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Статті в журналах з теми "CEO compensation"

Автор: Grafiati

Опубліковано: 4 червня 2021

Оновлено: 25 липня 2025

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1

Frydman, Carola, and Dirk Jenter. "CEO Compensation." Annual Review of Financial Economics 2, no. 1 (2010): 75–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-120209-133958.

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2

Wang, Hwei C., Chih C. Fang, Yung-I. Lou, Randall Zhaohui Xu, and Ya Ying Chou Yeh. "Corporate Diversification and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the Moderating Effect of Firm Size." Journal of Accounting, Business and Management (JABM) 29, no. 2 (2022): 92. http://dx.doi.org/10.31966/jabminternational.v29i2.854.

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This study explores whether firm size moderates the relationship between corporate diversification and CEO compensation. A sample of 2,448 CEO compensations across 1,622 firms from 1997 to 2002 was used to test several hypotheses. Corporate diversification was divided into two categories (international diversification and industry diversification) and firm size was defined using total assets. This study uses firm size as the moderator to test whether firm size influences the relationship between international diversification and CEO compensation. This study found new evidence that firm s

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3

Kolb, Robert, and Jeffrey Moriarty. "Dialogue: CEO Compensation." Business Ethics Quarterly 21, no. 4 (2011): 679–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/beq201121441.

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ABSTRACT:In this journal, Jeffrey Moriarty argued that CEOs must refuse to accept compensation above the minimum compensation that will induce them to accept and perform their jobs. Acting otherwise, he maintains, violates the CEO’s fiduciary duty, even for a CEO new to the firm. I argue that Moriarty’s conclusion rests on a failure to adequately distinguish when a person acts as a fiduciary from when she acts on her own account as a person. Further, Moriarty’s argument assumes that the CEO knows this minimum level of compensation. However, we learn the suitability of compensation only through

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4

EDMANS, ALEX, XAVIER GABAIX, TOMASZ SADZIK, and YULIY SANNIKOV. "Dynamic CEO Compensation." Journal of Finance 67, no. 5 (2012): 1603–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01768.x.

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5

Stringham, Richard. "Aligning CEO Compensation." Board Leadership 2015, no. 138 (2015): 4–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/bl.30012.

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6

Francis, Bill, Iftekhar Hasan, and Yun Zhu. "Benchmark on themselves: CEO-directors’ influence on the CEO compensation." Managerial Finance 45, no. 7 (2019): 810–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/mf-03-2018-0123.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine whether or not the chief executive officers’ (CEO) compensation is affected by the compensation of the outside directors sitting on their board, who are also CEOs of other firms. Design/methodology/approach The authors collect CEOs’ and CEO-directors’ compensation data from Execucomp. The authors then match the CEO-directors’ compensation with appointing firms’ CEO compensation and financial statements, from Execucomp and Compustat, respectively. The sample contains 7,561 firm-year observations from 1996 to 2010, with 1,213 distinct S&P 1500

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7

Rahman, Matiur, and Muhammad Mustafa. "Determining total CEO compensation of selected US public companies." International Journal of Managerial Finance 14, no. 2 (2018): 170–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijmf-03-2017-0047.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore the effects of total assets, stock performances, CEOs’ tenures, ages, and board sizes on total CEO compensations of 249 publicly listed US companies over a nine-year period from 2004-2012. Design/methodology/approach Pedroni’s panel cointegration, generalized method of moments, and dynamic ordinary least squares methodologies are applied. Findings All variables are non-stationary in log-levels. The findings show significant positive effects of total assets and stock performances on total CEO compensations. The effects of CEO’s tenure and age as w

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8

Zhao, Xin. "Public Disclosure and its Impact on CEO Compensation: Evidence of Media Influence." Journal of Global Awareness 5, no. 2 (2024): 1–21. https://doi.org/10.24073/jga/5/02/09.

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I investigate the impact of being identified on AFL-CIO executive paywatch on future CEO compensation. I find that publication of CEO compensation has negative impact on the change of CEO compensation. Moreover, I find that the ex-ante excessive CEO compensation reduces the change of CEO compensation. This paper contributes to the literature in the part of documenting that firms respond to negative press coverage on CEO compensation even after controlling for the mean reversion of high CEO compensation.

