Дисертації з теми "1711-1776 Philosophy"

Desde sua primeira obra, David Hume anuncia ao leitor o projeto de constituição de uma ciência da natureza humana. O principal objetivo deste trabalho consiste em examinar os argumentos utilizados por Hume para construir as condições de possibilidade desse saber.
Since his first work David Hume announces his intentions to constitute a science of human nature. The main target of this thesis is to examine the arguments used by Hume to build the conditions of possibility of this field of knowledge.

Orientador: José Oscar de Almeida Marques
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
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Resumo: David Hume, no Tratado da Natureza Humana, livro 1, parte 4, seção 2, "Do ceticismo quanto aos sentidos", pretende explicar a causa de nossa crença na existência do mundo exterior, isto é, a crença em existências contínuas e distintas da mente e da percepção. Ele inicia a seção com a seguinte afirmação: devemos dar nosso assentimento ao princípio referente à existência dos corpos, embora não possamos ter a pretensão de sustentar a sua veracidade por meio de argumentos filosóficos (T 1.4.2.1). Mas, ao final da seção, sua postura diante da crença na existência do mundo exterior muda totalmente, como Hume mesmo diz, em T 1.4.2.56, penúltimo parágrafo: "iniciei este tema com a premissa de que deveria ter uma fé implícita em nossos sentidos, e que essa é a conclusão que extrairia da totalidade de meu raciocínio", contudo, argumenta ele, "sinto-me neste momento possuído pelo sentimento contrário", ou seja, Hume não deposita mais nenhuma confiança nos sentidos, ou antes, imaginação. Por que Hume chega a tal conclusão? Hume argumenta que essas existências contínuas e distintas são ficções da imaginação e, como tais, não merecem nosso assentimento e confiança. Essa situação embaraçosa conduz Hume a um ceticismo radical que, segundo o próprio filósofo, somente pode ser curado por meio do "descuido e desatenção". Mas, como poderíamos interpretar essa declaração de Hume? Minha proposta de interpretação defende que através do conceito humeano de ceticismo mitigado presente no Tratado, livro 1, parte 4, seção 7, "Conclusão deste livro", e na Investigação sobre o Entendimento Humano, seção 12, "Da filosofia acadêmica ou cética", somos capazes de compreendê-la. Nas duas obras mencionadas Hume apresenta o modo de investigação filosófica que é, para ele, o mais adequado, a saber: o método cético. Contudo, o ceticismo de Hume não é o ceticismo radical que impede toda a ação, mas sim um ceticismo mais mitigado que combina consigo uma parcela da "mistura bruta e terrena" (T 1.4.7.14), constituinte da vida comum e afazeres cotidianos
Abstract: David Hume, in the Treatise of Human Nature, book 1, part 4, section 2, "Of scepticism with regard to the senses", wants to explain the cause of our belief in the existence of external world, i.e., the belief in existence continued and distinct of the mind and perception. He begins the section with the following affirmation: we might give our assentiment to the principle regarding the existence of external world, even though we cannot pretend to sustain its veracity through philosophical arguments (T 1.4.2.1). But, at the end of section, Hume's position as regards of the belief of external world changes completely, as Hume says, in T 1.4.2.56: "I begun this subject with premising, that we ought to have an implicit faith in our senses, and that this wou'd be the conclusion, I shou'd draw from the whole of my reasoning", however, he says, "I feel myself at present of quite contrary sentiment", i.e., Hume didn't deposit any more trust in the senses, or first, imagination. Why Hume concluded that? Hume says that these continued and distinct existences are fictions of imagination, and in this way, don't diserve our trust and assentiment. This complicated situation brings Hume to the radical scepticism that, according to himself, can only be cured by "carelessness and in-attention". But how can we interpret Hume's declaration? My proposal is that by means of the humean concept of mitigate scepticism present in the Treatise, book 1, part 4, section 7, and in Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, section 12, we can comprehended Hume's situation. In both books, he presented for us a way of philosophical investigation that is, for him, more adequate: the sceptical method. However, humean scepticism is not the radical one that obstructed all action, instead, more mitigated humean scepticism brings with itself one part of the "gross earthy mixture, as an ingredient" (T 1.4.7.14), that constitutes common life
Mestrado
Filosofia
Mestre em Filosofia

Orientador: José Oscar de Almeida Marques
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
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Resumo: Esta dissertação examina o tema da identidade pessoal no Livro 1 do Tratado da natureza humana de David Hume, e a sua retomada nos textos da Sinopse e do "Apêndice". Trata-se de explicar o sentido de algumas afirmações feitas por Hume sobre esse tema. Na seção "Da Identidade Pessoal", Hume, por um lado, nega a existência da ideia do eu e, por outro, propõe uma tese sobre o eu, segundo a qual o eu é um sistema de diferentes percepções, encadeadas pelos princípios de associação de ideias. Ao retomar o tema da identidade pessoal no "Apêndice", Hume mostra-se decepcionado com sua própria explicação oferecida previamente para esse assunto no Tratado e na Sinopse. Diante dessas afirmações, o objetivo do nosso trabalho é cotejar suas afirmações iniciais sobre o tema do eu com sua reconsideração posterior a fim de tentar entender o motivo da sua insatisfação. Seguindo a hipótese proposta por Piston, defendo que Hume apresenta uma concepção do eu alternativa para as explicações de Descartes e Locke. Além disso, sugiro que Hume mantém no "Apêndice" a mesma concepção de identidade pessoal apresentada inicialmente no texto do Tratado. Para sustentar essas hipóteses, é imprescindível distinguir o objeto da crítica de Hume, o eu inventado pelos filósofos, da proposição humeana acerca sobre o eu como um sistema de percepções em fluxo constante
Abstract: This dissertation examines the theme of personal identity in Book 1 of the Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume, and its resumption in the texts of the Synopsis and the "Appendix." It intends to explain the meaning of some statements made by Hume on this topic. In the section "Personal Identity" Hume, on the one hand, denies the existence of the idea of the self and, on the other, proposes a thesis about the self, according to which the self is a system of different perceptions, linked by the principles of association of ideas. When he revisited the issue of personal identity in the "Appendix", Hume appears disappointed with his own explanation previously offered for that subject in the Treatise and in the Synopsis. Given these statements, the aim of this work is to collate Hume's initial statements on the subject of the self with his subsequent reconsideration, in order to try to understand the reason for his dissatisfaction. Following a hypothesis proposed by Piston, I argue that Hume presents a conception of the self alternative to explanations of Descartes and Locke. Furthermore, I suggest that Hume holds in the "Appendix" the same conception of personal identity presented initially in the text of the Treatise. To support these hypotheses, it is essential to distinguish the object of Hume's criticism, the self invented by philosophers, from Hume's proposition about the self as a system of perceptions in constant flux
Mestrado
Filosofia
Mestre em Filosofia

