Добірка наукової літератури з теми "Saudi led coalition Intervention"
Оформте джерело за APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard та іншими стилями
Ознайомтеся зі списками актуальних статей, книг, дисертацій, тез та інших наукових джерел на тему "Saudi led coalition Intervention".
Біля кожної праці в переліку літератури доступна кнопка «Додати до бібліографії». Скористайтеся нею – і ми автоматично оформимо бібліографічне посилання на обрану працю в потрібному вам стилі цитування: APA, MLA, «Гарвард», «Чикаго», «Ванкувер» тощо.
Також ви можете завантажити повний текст наукової публікації у форматі «.pdf» та прочитати онлайн анотацію до роботи, якщо відповідні параметри наявні в метаданих.
Статті в журналах з теми "Saudi led coalition Intervention":
1
Ruys, Tom, and Luca Ferro. "WEATHERING THE STORM: LEGALITY AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE SAUDI-LED MILITARY INTERVENTION IN YEMEN." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 65, no. 1 (January 2016): 61–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020589315000536.
Анотація:
AbstractOn 26 March 2015, a Saudi-led coalition launched ‘Operation Decisive Storm’ on the territory of the Republic of Yemen following a request by that country's beleaguered government. Although it received no prior fiat from the UN Security Council and took place amidst a civil war, the intervention met with approval from numerous States, with only few critical sounds. Closer scrutiny nonetheless reveals that the self-defence justification, which is primarily relied upon, does not provide a convincing legal basis for the operation. Moreover, the intervention is problematical from the perspective of the intervention by invitation doctrine and undeniably exposes its indeterminacy and proneness to abuse.
2
Serebrov, S. N. "REWIEW OF: RAIMAN AL-HAMDANI AND HELEN LACKNER. WAR AND PIECES: POLITICAL DIVIDES IN SOUTHERN YEMEN (JANUARY 2020)." Journal of the Institute of Oriental Studies RAS, no. 1 (11) (2020): 303–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.31696/2618-7302-2020-1-303-316.
Анотація:
A 30-page article written by Raiman al-Hamdani and Helen Lackner titled “War and Pieces: Political Divides in Southern Yemen” appeared among publications of the influential think-tank — European Council on Foreign Relations in January, 2020. It is certainly a noticeable pivlication in the research studies of the five-year old war in Yemen. R. al-Hamdani is a researcher and consultant focusing on issues of security and development in the Middle East and North Africa. Dr. Helen Lackner is an expert of the European Council for Foreign Relations and research associate at SOAS University of London. She is the editor of the Journal of the British-Yemeni Society and a regular contributor to Open Democracy, Arab Digest, and Oxford Analytica. Her most recent book is ‘Yemen in Crisis: Autocracy, Neo-Liberalism and the Disintegration of a State’ (published by Saqi Books in 2017; by Verso in 2019; and in Arabic in 2020). The reviewed article reveal the hidden sides of the conflict by offering different angle of approach — the southern part of Yemen completely lacking the “houthi factor”, which used to monopolize the bulk of attention in writings on this topic since the war began in March, 2015. The military clashes within Arab coalition between its Saudi and Emirati wings in the South in August, 2019 brought to surface the deep antagonism among coalition’s Yemeni ‘friends’, represented by the Internationally Recognized Government of President A. M. Hadi (IRG) from the one side, and Southern Transitional Council (STC) supported by UAE, from the other. The resulted withdrawal of IRG structures from the temporary capital Aden turned the regime to the merely “exile government” located in Riyadh. The blow put the whole concept of KSA-led military intervention in Yemen in a rather fragile position. It’s dedication to the myth of civil war between IRG and houthi rebels representing the shi`a minority of the country was seriously compromised. The profound knowledge of the real country’s complicity and authors’ great professional experience helped them to reach the very roots of southern separatism and factualism, the core of “southern question” which they actually see as the real focal point of the crises and conflict in Yemen. The same phenomena laid the foundation for the further geopolitical moves of KSA and UAE towards South disintegration. Recent Saudi attempt to cure the devastating result of the August rivalry between IRG and STC by signing the Riyadh agreement on November 5th, 2019 is considered by the authors as nearly void. Therefore the article calls EU states and international community to change policies and enforce proactive role in both narrowing warfare and launching the carefully designed state and nation building programs aiming to keep Yemen united. The review attempts to evaluate the main arguments of this important article in a critical way while sharing the overall direction and goals to reach soonest solution to that largest manmade hotbed of humanitarian catastrophe on the planet.
