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Автор: Grafiati

Опубліковано: 15 вересня 2021

Оновлено: 1 лютого 2022

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1

Hnyluch Sobański, Konrad. "Inside information and insider trading." Studenckie Prace Prawnicze, Administratywistyczne i Ekonomiczne 29 (September 30, 2019): 119–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/1733-5779.29.8.

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EU law acts often have a built-in element of the so-called self-control, consisting in verification of the effectiveness of regulation after a specified period of time from the entry into force of a legal act. In the year 2019, the Market Abuse Regulation MAR, which in 2016 introduced new regulations concerning confidential information and trade related to internal information, causing a revolution in the capital market, will be reviewed. Numerous new duties were imposed on market participants, among others in the field of transaction reporting, access to confidential information, the circle of persons having access to confidential information. Due to the above, the article discusses the regulations of confidential information and related obligations imposed on market participants, based on the current achievements of the doctrine and judicatory. These considerations have been confronted with the undesirable element of having confidential information, i.e. insider trading. Often, an entity that has access to specific confidential information uses it in an unlawful manner to achieve its own profit. This causes inequalities in access to market information and leads to distortions in the transparency of financial markets. The article also included a polemic on the morality of insider dealing. Informacja poufna w obrocie papierami wartościowymiAkty prawa unijnego często mają wbudowany element tak zwanej samokontroli self controlling, polegający na weryfikacji skuteczności regulacji po upływie określonego czasu od wejścia w życie aktu prawnego. Na rok 2019 przypada rewizja rozporządzenia MAR Market Abuse Regulation, które wprowadzając w 2016 roku nowe regulacje dotyczące informacji poufnej i obrotu związanego z informacją wewnętrzną, spowodowało rewolucję na rynku kapitałowym. Na uczestników rynku zostały nałożone nowe liczne obowiązki, między innymi w zakresie raportowania transakcji, dostępu do informacji poufnej czy też kręgu osób mających dostęp do informacji poufnej. Z uwagi na to w artykule omówione zostały regulacje informacji poufnej oraz związanych z nią obowiązków nałożonych na uczestników rynku, opierając się na aktualnym dorobku doktryny i dostępnym orzecznictwie. Rozważania zostały zestawione z niepożądanym elementem posiadania informacji poufnej, to jest insider trading. Często podmiot mający dostęp do określonych informacji poufnych wykorzystuje je w sposób bezprawny dla osiągnięcia własnego zysku. Powoduje to nierówności w dostępie do informacji rynkowych i prowadzi do zaburzenia transparentności rynków finansowych. W artykule podjęto również polemikę co do moralności wykorzystywania informacji poufnych.

2

Rundfelt, Rolf. "Insider Trading: Regulation in Europe." Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance 1, no. 2 (April 1986): 125–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0148558x8600100205.

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This paper looks at insider trading regulation in Europe and finds a broad spectrum. Two countries, the United Kingdom and Sweden, have insider regulations very similar to those in the United States. The author attributes this to well-developed stock markets and the Swedish search for confidence in their stocks. At the other extreme, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Switzerland have no regulation at present.

3

Manchikatla, Anil Kumar, and Rajesh H. Acharya. "Insider trading in India – regulatory enforcement." Journal of Financial Crime 24, no. 1 (January 3, 2017): 48–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jfc-12-2015-0075.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to study the effectiveness of insider trading enforcement actions in India and international dimensions. Design/methodology/approach The research is based on the insider trading regulations and amendments made during the period 1992-2015. Findings The notable observation of the study is the dearth of insider trading conviction and the paucity of prosecution for insider trading offences in India. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that surveillance and enforcement matter more than the drafting of the relevant statutes and regulations in emerging markets. Whereas, developed countries have a better record of prosecution than emerging markets. Research limitations/implications Future research may explore the factors that hinder effective regulation and recommend new methods to increase the impact of Securities and Exchange Board of India insider trading regulation. Originality/value The current paper presents guidance for the foreign institutional investors, regulators and market participants on insider trading regulation and prosecution in India.