This thesis sets out to show that a philosophical reflection on history is, in the strongest possible way, an essential feature of Hume's project of a science of human nature: a philosophical investigation of human nature, for Hume, cannot be successful independently of an understanding of the relation of human beings to their history. Hume intended to criticize traditional metaphysics by referring all knowledge to experience. But it is almost always assumed that Hume means by "experience" the result of an individual's past sense perception or personal observation. Accordingly, Hume's criticism of traditional metaphysics is taken to lead to an individualistic conception of knowledge and human nature. In this thesis I claim that this picture of Hume's "empiricism" is simply wrong. He is not a philosopher who reduces "experience" to the merely private happenings within a personal psychology. On the contrary, Hume has a wider notion of experience, one that includes not only personal observation and memory, but, fundamentally, one that includes implicit knowledge of human history. Experience, so understood, brings about what I term a historical point of view, namely, the point of view of someone who seeks to extend his experience as far as it is possible in order to acquire the capacity to produce more nuanced and impartial judgments in any given practice. It is precisely this historical point of view that enables us to depart from the individualistic perspective that we would otherwise be bound to adopt not only in epistemology but, most significantly, in politics, in social life, in religion, etc.
Chapter 1 presents the historical background against which Hume elaborates his views of history's role in philosophy. Chapter 2 discusses and criticizes the individualist reading of Hume by showing that he had a satisfactory account of beliefs formed via human testimony. Chapter 3 presents a view of Hume on explanation that underscores his interest in practical and informal explanations as those of history. Chapter 4 provides a discussion of Hume's notion of historical experience in relation both to his theory of perception and to his project of a "science of man."

Orientador: Jose Oscar de Almeida Marques
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas
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Resumo: A análise de David Hume (1711-1776) vincula a epistemologia, a moral e a política de forma tal que a sociedade é apresentada como resultado da interação entre as faculdades naturais dos homens e os recursos artificiais decorrentes da reflexão. O artifício denota as invenções refletidas e voluntárias que ampliam as perspectivas da natureza humana, ou seja, os mecanismos de sociabilização do homem que promovem seu desenvolvimento social, situando-o no universo da moral e da política e adaptando seus interesses particulares ao interesse público. A essência do artifício reside na capacidade humana de dominar seus impulsos mediante a sublimação, que direciona os desejos para uma perspectiva estável de satisfação. Nesse sentido, ele amplia as possibilidades de realização do homem, além de cooperar na manutenção da sociedade. Este estudo pretende mostrar como Hume compõe uma filosofia que analisa a sociedade a partir das implicações e desdobramentos de princípios naturais e mostrar como o artifício estabelece um vínculo entre a moral e a política, entre os interesses particulares dos indivíduos e os interesses gerais da sociedade, contribuindo para o estabelecimento das instituições sociais e da autoridade
Abstract: The analysis of David Hume (1711-1776) entail the epistemology, the morals and the politics so that the society is presented like the result of interaction between the natural faculties of men and the artificial recourses current from reflexion. The artifice connotes the reflected and voluntary inventions that ampliflies the perspectives of human nature, that is, the mechanisms of sociabilization of man which promote their social development, placing them in the universe of morals and politics and adapting their particular interests to the public interest. The essence of the artifice resides in the human capability to dominate their impulses through sublimation, which directionates the desires to an estable perspective of satisfaction. In this sense, it amplifies the possibilities of man's realization, yonder to collaborate with the maintenance of society. This study intends to display how Hume composes a philosophy which analyses the society from the implications and unfoldments of natural principles and to indicate how the artifice establishes an entailment between moral and politics, between the particular interests of individuals and the general interests of society, contributing to the establishment of social instituitions and the authority
Mestrado
Ética e Política
Mestre em Filosofia

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Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico
This Work intends an epistemological approach of David Hume s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion by French philosopher Clément Rosset s category of tragic philosophy . We propose a new interpretative possibility of Hume s thought in the Dialogues, different form the naturalism and beyond the simple skepticism . The concept of tragic philosophy allows one to think the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion as a work of tragic philosophy, in which the concept of nature is completely dissolved by the skeptic arguments.
Esta dissertação pretende uma abordagem epistemológica dos Diálogos sobre a Religião Natural de David Hume por meio da categoria de filosofia trágica , trabalhada pelo filósofo francês Clément Rosset. Propomos uma nova possibilidade interpretativa do pensamento de David Hume, diferente do naturalismo e além do simples ceticismo. O conceito de filosofia trágica permite pensar os Diálogos sobre a Religião Natural como uma obra de filosofia trágica, na qual é efetuada, através dos argumentos céticos, a completa dissolução do conceito de natureza .

