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Journal articles on the topic '法哲學'
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DUH, Baurui. "中國哲學史方法論----以四方架構為中心/The Methodology of Chinese Philosophical History–Exemplifies by the Four Square Framework." Asian Studies, no. 1 (September 25, 2012): 3–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.4312/as.2012.-16.1.3-27.
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摘要針對傳統文本詮釋的需求，筆者提出一套「中國哲學史方法論」。以「宇宙論、本體論、工夫論、境界論」為哲學基本問題所組成的四方詮釋架構，它既有詮釋文本的功能，更有溝通中西的效果。同時，不妨礙仍以西方哲學的形上學、知識論、倫理學為進路進行「中國哲學研究」。關鍵詞：中國哲學方法論, 中國哲學史方法論, 宇宙論, 本體論, 工夫論, 境界論, 文本詮釋, 分類判教 The author suggests a method of text interpretative orientated methodological approach which has given the name of methodology of Chinese philosophical history. It is actually an interpretational system constructed by four basic philosophical questions which have all marked Chinese philosophy. They are cosmology, ontology, practical theory and theory of perfect personality. This paper focuses on introducing the methodology, its functioning, as well as its contributions and limitations. Any scholar can use this methodology to do his or hers own research work, as well as apply traditional Western philosophical method to the Chinese philosophy without any contradiction.
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LEE, Jer-shiarn. "論戴震 (1723–1777) 之考證哲學及其反思/On Dai Zhen’s (1723–1777) Philosophy of Evidential Research and Its Reflection." Asian Studies, no. 1 (September 25, 2012): 29–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.4312/as.2012.-16.1.29-41.
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摘要清代乾嘉時期之學風係以考證知名。之所以如此，主要由於乾嘉學者不滿宋、明學者以哲學思辯之方式研究儒學典籍，而未能把握原始儒學之真貌，故轉而以考證之方式來研究儒家之原典，其目的在於欲恢復原始儒學之真貌。在乾嘉時期，戴震雖被視為最重要之考證學者之一，然戴氏為學之旨趣，實超出考證學之外，而欲以之作為彰顯儒學原貌之方法學。戴氏明言，其為學之方法乃是一語言學或訓詁之方法，亦即欲以訓詁之方法來研究哲學之問題，以之作為彰顯原始儒學真相之最佳方法，並由此建立其考證哲學，其目的即欲以本身之哲學來取代宋、明理學。依此，本文旨在探究戴震在重建原始儒學之努力，並針對戴氏之考證哲學作一反思，以明其價值及限制。關鍵詞：考證學、復古主義、理學、漢學、考證哲學Dai Zhen was known as a leading proponent of the evidential research (kaozheng) school during the Qian Jia Era. However, he regarded kaozheng as primarily a means of revealing the truth. Moreover, he was regarded as a philosopher rather than as merely a kaozheng, or textual, scholar. In this respect, his philosophical writings reflect an attempt to substitute his own philosophy for the Song Philosophy of Principle (lixue). Dai Zhen’s philosophical writings indicate the impact philology had on philosophical issues. The methodology Dai Zhen adopted was essentially linguistic, that is, xungu (etymology, lit., “glossing”). The merit of this methodology was that it would trace back the original meanings of key terms in the Classics, and this in turn, would benefit the understanding of the Confucian tradition. The aim of this paper is to explore Dai Zhen’s attempt to reconstruct the Confucian tradition, and to assess his philosophy of evidential research in order to manifest its value and limitation.
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김지수. "莊子의 法哲學." Ilkam Law Review ll, no. 21 (February 2012): 321–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.35148/ilsilr.2012..21.321.
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HE, Huaihong. "預期壽命與生命之道——以當代中國與法國哲學家為例." International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 12, no. 2 (January 1, 2014): 51–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.121566.
