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Artykuły w czasopismach na temat „Loan contracting”

Autor: Grafiati

Data publikacji: 4 czerwca 2021

Data aktualizacji: 1 lutego 2022

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1

Udell, Gregory F. "Loan quality, commercial loan review and loan officer contracting." Journal of Banking & Finance 13, no. 3 (July 1989): 367–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0378-4266(89)90048-4.

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Ge, Wenxia, Tony Kang, Gerald J. Lobo, and Byron Y. Song. "Investment decisions and bank loan contracting." Asian Review of Accounting 25, no. 2 (May 2, 2017): 262–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ara-03-2016-0027.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine how a firm’s investment behavior relates to its subsequent bank loan contracting. Design/methodology/approach Using a sample of US firms during the period 1992-2011, the authors examine the association between overinvestment (underinvestment) and three characteristics of bank loan contracts: loan spread, collateral requirement, and loan maturity. Findings The authors find that overinvesting firms obtain loans with higher loan spreads. Additional tests show that the effect of overinvestment on loan spreads is generally more pronounced in firms wit

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3

Drucker, Steven, and Manju Puri. "On Loan Sales, Loan Contracting, and Lending Relationships." Review of Financial Studies 22, no. 7 (July 2, 2008): 2835–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn067.

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Chong, Dazhi, Ling Li, Harris Wu, Jong Park, Hui Shi, and Gongjun Yan. "Social Media Sentiment and Bank Loan Contracting." Journal of Industrial Integration and Management 03, no. 01 (March 2018): 1850007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s2424862218500070.

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This study analyzes how social media affects bank loan contracting. Using a sample of 642 US bank loan contracts, we hypothesize that social media can enhance information dissemination and mitigate the information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that borrowers that receive positive social media user opinion on social media enjoy more favorable price of bank loan contracts. Additional analyses indicate that the relations among social media user opinion and bank loan price vary with the firm size, loan structure and availability of public informa

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5

Yang, Ziyun. "Customer concentration, relationship, and debt contracting." Journal of Applied Accounting Research 18, no. 2 (May 8, 2017): 185–207. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jaar-04-2016-0041.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of a firm’s customer base concentration on its loan contract terms and how this effect varies with the strength of its customer relationship. Design/methodology/approach This study is an archival research based on a sample of US public firms that have loan contract data between 1990 and 2008. Major customer sales data are used to construct customer concentration and customer relationship measures. A debt contract model is employed to relate loan spread and other contract terms to customer concentration and relationship. Findings This s

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6

Freudenberg, Felix, Björn Imbierowicz, Anthony Saunders, and Sascha Steffen. "Covenant violations and dynamic loan contracting." Journal of Corporate Finance 45 (August 2017): 540–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.05.009.

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7

Lin, Chih-Yung, Yehning Chen, Po-Hsin Ho, and Ju-Fang Yen. "CEO overconfidence and bank loan contracting." Journal of Corporate Finance 64 (October 2020): 101637. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101637.

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8

Francis, Bill, Iftekhar Hasan, Michael Koetter, and Qiang Wu. "CORPORATE BOARDS AND BANK LOAN CONTRACTING." Journal of Financial Research 35, no. 4 (December 2012): 521–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6803.2012.01327.x.

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9

GRAHAM, J., S. LI, and J. QIU. "Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting☆." Journal of Financial Economics 89, no. 1 (July 2008): 44–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.08.005.

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10

Francis, Bill B., Iftekhar Hasan, and Yun Zhu. "Political uncertainty and bank loan contracting." Journal of Empirical Finance 29 (December 2014): 281–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jempfin.2014.08.004.

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11

Fang, Xiaohua, Yutao Li, Baohua Xin, and Wenjun Zhang. "Financial Statement Comparability and Debt Contracting: Evidence from the Syndicated Loan Market." Accounting Horizons 30, no. 2 (March 1, 2016): 277–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/acch-51437.

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SYNOPSIS In this study, we examine whether and how borrowing firms' financial statement comparability affects the contracting features of syndicated loans. Using a sample of loans issued by U.S. public firms in the syndicated loan market over the period 1992–2008, we find strong and robust evidence that financial statement comparability is negatively associated with loan spread and the likelihood of pledging collateral, and positively associated with loan maturity and the likelihood of including performance pricing provisions in loan contracts. We also find that borrowing firms with greater fi

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12

Chen, Gary, Jeong-Bon Kim, Jee-Hae Lim, and Jie Zhou. "XBRL Adoption and Bank Loan Contracting: Early Evidence." Journal of Information Systems 32, no. 2 (February 1, 2017): 47–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/isys-51688.

