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Artykuły w czasopismach na temat „Perfect information”

Autor: Grafiati

Data publikacji: 11 stycznia 2025

Data aktualizacji: 31 lipca 2025

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1

King, Stephen P. "Is perfect information perfectly useless?" Economics Letters 39, no. 4 (1992): 415–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(92)90178-2.

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2

Dowden, John S. "Product information past perfect." Medical Journal of Australia 186, no. 2 (2007): 51–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.5694/j.1326-5377.2007.tb00797.x.

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3

Dubey, Pradeep, and Ori Haimanko. "Learning with perfect information." Games and Economic Behavior 46, no. 2 (2004): 304–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(03)00127-1.

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4

Lapidoth, A., and S. Shamai. "Fading channels: how perfect need "perfect side information" be?" IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 48, no. 5 (2002): 1118–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/18.995552.

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5

Bondar, Vladimir. "The present perfect in past time contexts : a diachronic study of English." Brno studies in English, no. 2 (2023): 5–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.5817/bse2023-2-1.

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Throughout the history, English has developed a category of the present perfect that can be considered prototypical when compared to the same categories in other typologically similar languages. Although the present perfect in Standard British English has not reached the final stage of acquiring preterit semantics, data from diachronic corpora provides evidence that the English present perfect had the potential to follow a similar path of grammaticalization like the German Perfekt, for instance. This paper presents an investigation of data collected from several diachronic English corpora and

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6

Kukushkin, Nikolai S. "Perfect Information and Potential Games." Games and Economic Behavior 38, no. 2 (2002): 306–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.2001.0859.

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7

Flesch, János, and Arkadi Predtetchinski. "Parameterized games of perfect information." Annals of Operations Research 287, no. 2 (2018): 683–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10479-018-3087-5.

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8

He, Wei, and Yeneng Sun. "Dynamic games with (almost) perfect information." Theoretical Economics 15, no. 2 (2020): 811–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/te2927.

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This paper aims to solve two fundamental problems on finite‐ or infinite‐horizon dynamic games with complete information. Under some mild conditions, we prove the existence of subgame‐perfect equilibria and the upper hemicontinuity of equilibrium payoffs in general dynamic games with simultaneous moves (i.e., almost perfect information), which go beyond previous works in the sense that stagewise public randomization and the continuity requirement on the state variables are not needed. For alternating move (i.e., perfect‐information) dynamic games with uncertainty, we show the existence of pure

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9

Datta, Pratim, Mark Whitmore, and Joseph K. Nwankpa. "A Perfect Storm." Digital Threats: Research and Practice 2, no. 2 (2021): 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3428157.

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In an age where news information is created by millions and consumed by billions over social media ( SM ) every day, issues of information biases, fake news, and echo-chambers have dominated the corridors of technology firms, news corporations, policy makers, and society. While multiple disciplines have tried to tackle the issue using their disciplinary lenses, there has, hitherto, been no integrative model that surface the intricate, albeit “dark” explainable AI confluence of both technology and psychology. Investigating information bias anchoring as the overarching phenomenon, this research

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10

Harris, Christopher. "Existence and Characterization of Perfect Equilibrium in Games of Perfect Information." Econometrica 53, no. 3 (1985): 613. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1911658.

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11

Mariotti, Thomas. "Subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes in continuous games of almost perfect information." Journal of Mathematical Economics 34, no. 1 (2000): 99–128. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(99)00039-7.

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12

Desmedt, Yvo, and Fred Piper. "Perfect Anonymity." IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 65, no. 6 (2019): 3990–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tit.2019.2893334.

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13

Nitinawarat, Sirin, and Prakash Narayan. "Perfect Omniscience, Perfect Secrecy, and Steiner Tree Packing." IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 56, no. 12 (2010): 6490–500. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tit.2010.2081450.

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14

Cabrera García, S., J. E. Imbert Tamayo, J. Carbonell-Olivares, and Y. Pacheco Cabrera. "Application of the Game Theory with Perfect Information to an agricultural company." Agricultural Economics (Zemědělská ekonomika) 59, No. 1 (2013): 1–7. http://dx.doi.org/10.17221/1/2012-agricecon.

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This paper deals with the application of Game Theory with Perfect Information to an agricultural economics problem. The goal of this analysis is demonstrating the possibility of obtaining an equilibrium point, as proposed by Nash, in the case of an agricultural company that is considered together with its three sub-units in developing a game with perfect information. Production results in terms of several crops will be considered in this game, together with the necessary parameters to implement different linear programming problems. In the game with perfect information with the hierarchical st

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15

Petrosyan, L. A., and A. A. Sedakov. "Multistage network games with perfect information." Automation and Remote Control 75, no. 8 (2014): 1532–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1134/s0005117914080165.

