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Seonwoo, Yoo-Yeong, and Choong-Young Lee. "Preparing a Plan for Inter-Korean Taekwondo Exchange to Establish Peace and Unification on the Korean Peninsula." World Society of Taekwondo Culture 14, no. 2 (2023): 67–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.18789/jwstc.2023.39.67.
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The main purpose of this study is to prepare a plan for inter-Korean Taekwondo exchange to establish peace and unification on the Korean Peninsula, which will be of practical help in promoting the government's North Korea policy and sports exchange. This study aims to review the importance of factors that were left out in the study of “A Study on the Taekwondo Exchange Revitalization Plans to Mitigate tensions between South and North Korea”. The factors to be reviewed are four factors each in the government and in the Taekwondo federation and private areas. Government areas include supporting for education and research on Taekwondo exchanges between the two Korea, signing an inter-Korean agreement separating politics and sports exchanges, promoting the creation of a second Taekwondo park in the Kaesong Industrial Complex, and providing Taekwondo supplies and equipment to North Korea on a humanitarian basis. In the federation and the private areas, four factors are to promote integration or merger of the World Taekwondo and the International Taekwondo Federation, to hold an annual seminars and conferences about inter-Korean Taekwondo or sports exchanges, to establish an international non-governmental organization (NGO) for inter-Korean sports exchanges and cooperation, and to support North Korean Taekwondo athletes for participation in Paris 2024 Olympics.
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Muliawati, Esty Fidhela, Widya Setiabudi, and Wawan Darmawan. "Trust-politik Korea Selatan kepada Korea Utara dalam Konteks Reunifikasi Korea Pada Pemerintahan Park Geun-hye." Journal of Education, Humaniora and Social Sciences (JEHSS) 4, no. 2 (2021): 809–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.34007/jehss.v4i2.749.
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The reunification of Korea is something that has been continuously discussed in every government of the presidents of South Korea. The concept of foreign policy of the 11th President of South Korea, Park Geun-hye, is known as Trust-Politics Policy. Trust-politics is President Park's overarching political philosophy. It is a vision and a policy tool applied to domestic politics and international relations. At its heart lies the concept of trust. Trust-Political Policy, influenced by internal and external factors. This politics seeks to build mutually binding expectations based on global norms. The purpose of the problem in this research is to find out the idea of reunification of South and North Korea during President Park and to explain South Korea's Trust-Political Policy to North Korea in the context of Korean Reunification. Researchers used qualitative research methods with literature study techniques in the process of collecting data. Based on the results of discussion and data analysis, reunification can be carried out using three Korean reunification scenarios, namely unification through evolution and adaptation systems, unification through collapse and absorption, and unification through conflict. As well as the idiosyncratic factors that influence Park in politics are factors of leadership, belief, culture, and the political system.
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Carothers, Christopher. "The Rise and Fall of Anti-Corruption in North Korea." Journal of East Asian Studies 22, no. 1 (2022): 147–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/jea.2021.38.
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Abstract North Korea is widely seen as having among the most corrupt governments in the world. However, the Kim family regime has not always been so accepting of government wrongdoing. Drawing on archival evidence, this study shows that Kim Il-sung saw corruption as a threat to economic development and launched campaigns to curb it throughout the 1950s. I find that these campaigns were at least somewhat successful, and they contributed to post-Korean War reconstruction and rapid development afterwards. So when and why did the regime shift from combating corruption to embracing it? I argue that changes in the country's economic system following the crisis of the 1990s, especially de facto marketization, made corruption more beneficial to the regime both as a source of revenue and as an escape valve for public discontent. This study's findings contribute to our understanding of the politics of corruption control in authoritarian regimes.
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Lee, Dalgon. "Negotiation Strategy between the Two Koreas: With Emphasis on Politico-Military Affairs." Korean Journal of Policy Studies 5 (December 31, 1990): 25–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.52372/kjps05002.
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Global detente seems to be a trend in the near future. The exorbitant German reunification, expecially, has instigated South Korea's expectation for Korean integration. However, North Korea reportedly decided to return to their backward policy and took measures to forbid softening of their socio-political system: that is, they remain one of the world's most closed society. Although there is a hint of forward change, the behavior of the North Korean elites cast a gloom over the future of the lives of all Koreans. In the southern part of the peninsula, changes are occuring in the military section. The U. S. government has set plans to withdraw some portion of the U. S. Forces stationed in Korea. Implementation of the plan will be dependent on the strategic situation of the Far East. Besides the reduction of the U. S. forces in Korea, the Korean government began to seriously consider arms control. Such a change of attitude was signaled by the speech of President Rho in the U. N. General Assembly last year.
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Hong, Suk-Hoon, and Yun-Young Cho. "Consistent pattern of DRPK’s policy on ROK: What shapes North Korea’s foreign policy?" International Area Studies Review 20, no. 1 (2016): 57–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2233865916683602.
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Identity is the basis of North Korea’s regime legitimacy. As a divided country, North Korea’s legitimacy is forged in the inter-Korean comparison. This paper starts with the question of what factors influence whether North Korea chooses to implement risky or cooperative policies toward South Korea, as well as what role domestic politics and ideology play in The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s (DPRK) formation and enactment of foreign policy. This paper confirmed that the Pyongyang leadership’s policy priority has mostly depended on identity need. Also, we infer that Pyongyang tends to take a hostile stance whenever the South government is willing to infringe Pyongyang’s legitimacy and dignity regardless of the South’s economic assistance. This research attempts to explain how historical and cultural contexts play in the DPRK’s formation of its policy toward the Republic of Korea, and also examines Rodong Sinmun, the official newspaper of the Pyongyang regime, through the lens of content analysis in order to determine the DPRK’s perception and policy preferences toward the The Republic of Korea (ROK).
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Woo, Hee Choul, and Soon Jin Hong. "North Korea’s power structure by period a study(Centered on the party)." Taegu Science University Defense Security Institute 7, no. 2 (2023): 43–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.37181/jscs.2023.7.2.043.
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The above paper is a party-centered research and analysis of the power structure of each era in North Korea. North Korea does not seem to maintain its normal state in the North’s special political environment, which actually leads to the third succession of Kim Il-sung, Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un, with the 8th Party congress held in 2021 in the Notth. It can be said that the Kim Il-sung era, when North Korea was founded, was some what close to the socialist state centered on the party, but the importance of the party was recognized due to the military-first politics during the Kim Jong-il era, but its role was very weak. But forming the third-generation hereditary state to Kim Jong-un, whose origins are unknown in any country, the North’s leader is trying to rule the countty today by a system based on a party-state power structure based on patriotism with in the or bit of a normal socialist state. It can be tnought that the 8th Party Congress held in North Korea in 2021 represents that. There fore, this paper predicts the relationship hetween the North Korea in 2021 represents that. There fore, this paper predicts the relationship between the North Korea party, government, and military durint North Korea’s three hereditary governance and how they will change around Rodongdang through review of existing reseaech papers, analysis of recent situation in North Korea, and analysis of nuclear power plant data related to North Korea.