3
Svetlana, Babenkova. "FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM OF YEMEN: IS RECOVERY POSSIBLE?" Scientific notes of the Russian academy of entrepreneurship 19, no. 2 (May 28, 2020): 8–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.24182/2073-6258-2020-19-2-8-31.
Анотація:
The regional war in Yemen (the Republic of Yemen) began on the 26th March 2015 in the result of the military intervention of the Arabic coalition headed by Saudi Arabia. Nearly all the northern part of the the country is under control of the alliance with the participation of the former ruling party “Yemeni General People's Congress” and Houthi rebellions from the Shiite movement Ansar Allah. In August 2019 the southern part of the country loyal to the coalition was threatened by disintegration as a result of expulsion of the structures of internationally recognized President A.M. Hadi, living in Riyadh since the beginning of the conflict, from the temporary capital Aden by forces of the pro-Emirates group headed by the Southern Transition Council.
The war did not solve any domestic problems of Yemen caused by a massive peaceful protest in all parts of the country split by the crisis in 2011, disrupted the international plan of the peaceful solution to the crisis under United Nations auspices, which started in November 2011, and de facto worsened the split of Yemen, which appeared on the map of Arabia only in 1990 in the result of merging two previously existing sovereign republics – the Yemen Arab Republic and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.
According to the announcements of the UN, currently the country goes through the hardest humanitarian crisis in the world. The military actions devastated the economy of the country, almost entirely ruined the infrastructure and lead to the absence of food security. The UN estimated that in 2019 nearly 24.1 million people (80% of the population) were exposed to the risk of famine and diseases. In the result of the absence of sanitary conditions and vaccination of the population, the country faces large-scale disease outbreaks, such as cholera, diphtheria, measles and fever.
In addition, analysts estimate that more than 40% of Yemeni families lost their main source of income, consequently, it is quite difficult for them to by goods included in the minimum consumer basket. Poverty is getting worse: before the crisis it affected nearly half of the population, and currently it affects about 80% of Yemenis.
In the result of the inflation, the value of the national currency threefold dropped. Besides, the humanitarian crisis worsened, and failure in the operation of the facilities of the national infrastructure and financial institutions significantly influenced the activity of business society, especially small and medium-sized businesses.
The military conflict in Yemen disrupted the social and economic activity both of individual institutions and of the state as a whole. In the hard situation is found the revenue part of the budget, whose main source of income was export of hydrocarbons. Financial losses from oil revenues resulted in severe shortage of the national currency and plummeting of state revenue. The aforementioned factors in combination with the fragmentation of the public institutions, including the Central Bank of Yemen, resulted in stopping flow of foreign currency for essential imports and payment of salaries in the public sector, which led to the growth of inflation and worsening humanitarian crisis.
4
Beech, M., and T. J. Oliver. "Humanitarian Intervention and Foreign Policy in the Conservative-led Coalition." Parliamentary Affairs 67, no. 1 (September 30, 2013): 102–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/pa/gst024.
5
Pak, Hui-Chol, and Hye-Ryon Son. "Military Intervention in Syria and the “Unwilling or Unable” Test: Lawful or Unlawful?" Russian Law Journal 7, no. 4 (December 15, 2019): 73–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.17589/2309-8678-2019-7-4-73-98.
Анотація:
As is known, military intervention by the U.S.-led coalition was commenced in September 2014 in Syria. The justification invoked by some participants of the coalition was that the Syrian government was “unwilling or unable” to deal with Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), an international terrorist group. The “unwilling or unable” test gives rise to various debates among international scholars and practitioners. Some international publicists argue that military intervention on the basis of the “unwilling or unable” test is an emerging rule of customary international law, while others are rather opposed to it. The U.S. announced its intention to withdraw its troops from Syria on 19 December 2018. This, however, does not mean an immediate cessation of operations of the U.S.-led coalition in Syria. It is expressed in the statement made on 6 February 2019 by Mike Pompeo, the U.S. Secretary of State, in which he articulated that the arms cut in Syria is not a shift in mission but a strategic turn in essence. What can be inferred is that it seems unlikely that the military intervention of the U.S.-led coalition in Syria will be terminated in the near future. In fact, it arouses deep concern of humanity that the military intervention in Syria justified by the “unwilling or unable” test might recur in other regions or states. In this respect, the present article argues the compatibility of military intervention based on the “unwilling or unable” test proposed by some states, including the U.S., and some international publicists under universal principles of customary international law formation and international conventions.