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ABSTRACT We examine how the adoption of the eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) for financial reporting impacts the pricing of bank loans. Using a sample of loans granted to U.S. borrowers from 2007–2013, we find that the adoption of XBRL is associated with a reduction in loan spreads. We further find that the reduction in loan spreads is greater for borrowers who have information that is inherently costlier to process. Results from a difference-in-differences specification along with other alternative research designs provide similar inferences. Subsequent to XBRL adoption, we furth

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13

Hasan, Iftekhar, and Liang Song. "Public disclosure and bank loan contracting: evidence from emerging markets." Asian Review of Accounting 22, no. 1 (April 29, 2014): 2–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ara-10-2013-0069.

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to fill this void in the existing literature and investigate how firms’ disclosure policies influence bank loan contracting in emerging markets after controlling for the influence of borrowers’ private information obtained by banks. Furthermore, the paper examines how firms’ disclosure and non-disclosure governance interact to affect financial contracts. Design/methodology/approach – The key variables Disclosure and Firm Governance are based on a survey by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) in 2000. The paper hand-merges CLSA disclosure and governance

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14

한병석 and 강형구. "History of Derivatives Contracting on Student Loan." Review of Business History 30, no. 2 (June 2015): 163–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.22629/kabh.2015.30.2.008.

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15

Hsieh, Tien‐Shih, Byron Y. Song, Ray R. Wang, and Xinlu Wang. "Management earnings forecasts and bank loan contracting." Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 46, no. 5-6 (February 20, 2019): 712–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jbfa.12371.

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16

Alimov, Azizjon. "Labor Protection Laws and Bank Loan Contracting." Journal of Law and Economics 58, no. 1 (February 2015): 37–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/682908.

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17

Kim, Jeong-Bon, Byron Y. Song, and Zheng Wang. "Special purpose entities and bank loan contracting." Journal of Banking & Finance 74 (January 2017): 133–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2016.10.006.

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18

He, Zhongda, Guannan Qiao, Le Zhang, and Wenrui Zhang. "Regulator supervisory power and bank loan contracting." Journal of Banking & Finance 126 (May 2021): 106062. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2021.106062.

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19

Miao, Meng, Guanjie Niu, and Thomas Noe. "Contracting without contracting institutions: The trusted assistant loan in 19th century China." Journal of Financial Economics 140, no. 3 (June 2021): 987–1007. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.02.005.

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20

Deng, Saiying, Richard H. Willis, and Li Xu. "Shareholder Litigation, Reputational Loss, and Bank Loan Contracting." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 49, no. 4 (August 2014): 1101–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002210901400057x.

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AbstractWe examine shareholder litigation and the price and nonprice terms of bank loan contracts. After filing a lawsuit, defendant firms pay higher loan spreads and up-front charges, experience more financial covenants, and are more likely to have a collateral requirement. These findings are consistent with reputational losses associated with shareholder litigation. The magnitude of a firm’s lost market value when the lawsuit is filed is positively related to the increase in the firm’s future borrowing costs. We investigate whether the lawsuit allegations and its merit affect future bank loa

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21

Li, Shihong. "SOX 404 and debt contracting value of accounting information." International Journal of Accounting & Information Management 26, no. 3 (August 6, 2018): 384–412. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijaim-03-2017-0042.

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Purpose This paper aims to investigate whether the Section 404 of Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX 404) changed the way banks use accounting information to price corporate loans. Design/methodology/approach The study uses a sample of 1,173 US-listed firms that issued syndicated loans both before and after their compliance with SOX 404 to analyze the changes in loan spread’s sensitivity to some key accounting metrics such as ROA, interest coverage, leverage and net worth. Findings The study finds that the interest spread’s sensitivity to key accounting metrics, most noticeably for ROA, declined followin

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22

Deng, Saiying, Vincent J. Intintoli, and Andrew Zhang. "CEO Turnover, Information Uncertainty, and Debt Contracting." Quarterly Journal of Finance 09, no. 02 (March 25, 2019): 1950001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s2010139219500010.