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GOEDDE, Patricia. "Human Rights Diffusion in North Korea: The Impact of Transnational Legal Mobilization." Asian Journal of Law and Society 5, no. 1 (2017): 175–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/als.2017.20.
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AbstractThis article asks how legal mechanisms are employed outside of North Korea to achieve human rights diffusion in the country; to what extent these result in human rights diffusion in North Korea; and whether measures beyond accountability can be pursued in tandem for more productive engagement. Specifically, it examines how the North Korean government has interacted with the globalized legal regime of human rights vis-à-vis the UN and details the legal processes and implications of the UN Commission of Inquiry report, including domestic legislation, and evidence collection. While transnational legal mobilization has gathered momentum on the accountability side, it is significantly weaker in terms of achieving human rights protection within North Korea given the government’s perception of current human rights discourse as part of an externally produced war repertoire. Thus, efforts to engage the North Korean population and government require concurrent reframing of human rights discourse into more localized and relatable contexts.
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CHOO, Jaewoo. "South Korea’s Politics 2018: Unpredictable External Relations and a Slowing Economy." East Asian Policy 11, no. 01 (2019): 100–110. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s1793930519000096.
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South Korea will face enormous challenges on two fronts for 2019. The country’s economic base will collapse because of the government’s inability to counter the trap it has laid on itself with a dramatic elevation of minimum wage and tax rates on property and housing. The government will be diplomatically isolated for its blind love towards North Korea, and confronted with rising friction with Japan over history issues and China on Terminal High Altitude Area Defence.
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Kim, Min-jung, Min-joo Kim, Jyung-soo Kim, and Joon-ho Kim. "An improvement proposal: Protection and resettlement support act for North Korean defectors in order to propel social integration." International Social Work 61, no. 5 (2016): 665–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0020872816651700.
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The purpose of this study is to critically examine how North Korean defectors adapt to South Korean society and how the South Korean government institutes policies to support their settlement in the perspective of social integration. In particular, economic and psychological support by the South Korean government will be analyzed among the current resettlement support policies. The aim of this study is also to suggest proper remedial actions for North Korean defectors based on empirical research on the actual conditions of North Korean defectors in South Korea.
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Yun, Seongyi. "South Korea in 2022." Asian Survey 63, no. 2 (2023): 225–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2023.63.2.225.
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At the presidential and local levels, progressives were replaced by conservatives in 2022. But the National Assembly is still dominated by the opposition Democratic Party, so the government is more divided than ever. As a conservative government came into power in South Korea, North Korea fired the most missiles ever, and inter-Korean relations were very strained. The economy is in serious condition due to inflation, interest rate hikes, and slowing growth.
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Lee, Yusin. "Potential Risks of the Russia-North Korea-South Korea Gas Pipeline." Asian Survey 53, no. 3 (2013): 584–606. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2013.53.3.584.
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This paper analyzes the potential risks of the Russia-North Korea-South Korea (RNS) gas pipeline, comparing it with the Russia-Ukraine-Europe (RUE) pipeline. I argue that the possibility of disputes is much higher in the RNS case. Furthermore, I propose that the South Korean government opt to import liquefied natural gas by ship directly from Russia if contingency plans in the case of gas supply disruptions in the RNS pipeline are not available.
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Duckworth, Austin. "“Decisive Political Means”: International Security Cooperation and the 1988 Seoul Olympic Games." Journal of Sport History 48, no. 1 (2021): 17–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.5406/jsporthistory.48.1.0017.
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Abstract The International Olympic Committee (IOC) selected Seoul, South Korea, as the host of the 1988 Summer Olympic Games in Baden-Baden, Germany, in 1981. Due to the acrimonious history between the two nations, in particular North Korea’s bombing of a South Korean civilian airplane in 1987, fear existed that North Korea might attack the games. In response to the North Korean threat, the IOC, national governments, and national Olympic committees worked together to provide security for the 1988 Seoul Olympics. As relations between the United States and Soviet Union slowly improved, protecting the Olympics factored into arms-control discussions between the two rivals. Simultaneously, despite a long-held aversion to politics interfering with sport, the situation forced the IOC to manipulate political ties to ensure a safe Olympic Games. This system of international security cooperation had a lasting impact on Olympic security.
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Taylor, Moe. "A New Kind of Vanguard: Cuban−North Korean Discourse on Revolutionary Strategy for the Global South in the 1960s." Journal of Latin American Studies 53, no. 4 (2021): 667–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022216x21000754.
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AbstractDuring the 1960s, the Cuban government attempted to play a leadership role within the Latin American Left. In the process Cuban leaders departed from Marxist−Leninist orthodoxy, garnering harsh criticism from their Soviet and Chinese allies. Yet Cuba found a steadfast supporter of its controversial positions in North Korea. This support can in large part be explained by the parallels between Cuban and North Korean ideas about revolution in the developing nations of the Global South. Most significantly, both parties embraced a radical reconceptualisation of the role of the Marxist−Leninist vanguard party. This new doctrine appealed primarily to younger Latin American militants frustrated with the established leftist parties and party politics in general. The Cuban/North Korean theory of the party had a tangible influence in Colombia, Peru, Brazil, Puerto Rico, El Salvador, Mexico, Bolivia and Nicaragua, as revolutionary groups in these societies took up arms in the 1960s and 1970s.
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Bennett, Bruce W., and Jennifer Lind. "The Collapse of North Korea: Military Missions and Requirements." International Security 36, no. 2 (2011): 84–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00057.
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In North Korea, the upcoming leadership transition in the Kim Jong-il regime will be a precarious time for the Kim family's hold on power. A collapse of the North Korean government could have several dangerous implications for East Asia, including “loose nukes,” a humanitarian disaster, a regional refugee crisis, and potential escalation to war between China and the United States. To respond to a collapse and these problems, neighboring countries may perform several military missions to stabilize North Korea. These include the location and securing of North Korean weapons of mass destruction, stability operations, border control, conventional disarmament, and combat/deterrence operations. Assuming that collapse occurs in a relatively benign manner, military missions to stabilize North Korea could require 260,000 to 400,000 troops. If collapse occurs after a war on the peninsula, or if it sparks civil war in North Korea, the number of missions—and their requirements—would grow. Because of the size and complexity of these missions, and because of the perils associated with mismanaging them, advance and combined planning is essential. Combined planning should include those actors (e.g., China, South Korea, and the United States) that could otherwise take destabilizing action to protect their own interests.
