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1
BUGIULESCU, Marin. "THE CONCEPT OF THE SOUL IN PLATO AND IN PATRISTIC THOUGHT." International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conference on the Dialogue between Sciences & Arts, Religion & Education 5, no. 1 (November 24, 2021): 80–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.26520/mcdsare.2021.5.80-84.
Анотація:
This article is focuses on Plato's conception of the soul, through which man as a psycho-physical being, lives with the perspective of immortality. The pre-existence and immortality of the soul is in fact the basis of Platonic philosophy. Plato presents the existence of the soul in the Phaidon Dialogue starting from the hypothesis that something called the soul has existence in the form of pre-existence and post-existence and has an intelligible nature, similar to the structure of Eidos (Ideas). The second part of the research considers the transition from ontology to metaphysics, focused on a different perspective given the patristic thinking in which man is created in his divine image, as a personal being composed of body and soul, a synthesis of the intelligible world with the material.
2
Krausmüller, Dirk. "When Christology intersects with embryology: the viewpoints of Nestorian, Monophysite and Chalcedonian authors of the sixth to tenth centuries." Byzantinische Zeitschrift 113, no. 3 (August 1, 2020): 853–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/bz-2020-0037.
Анотація:
AbstractThe notion that the soul comes into existence simultaneously with the body at the moment of conception was originally introduced into the Patristic discourse as an alternative to the Origenist notion of a pre-existing soul. Yet from the sixth century onwards it was itself regarded as an Origenist tenet. Now it was claimed that only those who believed the soul to be created after the body were truly orthodox. The present article examines the links between this development and the Christological conversies.
3
Krausmüller, Dirk. "Origenism in the Sixth Century: Leontius of Byzantium on the Pre-Existence of the Soul." Journal for Late Antique Religion and Culture 8 (December 15, 2014): 46. http://dx.doi.org/10.18573/j.2014.10325.
4
SWINBURNE, RICHARD. "The argument from souls to God." Religious Studies 51, no. 3 (August 14, 2015): 293–305. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412515000232.
Анотація:
AbstractHumans are pure mental substances, that is essentially souls, who have a rich mental life of sensations, thoughts, intentions, and other pure mental events, largely caused by and sometimes causing events in their brains and so in their bodies. God has reason to create humans because humans have a kind of goodness, the ability to choose between good and evil, which God himself does not have. The existence of these causal connections between mental events and brain events requires an enormous number of separate psychophysical laws. It is most improbable that there would be such laws if God had not made them. Each soul has a thisness; it is the particular soul it is quite independently of its mental properties and bodily connections. So no scientific law, concerned only with relations between substances in virtue of their universal properties, could explain why God created this soul rather than that possible soul, and connected it to this body. Yet a rational person often has to choose between equally good alternatives on non-rational grounds; and so there is nothing puzzling about God choosing to create this soul rather than that possible soul. Hence the existence of souls provides a good argument for the existence of God.
5
Johnson, David Kyle. "DO SOULS EXIST?" Think 12, no. 35 (2013): 61–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1477175613000195.
Анотація:
‘The soul hypothesis’ (the belief that souls exist and humans have them) enjoys near unanimous support in the general population. Among philosophers and scientists, however, belief in the soul is far less common. The purpose of this essay to explain why many philosophers and scientists reject the soul hypothesis and to consider what the non-existence of the soul would entail.
6
Filipowicz, Adam M. "Chrześcijaństwo a reinkarnacja i metempsychoza w świetle polemiki Tertuliana z Platonem." Vox Patrum 55 (July 15, 2010): 189–212. http://dx.doi.org/10.31743/vp.4335.
Анотація:
The aim of this article is to show what the standpoint of Christianity in first centuries was among pagan conviction and teaching about reincarnation and metempsychosis. The author of this dissertation analyses Tertullian’s treatise On the Soul in context of Plato’ Dialogues. The first part of article puts in order meaning of terms: life after the death, immortality, resurrection, metempsychosis, metensomatosis, palingenesis, reincarnation, pre-existence of the soul. In the second part are discussed most important aspects of Plato’ view on the soul. Then are presented arguments (15) which Tertullian used to criticize Plato’ teaching about ideas and theory of anamnesis and to overthrow theory of reincarnation and metempsychosis. The conclusion takes recollection of standpoint and documents of the Church with reference to discussed matters.
7
Hartman, D. "Evidence for the existence of a soul?" Psychiatric Bulletin 19, no. 9 (September 1995): 562–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1192/pb.19.9.562.
8
BALTIMORE, JOSEPH A. "Got to have soul." Religious Studies 42, no. 4 (October 18, 2006): 417–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412506008584.
Анотація:
Kevin Corcoran offers an account of how one can be a physicalist about human persons, deny temporal gaps in the existence of persons, and hold that there is an afterlife. I argue that Corcoran's account both violates the necessity of metaphysical identity and implausibly makes an individual's existence dependent on factors wholly extrinsic to the individual. Corcoran's defence is considered, as well as Stephen Davis's suggestions on how an account like Corcoran's can defend itself against these concerns. It is shown, however, that the difficulties remain in full force and, therefore, that Corcoran's account fails to reconcile physicalism, no gappy existence, and an afterlife.
9
YUNG, Lawrence. "關文讀後——兼談哲學問題與哲學思考的本質". International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 14, № 2 (1 січня 2016): 61–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.141616.
