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Artigos de revistas sobre o assunto "Moral ignorance":
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Harman, Elizabeth. "DOES MORAL IGNORANCE EXCULPATE?" Ratio 24, n.º 4 (9 de novembro de 2011): 443–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9329.2011.00511.x.
Mason, Elinor. "Moral ignorance and blameworthiness". Philosophical Studies 172, n.º 11 (31 de janeiro de 2015): 3037–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-015-0456-7.
Guerrero, Alexander A. "UNEXCUSED REASONABLE MISTAKES: CAN THE CASE FOR NOT EXCUSING MISTAKES OF LAW BE SUPPORTED BY THE CASE FOR NOT EXCUSING MISTAKES OF MORALITY?" Legal Theory 21, n.º 2 (junho de 2015): 86–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s135232521600001x.
ABSTRACTIn most common-law and civil-law jurisdictions, mistakes of law do not excuse. That is, the fact that one was ignorant of the content or requirements of some law does not excuse violations of that law. Many have argued that this doctrine is mistaken. In particular, many have argued that if an individual's ignorance or false belief is blameless, if she held the false belief reasonably, then she ought to be able to use that ignorance as an excuse for violating the law. It is much harder to find defenders of the doctrine, despite its prevalence. Pragmatic considerations are occasionally offered on its behalf, but these are generally not impressive. In this paper, I consider a more direct kind of justification for the doctrine, one that attempts to identify something more immediately normatively objectionable about being ignorant of the law. In particular, I consider an argument that suggests that legal ignorance is more like moral ignorance than like nonmoral ignorance and maintains that even nonculpable moral ignorance does not excuse.
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Heikes, Deborah K. "Epistemic Ignorance and Moral Responsibility". Southwest Philosophy Review 36, n.º 1 (2020): 93–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview202036111.
It is a commonly-held belief that ignorance excuses. But what of moral ignorance? Is a person blameless who acts from “false” moral principles? In this paper I shall try to show that such a person is blameworthy. I shall produce an argument that connects the acceptance of moral principles with character, character with moral responsibility, and moral responsibility with the justifiability of blame.
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Shapira, Reuven. "Prevalent concealed ignorance of low-moral careerist managers". Management Decision 53, n.º 7 (17 de agosto de 2015): 1504–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/md-10-2014-0620.
Purpose – Organizational research missed managerial ignorance concealment (MIC) and the low-moral careerism (L-MC) it served, leaving a lacuna in managerial stupidity research: MIC serving L-MC was not used to explain this stupidity. The purpose of this paper is to remedy this lacuna. Design/methodology/approach – A semi-native longitudinal multi-site ethnography of automatic processing plants, their parent inter-kibbutz co-operatives (I-KC-Os) and their kibbutz field context enabled a Strathernian ethnography that contextualized the prevalence of MIC and L-MC. Findings – I-KC-Os’ oligarchic context encouraged outsider executives’ MIC and L-MC that caused vicious distrust and ignorance cycles, stupidity and failures. A few high-moral knowledgeable mid-managers prevented total failures by vulnerable involvement that created virtuous trust and learning cycles. This, however, furthered dominance by ignorant ineffective L-MC executives and furthered use of MIC. Practical implications – As managerial know-how portability is often illusory and causes negative dominance of ignorant outsider executives, new CEO succession norms and new yardsticks for assessing fitness of potential executives are required, proposed in the paper. Social implications – Oligarchic contexts encourage MIC and L-MC, hence democratization is called for to counter this negative impact and promote efficiency, effectiveness and innovation. Originality/value – Untangling and linking the neglected topics of MIC and L-MC explains, for the first time, the prevalence of these related phenomena and their unethical facets, particularly among outsider executives and managers, emphasizing the need for their phronetic ethnographying to further explain the resulting mismanagement.
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Hartman, Robert J. "Concomitant ignorance excuses from moral responsibility". Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10, n.º 1 (25 de janeiro de 2021): 58–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/tht3.481.
Harbour, Michael. "Ignorance of the Law and Moral Desert". Southwest Philosophy Review 28, n.º 1 (2012): 209–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview201228121.
The aim of this thesis is to defend a version of volitionism from objections concerning the epistemic condition of moral responsibility (especially of moral culpability). My view states that an agent is morally blameworthy for her action only if (a) the action is morally wrong and (b) she has performed the action against her better judgement that the action is wrong or from a state of culpable ignorance. In chapter 1 I provide reason in favour of volitionism and against attributionism to motivate further articulation of volitionism. In chapter 2 I discuss when it is appropriate to blame an agent for holding a false belief. In chapter 3 I defend the thesis that an agent is blameworthy for performing an action only if the action is objectively wrong (the Objective View). In chapter 4 I defend the thesis that whenever an agent acts from ignorance, she is culpable for the act only if she is culpable for the ignorance from which she acts (the Ignorance Thesis). In chapter 5 I defend the thesis that moral culpability always involves akrasia (the Akrasia Thesis). Finally, in chapter 6 I will conclude the defence of my version of volitionism by undermining the thesis that in order for an agent to be morally responsible for an action, it is necessary (and sufficient when the other conditions are met) that some facts she takes to be playing a role in explaining why the action is good or bad be personally available to her (The Consciousness Thesis).
