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Готові списки джерел за темами / Directors' liability to shareholders

Добірка наукової літератури з теми "Directors' liability to shareholders"

Автор: Grafiati

Опубліковано: 15 вересня 2021

Оновлено: 3 лютого 2022

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Статті в журналах з теми "Directors' liability to shareholders":

1

Jurič, Dionis, and Mihaela Braut Filipovič. "Limited Liability Companies in Croatia." Central European Journal of Comparative Law 1, no. 1 (June 30, 2020): 69–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.47078/2020.1.69-85.

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This article aims to provide an overview of the main features of the limited liability company (hereinafter: LLC) in Croatia. LLCs are the most common company type in Croatian business practices. This is because of low amounts of minimum sharecapital, limited liability of shareholders, freedom of shareholders to regulate own internal relations and the LLC’s internal organization, which is regulated by the articles of association and holds fewer formalities to function. Interestingly, most LLCs are established as a single shareholder LLC, followed by two and three shareholders LLCs. This supports the finding that Croatian LLCs are often closely held companies, whose founders also act as directors and employees of the company. Since 2012, it is possible to form a simple LLC for a minimum share capital of 10 KN (cca. 1.32 EUR), and as of 2020, LLCs can even be established online. Thus, the simplicity and cost effectiveness to establish an LLC remain its primary advantage. Mandatory provisions that shareholders must respect are inter alia capital requirements and capital maintenance, formation, and competencies of the management board and shareholders’ meeting. The shareholders’ meeting is superordinate to other LLC bodies, allowing directors to be appointed and dismissed at any time. Shares are alienable and inheritable, but their transfer may be limited by the LLC’s articles of association. In certain cases, shareholders can be held personally liable for the LLC’s obligations (e.g., in the event of abuse of limited liability, partial payment of capital contributions, and the LLC’s dissolution without liquidation). Further specifics and current challenges of LLCs in Croatia will be analysed in detail.

2

Tanaya, Velliana. "BENTUK KETERLIBATAN PEMEGANG SAHAM DALAM PERBUATAN MELAWAN HUKUM PERSEROAN TERBATAS YANG DAPAT MEMPERLUAS PERTANGGUNGJAWABANNYA." Law Review 17, no. 3 (May 4, 2018): 175. http://dx.doi.org/10.19166/lr.v17i3.834.

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<p><em>Limited Liability Company is the most popular form of business entity in Indonesia because law acknowledges the principle of limited liability of its shareholders, which gives advantages for entrepreneurs running a business. Article 3 Subsection 1 Law No. 40 Year 2007 concerning Limited Liability Company stated that company’s shareholders are not personally liable for agreements made on behalf of the Company and are not liable for the Company’s losses in excess of their prospective shareholding. However, in Article 3 Subsection 2 there are some waivers of the principle, one of the exceptions is if the relevant shareholders are involved in illegal actions committed by the Company. It is interesting because in fact, usually, shareholder do not get involved in company’s management. Through normative research with Statute and Conceptual Approach on Piercing the Corporate Veil, shareholders can be accountable for personal responsibility if shareholders in giving his/her voting rights in General Meeting of Shareholders neglect his/her duty of care, or if besides of being shareholders he/she also become Board of Directors and/or Board of Commissioners who runs the Company’s management, or if the shareholders give order or command to Board of Directors or Board of Commissioners or company’s employee to perform actions that causing the Company committed an unlawful act and harm others (tort). Personal liability can be requested if injured party filing a tort lawsuit and set the relevant shareholders as a defendant besides the Company.</em></p>

3

Janků, Martin. "Liability of statutory organs in limited liability companies." Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis 59, no. 2 (2011): 121–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.11118/actaun201159020121.

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Statutory organs of business companies (and similarly of co-operatives) have numerous obligations imposed by generally binding provisions; relied with these is the liability for non-fulfilment of the latter. Some of the obligations are imposed directly by the laws, some are assumed on contractual basis. Their infringements may lead to the liability for the situation and consequences occurred. The regulation of the liability of persons engaged in the company’s bodies covers persons that are entrusted by the management of foreign assets. Sometimes these are in fact not entirely foreign assets because, although the assets are legally owned by the business company, persons acting as statutory organs are mostly partners (shareholders) in these companies as well. As such they manage the foreign assets but the company properties were created by their contributions or through the business by themselves. The paper analyses the requirements laid down for the function of managing directors (jednatel) in the limited company. Consequently it analyses the scope of the liability of managing directors firstly, in relationship to the company’s creditors (persons standing outside the company) and, subsequently, in relationship to the shareholders. It also presents and characterises the recent trends in the Commercial Court’s judgement of the conditions required for the liability for damage and claims for damages put forward by action to recover damages by the managing directors. De lege ferenda the paper recommends that the legal regulation will be amended by provisions limiting the scope of persons to be appointed as executive director and/or extending the liability for damages for the partners of the company in cases where the damage in such cases can not be compensated by the executive director and the partners should bear consequences for their culpa in eligendo.

4

van der Pas, Jurian. "Getting Personal." European Journal of Comparative Law and Governance 1, no. 4 (November 14, 2014): 337–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22134514-00104002.

