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Venemyr, Henrik, and Per Johan Ericson. "Corporate Social Responsibility : whose responsibility is it?" Thesis, Jönköping University, JIBS, Business Administration, 2006. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-475.
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<p>Introduction: The society is becoming more aware of the importance of corporate social responsibility (CSR) work. CSR has also be-come a competitive tool in order to reach out to potential cus-tomers. There are also many definitions of what CSR actually means. These are things that makes it interesting to find out how multinational corporations, who has a lot of power, per-ceive and work with CSR, as well as what can be done to make corporations work more with CSR.</p><p>Purpose: The purpose of this thesis is to describe what CSR as a con-cept means, whose responsibility it is, as well as why corpora-tions work with it. We also intend to find out what it takes to make CSR a more prevailing and decisive instrument for cor-porations?</p><p>Method: We conducted six unstructed interviews with multinational corporations in Sweden.</p><p>Conclusion: Today the phenomena of CSR has no unified definition, this is why we believe that a definition that is precise in describing what CSR is can be useful. We think that transparency is something important since information provided to the pub-lic, provides consumers and stakeholders with power to make information based investment, and purchase decisions. We have also concluded that we think that the most important factor in driving the CSR work forward and making it grow in size, is to make consumers reward the corporations that per-form well in their CSR activities.</p>
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Child, Russell. "Is all moral responsibility ultimately individual responsibility?" Thesis, Birkbeck (University of London), 2018. http://bbktheses.da.ulcc.ac.uk/300/.
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The way people naturally talk about groups suggests they can be held morally responsible in their own right. People speak of blaming the banks for the global financial crisis while praising Oxfam for its charitable endeavours. In spite of this there is a clear tendency in contemporary philosophy to limit moral responsibility to individuals, thereby denying the existence and relevance of collective moral responsibility in general and the moral responsibility of groups like corporations, states and international institutions in particular. In this thesis I develop an account of responsibility that applies to both collectives and individuals. In particular I focus on developing an account of collective responsibility that is non-distributive. My account does not deny individual responsibility. Nor does it seek to replace individualistic accounts. It is intended to provide and additional layer of moral responsibility. I am particularly interested in scenarios where the harms are mediated by social and institutional structures leading to structural injustice occurring when organisations, institutions or governments discriminate directly or implicitly against certain groups of people to limit their rights. This is important because some of the most serious contemporary harms result from structural injustice, which is a form of injustice where the harms are not traceable to individual wrongdoers. Hence the need for a collectivist account of moral responsibility. Exclusively individualistic accounts of structural injustice do not fully incorporate the many other responsible collectives like states, international institutions and transnational corporations. I also consider the distinction between guilt and responsibility. Some theorists have a favourable view of guilt as it applies to collectives and/or individuals arguing that it has an instrumental value. My account of collective responsibility is sympathetic to this view of guilt but only as it applies to individuals. In which case the issue of distribution does not arise for guilt.
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Atry, Ashkan. "Transforming the Doping Culture : Whose responsibility, what responsibility?" Doctoral thesis, Uppsala universitet, Centrum för forsknings- och bioetik, 2013. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-206607.
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The doping culture represents an issue for sport and for society. Normative debates on doping have been mainly concerned with questions of the justifiability of doping. The practice of assigning responsibility for doping behaviour has chiefly been individual-based, focusing mainly on the individual athlete’s doping behaviour. The overarching aim of this thesis is to investigate the relevance and the importance of the ideas of responsibility in relation to ethical debates on doping. The more specific aim is to examine the possibility of broadening the scope of responsibility beyond the individual athlete, and to sketch a theoretical framework within which this expansion could be accommodated. In the first study, it is argued that bioethicists have a moral/professional responsibility to start out from a realistic and up-to-date view of genetics in ethical debates on gene doping, and that good bioethics requires good empirics. In study 2, the role played by affective processes in influencing athletes’ attitudes towards doping behaviour is investigated, both on an individual and on a collective level. It is concluded that an exclusive focus on individual-level rule violation and sanctions may entail overlooking the greater social picture and would prove to be ineffective in the long term. In study 3, the common doping-is-cheating arguments are examined and it is argued that they fail to capture vital features of people’s moral responses to doping behaviour. An alternative account of cheating in sport is presented in terms of failure to manifest good will and respect. It is concluded that putting cheating in the broader context of human interpersonal relationships makes evident the need to broaden the scope of moral responsibility and agency beyond the individual athlete. In study 4, the particular case of assigning responsibility for doping to sports physicians is used to examine the current individual-based approach to responsibility. This approach underestimates the scope of the responsibility by leaving out a range of other actors from the discourse of responsibility. The central conclusion of the thesis is that transforming the current doping culture requires broadening the scope of responsibility to include individuals and groups of individuals other than the athletes themselves.
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Hooper, R. S. "The responsibility to implement 'The Responsibility to Protect'." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.604216.
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The <i>Responsibility to Protect</i> offers a morally based policy that places a new responsibility on the international community to protect populations from extremes of harm caused by governments. From the policy’s text, the reason for action seems to lie, most fundamentally, in an expression of ‘<i>our common humanity</i>’. However, <i>The Responsibility to Protect</i> does not offer any justification for its proposals. It responds to the question ‘what ought to be done?’ but answers the question ‘what can be done?’ leaving in between a gap in the moral credibility of action. The thesis explores what this lack of philosophical underpinning means to the persuasive power of the policy. The thesis then examines the claim of sovereignty as responsibility and finds it confused and incomplete and lacking the detail necessary for coherent implementation. It uses the Aristotelian square of opposition to investigate the tripartite nature of the new responsibilities to prevent and rebuild. Finally, the thesis investigates the policy’s apparent assumption that an ethically based policy of humanitarian intervention can be appropriately guided by the ethical rules of war. It asks if war and humanitarian intervention are the same thing and finds that they are not. It then explores the incoherence created by using the Just War Tradition for guide R2P. If The Responsibility to Protect offers no greater generation of will and effective action to humanitarian intervention than the current ad hoc process does, its establishment as UN policy becomes a pyrrhic victory. It will result in further anomalies in response by the UN, and consequent damage to the reputation and credibility of the UN as the guardian of international peace and security.
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FERNANDES, RITA DE CASSIA CALDEIRAS VILAS. "MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY: CHOICE OR LEVY?" PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO, 2016. http://www.maxwell.vrac.puc-rio.br/Busca_etds.php?strSecao=resultado&nrSeq=28306@1.
