Готові списки джерел за темами / Strategyproofne

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Добірка наукової літератури з теми "Strategyproofne"

Автор: Grafiati
Опубліковано: 11 березня 2023

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Статті в журналах з теми "Strategyproofne"

1

Brandt, Felix, Martin Bullinger, and Patrick Lederer. "On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 73 (April 1, 2022): 1093–130. http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.1.13449.

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Анотація:
Social choice functions (SCFs) map the preferences of a group of agents over some set of alternatives to a non-empty subset of alternatives. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem has shown that only extremely restrictive SCFs are strategyproof when there are more than two alternatives. For set-valued SCFs, or so-called social choice correspondences, the situation is less clear. There are miscellaneous -- mostly negative -- results using a variety of strategyproofness notions and additional requirements. The simple and intuitive notion of Kelly-strategyproofness has turned out to be particularly co
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2

Dhull, Komal, Steven Jecmen, Pravesh Kothari, and Nihar B. Shah. "Strategyproofing Peer Assessment via Partitioning: The Price in Terms of Evaluators’ Expertise." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Human Computation and Crowdsourcing 10, no. 1 (2022): 53–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/hcomp.v10i1.21987.

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Анотація:
Strategic behavior is a fundamental problem in a variety of real-world applications that require some form of peer assessment, such as peer grading of homeworks, grant proposal review, conference peer review of scientific papers, and peer assessment of employees in organizations. Since an individual's own work is in competition with the submissions they are evaluating, they may provide dishonest evaluations to increase the relative standing of their own submission. This issue is typically addressed by partitioning the individuals and assigning them to evaluate the work of only those from diffe
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3

Guo, Xiaoxi, Sujoy Sikdar, Lirong Xia, Yongzhi Cao, and Hanpin Wang. "Favoring Eagerness for Remaining Items: Designing Efficient, Fair, and Strategyproof Mechanisms." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 76 (January 21, 2023): 287–339. http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.1.13878.

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Анотація:
In the assignment problem, the goal is to assign indivisible items to agents who have ordinal preferences, efficiently and fairly, in a strategyproof manner. In practice, first-choice maximality, i.e., assigning a maximal number of agents their top items, is often identified as an important efficiency criterion and measure of agents' satisfaction. In this paper, we propose a natural and intuitive efficiency property, favoring-eagerness-for-remaining-items (FERI), which requires that each item is allocated to an agent who ranks it highest among remaining items, thereby implying first-choice max
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4

Brandt, Felix, and Christian Geist. "Finding Strategyproof Social Choice Functions via SAT Solving." Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research 55 (March 4, 2016): 565–602. http://dx.doi.org/10.1613/jair.4959.

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Анотація:
A promising direction in computational social choice is to address research problems using computer-aided proving techniques. In particular with SAT solvers, this approach has been shown to be viable not only for proving classic impossibility theorems such as Arrow's Theorem but also for finding new impossibilities in the context of preference extensions. In this paper, we demonstrate that these computer-aided techniques can also be applied to improve our understanding of strategyproof irresolute social choice functions. These functions, however, requires a more evolved encoding as otherwise t
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5

Budish, Eric, and Estelle Cantillon. "The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard." American Economic Review 102, no. 5 (2012): 2237–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/aer.102.5.2237.

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Анотація:
We use theory and field data to study the draft mechanism used to allocate courses at Harvard Business School. We show that the draft is manipulable in theory, manipulated in practice, and that these manipulations cause significant welfare loss. Nevertheless, we find that welfare is higher than under its widely studied strategyproof alternative. We identify a new link between fairness and welfare that explains why the draft performs well despite the costs of strategic behavior, and then design a new draft that reduces these costs. We draw several broader lessons for market design, regarding Pa
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6

Chida, Takafumi, Toshiya Kaihara, Nobutada Fujii, Daisuke Kokuryo, and Yuma Shiho. "Computational Study on Strategyproofness of Resource Matching in Crowdsourced Manufacturing." International Journal of Automation Technology 14, no. 5 (2020): 734–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.20965/ijat.2020.p0734.

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Анотація:
The need for a sustainable society has grown rapidly. This trend requires new production system concepts following an era of mass customization. As one of these new concepts, “crowdsourced manufacturing” has attracted noticeable attention. In such systems, each participant shares their manufacturing resources for ecosystem co-prosperity, providing new value for the next society. To realize such a concept, it is important to (1) match resource requests and resource offers so as to achieve high efficiency, and (2) induce participants to act in a fair way. Previously, some studies showed producti
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7

Zou, James, Sujit Gujar, and David Parkes. "Tolerable Manipulability in Dynamic Assignment without Money." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 24, no. 1 (2010): 947–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v24i1.7630.