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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.比較中國和法國20 世紀以來重要哲學家的壽數，以及兩國哲學家和普通人口平均預期壽命的差異，可以發現一個似乎乖謬的事實：法國哲學家在社會境遇優於中國哲學家的情況下，壽命總的來說低於中國哲學家的壽命。本文推測，這事實主要和兩國哲學家持有的不同“生命之道”有關：即中國崇尚自然中和的“生命之道”，在相當程度上使中國哲學家得享高壽。The aim of this article is to describe and explain the seeming paradox that although the social situation of French philosophers is significantly better than that of Chinese philosophers, their life expectancy is lower. The lives of important Chinese and French philosophers of the 20th and 21st centuries are compared and the average life expectancy in their respective nations is explored. Based on the findings of this investigation, it is speculated that the most important cause of the abovementioned paradox lies in differences in “ways of life.” Compared with French philosophers, Chinese philosophers advocate a more natural and harmonious way of life, which is argued to considerably influence their life expectancy.The creativity and influence of an individual’s philosophical thought do not depend on the length of his life. Longevity is not the highest purpose of life, let alone its only goal. Nevertheless, it is important for individuals to experience full and meaningful lives and reach their natural life ends.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 88 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.
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LIZZA, John P. "萬物之靈與死亡: 我們的死亡法律定義在形而上學錯在哪裡？." International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 2, no. 3 (January 1, 1999): 59–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.21375.
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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese本文對1981年醫學以及生物醫學和行為科學研究倫理問題總統委員會的建議提出異議，該委員會建議美國的所有司法機構應該採納統一死亡確定法案，該法採取全腦死亡定義，而不是高級腦死亡定義。我要論証委員會以哲學家們或一般人群對構成“萬物之靈”（personhood）的是甚麼沒有一致意見為理由，擯棄支持高級腦定義的“萬物之靈論據”是錯誤的。我主張，哲學家們同意認識功能的某些潛力是萬物之靈的必要條件，這一條件不存在於無腦畸形和持續性植物狀態（PVS），所以這類人應被認為死人。我進一步論証，一般人群之間缺乏一致意見在很大程度上是由於對PVS的醫學現實有誤解，以及受到對處於PVS的特殊個人的感情的影響。我也考查並反對曾用來支持委員會立場的兩個可能的論據：高級腦定義會威脅年遇老年人和嚴重致殘者，目前沒有充分的醫學技術來確定何時高級腦活動已經停止。DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 26 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.
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CHAN, Jonathan. "導言." International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 5, no. 1 (January 1, 2007): 1–3. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.51434.
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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese生命倫理學深受英美的道德哲學（尤其是自由主義）的影響，這是無庸置疑的事實。大部分當代生命倫理學的著作都是從自由主義的道德前提出發來論証關於生命倫理課題的結論。然而必須提出的問題是，從事生命倫理學的探究是否必須從自由主義的道德前提出發？Norman Daniels 等生命倫理學家在其近作From Chance to Choice: Genetics & Justice 一書的一篇附錄裏指出，自由主義的道德架構是目前得到最佳表述和辯護的道德思想架構，其言下之意是理所當然地我們應從此一架構的道德前提出發從事生命倫理學的探究。然而， 倘若我們接受著名道德哲學家Alasdair Macintyre 對道德探究的看法，我們就不會同意Daniels 等人的看法。Macintyre 認為自由主義只是眾多的道德傳統之一，他在Whose Justice? Which Rationality?一書里指出並沒有跨越不同傳統的理性標準可用以支持自由主義具有普遍的合理性。相反，他認為不同傳統本身就其備了它的合理性。DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 19 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.
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LO, Ping Cheung. "儒化中醫哲學與當代基因改造人性道德爭論." International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 6, no. 1 (January 1, 2008): 147–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.61459.