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PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO<br>COORDENAÇÃO DE APERFEIÇOAMENTO DO PESSOAL DE ENSINO SUPERIOR<br>PROGRAMA DE SUPORTE À PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO DE INSTS. DE ENSINO<br>O presente estudo visa oferecer uma reflexão originária sobre responsabilidade moral e responsabilidade legal. A responsabilidade moral será baseada no tomismo, especificamente na Doutrina do Duplo Efeito. Quanto à
responsabilidade legal, abordaremos a moralidade do direito em Lon Fuller. No capítulo primeiro estudaremos a Doutrina do Duplo Efeito, também chamada de Teoria do Duplo Efeito, que tem as suas raízes na filosofia moral tomista, estudando as condições em que uma ação com bons e maus resultados é moralmente permissível. No segundo capítulo, estudaremos sobre o direito e sua moralidade, onde iremos tomar como base o conceito de direito natural segundo Lon Fuller. Verificaremos que Fuller considera que a qualidade do direito dependerá de sua moralidade interna. Por fim, no terceiro capítulo, baseada na obra de Lon Fuller: O caso dos exploradores de cavernas, traremos a resenha da obra e, traremos uma análise do livro sob o ponto de vista da DDE e sob o ponto de vista do Direito Penal brasileiro. Concluiremos este estudo falando sobre a escolha e sua responsabilidade moral e a responsabilidade legal e a imposição da lei.<br>The present study aims to offer a reflection on moral responsibility and legal responsibility. Moral responsibility will be based on thomism, specifically in Doctrine of double effect. With regard to legal responsibility, we will discuss the morality of law in Lon Fuller. In the first chapter we will study the Doctrine of double effect, also known as Theory of double effect, which has its roots in thomistic moral philosophy, by studying the conditions under which an action with good and bad results is morally permissible. In the second chapter, we will study about law and its morality, where we will take as basis for the concept of natural law according to Lon Fuller. We will notice that Fuller considers that the quality of law will depend on its internal morality. Finally, in the third chapter, based on the work of Lon Fuller: The case of the exploiters of cave, we will introduce a summary of the work and an analysis of the book under the Doctrine of double effect s point of view and criminal law Brazilian s either. We will complete this study speaking of the choice and its moral responsibility and the legal responsibility and the levy of law.
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Nilsson, Klara. "Corporate Social Responsibility : How Corporate is the Responsibility?" Thesis, Linnéuniversitetet, Institutionen för ekonomistyrning och logistik (ELO), 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:lnu:diva-75124.
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Bakgrund: Allt fler företag har idag erkänt betydelsen av att ta ett ökat samhällsansvar, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), samt att regelbundet kommunicera arbetet med deras intressenter. Då CSR saknar en enhetlig definition och därmed också en enhetlig modell att arbeta efter, skapar det emellertid oklarheter vad arbetet ska leda till. CSR kan då omfamnas av företag som enbart ser arbetet som ett PR-trick och gör symboliska handlingar för att utåt sett uppfattas som goda samhällsmedborgare. Det kan därför ifrågasättas hur väl CSR-arbetet integreras i kärnverksamheten. Det har dock kommit allt fler lagkrav och standarder inom området, vilket potentiellt kan skapa en tydligare ram men även ett annat synsätt. Syfte: Denna studie har som syfte att få en ökad förståelse över CSR som begrepp för att sedan se hur företagen arbetar för att integrera CSR i kärnverksamheten och varför. Studien ser även till påverkan av ökad reglering, för att se om företags syn på CSR har förändrats. Metod: Studien har huvudsakligen en kvalitativ forskningsstrategi med en deduktiv ansats då studien tar avstamp i tidigare studier. De företag som studerats är Lammhult Design Group AB och Electra AB. Som datainsamlingsmetod har det genomförts semistrukturerade intervjuer med ansvariga personer, men det har även skickats ut en medarbetarundersökning i form av en enkät. I studien har jag dessutom inhämtat information från fallföretagens hemsidor samt års- och hållbarhetsredovisningar. Resultat och slutsats: Det är inte lika viktigt att finna en enhetlig definition av CSR i dagens samhälle. CSR som begrepp har dessutom allt mer kommit att ersättas av hållbarhet som anses vara ett vidare begrepp. Vidare är det en långsam process att integrera CSR i kärnverksamheten, där intern CSR-röst, utbildning, rutiner och information är av särskild vikt. Genom att ha ett hållbarhetsarbete i framkant och se det som värdeskapande kan företag undvika påtryckning vid potentiella händelser såsom lagkrav.<br>Background: Today, most companies have recognized the importance of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and regularly communicating the work with stakeholders. Since CSR lacks a uniform definition and thus also a uniform model to work for, it creates uncertainties about the purpose of the work. Companies who only do symbolic actions to be perceived as good citizens of the community can then use CSR as PR. It can therefore be questioned how well CSR is integrated into the core business. However, it has been an increasing number of legal requirements and standards in the area, potentially creating a clearer framework but also another approach. Purpose: The purpose of this study is to gain a greater understanding of CSR as a concept and then see how companies work to integrate CSR into core business and why. The study also looks at the impact of increased regulation, to see if views on CSR have changed. Method: The study has primarily a qualitative research strategy with a deductive approach that stands on previous studies. The companies studied are Lammhult Design Group AB and Electra AB. As a data collection method, I have conducted semi-structured interviews with responsible managers, but also a staff survey. I have also used the homepages websites and annual and sustainability reports. Outcome and conclusion: It is not as important to find a unified definition of CSR in today's society. The concept of CSR has been replaced by sustainability, which is considered as a broader term. Furthermore, it is a slow process of integrating CSR into core business, where internal voice, education, routines and information are of particular importance. By maintaining sustainability at the forefront companies can avoid pressure such as legal requirements.
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Goetze, Trystan S. "Conceptual responsibility." Thesis, University of Sheffield, 2018. http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/22026/.
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This thesis concerns our moral and epistemic responsibilities regarding our concepts. I argue that certain concepts can be morally, epistemically, or socially problematic. This is particularly concerning with regard to our concepts of social kinds, which may have both descriptive and evaluative aspects. Being ignorant of certain concepts, or possessing mistaken conceptions, can be problematic for similar reasons, and contributes to various forms of epistemic injustice. I defend an expanded view of a type of epistemic injustice known as ‘hermeneutical injustice’, where widespread conceptual ignorance puts members of marginalized groups at risk of their distinctive and important experiences lacking intelligible interpretations. Together, I call the use of problematic concepts or the ignorance of appropriate concepts ‘conceptual incapacities’. I discuss the conditions under which we may be responsible for our conceptual incapacities on several major theories of responsibility, developing my own account of responsibility in the process, according to which we are responsible for something just in case it was caused by one of our reasons-responsive constitutive psychological traits. However, I argue that regardless of whether we are responsible for something, we may still be required to take responsibility for it. Whether or not we are responsible for our conceptual incapacities, we are required to reflect critically upon them in a variety of scenarios that throw our use of those concepts into question. I consider the method of conceptual engineering — the philosophical critique and revision of concepts — as one way we might take responsibility for our concepts, or at least, defer that duty to experts. But, this top-down model of conceptual revision is insufficient. Using a pragmatist model of the social epistemology of morality, I argue that conceptual inquiry is a social endeavour in which we are all required to participate, to some degree.
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Brown, Alexander Colin. "Individual responsibility." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2005. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1445378/.
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When, and how far, should individuals assume responsibility for their own disadvantages themselves, and when, in contrast to this, is it right for society as a collective body to try to remedy or mitigate disadvantage? Some theorists argue that in so far as disadvantages result from voluntary choices, they should be borne by the agents themselves and do not raise a case of justice for public assistance. This criterion is plausible in some cases but far from self-evident in others. In reality, people often fail to make the kinds of choices about what to do that we might hope for yet this does not necessarily make it right for them to abrogate responsibility entirely. And even where a voluntary choice has been made by the individual, it is not obviously right in every case for the individual to bear all the consequences. It is argued that in order to fully account for common intuitions in this area we must appeal to a more inclusive theory of responsibility that takes in a number of criteria of justice including, but not exhausted by, the presence or absence of voluntary choice. In addition to this, however, it is argued that, though important, justice is not the only reason why responsibility matters. We also care about individual responsibility because of its associations with human flourishing and because of the alleged moral value of autonomous choice. Whilst this pluralistic view of the value of individual responsibility can make it harder to arrive at definitive prescriptions about which social policies best advance our concerns, it is nevertheless possible to draw at least some policy conclusions. One important conclusion is that sometimes it is better not to hold individuals responsible for their past choices by denying them aid now, so that they might be better able to assume individual responsibility at a later date.