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Markey, Bren April. "Feminist methodologies in moral philosophy". Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/9107.
This thesis develops a critique of the methodology of mainstream academic moral philosophy, based on insights from feminist and more generally anti-oppressive political thought. The thesis consists of two parts. In the first, I loosely characterise a certain dominant methodology of philosophy, one based on giving an important epistemological role to existing, 'pre-theoretical' moral attitudes, such as intuitions. I then argue that such methodologies may be critiqued on the basis of theories that identify these moral attitudes as problematically rooted in oppressive social institutions, such as patriarchy and white supremacy; that is, I identify these attitudes as ideological, and so a poor guide to moral reality. In the second part, I identify and explore of a number of themes and tendencies from feminist, anti-racist, and other anti-oppressive traditions of research and activism, in order to draw out the implications of these themes for the methodology of moral philosophy. The first issue I examine is that of how, and how much, moral philosophers should use abstraction; I eventually use the concept of intersectionality to argue for the position that philosophers need to use less, and a different type of, abstraction. The second major theme I examine is that of ignorance, in the context of alternative epistemologies: standpoint epistemology and epistemologies of ignorance. I argue that philosophers must not take themselves to be well placed to understand, using solitary methodologies, any topic of moral interest. Finally, I examine the theme of transformation in moral philosophy. I argue that experiencing certain kinds of personal transformation may be an essential part of developing accurate ethical views, and I draw out the political implications of this position for the methodology of moral philosophy.
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Cox, Patrick A. "The Effects of Learning on Moral Education for Rousseau". Digital Archive @ GSU, 2012. http://digitalarchive.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/121.
Rousseau notoriously praises ignorance and censures learning for the moral corruption that it has inflicted upon his age, yet he admits that the arts and the sciences are good in themselves. I consider the effects of learning and knowledge on moral education, in an effort to answer the following question: What is the role of ignorance in moral education for Rousseau? While some interpreters have acknowledged his sensitivity to various groups in society with regard to moral education, none has properly systematized the different types of ignorance that Rousseau praises or identified the benefits of those types of ignorance to various individuals and societies. I distinguish the savage’s ignorance from that of Socrates and identify another important type of ignorance, the benefits of which stem from our natural sentiment and innate curiosity.
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Sjölander, Johansson Jakob Andreas. "Provisional Values". Thesis, Umeå universitet, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-184983.
This paper concerns the issue of ignorance about values, and how to best deal with it.I try to find out what we ought to do when we are ignorant of what it is valuable topromote. The proposed solution is an indirect system of “provisional values”, builtaround three goals that are likely to increase our chances of achieving real value,should such a thing be possible.These three provisional goals the system gives us are as follows: knowledge,optionality, and diversity.Knowledge is the traditional way of trying to relieve our ignorance and has beenthe focus of most philosophizing about value.Optionality means having options, or the power to act differently. This is likelyto become important should we ever discover what it is actually valuable to do.Finally, diversity is simply the idea that, not knowing what truly is valuable, weshould do as much as possible of everything in the hope that some of it may bevaluable. Denna uppsats handlar om problemet med vår brist på kunskap om värde och hur manbäst hanterar det. Jag försöker ta reda på vad vi borde göra i situationer där vi ärokunniga om vilka mål som är värdefulla att uppnå. Den lösning som föreslås är ettindirekt system av ”provisoriskt värde”. Detta system är uppbyggt kring tre mål somsannolikt kommer att öka våra chanser att uppnå direkta eller verkliga värden, om ensådan sak skulle vara möjlig. Dessa tre provisoriska mål som systemet ger oss ärföljande: kunskap, optionalitet och mångfald.Kunskap är det traditionella sättet att försöka lindra vår okunnighet, och harvarit fokus för det mesta filosoferandet om värde.Optionalitet innebär att ha alternativ eller makten att agera annorlunda. Dettakommer sannolikt att bli viktigt om vi någonsin upptäcker vad det är värdefullt attgöra.Slutligen är mångfald helt enkelt tanken att om vi inte vet vad som verkligen ärvärdefullt så bör vi göra så mycket som möjligt av allt i hopp om att något av det kanvisa sig värdefullt.