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Park, Han Woo. "Use of North Korea-Related YouTube Videos in South Korea: A Case Study of VideoMug." Drustvena istrazivanja 30, no. 4 (2021): 721–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.5559/di.30.4.04.
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South Koreans have been producing social media content that sharply divided between conservative and progressive perspectives. This study analyzes a YouTube video clip during a South-North summit and then expands its scope to include the entire set of North Korea-related videos. The video was accused on the presidential petition website of violating South Korea's National Security Law. Despite sparking a debate on the suitability of the video's content among YouTube viewers, the petition did not attract much attention from the general public. Using this clip as a basis, we examine how YouTubers show interest in, reactions to, and engagement with North Korea-related media content using several network metrics and visualizations. Our analysis includes extensive background on South Korea's information policy toward North Korea. Based on our findings, we recommend that the South Korean government use cognitive and communication-oriented profiling-based input when formulating their information policy toward North Korea.
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Tait, Richard. "Playing By the Rules in Korea: Lessons Learned in the North-South Economic Engagement." Asian Survey 43, no. 2 (2003): 305–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2003.43.2.305.
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This paper identifies common problems and solutions South Korean firms experience in engaging with North Korean entities. Korean government and commercial entities on both sides of the 38th parallel are guilty of engaging in economic policies and exchange that do not promote North Korea's productive and responsible introduction into world trade circles. U.S. and South Korean investment now that encourages North Korea to play by the rules of capitalist market exchange will pay off in inexpensive security guarantees much later down the road.
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Yang, Sanghee. "A Critical Review of North Korea's COVID-19 Response Policy: From the Perspective of International Cooperation in the International Health Regulations (2005)." Society for International Cultural Institute 15, no. 2 (2022): 185–204. http://dx.doi.org/10.34223/jic.2022.15.2.185.
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North Korea has vowed to provide equal health and medical services to all citizens, including free treatment, doctor's care assigned to each area, and preventive medicine, but it is suffering from a recession that began in the mid- to late 1990s and a lack of budget for arms strengthening. In particular, the COVID-19 pandemic in the early 2020s added to this difficult situation. This study criticizes the causes and effects of the Kim Jong-un administration's hasty policy errors in the COVID-19 pandemic, as North Korea's poor health care situation is due to various aspects of politics, economy, and society. This research first introduces the current status and attributes of the North Korean economy, and examines the characteristics of the North Korean health and medical treatment policy based on them. Subsequently, in terms of international cooperation in the International Health Regulations (2005), the North Korean government's COVID-19 pandemic policy is critically reviewed and the policy direction for private cooperation as a non-political means is presented in the conclusion. Finally, this paper argues that in order to effectively supplement the North Korean government's COVID-19 response policy, international solidarity and cooperation, including South Korea, should be promoted transnational, and the International Health Regulations (2005) should be revised to the International Health Law with treaty-level coercion to ensure human mobility as much as possible.
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Richardson, Lauren. "The Forgotten Victims of the Atomic Bomb: North Korean Pipokja and the Politics of Victimhood in Japan-DPRK Relations." Pacific Affairs 96, no. 1 (2023): 61–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.5509/202396161.
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This article examines the redress campaign waged by activists in Japan on behalf of roughly 2,000 North Korean A-bomb victims (pipokja). These victims were repatriated from Japan after being subjected to the 1945 US nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, while under colonial rule. From the early 1990s through to the twenty-first century, activists in Japan pursued redress for these A-bomb survivors in close synchronicity with the redress movements centred on South Korean victims. Highlighting the potential of the individual as entrepreneur within collective action settings, the redress developments were initiated and largely driven by an activist, Lee Sil-gun (1929–2020).<br/> Although Tokyo and Pyongyang were initially reluctant to acknowledge that A-bomb survivors existed in North Korea, in the face of sustained pressure by the Japan-based activists, the two governments facilitated a limited redress process for the victims by making various concessions on the issue. How did these activists navigate the structural constraints of the authoritarian North Korean state and the volatile bilateral relationship in enacting their transnational activism? How were they able to elicit concessions on their redress objectives from Tokyo and Pyongyang in the absence of formalized diplomatic relations? Drawing on fieldwork conducted in Japan and South Korea, this article probes these questions by empirically tracing and analyzing the evolution of the redress campaign for the North Korean A-bomb victims. I utilize the concept of polylateral diplomacy to elucidate the dynamic of engagement between the activists and the two governments.
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Dukalskis, Alexander, and Junhyoung Lee. "Everyday Nationalism and Authoritarian Rule: A Case Study of North Korea." Nationalities Papers 48, no. 6 (2020): 1052–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/nps.2019.99.
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AbstractThis article traces the evolution of “everyday nationalism” in North Korea and assesses its relationship to authoritarian resilience. It argues that coercion and the prospect of coercion play important roles in policing the contours of everyday nationalism. The state is able to infuse nationalism and authoritarian control into everyday life, but the “success” of its efforts has limits. This is due to social changes and the ways that material failures nurtured doubts about the legitimacy of the government among some citizens. It draws on data from North Korean state media, secondary historical literature, and 58 semi-structured interviews with North Koreans living in South Korea.
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Mah, Jai S. "North Korea’s Science and Technology Policy and the Development of Technology-Intensive Industries." Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 19, no. 4 (2020): 503–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15691497-12341567.
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Abstract The North Korean government declared a pursuit of the Military-First Policy and the Ideology of Focusing on Science and Technology in the late 1990s. It thus made science and technology central to its goal of the Establishment of Strong and Prosperous State. North Korea came to perceive science and technology as engines for promoting both nuclear armament and economic development. The switch of policy attention to science and technology has facilitated the development of some selected technology-intensive industries. In 2017, North Korea declared that it had completed development of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Although North Korea’s development of hi-tech arms including nuclear bombs and ICBMs appears inconsistent with its low level of economic development, it can be understood in light of the North Korean government’s emphasis on science and technology and prioritization of the allocation of resources to defense.
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Shin, Doh Chull. "Democratic Consolidation in Korea: A Trend Analysis of Public Opinion Surveys, 1997–2001." Japanese Journal of Political Science 2, no. 2 (2001): 177–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109901000226.