6
Idris, Asmady, and Asri Salleh. "The Role of Systemic and Leadership Factors in Influencing Malaysia’s Joint Military Involvementin the Saudi-led Coalition in Yemen,2015–2018." Contemporary Review of the Middle East 8, no. 3 (June 2, 2021): 356–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/23477989211017597.
Анотація:
Malaysia’s military involvement in the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen Ops Yemen II (2015–2018) had been a subject of rigorous debate in the country. Those who opposed it saw the operation as a breach of Malaysia’s Non-Alignment Policy, especially when it involves military operation in a foreign country’s civil war. The main objective of this study is to critically analyze why and how the Barisan Nasional (BN)-led Malaysian government decided to send armed forces to participate in the Saudi-led military operations stationed in Riyadh. In examining this, an analysis on the role of systemic and leadership factors within the conceptual framework of the foreign policy of developing countries is used to explain the character of Malaysia’s joint military operation with Saudi Arabia in the Yemen Crisis. The method and data analysis of this article were mostly derived from written documentary analysis and discussion with related individuals. The findings indicated that both systemic political pressure and the role of leadership were constantly and constructively influenced intersubjective interactions with other domestic factors, which played a vital role in Malaysia’s decision to join the Saudi-led military operations.
7
Musa, Shavana. "The Saudi-Led Coalition in Yemen, Arms Exports and Human Rights: Prevention Is Better Than Cure." Journal of Conflict and Security Law 22, no. 3 (2017): 433–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/jcsl/krx013.
8
Khairullin, T. R. "THE QATARI-TURKISH ALLIANCE AND SAUDI ARABIA: THE STRUGGLE OF ISLAMIST PROJECTS IN SYRIA." Islam in the modern world 14, no. 4 (January 7, 2019): 235–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.22311/2074-1529-2018-14-4-235-246.
Анотація:
The article discusses Islamist projects promoted by Saudi Arabia and the Qatari-Turkish Alliance to strengthen their positions in Syria. The Saudis are focused on conservative Salafi Islamism, while Qatar and Turkey adhere to the moderate ideology of Islamism Muslim Brotherhood. Since the beginning of the crisis, the struggle between the competing forces has been unfolding within the opposition structures (the Syrian National Council, the National Coalition) and in the theater of operations, where there is a support for certain military formations loyal to ‘Pro-Saudi’ or ‘Pro-Qatari’ representatives of the opposition. The struggle of the Qatari-Turkish Alliance and Saudi Arabia has led to a signifi cant weakening of the positions of Qatar and Turkey in the negotiation process, however Doha and Ankara continue to maintain control over numerous armed groups of moderate persuasion.
9
Din, Jamal Ud, and Dr Shabir Hussain. "Evaluating the Influence of Policy Certainty and Violence on Coverage of Policy Issues in Pakistani Media." Journal of Peace, Development & Communication Volume 5, no. 1 (March 30, 2021): 380–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.36968/jpdc-v05-i01-32.
Анотація:
This article examines the government and press relationship in the context of foreign policy related issues in Pakistan, where the nature of [policy]issues are subjected to frequent changes. The content analysis of three selected issues reflects the existence of soft relationship between media and government in the [violent]issue of Kashmir and Salala check post attack while the policy uncertainty in the issue to join the Saudi Arab led military coalition, instead of soft relations, triggered, comparatively more critical coverage in the selected newspapers- Dawn and The News.
10
Gul, Azeem, Rizwana Karim Abbasi, and Syed Arslan Haider. "Iran and Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Rivalry and the Middle Eastern Security: An Assessment." Liberal Arts and Social Sciences International Journal (LASSIJ) 5, no. 2 (September 12, 2021): 17–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.47264/idea.lassij/5.2.2.
Анотація:
The strategic rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has been worsened for the last two decades. This historical sectarian divisions led by Saudi Arabia and Iran has now morphed into a struggle for regional influence between Shia political power led by Iran and Sunni political power led by Saudi Arabia. Against this backdrop, the study examines the contours of the Middle Eastern security in the context of Saudi and Iran strategic rivalry in various conflicts such as crisis in Syria, Yemen, and situation in Iraq including proxy wars and Iran’s nuclear program. The study finds out that the security situation of the Middle East would have been much better if Saudi and Iran would have cooperated on various issues such as Yemen and Syrian crisis. In addition, the internal vulnerabilities of the Middle East with Iran and Saudi strategic antagonism provided opportunities to the external power intervention that further has intensified the conflicts in the region. The study concludes that the solution of the Middle Eastern problem would lie in building cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia relations and in this respect the current rapprochement between the two states is a positive development for Middle Eastern security.