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Kleinrichert, Denise. "Responsibility and practice in notions of corporate social responsibility." [Tampa, Fla] : University of South Florida, 2007. http://purl.fcla.edu/usf/dc/et/SFE0001893.
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Elford, Gideon. "Equality, responsibility and desert : a defence of responsibility sensitive egalitarianism." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2010. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.543687.
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Dummett, Kel, and kel_123@yahoo com. "Corporate Environmental Responsibility." RMIT University. Architecture and Design, 2009. http://adt.lib.rmit.edu.au/adt/public/adt-VIT20090501.144600.
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This thesis uses document analysis and semi-structured personal interviews to look at current strategies and policies of major companies to manage the life cycle environmental risks associated with their products and processes, which I refer to as corporate environmental responsibility (CER); The thesis also explores what some national governments are and could be doing to encourage greater environmental responsibility from companies. As environmentalists and climate scientists have been warning for decades, and now world leaders are coming to realise, the world faces serious environmental challenges, none more urgent than climate change. A failure to act to mitigate the risks associated with this one challenge, as Stern (2006, pii) asserts �could create risks of major disruptions to economic and social activity�. A major proportion of the world�s environmental problems can be attributed directly to production, use and disposal of products (Tukker & Jansen, 2006), and as this thesis will argue, national government policies to encourage or force greater environmental responsibility from producers are required to reduce risks and mitigate impacts. In recent decades national governments have been reluctant to intervene in the market place, preferring to rely on voluntary mechanisms, but as will be discussed in greater detail, there is now an increasingly critical voice (Zarsky, Roht-Ariaza & Brottem, 2002; Hirschland, 2003; Archer & Piper, 2003; Vogel 2005; Hay et al, 2005) that questions the effectiveness of voluntary corporate responsibility as it is currently practiced, which subsequently raises the question: what role national governments, and international governance should take? The primary data sources for this thesis are personal interviews with senior business leaders from 25 major companies, recorded public speeches, both web and non-web based corporate public relations material, and personal interviews with key academics in the field, environmentalists and corporate analysts, conducted mainly between 2002 and 2004. The analysis of this data has sought to investigate the attitudes of major companies to: - corporate environmental responsibility, though some interrelated aspects of social responsibility are also considered; - what drives them to take greater responsibility to reduce their environmental risks; - government policies, especially possible legislation to encourage and/or force CER. In addition through case studies of: - one industry sector - two major companies, and - one industry sector pilot study; as well as secondary research on several other companies, this thesis investigates what some companies are saying and doing about corporate environmental responsibility. This will lead to a short discussion of the degree to which these companies� rhetoric of responsibility matches their actions � that is how much they are �walking the talk�. The thesis also looks at the current potential of national governments in encouraging and/or forcing greater CER, then contrasts the development and implementation of national policies for CER in Australia with those in Europe, focussing on CER as it relates to products in the electrical and electronics industry. The thesis concludes with some observations and suggestions on policies of major companies and of national governments, as well as international governance, to encourage greater CER.
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Topornycky, Joseph Stephen. "Personhood and responsibility." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/42884.
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Understanding human behavior as caused by some combination of genetics,
environment, and upbringing is often taken to undermine the belief that human beings can be truly morally responsible. The root of this problem is in
an apparent conflict between the casual thesis and the idea of human beings
as persons that is premised in moral responsibility. I argue that this con-
flict is based on two related misunderstandings. Understood properly, moral
responsibility is grounded in our affective responses to others modified by a
reflective understanding of those responses under the idea of self-government according to standards. It is through a commitment to those standards that we come to be persons, understood as a distinct moral category.
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Lake, Christopher. "Egalitarianism and responsibility." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1996. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.363632.
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Crispo, Bruno. "Delegation of responsibility." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 1999. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.624433.
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McTernan, Emily Miriam. "Equality and responsibility." Thesis, University of Cambridge, 2014. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.648488.
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Cogley, Charles Zachary. "Responsibility and Manipulation." The Ohio State University, 2010. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=osu1275370229.
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Warmke, Brandon. "Forgiveness and Responsibility." Diss., The University of Arizona, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/333086.
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In Forgiveness and Responsibility, I investigate the nature and norms of moral forgiveness. The standard account of forgiveness claims that forgiving is (or at least requires) the overcoming of resentment. I argue, however, that there is no single way to forgive and so no non-trivial set of necessary and sufficient conditions for forgiveness. I identify the prototypical manifestation of forgiveness, using it to explain the diversity of our forgiveness practices. Prototypical manifestations of forgiveness are cases of directed forgiveness, in which one takes up a certain kind of forgiving attitude towards a wrongdoer and overtly manifests that attitude, most notably by a speech act. This speech act crucially involves the victim relinquishing certain of her rights to blame the wrongdoer, as well as releasing the wrongdoer from certain kinds of personal obligations to the victim. Other modes of forgiveness are understood as extensions of the prototype to the extent that they share either the interior, psychological features or the exterior, behavioral features of directed forgiveness. I conclude by arguing that in order to preserve certain intuitive views about the norms bearing on forgiveness, our best theories of forgiveness should hold that: (1) forgiving is prototypically under one's voluntary control; (2) wrongdoers cannot obligate their victims to forgive them; and (3) forgiving alters the norms of interaction between victim and wrongdoer.
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McKeown, M. C. "Responsibility without guilt : a Youngian approach to responsibility for global injustice." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2015. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1463742/.
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What responsibilities do individuals have in relation to global injustice? Iris Young argues that all agents “connected” to global structural injustice bear political responsibility, rather than moral responsibility; the difference being that political responsibility is non-blameworthy, shared and forward-looking, whereas moral responsibility entails blameworthiness, isolates particular agents for censure and is backward-looking. Thus, individuals are not guilty of wrongdoing but they bear responsibility for global injustice. Young’s argument is intuitively appealing and influential, however it is underdeveloped. In this thesis, I aim to develop Young’s account into a coherent theory of individuals’ responsibilities for global injustice, by reconstructing her core insights and critically developing the aspects that lack clarity and coherence. Young does not sufficiently distinguish political from moral responsibility. In Part One, I argue that there are two kinds of moral responsibility: relational moral responsibility, which refers to the traditional account of directly causing harm with intent and knowledge – what Young calls the “liability model” of responsibility; and moral responsibility as virtue, of which political responsibility is a particular kind. I strengthen Young’s argument that ordinary individuals cannot bear relational moral responsibility for global injustice, because they perpetuate structural injustice inadvertently, unintentionally or unavoidably, but that they should cultivate the virtue of political responsibility to participate in collective action for change. Young conceives of political responsibility as a responsibility for justice. In Part Two, I assess this claim. For Young, individuals’ behaviour reproduces unjust social-structural processes, thus individuals have a responsibility for justice. I contrast this to Rawlsian “dualism”, whereby responsibility for justice is institutional. I characterize sweatshop labour as a form of global structural exploitation. Political responsibility is triggered by “connection” to such an injustice, which I define as the reproduction of unjust structures or dependency on oppression.