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The Republic of Korea (Korea hereinafter) has been widely regarded as one of the most vigorous and analytically interesting third-wave democracies (Diamond and Shin, 2000: 1). During the first decade of democratic rule, Korea has successfully carried out a large number of electoral and other reforms to transform the institutions and procedures of military-authoritarian rule into those of a representative democracy. Unlike many of its counterparts in Latin America and elsewhere, Korea has fully restored civilian rule by extricating the military from power. As is the case in established democracies of North America and Western Europe, free and competitive elections have been regularly held at all the different levels of the government. In the most recent presidential election, held in December 1997, Korea also established itself as a mature electoral democracy by elevating an opposition party to political power. In Korea today, there is general agreement that electoral politics has become the only possible political game in town.
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Han, Sukhee, and Dongchan Kim. "North Korea in 2021." Asian Survey 62, no. 1 (2022): 53–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2022.62.1.05.
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Continuing the trendline of 2020, North Korea’s key priorities in 2021 were to tighten its belt economically and control the COVID-19 pandemic. Those two goals were related. With its healthcare system no match for such a public health crisis, the government continued its utmost effort to prevent a COVID-19 disaster through the near-complete closure of its borders, severely hampering vital trade with China. As seen in the 8th Congress of the Workers’ Party of North Korea, however, chairman Kim Jong-un also prioritized maintaining an assertive stance toward the United States, even to the point of abjuring negotiations with Washington that might have unlocked vaccines or medical assistance. Instead, North Korea frequently criticized the US’s “hostile position” and carried out a variety of missile tests, which seemed more provocative and capable throughout the year. Pyongyang also restarted the Yongbyon nuclear facilities for producing fissile materials. This assertive and provocative behavior was emboldened by steadily closer ties with traditional allies, notably China and Russia. Meanwhile, North Korea largely showed a cold, dismissive attitude to its southern counterpart.
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Sohn, Yul, and Won-Taek Kang. "South Korea in 2013." Asian Survey 54, no. 1 (2014): 138–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2014.54.1.138.
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The new government led by President Park Geun-hye faced challenges that the previous government had largely failed to address: rising income disparity, stagnant growth, political reform, and foreign policy issues, including a nuclear North Korea and an assertive Japan. Park’s foreign policy scored some successes while her old-style management of political affairs supported by the old guard caused a prolonged political stalemate with the opposition party.
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Strnad, Grażyna. "Wyzwania i kierunki nowej administracji prezydenta Yoon Suk Yeola." Azja-Pacyfik 25, no. 1 (2022): 43–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.15804/ap2022.1.03.
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The purpose of the article is to describe the 2022 South Korean presidential election against the backdrop of a paradigm shift and to show the challenges and directions of Yoon Suk Yeol’s new administration. The author focuses on the research problems present in the new South Korean politics. Elements of change and continuity, which were also present in previous administrations are highlighted. In May 2022, Yoon Suk Yeol was sworn into the South Korea’s highest office. Yoon’s win in the presidential election ended a trend in which a decade of progressive rule was followed by a change to conservative rule. Since 1998, progressive and conservative presidents have alternated every two terms. The minimal difference in votes in favor of the conservative candidate reflected the divisions and social preferences of Koreans who favored a change from progressive to conservative government. The results of the 2022 presidential election revealed the polarization of South Korean society. Yoon will face a series of difficult challenges. In domestic politics, he must confront the housing crisis, widespread dissatisfaction with economic inequality, and generational tensions, among other issues. Yoon will also be challenged by the parliamentary majority currently held by the Democratic Party in the National Assembly. In foreign policy, South Korea’s new president advocates strengthening the alliance with the United States and cooperation with the Quad countries; he promises to improve relations with Japan, and to take steps toward South Korea playing a greater role in the world. In his inter-Korean policy, on the other hand, Yoon follows the traditional position of the conservatives, pledging to strengthen a policy of deterrence against acts of aggression and provocation by North Korea.
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Kim, Inhan. "Land Reform in South Korea under the U.S. Military Occupation, 1945–1948." Journal of Cold War Studies 18, no. 2 (2016): 97–129. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_00639.
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The conventional wisdom regarding land reform in South Korea implemented by the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) is that it was a partial and short-term palliative driven by the exigent Communist threat and the free-land program adopted in North Korea. This article offers a new interpretation of the motives, process, and impact of the land reform program under the U.S. military occupation, highlighting three points. First, the United States was serious about conducting a land-to-tiller program because of its desire to stop Communism and pave the way for democracy in South Korea. Both goals were important. Second, the partial reform in March 1948 is explained by volatile political circumstances in South Korea: strong Communist activity at the beginning of the occupation and the rise of intransigent conservatives at the end. Third, the U.S.-sponsored land reform catalyzed further reform by the new South Korean government by setting a precedent and establishing guidelines for land redistribution parcel sizes, prices, and payment schedules.
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Okano-Heijmans, Maaike. "Troubled Neighbours: Japan's Negative Economic Diplomacy Towards North Korea." European Journal of East Asian Studies 9, no. 2 (2010): 363–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156805810x548793.
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AbstractThe importance of economic issues, in a comprehensive multilateral and bilateral context, has been receiving increased attention in writings about the Korean Peninsula lately. This article adds to this debate by analysing Japan's relations with North Korea from an economic diplomacy perspective. The concept of 'negative economic diplomacy' is introduced to understand actions of the Japanese government, which had tried economic engagement in various ways until the early 1990s, but hardened its stance thereafter. Tokyo seems to have come to the conclusion that North Korean rulers are more willing to preserve the status quo than some wish to believe and, consequently, started to use the North Korean threat to justify Japan's controversial military enhancement in a context of uncertainty about the United States' commitment and an increasingly stronger China. is strategy was practised through a negative approach to economic diplomacy of withholding economic benefits—in policy fields ranging from the abductees and normalisation of diplomatic relations, to trade relations, sanctions and the six-way process. Japan's policy was most outspoken from late 2002 until at least mid-2007.
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Park, Hwee-rhak. "What Made South Korea–Japan Security Cooperation Retreat During the Moon Jae-in Administration?" Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 11, no. 1 (2024): 94–121. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/23477970241230374.