Дисертації з теми "Saudi led coalition Intervention":
1
Moalim, Bostio Abdulahi. "Handling an epidemic during humanitarian crisis in a civil war - The case Yemen." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Teologiska institutionen, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-427899.
Анотація:
Yemen is amid in three threats at the moment, during a civil war with a pandemic hitting them during a humanitarian crisis. The aim of this work was to understand how has the civil war in Yemen shaped and impacted their humanitarian crisis and COVID-19 response. A literature review was used in this study which helped to analyze the work. As a theoretical framework, it was used Michael E. Brown’s concept of Causes and dimensions of internal actors and Mary Kaldor’s concept of New Wars, which helped to outline and analyze the elements of this conflict and what effects internal and external Actors have in the conflict. Mason and Rychard´s conflict mapping tools were used as a method. Also, the inter-agency framework helped to analyze the structural causes and key actors in the conflict. These all helped answer the research question, how has the civil war in Yemen affected their humanitarian crisis and COVID-19 response? One of the important points that this conflict in Yemen tells us is the importance of local humanitarian workers when the conflict actors deny access to the areas. Without them, the work of international aid workers would be almost impossible, as the war continued around. The two humanitarian actors benefit from each other and this brings joint benefit to the Yemeni civilians. The main findings are as the war prolongs for a long time and externals actors intervene in it, followed by a humanitarian crisis affecting innocent civilians. Such a country will then be vulnerable to various pandemics. This has happened in the conflict in Yemen, as the situation is terrible and the COVID-19 pandemic disaster is coming to light there. One can state as a conclusion of the study that further research on the effect of COVID-19 could be helpful for the future to understand the real catastrophic effects this absurd conflict has brought.
2
Tawaifi, Simon. "The Perfect Storm : How Offensive Opportunity and Ideational Distance led to third-party interventions in Syria, Yemen and Bahrain." Thesis, Stockholms universitet, Statsvetenskapliga institutionen, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-138880.
Книги з теми "Saudi led coalition Intervention":
1
Luca, Ferro, and Ruys Tom. Part 3 The Post 9/11-Era (2001–), 65 The Saudi-led Military Intervention in Yemen’s Civil War—2015. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198784357.003.0065.
Анотація:
This chapter addresses the intervention in Yemen’s civil war launched by Saudi Arabia on 26 March 2015. The intervention was supported by Gulf Cooperation Council and other Arab countries, and received technical and logistical support from the United States and the United Kingdom. After retracing the origin and development of the internal conflict, the contribution provides an overview of the legal positions of its main protagonists and the reaction (or lack thereof) by other States. Closer scrutiny of the operation’s legality nonetheless reveals that the self-defence justification, which is primarily relied upon, does not provide a convincing legal basis. Moreover, the intervention is problematical from the perspective of the intervention by invitation doctrine and exposes its indeterminacy and proneness to abuse. As a result, the authors argue in the final section that if the concept of ‘counter-intervention’ (as a possible exception to the prohibition on intervention during civil war) is to be more than an empty shell, it should be subject to a proportionality test.
2
Agatha, Verdebout. Part 3 The Post 9/11-Era (2001–), 59 The Intervention of the Gulf Cooperation Council in Bahrain—2011. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198784357.003.0059.
Анотація:
This contribution examines the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) Saudi led intervention in Barhrain. Following a brief overview of the events that shook the island in 2011, it analyses the legal arguments brought forth by the main protagonists (Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and GCC) to justify the intervention, and the reactions these triggered in the international community. It then discusses the intervention’s legality in light of the different doctrines of ‘intervention by invitation’ in situations of domestic unrest. As a conclusion, it argues that the general lack of attention that this intervention has received on the part of the media and of third states makes its precedential value hard to assess.
3
Orkaby, Asher. The UN Yemen Observer Mission (UNYOM). Oxford University Press, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190618445.003.0005.