A filosofia moral de David Hume é interpretada, predominantemente, como representante de um ceticismo normativo ou de uma moralidade psicologizada. Tais interpretações privilegiam um determinado hábito de leitura dos textos humeanos, influenciadas pelas denominadas "teorias da razão prática", afirmando que seu sistema filosófico não contempla a estrutura de racionalidade necessária para a fundamentação da normatividade da moralidade. De forma contrária, a presente investigação sustenta que a filosofia moral humeana permite uma interpretação normativa através do exame da "dinâmica dos sentimentos" presentes na natureza humana. A normatividade da moral é estabelecida, de acordo com o filósofo escocês, a partir do conteúdo valorativo dos sentimentos naturais de "dor" e "prazer" que "sentimos" de forma imediata. No entanto, isso não implica que sua filosofia moral possa ser reduzida a um puro hedonismo, subjetivismo ou relativismo moral. Defendemos que a sensibilidade moral, segundo Hume, providencia a discriminação das ações humanas com conteúdo valorativo através da comunicação dos sentimentos (simpatia) avaliados de um ponto de vista imparcial (espectador judicioso). Essa "dinâmica dos sentimentos" é o que denominamos de normatividade como reflexividade, ou seja, a sucessiva reflexividade produz um resultado normativo. Nossa tese conclui que, na visão do filósofo escocês, o problema da normatividade da moralidade pode ser respondido a partir das seguintes perspectivas: do conteúdo valorativo de sentimentos naturais, não de valores impostos por uma razão prática; da comunicação de sentimentos entre os agentes, não da deliberação solipsista do agente moral; do ponto de vista imparcial de um espectador judicioso, não dos interesses dos agentes envolvidos; da dinâmica de sentimentos com uma sucessiva reflexividade, não da reflexão de uma "pura razão".
David Hume's moral philosophy is mainly understood as a representative of a normative scepticism and also as a psychologised morality. Such conceptions privilege a reading habit of humeans texts influenced by the so called "theories of the practical reason'" stating that his philosophical system does not contemplate the rationality structure necessary for the grounds of normativity of morality. As opposed to this, the present investigation supports the idea that humean moral philosophy allows a normative interpretation by examining "dynamic of feelings" present in human nature. The normativity of moral is established, according to the Scottish philosopher, from the evaluative contents of natural feelings of "pain" and "pleasure" in which, we immediately "feel". However, that does not mean that his moral philosophy can be reduced to pure hedonism, subjectivism or moral relativism. We support the idea that moral sensibility, according to Hume, provides discrimination of worthy human actions through communication of the feelings (sympathy) evaluative from an impartial point of view (judicious spectator). Such "dynamic of feelings" is what we call normativity as reflexivity, in other words, successful reflexivity producing normative outcome. Our thesis concludes that according to the Scottish philosopher's view, the normativity of morality question can be answered from the following perspectives: from natural feelings' worth rather than from the worth imposed by practical reason; from communication of feelings between agents, rather than from the solipsist deliberation of moral agent; from the impartial point of view of a judicious spectator, rather than from the interests of the involved agents; from the dynamic of feelings with successive reflexivity, rather than from the reflexion of a "pure reason".

Orientador: Jose Oscar de Almeida Marques
Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas
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Resumo: A dissertação examina a análise de Hume dos conceitos de liberdade e imputabilidade moral. O texto de referência para a pesquisa é a seção VIII da Investigação sobre o entendimento humano. Mostro, a partir do estudo dessa seção, em que sentido os conceitos de liberdade e necessidade são compatíveis para Hume. Para tanto, analiso o compatibilismo humeano enfatizando a unidade explicativa que o autor esposa claramente na obra citada. De fato, Hume, em seu exame das noções de liberdade e necessidade anuncia introduzir novidades que prometem ao menos algum resultado na decisão da controvérsia entre a doutrina da necessidade e a doutrina da liberdade (da vontade). Ele propõe um 'projeto de reconciliação¿ (reconciling project) que consiste em mostrar que liberdade e necessidade são perfeitamente compatíveis entre si, e que afirmar que as ações humanas são livres não é afirmar que estejam fora do âmbito da necessidade, mas apenas que se realizaram sem constrangimento. Em seguida, esclareço as razões que conduzem à crença na vontade livre, crença esta infundada, segundo Hume. Por fim, procuro estabelecer as conseqüências que o compatibilismo humeano traz para a noção de responsabilidade moral. Hume entende que não só é perfeitamente possível explicar os juízos morais pelo seu compatibilismo, como também que o seu compatibilismo é a única alternativa de fato consistente para dar conta dos ajuizamentos que fazemos acerca da moralidade. Entendo que a explicação dos juízos morais de imputabilidade oferecida por Hume representa uma hipótese altamente persuasiva e com vigor suficiente para responder a objeções geralmente apresentadas pelos incompatibilistas
Abstract: The dissertation examines the analysis of Hume of the concepts of freedom and moral imputability. The text of reference for the research is section VIII of the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding. I show, from the study of this section, how freedom and necessity are compatible for Hume. To this effect, I analyze the humean compatibilism emphasizing the unit of the explanation that the author maintains in the cited work. Hume, in his examination of freedom and necessity, announces a new approach that promises at least some results for the decision of the controversy between the doctrine of the necessity and the doctrine of the freedom (of the will). He proposes a conciliatory project that consists in showing that freedom and necessity are perfectly compatible, and that to say that the human actions are free is not to say that they are out of the scope of the necessity, but only that they are without constraint. After that, I clarify the reasons that lead to the belief in free will, which is baseless according to Hume. Finally, I establish the consequences that humean compatibilism brings for the notion of moral responsibility. Hume understands not only that it is perfectly possible to explain moral judgments by means of his compatibilism, but also that his compatibilism is the only consistent alternative to account for moral judgement. I understand that the explanation of moral judgments of imputability offered by Hume represents a highly persuasive hypothesis, and strong enough to answer the objections generally raised by incompatibilists
Mestrado
Filosofia Moral
Mestre em Filosofia