4

Liu, Hong, Lina Qi, and Zaili Li. "Insider trading, representativeness heuristic insider, and market regulation." North American Journal of Economics and Finance 47 (January 2019): 48–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.najef.2018.11.011.

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5

조인호. "Regulation of Tipping in Insider Trading Regulation." KOOKMIN LAW REVIEW 29, no. 3 (February 2017): 459–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.17251/legal.2017.29.3.459.

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6

Jardak, Maha Khemakhem, and Hamadi Matoussi. "The effectiveness of insider trading disclosure policies: US and EU comparison." Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting 18, no. 3 (June 29, 2020): 591–614. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jfra-09-2019-0120.

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Purpose The purpose of this study is to examine the effectiveness of financial market rules in protecting minorities. Design/methodology/approach The study compares two alternative disclosure rules on insider trading, namely, the market abuse directive (Directive 2004/72/EC), inspired from the United State (US) insider trading regulation enacted by the Sarbanes–Oxley act and the transparency directive enacted by the European (Directive 2004/109/EC) dealing with the crossing of the shareholding threshold. To investigate which one is more effective in signaling reserved information, and thus in reducing information asymmetry, the authors run an event study on the French context, where both regulations are adopted. The data were hand collected from the French stock exchange securities commissions during the two years following the implementation of the two regulations in 2004. The final sample consists of 363 insiders trading and 35 crossing shareholding thresholds for 10 top French firms during the period 2006-2007. Findings The results show that the French market reacts significantly to insider trading, but poorly to the crossing shareholding thresholds. Abnormal returns are greater after insider purchases than after crossing up thresholds. These findings support the superiority of the insider disclosure regulation, as it has better information content and provides better protection to minorities. Research limitations/implications The study contributes to the corporate governance literature by comparing two disclosure-trading policies. The authors conclude that regulation of disclosure of insider trading along the lines of US disclosure rules is more informative to the market and thus more relevant and important than disclosure of cross-threshold trades. Practical implications The study contributes to the corporate governance literature by comparing two disclosure-trading policies. The authors conclude that regulation of disclosure of insider trading along the lines of US disclosure rules is more informative to the market and thus more relevant and important than disclosure of cross-threshold trades. This finding can be helpful for the securities lawmakers and regulators in the process of insider trading law enforcement. Originality/value Previous researchers approached the question of insider trading focusing on the identity of insiders. In the research, the authors address the question from another perspective, namely, the crossing of thresholds. Another methodological contribution of the study is the use of a market model that incorporates GARCH (generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedastic) effect and time-varying systematic risk parameter (β), which is recommended to tackle the classical event study problem of detecting the exact timing of the event.

7

Ludman, Earl A. "Insider Trading: The Case for Regulation." Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance 1, no. 2 (April 1986): 118–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0148558x8600100204.

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8

Engelen, Peter-Jan. "Structural Problems in the Design of Market Abuse Regulations in the EU." Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics 19, no. 1 (October 2007): 57–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/02601079x07001900105.

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This article analyzes the regulatory and supervisory design of market abuse regulations in the EU in order to set the right incentives for corporate insiders to abstain from illegal trading. The analysis is illustrated by the Belgian insider trading law. Although the level of punishment seems to be rather high, the probability of conviction for insider trading is very low. The analysis suggests that the expected costs component of this crime is too low compared to the expected insider trading profits. In order to obtain a higher deterrence of the insider trading prohibition, a change in the design of the financial regulation and supervision must be made. To increase the probability of conviction broad investigative powers and the authority to impose administrative sanctions have to be assigned to the financial markets supervisor, as was recently the case with the European Market Abuse Directive. JEL classification: K42

9

조인호. "Tippee Liability in Insider Trading Regulation." Korean Journal of Securities Law 18, no. 1 (April 2017): 99–123. http://dx.doi.org/10.17785/kjsl.2017.18.1.99.

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10

Akashi, Tomoko. "Regulation of Insider Trading in Japan." Columbia Law Review 89, no. 6 (October 1989): 1296. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1122831.

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11

Shin, Jhinyoung. "The Optimal Regulation of Insider Trading." Journal of Financial Intermediation 5, no. 1 (January 1996): 49–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/jfin.1996.0004.