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Pursuant to article 149 Company Law of the People’s Republic of China 2013 (clc), directors will be liable for the damages of the company if their actions violate the law, administrative regulations, or the company’s statutes. According to article 152 clc, directors will also face liability towards the company’s shareholders in case of a violating action that caused direct damages to the shareholders. Unfortunately, however, these provisions and their corresponding legal obligations are general and offer no procedural guidance, nor do they elaborate on the scope and extent of the directors’ personal liability. Furthermore, it is by and large ambiguous what the directors’ responsibilities are towards the creditors of the company. This article discusses this grey area of the clc by critically comparing it with the Dutch system of directors’ liability. Upon analysis, the author proposes to introduce a standard of fault in China to determine the scope and extent of the directors’ personal liability. In addition, the author argues that China should provide the company’s creditors with a direct action against the directors for compensation of their real damages.

5

Kurniawan, Mr. "TANGGUNG JAWAB PEMEGANG SAHAM PERSEROAN TERBATAS MENURUT HUKUM POSITIF." Mimbar Hukum - Fakultas Hukum Universitas Gadjah Mada 26, no. 1 (June 25, 2014): 72. http://dx.doi.org/10.22146/jmh.16055.

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Limited Liability Companies have completeness instrument called organ corporation which consists of General Meeting of Shareholders (GMS), the board of directors, and the board of commissioners. According to Commercial Law (KUHD), Act No. 1 of 1995 jo. Act No. 40 of 2007 on Limited Liability Companies, the principle liability of General Meeting of Shareholders (GMS) is limited on their share. But, if it is proven that, among others, there has been a mixing of the shareholder’s personal assets and the Company’s assets, so the limited liability turns into unlimited liability or personal liability. Perseroan Terbatas (PT) memiliki alat kelengkapan yang disebut organ perseroan terdiri dari Rapat Umum Pemegang Saham (RUPS), Direksi dan Dewan Komisaris. Menurut Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Dagang (KUHD), UU PT No. 1 Tahun 1995 jo. UU PT No. 40 Tahun 2007, tanggung jawab Pemegang Saham (RUPS) pada prinsipnya adalah bersifat terbatas pada saham yang dimiliki. Akan tetapi, apabila dapat dibuktikan bahwa telah terjadi pembauran harta kekayaan pribadi Pemegang Saham dengan harta kekayaan perseroan, maka tanggung jawab terbatas tersebut akan berubah menjadi tanggung jawab tidak terbatas atau tanggung jawab pribadi.

6

Hendrawan, Daniel, Emilia Fitriana Dewi, Subiakto Sukarno, and Isti Raafaldini Mirzanti. "Application of the Principles of Business Judgment in the Authoritative Function of Directors of Limited Liability Company in Singaporean and Indonesian Legal Perspectives." Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 9, no. 3 (May 10, 2020): 93. http://dx.doi.org/10.36941/ajis-2020-0044.

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The purpose of this study is to analyze the functions and authority of the director of limited liability company in applying business judgment principles, by taking comparative law studies in Singapore's common law and in Indonesia's civil law. By taking emphasis on the authority of directors in representing limited companies both in and out, there are several authorities that are regulated in it. This study was conducted with a comparative law approach, with descriptive qualitative analysis. The results showed that sometimes directors act outside their authority and can harm a limited liability company. On the other hand, that there are actions of the board of directors that are in accordance with their authority but still harm the limited liability company. In this case, the shareholders often hold accountable. In corporate law there is a principle of business judgment where a director cannot be held accountable if the directors are proven to have good faith. The difference between Singapore law and Indonesian law in regulating the authority of directors is the good faith assessment held by directors.

7

Casper, Matthias. "Liability of the Managing Director and the Shareholder in the GmbH (Private Limited Company) in Crisis." German Law Journal 9, no. 9 (September 1, 2008): 1125–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2071832200000353.

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The insolvency of a company does not arrive suddenly. Normally, insolvency precedes a crisis. At present, the term “crisis” is defined in § 32 a sec. 1 of the Gesetz betreffend die Gesellschaften mit Beschränkter Haftung (GmbHG – Private Limited Companies Act) as the point when the company does not receive any credits according to the usual conditions in the particular market and when the shareholders provide the company with further shareholder capital instead of debt capital. Besides the rules governing shareholder capital substitution, which will be omitted due to the upcoming reform of private limited companies, there are few legal guidelines that regulate the standards of conduct for managing directors and shareholders in the case of a crisis. In particular, § 49 sec. 3 GmbHG needs to be singled out. This paragraph establishes an obligation to call a shareholder meeting if more than half of the capital stock is lost. If an adverse balance arises because of the payouts to the shareholders, the protections of §§ 30, 31 GmbHG will intervene. An adverse balance results when there is insufficient capital to cover the liabilities, ownership's equity, and guaranteed capital. However these protections often do not suffice.

8

Poiedynok, V. V., and I. V. Kovalenko. "RESPONSIBILITY OF DIRECTORS IN BANKRUPTCY PROCEDURES UNDER EU LAW AND INDIVIDUAL MEMBER STATES OF EU." Economics and Law, no. 1 (April 15, 2021): 48–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.15407/econlaw.2021.01.048.

