Дисертації з теми "Anthropology Philosophy"

This thesis characterizes feminist anthropology's past, present and future. The early years of feminist anthropology were committed to explication of the relationship between gender and power. Currently feminists are engaging in new post-modern ideas. Post-modern concerns with epistemology and knowledge/truth production resound with feminist observations, but post-modern concepts of power, resistance and deconstruction present problems for feminists. For post-modern anthropologists, traditional ethnography has been replaced by experimental texts. Feminist anthropologists created the textual innovation of "voices." Feminist anthropological texts are now focusing on how women handle the complex and diverse power structures that oppress them, incorporating a focus on media and discourse. Recent feminist anthropology combines textual experimentation with a focus on resistance at its various levels. Future feminist anthropologists will return to the discussion of gender and power begun in the 70s retaining the post-modern textual experimentation and interest in resistance and power.

Thesis (MPhil (Sociology and Social Anthropology))--University of Stellenbosch, 2008.
It has been said that anthropology operates in “liminal spaces” which can be defined as “spaces between disciplines”. This study will explore the space where the fields of art and anthropology meet in order to discover the epistemological and representational challenges that arise from this encounter. The common ground on which art and anthropology engage can be defined in terms of their observational and knowledge producing practices. Both art and anthropology rely on observational skills and varying forms of visual literacy to collect and represent data. Anthropologists represent their data mostly in written form by means of ethnographic accounts, and artists represent their findings by means of imaginative artistic mediums such as painting, sculpture, filmmaking and music. Following the so-called ‘ethnographic turn’, contemporary artists have adopted an ‘anthropological’ gaze, including methodologies, such as fieldwork, in their appropriation of other cultures. Anthropologists, on the other hand, in the wake of the ‘writing culture’ critique of the 1980s, are starting to explore new forms of visual research and representational practices that go beyond written texts.

PONTIFÍCIA UNIVERSIDADE CATÓLICA DO RIO DE JANEIRO
CONSELHO NACIONAL DE DESENVOLVIMENTO CIENTÍFICO E TECNOLÓGICO
A proposta inicial de análise da linguagem afirmada pela filosofia analítica partia do pressuposto da existência de uma linguagem logicamente perfeita, que espelharia a forma lógica dos fatos. Essa linguagem ideal revelaria de maneira clara e correta a estrutura essencial do mundo, evitando as armadilhas da linguagem cotidiana. A filosofia desenvolvida na segunda fase da obra de Wittgenstein fragmenta essa noção de linguagem unitária em uma multiplicidade de jogos de linguagem, firmados sobre formas de vida particulares. A gramática, ou o conjunto de regras que regem uma linguagem, torna-se autônoma, posto que não leva em consideração uma pretensa essência ou forma da realidade, mas adquire seu sentido no uso das expressões que regula. Essa autonomia da gramática abre espaço para a existência de diferentes sistemas dotados de sentido e, portanto, nos permite falar de uma alteridade de formas de representação. A presente dissertação pretende apontar tal abertura provocada por Wittgenstein, em parte prefigurada na sua crítica à obra do antropólogo J. G. Frazer, bem como apresentar algumas discussões que ela suscitou dentro e fora da filosofia analítica. Por fim, o objetivo é esboçar um método de análise conceitual, derivado do encontro entre antropologia e filosofia, como uma alternativa de abordagem para a corrente analítica.
The original proposition of language analysis set forth by analytical philosophy stemmed from the assumption of the existence of a logically perfect language, which would mirror the logical form of the facts. This ideal language would clearly and correctly reveal the logical structure of the world, avoiding the 'traps' of daily language. The philosophy developed on the second phase of Wittgenstein's work breaks apart this notion of a unitary language in a multiplicity of language games, based upon particular forms of life. Grammar, or the set of rules that govern a language, becomes autonomous, since it does not account for an assumed essence or form of reality, but acquires its meaning in the use of the expressions it regulates. This autonomy of grammar makes room for the existence of different systems endowed with meaning and, therefore, allows us to speak of an otherness of forms of representation. This dissertation intends to point out this 'opening' introduced by Wittgenstein, which was partly foreshadowed on his critique of the works of the anthropologist J. G. Frazer. It also presents some discussions that it raised inside and outside of analytical philosophy. Finally, the objective is to sketch a method of conceptual analysis, derived from the encounter between anthropology and philosophy, as an alternative approach to the analytical train.

This thesis explores a rethinking of community, one without identity. This thinking became possible and necessary because I lived in a little Aboriginal community in south central Western Australia, called Ululla. The Jackman family have made Ululla a home (a home among others, this changes over time), not as a kind of ideal place that would stabilise and centre an identity, but as a place one leaves and returns to, where family gathers and stays for awhile – a number of years or a few months – depending on other forces going on in the region and with kin. What I gained a sense of, was that the claim of another – their work – forces one’s sense of responsibility outward, towards other gatherings across time and space; an extension that does not rest, stay put, but that moves. Extensive relatedness puts a community in motion, forces a thought of community without notions of bounded identity. A community at ‘loose ends’ perhaps, where differences, discontinuities and multiplicity do not become One (Miami Theory Collective 1991). Anthropologists have noted that what Aboriginal people emphasise is regional relatedness and extensive social ties rather than exclusive or restricted groupings (Myers 1986). There is no centring as such, rather relations are pivotal, turning one towards another without rest. As a result, and drawing broadly from Jean-Luc Nancy’s work on community, I think of community as movement and imperative – an outward extension – rather than a retreat or consolidation – an inward concentration. Here, community is not to be controlled or managed or unified (centred, bound-as-one ) but something to go with, to feel happening as an imperative or inclination; a kind of event where one gets ready to respond to the call of others from elsewhere. Following Nancy, I think of community as something that is happening – an event, a call, an inclination – rather than an object of description (Nancy 1990). My thesis draws upon a critique of anthropology and a use of Nancy’s philosophy (Levinas and Lyotard are also important at times) to say something about Ululla. The problem with anthropology, as I argue here, is that it works to secure the identity of a people through uncovering an underlying unity that is supposed to order and sustain the group (Norris 2000); the anthropologist works to centre an identity in order to speak of the group itself. I imagine a different possibility here, one that would reflect Aboriginal social practices of community. The thesis is structured in a non-linear way and is organised around ‘gatherings’ ‘breakaways’ ‘articulations’ and ‘spacings/rhythms’. This organisation means that the form and shape of the community, it’s rhythm if you like, is reflected in the structure of writing itself. Events happen, one is taken away, breakaways and gatherings take place across space.

The comprehension of Karl Barth's special ethics of the parent-child relationship as contained in his Church Dogmatics, III/4, requires its being interpreted in terms of his grounding it in his christological and so trinitarian anthropology which is essentially contained in CD, III/2. The key to the inter-connection between Barth's theology and ethics lies in comprehending the character of the relations involved in his doctrine of the analogia relationis. This thesis shows and makes explicit the nature, or better, the 'grammar' of personal being-in-relationship which arises in Barth's Christology, is central to his anthropology, is founded in his doctrine of the Trinity and grounds his special ethics as illustrated in the section on 'Parents and Children'. Barth's grammar of being-in-relationship can be encapsulated in six fluid and dynamic formulae. Being-in-relationship involves a unity of persons, a differentiation between persons, an ordered correspondence of one with another, a pesonal covenantal communion, a dynamic and eschatological becoming, and an extension to include others in convenantal relations. Barth's special ethics of parents and children, while not beyond criticism, is shown to be both relevant and fruitful for further developing a theological ethics of the family, for critiquing other such contributions, and for assisting the Church of Jesus Christ to address a number of issues facing the contemporary American family.

