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Готові списки джерел за темами / Shaun Nichols

Добірка наукової літератури з теми "Shaun Nichols"

Автор: Grafiati

Опубліковано: 19 червня 2021

Оновлено: 12 лютого 2022

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Статті в журналах
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Статті в журналах з теми "Shaun Nichols":

1

May, Joshua. "Bound: Essays on Free Will and Responsibility, by Shaun Nichols." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94, no. 2 (September 3, 2015): 416–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2015.1084344.

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2

Kane, Robert. "Free will, bound and unbound: reflections on Shaun Nichols’ bound." Philosophical Studies 174, no. 10 (July 18, 2016): 2479–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11098-016-0744-x.

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3

Gray, Robert L. "Philosophy: Traditional and Experimental Readings, ed. Fritz Allhoff, Ron Mallon, and Shaun Nichols." Teaching Philosophy 38, no. 2 (2015): 240–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/teachphil201538236.

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4

Snow, Nancy E. "“May You Live in Interesting Times”: Moral Philosophy and Empirical Psychology." Journal of Moral Philosophy 10, no. 3 (2013): 339–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/17455243-01003001.

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The Moral Psychology Handbook is a contribution to a relatively new genre of philosophical writing, the “handbook.” In the first section, I comment on an expectation about handbooks, namely that handbooks contain works representative of a field, and raise concerns about The Moral Psychology Handbook in this regard. In the rest of the article I comment in detail on two Handbook articles, “Moral Motivation” by Timothy Schroeder, Adina Roskies, and Shaun Nichols, and “Character” by Maria W. Merritt, John M. Doris, and Gilbert Harman. Both articles illustrate the perils as well as the promise of reliance on empirical studies for philosophers who work in moral psychology.

5

Sękowski, Krzysztof. "Analiza empirycznych argumentów na rzecz tezy o zróżnicowaniu kulturowym intuicji epistemicznych." Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia 14, no. 2 (June 7, 2019): 75–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/1895-8001.14.2.4.

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An analysis of empirical arguments for the thesis on cultural diversity of epistemic intuitionsThe founding text for the new current in modern philosophy—experimental philosophy—can be seen in Jonathan Weinberg, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich’s “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions” 2001. The authors describe in this article a study to prove cross-cultural differences in epistemic intuitions. On the basis of their results, they argue that since epistemic intuitions seem to serve a crucial role in the use of thought experiments, contemporary philosophical methodology is highly unjustified.That study has brought about at least three replication attempts Seyedsayamdost 2015; Kim, Yuan 2015; Nagel, San Juan, Mar 2013. None of them confirmed the original results.The aim of this article is to critically analyze in detail Weinberg, Nichols and Stich’s methodology and the three replications mentioned. Regarding the results of my analysis, I will try to examine what conclusions can be drawn with regard to the outcomes of analized studies. In particular I will refer to far-reaching conclusions about the universality of epistemic intuitions or universality of folk epistemology, which are sometimes—hastily, as I will argue—extrapolated from the results of such kind of studies e.g., Kim, Yuan 2015; Kim Yuan 2016.

6

Uller, Claudia. "Retraction Notice for the Brief Article “Goal attribution in chimpanzees” by Claudia Uller and Shaun Nichols." Cognition 80, no. 3 (July 2001): iii. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/s0010-0277(01)00143-3.

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7

Schwitzgebel, Eric. "Knowing Your Own Beliefs." Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume 35 (2009): 41–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2009.10717643.

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How do you know your own beliefs? And how well do you know them? The two questions are related. I'll recommend a pluralist answer to the first question. The answer to the second question, I'll suggest, varies depending on features of the case.Self-scanning. Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich (2003) say this: You have in your mind a functionally defined “belief box.” To believe some propositionP is just to have a representation with the content “P” in the belief box. You also have a monitoring mechanism that can scan the contents of the belief box. Normally, you come to know what you believe by deploying that scanner, creating a new belief in the belief box, a belief with the content “I believe thatP.” Self-scanning accounts admit of many possible variations and complications (e.g., Armstrong 1968, 1981, 1999; Lycan 1996; Goldman 2006), but the basic idea is that people have one or more interior monitors or scanners that detect the presence of beliefs and produce, as output, beliefs about those beliefs (or judgments about those beliefs, or representations of those beliefs).

8

Beebe, James R., and Ryan Undercoffer. "Individual and Cross-Cultural Differences in Semantic Intuitions: New Experimental Findings." Journal of Cognition and Culture 16, no. 3-4 (September 21, 2016): 322–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/15685373-12342182.

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In 2004 Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols and Stephen Stich published what has become one of the most widely discussed papers in experimental philosophy, in which they reported that East Asian and Western participants had different intuitions about the semantic reference of proper names. A flurry of criticisms of their work has emerged, and although various replications have been performed, many critics remain unconvinced. We review the current debate over Machery et al.’s (2004) results and take note of which objections to their work have been satisfactorily answered and which ones still need to be addressed. We then report the results of studies that reveal significant cross-cultural and intra-cultural differences in semantic intuitions when we control for variables that critics allege have had a potentially distorting effect on Machery et al.’s findings. These variables include the epistemic perspective from which participants are supposed to understand the research materials, unintended anchoring effects of those materials, and pragmatic factors involved in the interpretation of speech acts within them. Our results confirm the robustness of the cross-cultural differences observed by Machery et al. and thereby strengthen the philosophical challenge they pose.