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9

Wang, Hwei Cheng, Chih Chi Fang, Yung-I. Lou, and Randall Zhaohui Xu. "Determints of CEO Bonus Compensation." Financial Internet Quarterly 17, no. 3 (2021): 14–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/fiqf-2021-0016.

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Abstract The primary purpose of this study is to explore the determinants of CEO bonus compensation: to examine CEO bonuses and to explore whether or not the independent variables are associated with CEO bonus compensation. For the purposes of this study, a sample of 2,448 CEO bonus compensations across 1,622 firms from 1997 to 2002 was used to test several hypotheses. The dependent variable in this model is the CEO bonus compensation. Bonus is the dollar value of the bonus (cash and non-cash) earned by the named executive officer during the fiscal year. Corporate diversification was divided i

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10

Phuong, Ta Thu, Tran Phi Long, Nguyen Trung Kien, et al. "The impact of chief executive officer’s compensation on agency costs: The role of good corporate governance." Corporate Board: Role, Duties and Composition 20, no. 2 (2024): 34–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbv20i2art4.

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Exploring the interplay between managerial compensation, agency costs, and corporate governance, this study investigates how chief executive officer (CEO) duality (combined CEO and chairman roles) moderates the relationship. Using data from Vietnamese listed industrial firms (2013–2022), the research reveals that under weak governance (CEO duality), compensation has no significant impact on agency costs. However, with strong governance (separate CEO and chairman roles), compensation’s influence on agency costs weakens. Building on this analysis, the study proposes recommendations for enhancing

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11

Kang, Jingoo. "Unobservable CEO Characteristics and CEO Compensation as Correlated Determinants of CSP." Business & Society 56, no. 3 (2016): 419–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0007650314568862.

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Do unobservable CEO characteristics predict corporate social performance (CSP) and are they significantly correlated with CEO compensation? How meaningful is stock-based CEO compensation as a predictor of CSP? To answer these questions, the author empirically examines the relationship between stock-based CEO compensation and CSP while accounting for unobservable CEO characteristics. This study finds that CEO fixed effects (CEO dummies) account for a significant variance in CSP and that these fixed effects are correlated with CEO compensation variables in a statistically significant manner. The

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12

Conyon, Martin J., and Lerong He. "Compensation Committees and CEO Compensation Incentives in U.S. Entrepreneurial Firms." Journal of Management Accounting Research 16, no. 1 (2004): 35–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar.2004.16.1.35.

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This study uses a sample of IPO firms to investigate the relation between the compensation committee, CEO compensation, and CEO incentives. We investigate two theoretical models: the three-tier optimal contracting model and the managerial power model. We find support for the three-tier agency model. The presence of significant shareholders on the compensation committee (i.e., those with share stakes in excess of 5 percent) is associated with lower CEO pay and higher CEO equity incentives. Firms with higher paid compensation committee members are associated with greater CEO compensation and low

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13

Yu, Chia-Feng (Jeffrey). "CEO Overconfidence, CEO Compensation, and Earnings Manipulation." Journal of Management Accounting Research 26, no. 2 (2014): 167–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar-50722.

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ABSTRACT In the wake of recent financial crises and corporate failures, chief executive officers (CEOs) are often blamed for their overconfidence leading to earnings manipulation and excessive risks. Why is it then that these overconfident CEOs obtain job offers in the first place? This paper presents a novel explanation for the co-existence of CEO overconfidence and earnings manipulation observed in practice. In an agency model with an external capital market, I identify two potential reasons for a board to hire an overconfident CEO and design a contract that accommodates earnings manipulatio

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14

Li, Qianqian, Yong Jae Shin, and Unyong Pyo. "Impacts of CEO Incentives and Power on Employee Wages." International Academy of Global Business and Trade 18, no. 6 (2022): 33–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.20294/jgbt.2022.18.6.33.