Building upon an emerging literature of educational biopolitics, this dissertation develops and thinks through some concepts to explore the prevailing forms of educational life (constituted bíos) that schools commonly promote in the service of constituted power and, alternatively, the kinds of educational life (constituent bíos) that call constituted power into question and portend new possibilities and alternative arrangements of being. In considering the kinds of life that schools typically allow and disallow, this philosophical dissertation poses the following educational problem: schools have long celebrated and reproduced a limited and corrosive formulation of educational life (constituted bíos) while foreclosing constituent forms. Moreover, the emergent social, political and epistemological strengths of students marginalized in the configuration of constituted power—the component parts of constituent bíos —are routinely deemed inferior in schools and often regarded as a contaminating threat that must be eliminated. Using the concepts of constituent and constituted bíos as units of analysis, this study explores how progressive and critical educational approaches, such as culturally relevant teaching and resistance theory, also fail to account for and appreciate constituent forms of educational life. In order to offer a more nuanced understanding of the relation between forms of life and schools, this study offers an autonomist biopolitics of education. With this orientation, constituent bíos is recognized as the foundational and constitutive motor to which schools are constantly reacting and attempting to “deal with.” Such a perspective might help educators be more attuned and responsive to the constituent dimensions of social ontology.

In this thesis Hannah Arendt’s theories of science and technology are applied in an ethnographic study of engineering ethics. Seeking to gain further understanding of Arendt’s thoughts, her concepts of The Archimedean Point and Earth Alienation is applied in interviews with engineering students in Sweden’s Uppsala University. The purpose directing this study is thus twofold, it is an attempt to anthropologize Arendt’s thoughts of science and technology, and to further understand engineering’s ethical engagement. The study identifies a dynamic where engineering students create dichotomous mentalities. One mentality is engineering’s demand of a desubjectified instrumental rationality in inherent contradiction to an ethical consciousness, this mentality can be identified as Arendt’s Archimedean Point. In conflict to this mentality lies the intersubjectivity of a socio-politically engaged student concerned with engineering’s ability to create evil. This study makes the claim that Uppsala University’s student traditions and culture encourage the second mentality and forms an important resource for ethical engagement among students.

This study exposits Karl Barth's theological anthropology, and asks some leading questions regarding the relation of Barth's doctrine of the human person to the human sciences. Specific comparisons are drawn between Barth's doctrine of the person and the anthropology of British object relations psychology --especially as it has been articulated by the Scottish psychoanalyst, W. Ronald D. Fairburn. After a historical survey of the problems with which Barth dealt in formulating his doctrine of humanity, I show why it is important to focus upon Barth's mature anthropology. An accurate assessment of Barth's anthropology and its relation to the human sciences can only be undertaken after one acknowledges the extent to which Barth has made some significant modifications of his earlier dialectical theology. In Barth's more mature anthropology contained in volume III/2 of the Dogmatics he formulates his anthropology upon his understanding of God as triune. Barth achieves a very 'dynamic' understanding of the human person, based upon the idea that the human person reflects the dynamic nature of the triune God. Therefore, rather than stressing bodily and soulish substances, or innately endowed faculties, Barth emphasises that 'real man' is composed of certain vital relations to God, self and others. A leading question for this study is this: does a trinitarian theology such as Barth's necessarily exclude any dialogue between itself and other sciences? Based upon the evidence that Barth's mature theology shows an increasing amount of dialogue with the human sciences, I begin to question the attacks upon Barth's so-called 'positivity of revelation'. Furthermore, I build a case for the position that the dynamic anthropology which Barth espouses bears certain intriguing analogies to the dynamic anthropology of modern object relations psychology. Based upon these analogies, the relation between Barth's theology and the human sciences does not need to be seen as one of alienation or hostility. To the contrary, Barth's dynamic anthropology could open up the possibility of increased dialogue betwen theological anthropology and the findings of human science. This is because both indicate the importance of interpersonal relationships in the formulation of any adequate concept of the person. The parallels between Barth and object relations psychology build a case for a 'dynamic' understanding of the human person, demonstrating how the person is shaped at the deepest level by certain primary interpersonal relations. Both Barth's anthropology, and object relations psychology indicate, within their respective fields of study, how the human essence is social in origin. The faculties which differentiate human persons from all other creatures arise only within the shared experience of interpersonal relations. Barth discovered the relational character of human personhood by probing the nature of the triune God and expositing its implications for Christian anthropology. Object relations has discovered the same truth in an altogether different plane by examining the ways in which human behaviour develops--especially in the earliest stages of life. I propose that there exists an analogous relation between the two: each on its own level testifies to the fact that human personhood develops only as a shared experience between God, self and others.

This theoretical study seeks to continue the work initiated by Freud in 1918 on the taboo of virginity by assessing (a) the place of virginity in Lacan's theory on femininity and (b) the question of whether virginity can be considered a myth in Lacanian terms. Feminine virginity is the object of this research, with a focus on heterosexual feminine virginity in contemporary U.S. culture. The approach selected is psychoanalytical and uses the theory of Jacques Lacan, a 20th-century French psychoanalyst. As Lacan never refers to virginity or to the Freudian taboo of virginity, his work offers a space for new research.

Virginity is presented in its historical context, followed by a recounting of the various proofs of virginity utilized—to demonstrate the lack of scientific accuracy. A review of current information disseminated in the U.S. media on the topic of virginity provides an account of two movements in fierce opposition. It is then proposed that virginity is a cultural concept, and the review of literature continues with an assessment of virginity in psychoanalysis. Freud's work on taboo and his article "The Virginity Taboo" (Freud, 1918/2006c) set the stage for a total of six psychoanalytical papers that address feminine virginity. The theoretical tools used for this research consist of Freud's greatest contribution, the unconscious, and his work on feminine sexuality. Lacan's psychoanalytical project is presented in its historical context, and concepts relevant to this study are defined. Further, an elaboration of the role and purpose of myths in psychoanalysis, with a review of the contributions from Freud, Lévi-Strauss, and Lacan, provides the basis for the discussion.

This research led to two major conclusions. First, virginity plays no role in sexual difference in Lacanian theory; to the contrary, it negates sexual difference. Second, virginity is a myth that refers to the impossible response to the Other's desire. Virginity belongs to the imaginary, inasmuch as it is a semblance placed over feminine jouissance in the failed attempt to inscribe the feminine all into the symbolic, under the phallic function.

The following study discusses servant leadership in relation to the larger topic of global leadership. It derives composite definitions for each from the literature and offers a philosophical foundation for servant leadership in order to prepare for a discussion of the problem of lack of construct consensus in current servant leadership empirical research. An exhaustive literature review supplied a quantitative, cross-cultural study with established measures of reliability and validity. The current research replicated this study as it provided an instrument with a small number of constructs offering simplification for servant leadership construct consensus. Two changes were made, however, in methodology. First, respondents were tested from a newly introduced, multiple-leader model of leadership rather than the single-leader model in the original study. Secondly, culture was assigned to control variable status and a numerical value recorded for both countries. The data was then analyzed using measures consistent with the original study in order to compare results between the original single-leader and the new multiple-leader models as well as multiple-regression to see if culture can be predicted through a combined database of all respondents from both countries. The multiple-leader model provided more consistent construct evaluation across the specific high and low power-distance countries studied with generally equivalent or reduced standard deviations than the single-leader model. Culture cannot be predicted from the constructs as recorded. Structural equation modeling (SEM) was used to verify a lack of correlation between constructs in contrast to standard statistical program outputs.

