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Academic literature on the topic '利益分析'
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Journal articles on the topic "利益分析"
吴, 银霞. "技工院校产教融合发展的利益驱动细化研究与对策." 教育科学发展 2, no. 4 (September 8, 2020): 134–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.36012/sde.v2i4.1894.
Full text郭, 月楠. "基于博弈论视角的榆林文化旅游产业 公共管理体制现状分析." 财经与管理 3, no. 5 (September 16, 2019): 70. http://dx.doi.org/10.26549/cjygl.v3i5.2272.
Full text崔, 振莉. "浅析引岗渠渠系灌溉用水量情况." 水电科技 3, no. 6 (December 31, 2020): 52. http://dx.doi.org/10.33142/hst.v3i6.2999.
Full text何, 红卫. "国有土地上房屋征收中各类土地使用权价值分析." 智能城市应用 3, no. 5 (September 3, 2020): 43. http://dx.doi.org/10.33142/sca.v3i5.2296.
Full text黄, 震茹, and 彩虹 刘. "基于顾客视角下的茶饮行业营销策略研究——以“益禾堂”为例." 财经与管理 4, no. 10 (November 25, 2020): 105. http://dx.doi.org/10.26549/cjygl.v4i10.5935.
Full text任, 润泽, and 玉梅 昝. "新时期小型农田水利工程管理问题与对策." 水利科学与技术 1, no. 2 (December 25, 2019): 19. http://dx.doi.org/10.26549/slkxyjs.v1i2.2908.
Full text高, 怀欣, and 炳强 丁. "水利工程土石方施工技术探索." 水电科技 4, no. 2 (April 30, 2021): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.33142/hst.v4i2.3794.
Full text李, 润发, 巧. 易, and 欧. 王. "利益冲突视角下应用型本科院校校企共建实践基地探讨." 教学方法创新与实践 3, no. 13 (November 25, 2020): 178. http://dx.doi.org/10.26549/jxffcxysj.v3i13.5820.
Full text邱, 珊. "上市公司资本结构对企业价值的影响." 财经与管理 4, no. 2 (March 18, 2020): 10. http://dx.doi.org/10.26549/cjygl.v4i2.3371.
Full text张, 娜., and 进. 陈. "电商平台与农场合作模式分析." 财经与管理 4, no. 10 (November 25, 2020): 5. http://dx.doi.org/10.26549/cjygl.v4i10.5726.
Full textDissertations / Theses on the topic "利益分析"
KIMURA, Toshio, and 敏夫 木村. "報告利益とキャッシュフローの事例分析 : 「キャッシュフロー計算書」の分析可能性の再考." 名古屋大学大学院経済学研究科, 2012. http://hdl.handle.net/2237/16280.
Full text城戸, 英樹. "地方制度改革の比較分析―政治家と政党による地方政府利益の表出―." 京都大学 (Kyoto University), 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/2433/126772.
Full textChang, Chih-Wei, and 張志維. "社區發展政策利益分配的實證分析." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/19422182008029359587.
Full text國立臺北大學
公共行政暨政策學系
99
This thesis observes the distribution of community development policy benefits over the past few years from the political perspective. According to the past researches related to political issues, we focus on the influence of party, electoral institution of legislator, and the president of community development association on the distribution of policy benefit. The author uses multiple regression analysis to analyze the budget for community development of county and the grant for community development associations from central government (including the Ministry of the Interior, MOI, and the Council for Cultural Affairs, CCA) . The statistical findings are shown that, first of all, the county magistrate’s party membership does influence the allocation of the grant of MOI. In the sense that during the DPP administration in central government, counties that hold by DPP receive more MOI grants than other counties. On the other hand, the county government's budget and CCA grants data do not reach statistical significance level, but the sign of the regression coefficients is still in line with expectations in this thesis. Second, the legislator’s electoral institution factors, including district magnitude and vote-concentrated area, also influence the allocation of funds to the community development association of MOI. We find that the counties with large legislative district magnitude receive limited funds. Furthermore, when legislator’s vote-concentrated areas have more community development associations, the county tend to receive more funds. While CCA grants data do not reach statistical significance level, but the sign of the regression coefficients is still in line with expectations in this thesis. Finally, we find that the grants for community development association from MOI or CCA do make difference, if the president of community development association serve the post of village chief or not. However, past studies suggest that the president of community development association and the village chief by the same person will secure more grant, our findings clearly do not support such a view. We find that both show a negative relationship.
YOU, SU-JIU, and 游素秋. "國際證券投貨組合利益之分析." Thesis, 1989. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/94019211082995853565.
Full text蔡昆宏. "中共大國外交政策的家利益分析." Thesis, 2003. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/58641080579060847165.
Full textFAN, SHIN, and 范忻. "證券分析師角色與利益衝突之探討." Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/09252303191360912540.
Full textHong, Tsai Kung, and 蔡昆宏. "中共大國外交政策的國家利益分析." Thesis, 2003. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/02079117427286653962.
Full textTseng, Pei Hua, and 曾姵華. "勸退參選的賽局分析-政黨利益模型." Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/62688633799247396718.
Full text國立政治大學
財政研究所
96
After observing most elections in Taiwan, including the elections of the mayor, the head of the county and the legislators, it is very often for us to find those reports about that the authorities of the party dissuade the beginning candidates from running for the elections in order to raise the winning chance in elections. Jue-Shyan(2007)once discussed this correlative issue, and the focus of his paper is those elections that are only inside the party. However, to make the model in accord with the current conditions, we put another variable, the gain from the winning candidate of the same party, into the model to do further analyses. This paper establishes a model of game theory by using the concept of sequential equilibrium to explain the phenomenon in which authorities of the party dissuade the beginning candidates from running for the elections. Besides, it also points out that it is more difficult for the authorities to dissuade candidates from running for elections under the following conditions: the position in the party to be campaigned is higher, the winning probability of competing with other party is higher, and the opponent of the other party is not tough.
Lee, Yu-Ju, and 李育儒. "市場作為一種利益鬥爭結構:外資在台灣股市的利益社會學分析." Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/16932926537822171886.
Full textBooks on the topic "利益分析"
濮阳市地下水漏斗区综合治理研究. Frontier Scientific Publishing Pte. Ltd., 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.32629/9789811463044.
Full text水资源论证报告书中问题及案例分析. Frontier Scientific Publishing Pte. Ltd., 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.32629/9789811475559.
Full text新乡市水文水资源监测站基本资料实用手册. Frontier Scientific Publishing Pte. Ltd., 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.32629/9789811448102.
Full text河南省漳卫南运河水系主要河流纳污能力计算分析与研究. Frontier Scientific Publishing Pte. Ltd., 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.32629/9789811469176.
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