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Purpose - This study investigates the impact of CEO incentive compensation and power on employee wages. While CEO compensation negatively affects employee wages, powerful CEOs may care for employees, and their compensation can have positive impacts on employee wages. Design/Methodology/Approach - Using data from US capital markets during 1992 - 2017, we employ pay-performance sensitivity to measure incentive compensation and CEO pay slices to proxy CEO power. We also examined the potential interaction effects between CEO compensation and CEO power. We conduct a Heckman two-step analysis

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15

Mulligan, Karen, Seema Choksy, Catherine Ishitani, and John A. Romley. "New Evidence on the Compensation of Chief Executive Officers at Nonprofit U.S. Hospitals." Medical Care Research and Review 77, no. 5 (2019): 498–506. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1077558719849356.

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Chief executive officer (CEO) compensation is highly scrutinized, with nonprofit organizations often receiving additional attention due to their tax-exempt status. Understanding hospital CEO compensation is of increasing importance as health care costs remain high and strong leadership is required to implement new health policies. This study documents CEO compensation at nonprofit hospitals in the United States for 2010 and 2015. We compare hospital CEO compensation with CEO compensation in other institution types, including nonhospital health care. We also explore changes in hospital CEO comp

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16

Bolfek, Berislav, Perina Torbarina, and Lucija Surać. "Struktura i faktori koji utječu na utvrđivanje kompenzacija izvršnih menadžera." Oeconomica Jadertina 6, no. 2 (2017): 52. http://dx.doi.org/10.15291/oec.1343.

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Executive managers represent a small precentage of one companies workers but they are the most important group of employees. The ideal compensation management policy ensures that the best talent will remain with the organization while attracting new talent and minimizing turnover. Executive compensation normally combines base salary, short-term and long-term incentives, benefits and bonuses. The purpose of this paper is to explore and analyse data about stucture and factors that affect executive compensation determination of top five global brands. The collected data on the hight of executive

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17

Khanna, Vivek. "Determinants of CEO Compensation." International Journal of Management Excellence 6, no. 2 (2016): 679. http://dx.doi.org/10.17722/ijme.v6i2.223.

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18

Khanna, Vivek. "Determinants of CEO Compensation." International Journal of Management Excellence 6, no. 2 (2016): 679–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.17722/ijme.v6i2.823.

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Using a panel data analysis, the study explores the influence of size of a firm, firm-performance, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) duality and management pattern on CEO compensation. The final sample for the study comprises of a total of 300 Indian companies over a period of three years (2007-08 to 2009-10). The proposed relations are tested using the random-effects generalized least squares regression analysis. The age of the company and industry are introduced as the control variables. In conformity with the proposed hypotheses the analysis reveals that the size of the firm and the performance

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19

Bogle, John C. "Reflections on CEO Compensation." Academy of Management Perspectives 22, no. 2 (2008): 21–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amp.2008.32739756.

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20

Adams, Susan M., Atul Gupta, Dominique M. Haughton, and John D. Leeth. "Data Mining CEO Compensation." Journal of Modern Applied Statistical Methods 7, no. 2 (2008): 561–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.22237/jmasm/1225513200.

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21

Tosi, Henry L., and Thomas Greckhamer. "Culture and CEO Compensation." Organization Science 15, no. 6 (2004): 657–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/orsc.1040.0099.

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22

Xiao, Zhongyi, Rui He, Zhangxi Lin, and Hamilton Elkins. "CEO compensation in China." Nankai Business Review International 4, no. 4 (2013): 309–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/nbri-09-2013-0032.

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23

Beavers, Randy, and Damir Tokic. "CEO Compensation in IPOs." Cogent Economics & Finance 7, no. 1 (2019): 1640099. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23322039.2019.1640099.

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24

Wang, Hwei Cheng, Yung-I. Lou, Chiulien C. Venezia, and Nicole A. Buzzetto-Hollywood. "Corportate Diversification and CEO Compensation: Evidence from the Moderating Effect of Stock Ownership." e-Finanse 15, no. 4 (2019): 83–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/fiqf-2019-0030.