This thesis proposes that Søren Kierkegaard's thought - in particular, his theological anthropology - is undergirded by an inchoate metaphysics of modality. It focuses on the concept of possibility (Danish: Mulighed), arguing that possibility is a primary ingredient of the Kierkegaardian self and serves as a kind of 'engine' for the development of the individual before God. Accordingly, viewing Kierkegaard's works through the lens of possibility is a fruitful way to gain new insights into his beliefs, and clarifies what he sought to express in his authorship. Kierkegaard, I argue, formulates a multilayered account of possibility that, while not abandoning metaphysics, re-frames possibility existentially, in terms of what the self may actually become, not only in and for itself but also in relation to God. One's selfhood and one's relation to God both require an ontology of possibility. His existential concerns arise from this metaphysical footing. This thesis then considers how possibility is integral to human selfhood. Genuine selfhood is an openness towards God's eternal possibility, rather than the self's attempting to create its own eternal possibilities via some other means of actualization. If the human person, by faith, becomes 'grounded in the absolute', then that person is becoming a self precisely because God is actualizing her possibilities. God is for Kierkegaard the source of all possibility. Theologically, Kierkegaard's conception of possibility presents us with ideas that may be fruitful in further discussion of God's attributes and the ways in which God is understood to relate to the created world. Anthropology, ontology, and theology are thus inextricably linked.

Magister Theologiae - MTh
The Bible, a treasure of all Christian churches, contains the irreplaceable primary documents of the Christian faith. The Bible is also a collection of ancient documents, written in strange and even exotic languages of other ages and cultures. Much in the Bible is foreign to urbanized Western civilization and requires exploration. The Bible is also the major source of information about the history of Israel in pre-Christian times and the origins of the Christian faith and the Christian Church. Under all these aspects the Bible has been the source of information and doctrine, of faith and hope. lts interpretation has also been a battleground, for men's (sic.) hopes and most deeply held convictions are buttressed from the Bible, differences as to what the Bible says or how to read it provoke violent debate (Krentz 1975: 1).

Suhrawardi's interpretation of Avicenna's philosophical anthropology greatly depends on the Peripatetic system, in spite of its novel light motif and the faculty of imagination's predominance. His definition of the soul does not depart significantly from Avicenna's: its definition as an entelechy and a substance, its incorporeality, its pre-existence, or the role of the vital spirits---pneumata. However, he criticizes the materialism implied in a number of Avicennan theses. At issue is the ontological unity of the soul that Suhrawardi perceives to be jeopardized by the localization in the body of the representative faculties---the active and passive imaginations and the estimation---and their objects. After criticizing the "extramissive" and the "intromissive" theories of vision, Suhrawardi introduces his own illuminative theory in an effort to simultaneously account for mystical vision. He also reduces Avicenna's faculties responsible for representation to a single faculty, focusing on the soul's role in perception. Suhrawardi analyses self-knowledge, discussing the primary awareness of one's own existence, self-identity, the unmediated character of this type of knowledge, and the issue of individuation. At the conceptual level, intellection is logically prior to imagination, while discussions about the active intelligence, its functions, and the conjunction of the rational soul---the Isfahbad-light---with the active intelligence---the light principle---still remain Avicennan. Epistemological concepts such as intuition and mystical contemplation become central in the debate over the primacy of mystical knowledge over philosophical knowledge. Suhrawardi's and Avicenna's discussions about the nature of prophetic knowledge are then contrasted with the nature of mystical knowledge by introducing the negative and positive functions of the faculty of imagination, namely, its role in the particularization of universal truths and its mimetic function. The survival of th

This dissertation examines and compares the epistemologies of two of the most popular West African intellectual traditions: Tijani Sufism and Ifa. Employing theories native to the traditions themselves and contemporary oral and textual sources, I examine how these traditions answer the questions: What is knowledge? How is it acquired? And How is it verified? Or more simply, “What do you know?,” “How did you come to know it?,” and “How do you know that you know?” After analyzing each tradition separately, and on its own terms, I compare them to each other and to certain contemporary, Western theories. Despite having relatively limited historical contact, I conclude that the epistemologies of both traditions are based on forms of self-knowledge in which the knowing subject and known object are one. As a result, ritual practices that transform the knowing subject are key to cultivating these modes of knowledge. Therefore I argue that like the philosophical traditions of Greek antiquity, the intellectual or philosophical dimensions of Tijani Sufism and Ifa must be understood and should be studied as a part of a larger project of ritual self-transformation designed to cultivate an ideal mode of being, or way of life, which is also an ideal mode of knowing. I further assert that both traditions offer distinct and compelling perspectives on, and approaches to, metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, psychology, and ritual practice, which I suggest and begin to develop through comparison.
African and African American Studies

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, Dept. of Leadership and Policy Studies, 2007.
Title from PDF t.p. (viewed Nov. 20, 2008). Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 68-03, Section: A, page: 0926. Adviser: Phil F. Carspecken.

This dissertation revolves around the riddle of how to honor seemingly disparate traditions such as West African (Dagara) divinatory practices and Western philosophical praxis. The project, following the participatory approach of Jorge Ferrer and Jacob Sherman, sets out to honor these differences by embracing the agapeic-erotic metaphysics of William Desmond, and in so doing delimits modern distinctions between science, philosophy, religion, and anthropology. Rather than move beyond the important scholarly contributions of these fields, however, this dissertation embarks on an interdisciplinary adventure between these traditions by critically reading the work of Philippe Descola and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro in parallel with Desmond. This project articulates multiple ecologies of participation, with totemism, animism, and naturalism foremost among them. It clarifies how Descola and Viveiros de Castro's robust reading of animist/Amerindian shamanic perspectivism is in keeping with Ferrer and Sherman's participatory enaction. It is critical of Viveiros de Castro's dismissal of totemism as overly abstract, as well as Descola's conflation of naturalism solely with post-Enlightenment thought, and his broad use of the category of analogism to include disparate traditions such as Vedic, Ancient Chinese, Greek, West African, and Central American thought. By way of clarifying this critique, this dissertation applies the same participatory understanding offered to animism by Descola and Viveiros de Castro to both totemic (divinatory) and naturalist (metaphysical/philosophical) enactions, placing all three under the broader heading of ecological perspectivism. The subsequent comparative lens allows for a more balanced reading of these three ecologies by broadening the use of these terms. By including the work of Desmond, it also answers important concerns leveled by critics regarding the metaphysical underpinnings of Descola and Viveiros de Castro's assertions regarding ontological relativity. In so doing, this project sets the stage for renewed dialogue between what are often seen as radically divergent traditions (e.g., the animism of the Achuar, the totemism of the Guugu Yimithirr, and the naturalism of modern science).