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The Bankruptcy Proceedings Code of Ukraine provides for the possibility of imposing liability under the obligations of the debtor – a legal person on the founders (stakeholders, shareholders) or other persons who have the right to give mandatory instructions to the debtor or have the opportunity to otherwise determine his actions. As a result, "comfortable" organizational forms of companies, such as LLCs and JSCs, have become risky for investors; managers, who may be employees, bear risk too. The article analyzes the legislation of the EU and some EU member states (Germany, France, Spain, the Netherlands, Latvia, Romania), concerning the liability of individuals in insolvency proceedings. We find that the rules on such liability are not harmonized at the EU level; as for individual countries, their laws do provide for the possibility of holding both de jure and de facto directors, whereas the latter may include the founders (stakeholders, shareholders) of the company, for the debts of the company. At the same time, the legislation of European countries describes in great detail the conditions and procedure for imposing such liability, which makes the risks for the individuals concerned predictable. Moreover, special rules on liability in insolvency proceedings are systematically linked to the provisions of company law, which establish the obligation of directors to act with due diligence in the interests of the company and liability for knowingly making business transactions with the knowledge that the company is insolvent (wrongful trading). In Ukraine, there are absolutely no specific legal provisions on the conditions and procedure for holding even de jure directors to liable in insolvency proceedings, not to mention the founders (stakeholders, shareholders) of companies, which creates a situation of legal uncertainty. To eliminate it, the legislation of Ukraine should define: the range of individuals on whom such liability may be imposed; a specific list of actions, the commission of which may give rise to liability; the need to prove the guilt of such individuals; forms of guilt sufficient to be held liable (only intent or also negligence); procedural rules for establishing guilt, including the issue of the burden of proof; who may lay claim to a director (insolvency administrator, creditor, court); statutes of limitations on the liability of directors, etc.

9

NINGRUM, LESTARI. "The Linkage of the Board of Directors and the Status of Aviation Industry Licensing Law." JURNAL MANAJEMEN TRANSPORTASI DAN LOGISTIK 3, no. 1 (July 25, 2017): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.25292/j.mtl.v3i1.138.

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Aviation business is a capital intensive and high risk in terms of safety. Legislation in force in Indonesia requires enterprises should cost in the form of a limited liability company that is obliged to deposit the basic capital of 500 billion rupiah. The capital cannot be made in working capital which is useful for the collateral to a third party. The regulations for a limited liability company are to be established by at least 2 people. The purpose of this research is to analyze the linkage of the board directors and the status of aviation industry licensing law. The position of the legal status of business entities where shareholder is only one person is to be studied in this descriptive study. The result shows that the airlines company should provide the capital risk and high insurance of the third party. UUPT also has given the authority of the shareholders (who owns 20 % of the share) to be decision makers in the company. However, without independent surveillance, it is possible that the shareholders do some mistakes in making decisions. Some mistakes are related to the policy, the using of authorized capital, and others. Aviation business is a capital intensive and high risk in terms of safety. Legislation in force in Indonesia requires enterprises should cost in the form of a limited liability company that is obliged to deposit the basic capital of 500 billion rupiah. The capital cannot be made in working capital which is useful for the collateral to a third party. The regulations for a limited liability company are to be established by at least 2 people. The position of the legal status of business entities where shareholder is only one person is to be studied in this descriptive study.

10

Nuranda, Bima, Anita Afriana, and Holyness N. Singadimedja. "STATUS HUKUM PEKERJA YANG DIANGKAT MENJADI ANGGOTA DIREKSI PADA PERSEROAN TERBATAS TANPA ADANYA PENGAKHIRAN PERJANJIAN KERJA." Perspektif Hukum 19, no. 1 (July 5, 2019): 33. http://dx.doi.org/10.30649/phj.v19i1.189.

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<em>The appointment of a director in a Limited Liability Company can be chosen from its own workers. In reality, this raises a legal problem when the worker appointed to the Board of Directors is dismissed by the General Meeting of Shareholders (GMS), while the termination has been regulated in Law Number 40 of 2007 concerning Limited Liability Companies, but when workers appointed as members of the board of directors do not accept such dismissals, the aforementioned directors choose to submit the fulfillment of their workers’ rights as stipulated in Law Number 13 of 2003 concerning Employment. From this problem, it can be inferred that there is a lack of clarity regarding the legal status of a worker who is appointed as a board of directors through GMS and the legal consequences when the worker appointed as director is dismissed.</em>

Більше джерел

Дисертації з теми "Directors' liability to shareholders":

1

Sparis, Lauren Cheryl. "Can directors be held personally liable to shareholders in the context of South African law." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/73595.