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Bowers, Gemma. "The origins of inflated responsibility : an investigation into the relationship between adaptive responsibility and responsibility appraisals in young people." Thesis, University of East Anglia, 2009. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.521022.
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Background Inflated responsibility is a cognitive distortion that is characteristic of Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) and plays a crucial role in maintaining it (Salkovskis et at., 2000). The origins of inflated responsibility are uncertain, although Salkovskis, Shafran, Rachman, and Freeston (1999) proposed five hypotheses. Two of these related to experiences of excessive or insufficient levels of adaptive responsibility in childhood. With no existing measure of this `adaptive' responsibility, an initial aim of the study was to develop a measure to assess the responsibilities performed by young people. Then, the relationships between young people's adaptive responsibility, and parents' and young people's inflated responsibility and OCD symptomotology were investigated. Method The study used a cross sectional correlational design with a non-clinical population of young people (11 - 16years), and one of their parents (N = 67 dyads). All participants completed measures of inflated responsibility, OCD, and the adaptive responsibility of the young person. Results Responses on the new measure of adaptive responsibility were normally distributed, indicating that it adequately addressed the range of responsibilities across the 11-16 year age range. In contrast to the hypotheses, no significant relationships were found between high or low levels of adaptive responsibility and inflated responsibility or OCD symptoms in parents or young people. The exception was a significant difference in child-rated adaptive responsibility between those who scored high and low on the OCD-interference scale of the Leyton Obsessional Inventory-Child Version (Berg et al., 1988). Although parents' OCD was not related to young people's OCD or young people's inflated responsibility, parents' inflated responsibility was associatedw ith young people's inflated responsibility. Conclusions The results partially support the cognitive model of inflated responsibility in OCD, in both adults and young people. The relationship found between parents' and young people's inflated responsibility warrants further investigation. Methodological weaknesses must be acknowledged in interpreting the results and future research with larger samples is required to further explore the origins of inflated responsibility beliefs.
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Southam, Peter. "The origins of inflated responsibility : investigating the relationship between adaptive responsibility, inflated responsibility and obsessive compulsive symptoms in young people." Thesis, University of East Anglia, 2013. https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/68081/.
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Background and Objectives: Inflated responsibility is proposed to be a central concept in the development and maintenance of obsessive compulsive symptoms (Salkovskis, 1985). Five pathways to inflated responsibility have been proposed (Salkovskis et al., 1999) but have largely remained untested. Two of these pathways refer to experiences of having insufficient or excessive amounts of typical everyday childhood or ‘adaptive’ responsibilities. These two pathways were tested by the current study be examining the relationships between adaptive responsibilities, inflated responsibilities, and obsessive compulsive symptoms. Method: The study used a cross-sectional correlational questionnaire design to assess for levels of adaptive responsibilities, inflated responsibilities, and obsessive compulsive symptoms in 134 young people aged between 11 and 16 years, and one of their parents. Results: Significant positive associations were observed between levels of inflated responsibility and obsessive compulsive symptoms in young people and parents. There was also a significant positive relationship between child and parent ratings of adaptive responsibility. However, no relationships were observed between adaptive responsibility and inflated responsibility, or obsessive compulsive symptoms. Additionally, there were no between group differences observed for groups scoring high or low in levels of adaptive responsibility, inflated responsibility, or obsessive compulsive symptoms Conclusion: Findings appeared to support the inflated responsibility hypothesis of OCD in childhood and extend support to a downward extension of adult models of OCD to children. However, the findings did not support the notion of childhood experiences of insufficient or excessive amounts of adaptive responsibilities to be implicated in the development of OC symptoms. Methodological flaws limit the generalisability of these findings and further research may benefit from considering accumulative or interactions of experiences on the pathways hypothesised by Salkovskis et al. (1999).
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Fennessey, Jo-Ann. "Whistleblowing: Responsibility and accountability Does responsibility and accountability really exist in Canada?" Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/28884.
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Hamilton, Elizabeth Anne. "Coercion, responsibility, and discourse." Diss., [Riverside, Calif.] : University of California, Riverside, 2010. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=2019836961&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=2&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1274292798&clientId=48051.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Riverside, 2010.<br>Includes abstract. Title from first page of PDF file (viewed May 19, 2010). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Includes bibliographical references. Also issued in print.
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Adestam, Carina, and Sofia Gunnmo. "CSR : Structure for Responsibility." Thesis, Jönköping University, JIBS, EMM (Entrepreneurship, Marketing, Management), 2008. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-1362.
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<p>Many organisational flaws are consequences of unsuitable structure arrangements that do not support the organisation in its work towards goal accomplishment. The appropriateness of the structure is determined by how well it allows the organisation to respond to the environment in which it is active. Furthermore, an organisation is divided into parts with their own requirements on the structure. CSR is a concept that enables for a wider perspective of how to conduct business, thereby strengthening the link between the organisation and the external society. It addresses the issues of how a company can create sustainable wealth through behaving in a responsible way where a high responsiveness to the environment is crucial. The purpose of this thesis is therefore to describe and analyse how the organisational social structure of the CSR work can help and enhance such engagement.</p><p>An abductive approach have steered the authors when conducting this study. Qualitative data is explicitly used, gathered through interviews with representatives from ABB and Skanska. The data derived from these interviews provides a picture of what, why and how the two companies have chosen to work with CSR issues as well as how they have chosen to structure the work. Using the theoretical frame and the empirical data an analyse of the characteristics and arguments for CSR and the cultural, motivational and structural aspects led to the identification of requirements that this work place on the structure and how ABB and Skanska handle these requirements.</p><p>The objective of CSR is to be able to assess the business impact on the society and from that standpoint create a way to handle those impacts. Therefore the work is different from company to company but with common requirements on the structure where some are, local responsiveness, creativity and unified work. To answer to these requirements the structure should preferable have the characteristics of horizontal differentiation and specialisation on group level, an integration based on both human interaction and documents where standardisation should be avoided. This implies that the requirements of CSR are best met when the mechanic and the organic structure meet. An organic organisation needs mechanical traits to allow for the guidelines, directives and responsibilities to be defined in order to reach a unified picture. The mechanical on the other hand needs organic characteristics to support and allow for continuous improvements and work that takes local conditions into account.</p>
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Hildebrand, Carl H. "Kant and Moral Responsibility." Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/20641.
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This project is primarily exegetical in nature and aims to provide a rational reconstruction of the concept of moral responsibility in the work of Immanuel Kant, specifically in his Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (GR), and Critique of Practical Reason (CPrR). It consists of three chapters – the first chapter interprets the concept of freedom that follows from the resolution to the Third Antinomy in the CPR. It argues that Kant is best understood here to be providing an unusual but cogent, compatibilist account of freedom that the author terms meta-compatibilism. The second chapter examines the GR and CPrR to interpret the theory of practical reason and moral agency that Kant develops in these works. This chapter concludes by evaluating what has been established about Kant’s ideas of freedom and moral agency at that point in the project, identifying some problems and objections in addition to providing some suggestions for how Kantian ethics might be adapted within a consequentialist framework. The third chapter argues that, for Kant, there are two necessary and jointly sufficient conditions (in addition to a compatibilist definition of freedom) that must obtain for an individual to qualify as responsible for her actions.