Анотація:
LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract in English only.This article reviews Kwan Kai Man’s discussion of whether alleged cases of near death experience can give support to the existence of the soul. Kwan’s discussion strikes a balance between scientific explanations of near death experience and traditional religious views of the soul. The existence of the soul has remained a philosophical problem since ancient Greek philosophy. However, Socrates’s attempt to prove the existence of the soul in the Phaedo clearly shows that a purely philosophical approach is inadequate. The existence of the soul is a cross-disciplinary problem that calls for cross-disciplinary investigation. Kwan’s discussion is a good example of how philosophical thinking and methodology can contribute to this cross-disciplinary investigation into the existence of the soul.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 88 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.
10
Swinburne, Richard. "Body and soul." Think 2, no. 5 (2003): 31–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1477175600002578.
Анотація:
Richard Swinburne here defends the view that mind and body are distinct substances capable of independent existence. For a very different approach to the question of how mind and body are related contrast Rowland Stout's ‘Behaviourism’, which follows this article.
11
Owens, Joseph. "Aquinas on the Inseparability of Soul from Existence." New Scholasticism 61, no. 3 (1987): 249–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/newscholas198761312.
12
Morris, Herbert. "On The Soul." Philosophy 94, no. 02 (December 18, 2018): 221–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819118000517.
Анотація:
AbstractDiscussion of the soul in this essay departs from the concept of the soul that for thousands of years has occupied the attention of philosophers and theologians and pervaded religious discourse. The author is concerned with what William James referred to as ‘the popular soul,’ the soul as it is invoked by expressions such as ‘an expansive soul,’ ‘a soulless person,’ ‘soul-mate,’ and ‘that melody touched my soul.’ Skepticism with regard to the existence of this soul is without warrant. How this soul comes into being and develops; what its essential features are; how the world, when the soul is engaged, is transformed; what its relationship is to one's conscience; its importance in a human life; its connections to purity and perfection, to silence; its survival upon death; and the perils posed today to its development and existence are the principal topics considered.
13
Muhammad, Imandega. "REALITAS JIWA SEBAGAI BASIS ONTO-EPISTEMOLOGI PENGALAMAN RELIGIUS." Kanz Philosophia A Journal for Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism 6, no. 2 (December 31, 2020): 139–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.20871/kpjipm.v6i2.93.
Анотація:
A religious experience in the neuroscience view is interpreted as a symptom of neurological disorders of the brain. The neuroscience view is one of the various views that deny the reality of religious experience. Through empirical research instruments, neuroscientists have found that the soul is identical to the brain, which means that every activity can be measured through the brain. This has implications for the experiences of the Prophets in receiving revelations as the result of brain disorders. This paper seeks to explain religious experience through its ontological basis, namely the existence of immaterial existence and the existence of the soul, as well as its epistemological basis, namely the performance of the faculty of knowledge, both of which cannot be separated. The research method used is descriptive-analytic with the philosophical approach of the soul of Al-Ḥikmah Muta’āliyah. The results of this study indicate that the Al-Ḥikmah Muta’āliyah which was founded by Mulla Ṣadrā proves the existence of the wujūd levels, including the soul, explaining the various levels of perception carried out by the soul corresponding to the various levels of existence. Ṣadrā thought can explain the concept of the soul as an immaterial substance that can perceive metaphysical objects as the emanation of God
14
Weintraub, Ruth. "Hume on Local Conjunction and the Soul." History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis 13, no. 1 (April 5, 2010): 122–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/26664275-01301008.
Анотація:
In the (rather puzzling) section of the Treatise titled ‘Of the immateriality of the soul’, Hume adduces an argument to show that nothing can be ‘locally conjoined’ with all of a person’s perceptions. The argument is seldom discussed, and deserves attention, mainly because it can be transformed into an argument against the very existence of a soul. In this paper, I present and closely examine both arguments, Hume’s argument and the one against the existence of the soul. Both, I conclude, are fallacious. In dem (einigermaßen rätselhaften) Abschnitt des Treatise mit dem Titel ‚Of the immateriality of the soul‘ bringt Hume ein Argument vor, das zeigen soll, dass nichts mit allen Perzeptionen einer Person ‚lokal verknüpft‘ sein kann. Das Argument wird selten diskutiert, verdient aber Aufmerksamkeit, hauptsächlich deshalb, weil es in ein Argument gegen die Existenz der Seele umgewandelt werden kann. In diesem Aufsatz stelle ich beide Argumente – Humes Argument und das gegen die Existenz der Seele – dar und untersuche sie im Detail. Ich gelange zu der Feststellung, dass beide Argumente fehlerhaft sind.
15
Bennett, Byard. "When Souls had Wings: Pre-Mortal Existence in Western Thought." Journal of Religion in Europe 4, no. 2 (2011): 360–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187489211x574427.
16
Brennan, Robert. "Has a Frog Human a Soul? – Huxley, Tertullian, Physicalism and the Soul, Some Historical Antecedents." Scottish Journal of Theology 66, no. 4 (October 11, 2013): 400–413. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0036930613000215.
