Literatura científica selecionada sobre o tema "Legal domain epistemology"

This chapter shows that in the moral domain, as in epistemology, Hume’s task is to provide a naturalistic explanation of our moral conventions and explain why we so often misunderstand the structure of our own moral thought. He aims to explain how custom grounds, and is not grounded by, the moral universe we inhabit. Although many of the components of Hume’s account of morality derive from Hutcheson, Shaftesbury, and Mandeville, the structure into which he places these components—constituted by his naturalism and Pyrrhonism—together with the understanding of custom based in legal theory, gives rise to something entirely new. Hume offers an account of ethics grounded in the union of natural sentiment and a natural propensity to artifice, reflecting the seamless integration of distinct instances of custom as it is manifest both as habit and as convention, as a foundation for the normativity we seek in morality.