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Hanson, Craig A. "Addiction Rationality and responsibility /." Related electronic resource: Current Research at SU : database of SU dissertations, recent titles available full text, 2006. http://proquest.umi.com/login?COPT=REJTPTU0NWQmSU5UPTAmVkVSPTI=&clientId=3739.
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Tebbe, Thomas F. "Responsibility in pastoral counseling." Theological Research Exchange Network (TREN), 1985. http://www.tren.com.
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Watkins, Jeremy. "Equality, responsibility, and wrongdoing." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2003. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.273449.
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Gardner, John. "Responsibility and practical evaluation." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1995. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.319064.
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Ibrahim, Noor Aireen. "Constructing blame and responsibility:." Thesis, Cardiff University, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.490147.
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van, Zwol Erik. "Responsibility, spontaneity and liberty." Thesis, University of Canterbury. Humanities, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/10092/5763.
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Isaiah Berlin maintains that there are two distinct forms of freedom or liberty: negative and positive. Berlin’s principal claim is that negative liberty does not require that the self be somehow separate from the empirical world (causally aloof, or an originator of causal chains). My principal claim is that to be an agent is to be committed to a separation of self in this sense, thus that the self for its very being requires to possess a species of positive liberty. This conception proceeds in part from Immanuel Kant’s claim that there is a separation between spontaneity and receptivity. Commitment to this assertion allows there to be an understood distinction between the self as a spontaneous self-active agent that makes choices, and the self as a mere reactionary brute that does what it does by biological imperatives. In this thesis, I defend the view that negative liberty is subsumed under positive liberty: you cannot have the former without the latter. I am therefore taking a rationalist stance towards Berlin’s thinking. My methodology is to bring into consideration two perspectives upon the underlying normative principles within the space of reason. The first is of Kant’s understanding of the principle of responsibility and the activity of spontaneity; the second is John McDowell’s understanding of that principle and activity. The key claim of this thesis is that Berlin misunderstands what it is to be a chooser. To be a chooser is to be raised under the idea that one is an efficient cause; human children are brought up being held responsible for their reasons for acting. This principle allows mere animal being to be raised into the space of reason, where we live out a second nature in terms of reason. Using their conclusions I further investigate Berlin’s understanding of conceptual frameworks, taking particular interest in historic ‘universal’ conceptions that shape human lives. He too finds that that we are choosers is necessary for what it is to be human. I take his conclusion, and suggest that if he had had a clear understanding of the space of reason, the historic claim that we have choice would find a more solid footing in the principle of that space, in that we are responsible for our actions. I conclude that the upshot of understanding the ‘I’ as an originating efficient cause is that we treat ourselves as free from a universal determinism that Berlin himself disparages; and that the cost to Berlin is that all choice is necessarily the activity of a higher choosing self. It is part of a Liberal society’s valuing, by their societal commitment to, the ideology of raising our children to understand themselves as choosers, that we have choice at all. This is irrespective of whether that which fetters choice is internal or external to the agent, or of whether having self-conscious itself requires such a cultural emergence of second nature.
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Woodard, Christopher. "Justice, responsibility, and acquiescence." Thesis, University of Warwick, 1997. http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/71249/.
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This thesis investigates the relationship between the concepts of justice and responsibility. It is important to decide what the relationship is, because the details of a theory of justice will depend on it. Four possible views of the relationship are outlined, and arguments are canvassed for and against one of them, which I call naturalism. Naturalism is appealing because it offers to make theories of justice independent of troubling agency-implicating judgements. But I argue that naturalism is false, because political argument, including theories of justice, cannot do without such judgements. They play an essential role in determining which range of possible actions or arrangements is relevant to a political argument. The argument against naturalism is in two parts. The first part analyses the concept of benefit, underlining the feature of that concept which makes agency-implicating judgements necessary for those who employ it. This first anti-naturalist argument is directed to arguments in ideal theory, in Rawls's sense of that term. The second part of the argument against naturalism is directed to deliberative arguments. Naturalism is, I claim, a much more plausible doctrine if it is understood to apply to such arguments in particular. But I argue that it is nevertheless false, because it leaves us unable to account for some of the reasons persons have for resisting acquiescence. Discussion of the rationality of acquiescence leads into discussion of the nature of deliberation. I argue that a feature of some consequentialist models of deliberation, which I call the hard-nosed view, must be rejected. I end with a comparison of the resulting view with Kant's ethics, and some variant forms of consequentialism.
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Maitra, Ishani 1974. "Silence, speech, and responsibility." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2002. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/8150.
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Thesis (Ph. D.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2002.<br>Includes bibliographical references.<br>Pornography deserves special protections, it is often said, because it qualifies as speech; therefore, no matter what we think of it, we must afford it the protections that we extend to most speech, but don't extend to other actions. In response, it has been argued that the case is not so simple: one of the harms of pornography, it is claimed, is that it silences women's speech, thereby preventing women from deriving from speech the very benefits that warrant the special protections in the first place. This dissertation offers a way of making sense of the view that pornography silences women. In Chapter 1, I develop an account of silencing which, unlike other accounts of the same phenomenon, helps make clear why a speaker who is silenced is thereby deprived of the benefits that led us to place a special value on speech. In Chapter 2, I respond to an objection that purports to show that, even if women are silenced, pornography cannot be responsible: in fact, according to this objection, the responsibility for any instance of silencing cannot lie with any party other than the speaker and the audience involved. I show that this objection relies on an overly simplistic picture of what audiences can reasonably be required to do in a speech situation; I also offer an alternate picture, which leaves open the possibility that a speaker may be silenced in a context in which both she and her audience behave competently.<br>(cont.) In Chapter 3, I consider a view about the way in which pornography contributes to the silencing - and more generally, to the subordination - of women. I argue that this view fails because it is too individualistic: it ignores how the social and political context in which the pornography is consumed helps determine whether it subordinates. I then make some suggestions about what a more satisfactory view would be. Though pornography is the principal case study throughout this dissertation, much of what I say generalizes to other forms of representation that set limits on what speakers are able to convey. The main aim of my discussion is to contribute to the philosophical and feminist understanding of communication, by showing how an individual's social role can constrain her possibilities as a speaker.<br>by Ishani Maitra.<br>Ph.D.
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Claassens, Mareli Misha. "Responsibility in health care." Thesis, Stellenbosch : University of Stellenbosch, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/4280.
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Browne, Brynmor Tudor Davidson. "Human action and responsibility." Thesis, University of Wales Trinity Saint David, 1990. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.683115.
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Piovarchy, Adam James. "Situationism and Moral Responsibility." Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2019. https://hdl.handle.net/2123/21787.
