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1
Zips, Werner. "Laws in Competition." Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 28, no. 37-38 (January 1996): 279–305. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07329113.1996.10756484.
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2
N, Parmesh. "An Overview of Competition Laws in India." International Journal of Trend in Scientific Research and Development Volume-2, Issue-5 (August 31, 2018): 1705–12. http://dx.doi.org/10.31142/ijtsrd17151.
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REGENS, JAMES L. "Environmental Laws and Global Competition." Chemical & Engineering News 67, no. 43 (October 23, 1989): 39–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1021/cen-v067n043.p039.
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Kaushik, Prerna, Swagat Tripathy, Rishi Sharma, and Harish Dureja. "Anti-Monopoly and Competition Laws - Impact on the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry." Applied Clinical Research, Clinical Trials and Regulatory Affairs 2, no. 3 (December 2015): 153–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.2174/2213476x0203160219101526.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Background: Competition is a process of economic race between market participants to draw clients. The Indian competition law establishment is an early administration. Before the enactment of the Competition Act in May 2002, Monopolistic and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act was the active law that managed certain parts of the opposition. Objective: This manuscript highlights the purpose of competition laws for grappling with the monopolies and restrictive trade practices with a particular focus on pharmaceuticals. Conclusion The Competition Act highlights the main features of new competition law which put back the old MRTP act and also lets in the proscription of anti-competitive treaties, prevention of misuse of dominance and combinations which prove detrimental to the competition in the market.
5
Kerber, Wolfgang, and Oliver Budzinski. "Towards a Differentiated Analysis of Competition of Competition Laws." Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht 1, no. 4 (November 1, 2003): 411–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.15375/zwer-2003-0402.
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Singh, Ruchi. "A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE ANTI-TRUST LAWS IN U.S, U.K AND INDIA WITH SPECIAL REFRENCE TO HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS." International Journal of Advanced Research 10, no. 01 (January 31, 2022): 671–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.21474/ijar01/14090.
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This article focuses upon the conceptualization of the term competition and how competition in the present era has been a potent tool for encouraging economic development and socio-economic welfare rather than curbing monopolies only. The article shall be contextualised highlighting the facts related to the enactment of the Competition Laws in India, U.S and U.K and its actual implementation with special reference to horizontal and vertical anti-competitive agreements. The aim of the article is to do a comparative analysis between the provisions dealing with anti-competitive agreements in U.S.A and U.K and section 3 of the Indian Competition Act in order todiscusses the need of competition in global economic market, and why at all this concept of competition is of utmost importance to us.The analysis done in the article strictly restricts to the interpretation given to anti-competitive agreements under section 3 of Competition Act in India and its comparison thereof with Antitrust Laws in U.K and U.S. The paper aims to highlight the scope and interpretation of anti-competitive agreements as it is among the most sanitizing issues recently in global market.
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Tushevska, Borka. "COMPETITION LAW IN REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA - 20 YEARS OF COMPETITION LAW IN REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA." Pravni vjesnik 36, no. 3-4 (2020): 43–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.25234/pv/8940.
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This article examines the laws in the Republic of north Macedonia (hereinafter RNM), that prohibit agreements among competitors to fix prices, divide markets or in other ways avoid or undermine market competition, otherwise known as competition laws. it explores the conditions and challenges in implementing Macedonian competition laws, as well as the role of the state (regulatory) authorities, the degree to which the competition laws comply with the European Union’s competition laws, and finally, the degree to which competition laws are effective and beneficial for the Macedonian economy. Properly implemented competition laws hold much promise. The enactment of competition laws is fundamental for the benefits of a market economy to be achieved. This encompasses economic growth, innovation, lower prices and higher quality of goods and services. The enactment of competition laws since the independence of the Republic of Macedonia1 is furthermore important. This is due to Macedonian obligations to meet the requirements for EU accession. Additionally, adoption of competition law and competition by-laws in RNM, positively affects on the work of authorities for the protection of competition. What is most important, this competition legal regime represents a base for reducing the abuse of the state authorities and theirs incompetent behaviors. At the end, the article contains conclusions, opinions and suggestions from the conducted research, which hopefully will be beneficial for the relevant auditorium. The analytical-descriptive method, the comparative method, the method of analysis and synthesis, and the method of induction and deduction were used to analyze the subject matter for this article.
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Bednall, T. "COMPETITION LAWS IN THE COOPER BASIN." APPEA Journal 35, no. 1 (1995): 757. http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/aj94052.
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Competition laws in Australia are in the process of substantial reform. The major competition issues facing participants in the Cooper Basin: market definition, and competition between joint venturers are reviewed. The manner in which the Trade Practices Act has been applied to Cooper Basin producers is reviewed, proposed reforms to implement new national competition policy are outlined, and the likely impact which those reforms will have on the production and marketing of gas from the Cooper Basin are discussed.The likelihood, under reformed laws, of development of natural gas pipelines, open access, the difficulties of separate marketing of gas by joint venture parties, the potential for inter-basin competition in Australia, and the real issue of whether substantial benefits will flow to consumers of gas as a result of the application of new competition policies are evaluated.
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Takigawa, Toshiaki, and Mark Williams. "Guest Editors' Note: Asian Competition Laws." Antitrust Bulletin 54, no. 1 (March 2009): 1–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0003603x0905400101.