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16

Aghion, Philippe, Drew Fudenberg, Richard Holden, Takashi Kunimoto, and Olivier Tercieux. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations*." Quarterly Journal of Economics 127, no. 4 (2012): 1843–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjs026.

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Abstract We consider the robustness of extensive form mechanisms to deviations from common knowledge about the state of nature, which we refer to as information perturbations . First, we show that even under arbitrarily small information perturbations the Moore-Repullo mechanism does not yield (even approximately) truthful revelation and that in addition the mechanism has sequential equilibria with undesirable outcomes. More generally, we prove that any extensive form mechanism is fragile in the sense that if a non-Maskin monotonic social objective can be implemented with this mechanism, then

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17

Sarch, Yvonne. "Future Perfect." Serials: The Journal for the Serials Community 7, no. 1 (1994): 89–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1629/070189.

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18

Bremer, Peter. "Picture perfect." Reference Librarian 59, no. 3 (2018): 146–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02763877.2018.1454875.

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19

Larson, Per-Ake, and M. V. Ramakrishna. "External perfect hashing." ACM SIGMOD Record 14, no. 4 (1985): 190–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/971699.318916.

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20

Schmidt, Karen. "Past perfect, future tense." Library Collections, Acquisitions, & Technical Services 28, no. 4 (2004): 360–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14649055.2004.10766010.

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21

Kennedy, Marie R. "Dreams of perfect programs." Library Collections, Acquisitions, & Technical Services 28, no. 4 (2004): 449–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14649055.2004.10766016.

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22

Zhang, Tao, and Gennian Ge. "Perfect and Quasi-Perfect Codes Under the $l_{p}$ Metric." IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 63, no. 7 (2017): 4325–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/tit.2017.2685424.

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23

Harrington, Linda. "Health Information Technology Safety: The Perfect Storms." AACN Advanced Critical Care 25, no. 2 (2014): 91–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.4037/nci.0000000000000022.

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24

Apt, Krzysztof R., and Sunil Simon. "Well-Founded Extensive Games with Perfect Information." Electronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science 335 (June 22, 2021): 7–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.4204/eptcs.335.2.

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25

Rosha, Media. "Value of perfect information in stock picking." Journal of Physics: Conference Series 1317 (October 2019): 012010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/1317/1/012010.

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26

Berry, Donald A., and Robert P. Kertz. "Worth of perfect information in bernoulli bandits." Advances in Applied Probability 23, no. 1 (1991): 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1427509.

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For k-armed Bernoulli bandits with discounting, sharp comparisons are given between average optimal rewards for a gambler and for a ‘perfectly informed' gambler, over natural collections of prior distributions. Some of these comparisons are proved under general discounting, and others under non-increasing discount sequences. Connections are made between these comparisons and the concept of ‘regret' in the minimax approach to bandit processes. Identification of extremal cases in the sharp comparisons is emphasized.

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27

Johnson, J. David, Donald O. Case, James E. Andrews, and Suzanne L. Allard. "Genomics—the perfect information–seeking research problem." Journal of Health Communication 10, no. 4 (2005): 323–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10810730590950048.

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28

Herings, P. Jean-Jacques, and Arkadi Predtetchinski. "Best-Response Cycles in Perfect Information Games." Mathematics of Operations Research 42, no. 2 (2017): 427–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.2016.0808.

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29

Boppana, Ravi B., and Babu O. Narayanan. "Perfect-Information Leader Election with Optimal Resilience." SIAM Journal on Computing 29, no. 4 (2000): 1304–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1137/s0097539796307182.

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30

Clausing, Thorsten. "BELIEF REVISION IN GAMES OF PERFECT INFORMATION." Economics and Philosophy 20, no. 1 (2004): 89–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0266267104001269.

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A syntactic formalism for the modeling of belief revision in perfect information games is presented that allows to define the rationality of a player's choice of moves relative to the beliefs he holds as his respective decision nodes have been reached. In this setting, true common belief in the structure of the game and rationality held before the start of the game does not imply that backward induction will be played. To derive backward induction, a “forward belief” condition is formulated in terms of revised rather than initial beliefs. Alternative notions of rationality as well as the use o

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31

Berry, Donald A., and Robert P. Kertz. "Worth of perfect information in bernoulli bandits." Advances in Applied Probability 23, no. 01 (1991): 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0001867800023314.

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For k-armed Bernoulli bandits with discounting, sharp comparisons are given between average optimal rewards for a gambler and for a ‘perfectly informed' gambler, over natural collections of prior distributions. Some of these comparisons are proved under general discounting, and others under non-increasing discount sequences. Connections are made between these comparisons and the concept of ‘regret' in the minimax approach to bandit processes. Identification of extremal cases in the sharp comparisons is emphasized.

