendensi (transcendence). Berdasarkan hasil penelitian ini, dapat disimpulkan bahwa kebajikan (virtue) yang paling banyak ditemukan pada karakter Eva adalah virtue kemanusiaan (humanity) sedangkan virtue yang paling sedikit ditemukan adalah virtue keadilan (justice). Hasil penelitian ini juga menjelaskan bahwa Eva Evergreen adalah agen yang berbudi luhur karena karakter Eva memiliki kebajikan (virtue).

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Forst, Rainer. "Tolerance as a Virtue of Justice". Philosophical Explorations 4, nr 3 (wrzesień 2001): 193–206. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10002001098538716.

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Silva, Alvaro. "Justice as Virtue: A Thomistic Perspective". Mayéutica 43, nr 95 (2017): 207–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/mayeutica2017439515.

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Lee, Nam-won. "Hume’s Justice as an artificial Virtue". Korean Philosophical Society 141 (20.02.2017): 133–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.20293/jokps.2017.141.133.

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O'Connor, David K. "Aristotelian Justice as a Personal Virtue". Midwest Studies in Philosophy 13 (1988): 417–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1988.tb00136.x.

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Ware, Owen. "Virtue, Rules, and Justice: Kantian Aspirations". British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21, nr 5 (wrzesień 2013): 1005–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2013.821401.

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BLOOMFIELD, PAUL. "Justice as a Self-Regarding Virtue". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82, nr 1 (18.08.2010): 46–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00386.x.

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Fisher, David. "The Virtue of Justice and War". Philosophia 41, nr 2 (26.03.2013): 361–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-013-9437-2.

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Sim, May. "Confucianism and Transgenerational Grounds for Justice". Monist 106, nr 2 (1.04.2023): 181–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/monist/onad006.

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Abstract This article explores Mencius’s virtue-oriented ethics and its metaphysical foundation for resources they can provide to transgenerational communities. Mencius’s ethics offers moral norms for human actions that transcend those generations with whom they can interact and impact generations of people in the future. These actions range from the preservation of traditional values to the challenges of climate change, offering grounds for transgenerational justice. Mencius’s account of virtues offers a moral justification for the standards of living that are common to all human beings, justifying their entitlements to certain economic, social, cultural, and environmental conditions for the cultivation of moral virtues that perfect human nature. Due to his view that the metaphysics of human nature also governs the cosmic world, the virtues that govern good human relationships will also protect the world’s natural resources, regardless of whether someone subscribes to a Confucian community.

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Rybinska, Yuliia, Oleksandra Loshenko, Anton Kurapov, Taisiia Ponochovna-Rysak i Yuliia Kholmakova. "The change in the concept of virtue during the COVID-19 pandemic". Revista Amazonia Investiga 10, nr 47 (17.12.2021): 62–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.34069/ai/2021.47.11.7.

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The purpose of the article is to cover the change in the concept of virtue during the COVID-19 pandemic, show its connection with human values and ethics. Virtue is the highest spiritual quality of a person. The main virtues include wisdom, courage, justice, moderation, responsiveness, loyalty, modesty, generosity and many others that affect all aspects of human life. Despite the recognized value of virtue as a system of moral guidelines, its concept is fraught with disputes about whether it is really generally valid, as well as about the problem of the effectiveness of virtue as a universal guideline and criterion for moral choice and its relevance in modern moral experience. This article argues that the most significant shift in the concept of virtue during the pandemic was the rethinking and increased awareness of the importance of such virtues as solidarity and moral responsibility, as well as aspects of relationships with people such as kindness, compassion, and empathy. It is proved that the concept of virtue has moved from a question of choice to the category of necessity, the most important guideline and guarantee of the common good.

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Steen, Marc, Martin Sand i Ibo Van de Poel. "Virtue Ethics for Responsible Innovation". Business and Professional Ethics Journal 40, nr 2 (2021): 243–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/bpej2021319108.

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Governments and companies are increasingly promoting and organizing Responsible Innovation. It is, however, unclear how the seemingly incompatible demands for responsibility, which is associated with care and caution, can be harmonized with demands for innovation, which is associated with risk-taking and speed. We turn to the tradition of virtue ethics and argue that it can be a strong accomplice to Responsible Innovation by focussing on the agential side of innovation. Virtue ethics offers an adequate response to the epistemic and moral complexity in innovation and encourages moral behaviour. We enumerate a number of virtues that people involved in Responsible Innovation would need to cultivate both related to responsibility, such as justice, anticipation, civility and inclusion, and virtues related to innovation, such as courage, dedication, curiosity and creativity. We put forward practical wisdom (phronesis) as a key virtue to regulate relevant virtues and to deal with the tension between responsibility and innovation. Practical wisdom helps an agent to find an appropriate mean in exercising and expressing the other virtues—where the mean is relative to the specific context of action and the role and abilities of the agent.

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Whitebrook, Maureen. "Compassion as a Political Virtue". Political Studies 50, nr 3 (sierpień 2002): 529–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00383.

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The place of compassion in political thought and practice is debatable. This debate can be clarified by stipulating ‘compassion’ as referring to the practice of acting on the feeling of ‘pity’; in addition, compassion might best be understood politically speaking as properly exercised towards vulnerability rather than suffering. Working with these understandings, I contrast Martha Nussbaum's account of the criteria for the exercise of compassion in modern democracies with the treatment of compassion in Toni Morrison's novels in order to suggest how compassion can be viewed politically. In respect of distributive justice and public policy, in both cases compassion might modify the strict application of principles in the light of knowledge of particulars, suggesting an enlarged role for discretion in the implementation of social justice. More generally, compassion's focus on particulars and the interpersonal draws attention to the importance of imagination and judgement. The latter returns a consideration of compassion to the question of the relationship of compassion to justice. In the political context, although strict criteria for compassion are inappropriate, principles of justice might work as modifying compassion (rather than vice-versa, as might be expected).

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Mooney, T. Brian, i Damini Roy. "Politeness and Pietas as Annexed to the Virtue of Justice". Dialogue and Universalism 30, nr 1 (2020): 37–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/du20203013.

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“Politeness” appears to be connected to a quite disparate set of related concepts, including but not limited to, “manners,” “etiquette,” “agreeableness,” “respect” and even “piety.” While in the East politeness considered as an important social virtue is present (and even central) in the theoretical and practical expressions of the Confucian, Taoist and Buddhist traditions, (indeed politeness has been viewed in these traditions as central to proper education) it has not featured prominently in philosophical discussion in the West. American presidents Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin and George Washington all devoted discussion to politeness within the broader ambit of manners and etiquette, as too did Erasmus, Edmund Burke and Ralph Waldo Emerson but on the whole sustained philosophical engagement with the topic has been lacking in the West. The richest source for philosophical investigation is perhaps afforded by the centrality of the concept of respect in Immanuel Kant.However in this paper we will instead draw on the writings of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas to defend the centrality of “politeness” as an important and valuable moral virtue. Starting with an analysis of the broader Aristotelian arguments on the virtues associated with “agreeableness,” namely, friendliness, truthfulness and wit I will argue that “politeness” should be thought of as an important moral virtue attached to social intercourse (and by extension the vice of impoliteness). I then move to identify an even broader and more important account of politeness, drawing on the work of Aquinas, as intimately connected to the notion of pietas (piety) as a fundamental part of the virtue of justice.

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