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Pranadita, Nugraha, Ratih Hurriyati, and Puspo Dewi Dirgantari. "Pengaruh Hukum terhadap Lima Kekuatan Persaingan Terkait dengan Perumusan Strategi Bersaing Menurut Michael E. Porter." Jurnal Manajemen dan Organisasi 12, no. 1 (May 10, 2021): 51–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.29244/jmo.v12i1.33038.
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There are five competitive forces that influence the Industry. Industry competition affects business performance, so companies must adapt to changing environments to maintain a competitive position. One of the ways to win the competition is to use a strategy. Strategy allows organizations to gain a competitive advantage from three different foundations namely: cost leadership, differentiation and focus. Strategic planning can help to develop an early warning system to avoid threats or develop strategies that can turn threats into profits for the company. Thus the strategy can maximize competitive advantage on the one hand, and can minimize the limitations of competing. The question is; How do laws and regulations affect Porter's five competitive forces and the three generic strategies? This research is a qualitative analytical descriptive study using secondary data, and the unit of analysis is the prevailing laws and regulations in Indonesia. The results of this study; consistently statutory regulations (laws) influence the five competitive forces and three generic strategies put forward by Porter.
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Matulis, Brett Sylvester. "The coercive laws of competition in a neoliberal era: the case of forestry in Costa Rica." Journal of Political Ecology 23, no. 1 (December 1, 2016): 279. http://dx.doi.org/10.2458/v23i1.20217.
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Market-oriented forms of conservation are believed to deliver enhanced efficiency in ecosystem management. This greater efficiency is derived from the introduction of competitive mechanisms in resource governance. Market competition, however, produces new social relations that can alter the division of benefits between various actors within the economy and present opportunities for accumulation. The consequent gains in efficiency are not necessarily equitably distributed. Furthermore, the introduction of competition can erode cooperative arrangements designed to assist the poor and politically marginal. Drawing on theories of the 'coercive laws of competition', I seek in this article to understand how competitive structures compel actors to behave in ways that put profit before social or environmental responsibility and encourage self-interested behavior. I explore these ideas in the context of Costa Rican forest conservation, showing that competitive contracting in private forest management has resulted in an uneven distribution of benefits and a comparative advantage for larger landowners. In addition, I also re-think the 'coercive laws' for a neoliberal era.Keywords: competition, neoliberalism, conservation, markets, efficiency, PES
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Lacey, Eric F. "The Italian Competition Law Compared with Other OECD Countries’ Competition Laws." Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 8, no. 2 (October 1, 1990): 147–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/251569298x15668907345090.
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Abstract L’ltalia è il penultimo Paese membro dell’OCSE che abbia adottato una legge sulla protezione della concorrenza (adesso solo la Turchia non ha alcuna legge al riguardo).Peraltro, la legislazione vigente nei Paesi OCSE non è del tutto identica. Vi è, per esempio, una notevole differenza tra la legislazione anti-trust degli Stati Uniti, con proibizione (rafforzata da sanzioni penali) della fissazione di prezzi e di ripartizione dei mercati, ed il progetto di legge belga contro l’abuso di potere economico, che da luogo ad un tipo di controllo molto tenue.Per quanto riguarda, in particolare, le norme attinenti alle concentrazioni, l’ltalia è il quindicesimo Paese OCSE ad avere una normativa. Questo significa non soltanto che nove Paesi OCSE devono ancora convincersi dell’utilità del controllo delle concentrazioni, ma che, date le divergenze tra le diverse normative in vigore, sono anche diversi i criteri e le procedure mediante cui possono essere valutate fusioni ed acquisizioni.Si può affermare che l’impostazione della legge italiana, di carattere dichiaratamente proibitivo, quanto ad accordi restrittivi ed abuso di posizione dominante segue l’attuale tendenza dei Paesi OCSE a favore di questo metodo di controllo piuttosto che del metodo del caso per caso, che e ancora vigente nei Paesi nordici, in Irlanda e nel Regno Unito.Per quanto attiene, invece, alle concentrazioni, l’impostazione di carattere proibitivo non si estende normalmente al loro controllo. Molti ordinamenti preferiscono il sistema del «caso per caso» e così fa anche la legge italiana, anche se questa procedura richiede un giusto equilibrio tra l’esigenza di completare in tempi stretti l’indagine, per non danneggiare le imprese interessate, e l’altrettanto legittima esigenza di avere tempo sufficiente per un esame accurato. Su questo ultimo aspetto, i tempi previsti dalla legge italiana sembrano più brevi della media dei Paesi OCSE. In particolare, il periodo di tempo previsto dalla legge italiana perché l’Autorità effettui l’indagine è di quarantacinque giorni, mentre il tempo mediamente previsto nei Paesi OCSE è di tre mesi.Un elemento molto positivo della legge italiana è quello di sottoporre le concentrazioni ad una valutazione di natura strettamente concorrenziale, senza introdurre dementi di natura politica o sociale. Inoltre, in molti Paesi il Governo ha il potere di dire l’ultima parola sull’autorizzazione o meno delle concentrazioni.Bisogna anche notare che, mentre molti Paesi hanno costruito poco per volta la loro legislazione concorrenziale, partendo dagli accordi orizzontali per poi estendere il controllo all’abuso del potere di mercato e giungendo quindi al controllo delle concentrazioni, la legge italiana include tutti e tre questi tipi di restrizioni della concorrenza. Essa riguarda, inoltre, sia il mercato dei beni che quello dei servizi.La legge italiana si applicherà sia alle imprese private che a quelle pubbliche, con l’eccezione dei monopoli pubblici. Per quanto riguarda le banche e le assicurazioni, la legge italiana riserva ad essi un trattamento