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Thomas, Joaquin Teruji. "Topics in population ethics". Thesis, University of Oxford, 2016. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:fa2a09aa-e784-4126-bd4a-0487d3653add.
This thesis consists of several independent papers in population ethics. I begin in Chapter 1 by critiquing some well-known 'impossibility theorems', which purport to show there can be no intuitively satisfactory population axiology. I identify axiological vagueness as a promising way to escape or at least mitigate the effects of these theorems. In particular, in Chapter 2, I argue that certain of the impossibility theorems have little more dialectical force than sorites arguments do. From these negative arguments I move to positive ones. In Chapter 3, I justify the use of a 'veil of ignorance', starting from three more basic normative principles. This leads to positive arguments for various kinds of utilitarianism - the best such arguments I know. But in general the implications of the veil depend on how one answers what I call 'the risky existential question': what is the value to an individual of a chance of non-existence? I chart out the main options, and raise some puzzles for non-comparativism, the view that life is incomparable to non-existence. Finally, in Chapter 4, I consider the consequences for population ethics of the idea that what is normatively relevant is not personal identity, but a degreed relation of psychological connectedness. In particular, I pursue a strategy based in population ethics for understanding the controversial 'time-relative interests' account of the badness of death.
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Fishman, Christine A. "Making Way for Equity: Elementary Principals' Interpretations of Equity". Kent State University / OhioLINK, 2010. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=kent1269042026.
Lappalainen, Isa. "The Secret Ingredients to Moral Philosophy: Blood, Sweat, and Tears : On bad enough worst-case scenarios in experimental approximations of John Rawls' Original Position". Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-374308.
Le discernement est traditionnellement rattaché à l’étude de l’élément moral de l’infraction.Sous l’empire du Code pénal de 1810, des fondements de droit naturel sont à l’oeuvre, si bien que le discernement fut défini par emprunt au droit canon comme une aptitude à distinguer le bien du mal. Mais cette acception ne révèle pas la teneur originelle du critère du libre-arbitre :il correspondait à la connaissance de la loi divine dont le droit séculier n’était que le reflet.L’analyse du droit positif laïcisé invite à découvrir l’existence d’une présomption de connaissance de la loi toujours aussi impérative que dans les systèmes de pénalité antiques.Le discernement peut alors être défini comme une conscience réflexive : la connaissance des droits et devoirs reconnus à chaque personne, au sein de statuts juridiques que la prolifération des normes contribue à préciser. Aussi, la culpabilité n’est pas une connaissance de l’illicéité d’un résultat ; elle procède de l’ignorance des prescriptions légales chez celui qui est présumé en connaître l’existence. En procédure pénale, cette présomption devient protectrice des droits du mis en cause. Aucun acte coercitif ne peut être exercé à son encontre s’il n’a été avisé du statut dont il relève. Cette information assure ainsi la finalité rétributive de la peine chez celui qui n’ignore pas les raisons de sa condamnation. En tout état de cause, la soumission des individus au droit pénal est le seul objectif poursuivi en la matière, ce qui nécessite parfois la présence de victimes au procès pénal, à la seule fin de préserver leur foi en son impérativité Discernment is traditionally attached to the study of the « moral element » of the offense. Under the influence of the Penal Code of 1810, the foundations of natural law are at work, so that the discernment was defined by canon law as the ability to distinguish good from evil. But this understanding does not reveal the content of the original criterion of free will: it used to correspond to the knowledge of the divine law which secular law was only the reflection. The analysis of positive law secularized invites you to discover the existence of a presumption of knowledge of the law as imperative as it was in the systems of ancient penalty. Discernment can then be defined as a reflexive consciousness: the awareness of rights and obligations identified to each person within legal statutes that the proliferation of standards helps to clarify. Also, guilt is not a knowledge of the wrongfulness of an outcome; it proceeds fromignorance of the legal requirements in the person who is presumed to know of its existence. In criminal proceedings, this presumption becomes protective of the rights of the suspect. No coercive act can be exercised against him if he has not been notified of the status to which he belongs. This information ensures the retributive purpose of punishment, for the one who can’t ignore the reasons for his conviction. In any event, the submission of individuals to the established rules is the only objective of the criminal law, which might imply that it accepts the presence of victims in criminal proceedings, for the sole purpose of preserving their faith in his imperativity
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Robichaud, Philip. "Ignorance and Moral Responsibility: A Quality of Will Approach". Thesis, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/1911/64675.