Ce travail porte sur la période allant de 1750 à 1885 et documente la connexion épistémique entre la prépondérance des théories racistes et les sciences de l’homme, nouvelle forme de connaissance qui émerge et s’institutionnalise au cours de ces années. Nous opérons en identifiant les occurrences du concept d’ « égalitarisme racial » dans les discours savants européens de cette époque et cherchons les différences structurelles entre des discours ayant considéré la race au titre de facteur inopérant dans la partition naturelle des aptitudes intellectuelles entre les individus et ceux, majoritaires, l’ayant considéré au contraire comme facteur opérant à cet égard. L’objectif est de tester la validité une hypothèse selon laquelle ce serait la nouvelle perspective heuristique ouverte par l’histoire naturelle de l’homme dans les années 1750, perspective ensuite renforcée par l’institutionnalisation de l’ethnologie puis de l’anthropologie au 19ème siècle, qui aurait permis aux européens de trouver le moyen légal de se dispenser d’appliquer aux peuples colonisés la norme comportementale égalitaire traditionnellement prescrite par l’enseignement des humanités, norme rendue constitutionnelle lors de la Révolution française. Notre première partie est composée de deux chapitres, traite des années 1750-1802 et montre que cette perspective procède de la formulation de jugements théoriques portant sur les variétés et les races de l’espèce homo-sapiens rendue possible par l’adoption du postulat méthodologique des sciences physiques. Notre deuxième partie comporte trois chapitres et porte sur la période allant de 1802 à 1848. Elle renseigne le fait que ces jugements théoriques ont été formulés de manière systématique quand l’ethnologie est devenue une discipline institutionnelle. Notre troisième partie est composée de deux chapitres, porte sur les années 1848-1885 et se focalise plus spécifiquement sur le discours d’Anténor Firmin, lors de l’apogée institutionnelle de la Société d’Anthropologie de Paris. Nous développons l’idée que l’emprunt de la méthode physiologique propre à l’histoire naturelle a permis d’évaluer la qualité de l’intellect au titre de fonction organique puis suggérons que c’est par ce biais que les phénomènes traditionnellement expliqués par l’histoire civile ont désormais été expliqués par l’histoire naturelle. Enfin, nous identifions ce processus comme instrumental dans la légitimation des pratiques ségrégatives en place dans les colonies en démontrant qu’il a autorisé la théorisation de différences naturelles et essentielles entre les individus d’ascendance européenne et les autres. Notre focalisation sur les quelques auteurs ayant formulé des théories scientifiques relevant de l’égalitarisme racial pointe au fait que leurs systèmes comportent tous une profonde sympathie avec le modèle épistémologique l’ancien système des humanités qui rejette la réduction de l’histoire civile à l’histoire naturelle. Nous montrons que ces auteurs ont en commun commune de conserver une critériologie explicitement politique et morale dans l’évaluation de l’intellect et indiquons que la disparition du concept normatif d’humanité sur le registre savant ainsi que sa substitution par le concept théorique d’espèce humaine correspond chronologiquement à l’époque où la hiérarchie des races est devenue un fait scientifique. Pour nous, l’émergence du système objectivant des sciences de l’homme a engendré un problème épistémologique et politique majeur lié à l’abandon d’un savoir où la notion de nature humaine n’était pas un objet scientifique, où l’expression « race des mortels » avait encore une résonnance épistémologique, et où l’essence commune des individus appartenant à notre espèce résidait dans la possession naturelle et universelle d’aptitudes intellectuelles et de facultés langagières dont le principe était encore souvent expliqué en faisant allusion à des causes immatérielles
My dissertation focuses on the authors who have not succumbed to the fallacy of considering race a relevant factor in the natural partition of intellectual abilities among our species. My hypothesis is that from 1750 to 1885, the structural reason for racial egalitarianism lays in the refusal of a new axiom then becoming overwhelmingly accepted in Europe: the idea that the scientific method devised in the 17th century to deal with physical things could be applied to political and moral philosophy. My work unearths the link between the progressive adoption of this methodological postulate and the gradual dominance of theories, suggesting that the inequality in intellectual abilities is natural among the races of our species in the European scientific circles. I focus on French, English and German discourses refusing the natural ordering of mental powers according to race and show that they shared a common epistemological perspective refusing the reduction of civil history to natural history. I first point out the fact that transforming human nature into a topic of scientific research in the new field of investigation emerging in the second half of the 18th century, titled the “Science of Man” allowed for the old concept of “intellect”, to be more and more routinely seized as the physiological function of the brain organ. I point out the fact that scientific racism derives from the systematic application of the degeneration concept, mainly used in the realm of botany and animal breeding up until the mid-18th century, to our genus. I show that the emerging field of research, then called “the natural history of Man” allowed for natural distinctions among the intellectual abilities of the races to become logically plausible. I then show that this epistemological process lead to the emergence of ethnology and anthropology as institutionalized disciplines in the 19th century and produced the main tool used by Europeans and their descendants to exclude colonial people from the egalitarian propaedeutic of the humanities. I expose the fact that the gradual exclusion of philosophical, political and moral discussions occurred while the evaluation the intellect’s the quality became exclusively conducted using the means offered by natural history. Finally, I underline the fact that the scientific authors representative of racial egalitarianism refused to let go of the normative charge traditionally attached to the concepts of humanity and civility in the traditional knowledge of the humanities. I point to the advent of a new type of learned discourse - adopting the postulate which became the hallmark of science in the 17th century: the notion that nature may be dealt with objectively, meaning that any reference to nature’s final purpose or telos is a sure sign that the discourse making this reference is not scientific – as the principal explanation for the progress of racism in the learned circles of Europe. Focusing on scientists opposing racism, I expose the fact that those authors refused to apply the scientific method to the study of individual and group behavior and that they continued to envision this study as an act having political and moral underpinnings. My work reveals that the theories of authors in favor of racial egalitarianism all refuse to take part in the then growing trend to understand our species with the sole methodologies of the natural sciences. My point is to demonstrate by the means of historiography that the scientific method may not be applied to “human nature” because in this expression, the adjective human is in fact indicating the presence of a teleology that is foreign to science and that belongs to the humanities

C’est en 1974 que l'historien du droit Pierre Legendre publie l’Amour du Censeur, ouvrage dans lequel il propose une herméneutique originale du droit et des institutions, fondée sur l’histoire et la psychanalyse, qu'il nomme l’anthropologie dogmatique. On trouvera ici une interprétation de cette anthropologie dogmatique, qui est au cœur de l'œuvre de Pierre Legendre. Elle tient le droit et les institutions du monde occidental comme un ordre de type totémique, à la manière des sociétés supposées primitives.It’s in 1974 that the historian of law Pierre Legendre publishes The Love of the Censor, a work in which he proposes an original body of hermeneutics of law and institutions, based on history and psychoanalysis, that he names dogmatic anthropology. One will find here an interpretation of this dogmatic anthropology, which is in the heart of Pierre Legendre’s work. It considers law and the institutions of the western world as an order of a totemic kind, in the way of societies supposed to be primitive
It’s in 1974 that the historian of law Pierre Legendre publishes The Love of the Censor, a work in which he proposes an original body of hermeneutics of law and institutions, based on history and psychoanalysis, that he names dogmaticanthropology. One will find here an interpretation of this dogmatic anthropology, which is in the heart of Pierre Legendre’s work. It considers law and the institutions of the western world as an order of a totemic kind, in the way of societies supposed to be primitive

The primary focus of this qualitative grounded theory study was the reasons for the ability or inability of expatriate workers and their families to adjust and adapt to foreign cultures. The goal for this study was to investigate experiences of the whole expatriate family unit, including the children, to identify factors that could contribute to a successful expatriation assignment as well as develop a theory or model that could be used to help guide the success of the expatriate family tour time and decrease expatriate workers‘ failure to complete their assignments. The qualitative grounded theory method was used to analyze the whole of each expatriate family unit‘s experiences; however, hermeneutic phenomenology as theory was integrated into the study to get to the deeper meanings of families‘ actions, responses, memorabilia shared, and body language as stories were told in conversations and in response to open-ended questions. Seven family units participated in this study, for a total of 23 participants, to include children from age 7 (with parents‘ approval), and contributed to the findings of three main themes, a concept of an expatriation adaptation model, and a list of factors that are essential to global expatriation processes. The theoretical framework that guided the study consisted of family systems theory and cultural leadership theory constructs. The findings resulted from a triangulated data collection process to include questionnaire, one-on-one interviews, and group interviews. The three main themes that developed were 360-degree support, the power of knowledge, and expatriate children as future expatriates and expatriate leaders. The results also resulted in the development of an expatriation adaptation process model as well as a list of factors that could contribute to a successful expatriation assignment with the whole expatriate family unit, which would keep all family members together for the expatriation experience.