analogo a quello di altre leggi della concorrenza, anche se adesso sembra emergere la tendenza a restringere le esenzioni dalle leggi sulla concorrenza di cui godono questi settori.L’Autorità italiana per l’applicazione della legislazione concorrenziale ha ampi poteri di investigazione, di decisione e anche di sanzione, attraverso la comminazione di multe, nonche importanti funzioni consultive. In altri ordinamenti vi è una distinzione tra gli organi che nelle diverse fasi applicano la legislazione della concorrenza. La legge italiana, dato che l’Autorità è responsabile delle varie fasi, potrà essere applicata più facilmente, anche se si potrebbe rilevare che la distinzione tra funzioni istruttorie e funzioni decisionali dà maggiori garanzie (in ogni caso, le parti hanno comunque diritto di ricorrere contro le decisioni dell’Autorità).L’applicazione di sanzioni, che è un aspetto essenziale del sistema di controllo, è modellata nella legge italiana sulla base della normativa CEE e sembra adeguata.Per quanto riguarda il particolare trattamento riservato alle istituzioni finanziarie, sebbene in diversi Paesi vi siano norme speciali nei riguardi delle concentrazioni bancarie (con approvazione da parte delle autorità bancarie, in sostituzione delle autorità che si occupano della concorrenza o in aggiunta all’approvazione di queste ultime), non si riscontra in altri ordinamenti una norma come quella secondo cui anche l’acquisizione di una quota del cinque per cento del capitale debba essere sottoposta ad autorizzazione. Soltanto l’Olanda, forse, ha una regola analoga, mentre l’Australia ha una regola che stabilisce un limite generale del quindici per cento per un solo investitore.Nel complesso, la legge italiana per la concorrenza sembra fornire una buona base per una efficiente politica della concorrenza. Evidentemente, tutto dipenderà dal modo in cui l’Autorità assicurerà che le norme siano effettivamente applicate, soprattutto per quanto riguarda l’art. 4 (che prevede deroghe per le intese) e l’art. 8, paragrafo 2, sulle deroghe per le imprese che forniscono servizi d’interesse economico generale. Sarebbe molto spiacevole se questa norma fosse utilizzata per non applicare la legge allo stesso modo, sia alle imprese private che a quelle pubbliche.
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Memeti, Nora, and Agata Jurkowska-Gomulka. "SOEs, Foreign Investments & Competition: A View from the Gulf States." World Competition 44, Issue 4 (December 1, 2021): 507–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2021027.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) directly compete with private companies, including foreign investors. The scope of applicability of competition law towards SOEs constitutes one of the key features of national competition protection regimes. Two approaches (models) can be identified in this area: the equality approach (competition law applied in the same manner towards the public and the private sector; the model is based on the neutrality principle); and the differentiation approach (excluding fully the application of competition law on SOEs). The second model is usually justified by important social and economic goals, mainly by a necessity to provide highquality public services. However, the differentiation model may negatively affect both domestic competition and the investment atmosphere. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries adopted competition laws that generally put SOEs and the public sector in a broader sense out of scrutiny of competition law regime. The paper aims to check what reasons lie behind a rejection of the neutrality principle in GCC’s competition laws, specifically if competition protection regimes are patterned on antitrust laws from liberal economies. By identifying how the differentiation approach to addressees of competition laws is reflected at a legislative or practical level in most GCC’s countries, the article tends to assess the impact of national competition laws on Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) in the Gulf region. competition law, Gulf States, neutrality principle, State-owned enterprises, foreign investments, national champions
14
Bovis, Christopher. "Transforming the Application of EC Competition Laws." European Business Law Review 12, Issue 5/6 (May 1, 2001): 98–104. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/396515.
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15
Hove, Thomas. "Social Laws of Competition for Journalistic Authority." Journal of Mass Media Ethics 24, no. 2-3 (May 27, 2009): 164–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08900520902885251.
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Paul, Jomon A., Huan Ni, and Aniruddha Bagchi. "Does certificate of need law enhance competition in inpatient care market? An empirical analysis." Health Economics, Policy and Law 14, no. 03 (June 29, 2017): 400–420. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1744133117000184.
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AbstractThis article investigates the impact of Certificate of Need (CON) laws on competition in the inpatient care market. One of the major criticisms of these laws is that it may hinder competition in the health care market, which can lead to higher prices. However, from a theoretical standpoint, CON laws could also promote competition by limiting excessive expansion from incumbents. Our main conclusion is that CON laws by and large enhanced competition in the inpatient market during the period of our study. This indicates that the effects of CON laws to hinder predatory behavior could dominate its effects of preventing new entrants into the inpatient care market. We do not find statistically significant evidence to reject the exogeneity assumption of either CON laws or their stringency in our study. We also find factors such as proportion of population aged 18–44, proportion of Asian American population, obesity rate, political environment, etc., in a state significantly impact competition. Our findings could shed some light to public policy makers when deciding the appropriate health programs or legislative framework to promote health care market competition and thereby facilitate quality health care.
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Eldar, Ofer, and Lorenzo Magnolfi. "Regulatory Competition and the Market for Corporate Law." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 12, no. 2 (May 1, 2020): 60–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180056.