Анотація:
In 1963, the “shuttle diplomacy” efforts of Ellsworth Bunker and Ralph Bunche between Riyadh, Cairo, and Sana’a led to an agreement for the withdrawal of Egyptian and Saudi intervention in the Yemen Civil War. The UN Yemen Observer Mission, which ran from 1963 to 1964, was given the responsibility to oversee this withdrawal. Contemporary and historic perceptions of UNYOM have been tainted by a clash of personalities between the mission leader, Carl von Horn, who embodied the old European leadership of the UN, and Secretary General U Thant, who represented the new Asia-Africa bloc in the UN. UNYOM has been portrayed as the first failure in a new era of “tin-cup peacekeeping” that could scarcely feed and supply UN personnel. The reality, gleaned from interviews in addition to newly available UN and Canadian archives, is starkly different. The mission was in fact a success, limited only by the global conflict that overshadowed UNYOM.
4
Christine, Gray. International Law and the Use of Force. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198808411.001.0001.
Анотація:
This book explores the use of force in international law. It examines not only the use of force by states but also the role of the UN in peacekeeping and enforcement action, and the increasing role of regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. The UN Charter framework is under challenge: Russia’s invasion of Georgia and intervention in Ukraine, the USA’s military operations in Syria, and Saudi Arabia’s campaign to restore the government of Yemen by force all raise questions about the law on intervention. The ‘war on terror’ that began after the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the USA has not been won. It has spread far beyond Afghanistan, leading to targeted killings in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen, and to intervention against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. Is there an expanding right of self-defence against non-state actors? The development of nuclear weapons by North Korea has reignited discussion about the legality of pre-emptive self-defence. The NATO-led operation in Libya increased hopes for the implementation of ‘responsibility to protect’, but it also provoked criticism for exceeding the Security Council’s authorization of force because its outcome was regime change. UN peacekeeping faces new challenges, especially with regard to the protection of civilians, and UN forces have been given revolutionary mandates in several African states, but UN peacekeeping is not suited to counter-terrorism or enforcement operations. The UN now turns to regional organizations as first responders in situations of ongoing armed conflict.
Частини книг з теми "Saudi led coalition Intervention":
1
Malovany, Pesach, Amatzia Baram, Kevin M. Woods, and Ronna Englesberg. "Reactions to the Conquest of Kuwait and Iraqi Preparations for the Anticipated Conflict with the Coalition." In Wars of Modern Babylon. University Press of Kentucky, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.5810/kentucky/9780813169439.003.0030.
Анотація:
This chapter deals with the reactions to the conquest of Kuwait by Iraq and the Iraqi preparations for the anticipated conflict with the Coalition countries. It describes the global and regional reaction to the Iraqi surprising attack on Kuwait, the establishment of the Coalition countries against Iraq led by the United States, and the build-up of its military forces in Saudi Arabia. On the other side it describes the Iraqi preliminary measures taken towards the anticipated conflict with the Coalition, the Iraqi evaluation of the situation and their preparations of the Iraqis towards the war for defensive operations, as well as offensive ones and the deployment of forces of both sides on the eve of the war.
2
Hiro, Dilip. "Multi-front Cold War between Riyadh and Tehran." In Cold War in the Islamic World, 275–312. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190944650.003.0013.
Анотація:
When rebel Houthis, followers of Zaidi Shia code, captured Sanaa in September 2014, and expelled Yemen’s Sunni President Abd Rabbu al Hadi, alarm bells rang in Riyadh. Deputy Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman led a coalition of friendly states to intervene in the Yemeni civil war in March 2015. This ignited protest by the Shias in Saudi Arabia. Their indignation intensified when, ignoring international appeals for clemency, the Saudi government executed their revered Ayatollah Nimr al Nimr in January 2016. This led to the severance of diplomatic ties between Riyadh and Tehran. In Iraq, whereas Iran dispatched its trained Shia volunteers to fight Islamic Sate in Syria and Iraq (ISIS), Riyadh lent four jet fighters to the Pentagon in Washington’s anti-ISIS campaign. When Riyadh backed Syrian opposition with cash and weapons, Russian President Vladimir Putin sent air force units to Syria, and shored up Assad’s depleted arms arsenal. With Assad’s recapture of Eastern Aleppo, an opposition stronghold, in December 2016, Iran established superiority over Riyadh in Syria. In July 2015, Iran and six major world powers signed an accord on Tehran’s denuclearization program, titled Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It won universal approval except by Saudi Arabia and Israel.
3
Isakhan, Benjamin. "Introduction: The Iraq Legacies – Intervention, Occupation, Withdrawal and Beyond." In The Legacy of Iraq. Edinburgh University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9780748696161.003.0001.