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This article elucidates the reasons behind South Korea’s diminished security cooperation with Japan during the Moon Jae-in administration (2017–2022). The author discovered that President Moon halted ongoing security cooperation activities initiated by his predecessor, even though the North Korean nuclear threat became exponential. In particular, this article argues that not the national-level factors, such as South Koreans’ negative perception of Japan on the basis of their collective memory, but the leader factor was the main reason for the worsening of South Korea–Japan’s security cooperation during the Moon administration, contrary to most people’s expectations. The Moon administration’s progressive political leaders, who had acquired anti-United States/anti-Japan and pro-North Korea/pro-China perspectives during their anti-government protests in the 1970s and 1980s, decided to be confrontational towards Japan to their political benefit. The reality that the security cooperation between South Korea and Japan jumpstarted once the conservative Yoon Suk-yeol administration leaders replaced them supports this finding.
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Ilin, Mykhailo. "The Search for the Peaceful Development of Humankind: How South Korea’s Experience Can Be Useful for Ukraine." Diplomatic Ukraine, no. XX (2019): 729–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.37837/2707-7683-2019-48.
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The article deals with the summit held in Seoul, South Korea, in February 2019. The author outlines the issues of peaceful development of humanity, which were submitted for discussion by the summit participants, lists the speakers and highlights their main messages. At the summit, representatives of different nations and religions have expressed their concern about the challenges our societies are facing, especially in the context of the crisis on the Korean Peninsula. The author traces the common and distinctive features between South Korea and Ukraine. Korea was divided into South and North by a secret agreement between the USA and the USSR. Subsequently, two states were created, while the Korean War cemented the division of the country. The situation is very similar to the conflict in the Donbas, but in this case, no one consented that another country would control part of our territory. The experience of Korea proves that if the conflict situation is not solved immediately and results in the emergence of a new globally recognized state, the unification of the country may take decades. Now Korea is drawing on global expertise of public organizations, members of the government, religious figures and media to unify the country. The author summarizes the positive experience of the development of Korea, which may be projected to Ukraine. Korea is putting in a lot of effort into the education of the population. Culture of the nation has become the main policy line of the state, which is heavily investing in the development of its citizens’ potential. The ability to master cutting-edge technologies depends on the level and quality of education in a country. South Korea’s market economy encourages private business to invest in technological advancement. The author emphasizes that South Korea has achieved great success in science and technology thanks to the development of human resources. It is the development of human potential that contributes to scientific and technological progress, and as a result, to the economic growth of the country. Keywords: South Korea, scientific and technical development, culture, politics, summit.
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Grant, Cynthia. "CAN AN IMMIGRANT SOUTH KOREAN THEATRE ARTIST BE HEARD IN CANADA?" Canadian Theatre Review 117 (January 2004): 22–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.3138/ctr.117.006.
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Huynhee Seo came to Canada in 1997, after spending fifteen years working in activist theatre with a group called Tobagi Theatre, based in the southwest of South Korea in Kwangju. In Kiang, a very unique project of community development had taken place, through an initiative called the Wildfire Night School. Several popular educators, brilliant intellectuals influenced by Paolo Freire, transformed communities of the poor. So in 1980, when the military government was installed, it was in Kwangju that there was community resistance. Initially a street theatre group as part of the community actions, the group formalized itself over time and became Tobagi Theatre. Tobagi Theatre toured in North America in 1994 and 1996. I spoke with Huynhee one late night in a Toronto kitchen about a crucial period of politics and culture both in her life and the life of South Korea.
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Moon, Chung-In. "South Korea in 2009: From Setbacks to Reversal." Asian Survey 50, no. 1 (2010): 56–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2010.50.1.56.
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Despite political setbacks, aftershocks of the global financial crisis, and the continuing North Korean nuclear quagmire, the Lee Myung-bak government made dramatic reversals in 2009. But winning local elections, forging national unity, sustaining economic growth, and managing the North Korean question will remain daunting challenges throughout 2010.
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Szalontai, Balázs, and Yoo Jinil. "Maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran: North Korea's Relations with Iraq and Iran during the Cold War." Journal of Cold War Studies 25, no. 2 (2023): 179–247. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_01119.
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Abstract This article explores how North Korean leaders tried to maneuver between Iran and Iraq to gain greater leverage in the Cold War. Both of these Middle Eastern countries seemed potentially attractive partners for Pyongyang, but they were often on hostile terms with each other. The article considers how the Iraq-Iran rivalry and domestic changes in Iraq and Iran affected North Korean policy. Even when Pyongyang's cooperation with one or the other of the two states reached a high level, the North Koreans also reached out to the other country, regardless of the position of either state and of external actors such as the Soviet Union and China. The North Koreans generally avoided taking a public stand on the Iraq-Iran dispute, but on occasion they became more deeply involved. Mainly, the North Korean government sought to maximize the number of its partners, rather than to make a stable commitment to just one state. In turn, both Iraq and Iran eventually came to perceive North Korea as a state that was mostly out to benefit itself rather than helping either of them.
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Onderco, Michal, and Wolfgang Wagner. "The ideational foundations of coercion: political culture and policies towards North Korea." European Political Science Review 9, no. 2 (2015): 279–302. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755773915000387.
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The notion that states’ foreign and security policies are not exclusively driven by material interests is now firmly established. Whose ideas matter and in what way, however, has remained subject to debate. We advance this debate by studying the crisis diplomacy of liberal democracies towards North Korea during four crises around the country’s violation of international norms between 1993 and 2009. Although liberal democracies share a common perception of North Korea’s nuclear programme as a threat to international peace and security, they differ widely in either confronting or accommodating North Korea. We examine the explanatory power of two ideational driving forces behind the foreign policy of liberal democracies: the ideological orientation of the government, on the one hand, and a country’s political culture, on the other. Our analysis of 22 liberal democracies demonstrates that different domestic cultures of dealing with norm violations have a significant impact on crisis diplomacy: countries with punitive domestic cultures tend to adopt confrontational policies towards international norm violators; while left governments are not more accommodationist than right governments. Ideational differences across states are thus more pronounced than those within states.
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Evan Sarantakes, Nicholas. "Keeping the Cold War Cold: Korea, 1966–1976." Journal of American-East Asian Relations 31, no. 1 (2024): 36–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18765610-31010003.
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Abstract During the Cold War, U.S. strategic leaders had to deal with policies and issues in every part of the globe. The main theater was in Europe, but there were other regions that demanded attention. Korea was an important one. From the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, the peninsula was on the brink of conflict as North Korea initiated a series of operations that were legitimate acts of war. There was a strong desire among South Korean government officials for a military response, but U.S. government leaders said no. Officials in Washington recognized the limits of U.S. power at the time, and designed their responses to maintain the status quo. The story of how the United States handled its undertakings in areas of marginal importance was a chapter in the larger history of the Cold War. A number of historians have suggested that the Third World played a key role in shaping developments in the Cold War, but U.S. actions in Korea indicate something a bit more complicated. Knowing when to become involved and when to limit losses was crucial in how the United States managed events along the periphery of the Cold War.