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32

Alpern, Steve. "Cycles in extensive form perfect information games." Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications 159, no. 1 (1991): 1–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0022-247x(91)90217-n.

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33

Pak, Maxwell, and Bing Xu. "Generalized reinforcement learning in perfect-information games." International Journal of Game Theory 45, no. 4 (2015): 985–1011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00182-015-0499-1.

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34

Thuijsman, Frank, and Thirukkannamangai E. S. Raghavan. "Perfect Information Stochastic Games and Related Classes." International Journal of Game Theory 26, no. 3 (1997): 403–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001820050042.

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35

Maniquet, Fran�ois. "Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information." Social Choice and Welfare 21, no. 2 (2003): 323–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-003-0262-6.

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36

Ichiishi, T. "Stable extensive game forms with perfect information." International Journal of Game Theory 15, no. 3 (1986): 163–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01769256.

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37

Alós-Ferrer, Carlos, and Klaus Ritzberger. "Equilibrium existence for large perfect information games." Journal of Mathematical Economics 62 (January 2016): 5–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.10.005.

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38

Reny, Philip J. "Common Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information." PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988, no. 2 (1988): 363–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1988.2.192897.

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39

Demichelis, Stefano, Klaus Ritzberger, and Jeroen M. Swinkels. "The simple geometry of perfect information games." International Journal of Game Theory 32, no. 3 (2004): 315–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s001820400169.

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40

Flesch, János, Jeroen Kuipers, Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi, Gijs Schoenmakers, Eilon Solan, and Koos Vrieze. "Perfect-Information Games with Lower-Semicontinuous Payoffs." Mathematics of Operations Research 35, no. 4 (2010): 742–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.1100.0469.

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41

Purves, Roger A., and William D. Sudderth. "Perfect Information Games with Upper Semicontinuous Payoffs." Mathematics of Operations Research 36, no. 3 (2011): 468–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/moor.1110.0504.

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42

Thompson, David R. M., and Kevin Leyton-Brown. "Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions." Games and Economic Behavior 102 (March 2017): 583–623. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.009.

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43

Shitovitz, Benyamin. "Optimistic stability in games of perfect information." Mathematical Social Sciences 28, no. 3 (1994): 199–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(94)90003-5.

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44

Kůrka, P. "Darwinian evolution in games with perfect information." Biological Cybernetics 55, no. 5 (1987): 281–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02281974.

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45

K?rka, P. "Darwinian evolution in games with perfect information." Biological Cybernetics 55, no. 5 (1987): 281–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf00320540.

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46

Thuijsman, Frank, and Thirukkannamangai E. S. Raghavan. "Perfect information stochastic games and related classes." International Journal of Game Theory 26, no. 3 (1997): 403–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf01263280.

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47

Samet, Dov. "Hypothetical Knowledge and Games with Perfect Information." Games and Economic Behavior 17, no. 2 (1996): 230–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0104.

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48

Tranæs, Torben. "Tie-Breaking in Games of Perfect Information." Games and Economic Behavior 22, no. 1 (1998): 148–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0564.

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49

Delsol , Idris, Olivier Rioul , Julien Béguinot, Victor Rabiet , and Antoine Souloumiac . "An Information Theoretic Condition for Perfect Reconstruction." Entropy 26, no. 1 (2024): 86. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/e26010086.

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A new information theoretic condition is presented for reconstructing a discrete random variable X based on the knowledge of a set of discrete functions of X. The reconstruction condition is derived from Shannon’s 1953 lattice theory with two entropic metrics of Shannon and Rajski. Because such a theoretical material is relatively unknown and appears quite dispersed in different references, we first provide a synthetic description (with complete proofs) of its concepts, such as total, common, and complementary information. The definitions and properties of the two entropic metrics are also ful

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50

Barelli, Paulo, and John Duggan. "Subgame‐perfect equilibrium in games with almost perfect information: Dispensing with public randomization." Theoretical Economics 16, no. 4 (2021): 1221–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.3982/te3243.

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Harris, Reny, and Robson (1995) added a public randomization device to dynamic games with almost perfect information to ensure existence of subgame perfect equilibria (SPE). We show that when Nature's moves are atomless in the original game, public randomization does not enlarge the set of SPE payoffs: any SPE obtained using public randomization can be “decorrelated” to produce a payoff‐equivalent SPE of the original game. As a corollary, we provide an alternative route to a result of He and Sun (2020) on existence of SPE without public randomization, which in turn yields equilibrium existence

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