Анотація:
AbstractMuch theology presupposes a metaphysical spirit or soul, the existence of which has been questioned in contemporary neurobiological research. Green, Murphy and others argue for alternatives to metaphysical description. If the neuroscience is correct and the soul, if it exists, is not metaphysical then many theological descriptions will need serious revision or possibly even abandonment. One such theological description, directly affected and long considered to be an essential part of Christianity, is God's personal self-communication to humans. This has traditionally been understood to occur through the metaphysical human soul or spirit. The question explored in this article is whether the existence of a metaphysical soul is an all or nothing matter for Christian theology.A rational and strong challenge to the existence of metaphysical soul is demonstrably not new. Nonetheless, from the beginnings of modernity it has been generally assumed, utilising Augustinian anthropology, that the soul was a metaphysical element of human anatomy. Huxley's work on sensation, including ‘Has the Frog a Soul’, determines the anatomical location of the soul by its supposed function. Huxley questions early modernity's assumptions regarding the nature of sensation and the presumed role of the metaphysical soul within the sensorium. Huxley deduces limits and conditions on the existence of the soul and arrives at a description which has similarities to Tertullian's corporeal description of the soul. Huxley, however, does not engage with Tertullian, whose relatively orthodox description of the soul answers a number of issues that Huxley raises. Tertullian's careful revision of the Aristotelian category of corporeality is not exactly the same as Huxley's nineteenth-century materialism or contemporary physicalism. Tertullian's description of the soul is remarkably similar to Augustine's, differing mainly on the issue of corporeality and metaphysicality. Tertullian's description ironically draws on and shares the same functions as Greek philosophy and medicine. This description of the soul seems to be based more on these sources than scripture, unusually for Tertullian. Some form of reappropriation of Tertullian's non-metaphysical soul may be useful in the contemporary debate, noting the limitations of his understandings of biology and physics. It seems possible to take note, in some form, of changed and better contemporary worldviews, in order to better describe theological anthropology and in particular that element related to the soul.
17
Perrett, Roy W. "Rebirth." Religious Studies 23, no. 1 (March 1987): 41–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412500018539.
Анотація:
Traditional Western conceptions of immortality characteristically presume that we come into existence at a particular time (birth or conception), live out our earthly span and then die. According to some, our death may then be followed by a deathless post-mortem existence. In other words, it is assumed that (i) we are born only once and die only once; and (ii) that – at least on some accounts – we are future-sempiternal creatures. The Western secular tradition affirms at least (i); the Western religious tradition – Christianity, Judaism, Islam – generally affirms both (i) and (ii). The Indian tradition, however, typically denies both (i) and (ii). That is, it maintains both that we all have pre-existed beginninglessly, and that we have lived many times before and must live many times again in this world. The Indian picture, then, is that we have died and been reborn innumerable times previous to this life and (failing our undertaking some spiritual discipline) we will be reborn many times in the future. This is sometimes called the Indian belief in reincarnation. The difficulty with this usage is that the term ‘reincarnation’ suggests a belief in an immortal soul that transmigrates or reincarnates. However Buddhism, while affirming rebirth, specifically denies the existence of an eternal soul. Thus the term ‘rebirth’ is preferable for referring to the generally espoused Indian doctrine.
18
Rostalska, Agnieszka, and Rafal Urbaniak. "Swinburne’s Modal Argument for the Existence of a Soul." Philo 12, no. 1 (2009): 73–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philo20091216.
19
Ainur, Aivaz Kamer, and Vlăducă Ion. "Assessing Students’ Opinion Regarding the Existence of the Soul." Procedia Economics and Finance 10 (2014): 330–34. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s2212-5671(14)00309-8.
20
FARRIS, JOSHUA R. "Emergent creationism: another option in the origin of the soul debate." Religious Studies 50, no. 3 (February 13, 2014): 321–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034412514000018.
Анотація:
AbstractIn the debate over the theology of the soul's origin, there have traditionally been three broad views on origins. These include creationism, traducianism, and Origen's pre-existence view. In the recent philosophy of religion and mind literature, William Hasker posits an alternative view of origins called emergent substance dualism. As a contribution to this discussion, I put forward one novel option as a via media between simple creationism and Hasker's emergent substance dualism, wherein it has relevant overlapping features found in the two contrary positions. I suggest that this view is a variation of creationism like emergentism where the material part (i.e. the brain) has some positive causal role in the soul's coming to be as a discrete effect of one divine cause. I argue that emergent creationism (as I call it) is a viable option deserving the attention of philosophers and theologians.
21
ZUHARA, EVI. "KONSEP JIWA DALAM TRADISI KEILMUAN ISLAM." JURNAL EDUKASI: Jurnal Bimbingan Konseling 4, no. 1 (October 15, 2018): 44. http://dx.doi.org/10.22373/je.v4i1.3522.
Анотація:
This article disccuses about soul concept in Islamic tradition of science. Soul is one of the main theme in mataphysical philosophy that become into a long debate between scientists both Muslim and Western. When it viewed from western tradition of science, mind stands in the high level that become the only benchmark to elaborate the meaning of soul. Due to it`s appraoach through mind, so western scientists just can understand souls problem from the side of empirical ratio by elaborating common principals and psychological symtomps. Usually in the hypothetical conclusions from ones` or reseachers` expereinces. That is what make vary of pshycological flows come up in the western tradition of science, it is cannot be apart from the point of view of flows founder in understanding souls only through mind dan impricial expereinces. Fundamental differences in Islam is in the soul’s placement in the ontology domain that has a thigt relationship with the God as the creator. The mind existence is as a logic theorem for the God existence. The soul’s explanation become wider because the revelation talks about it. In Al-quran and prophet traditions, soul at first as seminal concept, then developed it`s definition among Muslim scientists, philosopher, and sufis. Different perspective in understanding the meaning of soul among Muslims is the focus in this paper. Differences that come up only at the level of epistemology which in principle remains the same meaning, namely to know the position of humans as a creature that has a close relationship with God as Creator. Scientifically to know the nature of the soul, and by application as a servant to God.