This thesis provides an original reading of Heidegger's 1929-30 lecture course The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics. Currently, the notoriety of FCM stems from controversy surrounding its description of human beings as 'world-forming,' and of animals as comparatively 'poor in world.' These propositions are interpreted within the secondary literature as a reinforcement of ontotheological and humanistic metaphysics. However, this standard interpretation misses the more complex and subtle significance of this material in the broader context of the lectures. I argue that Heidegger's 'comparative examination' forms part of a wider metaphysical project of interrogating a contemporary 'delusion,' a metaphysical division drawn between 'life' and 'spirit' engendered by an 'anthropological' worldview which pictures man as a composite of those two elements. Heidegger traces the manifestations of this delusion in Kulturphilosophie and biology, before attempting to recover a more genuinely metaphysical attitude, one founded not on anthropocentric 'worldviews' but on a direct, courageous 'confrontation' with ourselves. Heidegger argues that this confrontation must take its orientation from Greek thought, in which man is interpreted as that part of physis that apprehends physis as a whole. For Heidegger, this notion of the human as a kind of 'meta-physical' being enables us to grasp the coextensive essence of the human and of metaphysics. I argue that Heidegger's position can be extended and enriched if we consider it in conjunction with what he presents in the lecture course as one of its great adversaries; for the German tradition of philosophical anthropology, rather than being a straightforward articulation of the life-spirit divide that Heidegger wishes to eschew, actually harmonises with and deepens Heidegger's reflections in FCM concerning the nature of the human as a meta-physical being.

In this dissertation I trace the formation of citizens of the information age by comparing visions and practices to make children and the general public computer literate or cultured in the United States, France, and the Soviet Union. Computer literacy and computer culture programs in these three countries began in the early 1970s as efforts to adapt people to life in the information society as it was envisioned by scholars, thinkers, and practitioners in each cultural and sociopolitical context. The dissertation focuses on the ideas and influence of three individuals who played formative roles in propelling computer education initiatives in each country: Seymour Papert in the United States, Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber in France, and Andrei Ershov in the Soviet Union. According to these pioneers, to become computer literate or computer cultured meant more than developing computer skills or learning how to passively use the personal computer. Each envisioned a distinctive way of incorporating the machine into the individual human’s ways of thinking and being—as a cognitive enhancement in the United States, as a culture in France, and as a partner in the Soviet Union. The resulting human-computer hybrids all demanded what I call a playful relationship to the personal computer, that is, a domain of free and unstructured, exploratory creativity. I trace the realization of these human-computer hybrids from their origins in the visions of a few pioneers to their embedding in particular hardware, software, and educational curricula, through to their development in localized experiments with children and communities, and finally to their implementation at the scale of the nation. In that process of extension, pioneering visions bumped up against powerful sociotechnical imaginaries of the nation state in each country, and I show how, as a result of that clash, in each national case the visions of the pioneers failed to be fully realized. In conclusion, I suggest ways in which the twentieth-century imaginaries of the computer literate citizen extend beyond their points of origin and connect to aspects of the contemporary constitutions of humans in the computerized world.
History of Science

This thesis aims to show that Coleridge's thinking about science was inseparable from and influenced by his social and political concerns. During his lifetime, science was undergoing a major transition from mechanistic to dynamical modes of explanation. Coleridge's views on natural philosophy reflect this change. As a young man, in the mid-1790s, he embraced the mechanistic philosophy of Necessitarianism, especially in his psychology. In the early 1800s, however, he began to condemn the ideas to which he had previously been attracted. While there were technical, philosophical and religious reasons for this turnabout, there were also major political ones. For he repeatedly complained that the prevailing 'mechanical philosophy' of the period bolstered emerging liberal and Utilitarian philosophies based ultimately on self-interest. To combat the 'commercial' ideology of early nineteenth century Britain, he accordingly advocated an alternative, 'dynamic' view of nature, derived from German Idealism. I argue that Coleridge championed this 'dynamic philosophy' because it sustained his own conservative politics, grounded ultimately on the view that states possess an intrinsic unity, so are not the product of individualistic self-interest.

What is the most effective problem solving method at the environmental policy table in the context of a radical diversity of worldviews? I answer the question in the dissertation by developing a theory that accommodates diversity in policymaking. My line of reasoning is as follows.

In Chapter One, I survey the diverse discourse about Global Climate Models in detail. I demonstrate that a radical diversity of worldviews is expressed in the discourse. In Chapter Two, I advance a model of language that is an accurate foundation for discourse in policymaking. In Chapter Three, I consider the best policymaking strategy in view of the language model: idea-based policymaking. I then demonstrate that the policymaking strategy is weakly theorized. I introduce a theory of its operation at the end of Chapter Three, and develop it in detail in Chapters Four and Five. Because there is not currently a model, I consider an analogue model in play and explain the analogy in Chapter Four. I apply the analogue to the policy table in Chapter Five and fully develop an operational theory to explicate the problem solving method in policymaking.

The force of the dissertation's contribution is made in Chapters Three to Five. Chapters One and Two are a ground of the argument.

In Chapters Three to Five, I argue that idea-based policymaking is a promising form of policymaking practice because social learning is the operative problem-solving mechanism. In social learning: (1) the worldviews of the actors are leveraged in discourse and (2) power relations are dynamically distributed among actors (Hajer). The result is a fortified problem solving operation. This is because in (1) the heterogeneous problem solving resources of the group members are distributed and in (2) social learning shifts power relations by dislodging, mediating, and subsuming a new power regime.

In summary, the dissertation is a contribution in applied philosophy. I comprehensively demonstrate that an effective policymaking method will manage the incommensurability of worldview and stipulate a problem solving method that engages the basic condition of policymaking—radical diversity—rather than denies it.

Zweifellos beansprucht Schiller wie kaum ein anderer Dichter, die Freiheit des Menschen zur Grundlage seines philosophischen Denkens und künstlerischen Schaffens gemacht zu haben. Vorliegende Studie, die Schillers Jugendschriften zentral thematisiert, eröffnet den Blick auf die ideengeschichtliche Kontinuität dieses Denkens, das seinen Ursprung in der Stuttgarter Akademiezeit hat. Es wird also die innere Einheit von Schillers Denken betont, die jedoch nicht in der Kant-Lektüre, sondern in der frühen anthropologischen Prägung gesehen wird. Das verwendete quellenuntersuchende Vorgehen ermöglicht es, Schillers Akademieschriften in Verbindung mit der intellektuellen und szientifischen Gesamtlage der Zeit detailliert zu analysieren und zu interpretieren. Was dabei sichtbar wird, ist ein Naturbegriff, mit dem die lebendige Ganzheit der Natur als universeller Wirkungszusammenhang einzusehen versucht wird und der Akzent auf der Selbstbewegtheit der Natur liegt. Die Natur wird als etwas Produktives, sich Selbstorganisierendes, sich Selbstvollendendes begriffen. Dieser Naturbegriff liegt dem anthropologischen Selbstverständnis zugrunde. Frühzeitig gibt Schiller diesem anthropologischen Konzept eine geschichts- und moralphilosophische Dimension.
Undisputed, Schiller demands- as hardly any other poet – that he had made freedom of mankind to the foundation of his philosophical thoughts and artificial creation. This essay on hand has Schiller’ leaflet of his youth as subject and opens a view to the variety of ideas of the continuity of these thoughts which has its origin in the time at the academy in Stuttgart. The inner unit is marked which will not be seen in Kant’s readings , but also in the early anthropological coining. The used source- survey gives a chance to analyse and interpret Schiller’ leaflets in an association with the intellectual and scientific situation of this time in detail. It becomes clear that the expression of nature is seen as the living holistic of the nature which has a relationship between effects and that the accent lies on the automatically moving of the nature. The nature is made clear as something automatically organising and completed and something productive. This expression of nature is the basic of the anthropological comprehension. Premature, Schiller gives this anthropological draft a historical moral standard dimension.