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AbstractThe article is an attempt to assess whether Stock Ownership moderates the relationship between corporate diversification and CEO compensation. Based on agency theory, we develop the hypothesis of whether when CEOs hold a large fraction of their firms’ outstanding stock, the CEOs are acting more as owners or shareholders than employees. This reduces the principal and agency relationship of agency theory, since CEOs are acting as owners rather than employees; thus the demand for further stock-based compensation is likely to be reduced because the interests of CEOs and shareholders are re

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25

Potharla, Srikanth. "Impact of Managerial Ability and Power on CEOs Compensation." Applied Finance Letters 9, SI (2020): 103–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.24135/afl.v9i2.247.

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The present study aims to test whether the rent extraction or efficient contracting which significantly influences the compensation of CEOs in Indian companies. By drawing the sample from all the listed companies providing data on CEO characteristics from the year 2006 to 2018, the study tests the empirical model using ordinary least squares regression and quantile regression. The results of analysis reveal that CEO compensation is tenure-variant and there is a trivial difference between the impact of CEO power and CEO tenure. It is in line with the bargaining theory of managerial ability view

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26

Gong, James Jianxin. "Examining Shareholder Value Creation over CEO Tenure: A New Approach to Testing Effectiveness of Executive Compensation." Journal of Management Accounting Research 23, no. 1 (2011): 1–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/jmar-10105.

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ABSTRACT This paper examines the relationship between CEO compensation and shareholder value added over CEO tenure. The research design exploits two fundamental attributes of CEO compensation and shareholder value added: (1) both CEO compensation and shareholder value added aggregate naturally over CEO tenure, and (2) extending the time interval over which the two variables are measured is likely to result in a better match between CEO compensation and shareholder value created by the CEO. I measure CEO compensation with nominal value of CEO pay, ex post realized pay, and ex ante pay-for-perfo

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27

Schwering, Anja, Friedrich Sommer, Florian Uepping, and Sandra Winkelmann. "The social-psychological perspective on executive compensation: evidence from a two-tier board system." Journal of Business Economics 92, no. 2 (2021): 309–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11573-021-01066-5.

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AbstractThis paper investigates whether and how social-psychological mechanisms, namely reciprocity, demographic similarity, and similar experiences, affect CEO compensation packages with respect to the levels of total, fixed, and short- and mid-term compensation and the variable proportion of the compensation package. We use evidence from Germany as it is considered a prototype of a two-tier board system. Given the primary roles of both the CEO and the chair of the supervisory board, we especially highlight social-psychological mechanisms in the process leading to the final compensation packa

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28

Ben Ali, Chiraz, and Frédéric Teulon. "CEO Monitoring and Board Effectiveness: Resolving the CEO Compensation Issue." Management international 21, no. 2 (2018): 123–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.7202/1052692ar.

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This study examines the impact of board governance mechanisms on the pay of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) using a sample of major French listed companies for the 2009–2011 period. The results show that CEO pay is negatively associated with the presence of a family CEO and positively associated with board size, busy directors, board meetings, and compensation committee independence. We provide further evidence that CEO compensation increases with firm size, and both present and past performance. Our study casts doubt on the effectiveness of formal board attributes in constraining CEO compensa

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29

j, j., j. j, and j. j. "Does CEO Power Affect the Relations between CEO Compensation and Risk-Taking?" International Academy of Global Business and Trade 19, no. 5 (2023): 203–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.20294/jgbt.2023.19.5.203.

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Purpose - This study investigates the effect of incentive compensation and CEO power on a firm’s risk-taking behavior, leveraging stock return volatility and earnings volatility as the key indicators of risk-taking. Design/Methodology/Approach - A comprehensive analysis is conducted using data from 1,958 U.S. firms over a 28-year period (1992- 2019). The study employ both ordinary least square (OLS) regression and two-stage least square (2SLS) regression for analysis. Pay-volatility sensitivity (PVS) and CEO-pay slice (CPS) are used as proxies for incentive compensation and CEO power, re

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30

Mulligan, Karen, Seema Choksy, Catherine Ishitani, and John A. Romley. "What do nonprofit hospitals reward? An examination of CEO compensation in nonprofit hospitals." PLOS ONE 17, no. 3 (2022): e0264712. http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0264712.