9

Braga, Viviane Zarembski. "O papel dos afetos na vida humana." ethic@ - An international Journal for Moral Philosophy 20, no. 1 (April 30, 2021): 150–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1677-2954.2021.e80042.

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O objetivo deste artigo é o de apresentar algumas posições filosóficas, que dialogam com diferentes áreas do conhecimento, e que nos auxiliam a dar um passo a mais na compreensão da relação entre razão e emoção. Em primeiro lugar, apresentamos a ideia dos marcadores somáticos, de Damasio, que elucida o papel dos afetos no desenvolvimento do pensamento racional. Em segundo lugar, observamos que indivíduos psicopatas apresentam uma capacidade reduzida em diferentes esferas da vida, com evidente diminuição na capacidade de ligar sentimentos negativos a normas morais, o que leva a um comportamento moral inadequado e interfere na capacidade deliberativa. Por fim, apresentamos a teoria de Shaun Nichols acerca da Affective Resonance: normas que possuem respaldo afetivo (principalmente negativo) possuem vantagens de transmissão cultural, em detrimento de normas afetivamente neutras. Estes estudos comprovam a importância dos afetos para o pensamento racional e para a manutenção e propagação de normas e regras morais. A ideia principal aqui defendida é a de que há uma estreita relação entre razão e emoção. Ao elucidar esta relação, podemos aprofundar os estudos sobre a condição humana, em especial a razão e a moral.

10

Stich, Stephen. "Some Questions from the Not-So-Hostile WorldI'm grateful to Kent Bach, Peter Godfrey-Smith, and Shaun Nichols for their helpful advice." Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82, no. 3 (September 2004): 503–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/713659882.

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Більше джерел

Дисертації з теми "Shaun Nichols":

1

Svensk, Diana. "Expanding Our Concept of 'Free Will' : A case for the Development of Eliminativist Revisionism." Thesis, Umeå universitet, Institutionen för idé- och samhällsstudier, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-184766.

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This paper puts forth the thesis that free will skeptics should be motivated to develop revisionisteliminativist accounts of free will. As a starting point for this argument, it discusses and expands upon Shaun Nichols (2007) modeling of our reactive attitudes in narrow and widepsychological profiles. Utilizing this descriptive and prescriptive thesis, the paper then puts forthtwo main claims: 1. that revisionism is likely to produce our best descriptive accounts of free willbeliefs, and 2. that it is plausible that eliminativist revisionist is likely to produce our best prescriptive account of free will, as it is can capture some of the value in our “narrowpsychological profile” in ways its conventional counterpart is unable to. It is then argued that these two claims, in combination with the normative influence of free will beliefs, should provide sufficient motivations to develop eliminativist revisionist accounts of free will.

Книги з теми "Shaun Nichols":

1

FitzPatrick, William. Cognitive Science and Moral Philosophy. Oxford University Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190462758.003.0011.

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Can empirical work in cognitive science and moral psychology impact issues of general theoretical relevance to moral philosophy? Some think it can. They take it to underwrite debunking arguments against mainstream philosophical views. This chapter first critiques recent philosophical work by two prominent experimentalists, Joshua Greene and Shaun Nichols. The chapter argues that the cases they make for this sort of strong impact of experimental work on moral philosophy suffer from a problematic form of scientism and ultimately fail. Indeed, they fail for reasons that likely apply to other projects with similar ambitions as well. Second, the chapter clarifies the dialectical situation with respect to empirically driven attempts to debunk traditional philosophical views, which leads to a general challenge to such debunking projects going forward. It ends by suggesting a more modest and plausible role for experimental work in connection with moral philosophy that gives up the overreaching debunking ambitions.

Частини книг з теми "Shaun Nichols":

1

"Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe MORAL RESPONSIBILITY AND DETERMINISM: THE COGNITIVE SCIENCE OF FOLK INTUITIONS." In Ethics: Essential Readings in Moral Theory, 703–20. Routledge, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203723746-79.

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2

Deery, Oisín. "Preserving preservationism (about free will)." In Naturally Free Action, 137–56. Oxford University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198789796.003.0006.

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This chapter addresses the question of how phenomenology might influence the reference conditions of the concept of free will. For descriptivists about reference, if the presentational content of free-agency phenomenology is libertarian, then descriptively libertarian reference conditions for the concept might be inherited from the phenomenology. In that case, eliminativism about the concept and denialism about free will would be true, assuming determinism. However, Gregg Caruso has maintained that even on a non-descriptivist and apparently preservationist and realist approach to the conceptual question, such as the natural-kind view, if the phenomenology has libertarian presentational content, then eliminativism and denialism are also true, once we assume determinism. Relying on the view about free-agency phenomenology developed in Chapter 4, this chapter provides a non-descriptivist defense of both preservationism and realism about free will, against Caruso’s claims. The chapter also considers Shaun Nichols’s discretionist position about free will.