From the book of Genesis the human person is presented as divine image-bearer, a Godlike status that is further explained in terms of the dual constitution of matter and spirit. Natural Law provides a person-centred ethic that draws on a number of human goods that emanate naturally from the human person and lead in practice to human flourishing. This theory empowers towards making ethical decisions in the interest of human persons. Aristotle explained the human being as a substantially existing entity with rational powers. By means of his form-matter scheme he handed on, by way of Boethius, to Aquinas, a ready model for the Christian belief in the dual nature of the human person as an ensouled body or embodied soul. Applying the new scientific method to the question of the human self David Hume concluded that he could neither prove nor disprove her existence. By so reasoning Hume indirectly pointed to the need for other disciplines than empirical science to explain the human person. Emmanuel Levinas has drawn on the metaphysical tradition to draw attention to the social and ethical nature of the human person as she leaves the trace of her passing through the face of the other person who is encountered with an ethical gravitas of absolute demand. The genesis of the human person most naturally begins at conception at which point and onwards the human embryo grows continuously through an internal, animating principle towards a full-grown adult person. The main conclusion is that biblical anthropology and metaphysical philosophy provide the needed structures and concepts to explain adequately the full meaning of the human person and to establish the moral right of the human person at every stage to respect and protection.

This thesis presents descriptive and explanatory accounts of both non-theism, the lack of belief in the existence of supernatural agents, and strong atheism, the moral opposition to such beliefs on the grounds that they are both harmful and signs of weak character. Based on my fieldwork with non-theist groups and individuals in the United States, United Kingdom, and Denmark, an online survey of over 3,000 non-theists from over 50 countries, and theories from both the social and cognitive sciences, I offer a new account of why nations with low economic and normative threats produce high levels of non-theism. This account is offered in place of the common explanation that religious beliefs provide comfort in threatening circumstances, which I show to be both anthropologically and psychologically problematic. My account centres on the role of threats, both existential and normative, in increasing commitment to ingroup ideologies, many of which are religious, and the important role of witnessing displays of commitment to religious beliefs in producing such beliefs in each new generation. In environments with low levels of personal and normative threat, commitment to religious ideologies decreases, extrinsic reasons for religious participation decrease, and superstitious actions decrease. Given the human tendency to believe the communications of others to the extent that they are backed up by action, such a decrease in displays of commitment to religious beliefs leads to increased non-theism in the span of a generation. In relation to strong atheism, I document a correlation, both geographical and chronological, between strong atheism and the presence of religious beliefs and demands in the public sphere. I then offer an explanation of this correlation based on the effects of threats against a modern normative order characterized by philosopher Charles Taylor as a system of mutual benefit and individual liberty.

L’œuvre de Hans Blumenberg, reçue d’abord pour son apport au débat sur la sécularisation et sa proposition d’une « métaphorologie », trouve son centre de gravité dans une anthropologie philosophique originale et complexe. C’est à celle-ci que notre thèse se consacre, en prenant acte du fait qu’« anthropologie » et « homme » sont les noms de deux problèmes avant d’être ceux d’un champ de savoir et de son objet. Si la pensée de Blumenberg s’élabore en premier lieu dans un dialogue critique avec la phénoménologie, ce n’est pas pour lui adjoindre le chapitre anthropologique qu’elle aurait omis, mais pour réformer de fond en comble ses thèses, sa méthode et ses principes implicites. Il ne s’agit pas non plus de retourner simplement aux questions et réponses traditionnelles que la philosophie a formulées à propos de l’homme. S’interrogeant, dans la lignée de l’anthropologie philosophique allemande, sur la possibilité de l’homme, Blumenberg oriente sa réflexion dans une voie « négative », dont notre travail s’attache à rendre raison autant qu’à interroger les limites. Avec l’image d’un homme fondamentalement « démuni », un être lacunaire, que les descriptions et narrations de l’auteur mettent en scène, ne retrouve-t-on pas une conception « prométhéenne », qui reconduit les présupposés qu’elle critiquait pourtant ? Notre interprétation vise, dans une analyse des procédures discursives que l’auteur met en œuvre et une discussion des thèses qu’il propose, à faire valoir leurs ambivalences, tout autant que leur fécondité. Ce qui est à lire, en dernière instance, dans l’œuvre de l’auteur, c’est un ensemble d’approches historiques et philosophiques de la « seconde nature » de l’homme, qui décrit les inquiétudes inhérentes à sa condition culturelle, autant que les intermittences du sujet
First appreciated for the contribution made to the ‘Secularisation’ debate, along with its conception of ‘Metaphorology’, the work of Hans Blumenberg represents a complex and original philosophical anthropology, the core reflections of which form the central focus of this dissertation. We begin from a point of questioning whether “anthropology” and “man” are not simply terms used to describe a field of academic practice and it’s topic of study, but rather two distinct issues to be examined. The dominant motive of Blumenberg’s thought is to be found in a critical dialogue with phenomenology, but he is not interested in simply contributing an anthropological ‘chapter’ to the field, rather he works to criticise and seek a total reform of the theses, methodology and implicit principles therein. He similarly refuses to rerun the familiar philosophical debates regarding man, instead questioning the possibility of man, inspired by the German philosophical tradition. This thesis will assess and critically consider this ‘negative’ turn in Blumenberg’s thought. Do his descriptions and narrative conveying the human as a fundamentally lacking being not tend to invoke a ‘promethean’ conception of man, the very assumptions of which they seek to criticise?Through analysis of Blumenberg’s discursive procedures and consideration of his theses, our interpretation intends to demonstrate their sense of ambivalence as well as their considered abundance. Ultimately, what is to be found in the work of this author is a collection of approaches to the ‘second nature’ of man which together describe the unease inherent in the cultural condition, as well as the intermittencies of the subject

La thèse propose une étude de la notion de « monde de la vie » (Lebenswelt) telle qu’elle se déploie dans la pensée d’Edmund Husserl, fondateur de la phénoménologie. Prenant pour fil conducteur le problème qui est inscrit dans le nom même de cette notion (le problème d’une détermination du sens d’être du monde à partir de la vie intentionnelle du sujet), la thèse élucide la notion moyennant une approche fonctionnelle, fondée sur la distinction cardinale entre les régimes naturel et transcendantal de la vie intentionnelle. On montre en premier lieu que le monde de la vie se comprend comme monde corrélatif du passage d’une vie intentionnelle naturelle à la vie constituante de la subjectivité transcendantale (I), puis, à l’inverse, comme corrélat du recouvrement de cette vie transcendantale avec la vie naturelle de la conscience psychologique mondaine (II). Alors que la première partie rend compte de la genèse de cette notion dans la pensée de Husserl et montre qu’elle est indissociable du développement puis de la relativisation de l’idée d’une ontologie matérielle, la seconde partie montre que la notion de monde de la vie prend tout son sens lorsqu’elle est définie à partir des conditions de l’unité de la vie transcendantale et de la vie naturelle : on peut dès lors définir la phénoménologie husserlienne comme un positivisme transcendantal, au sein duquel le concept de monde de la vie reçoit des déterminations anthropologiques et biologiques tout en devenant le lieu d’une restitution transcendantale du sens de la positivité naturelle
This PhD studies the concept of « life-world » (Lebenswelt) as it is developed in Edmund Husserl’s thought. Using as a leading clue the problem inscribed in the very name of the notion (the problem of a determination of the world’s mode of being from the intentional life of the subject), the PhD clarifies the notion through a functional approach, funded on the cardinal distinction between the natural and transcendental sides of the intentional life. First, it shows that the life-world can be understood as a world correlated to the transition from the natural intentional life toward the constituting life of a transcendental subjectivity (I) ; then, conversely, as the correlate of the unity between this transcendental life and the natural-psychological life of a worldly consciousness (II). In the first part, the PhD highlights the complex genesis of this notion in Husserl’s thought and shows that it is linked with the development and then the relativisation of the idea of a material ontology ; in its second part, it shows that the notion of life-world is the most significant when defined on the basis of the conditions of the unity of transcendental and natural life : the Husserlian phenomenology can therefore be defined as a transcendental positivism, in which the concept of life-world receives anthropological and biological determinations while allowing at the same time a transcendental restitution of the world’s natural positivity