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Yap, O. Fiona. "South Korea in 2015." Asian Survey 56, no. 1 (2016): 78–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2016.56.1.78.
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The year 2015 featured real and metaphorical battles in South Korea: face-offs between the executive and the legislature saw President Park Geun-hye duel with the non-Park faction in the ruling Saenuri Party and fend off the opposition, whose alliance struggled with infighting and subsequent fractures. The government waged war against a health epidemic and exchanged artillery fire with North Korea at the Demilitarized Zone. The by-elections in April 2015 augur the political stage for pending elections in 2016 and 2017.
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Dittrich, Klaus. "Europeans and Americans in Korea, 1882–1910: A Bourgeois and Translocal Community." Itinerario 40, no. 1 (2016): 3–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0165115316000036.
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This article deals with the European and American community in Korea between the conclusion of Korea’s first international treaties in the early 1880s and the country’s annexation by the Japanese Empire in 1910. It begins by presenting an overview of the community. Concentrated in Seoul and Chemulp’o, the Anglo-Saxon element dominated a community made up of diplomats, foreign experts in the service of the Korean government, merchants and missionaries. Next, the article describes two key characteristics of the European and American residents in Korea. First, they were individuals who defined themselves as bourgeois, or middle-class; second, the term “translocality” serves to bring together the multiple layers of border-crossing these individuals were involved in—as long-distance migrants between Europe or North America and East Asia, as migrants within East Asia, and as representatives of different European and American nationalities living together in Korea.
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Davydov, O. "Yoon Suk-Yeol Administration's Foreign Policy Strategy and the U.S.–Rok Alliance." World Economy and International Relations 67, no. 1 (2023): 68–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2023-67-1-68-79.
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The article studies new foreign policy of South Korea after the administration change in Seoul in May 2022. Over the last period, the external environment for the country has become more complex. That was due to the growth of rivalry between the USA and China, COVID&#8209;19 pandemic implications as well as the Ukrainian crisis, which resulted in increased global and regional instability and disruption of previously established supply chains. Along with that, the confrontation on the Korean Peninsula has become deeper and more protracted with no way forward to break that impasse. All previous attempts to engage North Korea into the dialogue, made by the Moon Jae-in administration, have failed. Those factors affected the priorities chosen by the new administration in foreign affairs. The author concentrates on the concept of the “global pivotal state” announced by the Yoon Suk-yeol’s government. With the criticism of the previous government’s approach that was narrowly focused on Inter-Korean agendas, the new foreign policy team is going to pursue the brand of a “value diplomacy”, emphasizing South Korea’s role in promoting “liberal democracy” and “rules-based regional order”. As for North Korea, Yoon Suk-yeol has shifted his strategy to a hard-line approach which implied strengthening deterrence and raising credibility of the U.S. assurances to provide a nuclear umbrella to defend its ally. The article highlights Seoul’s new policy aimed at rebuilding and strengthening the “comprehensive global alliance” between the ROK and the USA that presupposes cooperation on a wide range of international and regional agendas beyond the Korean Peninsula. The paper explores some emerging political dimensions of South Korea in the Indo-Pacific region. It is shown that Seoul wishes to be an active participant of the U.S. – led minilateral arrangements to ensure its expanded economic and security interests in the region.
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Bae, Joonbum. "Limits of engagement? The sunshine policy, nuclear tests, and South Korean views of North Korea 1995–2013." International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 20, no. 3 (2019): 411–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcz004.
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Abstract Can positive domestic messages generated by a foreign policy of engagement toward another country change public views regarding that state? How resistant are such changes to events that contradict the positive messages? I argue that while positive government messages about an adversary can significantly improve public opinion, highly consequential foreign policy events that contradict the messages influence public opinion at the cost of elites’ ability to shape it through their messages. Such differing effects can lead to a polarization of opinion when the content of the messages and the nature of events diverge from each other. Leveraging the unpredictability of North Korea’s foreign policy behavior, the South Korean government’s sustained policy of engagement toward it during the years 1998–2007, and North Korea’s first two nuclear tests to examine the relative impact of consequential foreign policy events and elite messages on public opinion, I find strong evidence consistent with this argument.
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Ahn, Mun-Suk. "Bureaucratic Politics and Bureaucrats` Mobilizationof Power Resources: Centering on the Process of North Korea Policy Making under the Park Geun-hye Government." Korean Journal of International Relations 55, no. 4 (2015): 169–201. http://dx.doi.org/10.14731/kjir.2015.12.55.4.169.
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Kim, Sung-han, and Geun Lee. "When security met politics: desecuritization of North Korean threats by South Korea's Kim Dae-jung government." International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 11, no. 1 (2010): 25–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcq015.
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Clemens, Walter. "Negotiating to Control Weapons of Mass Destruction in North Korea." International Negotiation 10, no. 3 (2005): 453–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157180605776087462.
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AbstractNegotiations to control and perhaps eliminate North Korea's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) appeared to achieve positive results in the 1990s. But these positive trends reversed direction in 2001–2004 under President George W. Bush. Why? This essay weighs six possible explanations. 1. progress in the 1990s as a mirage; 2. cultural differences; 3. distrust of international agreements; 4. perceptions regarding the utility of WMD; 5. internal divisions within each government and society; and 6. ulterior motives.The evidence suggests that the sixth explanation carries the most weight. Top leaders in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) as well as in the United States had priorities other than arms control. Each side used arms control negotiations as an instrument to promote its political and economic agenda in other realms. Pyongyang demanded large and certain rewards to give up its main bargaining chips. North Korea's negotiating behavior suggested some willingness to freeze or eliminate WMD programs if the price were right. But Kim Jong Il's regime clearly saw its nuclear and missile capabilities as major assets not to be traded away except for very substantial security and economic rewards. For its part, the Bush White House probably worried that any accord with Pyongyang would impede Washington's larger political, military, and economic ambitions, including deployment of a national missile defense (NMD). There was also a subjective element: President Bush probably loathed Kim Jong Il and did not relish the prospect of making any compromises with evil incarnate. For enlightened self-interest to prevail, the parties could benefit from greater empathy and a quest for mutual rather than one-sided gain.
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KIM, JUNG HYOUN. "The Comparative Analysis of Public Support for Developing Regional Regime in East Sea Rim (Sea of Japan) Region." Japanese Journal of Political Science 15, no. 1 (2014): 131–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109913000388.