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12

Esqueda, Omar, Thanh Ngo, and Daphne Wang. "The information content of managerial insider trading: evidence from analyst forecasts." Asian Review of Accounting 29, no. 3 (June 29, 2021): 332–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ara-04-2020-0062.

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PurposeThis paper examines the effect of managerial insider trading on analyst forecast accuracy, dispersion and bias. Specifically, the authors test whether insider-trading information is positively associated with the precision of earnings forecasts. In addition, this relationship between Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) and the Galleon insider trading case is examined.Design/methodology/approachPooled ordinary least squares (Pooled OLS) rregressions with year-fixed effects, firm-fixed effects, and firm-level clustered standard errors are used. Our proxies for forecast precision are regressed on alternative measures of insider trading activities and a vector of control variables.FindingsInsider-trading information is positively associated with the precision of earnings forecasts. Analysts provide better forecast accuracy, less forecast dispersion and lower forecast bias among firms with insider trading in the six months leading to the forecast issues. In addition, bullish (bearish) insider trades are associated with increased (decreased) forecast bias. Insider trading information complements analysts' independent opinion and increases the precision of their forecast.Practical implicationsRegulators may pursue rules that promote the rapid disclosure of managerial insider trades, particularly given the increasing availability of Internet tools. Securities regulators may attempt to increase transparency and enhance the reporting procedures of corporate insiders, for example, using Internet sources with direct release to the public to ensure more timely information dissemination.Originality/valueThe authors document a positive association between earnings forecast precision and managerial insider trading up to six months prior to the forecast issue. This relationship is stronger after the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) prohibited the selective disclosure of material nonpublic information through Regulation FD. In addition, the association between insider trading and forecast accuracy has weakened after the Galleon insider trading case.

13

Kecskés, András. "Ügynökök és bennfentesek – A bennfentes kereskedelem és az ügynök–költség összefüggései." Debreceni Jogi Műhely 13, no. 1-2 (July 31, 2016): 54–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.24169/djm/2016/1-2/5.

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This paper examines insider trading regulation regulations from the viewpoint of agency costs. An overview is given regarding the different definitions of insider trading in jurisprudence which helps establishing the essence of this behaviour. The author also aims to give an insight to the agency problem and agency costs which arise in a business organisation with separate ownership and management. Only through that can be the effects of insider trading demonstrated on agency costs. The article aims to give a balanced overview by enumerating reasons whether insider trading increases or decreases agency costs. If it raises agency costs then prohibition is justified. If it decreases agency costs, e.g. it serves as a more efficient compensation mechanism, then allowing insider trading might be more beneficial.

14

Durnev, Art A., and Amrita S. Nain. "Does insider trading regulation deter private information trading? International evidence." Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 15, no. 5 (November 2007): 409–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2006.10.003.

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15

Summe, Philip, and Kimberly A. McCoy. "Insider Trading Regulation: A Developing State's Perspective." Journal of Financial Crime 5, no. 4 (February 1998): 311–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/eb025845.

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16

Zhu, Weihua. "Corporate governance and insider trading regulation efficiency." Frontiers of Business Research in China 4, no. 2 (May 23, 2010): 306–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11782-010-0014-2.

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17

Deng, Shangkun, Chenguang Wang, Jie Li, Haoran Yu, Hongyu Tian, Yu Zhang, Yong Cui, Fangjie Ma, and Tianxiang Yang. "Identification of Insider Trading Using Extreme Gradient Boosting and Multi-Objective Optimization." Information 10, no. 12 (November 25, 2019): 367. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/info10120367.