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Considering the recent corporate scandals over the past couple years – VBS Mutual Bank, McKinsey & Trillian, Steinhoff, EOH and possibly Tongaat Hulett to name but a few – many shareholders may seek to hold the directors and management of such entities personally liable for their involvement or negligence. Especially where their actions were tantamount to fraud, they benefited in some way and or as a result the company, and possibly the shareholders, suffered damages. This is especially true when a company as consequence is liquidated and cannot institute action on its behalf. It is submitted that directors are rarely held personally liable for failing to fulfill their duties, let alone liable to the shareholders. The risk of failing to monitor internal controls or business risks, and to hold those acting on behalf of the company responsible and accountable for their actions, is dangerous due to the significant effect that such failure could have on the economy, for example the economic collapse with respect to the recent Steinhoff debacle. Whereas the earlier Companies Act 61 of 1973 did not necessarily ‘spell out’ directors’ duties in detail, the Companies 71 of 2008 comprehensibly records their statutory and common law duties. To this extent the board is held accountable and can ensure proper governance in the company’s internal affairs. Shareholders expect management to maximise the value of a company for the benefit of the shareholders and to act in their best interest. In achieving this, directors are required to act in the best interests of the company. However, directors may use their elevated position for their own personal gain and self-interests. Thus, in which circumstances will courts pierce the corporate veil, stepping aside from a company’s unique legal personality, to impute liability to the wrongdoers lurking behind? The relationship between directors, a company and its shareholders is a fiduciary one which imposes certain duties upon directors. However, it is well established in law that directors’ duties are owed to the company itself. Thus, considering common and statutory law, on what legal basis would shareholders be able to bring a claim against directors for the loss or damage they suffered due to an act of the directors? Considering the above, this paper seeks to explore directors’ liability to shareholders within South Africa’s common and statutory law, bearing in mind entrenched legal principles, such as the argument that fiduciary duties are duties owed to the company and not to individual shareholders; and that as a result only the company can impose liability on its directors.
Mini Dissertation (LLM (Corporate Law))--University of Pretoria, 2019.
Mercantile Law
LLM (Corporate Law)
Unrestricted

2

Sauls, Daveraj Landor. "Directors Personal Liability for Irregular, Wasteful and Fruitless Expenditure in South African (SA) State owned Companies (SOC)." University of the Western Cape, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/11394/7705.

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Magister Legum - LLM
Directors of companies are the forerunners in overseeing and strategically managing a company.1 The Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Companies Act) gives the board of directors the legislative obligation for a company to be managed by or under the direction of the board of directors.2 The board of directors have a central role in the decision making and operation of a company; this position also applies to the board of directors of State owned Companies (SOC). This dissertation explores methods to hold directors of SOCs personally liable for irregular, wasteful and fruitless expenditure Irregular expenditure is defined as expenditure that does not comply with the provisions of the Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (PFMA), the State Tender Board Act 86 of 1968 or any legislation that provides for provincial government procedure.3 Fruitless and wasteful expenditure is defined as ‘expenditure which was made in vain and would have been avoided had reasonable care has been exercised’.This research aims to analyse legislative mechanisms put in place that hold directors of SOCs personally liable for irregular, reckless, wasteful and fruitless expenditure. Section 77(2)(b) and 218(2) of the Companies Act contains the legislative basis for the personal liability of directors of SOCs for irregular, wasteful and fruitless expenditure.

3

Mboweni, Pamela. "A Critical Analysis of the Liability of Directors in Light of the Unwarranted Shareholder Involvement in South African State-Owned Enterprises." Diss., University of Pretoria, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/2263/77415.

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South African state-owned enterprises are continually in distress and are failing to meet their objectives. Most of the failures can be attributed to corporate governance contraventions that take place within these enterprises. The regulatory framework of South African state-owned enterprises is wide and diverse in nature. The dissertation will critically analyse the liability of directors in light of the unwarranted shareholder involvement in South African state-owned enterprises. An overview of the current governance trends within these enterprises will be provided with the view of analysing the existence of effective corporate governance practices. A critic in relation to the current state of governance within these institutions will be provided. The study will outline will the role of the board of the directors and the role of government as a shareholder in state-owned enterprises. And also provide the mechanisms that can be utilized to ensure accountability within state-owned enterprises.
Mini Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2019.
Mercantile Law
LLM
Unrestricted

4

Stratton, M. Lee. "Directors' fiduciary duties to shareholders." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1993. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/6561.

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Since the 1902 decision of Percival v. $Wright\sp1,$ Canadian common law has provided that directors generally have no fiduciary duties to shareholders. Shareholders have continued to assert that directors have such duties, however. Moreover, shareholders have been attracted by the allure of the rigorously restitutionary remedies imposed on fiduciaries. Cases in which share holders have made claims of fiduciary duty against directors since the law reforms of the 1960s and 1970s are examined. The law reformers expected that the courts would develop the law of fiduciary relations within the corporation. Moreover, the nature of securities law reforms confronted the courts with the previously noted gulf between the statutory fiduciary obligations imposed on directors and insiders of widely-held corporations and the lack of such obligations in private companies. This review of judicial decisions begins with an examination of the compulsory acquisition cases which preceded the statutory take-over bid reforms. These cases arise from facts which would constitute take-over bids under the statutory reforms of the 1960s. In these cases, we see a very limited attempt by the judiciary to impose fiduciary obligations of good faith and candour in favour of minority shareholders. The courts' sense of commercial morality seems to have been stirred in these cases, a morality engendered by the arbitrary expropriation permitted by the statutory compulsory acquisition provisions. An examination of latter day cases involving claims of fiduciary duty show that the decisions are sprinkled with references to commercial morality. Despite this moral impetus, the courts seem unwilling to venture beyond the perceived constraints of the corporations statutes. This unwillingness, coupled with the courts' inability to articulate a uniform rationale for imposing fiduciary duties on directors in favour of shareholders contribute to the unsatisfactory state of the law. (Abstract shortened by UMI.) ftn$\sp1$ (1902) 2 Ch 421.