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This thesis examines whether it is appropriate to blame the subjects who act wrongly in the situationist psychology experiments for their actions, focusing on the subjects in Milgram’s ‘Obedience to Authority’ studies. Both philosophers and psychologists currently lack any convincing explanation for why subjects in these experiments behave as they do. However, one promising avenue which has not been considered is to examine subjects’ perceived reasons for action. If subjects act differently to how we expect because they do not share our assessments of their reasons for action, this would explain their behaviour. The first part of this thesis argues that, given a number of sources of evidence from the situationist experiments, and other related experiments which philosophers have not considered, the best explanation of subjects’ wrongdoing is they had a reduced capacity to avoid wrongdoing. This entails that they are excused for their wrongdoing, and thus not blameworthy. The second part of this thesis sees what follows if the subjects in these experiments did possess the capacity to avoid wrongdoing, but simply didn’t exercise it. Given the high rates of wrongdoing in these studies, and consistent replication of results with subjects from number of social groups, we have strong evidence that most members of the moral community would also have committed wrongdoing in these experiments. Due to the relationship between standing to blame and hypocrisy, the fact most of us would have committed wrongdoing in these experiments undermines our standing to blame. In particular, we lack the normative authority to make second-personal demands when blaming.
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Piovarchy, Adam James. "Situationism and Moral Responsibility." Thesis, The University of Sydney, 2020. https://hdl.handle.net/2123/21792.
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This thesis examines whether it is appropriate to blame the subjects who act wrongly in the situationist psychology experiments for their actions, focusing on the subjects in Milgram’s ‘Obedience to Authority’ studies. Both philosophers and psychologists currently lack any convincing explanation for why subjects in these experiments behave as they do. However, one promising avenue which has not been considered is to examine subjects’ perceived reasons for action. If subjects act differently to how we expect because they do not share our assessments of their reasons for action, this would explain their behaviour. The first part of this thesis argues that, given a number of sources of evidence from the situationist experiments, and other related experiments which philosophers have not considered, the best explanation of subjects’ wrongdoing is they had a reduced capacity to avoid wrongdoing. This entails that they are excused for their wrongdoing, and thus not blameworthy. The second part of this thesis sees what follows if the subjects in these experiments did possess the capacity to avoid wrongdoing, but simply didn’t exercise it. Given the high rates of wrongdoing in these studies, and consistent replication of results with subjects from number of social groups, we have strong evidence that most members of the moral community would also have committed wrongdoing in these experiments. Due to the relationship between standing to blame and hypocrisy, the fact most of us would have committed wrongdoing in these experiments undermines our standing to blame. In particular, we lack the normative authority to make second-personal demands when blaming.
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Scalet, Steven Paul. "Justice, liberalism, and responsibility." Diss., The University of Arizona, 1999. http://hdl.handle.net/10150/288997.
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This dissertation addresses the importance of conceptions of responsibility for contemporary theories of justice. I criticize recent defenses of liberalism which try to proceed without conceptions of responsibility. I argue that a conception of neutrality does not provide adequate support for defending a liberal theory of justice. I defend this claim by examining Brian Barry's recent defense of neutrality liberalism. His idea of neutrality reduces to an indefensible skeptical argument about conceptions of the good. I next examine John Rawls's account of political liberalism. I argue that his approach fails to appropriately address the persons and traditions that would be sacrificed within a Rawlsian liberal order. Rawls's notion of reasonableness and his argument from the burdens of judgment are insufficient bases to develop a liberal theory of justice. I then examine the idea of equality and its relationship with responsibility. Egalitarians describe the ideal of equality as the most fundamental notion for a theory of justice. They also interpret other traditions--such as the contractarian approaches of Barry and Rawls--in terms of this commitment to moral equality. Through a discussion of Ronald Dworkin's liberal egalitarianism, I argue that any plausible interpretation of moral equality must rely on an account of personal responsibility. Claims about responsibility, I argue, must be at the core of any theory of theory of justice. In the last chapter, I consider what a theory of justice should be about. I argue that the common assumption that justice is about devising principles to regulate institutions distorts how we should organize concerns of justice. Justice is about people treating each other with the respect and dignity that they are due. Problems about institutional design must be responsive to an account of individual responsibilities of justice, rather than the contemporary liberal approach of devising institutional principles prior to and with regulative primacy.
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Nanni, Milo. "Moral responsibility and ignorance." Thesis, University of Nottingham, 2018. http://eprints.nottingham.ac.uk/49072/.
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The aim of this thesis is to defend a version of volitionism from objections concerning the epistemic condition of moral responsibility (especially of moral culpability). My view states that an agent is morally blameworthy for her action only if (a) the action is morally wrong and (b) she has performed the action against her better judgement that the action is wrong or from a state of culpable ignorance. In chapter 1 I provide reason in favour of volitionism and against attributionism to motivate further articulation of volitionism. In chapter 2 I discuss when it is appropriate to blame an agent for holding a false belief. In chapter 3 I defend the thesis that an agent is blameworthy for performing an action only if the action is objectively wrong (the Objective View). In chapter 4 I defend the thesis that whenever an agent acts from ignorance, she is culpable for the act only if she is culpable for the ignorance from which she acts (the Ignorance Thesis). In chapter 5 I defend the thesis that moral culpability always involves akrasia (the Akrasia Thesis). Finally, in chapter 6 I will conclude the defence of my version of volitionism by undermining the thesis that in order for an agent to be morally responsible for an action, it is necessary (and sufficient when the other conditions are met) that some facts she takes to be playing a role in explaining why the action is good or bad be personally available to her (The Consciousness Thesis).
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Lawrence, Rebecca. "Shifting Responsibilities and Shifting Terrains : State Responsibility, Corporate Social Responsibility and Indigenous Claims." Doctoral thesis, Stockholms universitet, Sociologiska institutionen, 2009. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-28512.
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Using case studies from Australia, Sweden and Finland, and also drawing on examples from parts of Asia, including Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, and Thailand, the thesis explores how state and market actors respond to Indigenous claims and how Indigenous claims are themselves reconstituted through those particular responses. While the duty of protecting Indigenous rights might nominally fall upon the state, we are increasingly witness to the enfolding of market actors and market rationalities in debates concerning Indigenous claims. The research contained in the thesis highlights how a practice of 'passing the buck', or passing of responsibility onto others, is constituted through both market and government relations whereby responsibility for addressing Indigenous claims is shifted from states to corporations, from corporations to states, and from states back to Indigenous peoples themselves. The thesis consists of four articles. Article 1, titled 'Obliging Indigenous Citizens: Shared Responsibility Agreements in Australian Aboriginal Communities' provides a critique of the governmental provision of services to remote Australian Aboriginal communities through quasi-market arrangements. Article 2, titled 'Corporate Social Responsibility, Supply-chains and Saami Claims: Tracing the Political in the Finnish Forestry Industry' explores conflicts over state logging in Saami territories and the construction of the state/market divide in CSR debates over the rights of Indigenous peoples. Article 3, titled 'NGO Campaigns and Banks: Constituting Risk and Uncertainty' studies the negotiated and contested boundaries of markets through debates over the governance of social and environmental risks in the investment banking sector. Article 4, titled 'The Last Frontier? Windpower developments on traditional Saami lands' considers how colonial rationalities constituting the state-Saami relationship are reproduced in new debates over windpower developments in Saami mountain areas.<br><p>At the time of the doctoral defense, the following papers were unpublished and had a status as follows: Paper 4: In progress.</p>
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Horbach, Nathalie Louisa Johanna Theodora. "Liability versus responsibility under international law : defending strict state responsibility for transboundary damage /." [S.l.] : [S.n.], 1996. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb37760399h.
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Ndowora, Nyari. "The relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility Drivers and Corporate Social Responsibility Maturity levels." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2015. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/52275.