En esta tesis analizaremos la filosofía de la identidad personal elaborada por Hume. Para ello, partiremos del análisis de los principios expuestos en el Tratado de la Naturaleza Humana. Distinguiremos detalladamente lo que los estudiosos de Hume han llamado los primeros y los segundos pensamientos sobre la identidad personal, profundizando en el crucial momento en el que en los segundos pensamientos, Hume confiesa que "todas mis esperanzas se desvanecen" al intentar explicar los principios que enlazan nuestras sucesivas percepciones. Ello nos sugiere que se siente frustrado al intentar explicitar, desde sus principios epistemológicos, las conexiones reales que enlazarían las percepciones y que son necesarias para el funcionamiento de la memoria. Encontraremos a Hume ante un dilema imposible, pues o bien ha de renunciar a la identidad personal y a la memoria o bien tiene que renunciar a los principios de su filosofía. Por ello, Hume se encontrará perdido dentro del laberinto de la identidad personal, de tal manera que la única salida posible es sentarse en el banco de escepticismo.
In this thesis we will discuss the philosophy of personal identity developed by Hume. Starting from the analysis of the principles outlined in the Treatise of Human Nature, we will thoroughly describe what the experts in the work of Hume have called the first and second thoughts about personal identity. Then we will delve in the crucial moment when, while discussing second thoughts, Hume confesses that "all my hopes vanish" when trying to explain the principles that link our successive perceptions. This implies that he feels frustrated when trying to explain, from its epistemological principles, the real connections that would link perceptions and that are necessary for the functioning of memory. Here we find Hume facing an impossible dilemma, since he has to give up either his personal identity and memory or the principles of his philosophy. Therefore, Hume will be lost in the maze of personal identity, until the only way out is to sit on the bench of skepticism.

L'idée que nous défendons est celle suivant laquelle les discussions au sujet de l'identité personnelle développées dans les Livre I et II du Traité de la Nature Humaine sont consistantes l'une avec l'autre. Afin de démontrer cette thèse, nous discutons les propos tenus par Hume dans ces Livres et montrons que les discussions répondent à différentes questions et qu'elles se complètent bien théoriquement. Cette thèse se divise en trois parties. Nous expliquons, tout d'abord,"L'existence des substances matérielles". Nous montrons que nous trouvons chez Hume une première formulation de la thèse de la collection ainsi qu'une précision importante quant à la nature du lien entre les perceptions. Nous expliquons les croyances au sujet des corps extérieurs et soutenons que c'est grâce à la conception chez Hume de l'imagination que ces croyances "naturelles" peuvent être expliquées et justifiées. Nous distinguons, finalement, la croyance et la fiction et montrons l'importance de cette différenciation pour suivre correctement le propos humien. Dans la deuxième partie, nous discutons de "L'existence des substances spirituelles". Nous distinguons l'idée du moi et le moi des passions et montrons que l'idée "vraie" du moi ou de l'esprit est une idée complexe [. . . . ] Nous présentons ce que soutient Hume dans l'Appendice concernant l'identité et défendons les thèses suivant lesquelles 1) il n'y a pas de deuxième circularité théorique dans son traitement de l'identité et que 2) Hume est insatisfait de son explication de l'unité réelle de l'esprit humain. Dans la dernière partie, nous discutons de l'identité en tant qu'elle concerne les passions. Nous défendons l'idée suivant laquelle les passions contribuent grandement à la formation du moi et que, par conséquent, nous pouvons le différencier des fictions établies dans le Livre I. Nous expliquons le rôle essentiel que joue l'idée du moi dans les passions indirectes ainsi que dans les mécanismes de la sympathie et de la comparaison. Nous montrons, dans nos conclusions, la relation étroite entre le moi et l'autre ainsi que le rôle privilégié du corps humain dans la conception humienne de l'identité personnelle.

Although many historians assert the unity of the Enlightenment, their histories essentially belie this notion. Consequently, Enlightenment history is confused and meaningless, urging the reader to believe that diversity is similarity and faction is unity. Fundamental among the common denominators of these various interpretations, however, are the scientific method and empirical observation, as introduced by Newton. These, historians acclaim as the turning point when mankind escaped the ignorance of superstition and the oppression of the church, and embarked upon the modern secular age. The Enlightenment, however, founders immediately upon its own standards of empiricism and demonstrable philosophical tenets, with the exception of David Hume. As the most consistent and fearless empiricist of the era, Hume's is by far the most "legitimate" philosophy of the Enlightenment, but it starkly contrasts the rhetoric and ideology of the philosophe community, and, therefore, defies attempts by historians to incorporate it into the traditional Enlightenment picture. Hume, then, exposes the Enlightenment dilemma: either the Enlightenment is not empirical, but rather the new Age of Faith Carl Becker proclaimed it, or Enlightenment philosophy is that of Hume. This study presents the historical characterization of major Enlightenment themes, such as method, reason, religion, morality, and politics, then juxtaposes this picture with the particulars (data) that contradict or seriously qualify it. As a result, much superficial analysis, wishful thinking, even proselytizing is demonstrated in the traditional Enlightenment characterization, especially with regard to the widely heralded liberal and progressive legacy of the era. In contrast, Hume's conclusions, based on the method of Newton-the essence of "enlightened" philosophy, are presented, revealing the authoritarian character (and legacy) of the Enlightenment as well as the utility and relevance of its method when honestly and rigorously applied. Through David Hume, the twentieth century can truly acquire what the Enlightenment promised—an understanding of human nature and a genuinely secular society.

Ce travail tente de renouveler la lecture du thème de l'association chez Hume. Loin de comprendre l'associationnisme du seul point de vue des idées, on peut montrer que l'originalité de Hume consiste à mettre l'accent sur des renforcements entre divers niveaux de l'association. Chaque niveau a son régime propre et correspond lui-même à la fois à un point de vue sur l'esprit et à un point de vue sur l'homme. Ainsi, de même que l'homme est compris comme être spéculatif, affectif et social, de même y a-t-il une association des idées, une association des impressions et une association sociale. Afin de préparer l'étude de ces associations, nous commençons par un retour sur les perceptions humiennes. Dans un second temps, nous essayons de dégager la spécificité de chaque niveau de l'association. Ce travail se clôt par l'étude des effets des associations pour montrer le passage de la réalité mentale, spéculative et affective, à la réalité sociale des relations.