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This article develops an empirical model of firms’ choice of corporate laws under inertia. Delaware dominates the incorporation market, though recently Nevada, a state whose laws are highly protective of managers, has acquired a sizable market share. Using a database of firm incorporation decisions from 1995 to 2013, we show that most firms dislike protectionist laws, such as anti-takeover statutes and liability protections for officers, and that Nevada’s rise is due to the preferences of small firms. Consistent with the bonding hypothesis, our estimates indicate that despite inertia, Delaware would lose significant market share and revenues if it adopted protectionist laws. (JEL G34, G38, K21, K22, L25, L51)
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Sims, Rod, and Graeme Woodbridge. "Public Interest in Antitrust Enforcement: An Australian Perspective." Antitrust Bulletin 65, no. 2 (May 4, 2020): 282–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0003603x20912890.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission’s (ACCC) objective in enforcing Australia’s competition laws is to make markets work in the interests of Australians by protecting and promoting competition. From the ACCC’s perspective, it is poor public policy to introduce other objectives, such as reducing income inequality or political influence, into the enforcement of competition laws. If the enforcement of competition laws tries to achieve everything, in the end, it will achieve nothing. Moreover, there are other, more targeted instruments that are much better placed to achieve these other objectives. The ACCC is of the view that business conduct is likely to be anticompetitive if it interferes with the process of competition and harms trading parties on the other side of the market, or is likely to do so. The ACCC places great significance on these two issues to develop, test, and establish theories of harm to competition. While this is the case, the ACCC is of the view that it is not necessary to precisely quantify the degree of harm to establish that conduct is anticompetitive. Imposing such a requirement risks under enforcement of competition laws.
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Mazahir Cahangirli, Gulara. "PRECONDITIONS FOR UNFAIR COMPETITION AND THE PROBLEM OF ITS STATE REGULATION." SCIENTIFIC WORK 53, no. 04 (February 28, 2020): 53–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.36719/aem/2007-2020/53/53-56.
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Smyrnova, K. "EU LEGAL REGULATION OF COMPETITION IN INNOVATIVE MARKETS." Actual Problems of International Relations, no. 136 (2018): 25–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/apmv.2018.136.0.25-35.
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The digital world is highly dynamic. The only way of survival is to keep innovating, in some extend even invent a way (legal or illegal) to secure its position. As this new phenomenon becomes increasingly sophisticated, the need for laws to govern it becomes more poignant. In consequence, the European Union has taken various actions towards realizing this aim of regulating the digital platform horizon. The evolutionary development of active & passive selling through new electronic or other innovative means which is currently erases national borders leads to the comprehensive involvement of different national competition regimes. The competition authority has kept close scrutinizing on those firms in dominant position in their relevant market. Not only this, as the digital market is mostly multiple sided, the interaction between market are also taking care. However, the competition laws should adapt in the proactively to prevent the anti-competitive measures. The competition authority needs to have the anticipation on the dynamic evolution of competition in digital market and act proactively. Thus the most crucial aspect is to balance the innovative progress & the necessity to control on competition. This article examines how the nature and logic of competition law changes as authorities expand the time horizon that they consider in their prospective analysis.
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Hennig, Martin. "Environmental Integration in Competition and Free-Movement Laws." Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 26, no. 2 (July 2017): 184–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/reel.12201.
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Maher, I. "Alignment of Competition Laws in the European Community." Yearbook of European Law 16, no. 1 (January 1, 1996): 223–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/yel/16.1.223.
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Silalahi, Udin, and Dian Parluhutan. "The Necessity of ASEAN Competition Law: Rethinking." Hasanuddin Law Review 3, no. 3 (December 26, 2017): 218. http://dx.doi.org/10.20956/halrev.v3i3.1165.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
As outlined in the AEC Blueprint, all ASEAN member states (AMSs) will endeavour to introduce competition policy by 2015. At present 7 (seven) AMSs, namely: Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Philippines, Myanmar have the national competition laws to supervise anti-competitive conduct in the domestic market. But the question is what if happened unfair competition between ASEAN member states, due to the agreement or businesses activities by business actors that harm competition? ASEAN has an ASEAN Regional Guidelines on Competition Policy (ARGCP) that developed by ASEAN Experts Group on Competition (AEGC) as framework for member states to develop its own competition law or policy and as a guideline in measuring that directly affect the behaviour of enterprises and the structure of industry and markets. Regional Guideline is just to help AMSs in increasing of awareness of important policy, not to sustain the competition among ASEAN member countries. Until now there is no ASEAN Competition Law and Institution to oversee competition among ASEAN member countries. In this era, ASEAN economic integration it is a certainty that anti-competitive among AMSs will happen.
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SIVALINGAM, G. "COMPETITION POLICY AND LAW IN ASEAN." Singapore Economic Review 51, no. 02 (August 2006): 241–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0217590806002354.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The focus of this paper is on competition policy and law in the ASEAN countries. The paper begins with a descriptive evaluation of competition policy in the ASEAN countries. We then look at the effect of economic structure on the probability of early adoption of competition law among the ASEAN countries after which the competition laws of the ASEAN countries are evaluated in terms of objectives, jurisdictional exception, horizontal agreements, vertical agreements, definition and abuse of dominant position and mergers. We find that the competition laws of the four ASEAN countries that have implemented competition law are not completely harmonized.