This thesis explores how government policy impacts everyday support settings in UK-based learning disability social care. The empirical research took the form of an ethnography conducted within two learning disability social care provider organisations based in the South West of England. I spent time with people with learning disabilities and staff members in a range of settings, including home and day services. I also spent time with independent community organisations, including an advocacy service and a café supporting people with volunteering opportunities. Contemporary social care policy aims to reduce the exclusion and inequalities that people with learning disabilities experience by empowering them, as much as possible, with independence and equal access to community life. Within this, a range of social, political and economic philosophies have come to shape policy objectives, constructing different identities for people with learning disabilities. Yet, despite this, across the decades, services have continued to be plagued by cases uncovering fundamental failings, which at worse, have led to terrible abuses of people with learning disabilities. To unpick further the complexities of empowering people with learning disabilities, I used ethnography to understand the ways that policy objectives were experienced in everyday practice. The key findings from my research challenge current empowerment approaches which aim to improve the lives of people with learning disabilities. The expectation is that aspirations of independence and community living are possible to achieve if the necessary resources are made available. However, for people with learning disabilities, their intellectual – and for some physical – impairments meant that they tended to experience difficulty in meaningfully assuming the rights and responsibilities that accompany these aspirations. Yet, the focus within policy that these are aspects of a ‘normal’ life is such that, in everyday settings, people were compelled to partake in a performance, which sustained the notion that these are realistic expectations. Ultimately, these factors undermined relationships between people with learning disabilities and the people supporting them, alienating them from each other.

In this thesis I put forward a new definition of anthropocentrism based on a thorough overview of use in the literature and via analogy with other centrisms, such as androcentrism. I argue that thus clarified anthropocentrism is unjustified and results in problems for nonhuman animals and that any nonhuman ethic should wish to avoid. I then demonstrate how important nonhuman ethics theories are anthropocentric on this definition, and do not address anthropocentrism, in a way that results in these problems for nonhumans. I therefore propose a nonhuman ethic that aims to be less anthropocentric. I do this by first considering morality in light of evolution and second by looking at nonhuman moral codes. I draw upon both of these to set out a less anthropocentric nonhuman ethic and show why this account is at least as viable as, and less problematic than, the current theories as well as outlining its beneficial implications for nonhuman animals and the field. I conclude that anthropocentrism and approaching nonhuman ethics in the manner I have is therefore important for considering nonhuman issues, and that the theory I have put forward is advantageous.

A obra de Edith Stein denominada A Constituição da Pessoa Humana (Der Aufbau der menschlichen Person), de 1932-1933, é resultante do curso sobre antropologia filosófica oferecido às alunas do Instituto Alemão de Pedagogia Científica, em Münster, e foi escrita no contexto de estabelecimento da Antropologia Filosófica, alguns anos após a obra de Max Scheler, denominada A Posição do Homem no Cosmos (1928), e respondendo às questões formuladas nela. Na obra, Stein realiza um diálogo entre a filosofia de Tomás de Aquino e a fenomenologia de Edmund Husserl. Utilizando o método do segundo e a orientação nas questões do primeiro, visa oferecer uma resposta à questão “o que é o homem?”, como fundamento para a pedagogia, e distinguir a Antropologia Filosófica de outras formas de antropologia. No texto, Stein expõe a sua tese sobre a pessoa: “ele pode e deve 'formar' a si mesmo” (STEIN, 2014, p. 123). É na análise e discussão desta ideia de pessoa que se centra a presente dissertação. Para tanto, investigou-se também como a questão antropológica, no contexto em que Stein elaborou a sua obra, erigiu-se como tema tão importante na Alemanha e algumas questões que estão envolvidas com essa problemática, bem como analisou-se minimamente a peculiaridade do método fenomenológico quando aplicado à questão do ser humano. A pessoa é compreendida como um ser espiritual e livre, centro de atos e com consciência de si, mostrando proximidades com a compreensão de Scheler. No entanto, Stein descreve a estrutura essencial do espírito, que manifesta como peculiaridade – frente aos níveis inferiores de ser – o poder de formar a si mesmo e, como sendo essencial ao espírito, esse desdobrar-se entre eu e si, designando-se, por este último, o conjunto de capacidades de sua natureza humana, dadas ao eu para a sua autoconfiguração livre e singular. Essa pessoa espiritual e livre é compreendida como pertencendo essencialmente a uma estrutura anímica em cuja espacialidade pode se mover e cujos atos, em relação ao mundo, são mais ou menos profundos.
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La obra de Edith Stein denominada La Constitución de la Persona Humana (Der Aufbau der menschlichen Person), de 1932-1933, es el resultado del curso sobre antropología filosófica ofrecido a las alumnas del Instituto Alemán de Pedagogía Científica en Münster, y fue escrita en el contexto de la consolidación de la Antropología Filosófico-Fenomenológica en los años 30, algunos años después de la obra de Max Scheler, denominada La posición del Hombre en el Cosmos (1928), y respondiendo a las preguntas formuladas en ella. En la obra, Stein realiza un diálogo entre la filosofía de Tomás de Aquino y la fenomenología de Edmund Husserl. Utilizando el método del segundo y la orientación en las cuestiones del primero, pretende ofrecer una respuesta a la pregunta "¿qué es el hombre?", como fundamento para la pedagogía, y distinguir la antropología filosófica de otras formas de antropología. En el texto, Stein expone su tesis sobre la persona: "él puede y debe 'formarse' a sí mismo" (STEIN, 2014, p. 123). Es en el análisis y discusión de esta idea de persona que se centra la presente disertación. Para ello, se investigó también cómo la cuestión antropológica, en el contexto en que Stein elaboró su obra, se erigió como tema tan importante en Alemania y algunas cuestiones que están involucradas con esa problemática, así como se analizó mínimamente la peculiaridad del método fenomenológico cuando se aplica a la cuestión del ser humano. La persona es comprendida como un ser espiritual y libre, centro de actos y con conciencia de sí, mostrando cercanía con la comprensión de Scheler. Sin embargo, Stein describe la estructura esencial del espíritu, que manifiesta como peculiaridad –frente a los niveles inferiores de ser– el poder de formarse a sí mismo y, como siendo esencial al espíritu, ese desdoblamiento entre yo y sí, designándose por este último, el conjunto de capacidades de su naturaleza humana dadas al yo para su auto-configuración libre y singular. Esta persona espiritual y libre es comprendida como perteneciente esencialmente a una estructura anímica en cuya espacialidad puede moverse y cuyos actos, en relación al mundo, son más o menos profundos.

Philosophy
Ph.D.
What is a human being? In the early 20th century, the "philosophical anthropologists" Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner, and Arnold Gehlen approached this question through a comparison between human and non-human organisms' species-typical interaction with environments and an account of the conditions of the emergence of "higher" cognitive and agentive functions on this basis. In this text I offer a critical review of the central arguments of Scheler, Plessner, and Gehlen on these issues, as well as of their debates with figures such as Jakob von Uexküll, Martin Heidegger, and G. H. Mead. I take note of the consequences of various answers to this question for the interpretation of human beings' dually biological and cultural status and for the theory of the human self or person. I argue that the approaches of Plessner and Gehlen, despite objections raised by Hans Joas and others, have important advantages over those of Scheler, Uexküll, Heidegger, and Mead, as well as over recent suggestions by Korsgaard and Tomasello. I conclude by outlining a reconstructed philosophical anthropology that supports a new perspective on the question of human distinctiveness and on a number of related questions in the context of contemporary debates.
Temple University--Theses

Hick’s pluralist assumption has remained the most knowable model of religious pluralism in the last few decades. Many have, from the perspectives of various major world religions, questioned his notion that the teachings of all religions are derived from the same Absolute Truth and that salvific-end is one, yet little attention has been paid to the traditions that he graded as unauthentic and non-valuable according to his soteriological and ethical criteriology. The purpose of this thesis was to demonstrate the exclusiveness of Hick’s model by describing a tradition called “Chinese Folk Religion” that does not fit into his definition of ‘authentic religion’. As the study suggested, his understanding of the world religious situation is over-generalised and simplified, and his particular criteriology does not treat all traditions fairly or pluralistically. As a response, this thesis proposed a more inclusive theory that also integrates the currently disregarded tradition into the interpretation.