Cette étude se propose d'examiner la façon dont les philosophies de David Hume et Thomas Reid ont promu le concept de croyance afin de repenser la logique qu'ils tenaient pour traditionnelle, et la métaphysique entendue comme réflexion sur la fiabilité de nos facultés naturelles. L'opposition philosophique entre ces deux auteurs invite d'une part à reconstruire le sens respectif de la "croyance naturelle" chez chacun d'eux sans y projeter les connotations que les débats ultérieurs du XIXe siècle ont pu donner à ce concept. D'autre part il faut comprendre si et comment une philosophie qui assume la distanciation critique, telle celle de Hume, peut rendre compte de notre réalisme naturel ; et inversement si et comment la croyance naturelle peut avoir un sens au sein d'une philosophie réaliste par principe, telle celle de Reid. Cette croyance étant considérée comme un fait de nature, comment est-il possible d'en rendre raison et d'en être responsable : à quelles épistémologies et quelles éthiques de la croyance, les décisions naturalistes de Hume et de Reid pourraient-elles donc donner lieu ? Une première partie est donc consacrée à l'élucidation du concept de croyance dont le rôle premier semble être de promouvoir une logique de l'existant, en repensant le jugement comme comportement mental. Une seconde partie cherche à évaluer la consistance de leurs psychologies ainsi promues à l'aune de leurs options respectives en métaphysique. On en vient alors à considérer le rapport entre scepticisme et naturalisme chez Hume, entre théisme et naturalisme chez Reid, et ce faisant les linéaments respectifs d'une éthique de la croyance
The aim of this study is to examine how David Hume's and Thomas Reid's philosophies promoted the concept of belief in order to be able to rethink the so-called "traditional logic", and the metaphysical reflection on the reliability of our natural faculties. Fisrtly, the philosophical opposition between the two thinkers requires that we redefine the respective meanings that they have given to the notion of "natural belief", without taking into account the subsequent connotations that arose from the debates of the nineteenth century. Secondly, the goal is to understand if and how a philosophy such as Hume's, which takes on a critical distance, is able to account for our natural realism ; but also to understand what meaning a philosophy such as Reid's, which is realistic by principle, might give to the notion of natural belief. Since belief is regarded as a fact of nature, how can it be epistemologically justified and imputable to our responsability ? What epistemologies and what ethics of belief do Hume's and Reid's naturalistic decisions imply ? The first part is devoted to the elucidation of the concept of belief whose role is prima facie to promote a logic of the existing by redefining judgment as mental behaviour. The second part aims at evaluating the consistency of the promoted psychologies, considering their respective options in metaphysics. Henceforth the link between scepticism and naturalism for Hume, and between theism and naturalism for Reid can be drawn, and their respective athics of belief outlined

La nature humaine telle que Hume nous la présente peut être envisagée comme un système autorégulé. Telle serait la signification de ce que Hume nomme « l'inventivité » de la nature humaine, une inventivité qui n'est pas seulement le propre du vivant mais la marque d'une espèce douée d'une puissance d'artifice. De nombreux principes de la nature humaine s'avèrent, en effet, capables de se réorienter spontanément à chaque fois que leur direction primitive menace l'équilibre ou la survie du système. Au cceur du système « de l'entendement », l'imagination agit comme un pivot régulateur. A l'origine d'emportements parfois intempestifs, elle est aussi une source de régularisation et de stabilisation. Cette faculté est surtout le sujet d'une remarquable logique vitale, seule capable de préserver la vivacité du jugement lorsque l'excès de régularité de la logique stricte menace de le suspendre ou de l'exténuer. Le système des passions quant à lui engendre, grâce au changement de direction spontané de « l'amour du gain » (passion inventive s'il en est), un système de conventions et d'artifices lui aussi caractérisé par l'autorégulation. Etant donné que Hume, notamment grâce à son analyse de la convention, donne à voir une harmonisation concertée des intérêts qui ne se confond pas selon nous avec une pure « harmonie involontaire », sa pensée politique peut se caractériser comme un constructivisme autorégulé. L'autorégulation est aussi le propre de la science de la nature humaine. Puisque la science de l'homme est Nature humaine, la même autorégulation qui caractérise cette dernière doit aussi caractériser le « vrai système », dont les principes s'identifient ainsi aux principes mêmes de son objet. L'écriture philosophique n'est pas, dès lors, autre chose qu'une tendance capable, comme toute propension, de changer de direction lorsque sa meilleure satisfaction l'exige
Human Nature, as described by Hume, may be characterized as a self-organized system. Such is the meaning of the « inventivity » of this species. Many principles of human nature are able to change their own direction whenever this change is required by the sability or the preservation of the whole. Within the system « of the Understanding », the imagination is a kind of regulating faculty, which is able to control and to correct its own disordered propensities. This faculty maintains a vital logics which preserves judgment whenever formal logics threatens to suspend or to destroy it. Thanks to the spontaneous change of direction of a particularly inventive passion, i. E. « the love of gain », the natural system of the passions gives rise to an artificial system of institutions ; also a self-organized system. Self-organization may be applied to the science of Human Nature. Since Human Nature is the science of Man, the principles of the science are equal to the principles ot the object of the science, and self-organization characterizes both of them. Thus, the philosophical writing process turns out to be nothing but a propensity, which is able to change its own direction, while increasing its own satisfaction

Cette étude se propose de montrer comment le concept humien de sympathie constitue le principe d'explication de l'unité d'analyse minutieusement explorée par Erving Goffman : l'interaction. Elle se donne pour tache d'explorer une pensée du social en germe dans la philosophie de Hume et qui s'épanouit dans la sociologie de Goffman. Il ne s'agit pas simplement de retracer la généalogie d'une certaine sociologie de l'action mais d'en mettre au jour les prémisses conceptuelles et les implications théoriques, grâce à la redécouverte de la radicalité philosophique du concept humien. Dans une première partie, nous établissons la filiation entre la sympathie et l'interaction telle qu'elle est introduite par Robert Ezra Park dans la sociologie américaine, et nous pointons son oubli par ses héritiers, notamment par Goffman. Dans une seconde partie. Nous montrons que l'intervention dans une explication sociologique d'un principe psychologique comme la sympathie ne conduit nullement à nier la spécificité du social mais révèle au contraire le caractère non exclusivement individuel d'une partie du psychisme. Dans une troisième partie, nous étudions comment l'évolution de l’œuvre de Goffman rend compte de l'insuffisance d'un concept d'interaction uniquement descriptif, et comment le recours à la sympathie humienne permet d'expliquer son fonctionnement. Enfin, nous analysons comment la sociologie de I'interaction éclairée par son origine philosophique contribue à résoudre un problème crucial pour la théorie sociale : comment penser le changement social ?