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The need for companies to achieve different outcomes in terms of their vision and goals has resulted in the rise of different drivers of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Due to the differences in these desired outcomes and in some instances lack of sufficient knowledge, companies operate at different maturity levels of CSR. This research was based on the premise that identifying the relationship between CSR drivers and the CSR maturity levels would contribute towards helping to achieve the highest level of maturity while identifying how companies can better understand the concept of CSR as a whole.
An exploratory study was undertaken between July 2015 to October 2015 and ten interviews were conducted with company directors, executives or senior managers responsible for sustainability / CSR. Research findings indicate strong, moderate and weak links between CSR drivers and CSR maturity level and these could be used to guide companies that need to move to next level of maturity. Factors such as education and mentoring of companies were identified to be essential for companies in order for them to be driven to a higher CSR maturity level. Matching allocation of funds between the drivers and the desired longterm achievements was found to be essential for achievement of the highest level of maturity level.<br>Mini-disseration (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2015.<br>nk2016<br>Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS)<br>MBA<br>Unrestricted
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Poukka, Riikka. "Corporate Responsibilityon the Media Sector : Study on the Corporate Responsibility Perceptions of Alma Media’s Stakeholders." Thesis, Stockholm University, Stockholm Resilience Centre, 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-41215.
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<p>Despite the globally growing interest in corporate responsibility (CR), there is little practical as wellas academic knowledge of CR practises in the media sector. The aim of this study is to make acontribution to the evolving understanding of what CR implies in the media sector by applying astakeholder approach to a case study, which is Alma Media, a Finnish media corporation. Firstly,from the corporate perspective, the objective of this study is to provide Alma Media with a CRagenda, based on the CR priorities defined in stakeholder interviews. Secondly, from a moretheoretical point of view, this study aims to evaluate the stakeholder theory as a means of definingthe CR characteristics of the media sector in Finland.The main body of the primary data is collected by 44 stakeholder interviews, supportedby participant observation at the case company. The data is structured with content analysis andanalysed according to the stakeholder categorisation of Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) in order toprioritise between the different stakeholders and their CR interests.The findings indicate Alma Media’s CR priorities are a mix of media ethics (reliability,responsible journalism, journalistic integrity), traditional CR issues (environment, personnel) andcultural responsibility (locality, citizenship). Most stakeholder demands concerns environmentalresponsibility. To understand media CR on a general, global level, further research is needed toconfirm the findings of this study and, particularly, to highlight the international differences andsimilarities in media CR.Concerning the theoretical objective of the study, the study concludes that the Mitchell,Agle and Wood model helps to identify the priority stakeholders and CR issues but fails to capturethe multi-dimensional nature of the power attribute and the role of stakeholder networks in themanagement of CR. Thus, stakeholder theory provides valuable insight into CR management butfurther research on stakeholder network models is needed.</p>
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Kilje, Bim. "The Conception of Responsibility : Experiences of and Reflections on Male Contraceptive Responsibility in Sweden." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Institutionen för kulturantropologi och etnologi, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-375245.
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This essay examines male contraceptive responsibility in theory and practice, within the framework of experiences of existing contraceptives, as well as views on new contraceptives for men that are being researched. In today’s Sweden, contraception is largely a female area. However, with progress on the area of research into new hormonal male contraceptives, we might be headed towards a different reality. In hope of gaining a fuller understanding of contraceptive experiences, this paper aims to contribute to the understudied area of men and reproduction, and add understanding of how men would approach a new contraceptive. The empirical material consists of in-depth interviews with five male Medicine students and Intern Physicians living in Sweden – some of the people who are going to influence other’s contraceptive realities in their professional practice. The essay explores the social contexts in which these men’s personal contraceptive experiences and thoughts around responsibility are created. The results show that women use contraceptive methods to a greater extent than men do. However, it is thought among the students and Physicians that contraceptive responsibility should be equal between the genders, and the approach to using a new male contraceptive is positive. Female contraceptive use is understood by the informants as a “burden”, the sharing of which is posed as the main reason to use new male contraceptives. New male contraceptives are hence found to be understood as a female right, rather than a male right. The essay shows that perceptions of responsibilities for contraception are rooted in cultural discourses, such as the assumption that women are more concerned to avoid pregnancy, and that it is difficult to develop contraceptives for men. Therefore, new male contraceptives might extend the possibilities for men to be involved in contraception – but our gendered ideas of, for example risk, might not change just because new contraceptives become available.
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Ruiz, Svensson Erik, and Emma Rådhall. "Social responsibility in the digital era : Digital communication agencies social responsibility in digital channels." Thesis, Tekniska Högskolan, Högskolan i Jönköping, JTH, Datateknik och informatik, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-46404.
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Purpose and problem discussion: Nowadays, it is crucial to implement social responsibility to business operations to succeed as a business. Companies face increased demands from customers and stakeholders to show their actions regarding social responsibility. At the same time, digital development is shaping the communication industry, creating new communication platforms in the world. The purpose of this study is to explore digital communication agencies role in the production and implementation of digital products within digital channels to best understand digital social responsibility. The study aims to answer the research questions: What social responsibilities does a digital communication agency have in regard to the products and messages they produce for digital channels? and How do digital communication agencies become socially responsible when using digital channels? Method: An abductive analysis method was applied to semi-structured interviews with digital communication agencies in Jönköping, Sweden. The analysis of the empirical findings has resulted in deeper understanding of social responsibility in digital environments; a study area that has not been explored before. Four digital communication agencies represent the average digital social responsibility mindset and business culture in Jönköping, Sweden. This gave us the possibility to research social responsibility on digital channels. Results, discussion and conclusions: The results show that the digital communication agencies clients are entirely responsible for the digital material published on their own digital channels. Although, the agencies do need to make sure they produce the best possible material for their clients to avoid bad relationships with stakeholders and a bad reputation. The results also show that social responsibility is not first priority for any company; profitability always comes first. The key to digital social responsibility is to work with the right clients and thoroughly analyse the client’s business operations to bring out the best in each case and to be prepared for backlashes. The digital communication agencies could also benefit from a crisis plan, to minimise stress and optimize the problem solving if a crisis would occur. If doing this correctly,the agencies enable genuine and honest digital communication, which minimises the risk of being perceived unfairly on digital platforms. This is especially of importance on digital platforms, where the speed, great reach and two-way communication makes it even easier to receive negativity and face backlashes. A digital communication agency can become socially responsible by working with the right clients, as well as producing and publishing genuine and honest digital communication.
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Rudolph, Thomas James. "Institutional responsibility for economic conditions /." Diss., ON-CAMPUS Access For University of Minnesota, Twin Cities Click on "Connect to Digital Dissertations", 2001. http://www.lib.umn.edu/articles/proquest.phtml.
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Lenger, Katarina, and Johanna Thorpert. "Corporate Social Responsibility : ett marknadsföringsverktyg?" Thesis, Halmstad University, School of Business and Engineering (SET), 2009. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hh:diva-3163.