This thesis absorbs and reflects on Choiseul Island responses and caution towards the making of anthropological knowledge. Initial interests that can easily become familiar to anthropology as research topics such as village life, local cosmology and local alternatives to cosmologies of climate and ecology, make way here for another activity of working through Choiseul responses to anthropology. In taking seriously the precautions and the considerations of people in this Solomon Islands locality, anthropology is invited to put a stoppage to practices that it would consider ordinary and part of anthropological knowledge making. This impasse for the discipline is outlined and explored in various chapters, in which usual styles of ethnography and topic-making take formation in respect of a Choiseul world that does not fit easily into encapsulation by anthropology. Effects for the discipline of anthropology are given consideration, within a wider view of imagining how an alternative anthropology in the vernacular can also entail an obviation of anthropology itself in favour of new forms of cultural sensitivity.

This study was conducted with two congregations from two different joining denominations within the United Reformed Church in two post-industrial towns. I spent two years with each congregation as a participant observer, taking part in congregational life and interviewing members for a total of four years. My interest is in the activity that members of these congregations undertake to sustain and change their congregation’s identity. What particularly interested me was how a Reformed cultural identity was sustained, as there is no central body preserving the tradition. In tackling these issues, I explore the interplay of identity with location, community and worship. The recurring tensions drew my attention to the ways identity is renegotiated, which I explore further by engaging with the dynamic metaphor of flow and turbulence. I formulate a concept of belonging by modifying Foucault’s understanding of technology. I go on to explore the way that this technology of belonging is a driver of members’ interaction with the congregational identity. I therefore argue that congregational identity is a recapitulatory process, which engages the members’ understanding of themselves as belonging to the congregation. In doing this I demonstrate the unsettled, contraplex nature of members’ engagement with the congregation’s identity.

This dissertation explores the interface between reflecting on ideals and the action or physical transformation that occurs in the world. Rephrased as a question: What are the appropriate and necessary epistemological pre-requisites for scholars that will increase the likelihood that their praxis succeeds in transforming society away from capitalism towards something that does a better job of assuring social justice? This question is good to organize around but makes for a poor research question because its answer is near infinitely debatable. My research questions then, come down to the following: In what ways can a researcher participate in a deliberate cultural intervention through the utilization of technological systems? What makes these interventions successful and what makes them fail? How does a researcher “step back” from such a project and draw out lessons for future interventions?

In service of answering these questions I have developed three “sense-making tools” to work through this difficult position. A sense-making tool is an epistemological framework that comes short of a theory of causation and instead prioritizes a change in perspective on the part of the individual engaging in praxis.

Those three tools are 1) capitalism is an emergent phenomenon, 2) recursivity is an epistemology that prioritizes organized complexity over rationalized efficiency, and 3) once decoupled from its main usage in reference to the Internet, the term “online” is a useful means of describing and understanding humans’ relationships to networks of communication and economic exchange. These three sense-making tools are applied to two case studies, an open source condom vending machine and a mesh Wi-Fi network. Both projects employed an “inverted critical technical practice” methodology that brought together engineering’s tacit ways of knowing and critical theory’s analytic tools to foster a symbiotic working relationship between the two. I fortify this experimental approach with some classic interview and participant observation techniques to ensure sufficient data collection. Taken together, this work tells a story about the importance of thinking deeply about what we as researchers bring to our field sites, both metaphorically and literally.

By evaluating my own projects and sharing what worked and what didn’t I aim to increase the likelihood of achieving successful projects in the future. I have prioritized understanding my case studies and subject position in terms of how to do better work in the future, not necessarily painting a perfect picture of how the world works or even should work.

This thesis is an ethnography of Anglo-Indians in Calcutta. All ethnographies are accounts arising out of the experience of a particular kind of encounter between the people being written about and the person doing the writing. This thesis, amongst other things, reflects my changing views of how that experience should be recounted. I begin by outlining briefly who Anglo-Indians are, a topic which in itself alerts one to complexities of trying to get an ethnographic grip on a shifting subject. I then look at some crucial elements that are necessary for an “understanding” of Anglo-Indians in Calcutta: the work that has already been done in relation to Anglo-Indians, the urban context of the lives of my research participants and I discuss the methodological issues that I had to deal with in constructing this account. In the second part of my thesis I explore some crucial elements of the lives of Anglo-Indians in Calcutta: the place of Christianity in their lives, education not just as an aspect of socialisation but as part of their very being and, finally, the public rituals that now give them another way of giving expression to new forms of Anglo-Indian becoming. In all of my work I was driven by a desire to keep close to the experience of the people themselves and I have tried to write a “peopled” ethnography. This ambition is most fully realised in the final part of my thesis where I recount the lives of three key participants.

La critique feuerbachienne de la philosophie idéaliste de Hegel a beaucoup influencé ses contemporains et les matérialistes et humanistes du 19eme siècle. Cependant, les études françaises ne rendent pas compte de sa contribution à l'histoire de la philosophie autant qu'elles le devraient. Le but de ce travail est de présenter l'évolution de la pensée de Feuerbach de sa jeunesse hégélienne jusqu'à son matérialisme anthropologique et humaniste. Cette évolution est le résultat de la remise en cause progressive puis du renversement de la philosophie spéculative. Sa critique de la religion diffère profondément de celle des Lumières françaises dans le sens où loin de ne voir dans la religion qu'erreur, tromperie et fanatisme, il reconnaît que le religion exprime un trait anthropologique essentiel: l'essence de l'homme. La pensée de Feuerbach réside essentiellement alors dans une nouvelle interprétation du phénomène religieux en lui donnant une explication anthropologique. L'être humain est un mélange de rationalité et de sensibilité, d'affectivité et de passivité, qui doit être considéré en même temps en tant qu'individu et qu'être social. En opposition à l'interprétation de Marx, j'étudie plus particulièrement dans cette thèse, le rôle de la praxis sociale dans l'anthropologie feuerbachienne. Enfin, méthodologiquement, en plus d'une lecture attentive de l'ensemble du corpus feuerbachien, je re-contextualise sa pensée au sein du mouvement jeune-hégélien, et après la révolution de 1848
Feuerbach's anthropological critique of Hegel's idealism has strongly influenced German materialists and humanists in the nineteenth-century as well as the following generations of thinkers. Even so particularly French scholars may still not recognize his contribution as central in the history of thought. The aim of my work is to present the development of Feuerbach's thought in particular how Feuerbach's early Hegelianism evolved into professing an empirical realism and materialist humanism, resulting in what was considered by Feuerbach himself as the negation of speculative German idealism. His critique of religion is fundamentally different from that of the French Enlightenment since according to him religion is not only fraudulent and deceptive, but also an essential anthropological feature. Essentially the thought of Feuerbach consists in a new interpretation of religion's phenomena, giving an anthropological explanation. For Feuerbach, the human subject was a complex weave of rationality and sensuality, affectivity and passivity, sociality and individualism. Contrasting with Marx's interpretation of Feuerbach, in this work 1 will study the role of the social praxis in Feuerbach's anthropology. Besides including a thorough reading of Feuerbach's work, my thesis will present a re-contextualisation of it in the Left Hegelian mouvement and after the March Revolution, as an additional rnaterial for my interpretation