5

Mwaura, Joseph Kiarie. "The Kenyan regulation of company directors : an analytical study." Thesis, University of Wolverhampton, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/2436/96292.

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6

Paolini, Adolfo. "The nature of directors' and officers' liability insurance." Thesis, University of Southampton, 2005. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.430716.

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7

Zhang, Huang. "Directors’ liability from the perspective of private international law." Doctoral thesis, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/284240.

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La responsabilidad de los administradores es una buena herramienta que nos permite revelar las diversas teorías y ideologías en materia de gobierno corporativo. Se trata de un tema societario muy importante en el ámbito jurídico internacional. Esta tesis aborda el problema de la aplicación de las normas del Derecho internacional privado a la responsabilidad de los administradores. La primera parte de la tesis realiza un análisis profundo del ordenamiento sustantivo de Francia, Reino Unido, Alemania, España y China, partiendo de una perspectiva comparada. A través de una comparación entre los diferentes sistemas jurídicos se obtiene un panorama general de los ordenamientos sustantivos sobre la responsabilidad de administradores. También se estudian las medidas que se adoptan en los países al establecer sus propios sistemas con el objetivo de tener un buen gobierno corporativo. La segunda parte de la tesis se ocupa de los problemas de competencia judicial internacional en la materia de la responsabilidad de los administradores. Por un lado, se tienen en cuenta aspectos tales como el domicilio del demandado, competencia exclusiva, sumisión de las partes, y obligaciones contractuales y extra-contractuales. El examen se centra en la aplicabilidad del Reglamento Bruselas I en este sector. Por otro lado, se procede tanto a la interacción entre el Reglamento de Insolvencia y el Reglamento Bruselas I, como a la articulación del Derecho europeo con el Derecho nacional. Asimismo, también se presta atención a la búsqueda de una solución para los problemas que se derivan del recurso a los tribunales estatales, y por tanto se tiene en cuenta la aplicabilidad de arbitraje en dicha materia. La tercera parte de la tesis se dedica a la determinación de la ley aplicable a las cuestiones derivadas de la responsabilidad de administradores. Por un lado, se estudia la articulación entre lex societatis, lex concursus, lex contractus, lex loci delicti y lex fori. Por tanto, se examinan tanto la aplicabilidad del Reglamento Roma I, Reglamento Roma II, Reglamento de Insolvencia, como la de las normas nacionales del Derecho internacional privado. Por otro lado, se tiene en cuenta tanto el principio de la libertad de establecimiento garantizado por el Derecho europeo, así como en qué medida este principio afecta al régimen de la responsabilidad de administradores
Directors’ liability is an excellent vehicle for revealing the diverse theoretical and ideological approaches to corporate governance. It is a subject of corporate legal work all over the world. Based on directors’ liability, this dissertation focuses on how the private international law rules apply in dealing with this kind of liability. The first part of the dissertation examines comprehensively with detailed analysis the legal systems in France, the UK, Germany, Spain and China from a comparative perspective. By comparing competitive legal systems of different countries, we try to give a panorama on the substantive rules on directors’ liability, and to clarify how the legal systems of different countries are designed to ensure good corporate governance. The second part of the dissertation deals with jurisdictional problems in the regime of directors’ liability. On one hand, we take into account the aspects such as defendant’s domicile, exclusive jurisdiction, party autonomy, and contractual and non-contractual obligations and investigate the applicability of Brussels I Regulation in directors’ liability. On the other hand, we also examine the interaction of Insolvency Regulation with Brussels I Regulation, and the articulation of the EU law and national law in this area. Furthermore, we try to offer another solution to the jurisdictional problems existing in directors’ liability by referring to arbitration as well. The third part of the dissertation deals with the problems relating to applicable law in the regime of directors’ liability. On one hand, we investigate the articulation of lex societatis, lex concursus, lex contractus, lex loci delicti and lex fori. And therefore we examine the applicability of Rome I Regulation, Rome II Regulation, Insolvency Regulation as well as national private international law rules in this area. On the other hand, we also take into account the EU principle of freedom of establishment and therefore study on how it affects the regime of directors’ liability on the basis of ECJ’s interpretation.

8

Smadja, Clément. "Hostile takeovers and directors' duties: from Delaware to Brussels, what's best for shareholders?" Thesis, McGill University, 2008. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=18727.