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Fox, Eleanor M. "“We Protect Competition, You Protect Competitors”." World Competition 26, Issue 2 (June 1, 2003): 149–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2003002.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
It is widely stated, in contemporary antitrust circles, that antitrust law protects consumers, not competitors. This article explores two questions: Do these words have a clear and uniform meaning, and, Is the statement a fair description of what antitrust laws in fact do? Antitrust laws protect competition. But the laws do not mandate competition; they simply intervene to prevent certain obstructions. This mission may take one or more of three paths: 1) prevent direct harm to consumer welfare by output-limiting acts or transactions, 2) also, protect the openness of markets, and 3) also, put a lid on aggressive competition that might destroy a market of smaller, weaker firms. This article argues that only the third category unabashedly protects competitors. The second category takes a broad view of a dynamic process that “should” not be degraded. It is not designed to protect competitors from competition. But the second category could err on the side of protecting competitors unless the jurisdiction gives serious regard to efficiency justifications, even while the first category could err on the side of perpetuating the power of dominant firms.
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Gillespie, John. "LOCALIZING GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW IN VIETNAM: A BOTTOM-UP PERSPECTIVE." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 64, no. 4 (October 2015): 935–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020589315000445.
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AbstractGlobal laws are an important inspiration for commercial law reforms around the world. Much analysis of this phenomenon emphasizes the capacity of regulatory élites, such as lawmakers, courts and lawyers, to adapt global laws to local conditions. What is often absent from this top-down analysis is a wide-ranging consideration of what the regulated think about global laws. This article aims to redress this shortcoming in the comparative literature by drawing fresh perspectives from bottom-up responses to global laws. It takes from socio-legal scholarship a framework for analysing the interface between thought formation and social action and explores the question—how do the regulated conceptualize and localize global laws? If compliance is socially constructed from below, as this literature suggests, then attempts to understand legal globalization by focusing exclusively on regulatory élites misses much of the localization story.
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Malinauskaite, Jurgita, and Fatih Bugra Erdem. "Digital Antitrust: The Google (Android) Decisions in Russia, Turkey and India." Business Law Review 42, Issue 4 (August 1, 2021): 182–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/bula2021026.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Digital markets and new business models in multi-sided markets with certain market peculiarities (i.e., network, scale, lock-in effects) have challenged the traditional competition tools. National competition authorities (NCAs), especially younger authorities, across the globe have struggled with the investigations of anticompetitive practices in those markets. Specifically, the paper will use Google (Android) as a case study to explore the approaches taken by three competition authorities, based in Russia, Turkey and India, leading to the prohibition decisions of their national competition laws. Discussions centred on the nationalGoogle Android decisions will be placed in a broader context underpinned by recent ongoing developments of competition laws in Russia, Turkey and India. The Google Android case, digital markets, Turkish competition law, Russian competition law, Indian competition law
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Olofinbiyi, Tolulope, and Fred O. Boadu. "Regulating the Market: Competition Law and Policy in Kenya and Zambia." World Competition 26, Issue 1 (March 1, 2003): 75–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2003009.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
There is broad agreement that the transition to a market-based economy in countries in Sub-Sahara Africa (SSA) requires supporting institutions to be successful. This article discusses efforts by Kenya and Zambia to improve market performance with the enactment and implementation of a competition law. Kenya established the Monopolies and Prices Commission (MPC) and Zambia established the Zambia Competition Commission (ZCC). These Commissions are responsible for monitoring such market practices as restrictive business practices, control of monopolies and concentration of economic power, and mergers and takeovers that could have anti-competitive effects. The article concludes that for the laws in the two countries to achieve their intended objectives, there is a need to fine-tune provisions to remove ambiguities, harmonise these laws with other trade laws to prevent jurisdictional problems, guard the independence of the Commissions against political interference, and strengthen the human and technical resources of the Commissions in the areas of market research and competition analysis. This latter need calls for considerable donor support given the budget constraints facing the two countries. The study finds the efforts in these countries laudable and worthy of study by other countries in SSA that are interested in developing market-monitoring institutions.
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Surya Putra, A. A. B. N. A. "Competition Law and Policy Harmonisation: Its Relation to Fair Competition Realisation in ASEAN Single Aviation Market." Udayana Journal of Law and Culture 3, no. 2 (July 31, 2019): 164. http://dx.doi.org/10.24843/ujlc.2019.v03.i02.p03.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
A well-functioning ASEAN Single Aviation Market Requires a level-playing field and fair competition. ASEAN does not have a multilateral agreement on competition related issues but opts to harmonise its Member States’ domestic legislation. This article asks whether this approach is appropriate to realise fair competition in ASEAN Single Aviation Market. It finds that mere harmonisation of laws and policies is insufficient without being complemented by effective implementation and enforcement. While regional enforcement is the ideal way of preventing and opposing unfair competition, this article also proposes the adoption of the concept of international comity as an achievable alternative to currently unequal ASEAN competition laws or the absence thereof.