Анотація:
This introductory chapter provides an overview of the book's main themes. This book dissects and discusses some of the Iraq War's more complex legacies and the varying analyses, debates and discussions they have stimulated. It follows the trajectory of these legacies back to the earliest days of the US intervention and examines the extent to which key decisions and errors of judgement on the part of the Coalition and the Iraqi political elite have had unexpected and devastating consequences for Iraq today. The book examines how the war dramatically altered the lives of ordinary Iraqis and led to many of the most deep-seated and intractable problems facing Iraq, the region and the world today. It is argued that the Iraq War of 2003 left behind a sequence of deeply felt but rarely examined legacies and that together have served as the catalyst of Iraq's current chaos.
4
Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates. "The 2014 Rift." In Qatar and the Gulf Crisis, 43–66. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197525593.003.0003.
Анотація:
This chapter examines the period between the Arab Spring uprisings in 2011 and the first iteration of the rift between Qatar and its three Gulf neighbors in 2014, when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain withdrew their Ambassadors from Doha for eight months. The chapter analyzes why and where policy responses to the Arab Spring differed and explores how they generated new tensions between Qatar and its neighbors, especially after the election of a Muslim Brotherhood-led government in Egypt in 2012 and its toppling a year later. By the time Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani became Emir of Qatar in June 2013, Saudi Arabia and the UAE had emerged at the head of a counter-revolutionary coalition determined to roll back the gains of the Arab Spring, and the chapter examines the immediate buildup of pressure on Qatar in late-2013, the contours of the 2014 rift, and the aftermath through 2016.
5
Blumi, Isa. "Making Yemen Dance." In Destroying Yemen. University of California Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/california/9780520296138.003.0006.
Анотація:
It is in this chapter that I begin my detailed revisionist accounting of Yemen’s recent history. Crucially, I do so by emphasizing the global dynamics behind events occurring in Southern Arabia since 2000. The focus will be to identify the origins of the so-called Arab Spring in 2011. I incrementally “retell” what led to the direct confrontation between different groups in Yemen. Quickly identifying these factions may prove useful here. The most important, are a cluster of parties crudely reduced to the “Houthis” found in the Northwest in Yemen. As of March 2015, when Saudi Arabia, the US/UK and UAE initiated a war to reassert hegemony over Yemen, this coalition of parties known as “Huthis” aligned with the Ali Saleh who commands considerable support within the Yemeni military services. Their main rivals are the so-called southern separatists. These southern Yemenis have forged a precarious alliance with other rivals of the “Huthis,” including Islamist groups under the protection of competing external powers—ostensibly pitting Qatar, Saudi Arabia and UAE against each other—as well as with “President” Hadi, whom the US and Saudi Arabia/UAE claim to be the head of Yemen’s “legitimate” government.
6
Gent, Stephen E., and Mark J. C. Crescenzi. "Iraq." In Market Power Politics, 94–124. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197529805.003.0005.
Анотація:
This chapter examines how the motivation to establish market power in the oil export market influenced Saddam Hussein’s decision to invade Kuwait in 1990. In the wake of the costly Iran-Iraq war, Hussein desperately needed access to new resources. By controlling Kuwait’s oil production, Iraq could both augment its own oil resources and prevent Kuwait from overproducing and putting downward pressure on the price of oil. Relatively unconstrained by low levels of economic dependence and a lack of acceptable institutional solutions, Hussein turned to violence to pursue his market power goals. A subsequent invasion of Saudi Arabia would have given Iraq a sufficient market share to be able to control the global output and price of oil. To prevent such a shift in market power, a coalition of forces led by the United States intervened militarily and drove Iraqi forces out of Kuwait.
7
Barany, Zoltan. "Background." In Armies of Arabia, 20–52. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190866204.003.0002.
Анотація:
This chapter sets the stage for the study by calling attention to some of the key issues and turning points that are intrinsic parts of Arabia’s social and political history. The first is tribalism, which is integral to understanding these societies. The second is the atypical military force, the Ikhwan, that the founder of modern Saudi Arabia, King Ibn Saud (known in Arabia as Abdulaziz Al Saud), developed to conquer much of the territory that became the region’s largest country. The third is the British role in influencing the Gulf states’ security sector. The fourth is the creation of the United Arab Emirates and its military force. Finally, I probe two formative moments in recent history: the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the country’s liberation by a US-led coalition, and the military-security dimension of the Arab uprisings that began in late 2010 and have influenced subsequent related developments.
8
Weighill, Rob, and Florence Gaub. "From Benghazi to Bagnoli." In The Cauldron, 31–70. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190916220.003.0002.