Cette thèse porte sur la relation entre histoire et analyse dans les considérations de Hume et de Smith sur le progrès. Son objectif est double. En premier lieu, elle vise à montrer que ces deux auteurs écossais articulent une approche historique, dite conjecturale, avec une autre approche historique qui relève de leur analyse de l’émergence de la société civile. Tandis que Hume rassemble ces deux approches historiques distinctes dans sa philosophie politique, Smith fait émerger son analyse économique de sa philosophie politique, qui est une histoire conjecturale de la société civile. Selon les deux auteurs, le gouvernement naît d’une inégalité de richesse au sein de la société et son but principal est de sécuriser la propriété privée. L’analyse économique de la Richesse des Nations dérive de cette théorie du gouvernement et de la justice. En second lieu, ce travail a pour but de souligner que Smith donne un moindre rôle à l’histoire dans sa théorie économique que Hume. Les attitudes divergentes de Hume et Smith vis-à-vis du problème de la dette publique britannique en témoigne. Tandis que Hume met en avant le danger provenant de la politique belliqueuse de la Grande Bretagne en traçant un parallèle avec l’Empire romain, Smith privilégie les effets économiques de la dette, qui, malgré leur nocivité, sont compensés par l’épargne privée. Une telle comparaison explique l’émergence ultérieure de l’école classique qui privilégie une analyse économique purement théorique, dépourvue de contexte historique
This dissertation examines the relationship between history and analysis in Hume’s and Smith's considerations on progress. Its objective is twofold. First, it aims to show that these two Scottish thinkers bring together an historical approach, i.e. conjectural history, with another historical approach stemming from their analysis of the rise of civil society. Hume conflates these two distinct historical approaches in his political philosophy, whereas Smith separates gradually his economic analysis of from his political philosophy ― which is a conjectural history of civil society. According to both of them, the government originates from the inequality of wealth within society and its main purpose is to secure private property. The economic analysis of the Wealth of Nations derives from this theory of government and justice. Secondly, this study aims to emphasize that Smith’s economic theory is less historical than Hume. This is illustrated by the difference between Hume’s and Smith’s stance on the problem of the British public debt. While Hume points out the danger proceeding from Great Britain's aggressive international politics ― by drawing a parallel with the Roman Empire ―, Smith brings to the fore the economic effects of public debt, which, despite their harmfulness, are offset by private savings. Such a comparison explains the subsequent emergence of the classical school which deploys a purely theoretical economic analysis that lacks historical context

Mal compris du grand public dans sa philosophie morale, juge, peut-etre a tort ou a raison hermetique et abstrus, david hume, philosophe ecossais, s'est propose de reprendre les grandes lignes de sa philosophie morale developpee dans le traite de la nature humaine (1739), dans les essais moraux(1742) que leur traducteur francais, a. Leroy a appele les quatre philosophes. Hume imagine quatre philosophes : l'epicurien, le stoicien, le platonicien et le sceptique, places cote a cote. Ils forment ainsi quatre portraits. Ces tenants de doctrine exposent, chacun a sa maniere, comment la philosophie est un art de vivre susceptible de nous conduire au bonheur. Le sceptique, contrairement aux trois precedents, ne dispose pas d'une doctrine etablie. Il petrit sa methode de la matiere recue des autres philosophes et la transforme en une attitude de vie
David hume, scottish philosopher, was disappointed by the attitude of public after his publishing of treatise of human nature (1739), where he has explained the tenets of his moral philosophy. He decided again to explain more simply these tenets in his moral essays (1742) which became more popular. These essays were presented as four portraits of philosophers : epicurean, stoic, platonist and the sceptic. Every philosopher thinks that philosophy is an art of life. This art may be conduct us to happiness. And at last, the sceptic uses the ideas of the three others in order to make up his method. Consequently, happiness consist in attitude to maintain generally us in life