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Анотація:
We study a problem of dynamic allocation without money. Agents have arrivals and departures and strict preferences over items. Strategyproofness requires the use of an arrival-priority serial-dictatorship (APSD) mechanism, which is ex post Pareto efficient but has poor ex ante efficiency as measured through average rank efficiency. We introduce the scoring-rule (SR) mechanism, which biases in favor of allocating items that an agent values above the population consensus. The SR mechanism is not strategyproof but has tolerable manipulability in the sense that: (i) if every agent optimally manipu
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8

Bichler, Martin, Zhen Hao, Richard Littmann, and Stefan Waldherr. "Strategyproof auction mechanisms for network procurement." OR Spectrum 42, no. 4 (2020): 965–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00291-020-00597-7.

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Анотація:
Abstract Deferred-acceptance auctions can be seen as heuristic algorithms to solve $${{\mathcal {N}}}{{\mathcal {P}}}$$ N P -hard allocation problems. Such auctions have been used in the context of the Incentive Auction by the US Federal Communications Commission in 2017, and they have remarkable incentive properties. Besides being strategyproof, they also prevent collusion among participants. Unfortunately, the worst-case approximation ratio of these algorithms is very low in general, but it was observed that they lead to near-optimal solutions in experiments on the specific allocation proble
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9

Aziz, Haris, Hau Chan, Barton Lee, Bo Li, and Toby Walsh. "Facility Location Problem with Capacity Constraints: Algorithmic and Mechanism Design Perspectives." Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence 34, no. 02 (2020): 1806–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5547.

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Анотація:
We consider the facility location problem in the one-dimensional setting where each facility can serve a limited number of agents from the algorithmic and mechanism design perspectives. From the algorithmic perspective, we prove that the corresponding optimization problem, where the goal is to locate facilities to minimize either the total cost to all agents or the maximum cost of any agent is NP-hard. However, we show that the problem is fixed-parameter tractable, and the optimal solution can be computed in polynomial time whenever the number of facilities is bounded, or when all facilities h
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10

Haeringer, Guillaume, and Hanna Hałaburda. "Monotone strategyproofness." Games and Economic Behavior 98 (July 2016): 68–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2016.05.007.

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Дисертації з теми "Strategyproofne"

1

Leroux, Justin Theodore. "Essays on strategyproofness in cooperative production." Thesis, 2005. http://hdl.handle.net/1911/18852.

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Анотація:
We study incentive compatible profit-sharing rules when output (or profit) is obtained via the joint use of a technology exhibiting decreasing marginal returns. The incentives compatibility criterion we adopt is that of strategy-proofness (SP), arguably the most robust and the most demanding incentives requirement. We first show that no strategy-proof mechanism is efficient. We then characterize the class of strategy-proof mechanisms in the two-agent case, and show that it is the union of the serial and reverse serial families of sharing rules. Moreover, SP and the requirement that no indivi
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Частини книг з теми "Strategyproofne"

1

Chun, Youngsub. "Strategyproofness." In Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33771-5_6.

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2

Kao, Ming-Yang. "Strategyproof." In Encyclopedia of Algorithms. Springer US, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-30162-4_405.

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3

Morrill, Thayer. "Beyond Strategyproofness." In The Future of Economic Design. Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_68.

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4

Chun, Youngsub. "Strategyproofness and Egalitarian Equivalence." In Studies in Choice and Welfare. Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-33771-5_7.

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5

Ferraioli, Diodato, and Carmine Ventre. "Obvious Strategyproofness, Bounded Rationality and Approximation." In Algorithmic Game Theory. Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-30473-7_6.

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6

Meir, Reshef. "Strategyproofness and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem." In Strategic Voting. Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-01579-3_3.

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7

Fotakis, Dimitris, and Panagiotis Patsilinakos. "Strategyproof Facility Location in Perturbation Stable Instances." In Web and Internet Economics. Springer International Publishing, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-94676-0_6.

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8

Gopinathan, Ajay, and Zongpeng Li. "Strategyproof Mechanisms for Content Delivery via Layered Multicast." In NETWORKING 2011. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2011. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-20798-3_7.

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9

Immorlica, Nicole, and Emmanouil Pountourakis. "On Budget-Balanced Group-Strategyproof Cost-Sharing Mechanisms." In Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-35311-6_18.

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10

Xu, Ping, and Xiang-Yang Li. "SOFA: Strategyproof Online Frequency Allocation for Multihop Wireless Networks." In Algorithms and Computation. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-10631-6_33.

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Тези доповідей конференцій з теми "Strategyproofne"

1

Lederer, Patrick. "Strategyproof Randomized Social Choice for Restricted Sets of Utility Functions." In Thirtieth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-21}. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2021/43.