22
Khair, Nurul. "MEMOTRET KESEMPURNAAN INSAN MENURUT FILSAFAT JIWA IBN SĪNĀ." Kanz Philosophia A Journal for Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism 6, no. 2 (December 31, 2020): 165–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.20871/kpjipm.v6i2.95.
Анотація:
This paper aims to offer a new perspective on understanding human perfection through Ibn Sīnā’s philosophical framework which is seen as being able to correct the mistakes of western philosophers. It is known that Sigmund Freud and Thomas Hobbes understood human existence physically. As a result, the soul which is seen as the substance of human existence is seen as materialistic which can be measured materially to achieve perfection in reality. The implication is that human perfection is also seen as partially. Partial perfection does not explain the value, dignity and happiness of humans universally, so the views of Sigmund Freud and Thomas Hobbes do not lead humans to holistic perfection, as human nature wants absolutes. In order to overcome the paradigm of Sigmund Freud and Thomas Hobbes, this paper explores human perfection according to Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy of the soul through one of his magnumopuses, entitled Mabda wa al-Ma’ad. By using a descriptive-philosophical method, the conclusion is that Ibn Sīnā examines the existence of the soul through a transcendental approach. According to Ibn Sīnā, the existence of the soul cannot be perceived through the senses. Conversely, the existence of the soul can be known through human awareness of correct knowledge, called ma’rifatal-Ḥaq to systematize various human behavior, called ma’rifat al-khair. Human understanding of ma’rifat al-Ḥaq and ma’rifat al-khair will guide him towards holistic perfection, both paradigmatically and behaviorally.
23
Lowinsky, Naomi Ruth. "Pre-millennial Angst and the poetry of soul." Psychological Perspectives 32, no. 1 (September 1995): 26–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00332929508404865.
24
Lewis, Rhodri. "Of "Origenian Platonisme": Joseph Glanvill on the Pre-existence of Souls." Huntington Library Quarterly 69, no. 2 (June 2006): 267–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/hlq.2006.69.2.267.
25
Vaughn, Jonathan. "Soul-Searching at Standing Rock." Journal of Jungian Scholarly Studies 13 (June 12, 2018): 19–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.29173/jjs11s.
Анотація:
This paper proposes the existence of two cultural complexes—a Native Complex and a Pilgrim Complex—active in the United States today. Continuously functioning since the nation’s founding, these complexes recently manifested in the #NoDAPL actions at the Standing Rock reservation and can be seen constellating with and in opposition to each other.
26
Učník, L’ubica. "Patočka’s Socrates: The Care for the Soul and Human Existence." Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, no. 4-II (February 11, 2021): 87. http://dx.doi.org/10.5944/rif.4-ii.2013.29783.
Анотація:
In order to get out of present day discussions between (for example) determinism and free will, creationism and evolution, bios and zoē, human existence and biological life – those dead end binaries of our present day thinking into which we have manoeuvred ourselves – we need to revisit the Ancient discussions relating to the care of the soul and human existence. I will draw together these two themes from Jan Patočka’s writings by anchor-ing them in his account of Socrates who was the first to emphasise the idea of human re-sponsibility not only for thinking but also for human acting in the world. I will argue that the significant common feature – the care for our own being, our existence – brings Patočka’s reflections on the care for the soul and care for our human existence together. While, according to Patočka, the notion of the care for the soul was displaced from the philosophical reflection by the modern scientific venture, the idea of human existence is, although problematic from the scientific point of view, still a part of our experience.Para librarnos de discusiones contemporáneas entre (por ejemplo) determinismo y libre albedrío, creacionismo y evolución, bios y zoē, existencia humana y vida biológica, estos binomios, callejones de salida del pensamiento de hoy en los que nos hemos metido, tenemos que volver a escuchar las discusiones de la Antigüedad sobre el cuidado del alma y la existencia humana. Voy a recuperar estos dos temas de escritos de Jan Patočka, anclándolos en su interpretación de Sócrates, el primero en poner énfasis en la idea de responsabilidad humana no solo de su pensamiento sino también de su actuar en el mundo. Argumentaré que el significativo rasgo común, esto es, el cuidado por nuestro propio ser, nuestra existencia, es lo que une las reflexiones de Patočka sobre el cuidado del alma y el cuidado de la exitencia humana. Mientras que, según Patočka, la noción del cuidado del alma ha sido desplazada de la reflexión filosófica por la empresa científica moderna, la idea de la existencia humana, a pesar de lo problemático que puede resultar desde un punto de vista científi-co, todavía forma parte de nuestra experiencia.
27
FORMENT, Eudaldo. "Autoconciencia y ser en santo Tomás." Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval 8 (October 1, 2001): 7. http://dx.doi.org/10.21071/refime.v8i.9378.
Анотація:
The conscience allows Saint Thomas to prove the existence and the nature of soul. Thanks to the conscience, the soul is present in an intelective manner, but existencial and it can be connected to the singulars in thein individuality and in thein existence. Besides, without the own being's conscience, it would be impossible to attribute the being to the things or to their inmaterial presence or even to know something of God.
28
Gräslund, Bo. "Prehistoric Soul Beliefs in Northern Europe." Proceedings of the Prehistoric Society 60, no. 1 (1994): 15–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0079497x00003364.