Quelle est la relation entre la critique et le corps ? Dans l’histoire de la philosophie le but de la critique a été toujours de mettre en question les prétentions de la pensée, à l’égard de la vérité. Mais puisque la philosophie occidentale a toujours conçu la vérité comme une essence suprasensible, c’est l’immanence du corps qui devient alors le véritable fil conducteur pour atteindre à ce but. En prenant le corps comme critère d’enquête, la critique devient une investigation génétique et généalogique de la formation des idées du monde et du soi. En même temps, le corps change de nature, car lui-même devient la cible de la critique. Autrement-dit, il ne peut plus être considéré dans le cadre d’une simple opposition entre corps et esprit, comme le fait l’idéalisme. Le corps se révèle le paradigme d’une pensée naturelle, le point de vue décentré de l’existence, la perspective morcelée et dynamique de l’immanence. Sujet et objet de la critique, le corps devient la dimension originaire d’un naturalisme de la production immanente. En résumé, cette thèse porte sur une compréhension du concept du corps afin d’évaluer la possibilité qu’il devienne le critère d’un naturalisme critique : c’est-à-dire une pensée plongée dans le temps et la vie, dans le devenir et la matière, parmi une multitude de singularités. Pour comprendre une telle pensée, on convoque les philosophes qui, dans l’histoire de la philosophie, ont déjà indiqué les grandes « raisons du corps » : Spinoza, Hume, Nietzsche. Les questions qui traversent cette thèse, donc, sont les suivantes : qu’est-ce que sont la critique et le corps du point de vue de l’immanence ? Est-ce la critique est possible à partir du corps ? Est-ce que le corps, est-il un principe capable de produire du sens et de la valeur ? Qu’est-ce qu’une philosophie de la production immanente ?
What is the relationship between body and critique? In the history of philosophy, the aim of the critique has always been to unveil the pretentions of thought towards the truth. Yet, since western philosophy has always conceived truth as a transcendent value, the only appropriate way to achieve this aim, looks like to adopt the immanence of the body, as the starting point and the main force of this quest. By adopting the body, as the method of the philosophical examination, the critique becomes a genetic and genealogic investigation on how our ideas are produced. At the same time, the body too change his nature, as it becomes the object of the critique. It means that the body is no longer considered in a simple opposition to the mind, as it is conceived within the Mind-Body problem debate. That would mean to remain within the perspective of idealism. On the contrary, the body reveals itself as the paradigm of a natural thinking, the decentralized point of view of existence, the fragmented and dynamic perspective of the immanence. Subject and object of the critique, the body becomes the primordial dimension of a productive naturalism So, the aim of this thesis is to investigate the possibilities for the body to become the criteria of the critique, and the force of a naturalistic philosophy of production. It means to produce a form of thinking that arises directly from life and time, becoming and matter, singularities and multiples. In order to do so, we discuss the philosophies of those thinkers who, during the history of western thought, have already recognised this productive potential of the body: Spinoza, Hume, Nietzsche. Finally, the questions guiding this thesis are: What are critique and body from an immanent perspective? Is it possible a critique starting from the body? Can the body become a force apt to produce values and thoughts? What is, then, philosophy of natural production?

Quiconque scrute le statut de l’éloquence chez Hume ne peut se dispenser d’interroger les analyses de l’auteur dans le Traité de la nature humaine, tout en accordant une attention soutenue aux Essais moraux, politiques et littéraires, et à l’Enquête sur l’entendement humain. L’examen de la verve au sein de la philosophie humienne peut s’avérer risquée et complexe, d’autant que la fragmentation dans la manière d’aborder le sujet s’accompagne de considérations qui peuvent obscurcir plutôt qu’éclaircir la compréhension d’un certain nombre de problèmes. Le présent travail cherche à démontrer que, chez Hume, l’’éloquence peut être comprise sous le prisme d’une activité délibérée et amusante de « connaissance de soi de l’imagination (esprit), puisque celle-ci se replie sur elle-même lorsqu’elle se représente une myriade d’existences possibles. De cette manière, l’éloquence quitte son statut de pratique risquée et hasardeuse pour se faire la garante d’une propédeutique scientifique, c’est-à-dire d’une discipline d’initiation à la science humienne de l’homme
Anyone who scrutinizes the status of eloquence in Hume cannot dismiss questioning the author's analyses in A Treatise on Human Nature, while paying close attention to the Moral, Political, and Literary Essays, and to An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Examination of the verve within humian philosophy can be risky and complex, especially as the fragmentation in the approach to the subject is accompanied by considerations that may obscure rather than clarify the understanding of a number of problems. This work seeks to demonstrate that, in Hume, eloquence can be understood under the prism of a deliberate and amusing activity of “self-knowledge of the imagination (spirit)”, since it is withdrawn on itself even when it represents a myriad of possible existences. In this way, eloquence abandons its status of risky and hazardous practice to make itself the guarantor of a scientific propaedeutic endeavor, that is to say, a discipline of initiation to the humian science of man

Ce travail étudie la relation entre scepticisme et politesse dans l’œuvre de David Hume afin de contribuer à la compréhension philosophique de l’art d’écrire de Hume et de son évolution. Du Traité de la nature humaine (1739-1740) aux œuvres suivantes (les Essais, les deux Enquêtes, les Four Dissertations et les Dialogues sur la religion naturelle), on observe un incontestable changement dans la manière de communiquer la science de l’homme au public du XVIIIe siècle. Inspiré en partie du journalisme philosophique d’Addison et de Steele et destiné à rendre la philosophie abstraite accessible au public de la conversation, l’art d’écrire de Hume témoigne d’une intégration progressive de la culture de la politesse au scepticisme mitigé et à son expression. Mais cela signifie tout sauf un renoncement aux ambitions spéculatives du Traité, que Hume aurait abandonnées pour la recherche d’une gloire mondaine. Au contraire, comme expression de la bonne humeur caractéristique du « vrai sceptique » et comme préparation littéraire de la réception critique de la philosophie au sein de la République des Lettres, l’art d’écrire de Hume cherche à donner à cette science sceptique – et science nouvelle – qu’est la science de l’homme le public dont elle a besoin pour assurer sa fondation. Le scepticisme mitigé apparaît alors comme étant essentiellement un scepticisme policé, c’est-à-dire comme la meilleure manière de faire entrer la « métaphysique » dans la voie sûre de la civilisation
This study deals with the relationship between scepticism and politeness in the works of David Hume, in order to contribute to the understanding of Hume’s art of writing from a philosophical point of view. From the Treatise of human nature (1739-1740) to the later works (the Essays, the two Enquiries, the Four dissertations and the Dialogues concerning natural religion), one can observe an obvious change in the manner of communicating the science of man to the public of the eighteenth century. Partly inspired by the philosophical journalism of Addison and Steele and designed to make abstract philosophy accessible to the public of conversation, Hume’s art of writing shows a progressive integration of the culture of politeness with scepticism and its expression. But this certainly does not mean that Hume would have left the speculative ambitions of the Treatise for worldly success. On the contrary, as an expression of the good humour which characterizes the « true sceptic » as well as a literary preparation of the critical reception of philosophy in the Republic of Letters, Hume’s art of writing tries to give to the science of man, considered as a sceptical – and new – science, the public that it needs for its foundation. Hence mitigated scepticism appears essentially as a polite scepticism, the best way for « metaphysics » to enter upon the secure path of civilization