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CEO turnovers are important corporate events that can lead to significant changes within the firm. We find that CEO departures are associated with a subsequent increase in bank loan financing. The negative effect that CEO departures have on borrowing costs is largely driven by forced CEO turnovers. Following such departures, firms pay higher loan spreads, see an increase in covenants, and are more likely to be subject to collateral requirements, when compared to matched non-turnover and voluntary turnover firms. Evidence suggests that asset substitution and changes in accounting information qu

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23

Račić, Ranka. "(Im)permissibility of contracting the fee for loan processing costs in Bosnia and Herzegovina law." Pravo i privreda 58, no. 3 (2020): 270–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/pip2003270r.

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The paper analyses the legal aspects of the issue related to the (im)permissibility of contracting fees for loan processing costs. This issue has recently become acute in the law of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first court decision, which determined that the provision on the costs of loan processing is null and void, was passed in the Brcko District of Bosnia and Herzegovina. After this decision went into effect, dozens of lawsuits have been filed before the courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina requesting the court to determine that the provision on reimbursement of loan processing costs is null an

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24

Hasan, Iftekhar, Chun Keung Hoi, Qiang Wu, and Hao Zhang. "Social Capital and Debt Contracting: Evidence from Bank Loans and Public Bonds." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 52, no. 3 (May 3, 2017): 1017–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109017000205.

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We find that firms headquartered in U.S. counties with higher levels of social capital incur lower bank loan spreads. This finding is robust to using organ donation as an alternative social capital measure and incremental to the effects of religiosity, corporate social responsibility, and tax avoidance. We identify the causal relation using companies with a social-capital-changing headquarters relocation. We also find that high-social-capital firms face loosened nonprice loan terms, incur lower at-issue bond spreads, and prefer public bonds over bank loans. We conclude that debt holders percei

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25

Hasan, Iftekhar, Jong Chool Park, and Qiang Wu. "The Impact of Earnings Predictability on Bank Loan Contracting." Journal of Business Finance & Accounting 39, no. 7-8 (July 5, 2012): 1068–101. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5957.2012.02292.x.

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26

Francis, Bill, Iftekhar Hasan, and Qiang Wu. "The Impact of CFO Gender on Bank Loan Contracting." Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance 28, no. 1 (October 3, 2012): 53–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0148558x12452399.

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27

Kim, Jeong-Bon, Byron Y. Song, and Theophanis C. Stratopoulos. "Does Information Technology Reputation Affect Bank Loan Terms?" Accounting Review 93, no. 3 (October 1, 2017): 185–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-51927.

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ABSTRACT This study investigates whether Information Technology (IT) reputation, captured by the accumulation of consistent IT capability signals, influences bank loan contracting even though banks have access to inside information. We predict that IT reputation is associated with better loan terms because it lowers credit risk via its impact on default and information risks. Results based on 4,218 loan facility-years reveal, as predicted, that firms with a reputation for IT capability tend to have more favorable price and non-price terms for loan contracts and are less likely to have their cr

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28

Kim, Jeong-Bon, Byron Y. Song, and Liandong Zhang. "Internal Control Weakness and Bank Loan Contracting: Evidence from SOX Section 404 Disclosures." Accounting Review 86, no. 4 (April 1, 2011): 1157–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-10036.

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ABSTRACT Using a sample of borrowing firms that disclosed internal control weaknesses (ICW) under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, this study compares various features of loan contracts between firms with ICW and those without ICW. Our results show the following. First, the loan spread is higher for ICW firms than for non-ICW firms by about 28 basis points, after controlling for other known determinants of loan contract terms. Second, firms with more severe, company-level ICW pay significantly higher loan rates than those with less severe, account-level ICW. Third, lenders impose tighter

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29

Chen, Tai-Yuan, Chen-Lung Chin, Shiheng Wang, and Wei-Ren Yao. "The Effects of Financial Reporting on Bank Loan Contracting in Global Markets: Evidence from Mandatory IFRS Adoption." Journal of International Accounting Research 14, no. 2 (January 1, 2015): 45–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jiar-51031.

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ABSTRACT This study examines the effects of the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on the contract terms of bank loans in a global setting. Using a difference-in-differences design based on 26,474 bank loans in 31 countries during the 2000–2011 period, we find that borrowers who mandatorily adopt IFRS experience an increase in interest rates, a reduction in the use of accounting-based financial covenants, an increase in the likelihood that a loan is collateralized, a reduction in loan maturity, and an increase in the fraction of a loan retained by lead arr

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30

Bozanic, Zahn, Lin Cheng, and Tzachi Zach. "Soft Information in Loan Agreements." Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance 33, no. 1 (February 1, 2017): 40–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0148558x16689653.