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Illegal insider trading identification presents a challenging task that attracts great interest from researchers due to the serious harm of insider trading activities to the investors’ confidence and the sustainable development of security markets. In this study, we proposed an identification approach which integrates XGboost (eXtreme Gradient Boosting) and NSGA-II (Non-dominated Sorting Genetic Algorithm II) for insider trading regulation. First, the insider trading cases that occurred in the Chinese security market were automatically derived, and their relevant indicators were calculated and obtained. Then, the proposed method trained the XGboost model and it employed the NSGA-II for optimizing the parameters of XGboost by using multiple objective functions. Finally, the testing samples were identified using the XGboost with optimized parameters. Its performances were empirically measured by both identification accuracy and efficiency over multiple time window lengths. Results of experiments showed that the proposed approach successfully achieved the best accuracy under the time window length of 90-days, demonstrating that relevant features calculated within the 90-days time window length could be extremely beneficial for insider trading regulation. Additionally, the proposed approach outperformed all benchmark methods in terms of both identification accuracy and efficiency, indicating that it could be used as an alternative approach for insider trading regulation in the Chinese security market. The proposed approach and results in this research is of great significance for market regulators to improve their supervision efficiency and accuracy on illegal insider trading identification.

18

Zhu, Chafen, and Li Wang. "Insider trading under trading ban regulation in China’s A-share market." China Journal of Accounting Research 8, no. 3 (September 2015): 169–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cjar.2015.06.002.

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19

Banerjee, Ajeyo, and E. Woodrow Eckard. "Why Regulate Insider Trading? Evidence from the First Great Merger Wave (1897–1903)." American Economic Review 91, no. 5 (December 1, 2001): 1329–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.91.5.1329.

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We use event-time methodology to study legal insider trading associated with mergers circa 1900. For mergers with “prospective” disclosures similar to today's, we find substantial value gains at announcement, implying participation by “out-side” shareholders despite the absence of insider constraints. Furthermore, preannouncement stock-price runups, relative to total value gain, are no more than those observed for modern mergers. Insider regulation apparently has produced little benefit for outsiders, with the inside information-pricing function and related gains shifting to external “information specialists.” Other results suggest market penalties for nondisclosure; i.e., insider trading is less successful in a restricted information environment. (JEL G3, K2, L5, N2)

20

Sjodin, Ulrika, Thomas Bay, and Elton G. McGoun. "Turning financial markets inside out: how insider trading regulation really works." International Journal of Critical Accounting 2, no. 4 (2010): 419. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/ijca.2010.036179.

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21

Salbu, Steven R. "Insider Trading and the Social Contract." Business Ethics Quarterly 5, no. 2 (April 1995): 313–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3857359.

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Abstract:The law of insider trading has progressed from an expansive approach, according to which all trading on nonpublic information was considered illegal, to a constricted approach, under which corporate outsiders are permitted to trade on nonpublic information provided such trading does not breach a fiduciary duty. This article analyzes both the former, expansive theory and the currently utilized constricted theory, within a framework of basic tenets of the American capitalist social contract regarding legitimacy of property claims. The existing constricted approach to the regulation of insider trading is found to be deficient in meeting the expectations of two core components of the social contract: it discourages procedural equality of opportunity, and it endorses claims to property that are not characterized by legitimate methods of acquisition or transfer. Because the old, expansive regulatory interpretation was more consistent with the terms of the social contract in regard to property claims, it served our economic and ethical expectations more effectively than the system presently in place. Accordingly, the article culminates in a recommendation that the expansive approach to regulating insider trading be reestablished under Unites States law.

22

Engelen, Peter-Jan. "Is the Enforcement of Insider Trading Regulation Enforceable?" European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 5, no. 2 (1997): 105–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/157181797x00455.

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23

Kadir, Rokiah, and Suriyani Muhamad. "Insider trading in Malaysia; towards an improved regulation." International Journal of Law and Management 54, no. 1 (February 3, 2012): 78–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/17542431211189614.

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24

Lambe, Brendan John. "The efficacy of market abuse regulation in the UK." Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 24, no. 3 (July 11, 2016): 248–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jfrc-06-2015-0029.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to ascertain the efficacy of Financial Services and Markets Act (FMSA) (2000) in deterring illegal insider trading in target companies around the time of a merger and aquisition announcement. Design/methodology/approach The author uses an event study to measure the cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) around both the announcement and rumour date for a sample of UK takeovers between 2001 and 2010. Findings Statistically significant CAARs prior to the event date are observed across the sample. Research limitations/implications It is not possible to link unknown instances of illegal insider trading with pre takeover residuals, therefore explaining the residuals remains a deductive process. Practical implications Pre-event abnormal returns may indicate that trading on material nonpublic information is still a contributory factor in the run-up proportion of takeover premiums. Social implications This draws a question over the efficacy of the regulatory system. Originality/value This study provides evidence which points to insider trading activity ahead of Mergers in a post FMSA 200 UK context.