Анотація:
Prehistoric burial rites and burial finds ought to be studied also in the light of primitive soul beliefs. It is argued that the customs of submitting prestige grave goods in northern Europe during the Neolithic, the Bronze Age, and the Iron Age consistently reflect a pluralistic soul idea with a free soul aimed for the next existence.
29
Kane, Paula M. "“She offered herself up”: The Victim Soul and Victim Spirituality in Catholicism." Church History 71, no. 1 (March 2002): 80–119. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0009640700095160.
Анотація:
A teenage Catholic girl lies immobilized in her bed in Worcester, Massachusetts, her dark hair gathered in pink satin ribbons, her lacy nightgown spread neatly around her. The pleasing effect of a damsel in a pre-Raphaelite painting is broken by the sight of a tracheotomy tube in her neck attached to a ventilator, and a feeding tube in her stomach. For the last six years the American media has provided glimpses into the curious vegetative existence of Audrey Santo (1984–), who has lain in a coma-like state since a swimming pool accident at the age of three. Despite the girl's lack of consciousness and brain function, she has been credited as the conduit for extraordinary events in her home which have included bleeding hosts, stigmata, weeping statues, exuding walls, and physical healings. Audrey's popularity is largely a media creation, stemming from a 1996 televised documentary film about her on EWTN, a Christian broadcasting network in Alabama, which spawned a deluge of requests to the Santo family from people wanting to make a pilgrimage to see their daughter.
30
Waldow, Anik. "Locke on the Irrelevance of the Soul." Philosophy 87, no. 3 (June 15, 2012): 353–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819112000186.
Анотація:
AbstractCommentators usually agree that Locke's discussion of thinking matter is intended to undermine the plausibility of the belief in the existence of the soul. In this paper I argue that, instead of trying to reveal the implausibility of this belief, Locke seeks to rid the concept of the soul of its traditional cognitive and moral functions in order to render references to the soul redundant in philosophical explanations of the nature of human beings and their place in the world. On this reading, the driving force behind Locke's discussion is not a sceptical problem posed by the impossibility of proving the existence of the soul, but the wish to maximize the ability of limited creatures such as ourselves to engage positively with their lives in the here and now. Locke's experience-focused philosophy will here present itself as a position with significant moral implications.
31
Noble, Christopher Isaac. "How Plotinus’ Soul Animates his Body: The Argument for the Soul-Trace at Ennead 4.4.18.1-9." Phronesis 58, no. 3 (2013): 249–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685284-12341251.
Анотація:
Abstract In this paper I offer an analysis of Plotinus’ argument for the existence of a quasi-psychic entity, the so-called ‘trace of soul’, that functions as an immanent cause of life for an organism’s body. I argue that Plotinus posits this entity primarily in order to account for the body’s possession of certain quasi-psychic states that are instrumental in his account of soul-body interaction. Since these quasi-psychic states imply that an organism’s body has vitality of its own (a claim for which Plotinus also finds support in the Phaedo), and Platonic souls are no part or aspect of any body, Plotinus draws the conclusion that the soul must be a cause of the body’s life by imparting a quasi-psychic qualification to it. In so doing, Plotinus introduces elements of hylomorphism into Platonist psychology, and addresses a problem for the animation of the body that Platonic soul-body dualism may plausibly be thought to face.
32
Пивоев, Василий, and Vasilii Pivoev. "Two souls, two subjects: are the interests of body and soul the same?" Servis Plus 11, no. 3 (September 19, 2017): 86–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.22412/1993-7768-11-3-10.
Анотація:
Who is the originator of sin, the body or the soul? Does the body present the subject or only the obedient object of the soul manipulation? Does the body have its own interests that do not coincide with the goals and meanings of human life? From what point of view and in what respect does the body consider being subject? The essence of the person is associated with two unequal actors, whose interests may differ and even be opposite. Time and the rhythms of existence can also be different, since the body spends more energy than the soul, and time is a waste of energy. The deeds of the body are deterministic ("the selfish gene"), whereas the behavior of the soul does not always have any connection with reason. The distinction between the two entities allows expressing the assumption that man has two souls. One soul (ego) belongs to the body and is associated with the genetic information of the parents, the other connects to the body of the baby in the womb, coming from another, spiritual world. The soul is mortal, and the soul of the spirit after the body death leaves it and continues to exist in another world, waiting for a new incarnation.
33
Faul, Bogdan Vladimirovich. "“Are We Souls or Bodies?” R. Swinburne’s Substantial Dualism." Philosophy of Religion: Analytic Researches 5, no. 1 (2021): 152–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.21146/2587-683x-2021-5-1-152-160.
Анотація:
This article is a review of R. Swinburne’s book, “Are we bodies or souls?”. Swinburne seeks to prove that the existence of our bodies is not necessary for the existence of us, although he certainly does not deny their value. The mental substance, which he calls the soul, is both necessary and sufficient for the existence and individuation of persons. In this article the author analyzes two central arguments in defense of this view. The first argument is a solution to the problem of personal identity. Swinburne argues for what the modern literature calls “soul-theory”, according to which we are a substance with a unique principle of individuation – thisness. The second argument is a modification of Descartes’ argument, relying on the possibility of the sudden destruction of the body with the preservation of what Swinburne calls «I». The last part of the paper examines Swinburne’s response to the central problem of this argument, namely, the problem of reference to «I». The author concludes that, although Swinburne’s argument is not sufficient for those who already has physicalistic beliefs about the nature of persons, he nevertheless makes a good case that Descartes’ modified argument is successful.