Анотація:
This Chapter presents an account of the rapidly evolving and highly volatile political and strategic environment as the situation in Libya deteriorated. JFC Naples, the NATO headquarters that was to assume responsibility for the operation, was profoundly unprepared for the ensuing campaign and faced many challenges as it planned and transitioned for war. In the face of increasing regime violence and international support, the chapter examines the establishment of an interim government (The National Transitional Council) to counter Gaddafi. It further covers the formal activation of a coalition intervention operation under US command. International political activity intensified sharply as nations and alliances sought a resolution to the ensuing conflict, but with an increasing likelihood of a NATO-led intervention operation to protect civilians. The international community also considered means by which the flow of refugees could be stemmed to reverse the humanitarian crisis.
9
Weighill, Rob, and Florence Gaub. "The War Begins—And NATO Thinks About It." In The Cauldron, 71–114. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190916220.003.0003.
Анотація:
This chapter describes the start of the US-led coalition intervention (Odyssey Dawn) as the prelude to NATO involvement, aimed at reducing Gaddafi’s combat forces, especially his air defences, command and control nodes and fielded forces. It lays out how NATO became finally the body executing the UN mandate despite French, German, Turkish and African Union reticence. The chapter also discusses the doctrine of Responsibility to Protect, which became the NATO mandate but did not include regime change or removal of Gaddafi from power. The chapter concludes describing deepening resolve by Gaddafi to remain in power, political maneuvering across the global stage and the final preparations by NATO to integrate forces into its command and control and begin combat operations.
10
Isakhan, Benjamin. "Conclusion: The Iraq Legacies and the Roots of the ‘Islamic State’." In The Legacy of Iraq. Edinburgh University Press, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9780748696161.003.0016.
Анотація:
This concluding chapter draws together the key arguments of this volume and reflects briefly on the three central legacies of the 2003 Iraq War and their relationship to contemporary events in Iraq. The first central legacy of the Iraq War is the ongoing consequences of several critical mistakes made by the US-led coalition before, during, and immediately after the 2003 intervention. These include the design of the de-Baathification process which failed to include a ‘truth and reconciliation’ dimension that would have allowed the Iraqi people to publicly purge the grievances of the past and might have stemmed the rapid descent into sectarianism after 2006. The second legacy is the loss of much of Iraq's fragile cultural mosaic of overlapping and intersecting communities, ideologies, and narratives. The third legacy of the 2003 Iraq War is its significant regional and global consequences.
Тези доповідей конференцій з теми "Saudi led coalition Intervention":
1
Alduaij, Ahmed N., Zakareya Al-Bensaad, Danish Ahmed, Mohd Nazri Bin Md Noor, Nabil Batita, and Abdul Muqtadir Khan. "Successful Intervention of Coiled Tubing Rugged Tool with Real-Time Telemetry System in Saudi Arabia First Multistage Fracturing Completion with Sand Control System." In SPE Annual Technical Conference and Exhibition. SPE, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.2118/205943-ms.
Анотація:
Abstract An openhole multistage completion required selective fracture stimulation, flow control, and sand control in each zone. An openhole multistage completion was designed by combining a production sleeve integrated with sand screens and inflow control devices and a fracture sleeve with high open flow port. The system was designed to use a ball drop to isolate the bottom intervals while fracturing upper intervals. After fracture stimulation, the fracture seat/ball needed to be milled. The production sleeve were designed to be shifted to the open position and the fracturing sleeve to the closed position through mechanical shifting tool to put the well on production. The fracturing sleeve and the production sleeve were located close to each other and a successful shifting operation needed an appropriate shifting tool, with a real-time downhole telemetry system that met the temperature limitations while providing accurate depth control, differential pressure readings, and axial force (tension and compression) measurements. Hydraulic-pressure-activated shifting tools were used to manipulate the sleeves. A coiled tubing (CT) rugged downhole tool with real-time telemetry was used to run the shifting tools. Yard tests were conducted to identify the optimum rates and pressures to actuate the hydraulically activated shifting tools and study their behavior. The expansion of the fracturing sleeve shifting tool keys initiated at 1.6 bbl/min (400 psi) and the keys were fully expanded at 1.8 bbl/min (600 psi), whereas the expansion of production sleeve shifting tool keys initiated at 0.3 bbl/min (700 psi), and the keys were fully expanded at 0.4 bbl/min (900 psi). During the design and planning of the shifting operation, simulations were conducted, and surface and downhole tools were selected carefully to ensure the CT could provide enough downhole upward force (5,000 to 6,000 lbf) to close the fracture ports and 