25

Huang, Robin Hui. "Enforcement of Chinese Insider Trading Law: An Empirical and Comparative Perspective." American Journal of Comparative Law 68, no. 3 (September 1, 2020): 517–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ajcl/avaa018.

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Abstract This Article conducts the first comprehensive and systematic empirical analysis of all relevant insider trading cases in China from the birth of Chinese securities markets in the early 1990s until mid-2017, shedding light on the way in which China’s insider trading law has been enforced by the regulator and criminal courts in practice. First, the Article generates descriptive statistics on features of insider trading cases, such as the total number of cases over the study period, the temporal distribution of the cases, the identity of the insider, and the nature of the insider information. Second, it measures the intensity of insider trading enforcement and compares the Chinese situation with six overseas jurisdictions, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Third, using multiple regression analyses, it identifies potential factors determining the administrative and criminal penalties for insider trading. The results of the empirical study indicate that China has significantly stepped up its efforts to crack down on insider trading in recent years, resulting in a sharp increase in insider trading cases, particularly criminal cases since 2008. While the Chinese insider trading law was essentially transplanted from overseas jurisdictions, its; enforcement has exhibited distinctive features in its local environment. Judging by the type, magnitude, and frequency of the sanctions imposed, the intensity of insider trading enforcement in China seems to be at a level comparable to relevant jurisdictions overseas. Administrative and criminal penalties against insider trading are found to be significantly influenced by some factors, notably the amount of illegal proceeds, the magnitude of social impact, the presence of mitigating circumstances, and whether the trader used others’ accounts to trade. The hope is that the empirical findings will help inform the policy debate over the regulation of insider trading in China and beyond.

26

L. Hansen, Laura. "“Gossip boys”: insider trading and regulatory ambiguity." Journal of Financial Crime 21, no. 1 (December 20, 2013): 29–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jfc-04-2013-0030.

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Purpose – The purpose of this viewpoint, case study analysis paper is to assist in understanding how history repeats itself in the case of insider trading, even with regulatory intervention. Design/methodology/approach – Qualitative methodology approach, using interviews of some of the watchdogs of Wall Street (SEC, US Attorney's Office) during the insider trading scandals of the 1980s. Key themes including ambiguity of money, regulation, and the networks of financial institution professionals are discussed. Findings – Findings suggest that regulation is difficult if nearly impossible, in the face of limited resources and regulatory ambiguity. Practical implications – This paper suggests a network approach to regulators, corporate decision makers, and academics in order to understand the structure of insider trading conspiracies. Originality/value – Continues the tradition of qualitative research in a niche of white-collar crime that is more often approached with strict statistic analysis. Value is that the data are allowed to “speak for themselves” and patterns of structure are allowed to emerge without prior biases of hypotheses.

27

박임출. "Regulation Strengthening of Insider Trading in Japanand Legal Suggestions." Korean Journal of Securities Law 15, no. 3 (December 2014): 283–316. http://dx.doi.org/10.17785/kjsl.2014.15.3.283.

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28

Klöhn, Lars. "The European Insider Trading Regulation after Spector Photo Group." European Company and Financial Law Review 7, no. 2 (January 2010): 347–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ecfr.2010.347.

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29

Padilla, Alexandre. "Can agency theory justify the regulation of insider trading?" Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 5, no. 1 (March 2002): 3–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12113-002-1015-6.

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30

Ronen, Joshua. "INSIDER TRADING REGULATION IN AN EFFICIENT MARKET: A CONTRADICTION." Critical Perspectives on Accounting 11, no. 1 (February 2000): 97–103. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/cpac.1999.0377.

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31

Keenan, Michael G. "INSIDER TRADING, MARKET EFFICIENCY, BUSINESS ETHICS AND EXTERNAL REGULATION." Critical Perspectives on Accounting 11, no. 1 (February 2000): 71–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1006/cpac.1999.0378.