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Choi, Yo Sop, and Kazuhiko Fuchikawa. "Comparative Analysis of Competition Laws on Buyer Power in Korea and Japan." World Competition 33, Issue 3 (September 1, 2010): 499–519. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2010040.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Competition authorities frequently focus more on the effects of the power of sellers than the power of buyers. Competition laws and policies that address the issue of buyer power are also diverse across different jurisdictions. This raises difficult problems for assessing the practice of buyer power. The competition authorities in the Republic of Korea (henceforth, Korea) and Japan have scrutinized a number of cases of buyer power involving large retail businesses. This article examines the current application of the laws relating to buyer power in Korea and Japan, by a comparative study, in order to contribute to improved implementation of competition law. This article analyses the existing competition laws on buyer power and their implementation in Korea and Japan to discern the common issues arising from their similar regulatory structure. These include: (1) the problem of overlap between the provisions on abuse of market dominance or monopolization and the provisions on unfair business practices (UBPs); (2) the problem of the presumption of superior bargaining position of large retail businesses; and (3) the issue of balancing tests of the positive and negative effects of buyer power. We argue that the distinctive approaches to buyer power under the competition laws of Korea and Japan reflect incentives different from those of other competition regimes with regard to the different legislative structure. This article finally gives further suggestions focusing on practical matters.
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Lee, Edward D., Christopher P. Kempes, and Geoffrey B. West. "Growth, death, and resource competition in sessile organisms." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 118, no. 15 (April 9, 2021): e2020424118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2020424118.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Population-level scaling in ecological systems arises from individual growth and death with competitive constraints. We build on a minimal dynamical model of metabolic growth where the tension between individual growth and mortality determines population size distribution. We then separately include resource competition based on shared capture area. By varying rates of growth, death, and competitive attrition, we connect regular and random spatial patterns across sessile organisms from forests to ants, termites, and fairy circles. Then, we consider transient temporal dynamics in the context of asymmetric competition, such as canopy shading or large colony dominance, whose effects primarily weaken the smaller of two competitors. When such competition couples slow timescales of growth to fast competitive death, it generates population shocks and demographic oscillations similar to those observed in forest data. Our minimal quantitative theory unifies spatiotemporal patterns across sessile organisms through local competition mediated by the laws of metabolic growth, which in turn, are the result of long-term evolutionary dynamics.
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Vovkivskaya, L. V., and E. V. Savostina. "Review of Judicial Cases Involving the Competition Authority." Russian competition law and economy, no. 1 (August 20, 2021): 88–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.47361/2542-0259-2021-1-25-88-91.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Analysis of the legal positions of arbitration courts in cases of violation of antimonopoly laws in terms of consideration of issues: determination of the dominant position of an economic entity, abuse by regulated organizations, abuse of regional operators in the treatment of MSW, approaches to proving anticompetitive agreements. Target. Development of uniform approaches in law enforcement practice in cases of violation of antitrust laws.
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Kim, Dong-Hwan, and Yo Sop Choi. "Modernization of Competition Law and Policy in Egypt: Past, Present and Future." Journal of African Law 64, no. 1 (January 9, 2020): 107–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021855319000342.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
AbstractCompetition laws and policies play an important role in developing countries. More than 130 countries have adopted either a competition law or a similar framework of anti-monopoly laws that aims to improve social welfare. Most African countries have already started developing their competition regimes, and regional trade organizations in Africa have provided competition sections in their free trade agreements to enhance enforcement cooperation. For fledgling competition regimes in Africa, the improvement of effective public enforcement and competition law culture has become an essential driver of competition law development. In particular, Egypt has demonstrated its efforts towards the modernization of competition law and the enhancement of fair and free competition, which is an example of the development of the competition regime in a developing African country. This article discusses the development of the Egyptian competition regime from a comparative perspective and suggests proposals for its further modernization.
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Pittman, Russell. "Abuse-of-Dominance Provisions of Central and Eastern European Competition Laws: Have Fears of Over-Enforcement Been Borne Out?" World Competition 27, Issue 2 (June 1, 2004): 245–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2004015.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Fifteen years ago, when economic reformers were writing and enacting competition laws in the transition economies of Central and Eastern Europe, some critics warned that such laws, or too stringent enforcement of such laws, carried the danger of discouraging competitive behaviour and the development of markets. An examination of the enforcement experience with the abuse-of-dominance provisions of the laws of eleven countries over two separate time periods suggests that the feared evils have not materialized. Two patterns stand out in this enforcement experience: first, the number of findings of abuse of dominance has been very small in countries other than Poland, and second, a large and growing proportion of these findings of abuse have been in sectors that would in developed market economies be subject to economic regulation.
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Vovkivskaya, L. V., and E. V. Savostina. "Review of judicial cases involving the competition authority." Russian competition law and economy, no. 3 (October 1, 2021): 102–6. http://dx.doi.org/10.47361/2542-0259-2021-3-27-102-106.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Analysis of the legal positions of arbitration courts in cases of violation of antitrust laws in terms of consideration of issues: exceptions to the patent monopoly, approaches to proving anticompetitive agreements, establishing the fact of being under the control of a foreign investor, abuse of dominant position, bringing to administrative responsibility in the absence of representatives of the person involved. Target: developing uniform approaches in law enforcement practice in cases of violation of antitrust laws.
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Furse, Mark. "Competition Law Choice in China." World Competition 30, Issue 2 (June 1, 2007): 323–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2007021.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
China is in the process of introducing a new comprehensive competition law, which will replace a disjointed and ill-enforced set of laws that apply to some, but not all, competitive constraints. In shaping its new law China has taken advice from international organisations and from regimes, notably the United States and the European Community, with mature competition law systems. This article argues that while much can be learned from such international comparisons competition law is not necessarily a standard that can be applied in a one-size-fits-all formulation to any jurisdiction, and that some sensitivity to local market conditions and economic development may be required. However, the law as presently drafted is an uneasy amalgam of competition law standards and wider political and industrial agendas. There exists a danger that the law may be inconsistent and non-transparent in application, undermining the attainment of competition objectives.