34
Richert, Rebekah, and Paul Harris. "Dualism Revisited: Body vs. Mind vs. Soul." Journal of Cognition and Culture 8, no. 1-2 (2008): 99–115. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156770908x289224.
Анотація:
AbstractA large, diverse sample of adults was interviewed about their conception of the ontological and functional properties of the mind as compared to the soul. The existence of the mind was generally tied to the human lifecycle of conception, birth, growth and death, and was primarily associated with cognitive as opposed to spiritual functions. In contrast, the existence of the soul was less systematically tied to the lifecycle and frequently associated with spiritual as opposed to cognitive functions. Participants were also asked about three ethical issues: stem cell research, life support for patients in a persistent vegetative state and cloning. As expected, participants' beliefs about the ontology and function of the soul were linked to their judgments about these ethical issues whereas their beliefs about the mind were unrelated. Overall, the findings show that many adults do not espouse a simple body-mind dualism, and any tendency toward such dualism is unlikely to explain their beliefs in an afterlife. Instead, afterlife beliefs appear to be associated with the idea of an immaterial essence, potentially dissociable from the biology of life and death.
35
Aros, Jesus (Jess). "Discussion of Arredondo: Psychohistory and Soul Wounds." Journal of Pacific Rim Psychology 2, no. 1 (March 1, 2008): 18–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1375/prp.2.1.18.
Анотація:
AbstractIt is clear that organisational and social efforts are necessary in forming a nonviolent political process that rightly seeks to empower both the Mestizo (mixed) and fully indigenous peoples of Mexico, and western Latino/a America as a part of the Pacific Rim, and affirm our multiple existence and voices (Arredondo & Aros, 2004; Arredondo, this volume).
36
Harris, Paul, Ileana Enesco, and Silvia Guerrero. "Oxygen and the Soul: Children's Conception of Invisible Entities." Journal of Cognition and Culture 10, no. 1-2 (2010): 123–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156853710x497202.
Анотація:
AbstractIn two studies, children's concepts of various types of ordinarily unobservable entities were examined. Study 1 confirmed earlier findings in showing that children aged 4–9 years are confident of the existence of scientific entities such as germs as well as religious beings such as God. At the same time, both age groups are skeptical of the existence of various mythical beings such as mermaids. In Study 2, older children aged 10–12 years were probed for their concepts of religious as compared to scientific phenomena. Despite considerable confidence in each type, older children differentiated between them, both with respect to their level of confidence and their pattern of justification.
37
Schwaller, John F. "The Ilhuica of the Nahua: Is Heaven just a Place?" Americas 62, no. 03 (January 2006): 391–412. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0003161500064531.
Анотація:
The Nahua concept of heaven was one of the central issues that the missionary friars confronted as they attempted to reconcile Christian and Nahua thought in the early sixteenth century. The Nahua believed in the existence of both celestial heavens and subterranean hells, as possible destinations for individuals after death. The celestial realms, of which there were thirteen, were in general pleasant places. The subterranean realms were unpleasant. Unfortunately for the friars, the mechanisms whereby one could come to enjoy or suffer in these realms depended not on the quality of one’s life, but rather on the particulars of one’s death, the date of one’s birth, and other features of one’s existence. For instance, those who died by water, or lightening, were consigned to the heaven of the god of rain, Tlaloc. For the Nahua this post-mortem existence was corporeal, although the nature of one’s body might change in the process. The Nahua did not have any easy equivalent for the Christian soul. This essay will look particularly at the Nahuatl word for the sky, ilhuicatl, and how it functioned in both pre-Columbian thought and in the works written after the conquest with greater, or lesser, degrees of Christian input.
38
Schwaller, John F. "The Ilhuica of the Nahua: Is Heaven just a Place?" Americas 62, no. 3 (January 2006): 391–412. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/tam.2006.0044.
Анотація:
The Nahua concept of heaven was one of the central issues that the missionary friars confronted as they attempted to reconcile Christian and Nahua thought in the early sixteenth century. The Nahua believed in the existence of both celestial heavens and subterranean hells, as possible destinations for individuals after death. The celestial realms, of which there were thirteen, were in general pleasant places. The subterranean realms were unpleasant. Unfortunately for the friars, the mechanisms whereby one could come to enjoy or suffer in these realms depended not on the quality of one’s life, but rather on the particulars of one’s death, the date of one’s birth, and other features of one’s existence. For instance, those who died by water, or lightening, were consigned to the heaven of the god of rain, Tlaloc. For the Nahua this post-mortem existence was corporeal, although the nature of one’s body might change in the process. The Nahua did not have any easy equivalent for the Christian soul. This essay will look particularly at the Nahuatl word for the sky, ilhuicatl, and how it functioned in both pre-Columbian thought and in the works written after the conquest with greater, or lesser, degrees of Christian input.
39
Furton, Edward J. "The Soul Is Not Sexed." Ethics & Medics 41, no. 11 (2016): 3–4. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/em2016411122.
Анотація:
Although the Catholic philosophical tradition speaks of the generative faculty as one of the vital powers of the soul, this power is not described, in its own right, as either male or female. The generative faculty exists generically within the soul and only manifests as male or female in a given body. That is, the generative power may be male or female depending on the body in which the soul is infused. If we do not take this view, then we must either assert that it is possible for God to infuse a sexed soul into the wrong body or hold that the body–soul union does not bring the individual substance into existence. The doctrinal teachings of the Church and the Catholic philosophical tradition would seem to bar any claim that the soul can be infused into the wrong body.