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32

Cline, Brandon N., Claudia R. Williamson, and Haoyang Xiong. "Culture and the regulation of insider trading across countries." Journal of Corporate Finance 67 (April 2021): 101917. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.101917.

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33

Chitimira, Howard. "A Historical Overview of the Regulation of Market Abuse in South Africa." Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 17, no. 3 (April 24, 2017): 971. http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/1727-3781/2014/v17i3a2275.

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In an early attempt to combat market abuse in the South African financial markets, legislation such as the Companies Act, the Financial Markets Control Act and the Stock Exchanges Control Act were enacted. However, these Acts failed to effectively curb market abuse activities that were allegedly rife in the financial markets. Consequently, the Insider Trading Act was enacted and came into effect on 17 January 1999. While the introduction of the Insider Trading Act brought some confidence in the financial markets, market abuse activities were still not extinguished. The provisions of the Insider Trading Act were to some extent inadequate and ineffectively implemented. Eventually, the Securities Services Act was enacted to repeal all the flawed provisions of the Insider Trading Act. Notwithstanding these efforts on the part of the legislature, more may still need to be done to increase the number of convictions and settlements in cases involving market abuse in South Africa. It is against this background that a historical overview analysis of the regulation of market abuse is carried out in this article to expose the flaws that were previously embedded in the South African market abuse laws prior to 2004. This is done to raise awareness of the situation on the part of the relevant stakeholders, as they consider whether such flaws were adequately resolved or subsequently re-introduced under the Securities Services Act and the Financial Markets Act. To this end, the article firstly discusses the historical development and regulation of market manipulation prior to 2004. Secondly, the regulation and enforcement of insider trading legislation prior to 2004 are examined. Moreover, where possible, certain flaws of the previous market abuse laws that were re-incorporated into the current South African market abuse legislation are isolated and recommendations are made in that regard.

34

Ovakimyan, E. K. "Opportunities for improving the insider laws: A comparative analysis of the practice in the USA and Russia." Finance and Credit 26, no. 4 (April 28, 2020): 796–814. http://dx.doi.org/10.24891/fc.26.4.796.

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Subject. The article examines the laws regulating insider trading. Objectives. The study outlines recommendations for refining Law On Countering the Illegal Use of Insider Information and Market Manipulation and Amendments to Some Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation, № 224-ФЗ of July 27, 2010. Methods. The methodological framework includes a general dialectical method, analysis and synthesis, induction and deductions, and some specific methods, such as comparative and formal logic analysis to specify the definition of insider information, structural logic and functional analysis to improve the mechanism for countering insider trading and market manipulation. Results. We discovered key drawbacks to be addressed so as to improve the business environment in Russia. Although the Russia laws mainly mirror the U.S. laws, they present a more extended list of terms concerning the insider information. I believe the legislative perfection should be continued. Conclusions and Relevance. The study helps apply the findings to outline a new legislative regulation or amend the existing ones, add a new mention on the course of financial markets to students’ books, develop new methods for detecting and countering and improving the existing ones. If all parties to insider relationships use the findings, they will prevent insider trading crimes in financial markets and (or) reduce the negative impact of such crimes on the parties.

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Lambe, Brendan. "Is insider trading regulation effective? Evidence from UK takeover activity." Journal of Governance and Regulation 1, no. 2 (2012): 24–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/jgr_v1_i2_p2.

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Analysed in this study are the returns on stock prices of target companies surrounding the first publicised dates of completed takeovers in the UK between 2001 and 2010. Two samples are created of 209 and 197 firms for announcement and rumoured dates respectively. Both demonstrate statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) prior to the release of information about the impending bid. This paper investigates whether observable factors create this price run-up or if it is the result of disclosed insider trading. Cross sectional analysis of CARs do not corroborate the claim that reported informed trades are the cause of this effect, this may indicate that trading on material non public information goes undisclosed.

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Taleska, Ana. "European Insider Trading Theory Revisited: The Limits of the Parity-of-Information Theory and the Application of the Property Rights in Information Theory to Activist Investment Strategies." European Company and Financial Law Review 17, no. 5 (November 10, 2020): 558–600. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ecfr-2020-0024.