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Nonprofit hospital chief executive officer (CEO) compensation has received considerable attention in light of nonprofits’ tax-favored status as well as the high costs of hospital care. Past studies have found that hospital financial performance is a significant determinant of CEO pay but nonprofit performance, including quality and charity care, are not. Using post-ACA data, we re-examine whether a variety of hospital performance measures are important determinants of nonprofit hospital CEO compensation. We found mixed evidence with respect to the significance of the association between financ

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31

K., Buigut, Cheboi J., and Bonuke R. "Effect Of CEO Compensation on Dividend Payout Policy." African Journal of Accounting and Financial Research 6, no. 4 (2023): 29–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.52589/ajafr-mohjsmo5.

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Purpose - This study seeks to investigate the association between CEO compensation and dividend payout policy among listed firms in Kenya. Design/methodology/approach - The study used a sample of 40 firms listed in the Nairobi Securities Exchange(NSE) over the period 2009-2019. Data was analysed using fixed and random effect models to test the research hypothesis. Findings - The empirical results show that CEO compensation is significantly and positively associated with dividend payout policy. Practical implications – The study indicates that CEO compensation can be used as a corporate governa

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32

Jung, Hae Won (Henny), and Ajay Subramanian. "CEO talent, CEO compensation, and product market competition." Journal of Financial Economics 125, no. 1 (2017): 48–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.04.005.

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33

Zheng, Yudan. "The effect of CEO tenure on CEO compensation." Managerial Finance 36, no. 10 (2010): 832–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/03074351011070224.

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34

Lee, Kin-Wai, Cheng-Few Lee, and Gillian Hian-Heng Yeo. "Does CEO Power Affect the Association Between CEO Compensation and Tangible Assets Impairments?" Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies 24, no. 01 (2021): 2150005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219091521500053.

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This paper examines the association between CEO compensation and tangible long-lived assets impairment. We find that the level of CEO compensation is negatively associated with the tangible long-lived assets impairment charges. We also document that in firms with CEOs who have more decision-making power, the negative association between CEO compensation and tangible long-lived assets impairment charges is mitigated. Specifically, the negative association between CEO compensation and tangible long-lived assets impairment charges is less pronounced (1) when CEO chairs the board, (2) when CEO is

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35

Huang, Ying, and Carl R. Chen. "The dynamics of CEO compensation and firm performance: are executive compensations excessive?" Corporate Ownership and Control 5, no. 2 (2008): 237–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i2c1p8.

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We evaluate the dynamics of executive compensation and shareholder returns. In observing the level of compensation, we notice that CEOs’ salaries, bonuses, annual stock options, and accumulation of stock options all showed strong or explosive growth. We postulate that the marginal productivity of CEO compensation diminishes over the sample period due to this substantial growth. Our empirical results support this hypothesis. Using both single equation and simultaneous equation models, we find the marginal effect of compensation on total shareholder returns declines substantially. The results su

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36

Younas, Zahid Irshad, Bilal Mehmood, Asal Ilyas, and Haseeb Asif Bajwa. "Corporate Governance Mechanism and Firm Performance as Determinants of CEO Compensation: A Panel Data Analysis of Pakistani Listed Companies." Journal of Global Economy 8, no. 4 (2013): 307–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1956/jge.v8i4.262.

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The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of corporate governance, firm performance on CEO compensation. More specific, firm performance, board size and audit expenditure are linked with CEO compensation. Using panel data for 151 Pakistani firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE), fixed effects regression has been performed. The results indicate firm performance is negatively associated with CEO compensation, which hold managerial power theory. While, board size and audit expenditure showed a positive relationship with CEO compensation, which reflects the presence of human cap

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37

Graefe-Anderson, Rachel. "CEO Turnover and Compensation: An Empirical Investigation." Quarterly Journal of Finance 04, no. 02 (2014): 1450008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s2010139214500086.

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Because CEO turnover events provide the board of directors with a unique opportunity to potentially completely restructure CEO compensation packages, changes to CEO compensation following a turnover event could prove to inform the ongoing debate regarding CEO compensation. This paper investigates what happens to CEO compensation when a turnover event occurs. Specifically, I examine CEO compensation levels and pay-performance sensitivity for incoming and outgoing CEOs involved in turnover events at public companies in the United States. My main findings are as follows: (1) incoming CEOs are pai

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38

Li, Yuan, and Manisha Singal. "Firm Performance in the Hospitality Industry: Do CEO Attributes and Compensation Matter?" Journal of Hospitality & Tourism Research 43, no. 2 (2018): 272–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1096348018776453.