40
TELLKAMP, Jörg A. "Sobre la relación de alma y cuerpo en Alberto Magno." Revista Española de Filosofía Medieval 14 (October 1, 2007): 151. http://dx.doi.org/10.21071/refime.v14i.6245.
Анотація:
The main purpose of this article consists in giving account of Albert the Great’s arguments against an array of materialism explanations of the soul. The point of departure is the question whether the soul can be reduced to a mechanical principle of movement. In order to clarify this issue, a short characterization of the concept «mechanicus» is in order. Following this, Albert’s stance regarding materialist, mainly atomist explanations of the soul is presented. It will be shown that his solution to the problem of the relation of soul and body in not derived from the falsity of materialism, but from his basic assumption that the soul has per se an existence independent from the body in which it occurs. Hence, his criticism of materialist theories of the relation of soul and body either is not designed to resolve any soul-body problem or it simply begs the question.
41
Solehah, Eka Lutfiatus, Byba Melda Suhita, and Yuly Peristiowati. "The Influence of Psikoedukasi on Stress Management in Improving Self Efficacy and Coping Mechanism of Families in Caring for Caring for ODGJ Patient (Schizophrenia) at Public Health Center of Balowerti Kediri Regency." STRADA JURNAL ILMIAH KESEHATAN 8, no. 1 (May 21, 2019): 41–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.30994/sjik.v8i1.208.
Анотація:
Families need to have the attitude of accepting patients, give a positive response, appreciate the patient as family members and foster an attitude of responsibility to the patient, so the balance of life in the family may occur. The existence of the soul in the family of disorders affecting the function of the family. Families that work well will be able to provide care on a family member with good and vice versa. Research objectives to analyzed the influence of psikoedukasi on stress management in improving self efficacy and mechanism of ODGJ in caring for families koping (Schizophrenia).
Design research is to take the pretest-posttest alphabets experiment pre design. The research of the variable Psikoedukasi as the independent variable and self efficacy and mechanism of the dependent variables as koping.
42
Grupp, Jeff. "Why God Did Not Choose All Souls." Philosophy and Theology 32, no. 1 (2020): 93–117. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtheol2021714137.
Анотація:
An analysis of Scripture uncovers a new model of God’s election and predestination of souls, which fits under the umbrella of the Calvinist theologies, but where this model involves an answer to the long-standing question of why God chose some, rather than all. It will be explored how before souls were elected (or condemned), God looked at them and knew them in a pre-election state, which God used to predestine each soul in physical reality. This analysis reveals why it could be no other way but where God only would choose some, rather than all souls during the physical embodiment stage of the soul, and the vexing centuries-old Calvinist question of why God elected some not all has an answer.
43
Van, Vu Hong. "From the Belief of the Immortality of the Soul, the Blessing or the Harassing of the Soul Towards People to the Worship of the Souls of Vietnamese People." Asian Social Science 16, no. 3 (February 27, 2020): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ass.v16n3p1.
Анотація:
Does the soul exist? If there exists where it is, what it is doing and if the soul does not exist why is it still appear in the daily lives of so many people, so many generations and many places in the world. Why is it so important for so many countries in the world to believe in the immortality of the soul and death? Faith in the dead and the next generation depends largely on a person’s religion and culture, on a community of people. For many Vietnamese, this belief goes from the belief that the soul only reaches its ultimate goal after many reincarnations, to the idea that life will now determine its final destiny. Consequently, one person can feel confident that he will eventually merge with the ultimate reality after death, others will surely reach Nirvana, and others will believe that he will be rewarded in heaven. So what is the truth? Because our beliefs affect our attitude, actions, and decisions, are we not interested in finding answers to that question? The dead are not finished but their souls still exist. Depending on the behavior of those who live with those who have died, they (those who are still alive) may be blessed by the soul or punished by the soul, encountering unfortunate things in life. This study provides a discussion of whether or not the existence of the immortal soul and the blessing or harassing of the soul for human life. How can humans limit the harassing and many blessings from the soul? Why does belief in the blessing and harassing of the soul become such a popular custom of worship among Vietnamese people?
44
Ortiz Millán, Gustavo. "¿Cuándo entra el alma al cuerpo?" Theoría. Revista del Colegio de Filosofía, no. 32 (June 1, 2017): 53–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/ffyl.16656415p.2017.32.438.
Анотація:
In this article I contrast the two traditional theories about the moment of the animation of the body, which serve as justification for the permissiveness of abortion. I analyze some of the metaphysical commitments of the idea of the soul and present some objections to the metaphysical framework that supports it. Although it is not possible to prove or disprove the existence of the soul, by an inference to the best explanation we should reject the idea and, therefore, claim that the soul does not enter the body at any time.
45
Arroisi, Jarman, and Rahmat Ardi Nur Rifa Da'i. "Konsep Jiwa Perspektif Ibn S?n?" ISLAMICA: Jurnal Studi Keislaman 13, no. 2 (March 1, 2019): 256–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.15642/islamica.2019.13.2.323-345.
Анотація:
The soul is one of the topics that really attracts the attention of Muslim and Western scientists. Not a few of those who spend their time to study this problem. However, the study of the soul in the West is not based on religion. In contrast to Muslim scientists who make religion as the footing. This paper intends to discuss the concept of the soul emphasized by one of the Muslim scientists, Ibn S?n?. By using the descriptive-analysis method, this study produces three important conclusions. First, the soul is the initial perfection to make a real human being. Second, the soul is eternal and does not go along with the destruction of the body. Third, when the soul is separated from the body and is eternal, it has a degree of happiness and misery. To reveal more deeply about the nature of the soul and its existence is very important to discuss.