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AbstractParity-of-information is purported to be the single overarching policy rationale for the European Union (EU) regulation on insider trading. This is because securities trading on the basis of informational advantages is generally prohibited under EU rules, as is tipping (and issuers’ selective disclosure) of material, non-public information. Yet, EU regulations allow market actors, including investment professionals and analysts, that have discovered valuable information -and thereby, have an informational advantage vis-à-vis their trading counterparties- to trade on this information. Relatedly, issuers of financial instruments, takeover bidders and merging parties can share information with a selected group of investors prior to public announcement of the transaction (market sounding), whereas firms can delay public disclosure of inside information and prevent all other market participants from trading on this information. I argue that these exceptions from the parity-of-information theory are -from a doctrinal standpoint- best explained as property rights in information of market actors that have developed new proprietary information with respect to European listed securities. This article, therefore, aims at providing a property rights account of the exceptions to the parity-of-information theory and it illustrates the trade-offs between the parity-of-information and the property rights in information theories underlying European insider trading rules. By extension, I analyze the specific case of activist campaigns as inside information and argue that it would be consistent with the property rights approach to allow activist investors to share their investment and trading strategies with other market participants that further their activist agenda.

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조인호. "SEC v. Dorozhko and Its Implications in Insider Trading Regulation." KOOKMIN LAW REVIEW 30, no. 1 (June 2017): 293–320. http://dx.doi.org/10.17251/legal.2017.30.1.293.

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Byoung Youn Kim. "Recent Development in Insider Trading Regulation in U.S. Case Laws." Korean Journal of Securities Law 17, no. 1 (April 2016): 79–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.17785/kjsl.2016.17.1.79.

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Chitimira, Howard, and Pontsho Mokone. "The Pros and Cons for Insider Trading Regulation in Zimbabwe." Law and Financial Markets Review 14, no. 2 (March 17, 2020): 102–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17521440.2020.1726617.

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Schäfer, Hans-Bernd, and Claus Ott. "Economic effects of EEC insider trading regulation applied to Germany." International Review of Law and Economics 12, no. 3 (September 1992): 357–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(92)90014-i.

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Estrada, Javier. "Insider trading: Regulation, securities markets, and welfare under risk aversion." Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 35, no. 4 (December 1995): 421–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/1062-9769(95)90040-3.

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42

Filbeck, Greg, and Donald J. Mullineaux. "Insider Trading and regulation: A look at bank holding companies." Journal of Economics and Finance 19, no. 3 (September 1995): 71–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/bf02920615.

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QUIÑONES, JAVIER FERNANDO. "EL DELITO DE INSIDER TRADING EN ALEMANIA." YachaQ Revista de Derecho, no. 9 (December 28, 2018): 72–90. http://dx.doi.org/10.51343/yq.vi9.715.

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El autor realiza un estudio del tipo penal de Insider Trading en Alemania, revisando los antecedentes históricos, la normativa interna y comunitaria, resaltando los aspectos altamente técnicos de la prohibición, así como a las corrientes que aún hoy critican su existencia. Así mismo, se menciona el efecto de las investigaciones fiscales y sanciones que, si han tenido lugar en Alemania, destacando que la prohibición tiene efectos reales en los mercados. ABSTRACT The author does a study related to the criminal law prohibition of Insider Trading in Germany, reviewing the historical backgrounds, the intern and European community regulation, and highlighting the highly technical aspects of the criminalization, as well as the movements that still now critic its existence. Also, is mentioned the effect of the prosecutions and sanctions that had taken place in Germany, showing that the criminalization has real effects in the markets.

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S. Knewtson, Heather, and John R. Nofsinger. "Why are CFO insider trades more informative?" Managerial Finance 40, no. 2 (January 7, 2014): 157–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/mf-02-2013-0035.