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This thesis attempts to address the crucial issue of the appropriate role of corporate boards in response to hostile takeover bids. In such circumstances, directors face an obvious conflict of interests: since they might lose their jobs and benefits once the acquisition is completed, they may use their corporate powers to erect takeover defenses or to simply veto the offer. As a matter of doctrine, the debate falls into two schools of thoughts. The managerialist school supports that boards should be permitted to erect defenses and/or veto on the grounds that directors are better placed to protect the interests of shareholders whereas the shareholder choice school relies on the conflict of interest to support boards' passivity. As a matter of practice, the U.S. system adopts an approach that is more consistent with managerialism, while the recent European takeover directive advocates in essence that shareholders are the only ones that should take the ultimate decision. At the end of the day, we must ask ourselves “What's best for shareholders?”
Pléthore d'hypothèses, de théories et d'arguments ont été développées au sujet du rôle des dirigeants de sociétés cotées lors d'offres publiques d'achat hostiles. Le conflit d'intérêts dont les intéressés font face est évident: le risque notable de se voir remercier à la suite de l'acquisition, et de facto de perdre les avantages pécuniaires directement associés à leurs positions, les conduit le plus souvent à rejeter une offre, fut-elle favorable aux actionnaires. De ce débat éminemment important pour le droit des sociétés, deux écoles se distinguent. L'école « managériale », que les Etats-Unis ont pris comme modèle, se fait l'avocate d'un système dans lequel les dirigeants garderaient les pouvoirs de négocier et éventuellement de refuser une offre, ceci dans l'intérêt de leurs actionnaires. L'école actionnariale, au contraire, argue de la nocivité du conflit d'intérêt ainsi que des droits fondamentaux des actionnaires de pouvoir se prononcer sur le destin de la société, afin de leur conférer l'autorité décisionnelle. Ainsi se positionne la toute récente directive européenne sur les offres publiques d'achat. Reste la question cruciale dont la présente thèse s'attache à répondre: lequel de ces deux systèmes bénéficie au mieux les actionnaires ?

9

Chien, Li-Fen. "Do existing laws in South Africa hold directors personally liable for environmental transgressions?" University of the Western Cape, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/11394/8008.

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Magister Legum - LLM
The number of environmental offences taking place continues to increase each year. Despite the special position of responsibility occupied by directors as the ‘directing mind and will’ of the companies responsible for the commission of these offences, directors appear to continue to be shielded unconditionally behind the separate legal personality of the company. This thesis consists of a thorough examination of existing environmental laws, as well as the Companies Act 71 of 2008 and the King IV Report on Corporate Governance, to determine whether the provisions contained therein may be interpreted so as to depart from the principle of separate legal personality (as provided for by corporate law) in order to hold directors personally liable for environmental transgressions.

10

賴佳芳. "The Association among Agency Problem of Controlling Shareholders, Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance, and Earnings Persistence." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/84803683367435964203.

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碩士
國立彰化師範大學
會計學系
99
More than half of Taiwanese listed companies have concentrated ownership structures that are often controlled by families. The agency problems arise from the conflict of interest between minority shareholders and the controlling owner, who generally has control rights in excess of their cash flow rights via pyramid and cross-shareholdings. The divergence between control rights and cash flow rights provides controlling owners with the ability and incentives to derive private control benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. With the raising awareness of investor protection and the competent authorities pay attention to the corporate governance, directors and officers confront the higher liability risk. Therefore, the demand for purchasing Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance (D&O insurance) has become increased. This paper mainly examine the association between ownership structure and D&O insurance and further test whether the earnings quality of the corporations purchasing D&O insurance are better than those not purchasing D&O insurance. The empirical results reveal that when the divergence between the ultimate owners’ voting rights and the cash flow rights is larger, the corporation has a greater tendency to purchase D&O insurance. The paper also finds that the earnings persistence of these companies purchasing D&O insurance are higher than those without purchasing D&O insurance, hence the earnings quality are also better.

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Книги з теми "Directors' liability to shareholders":

1

Haider, Tom. Directors' liability. Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Pub. Co., 1992.

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2

Pennington, Robert R. Directors' personal liability. London: BSP Professional, 1989.

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3

Pennington, Robert R. Directors' personal liability. London: Collins Professional Books, 1987.

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4

Pennington, Robert R. Directors' personal liability. London: Collins Professional and Technical, 1987.

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5

Kang, Shew Meng. Directors' & shareholders' guide on annual general meetings. Kuala Lumpur: Malayan Law Journal Sdn Bhd, 2000.

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6

Fanto, James A. Directors' and officers' liability. 2nd ed. New York City: Practising Law Institute, 2005.

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7

Chew, Pat K. Directors' and officers' liability. New York City: Practising Law Institute, 1993.

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8

Davisson, Michael R. Directors & officers liability insurance. 3rd ed. Chicago, Ill: American Bar Association, 2011.

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9

Siemens, E. Edward. Directors' liability in Canada. North Vancouver, B.C: STP Specialty Technical Publishers, 1994.

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10

Institute, Pennsylvania Bar. Directors' and officers' liability insurance. [Mechanicsburg, Pa.]: Pennsylvania Bar Institute, 2010.

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Частини книг з теми "Directors' liability to shareholders":

1

Briatte, Alain-Xavier, and Michael Julian. "Directors' and Officers' Liability in France." In International Corporate Governance After Sarbanes-Oxley, 337–57. Hoboken, NJ, USA: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/9781119201885.ch16.

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2

Kochan, Nick, and Robin Goodyear. "Who Would Be a Director? Directors’ Liability." In Corruption, 188–93. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230343344_10.