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In this study, we seek to understand whether soft information conveyed by contracting language found in private loan agreements is informative regarding borrower risk. We proxy for credit-risk-relevant soft information using Loughran and McDonald’s uncertainty measure. We first examine initial contract terms and find that, incremental to traditional summary measures of credit risk, increased contractual uncertainty is associated with higher initial loan spreads and a greater likelihood of using dynamic and performance-pricing covenants. We then turn to examine realized credit risk over the lif

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31

Haß, Lars Helge, Skrålan Vergauwe, and Zhifang Zhang. "State-ownership and bank loan contracting: evidence from corporate fraud." European Journal of Finance 25, no. 6 (May 22, 2017): 550–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1351847x.2017.1328454.

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32

Lin, Zhijun, Byron Y. Song, and Zhimin Tian. "Does director-level reputation matter? Evidence from bank loan contracting." Journal of Banking & Finance 70 (September 2016): 160–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2016.04.021.

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33

Song, Liang, and Joel C. Tuoriniemi. "Accounting quality, governance standards, and syndicated loan contracts." Pacific Accounting Review 28, no. 1 (February 1, 2016): 2–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/par-10-2014-0035.

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine how firms’ accounting quality affects bank loan contracting in seven emerging markets and whether these relationships are affected by borrowers’ governance standards. Design/methodology/approach – The study sample period is 1999-2007 because the syndicated loan market was severely affected by the East Asian financial crisis of 1998 and the US financial crisis of 2008. The final sample includes 719 loan observations for 75 firms in seven emerging markets. Findings – The authors find that syndicated lenders provide loans with more favorable terms

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34

Day, Judy F., Paul R. Mather, and Peter Taylor. "The effect of corporate board characteristics on loan monitoring decisions." Corporate Ownership and Control 11, no. 2 (2014): 46–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv11i2p4.

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Motivated by a paucity of research into the impact of corporate governance from a debtholder perspective, we examine the impact of corporate governance on loan monitoring decisions. The active and close involvement of a major UK bank facilitated the development of extremely realistic experimental scenarios with a great deal of accurate institutional detail. The results show that the likelihood of loan officers increasing the level of monitoring in the context of a debt covenant breach is associated with board independence, director financial expertise and the presence of a blockholder. A two-w

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35

Ge, Wenxia, Jeong-Bon Kim, and Byron Y. Song. "Internal governance, legal institutions and bank loan contracting around the world." Journal of Corporate Finance 18, no. 3 (June 2012): 413–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2012.01.006.

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Chong, Dazhi, Hui Shi, Liuliu(Luna) Fu, Hao Ji, and Gongjun Yan. "The impact of XBRL on information asymmetry: evidence from loan contracting." Journal of Management Analytics 4, no. 2 (April 3, 2017): 145–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23270012.2017.1299047.

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BALL, RYAN, ROBERT M. BUSHMAN, and FLORIN P. VASVARI. "The Debt-Contracting Value of Accounting Information and Loan Syndicate Structure." Journal of Accounting Research 46, no. 2 (May 2008): 247–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679x.2008.00273.x.

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Minetti, Raoul, and Sung-Guan Yun. "Institutions, Bailout Policies, and Bank Loan Contracting: Evidence from Korean Chaebols." Review of Finance 19, no. 6 (January 6, 2015): 2223–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfu053.

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39

Kim, Jeong-Bon, Byron Y. Song, and Yue Zhang. "Earnings performance of major customers and bank loan contracting with suppliers." Journal of Banking & Finance 59 (October 2015): 384–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2015.06.020.

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40

Chan, Lilian H., Kevin C. W. Chen, and Tai-Yuan Chen. "The effects of firm-initiated clawback provisions on bank loan contracting." Journal of Financial Economics 110, no. 3 (December 2013): 659–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.08.010.

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Ding, Libo, Bangyi Li, and Suling Feng. "Research on Multiprincipals Selecting Effective Agency Mode in the Student Loan System." Mathematical Problems in Engineering 2014 (2014): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/835254.