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Purpose – The authors examine whether the stronger information content of chief financial officer (CFO) insider trading relative to that of chief executive officers (CEOs) results from a different willingness to exploit the information asymmetry that exists between executives and outside shareholders (scrutiny hypothesis) or from differing financial acumen between CFOs and CEOs (financial acumen hypothesis). The authors consider the information content of equity purchases for CEOs and CFOs. The paper aims to discuss these issues. Design/methodology/approach – The authors examine purchase-based insider trading portfolio returns before and after the implementation of SOX in firms with high versus low regulation, for routine and opportunistic managers, and in samples of CEOs with prior CFO experience. Findings – The authors provide evidence that SOX affected executives differently and provide support for the scrutiny hypothesis. CFO-based portfolios remain the most profitable post-SOX, but the magnitude of returns has fallen in absolute and relative terms compared to returns for CEOs. Superior financial acumen of CFOs does not appear to be supported. CEO purchase trade returns appear to be lower than CFO returns because CEOs face greater visibility and scrutiny and thus limit their own trading aggressiveness. Originality/value – This research contributes to the literature in explaining why CFOs best CEOs in their insider trading purchases and documents that in the post-SOX period, CFO insider trading superiority disappears.

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Tomasic, Roman, and Brendan Pentony. "The prosecution of insider trading: Obstacles to enforcement." Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology 22, no. 2 (June 1989): 65–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/000486588902200201.

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Insider trading has been criminalised in Australia for over a decade. Yet there have been few prosecutions in respect of such conduct, and none of these have been successful. There is little doubt that insider trading in Australia is extensive and is to be found across many sectors of the securities industry. Despite this, the law has not proved to be an effective vehicle for the social control of insider trading or for the deterrence of such conduct. It seems that the criminal sanctions for insider trading have been largely symbolic in nature. This article explores the obstacles to enforcement of criminal laws in this area by reference to findings from a national empirical study funded by the Criminology Research Council. The study involved in-depth interviews with almost 100 key figures in the Australian securities industry (brokers, lawyers, merchant bankers etc) and of officials involved in its regulation (from the Corporate Affairs Commissions and the Australian Stock Exchange). Problems in detection, proof and punishment, in the nature and extent of regulatory resources devoted to this area and in the content of the law itself are identified and discussed.

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Bach, David, and Abraham L. Newman. "Transgovernmental Networks and Domestic Policy Convergence: Evidence from Insider Trading Regulation." International Organization 64, no. 3 (July 2010): 505–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020818310000135.

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AbstractCross-border cooperation among domestic regulators and public officials has become a defining feature of global governance. While a number of studies have tracked the emergence and institutionalization of such transgovernmental networks, less is known about their effect on domestic policy. This study explores this link for the important case of insider-trading regulation in original data for 116 countries between 1977 and 2006. It offers quantitative evidence that transgovernmental cooperation is related to domestic policy convergence but that the relationship is more complex than often assumed. Direct ties to powerful regulators increases a jurisdiction's likelihood of adopting internationally promoted policies such as insider-trading rules. Separately, membership in the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), a forum designed to diffuse best practices among regulators, increases a jurisdiction's likelihood of subsequently enforcing newly adopted policies. The findings in this study suggest that different network components are associated with distinct aspects of domestic policy convergence. The results are directly relevant for current public policy debates about the reregulation of global financial markets as transgovernmental networks among domestic regulators have assumed a critical role.

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Chung, Kee H., and Hao Zhang. "Insider Trading Regulation and Market Quality: Evidence from American Depositary Receipts." Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies 39, no. 3 (June 2010): 340–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6156.2010.01013.x.

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Frijns, Bart, Aaron Gilbert, and Alireza Tourani-Rad. "INSIDER TRADING, REGULATION, AND THE COMPONENTS OF THE BID-ASK SPREAD." Journal of Financial Research 31, no. 3 (September 2008): 225–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6803.2008.00238.x.

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Langevoort, Donald C. "Rereading "Cady, Roberts": The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation." Columbia Law Review 99, no. 5 (June 1999): 1319. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1123458.

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Hansen, Jesper Lau. "The trinity of market regulation: Disclosure, insider trading and market manipulation." International Journal of Disclosure and Governance 1, no. 1 (December 2003): 82–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.jdg.2040015.

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