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Анотація:
When aggregating preferences of multiple agents, strategyproofness is a fundamental requirement. For randomized voting rules, so-called social decision schemes (SDSs), strategyproofness is usually formalized with the help of utility functions. A classic result shown by Gibbard in 1977 characterizes the set of SDSs that are strategyproof with respect to all utility functions and shows that these SDSs are either indecisive or unfair. For finding more insights into the trade-off between strategyproofness and decisiveness, we propose the notion of U-strategyproofness which requires that only voter
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2

Menon, Vijay, and Kate Larson. "Deterministic, Strategyproof, and Fair Cake Cutting." In Twenty-Sixth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2017/50.

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Анотація:
We study the classic cake cutting problem from a mechanism design perspective, in particular focusing on deterministic mechanisms that are strategyproof and fair. We begin by looking at mechanisms that are non-wasteful and primarily show that for even the restricted class of piecewise constant valuations there exists no direct-revelation mechanism that is strategyproof and even approximately proportional. Subsequently, we remove the non-wasteful constraint and show another impossibility result stating that there is no strategyproof and approximately proportional direct-revelation mechanism tha
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3

Li, Minming, Pinyan Lu, Yuhao Yao, and Jialin Zhang. "Strategyproof Mechanism for Two Heterogeneous Facilities with Constant Approximation Ratio." In Twenty-Ninth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Seventeenth Pacific Rim International Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-PRICAI-20}. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2020/34.

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In this paper, we study the two-facility location game with optional preference where the acceptable set of facilities for each agent could be different and an agent's cost is his distance to the closest facility within his acceptable set. The objective is to minimize the total cost of all agents while achieving strategyproofness. For general metrics, we design a deterministic strategyproof mechanism for the problem with approximation ratio of 1+2alpha, where alpha is the approximation ratio of the optimization version. In particular, for the setting on a line, we improve the earlier best rati
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4

Xu, Yichong, Han Zhao, Xiaofei Shi, and Nihar B. Shah. "On Strategyproof Conference Peer Review." In Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-19}. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2019/87.

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Анотація:
We consider peer review under a conference setting where there are conflicts between the reviewers and the submissions. Under such conflicts, reviewers can manipulate their reviews in a strategic manner to influence the final rankings of their own papers. Present-day peer-review systems are not designed to guard against such strategic behavior, beyond minimal (and insufficient) checks such as not assigning a paper to a conflicted reviewer. In this work, we address this problem through the lens of social choice, and present a theoretical framework for strategyproof and efficient peer review. Gi
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5

Brandt, Felix, Patrick Lederer, and Warut Suksompong. "Incentives in Social Decision Schemes with Pairwise Comparison Preferences." In Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-22}. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2022/19.

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Анотація:
Social decision schemes (SDSs) map the preferences of individual voters over multiple alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. In order to study properties such as efficiency, strategyproofness, and participation for SDSs, preferences over alternatives are typically lifted to preferences over lotteries using the notion of stochastic dominance (SD). However, requiring strategyproofness or strict participation with respect to this preference extension only leaves room for rather undesirable SDSs such as random dictatorships. Hence, we focus on the natural but little unde
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6

Varloot, Estelle Marine, and Rida Laraki. "Level-strategyproof Belief Aggregation Mechanisms." In EC '22: The 23rd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. ACM, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3490486.3538309.

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7

Gopinathan, Ajay, and Zongpeng Li. "Strategyproof Wireless Spectrum Auctions with Interference." In GLOBECOM 2010 - 2010 IEEE Global Communications Conference. IEEE, 2010. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/glocom.2010.5684075.

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8

Wang, Jiafan, and Sherman S. M. Chow. "Secure Strategyproof Ascending-Price Spectrum Auction." In 2017 IEEE Symposium on Privacy-Aware Computing (PAC). IEEE, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/pac.2017.42.

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9

Ferraioli, Diodato, and Carmine Ventre. "Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms." In Twenty-Seventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence {IJCAI-18}. International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.24963/ijcai.2018/33.

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Анотація:
Obviously strategyproof (OSP) mechanisms maintain the incentive compatibility of agents that are not fully rational. They have been object of a number of studies since their recent definition. A research agenda, initiated in [Ferraioli and Ventre, 2017], is to find a small set (possibly, the smallest) of conditions allowing to implement an OSP mechanism. To this aim, we define a model of probabilistic verification wherein agents are caught misbehaving with a certain probability, and show how OSP mechanisms can implement every social choice function at the cost of either imposing very large fin
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10

Chen, Yiling, Chara Podimata, Ariel D. Procaccia, and Nisarg Shah. "Strategyproof Linear Regression in High Dimensions." In EC '18: ACM Conference on Economics and Computation. ACM, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/3219166.3219175.

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