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Ezrachi, Ariel. "Unchallenged Market Power? The Tale of Supermarkets, Private Labels, and Competition Law." World Competition 33, Issue 2 (June 1, 2010): 257–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2010020.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The proliferation of private labels has transformed the landscape of retail competition in developed countries. Major retailers are no longer confined to their traditional roles of purchasers and distributors of branded goods. By selling their own label products they compete with their upstream brand suppliers on sales and shelf space. The paper explores the emergence of ‘vertical competition’ between retailers and suppliers and the pro-competitive and possible anti-competitive effects that stem from the use of private labels. It reviews the enforcement of European competition laws in a private label environment and the difficulty in balancing the beneficial short-term effects of private labels and their possible, harmful, long-term effects. It subsequently questions whether these difficulties imply a lack of competitive harm or reflect a gap in regulation, as traditional analysis fails to encompass the increased market power of retailers and the competitive effects of private labels.
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Taranukha, Yuriy V. "Free and Regulated Competition: Two Forms of the Competitive Principle Implementation." Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta. Ekonomika, no. 54 (2021): 7–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.17223/19988648/54/1.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Although interference in the competitive mechanism is a fact of economic reality, the controversy around free and regulated competition does not subside. In contrast to opposing these forms of competition to each other, the author views them as ensuring re-creation of competitive relations at qualitatively different stages of competition development. Based on the reproduction approach, the objective nature of these forms’ existence is revealed, and the reasons for transition from free to regulated competition are shown. Free competition is interpreted as a way of the competitors selection mechanism, acting without regard to position occupied by competitors in the market. Regulated competition is characterised by external interference, carried out by influencing the mechanism and results of the competitive process, in competitive selection. Considering free and regulated competition as a means of maintaining the competitive principle and restoring rivalry relationships, the author concludes that each form reflects the specifics of the implementation of this principle at different stages of the competitive system development. At the same time, the transition from free competition to its regulated form is interpreted as a way of resolving the internal contradiction within the competition, and at the same time as an evidence of its evolution. This interpretation is not only of theoretical significance related to justification of the need to regulate competition. It is a methodological key to determine areas and boundaries of intervention in the competitive process for competitive policy. The current stage of competition development is characterised by a high rate of change, ultimate and unpredictable, and requires a transition to new regulatory measures affecting the competitive principle itself. The study of this side of regulated competition seems to be the most promising. This article focuses on the subjective side of macrocompetition represented by institutions (antitrust laws) and actors (rivals and regulators). However, the evolution of competitive conditions and competitors also change the content of the competitive principle. This requires regulation of competition from within.
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Bittlingmayer, George. "The Economic Problem of Fixed Costs and What Legal Research Can Contribute." Law & Social Inquiry 14, no. 04 (1989): 739–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-4469.1989.tb00003.x.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The antitrust laws demand competition but, in general, no competitive outcome is possible in markets characterized by substantial fixed costs. Consequently, restrictions on competition may have an efficiency defense, and a prohibition of cartel agreements may entail costs as well as benefits. Giving examples, this essay illustrates the problem that fixed costs pose for competition, long recognized in economics, and discusses implications for real-world industries. The author addresses Wiley's recent criticism of theoretical and empirical work on the fixed cost problem and outlines an agenda for legal research that can help illuminate the underlying economic and antitrust policy issues posed by industries with high fixed costs.
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Türem, Z. Umut. "‘The market’ unbound: neoliberalism, competition laws and post territoriality." Journal of International Relations and Development 19, no. 2 (April 2016): 242–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/jird.2016.5.
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Wood, Diane P. "Soft Harmonization among Competition Laws: Track Record and Prospects." Antitrust Bulletin 48, no. 2 (March 2003): 305–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0003603x0304800202.
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McGlynn, Terrence P. "Do Lanchester's laws of combat describe competition in ants?" Behavioral Ecology 11, no. 6 (November 2000): 686–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/beheco/11.6.686.
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Potter, Joshua D., and Margit Tavits. "The Impact of Campaign Finance Laws on Party Competition." British Journal of Political Science 45, no. 1 (July 2, 2013): 73–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0007123413000227.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The comparative literature on party systems has convincingly demonstrated that electoral rules, social cleavages and their interaction can explain much of the cross-national variation in the size of party systems. This literature, however, has thus far ignored campaign finance laws. This article argues that various campaign finance laws exert more or less restrictive pressures on party competition. It develops a new theoretical concept, fund parity. The study demonstrates the positive relationship between fund parity and party system size and employs additional tests to supplement the regression analysis in order to account for potential endogeneity issues. The findings underscore an intuitive – but heretofore untested – relationship: increasing parity makes party competition more permissive and increases the size of the party system.
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Mendes, Philip. "Do competition laws have a place in technology licensing ?" R & D Enterprise: Asia Pacific 2, no. 4 (September 1999): 27–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.5172/impp.1999.2.4.27.
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Tyson, Nicole. "Joint Venture Regulation under European Competition Laws: An Update." European Law Journal 13, no. 3 (May 2007): 408–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0386.2007.00356.x.