2,000 to 4,000 lbf to open production sleeves. Following the fracturing operation, the first CT run aimed to mill fracture seats/balls to clear the path for the subsequent shifting operation. In the second CT run, all the fracturing sleeves were shifted to the closed position while production sleeves were shifted to the open position. The CT rugged downhole tool proved critical for depth correlation and accurate placement of the shifting tools. The real-time downhole acquisition of differential pressure across the toolstring also allowed operating the shifting tools under optimum conditions, while downhole force readings of tension and compression confirmed the shifting of completion accessories. Two fracturing sleeves were shifted to the closed position at 2.4 bbl/min and 700-psi downhole differential pressure, with the downhole weights of 700 lb and 1,000 lbf. Three production sleeves were shifted to open position at 0.6 bbl/min and 1,200-psi downhole differential pressure, and the maximum surface and downhole weights recorded were 73,000 lb and 19,200 lb, respectively. That operation led to sand-free production and confirmed the success of the first multistage completion enabling fracturing operation and controlling sand production in Saudi Arabia. This study describes the use of real-time downhole measurements and their significance when surface parameters do not give clear indication of shifting. It also features the first-time use of two hydraulically activated shifting tools operated during the shifting operation in Saudi Arabia's first multistage completion enabling fracturing operation and controlling flow/sand production.
2
YEŞİLBURSA, Behçet Kemal. "THE FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN TURKEY (1908-1980)." In 9. Uluslararası Atatürk Kongresi. Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.51824/978-975-17-4794-5.08.
Анотація:
Political parties started to be established in Turkey in the second half of the 19th century with the formation of societies aiming at the reform of the Ottoman Empire. They reaped the fruits of their labour in 1908 when the Young Turk Revolution replaced the Sultan with the Committee of Union and Progress, which disbanded itself on the defeat of the Empire in 1918. Following the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, new parties started to be formed, but experiments with a multi-party system were soon abandoned in favour of a one-party system. From 1930 until the end of the Second World War, the People’s Republican Party (PRP) was the only political party. It was not until after the Second World War that Turkey reverted to a multiparty system. The most significant new parties were the Democrat Party (DP), formed on 7 January 1946, and the Nation Party (NP) formed on 20 July 1948, after a spilt in the DP. However, as a result of the coup of 27 May 1960, the military Government, the Committee of National Union (CNU), declared its intentions of seizing power, restoring rights and privileges infringed by the Democrats, and drawing up a new Constitution, to be brought into being by a free election. In January 1961, the CNU relaxed its initial ban on all political activities, and within a month eleven new parties were formed, in addition to the already established parties. The most important of the new parties were the Justice Party (JP) and New Turkey Party (NTP), which competed with each other for the DP’s electoral support. In the general election of October 1961, the PRP’s failure to win an absolute majority resulted in four coalition Governments, until the elections in October 1965. The General Election of October 1965 returned the JP to power with a clear, overall majority. The poor performance of almost all the minor parties led to the virtual establishment of a two-party system. Neither the JP nor the PRP were, however, completely united. With the General Election of October 1969, the JP was returned to office, although with a reduced share of the vote. The position of the minor parties declined still further. Demirel resigned on 12 March 1971 after receiving a memorandum from the Armed Forces Commanders threatening to take direct control of the country. Thus, an “above-party” Government was formed to restore law and order and carry out reforms in keeping with the policies and ideals of Atatürk. In March 1973, the “above-party” Melen Government resigned, partly because Parliament rejected the military candidate, General Gürler, whom it had supported in the Presidential Elections of March-April 1973. This rejection represented the determination of Parliament not to accept the dictates of the Armed Forces. On 15 April, a new “above party” government was formed by Naim Talu. The fundamental dilemma of Turkish politics was that democracy impeded reform. The democratic process tended to return conservative parties (such as the Democrat and Justice Parties) to power, with the support of the traditional Islamic sectors of Turkish society, which in turn resulted in the frustration of the demands for reform of a powerful minority, including the intellectuals, the Armed Forces and the newly purged PRP. In the last half of the 20th century, this conflict resulted in two periods of military intervention, two direct and one indirect, to secure reform and to quell the disorder resulting from the lack of it. This paper examines the historical development of the Turkish party system, and the factors which have contributed to breakdowns in multiparty democracy.