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Past research has shown mixed results regarding the role CEO compensation plays in influencing firm financial performance in the hospitality industry. To explore this relationship further, we concomitantly examine the role of compensation and CEO attributes like education, age, tenure, functional background, and gender on firm financial performance. Our analyses are based on secondary and hand-collected data from a large and comprehensive sample of U.S. publicly traded hospitality firms. The results from panel data analyses show that CEO cash compensation is positively related to return on ass

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39

Akingbola, Kunle, and Herman A. van den Berg. "Does CEO compensation impact patient satisfaction?" Journal of Health Organization and Management 29, no. 1 (2015): 111–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jhom-02-2013-0034.

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Purpose – This study examines the relationship between CEO compensation and patient satisfaction in Ontario, Canada. The purpose of this paper is to determine what impact hospital CEO compensation has on hospital patient satisfaction. Design/methodology/approach – The analyses in this study were based on data of 261 CEO-hospital-year observations in a sample of 103 nonprofit hospitals. A number of linear regressions were conducted, with patient satisfaction as the dependent variable and CEO compensation as the independent variable of interest. Controlling variables included hospital size, type

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40

Chowdhury, Shamsud D., and Eric Zengxiang Wang. "Institutional Activism Types and CEO Compensation: A Time-Series Analysis of Large Canadian Corporations †." Journal of Management 35, no. 1 (2007): 5–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0149206308326772.

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Using data from the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 companies for a 7-year period, the authors examine the role that institutional activism types and three salient board monitoring mechanisms— CEO/board chair split, board composition, and compensation committee independence—play in influencing CEO contingent compensation in Canada. The authors find that the effect of institutional activism, especially proxy based, is stronger on contingent CEO compensation and that its effects span a longer time. As opposed to the interactions of cumulative proxy-based activism with any of the three monitoring mech

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Ballard, Heather, Mitch Phillips, Eric C. Cheon, and Dustin D. French. "Gender differences in paediatric hospital chief executive officer compensation." BMJ Paediatrics Open 6, no. 1 (2022): e001798. http://dx.doi.org/10.1136/bmjpo-2022-001798.

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Though there is a well-established gender pay gap in medicine, studies on compensation disparities between women and men chief executive officers (CEO) showed mixed results. We conducted a cross-sectional study of children’s hospitals in the USA to evaluate whether CEO gender was associated with compensation differences. Nine out of 31 children’s hospitals employed a female CEO. There was no significant difference between men and women CEOs in terms of hospital characteristics (location, size or ranking in US News and World report) or CEO characteristics (advanced degrees, tenure or compensati

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Robinson, John R., Yanfeng Xue, and Yong Yu. "Determinants of Disclosure Noncompliance and the Effect of the SEC Review: Evidence from the 2006 Mandated Compensation Disclosure Regulations." Accounting Review 86, no. 4 (2011): 1415–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/accr-10033.

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ABSTRACT We investigate the economic forces that influence noncompliance with mandatory compensation disclosures and the effect of a subsequent focused enforcement action. We utilize SEC evaluations of compensation disclosures mandated by rules adopted in 2006 to examine whether noncompliance is associated with excess CEO compensation, proprietary costs, or previous media attention. We further test whether subsequent CEO compensation declines after the SEC publicly identifies noncompliance. We construct measures of defective disclosures from SEC critiques and find that disclosure defects are p

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Shiah-Hou, Shin-Rong. "The effect of analyst coverage on CEO compensation structure: evidence from the S & P 1500." Managerial Finance 42, no. 3 (2016): 191–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/mf-10-2014-0273.