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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.當代世界其中一個重大道德爭議是，以基因科技改造人性應否進行。一些平常學術著作不討論這類問題的西方哲學家（如Habermas, Fukuyama, Sandel）也紛紛加入討論，可見這問題的劃時代重要性。本文希望透過整理及分析傳統中國思想來看這個道德爭議。直到今天，傳統中醫並不依賴高科技。其中一個原因是《黃帝內經》中的“人與天地相應”這基本看法。然而，醫治病人始終是一個人為行動，而非天地自然所為。如何在一個強調人配合天工的思維框架中為醫者的人工行為辯護，是明清時期不少醫學哲學所討論的議題。《黃帝內經》原與《周易》及《老子》皆有相通之處，到明清時期，由於儒醫的大量出現，及朱子理學的官學地位，很多儒化（理學化）的中醫哲學便冒現。透過“人補造化”、“人補天之缺陷”、“人補天功”、“人挽回天”等新瓶，承載《中庸》的人參贊天地化育的舊酒。本文會嘗試說明這個中醫哲學的天人觀，蘊涵支持基因科技的治療用途，但不蘊涵支持基因科技的優生用途。本文的用意並非要提供一個決定性或最終的論證，終極地反駁所有贊成基因改造人性的論證。本文所起的作用，只在提供一個非西方式的思考方法，以傳統儒化中醫哲學為資源，協助人類以多元文化角度思考當代重大道德爭議。Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM), even in modern time, does not rely on high technology. This is partly due to TCM's worldview in which the oneness of human beings with nature is of paramount importance. But this non-reliance on high technology does not prevent TCM thinkers from recognizing that healing is still an artificial act. A philosophical justification for this artif iciality within the worldview of human-nature oneness is needed. Such philosophical justifications became more frequent in the Confucianized medicine manuals of the Ming and Qing Dynasties (1368-1644, 1644-1911 C.E.). This paper surveys and analyzes these seldom-discussed medical-philosophical writings and attempts to articulate a representative Confucian philosophical justif ication for“ human intervention into nature” in the practice of TCM. Both the necessity and the moral limits of this intervention will be noted. I shall then argue that such a worldview of“ limited human intervention into nature” is significantly different from that of the modern West since Francis Bacon, which informs some contemporary Western enthusiastic advocates of the genetic enhancement of human beings. This model will then serve illustrating an Asian way of thinking about science, technology, and values which is very different from a predominant Western paradigm.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 368 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.
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CRUZ, Albert. "Coaching Behaviours and Philosophy of High Performance Secondary School Basketball Coaches." Asian Journal of Physical Education & Recreation 20, no. 1 (June 1, 2014): 21–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ajper.201811.
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The purpose of the study was to examine the coaching behaviours and philosophy of four high performance secondary school basketball coaches during their in-season practice sessions. A mixed-method approach was used to identify the coaching behaviours used by the four coaches in the practice environment and to generate an insight into the rationales that underpinned their use. They were videotaped and observed coaching four practice sessions with their own teams. The videotaped sessions were coded using the Arizona State University Observation Instrument (ASUOI) (Lacy & Darst, 1984). Data generated by the ASUOI provided information of the percentages of coaching behavioral categories of the coaches. The four coaches were interviewed after their practice sessions. Qualitative data were collected through field observations and interviews. Constant comparison and analytic induction were used to organize and categorize the data. Data analyzing attempted to provide explanations and rationales for their coaching behaviours and philosophy in the practice sessions. Findings of the study helped to provide a more holistic understanding of the coaching behaviours and philosophy of high performance basketball coaches. This information is invaluable and significant in the training and advancement of both apprentice and veteran coach in basketball as well as other sports areas.
本研究目的是探究四位出色表現中學籃球教練在賽季訓練時的教練行為及哲學理念。研究方法是採用混合模式去識別教練行為及其背後理念。教練被錄影及觀察四節球隊訓練課。訓練課利用ASUOI觀察系統分析教練行為及提供行為百分比資料。四位教練於訓練課後接受訪談。以持續比較法分析歸納訪談及觀察數據說明教練行為及哲學理念原因。研究結果協助全面理解教練行為及哲學理念。此等資料對於培訓新手及經驗籃球教練及其他運動教練圽為重要。
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BEAUCHAMP, Tom L. "醫學道德的內在和外在標準." International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 4, no. 1 (January 1, 2002): 25–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.41419.
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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese醫學倫理學結論的基礎和依據何在？這些基礎和依據是內在還是外在的？根據近來的討論，有三種不同的說法：一種是內在的解釋；一種是外在的解釋；還有一種是內在因素和外在因素給合的解釋。第一種是從醫學角度以及專業實踐的標準中發展一套倫理觀。第二種解釋醫學倫理學中的規範是以外在的標準為依據。例如公眾的意見、法律、宗教倫理觀或哲學倫理觀等。第三種則認為個別的醫學倫理權是從個別的文化架構產生出來的，而每一種文化都有管制醫生的規範。每一種觀點都有可取之處，但每一種也不足以支持它自己的論辯以及無法結合其他觀點中合理和可取的部分。本文建議的第四種解釋，它既可以提供一個避開上述三種觀點的限制的方法。同時又能保留每一種觀點當中最可圈可點的特徵。DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 15 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.