46
Skrzypek, Jeremy W. "Complex Survivalism, or: How to Lose Your Essence and Live to Tell About It." Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 91 (2017): 185–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/acpaproc20199586.
Анотація:
Of those who defend a Thomistic hylomorphic account of human persons, “survivalists” hold that the persistence of the human person’s rational soul between death and the resurrection is sufficient to maintain the persistence of the human person herself throughout that interim. (“Corruptionists” deny this.) According to survivalists, at death, and until the resurrection, a human person comes to be temporarily composed of, but not identical to, her rational soul. One of the major objections to survivalism is that it is committed to a rejection of a widely accepted mereological principle called the weak-supplementation principle, according to which any composite whole must, at any moment of its existence, possess more than one proper part. In this paper, I argue that by recognizing the existence of certain other metaphysical parts of a human person beyond her prime matter and her rational soul, hylomorphists can adhere to survivalism without violating the weak-supplementation principle.
47
Alpina, Tommaso. "THE SOUL OF, THE SOUL IN ITSELF, AND THE FLYING MAN EXPERIMENT." Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 28, no. 2 (August 10, 2018): 187–224. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0957423918000024.
Анотація:
AbstractIn Avicenna's Nafs there are two investigations that run in parallel from its very beginning: (a) the investigation of the soul as a relational entity, always considered in connection with the body, and (b) that of the human soul in itself. Both investigations aim at ascertaining the existence and the essence of the soul, in relation to the body, of which it is the soul, and in itself respectively. The aim of this contribution is to reconstruct the phases of these investigations, in order to single out the way in which they are mutually related to each other, and to detect what acts as an indicator of the transition from the first, more general investigation to the second, more specific one. In my reconstruction, this role is assigned to the Flying Man experiment. In order to corroborate this interpretation, passages from three other Avicennian works (Ḥikma mašriqiyya or al-Mašriqiyyūn, Kitāb al-Išārāt wa-l-Tanbīhāt, and Risāla Aḍḥawiyya fī l-ma‘ād) are taken into account, since they contain the three other attested formulations of the Flying Man experiment, and an argumentative move similar to the one detectable in the Nafs.
48
Bakri, Syamsul. "PEMIKIRAN FILSAFAT MANUSIA IBNU MISKAWAIH: TELAAH KRITIS ATAS KITAB TAHDZIB ALAKHLAQ." Al-A'raf : Jurnal Pemikiran Islam dan Filsafat 15, no. 1 (June 30, 2018): 147. http://dx.doi.org/10.22515/ajpif.v15i1.1102.
Анотація:
This article aims to describe human philosophical thought of Ibn Miskawaih in the book entitled Tahdzib Alakhlaq which is focused on the conception of human being structure; the relation of human material substance (physic) and immaterial substance (soul); the human life ultimate; and the conception of Insan Kamil. Based on the library studies, by using content analysis approach, this study found the historical fact that Ibnu Miskawaih acknowledged; first, the existence of physical essence made human being bound by space, time, and material determination. While the existence of soul made human being be able to build a relationship with God and to create culture and civilization. Second the existence of a structural and functional relationship between physic as a material substance, and soul as an immaterial substance of a human being, and not human immaterial essential relationship. Third, the human life ultimate is to achieve ideal condition, related to their behavior and special characteristic, i.e. faculty of thought. Fourth, the conception of Insan Kamil which is emphasized to the force and magnificence of the faculty of thought that made human left their instincts, syahwiyah and amarah desire toward sharia law and wisdom of thought so that they would be able to achieve to the highest position in the human nature.
49
Johnson, David Kyle. "DOES FREE WILL EXIST?" Think 15, no. 42 (December 9, 2015): 53–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1477175615000238.
Анотація:
In ‘Do Souls Exist’, I suggested that, while the non-existence of the soul does threaten free will, the threat it possess is inconsequential. Free will faces so many other hurdles that, if those were overcome, the soul's non-existence would be a non-threat. In this paper, I establish this; and to do so, I define the common libertarian notion of free will, and show how neuroscience, determinism, indeterminism, theological belief, axioms in logic, and even Einstein's theory of relativity each entail that libertarian free will does not exist. I conclude by demonstrating why some philosophers reject alternate (compatibilist) understandings of free will, and so believe that the notion we are free is an illusion.
50
Spence, Martin. "The ‘Restitution of All Things’ in Nineteenth-Century Evangelical Premillennialism." Studies in Church History 45 (2009): 349–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s042420840000262x.
Анотація:
This paper explores the nineteenth-century doctrine of the ‘restitution of all things’, a concept of the afterlife which emphasized material continuity with the present and generated detailed speculation about the activities and events which would take place in the eternal realm. Such beliefs, it will be suggested, resonated with broader developments in nineteenth-century theology which tended to soften the boundary between this life and the life to come, and increasingly suggested that the Christian hope was for the coming of the kingdom of God on earth rather than for the soul to go to heaven after an individual’s death. This belief has been almost completely neglected in previous historiographical discussions of nineteenth-century evangelical eschatology. To recognize its existence challenges many historiographical depictions of the ‘world-denying’ nature of Evangelicalism in general and the pessimistic temperament of pre-millennialism in particular.