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3

"LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS AND SHAREHOLDERS." In Insolvency Law Professional Practice Guide, 63–76. Routledge-Cavendish, 2007. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781843145202-8.

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4

Morse, Geoffrey. "11. Limited Liability Partnerships—Membership." In Partnership and LLP Law. Oxford University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198744467.003.0011.

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This chapter considers the requirements needed to become a member of a limited liability partnership (LLP) under the Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000 (LLP Act). The term ‘member’ of an LLP is used to distinguish them from partners, directors, or shareholders. Since the law applicable to LLPs derives mainly from adaptations from both company law and partnership law, members of an LLP are nevertheless treated as substituting for the role of partner, director, officer, or shareholder depending upon the relevant provision. For the various controls imposed on LLPs and for winding up, members can take the place either of shareholders, directors, or both. The chapter analyses members of an LLP as employees and workers. It then outlines the duties of members of an LLP and to each other as stated in Section 5 of the LLP Act.

5

"Liability of Companies, Shareholders and Directors." In Sustainability and Corporate Mechanisms in Asia, 235–83. Cambridge University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781108658508.007.

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6

Peter T, Muchlinski. "Part II Economic Regulation, 8 Multinational Group Liability and Directors’ Duties." In Multinational Enterprises and the Law. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198824138.003.0008.

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This chapter addresses the impact of the multinational enterprise (MNE) group on company law, considering the themes of corporate control and liability. The existence of group enterprises challenges the basic legal characteristics of the corporation: separate legal personality; directors’ duties to the company; the integrity of corporate capital; and protection of shareholders against liability for corporate debts. Corporate legal separation also hides the underlying group enterprise, reducing accountability for group actions and impacting various classes of potential claimants. The chapter then offers a historical analysis of the corporate legal form as a regulatory device for transnational corporate groups. It looks at the limits of group liability towards voluntary and involuntary creditors in equity-based groups, and in contract-based transnational network enterprises. The chapter also discusses reforms that could enhance MNE group liability and examines the group liability of directors, covering protection of minority shareholders in subsidiaries and compensation of creditors on the insolvency of affiliates.

7

Rosemary Teele Langford, Dr. "Consequences of Breach." In Company Directors’ Duties and Conflicts of Interest. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198813668.003.0012.

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This chapter provides an outline of the consequences of breach of the duties discussed in this book and, in particular, of the duty to avoid conflicts (the conflicts rule) at general law and under statute. This includes discussion of third party liability based on the rule in Barnes v Addy, which may be very valuable in certain circumstances. It highlights the available remedies, as well as issues arising in the framing and application of the remedies. It also draws attention to the role played by the unfair prejudice (or oppression) remedy in relation to directors’ conflicts. Given that this remedy is favoured by shareholders, and that a number of unfair prejudice cases concern directors’ conflicts, it is important to outline its contours. Indirect enforcement, and any significant differences in enforcement mechanisms between the jurisdictions, will be considered. The chapter does not provide a comprehensive outline in relation to all remedies or the detail of every aspect of the remedies discussed. There is, at times, clear divergence between the application of certain remedies in different jurisdictions—a complete and comprehensive comparative critical analysis of remedies would fill an entire book on its own.

8

Davies, Paul. "7. Creditors." In Introduction to Company Law, 223–60. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198854913.003.0007.

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Because of limited liability, creditor protection has always been a feature of company law. Large creditors can contract ex ante for customised protection and the law facilitates this in various ways, notably by the creation of the floating charge. Non-adjusting creditors require the protection of mandatory rules, at least in some situations. Creditor protection in relation to companies in the vicinity of insolvency is now well established, not only through ‘wrongful trading’ but also via transaction invalidity rules and directors’ disqualification. For going-concern companies the emphasis is on rules restricting the shifting assets to shareholders via distributions and associated rules relating to the maintenance of capital.

9

Davies, Paul. "Creditors." In Introduction to Company Law, 223–60. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198854913.003.0007.

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Because of limited liability, creditor protection has always been a feature of company law. Large creditors can contract ex ante for customised protection and the law facilitates this in various ways, notably by the creation of the floating charge. Non-adjusting creditors require the protection of mandatory rules, at least in some situations. Creditor protection in relation to companies in the vicinity of insolvency is now well established, not only through ‘wrongful trading’ but also via transaction invalidity rules and directors’ disqualification. For going-concern companies the emphasis is on rules restricting the shifting assets to shareholders via distributions and associated rules relating to the maintenance of capital.

10

Hannigan, Brenda. "22. The doctrine of capital maintenance." In Company Law, 531–83. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198848493.003.0022.

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This chapter discusses the doctrine of capital maintenance which precludes the return of capital, directly or indirectly, to the shareholders ahead of a winding up of the company. The discussion covers the purchase and redemption of a company’s own shares, reduction of capital, distributions to the members, and financial assistance by a company for the acquisition of its own shares. Purchase and redemption schemes (buy-backs) are common transactions and are discussed in detail as is the procedure for a reduction of capital. The key issue for creditors, however, is the risk posed by distributions to members and much of the chapter is devoted to discussing the distribution rules laid down in CA 2006, Part 23 and the common law. The chapter discusses the rules as to distributable profits and the liability of directors in the case of improper distributions and, in particular, their liability for dividends improperly declared.