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<p>Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is the act of taking social responsibility above what you need to do as a corporation. It can be of social, ethical or environmental character, for example an engagement in a local school or a voluntary reduction of pollution within the business buildings. There is no global standard concerning CSR, thus creating a definition gap where organisations are free to create their own definitions of the subject. This is in turn generating validity problems. Some companies are forced to behave as responsible corporate citizens by external pressure groups, for example by negative media attention. Others, though they are not as numerous, choose to implement CSR voluntary. An absolute model of CSR does not exist, since CSR is a concept with many different definitions. There are however two extreme schools that tries to explain CSR. Some argue that CSR is in the interest of all stakeholders, while others claim that CSR is a distraction from the shareholders interest. We have selected three models in order to give an overall picture. These will not however be used to validate the reality.</p><p>We argue in our thesis that CSR can be used as a tool within the area of reputation marketing. The purpose is therefore to research this argument with accurate research methods. We conducted a qualitative survey, with a company within the business to business service sector in Sweden, and compared it with a quantitative survey amongst the company’s clients, combined with existing theories concerning CSR as a concept. This is done in order to see whether CSR has made an impact upon the clients’ selection process, whilst choosing service providers.</p><p>Our findings show that there are other, more pressing interest areas that are important for the customers within this sector of business. But as pointed out by the service company itself, CSR is not doing any harm to the company, and in the long run, the overall trend is an increase in CSR-associated activities throughout the business environment.</p>
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Shamoun, Devan, and Jelena Kokosar. "Corporate Social Responsibility : Inom bankverksamhet." Thesis, Södertörns högskola, Institutionen för ekonomi och företagande, 2012. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:sh:diva-17783.
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Begreppet CSR, Corporate Social Responsibility, har på senare årtionden blivit ett allt viktigare koncept för företag. För att företag ska kunna vara konkurrenskraftiga krävs det idag att man både tar sitt ansvar utifrån det ekonomiska perspektivet och det sociala perspektivet. I och med att begreppet har vuxit har fler och fler företag börjat använda sig utav CSR och börjat integrera det sin verksamhet. Bankerna ser sig själva idag som stora aktörer i samhällets påverkan att sträva framåt. Därför tar man sig an det samhällsansvar som man förväntas att ta av samhällets medborgare för att bankerna ska anses som goda bankaktörer. Detta är det som kännetecknar CSR, Corporate Social Responsibility, d.v.s. att man tar ett socialt ansvar som man inte tjänar något på. Somliga företag använder begreppet “hållbarhet” hellre än CSR. Vårt syfte med uppsatsen är att beskriva och förklara fenomenet CSR inom bankerna och få större insyn vad det innebär fören bankverksamhet samt hur viktigt det är för bankerna att ha CSR i sin verksamhet. För att kunna besvara våra frågeställningar har vi dels samlat in data i form av intervjuer med CSR ansvariga i Handelsbanken och Swedbank samt den fackliga organisationen Finansförbundet. Vi har även hämtat data från litteratur och vetenskapliga artiklar. Bankerna försöker göra egna tolkningar av begreppet CSR. Trots att Swedbank och Handelsbanken väljer att använda två olika begrepp så går det att se att grundtanken är den samma. Det som skiljer sig mellan dessa två banker när det gäller CSR är vilka projekt man väljer att involvera sig i när det kommer till de olika ansvarsområdena. Allmänheten kan även se mer av Swedbanks CSR arbete, som sticker ut lite mer än Handelsbankens.
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Gustafsson, Anna, and Kinnunen Henrietta Lumme. "Corporate Social Responsibility i Fastighetsbranschen." Thesis, KTH, Bygg- och fastighetsekonomi, 2011. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-77487.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
Today, more and more companies are taking their responsibility in different areas. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a concept that companies can use to express their responsibilities in a number of areas. CSR, however, lacks a uniform definition. The view on what the responsibilities are for the companies in different areas are not consistent. The Swedish real estate industry has been working with an environmental focus for a number of years. Today, companies are aware of real estates’ environmental impact and how they can work with the environment in a responsible manner. Discussions have begun over what other responsibilities the real estate sector has and how companies should respond to them. The purpose of this thesis is to locate where the Swedish real estate sector is staged within CSR and how they are addressing this issue. To examine this, a literature review is conducted on the meaning of CSR. The public material from a number of leading companies in CSR has been examined to see what makes their CSR work unique. Furthermore, interviews were conducted with some of Sweden's leading commercial real estate companies and an online survey was sent out to see how companies work with CSR compared to each other and how they define CSR. The results show that the Swedish real estate sector has recently begun working within this field. So far, only a few companies present themselves as CSR. It is relatively unclear in the industry what CSR means and many companies are instead talking about sustainability. What is surprising is that although the environmental issue has been so central in the sector several companies fail to recognize this issue, which means that there is still a lot left to do. Another interesting aspect is that despite the fact that few companies choose to demonstrate a commitment to CSR, the survey shows that a number of companies have involvement in those elements covered by CSR. Why these companies chose not to express themselves as a company with CSR responsibilities may be due to ignorance of what is required in the field. Other companies choose to wait to put resources into developing a strategy and instead see how it develops in the industry. Since a number of companies already demonstrate a CSR commitment and some are currently working on developing strategies for this, it can be assumed that CSR will grow in this industry.
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Stepanenko, Ievgeniia. "Corporate Social Responsibility in Ukraine." Thesis, KTH, Fastigheter och byggande, 2012. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-102383.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
The following thesis is a study of development of CSR policies around the world and in Ukraine in particular. Additionally, the purpose is to make suggestions for positive change in a process of CSR implementation by Ukrainian companies and a role of state in promoting responsible business behavior. Corporate Social Responsibility is an emerging concept in Ukrainian business and delay in its establishment can be explained with a number of factors. There is a need in changes to existing management practice, insuring integration of principles, methods and tools of social responsibility in business activities of Ukrainian corporations in order to ensure their competitiveness, achievement of high productivity and profitability. The study has been performed through a literature review of current research and a case study of Ukrainian company CSR policy. The results show that there have been a major improvement in evolution of CSR concept in Ukraine over last few years, but there are still a number of problems to deal with. This thesis can be useful in reviewing last trends in development of CSR in Ukraine and defining challenges and problematic areas.
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Voorhoeve, Alexander Edmund. "Equal opportunity, equality, and responsibility." Thesis, University College London (University of London), 2006. http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/1446749/.
Texto completo da fonteResumo:
This thesis argues that a particular version of equal opportunity for welfare is the best way of meeting the joint demands of three liberal egalitarian ideals: distributional equality, responsibility, and respect for individuals' differing reasonable judgements of their own good. It also examines which social choice rules best represent these demands. Finally, it defends the view that achieving equal opportunity for welfare should not only be a goal of formal public institutions, but that just citizens should also sometimes be guided by it in their everyday life. The version of equal opportunity for welfare it defends differs from some well-known contemporary versions in the following ways. First, it rejects a definition of welfare as the degree of satisfaction of a person's preferences, because, it argues, this conception of welfare cannot adequately deal with preference change. Instead, it suggests that we should adopt a conception of welfare based on a list of goods and conditions that are recognised as valuable from the perspective of a variety of different conceptions of the good. Second, it argues that individuals' prima facie claim to an equally valuable share of the world's resources-a claim which is based on their equal moral worth-is limited to situations in which giving one person a more valuable share means that someone else ends up with a less valuable share. It also argues that in situations where we can improve at least one person's situation without worsening anyone else's, we generally do not fail to respect each person's equal moral worth by doing so, even if this leads to inequalities. Third, it defends a distinct view of responsibility, which justifies social arrangements that give people certain options with reference to the value that individuals can achieve (but don't necessarily achieve) through their choices from these options.