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AbstractThe East Sea (or Sea of Japan) (ESR/SOJ) Rim region, in which five countries – Japan, China, Russia, and North and South Korea – have their own coastal areas, is complex and dynamic, with many emerging regional security concerns. In this paper, the author tries to show that there is the possibility of a maritime regional regime in the ESR/SOJ region by investigating the level of public support, in Japan and South Korea, for the formation of a regional regime. Based on the theoretical assumptions of constructivism, the author analyzes what kinds of individual's social position factors influence the level of support for regional regime formation by conducting a nested regression model of survey datasets. The results of the statistical analysis suggest that people with a high level of national pride in South Korea are more likely to support a regional regime in the ESR/SOJ region. In contrast, for Japanese people, there is no relationship between people's national pride and the level of support for regional regime formation. The economic recession in Japan since the early 1990s has made public concern more about domestic policy than about foreign policy issues. Based on strong support of the bottom, public opinion towards regional regime formation, the South Korean government may play a leading role in developing a regional regime in the ESR/SOJ region (when the process of negotiation begins) as in the case of Japan in nineteenth century.
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Lim, J., and H. Seo. "Frame Flow Between Government and the News Media and its Effects on the Public: Framing of North Korea." International Journal of Public Opinion Research 21, no. 3 (2009): 396. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/edp041.
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Marcus, David. "Famine Crimes in International Law." American Journal of International Law 97, no. 2 (2003): 245–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3100102.
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Some of the worst human rights catastrophes of the twentieth century were famines created or manipulated by governments. In 1932 at least five million Ukrainians starved to death, while hunger was largely unknown across the border in Russia.The Soviet government imposed disastrous grain quotas on the Ukraine, then let its own citizens literally collapse in the streets while it exported grain to further its “revolutionary” objectives.The Ethiopian famine of 1983-1985, preserved in popular memory as a natural disaster of biblical proportions, most fiercely struck those parts of the country that harbored irredentist movements. In a stunning, but telling, rejoinder to international pity for the purportedly hapless Ethiopian government, the Ethiopian foreign minister told a U.S. chargé d’affaires that “food is a major element in our strategy against the secessionists.” Since 1994, more than two million out of a population of twenty-two million in North Korea have starved to death, while South Koreans, affected by similar weather patterns, have remained completely untouched by famine. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), trying to distribute aid earmarked for famine victims, have watched helplessly as the government callously interfered and have arrived at the conclusion that “the authorities are deliberately depriving hundreds of thousands of truly needy Koreans of assistance.”
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Contreras Luna, Rafael. "Russia, the Arctic and Northeast Asia: The Strategic Importance of the Far North." Central European Journal of International and Security Studies 13, no. 3 (2019): 101–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.51870/cejiss.a130303.
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Historically, the Arctic has been much more important to Russia than to other Arctic countries. In Soviet times, the development of the Arctic was of paramount importance and it was used by the Soviet government to legitimise its great power status to domestic and international audiences. It is argued in this paper that the administration of President Putin has re-established a narrative on Russia as an Arctic power. In this sense, Russia not only seeks to exploit natural resources and develop the Northern Sea Route, but to project status as it conceives of itself as a great power. This paper suggests that the Arctic is not only becoming more important for Russia itself but also for Northeast Asian countries, as China, Japan and South Korea require a stable regional environment and secure supply of natural resources, which are essential for their prosperity and stability. In this sense, diverse partnerships are being developed between Russian and Northeast Asian countries; this work analyses the key components of those partnerships and its potential benefits. The development of the Far North constitutes an essential component in Russia’s larger and long-term project to develop Asiatic Russia. It would be fallacious to examine Russia’s Arctic strategy only through the prism of the current confrontation between Russia and the West. Keywords: Russia, great power, Arctic, Far North, Northeast Asia, China, Japan, South Korea.
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Kornai, János. "The system paradigm revisited." Acta Oeconomica 66, no. 4 (2016): 547–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1556/032.2016.66.4.1.
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The term paradigm was introduced to the philosophy of science by Thomas Kuhn — he used this term to denote the specific approach applied by a school of reasearch to examine its subject matter. Researchers using the same paradigm seek answers to similar questions, and employ similar methods and concepts. In an article published in 2000, the author of this essay introduced the term system paradigm, which focuses on the systems functioning in a society. This study develops the theoretical considerations outlined in that earlier article on the basis of experience on post-socialist transition. The first part compares the socialist and capitalist systems, describing their main characteristics, and concludes that the capitalist system has become established in former socialist countries, except for North Korea and Cuba. The second part analyzes varieties of capitalism within a typology which classifies prevailing forms of politics and government. Three markedly different types are identified: democracy, autocracy, and dictatorship. Huntington wrote about the “third wave” of democratization. This study concludes the third wave has dried up: for the 47 post-socialist countries, only a tenth of the population live in democracy, while autocracy or dictatorship prevails in all other countries in this group. The third part of this essay applies the conceptual and analytical apparatus to Hungary, where capitalism exists, and autocracy is the prevailing politico-governmental form — here we can find important characteristics common to other capitalist countries or other autocracies. This finding is compatible with the observation that there are some, less fundamental, characteristics unique to Hungary, or “Hungarica”, which differ from the characteristics of all other countries.1
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Pugacheva, O., and A. Pyatachkova. "South Korea’s Policy toward Belt and Road Initiative." World Economy and International Relations 65, no. 10 (2021): 81–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.20542/0131-2227-2021-65-10-81-90.
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The article explores the Republic of Korea’s (ROK) position and policy toward China’s Belt and Road initiative (BRI). South Korea’s interests and intentions regarding linking of Moon Jae-in’s New Northern and New Southern Policies (in an earlier period – Park Geun-hye’s Eurasia Initiative) and China’s BRI are examined. The potential risks and factors that will influence such cooperation are defined, in particular the deepening of US–China rivalry in the region, fears of overdependence on China, instability on the Korean Peninsula, and costs associated with a slowdown in economic growth during the (post) pandemic period. At the official level the ROK has not joined the Belt and Road initiative, but Moon Jae-in’s government adheres to the position of the need to develop cooperation with the PRC. The ROK is interested in economic benefits it can have through its participation in the BRI. In particular, it expects to enter new infrastructure markets together with China. Seoul’s diplomatic curtsy over the BRI is not least related to the ROK’s interest in the Chinese consumer market, which in 2020 became the largest in the world after the US consumer goods market, as well as the importance of economic cooperation with China, its largest trading partner. Projects with the participation of North Korea are of great importance for Seoul as well, but their implementation at this stage is extremely problematic due to international sanctions. Under these circumstances, South Korea is trying to find common ground between its regional policies and the BRI at the level of interregional cooperation and joint investments in third countries (in particular, ASEAN). Thus, South Korea is highly likely to continue its balancing act towards China’s BRI. Seoul will support the Chinese initiative at the level of official rhetoric about the search for formats of linking it with South Korean regional policy, while emphasizing the multilateral nature of cooperation and avoiding as much as possible too much involvement. Acknowledgements. Research for this article was supported by MGIMO University, project No. 1921-01-02.