Тези доповідей конференцій з теми "Directors' liability to shareholders":

1

Sampson, Paul. "Company law and the liability of directors." In IEE Colloquium on `Principles of Law for Engineers and Managers'. IEE, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/ic:19961315.

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2

Zabitov, Kerim. "Civil liability for the breach of minority shareholders squeeze-out." In VIII Annual scientific readings in memoriam of Professor S.N. Bratus. Infra-M Academic Publishing House, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/1036.

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3

Krugerova, Martina. "ANALYSIS OF COMPANY STATUTORY BODIES MEMBERS? LIABILITY AND ADVANTAGES OF DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY INSURANCE." In 4th International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conference on Social Sciences and Arts SGEM2017. Stef92 Technology, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.5593/sgemsocial2017/12/s02.041.

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4

Cojocaru, Cristina. "JOINT STOCK MANAGEMENT IN ROMANIAN LAW. ON THE LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS." In 5th International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conferences on SOCIAL SCIENCES and ARTS SGEM2018. STEF92 Technology, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.5593/sgemsocial2018/1.2/s02.080.

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5

Cheng Jinfeng. "Notice of Retraction: Shareholders structure, characteristics of boards and directors and list company environmental performance." In 2011 International Conference on Electric Technology and Civil Engineering (ICETCE). IEEE, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icetce.2011.5775999.

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6

Niu, Jianbo, and Shengnan Li. "The Effect of Directors' and Officers' Liability Insurance on Performance: Evidence from China." In 2010 International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Software Engineering (CiSE). IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cise.2010.5677135.

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7

Burnley, P. "The position of directors and managers in a criminal investigation." In IET Seminar on Railway Law for Engineers: How Legislation, Liability and Legal Issues Affect You. IEE, 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1049/ic:20060638.

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8

Lin, Huashan. "On the Judicial Review of the Minority Shareholders of Limited Liability Companies Exercising the Right of Veto." In 2020 2nd International Conference on Economic Management and Cultural Industry (ICEMCI2020). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/aebmr.k.201128.042.

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9

Schoenhardt, Matthew, Vachel Pardais, Cheryl Fortin, Brent Kitson, and Jay Hanzel. "Enbridge Cost and Schedule Contingency Assessments." In 2012 9th International Pipeline Conference. American Society of Mechanical Engineers, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/ipc2012-90259.

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All capital projects have an element of risk and uncertainty. In today’s business environment this requires more than just simply adding 10 percent contingency to the cost estimate to cover off project unknowns. Before sanctioning a project for hundreds of millions of dollars, Board of Directors need to know what possible cost and schedule outcomes exist in order to safe-guard shareholders’ investments. Contingency assessments must be: • Risk-based • Project Specific • Repeatable • Defendable • Cost effective Six years ago, Enbridge grappled with these issues and realized it needed to adopt a new method of assessing both cost and schedule contingencies. After evaluating options, Enbridge set upon developing an in-house parametric modeling solution for its contingency assessment needs. This paper will: • Identify various options for assessing contingency • Review the Enbridge process • Demonstrate the value of a simplified risk register • Identify required data inputs • Illustrate calibration and accuracy of assessments • Discuss business advantages of parametric modelling

10

Kamenjarska, Tanja, and Igor Ivanovski. "IMPACT OF BOARD CHARACTERISTICS ON FIRM PERFORMANCE: DYNAMIC PANEL EVIDENCE OF THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY IN THE REPUBLIC OF NORTH MACEDONIA." In Economic and Business Trends Shaping the Future. Ss Cyril and Methodius University, Faculty of Economics-Skopje, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.47063/ebtsf.2020.0027.

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Corporate governance is a crucial mechanism for the organizations’ actions to maintain market successful adequate and targeted policies and long-term strategies that ensure the maximization of shareholders’ benefits. The board of directors is appointed by organizations’ shareholders and its main role is to be responsible and accountable and to ensure enforcement of the top management acts concerning the fulfillment of the shareholder’s interests. For this to be achieved, it is important for the board to be efficient, effective, and focused on protecting the organization and shareholder’s interests. Good corporate governance and more specifically, board characteristics play a central role in companies’ management, coordination, and control mechanisms. The paper analyses various theoretical and empirical findings regarding the prominence of various board characteristics within companies and particularly evaluates the impact of board characteristics on the financial performance of listed companies in the insurance industry in the Republic of North Macedonia. The financial ratio ROA is used as a proxy and as a variable for firm performance while the board experience, CEO duality, board size, board composition, and gender diversity are set to be as independent variables. Based on the variables related to board characteristics, hypotheses are developed and their impact upon firm performance is examined with the use of Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM), a pairwise correlation matrix, as well as with multicollinearity VIF test. In that direction, this paper aims to determine the level of effectiveness of current governance mechanisms and based on the results, propose measures and actions for successfully handling agency costs while maximizing governance capability and performance in the insurance sector in the Republic of North Macedonia.

Звіти організацій з теми "Directors' liability to shareholders":

1

Bodenhorn, Howard. Large Block Shareholders, Institutional Investors, Boards of Directors and Bank Value in the Nineteenth Century. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w18955.

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