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Purpose – What is the role of analysts in reducing agency problems and information asymmetry between stockholders and managers? The purpose of this paper is to confirm the analyst’s role by examining his or her influence on CEO compensation structure. Design/methodology/approach – The major population for this study consists of publicly traded corporations of the S & P 1500 for which data on CEO compensation is available from Standard & Poor’s Execucomp database, along with the proxy statements of these firms. Regression analysis is used to test hypotheses about the effect of analyst c

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Liu, Ruonan. "Can compensation committees effectively mitigate the CEO horizon problem? The role of co-opted directors." Accounting Research Journal 34, no. 1 (2021): 1–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/arj-11-2019-0213.

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Purpose This study aims to examine whether compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in mitigating the CEO horizon problem. Design/methodology/approach The author uses a sample of 7,280 firm-year observations from 1998 to 2011. Findings In this study, the author finds evidence of opportunistic research and development (R&D) reduction and accruals management in firms with retiring CEOs and compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors. Moreover, it is found that R&D reduction and income-increasing accruals are less discouraged when determining

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Winfrey, F. L., and J. E. Logan. "Are Reputation and Power Compensating Differentials in CEO Compensation?" Corporate Reputation Review 2, no. 1 (1998): 61–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.crr.1540067.

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Azazi, Anwar. "CEO Compensation and Firm Performance in Emerging Market: Evidence from Indonesia Selected Listed Banks." GATR Accounting and Finance Review 5, no. 3 (2020): 95–109. http://dx.doi.org/10.35609/afr.2020.5.3(2).

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Objective – The objective of this study was to investigate empirically the relationship between the compensation of chief executive officers (CEO) and a firm’s performance in the banking industry and to examine if CEO compensation affects bank performance differently between banks with and without prospect. Methodology/Technique – The author uses two measures of performance, total return on assets and Tobin, s Q, and concentrate on total CEO compensation. All data are collected from annual reports of banks listed in Indonesia Stock Exchange for a sample of 23 commercial banks or 167 firm-year

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Nulla, Yusuf Mohammed. "The importance of firm ownership on CEO compensation system: an empirical study of New York stock exchange (NYSE) companies." Corporate Ownership and Control 9, no. 4 (2012): 131–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv9i4c1art1.

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This important study in Executive Compensation topic investigated the importance of Firm Ownership on the CEO Compensation in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) companies. This research had compared the CEO Compensation System of the Owner-Managed and the Management-Controlled companies from the period 2005 to 2010. The research question for this study was: is there a relationship between the CEO Cash Compensation, the Firm Size, the Accounting Firm Performance, and the Corporate Governance, among the Owner-Managed and the Management-Controlled companies? It was found that, there was a relatio

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Aljughaiman, Abdullah A., Abdulateif A. Almulhim, and Abdulaziz S. Al Naim. "Board Structure, CEO Equity-Based Compensation, and Financial Performance: Evidence from MENA Countries." International Journal of Financial Studies 12, no. 1 (2024): 13. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/ijfs12010013.

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This paper investigates the association between board of director (BOD) structures and CEO equity-based compensation (long-term incentive) for commercial banks (conventional and Islamic banks) in MENA countries. Specifically, we take board size and board independence to measure the board structure. Furthermore, we investigate the influence of board structure on the association between CEO equity-based compensation and financial performance. Moreover, we compare conventional and Islamic banks in testing these relationships. Using a sample of 65 banks in MENA countries for the period between 200

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Ghulam Fareed Khan, Sonia Hassan, and Naureen Qadeer. "Impact of Firm Performance and CEO Compensation with Moderating Role of Board Characteristics and Audit Quality." ANNALS OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND PERSPECTIVE 4, no. 1 (2023): 209–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.52700/assap.v4i1.227.

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The motive behind conducting this study is to investigate the effect of the agency theory on Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Compensation through alignment among firm performance and CEO compensation. The moderating variables like Board characteristics (Board independence, Board gender diversification) and Audit quality have some connection between firm performance and CEOs compensation. The data for the period 2013 to 2017 is collected from 100 non-financial firms registered at the stock exchange of Pakistan. Empirical evidence show that firm performance is positively connected with CEO compens

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Hsu, Audrey Wen-hsin, Yi-Ru Shyu, and Victoria Shao-Pin Wang. "Non-compensation-related consultant service and CEO compensation." Journal of Contemporary Accounting & Economics 10, no. 1 (2014): 59–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcae.2014.01.003.

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