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Ahn, Jae-Ik. "The Beginning of the Sino-Japanese War and International Politics in East Asia in the 1930s: Focusing on the Protracted Course of the War." Korean Association For Japanese History 61 (August 31, 2023): 157–203. http://dx.doi.org/10.24939/kjh.2023.8.61.157.
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When examining the outbreak and protracted course of the Sino-Japanese War, it is important to note the attitudes of neighboring countries such as the United States and the Soviet Union toward the Sino-Japanese issue, which arose as a result of Japan's aggressive continental policy, and how these attitudes influenced the outbreak of the war. Given that the Sino-Japanese War was a protracted eight-year war fought by the Chinese government with the support of the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom, and that it was an international event that directly influenced the outbreak of the Asia-Pacific War, it is necessary to understand the diplomatic process surrounding the war, not just the decision to escalate the war within the Japanese leadership and the decision to wage a protracted global war.
 After the Manchurian Incident, Japan's East Asian policy included an aggressive expansion of its influence on the Chinese mainland, which was embodied in aggressive public policies such as the army-led campaign to separate Hwaseong from North Korea. In response to these Japanese public policies, the Chinese government actively sought internal and diplomatic means to resist, while the Soviet Union and the United States, both of which were paying attention to East Asian affairs, gradually shifted their policies toward supporting China in the Sino-Japanese conflict and deterring Japanese aggression. The fact that 1935 was the year when Japan's public policy became overtly aggressive, as symbolized by the separation of Hwaseong, and that Sino-Japanese relations began to trend in a friendly direction from this year shows that the attitude of neighboring countries toward the Sino-Japanese dispute had already shifted in a direction favorable to China before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War.
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Cotton, James. "Opposition in Asian Constitutional Systems: Characteristics and Potential for Democratic Consolidation." Government and Opposition 31, no. 2 (1996): 175–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.1996.tb00603.x.
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The Analysis of Opposition in Asian Political Systems raises acute problems of definition. At one end of a continuum lie those polities in which an ‘opposition’ is either inconceivable (North Korea is perhaps the best example) or inevitably in a state of war or confrontation with the regime (as is the case in Burma/Myanmar). In cases at this end of the continuum opposition cannot be democratic in the systemic sense, unless the opposition realizes its programme and becomes a democratic government. At the other end of the continuum, however, the character, standing and potential of ‘opposition’ is very much a matter of debate. In these systems a multiplicity of non-governing political parties exist, and these parties contest elections and send members to legislatures, though they often operate under rules (informal as well as formal) and conditions which tend to prevent them from gaining power. The focus of this article will be upon these systems, which are here labelled – whether parliamentary or presidential – ‘constitutional’. ‘Constitutional’ is understood as entailing the existence of an embedded and more or less regularly operating set of electoral mechanisms which plays an essential part in the selection of the government.
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Ko, Mi Seon, Jun Young Lee, Hong Jun Park, and Jae Hung Jung. "Loco-regional Risk Factors for Acute Stroke Mortality in Korea Based on Claim Data of Health Insurance Review and Assessment Service." Korean Association of Health and Medical Sociology 60 (August 31, 2022): 5–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.37243/kahms.2022.60.5.
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We aim to elucidate the discrepancies in acute stroke mortality among primary local governments and identify the risk factors of the mortality at loco-regional level to establish tailored health policies in Korea.
 From January 1, 2017 to December 31, 2019, the mortality rates of patients who died from stroke within 30 days of hospitalization in 226 municipalities were analyzed using the claims data accumulated by Health Insurance Review and Assessment Service. Demographic factors (elderly population ratio, gender ratio, alcohol consumption rate, smoking rate, subjective health status awareness), socioeconomic factors (ratio of old houses, financial autonomy rate, rate of medical aid beneficiaries) and medical resource factors (number of hospitals/ doctors) were analyzed.
 Acute stroke mortality rate in Korea is 12.1 ± 2.2%. The region with the lowest mortality rate is Gyeonggi Province (local government mainly consisting of urban cities) and regions with the highest mortality rates are North Chungcheong Province and South Jeolla. The elderly population is associated with mortality using overall nationwide data. It was also risk factor for stroke mortality in the cities or counties in rural areas. The male-female ratio, alcohol consumption rate, financial autonomy rate, and number of hospitals in the region were also mortality risk factors based on the data of urban cities.
 Based on the results from counties, the proportion of elderly population and financial autonomy rate were found to be a significant risk factor for stroke mortality in small towns in rural areas. Regional differences of acute stroke mortality were also found.
 Aside from demographic factors (proportion of elderly population), socioeconomic factors (financial autonomy rate) were identified as risk factors for acute stroke mortality. Collectively, it is necessary to build health care policies that address the health inequality at the loco-regional level.
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Noble, Gregory W. "Congestion Ahead: Japanese Automakers in Southeast Asia." Business and Politics 3, no. 2 (2001): 157–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1469-3569.1023.
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For three decades Japanese auto producers, supported by the Japanese government, deployed with extraordinary success market and nonmarket strategies to access the small and fragmented but rapidly growing car markets of Southeast Asia. The last half-decade has presented a series of unexpected challenges, including extended recession and financial reform in Japan; the lingering effects of the financial crisis in Southeast Asia; and the entry of new competitors from South Korea, North America, and Europe. These pressures have split the industry into two. Leaders Toyota and Honda have defended and extended traditional Japanese production networks. Weaker players such as Nissan, Mitsubishi, and Suzuki have accepted subordination to the leading western firms, which are rationalizing their Japanese partners and using them to enter Japan and other Asian markets. This article explores production, trade, and investment data, industrial policies toward autos in Japan and Southeast Asia, and brief case studies of Toyota and Nissan to illustrate the challenges to, and varying responses of, Japanese auto producers in developing Asia. These firms remain committed to Southeast Asia, but the days of Japanese dominance are drawing to a close.