Le « Je théorique » kantien constitue une unité sémantique unifiante qui se produit de façon epigénétique. Ainsi cette fonction cognitive spontanée - poïétique - s'avère-t-elle à la fois irréductible à une simple « forme logique » et non-assimilable à une « entité substantielle ». Le « Je pense », l'aperception transcendantale, est un pouvoir-force morphogénétique qui se déploie sur le mode d'un processus continu de synthèse virtuellement infini dont la visée est la production d'un système organique de connaissance. Sa modalité logique est la nécessité et sa manière d'agir est méta-phénoménologique ; « devoir pouvoir accompagner toutes mes représentations », signifie « instituer la forme-acte de toute représentation », à savoir son appartenance à un seul et même moi. En pensant Kant avec Hume, Leibniz et Fichte, cette étude tente d'élucider l'instabilité inévitable du passage critique à un Cogito postmétaphysique
The Kantian "theoretical I" constitutes a unifying semantic unity wich produces itself epigenetically. Thus, this spontaneous - poetic - cognitive function appears to be both irreducible to a mere "logical form" and non-identifiable with a "substantial entity". The "I think", transcendental apperception, is a morphogenetic power-force wich unfolds as a continuous - virtually infinite - process of synthesis whose aim is the production of an organic system of knowledge. Its logical modality is necessity and its manner of acting is metaphenomenological ; "to must be capable of accompanying all my representations" means "to institute the act-form of all representation as such", namely their belonging to one and the same self. By questioning Kant with Hume, Leibniz and Fichte, this research attempts to elucidate the inevitable instability of the critical transition to a postmetaphysical Cogito

Les idées, dans les théories de la connaissance de Descartes à Hume, sont des normes intuitives pour interpréter la nature. Quelle cosmologie en résulte? Un matérialisme (l'analyse de Berkeley le montre), débouchant chez Locke puis Hume sur l' agnosticisme, et une théorie de l'entendement qui est le modèle de l'idéalisme kantien. Mais Kant a rejoint la théorie des idées indépendamment, par le problème métaphysique de l'espace, qu'il déclare idéal en 1770, pour corriger sa théorie de l'espace absolu de 1768. De ce point, on peut tenter de suivre la construction de l'idéalisme transcendantal, et comprendre sa convergence avec la métaphysique cartésienne et l'empirisme de Locke.

As a practical moralist and political theorist concerned with reforming a factious and religious public, Hume recommends a particular outlook that is fit for civilized society. In this dissertation, I present Hume as a contributor to the post-scholastic contest of philosophical systems, as an innovative thinker who revised the modern Epicurean outlook of Hobbes and Mandeville and challenged both the austere Christian Stoicism of Francis Hutcheson and the Platonic rationalism of Samuel Clarke. I argue that the political mentality that Hume presented as suitable for sustaining the prevailing social order constitutes one more step in the development of the modern Epicurean mentality. This mentality, moreover, is not strictly political, but incorporates metaphysical, epistemological, and moral judgments that, in light of the contest of systems, are rightly regarded as a restatement of modern Epicurean positions. Hume, in accord with the principles of the new political science, sought to protect the gains of civilization from the vestiges of barbarism, which, for Hume, were manifested in the superstitious tribalism of religionists and political partisans. Hume replaces Christian, Whig, and Tory myths—i.e. grand narratives situating human beings as moral and political subjects—with the Epicurean myth of the progress of human society. The end of political society, from this perspective, is neither piety nor moral improvement, but prosperity, ease, and comfort, which, together, serve as the measure of progress and the reason for popular consent to the exercise of public political authority. This mentality, I argue, sheds light on the normative dimensions of Hume’s liberal political science.

Les travaux de Tversky et Kahneman à propos du raisonnement probabiliste ont déclenché un débat qui s'est transposé aux normes du raisonnement en général. Les tentatives de naturalisation de ces normes entreprises par les psychologues évolutionnistes (en particulier Gigerenzer) avaient comme objectif d'expliquer les normes en fonction du contexte pour lequel elles avaient évolué. Nous présentons les travaux de Tversky et Kahneman ainsi que leur interprétation et celle de la psychologie évolutionniste. Par contre, un problème majeur émerge de ces tentatives. Considérer les normes dans leur adéquation à un contexte particulier a comme conséquence de relativiser ces normes. Or, nous souhaitons, lorsque nous entreprenons une étude normative, expliquer aussi les normes générales du raisonnement et conserver cet aspect de généralité. Il est possible d'expliquer les normes générales du raisonnement à l'intérieur d'un modèle naturaliste. Stanovich réalise cette explication à l'aide de la théorie des mèmes. Nous présentons les arguments de Stanovich. Nous remarquons, ensuite, que malgré la justesse des arguments de Stanovich un second problème demeure en suspens. Ce problème peut être appelé le problème du processus motivationnel qui pousse les individus à accepter et à intégrer les normes générales du raisonnement. Nous faisons alors l'hypothèse selon laquelle il peut être pertinent de regarder du côté de l'histoire de la philosophie, et plus précisément de David Hume, pour trouver des pistes de solution au problème de la motivation. Dans un premier temps nous revoyons les lignes directrices de la théorie de l'esprit et de la croyance de Hume. Nous présentons ensuite sa théorie normative naturaliste et terminons en dressant un tableau comparatif entre Hume et les théories contemporaines. Si nous acceptons de prendre en considération le fait que l'entreprise philosophique de Hume se déploie dans un contexte historique et philosophique différent, nous pouvons accepter que les pistes de solutions qu'il avance demeurent pertinentes. Cette thèse peut être vue comme un complément au débat contemporain. Les deux idées principales de cette tentative de solution sont 1) l'importance des sentiments dans le processus de formation de la croyance (incluant les croyances à propos des normes générales du raisonnement) et 2) la volonté naturelle de s'adapter à notre environnement social, ce qui nous pousse parfois à adopter un point de vue général afin d'éviter les conflits. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : normativité, raisonnement, raisonnement probabiliste, motivation, naturalisme, Hume.