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An effective agency mode is the key to solve incentive problems in Chinese student loan system. Principal-agent frameworks are considered in which two principals share one common agent that is performing one single task but each prefers the different aspect of the task. Three models are built and decision mechanisms are given. The studies show that the three modes have different effects. Exclusive dealing mode is not good for long-term effect because sometimes it guides agent ignoring repayment. If effort proportionality coefficient and observability are both unchanged, principals all prefer c

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42

Aivazian, Varouj A., Jiaping Qiu, and Mohammad M. Rahaman. "Bank loan contracting and corporate diversification: Does organizational structure matter to lenders?" Journal of Financial Intermediation 24, no. 2 (April 2015): 252–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2015.02.002.

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Paik, Daniel Gyung, Timothy Hamilton, Brandon Byunghwan Lee, and Sung Wook Yoon. "Loan purpose and accounting based debt covenants." Review of Accounting and Finance 18, no. 2 (May 13, 2019): 321–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/raf-10-2017-0194.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate the association between the purpose of a loan and the type of debt covenants, separated into balance sheet-based and income statement-based covenants. Design/methodology/approach Using private loan deal observations obtained from the DealScan database over the period between 1996 and 2013, the authors classify the sample loan deals into three categories based on the purpose of borrowing, namely, borrowings for corporate daily operating purposes, financing purposes and acquisition and investing purposes. The authors conduct multinomial logisti

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44

BEATTY, ANNE. "Discussion of The Debt-Contracting Value of Accounting Information and Loan Syndicate Structure." Journal of Accounting Research 46, no. 2 (May 2008): 289–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679x.2008.00274.x.

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Giner, Begoña, and Araceli Mora. "Bank loan loss accounting and its contracting effects: the new expected loss models." Accounting and Business Research 49, no. 6 (May 8, 2019): 726–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00014788.2019.1609898.

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46

Ramadhan, Chesa, and Adimas Rakyandani Saksono. "Proportionality Principle on Online Lending Contract in Indonesia." Notaire 2, no. 1 (July 22, 2019): 19. http://dx.doi.org/10.20473/ntr.v2i1.12986.

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AbstractOnline lending is form of alternative funding resulted from financial technology innovation. Until February 2019 there are 99 financial technology corporations that engaged in lending activity that operated officially, legally, and recognized by Otoritas Jasa Keuangan. However, many problems arise form this innovation in form of online lending. Many consumers became the victims of either illegal or even legal online lending platforms. Started from the paramount loan interest applied in the online lending agreement until the amount of loan that need to be paid did not in accordance to t

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47

Gong, Guojin, and Shuqing Luo. "Lenders' Experience with Borrowers' Major Customers and the Debt Contracting Demand for Accounting Conservatism." Accounting Review 93, no. 5 (January 1, 2018): 187–222. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-52022.

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ABSTRACT Lenders often have lending relationships with borrowers' major customers (labeled as “supply-chain lenders”). We hypothesize that private information obtained from borrowers' major customers can facilitate more timely and precise evaluation of borrowers' creditworthiness; this potentially reduces supply-chain lenders' reliance on accounting conservatism in debt contracting. Consistently, we find that suppliers borrowing from supply-chain lenders provide less conservative financial statements than suppliers borrowing from non-supply-chain lenders at loan origination. This finding is mo

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48

Mamonov, M. E. "Hidden “holes” in the capital of banks and the supply of credit to the real sector of economy." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 5 (May 28, 2018): 49–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2018-5-49-68.

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Our analysis documents that the existence of hidden “holes” in the capital of not yet failed banks - while creating intertemporal pressure on the actual level of capital - leads to changing of maturity of loans supplied rather than to contracting of their volume. Long-term loans decrease, whereas short-term loans rise - and, what is most remarkably, by approximately the same amounts. Standardly, the higher the maturity of loans the higher the credit risk and, thus, the more loan loss reserves (LLP) banks are forced to create, increasing the pressure on capital. Banks that already hide “holes”

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49

Gopalakrishnan, Balagopal, Sanket Mohapatra, and David McMillan. "The effects of reporting standards and information sharing on loan contracting: Cross-country evidence." Cogent Economics & Finance 8, no. 1 (January 1, 2020): 1716920. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2020.1716920.

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Kim, Jeong-Bon, Judy S. L. Tsui, and Cheong H. Yi. "The voluntary adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards and loan contracting around the world." Review of Accounting Studies 16, no. 4 (May 12, 2011): 779–811. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11142-011-9148-5.

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