My central aim in the dissertation is to defend an account of the epistemic condition of moral responsibility that distinguishes culpable ignorance from non-culpable ignorance. The view that I defend is that ignorance is culpable just when an agent flouts or ignores moral reasons that underlie her epistemic norms or obligations. This view is a quality-of-will theory of moral responsibility that emphasizes the agent’s reasons-responsiveness. It holds that only relevant epistemic obligations are those that require acts of investigation or reflection.
In the dissertation, I examine extant theories of culpable ignorance and suggest that they all fall short in some important respect. Then, I propose and defend an account in which epistemic norms play a leading role. I analyze the nature of epistemic norms and their normativity, and I argue that agents who ignore or flout actional investigative norms and then act on subsequent false beliefs are connected to the wrongness of their action in a way that establishes their blameworthiness. I also argue that epistemic norms that require agents to hold certain beliefs or make certain inferences are not relevant to culpable ignorance. Finally, I explore the implications of my view for certain interesting cases of moral ignorance. I discuss ignorance that results from an agent’s social or historical circumstances, ignorance that stems from pure moral deference, and ignorance that is explained by epistemic difficulty of getting certain moral facts right.
There are two striking outcomes of my research. The first is that reflection on the epistemic condition shows that one cannot think deeply about moral responsibility without also engaging issues in epistemology relating to the nature and normativity of belief, and issues in normative ethics relating to what our moral obligations actually are. The second striking outcome is that bringing these rather disparate topics together, as I attempted to do, reveals that much of our ignorance is actually non-culpable, and that many of our beliefs about the blameworthiness of ignorant agents are unwarranted.
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Ehrich, Kristine Renee. "Willful ignorance: the avoidance of ethical attribute information". Thesis, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/2152/1955.
Peels, Rik. Perspectives on Ignorance from Moral and Social Philosophy. 1 [edition]. | New York : Routledge, 2016. | Series: Routledge: Routledge, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315671246.
People can be mistaken either about the truth of the moral principles they accept or about the rightness of their actions. Can they legitimately be blamed for acting wrongly when they know what they are doing but don’t know that it is wrong? This chapter argues that the answer is sometimes “yes,” but that whether blame is appropriate in any given case depends on certain facts about the actor’s epistemic situation. The aims of the chapter are to establish, first, that a morally ignorant wrongdoer’s epistemic circumstances do have a bearing on that person’s culpability, but, second, that giving content to this familiar view is far harder than is generally appreciated.
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Sher, George, ed. Blame and Moral Ignorance. Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198779667.003.0005.
Can a person legitimately be blamed for acting wrongly when he knows what he is doing, but does not know that it is wrong? Like a good many others who have written on this topic, the author believes the answer is sometimes “yes,” but that whether blame is appropriate in any given case depends on certain facts about the agent’s epistemic situation. The chapter’s aims are to establish, first, that a morally ignorant wrongdoer’s epistemic circumstances do have a bearing on his culpability, but, second, that giving content to this familiar view is far harder than is generally appreciated.
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Ignorance And Moral Obligation. Oxford University Press, 2014.
Bisel, Ryan S. "Stories of Organizational Moral Learning and Ignorance". In Organizational Moral Learning, 204–33. New York, NY : Routledge, 2017.: Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315652252-13.
Bisel, Ryan S. "Pluralistic Moral Ignorance and Spirals of Silent Misdirection". In Organizational Moral Learning, 82–98. New York, NY : Routledge, 2017.: Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315652252-6.
Midgley, Mary. "Can We Base Freedom on Ignorance?" In Can’t We Make Moral Judgements?, 3–11. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-09446-9_1.
Matthyssen, Mieke. "The Moral Code of Playing Dumb". In Ignorance is Bliss: The Chinese Art of Not Knowing, 279–333. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-73902-7_7.
Weatherson, Brian. "Blame and Moral Ignorance". In Normative Externalism, 84–108. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199696536.003.0005.
This chapter argues against the popular view that acting in accordance with one’s principles excuses moral wrongdoing. That is, if one is ignorant of the moral truth, and that ignorance explains one’s wrong actions in the right way, one shouldn’t be blamed for doing the wrong thing. One objection I raise is that there is no good way to make sense of the notion of the ignorance explaining the action in the right way. Another, linking back to the discussion of moral motivation, is that it is rare for moral ignorance to lead to wrong action in the absence of some other blameworthy moral failing. But the chapter ends on a concessive note; there are some rare cases where a false moral belief could excuse certain wrong actions.
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Zimmerman, Michael J. "Moral Rights". In Ignorance and Moral Obligation, 113–40. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199688852.003.0005.
Zimmerman, Michael J. "Three Views of Moral Obligation". In Ignorance and Moral Obligation, 1–24. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199688852.003.0001.
Zimmerman, Michael J. "In Defense of the Prospective View". In Ignorance and Moral Obligation, 25–57. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199688852.003.0002.