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Ng, Wendy. "Changing Global Dynamics and International Competition Law: Considering China’s Potential Impact." European Journal of International Law 30, no. 4 (November 2019): 1409–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chz066.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Abstract Competition law is increasingly international in its scope and application. Today, over 130 jurisdictions have competition law. Although most competition laws are national in scope and no formalized competition law-related rules apply globally, international norms for competition law have been created and fostered. These norms largely reflect the perspectives and approaches of the USA, European Union and developed countries more generally. However, developing countries now constitute the majority of competition law jurisdictions, and Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa – which all have competition laws – have risen as important economic powers. Whether and how these changing global dynamics will impact international competition law norms is an important issue that remains under-explored. This article considers this question by examining China and its competition law. It examines the extent to which China has adopted and incorporated international norms into its competition law and evaluates whether China’s approach to, and understanding of, competition law might challenge or change the development of international competition law norms in the future.
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Edge, Marc. "Conspiracy to Commit Murder? Canadian Newspaper Trades and Closures, 2010-2017." Canadian Journal of Media Studies 16, no. 1 (July 1, 2018): 28–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.18192/cjmsrcem.v16i1.6454.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Newspaper companies in both Eastern and Western Canada have engaged in anti-competitive behaviour since 2010 by exchanging titles, increasingly through trades, and then closing them to create more lucrative local monopolies. This phenomenon reached its height in late 2017 when the country’s two largest chains, Postmedia Network and Torstar Inc., traded 41 mostly Ontario titles and closed almost all of them. The chains claimed there was no collusion involved, but a Competition Bureau investigation reportedly found detailed memos and non-compete agreements. The British Columbia chains Black Press and Glacier Media also engaged in this type of consolidation in the first half of the decade without legal consequence. Including non-daily community newspapers, Black Press and Glacier Media closed or merged twenty-four of the thirty-three titles they exchanged from 2010-2014, or a competitor one of them already owned. While this would appear to be classic anti-competitive behaviour, their dealings went without investigation by the Competition Bureau. This points up the laxity of Canada’s antitrust laws in dealing with newspaper mergers and takeovers.
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Han, Alex. "Sherman Act 1890: Modernization and Impact on Markets." ABC Research Alert 9, no. 3 (November 27, 2021): 104–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.18034/abcra.v9i3.583.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The major purpose of the Sherman Act was to prevent mergers from forming monopolies. It ensures consumers are protected from price discrimination, and there is free competition. Several economists, classical economists, neoclassical economists, Chicago school and Harvard school, pointed out several antitrust laws. Classical economists led by Smith argued that monopolists set prices at higher prices and raise their charges higher through understocking the markets hence corporations and mergers should be prevented. Neoclassical economists developed a model which assumes that there are no barriers to entry whereby there is free entry to the market. Harvard school also advocated for free competition. Either, the Chicago school was against the idea of free competition and proposed some acts from the antitrust laws to be removed. However, with advancements in technology, the Sherman Act has become outdated and some languages used are held, making it a challenge to interpret in courts. There is a need for the antitrust laws to be reformed to fit the changing technology. Bills should be proposed to make improvements to the acts. For example, Klobuchar Amy, in April 2021, proposed a bill seeking to reform antitrust laws to better perfect competition in the American economy.
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Robertson, David Brian. "Leader to Laggard: How Founding Institutions Have Shaped American Environmental Policy." Studies in American Political Development 34, no. 1 (April 2020): 110–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0898588x20000024.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
The U.S. led the world in environmental policy in the 1970s, but now lags behind comparable nations and resists joining others in tackling climate change. Two embedded, entwined, and exceptional American institutions—broad private property rights and competitive federalism—are necessary for explaining this shift. These two institutions shaped the exceptional stringency of 1970s American environmental laws and the powerful backlash against these laws that continues today. American colonies ensured broad private rights to use land and natural resources for profit. The colonies and the independent state governments that followed wielded expansive authority to govern this commodified environment. In the 1780s, Congress underwrote state governance of the privatized environment by directing the parceling and transfer of federal land to private parties and of environmental governance to future states. The 1787 Constitution cemented these relationships and exposed states to interstate economic competition. Environmental laws of the 1970s imposed unprecedented challenges to the environmental prerogatives long protected by these institutions, and the beneficiaries responded with a wide-ranging counterattack. Federalism enabled this opposition to build powerful regional alliances to stymie action on climate change. These overlooked institutional factors are necessary to explain why Canadian and American environmental policies have diverged.
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Rajabiun, Reza. "Competition Law and the Economy in the Russian Federation, 1990-2006." Global Jurist 9, no. 2 (January 22, 2009): 1–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1934-2640.1279.
Повний текст джерелаАнотація:
Most developing and transition countries adopted statutes prohibiting anticompetitive agreements and abusive practices during the 1980's and 1990's. The effectiveness of these laws is nevertheless widely debated. This paper contributes to the literature by conducting an event study of the adoption of Russian competition laws in the early years of transition, the subsequent economic developments and the legislative reform process of 2002-2006. An examination of the substantive prohibitions and enforcement data reveals that Russian competition laws relied on complex standards and imposed weak constraints on anticompetitive practices. The more recent shift to simpler and more predictable per se prohibitions against collusive agreements substantiates this hypothesis. The evidence has implications for the design of regulatory regimes in other countries with laws similar to those operative in Russia during the transition process.