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ZHANG, Ellen Y. "導言." International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 8, no. 1 (January 1, 2010): 1–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.81482.
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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese生命倫理學於20 世紀70 年代在北美出現。生命倫理學(bioethics)一詞本是美國生化學家波德(Van Rensselaer Potter II)所創造的一個新概念，用以指生態學意義下的“生存之科學”(science of survival )，與今日通用的意義有所不同。今天，生命倫理學有時也稱之為醫藥倫理學(medical ethics)，而它已經成為一個重要的倫理學科。作為應用倫理學的一個部分，生命倫理學的特質在於不同學科的交叉，其中包括醫學、生物學、哲學、政治學、法學等等。就其思想淵源來講，西方啟蒙理性、個人主義、原則主義又是生命倫理學的核心部分，而原則主義又是以個人的理性主義為其理論基礎。無疑，生命倫理學是一門從裡到外道地的“西學”。因此，當我們談論建構中國生命倫理學這個議題時，有些問題是不能迴避的。譬如，我們是否可以照搬西方思想？如果不能，中國的國學如何與西學接軌？DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 111 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.
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WHITE, Becky Cox, and Joel ZIMBELMAN. "放棄知情同意: 一個尚未成熟的想法." International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 2, no. 2 (January 1, 1999): 53–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.21368.
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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese在晚近對知情同意的批判裏，Robert Veatch論證， 這種實踐之發展目標，在原則上是無法達成的。筆者則認為，Veatch以病人最佳利益之決定在理論不可能性為焦點，被誤用到醫療的實踐學科裏，而且，他誤以為病人／醫生的溝通，無法提供確保病人最佳利益的知識。筆者亦將推斷，Veatch倡議的那種以價值為基礎的專業配對，根據他自己的標準來看，是不可能落實的。最後，我們要重新檢視知情同意在哲學和實踐上的成立理由，並歸結核實踐應該保留下來。DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 17 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.
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FAN, Ruiping. "導言." International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 8, no. 2 (January 1, 2010): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.81488.
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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese本期首先推出邊林對中國大陸生命倫理學的形成及三十年來的發展歷程進行總結和反思的論文。本文富有哲學見地，且不作現實粉飾，實話實說，值得關心這一學科的人認真閱讀。在邊林看來，一種學問的本質乃是對一個事物的邏輯構建，而任何事物的合理的邏輯構建都必須與這個事物的實際發展過程以及人們對它的認識過程相統一。生命倫理學當然也不例外，其合理的構建勢必是一種邏輯體系的構建。所以，歷史與邏輯的統一是考察具有哲學特性的生命倫理學學科的重要認識視角和方法根據。邊林認為生命倫理學在美國的產生與發展在本質上體現了歷史與邏輯的統一。生命倫理學肇始於美國，恰恰是在美國社會特定歷史階段的文化與科學兩大洪流衝擊下的產物：既是具有顯著學理特徵的西方現代、後現代哲學和倫理學向生命道德領域延伸和擴展的結果，也是科學技術特別是生命科學技術開始進入快速發展期帶來的社會觀念、社會心理以及倫理標準調整、醫學和生命倫理難題大量湧現導致強烈現實需求的產物。它是在一定意義上完成了對醫學倫理學的一個超越，用更寬闊的視野和更深入的思考來認識、評價生命的道德問題，並且將這一學科置於西方倫理傳統和現代思想完整而系統的本體論承諾上。無論道德多元化為“道德異鄉人”之間帶來多少道德矛盾和差異，西方生命倫理學大體都是在自由主義的旗幟下尋求行為的道德解釋和道德根據。相對比，中國大陸生命倫理學的形成過程恰恰缺失了西方生命倫理學所具有的這種統一性。在邊林看來，中國生命倫理學的形成與發展本來也應該是歷史與邏輯的統一，可惜的是，事實並非如此。由於特定歷史階段中國社會現實以及思想和人文環境的原因，中國大陸的生命倫理學在其形成階段就存在先天性的缺陷。而且，在其發展過程中，先天缺陷並沒有得到矯正，邏輯演化過程出現了失常。邊林概述的這種缺陷和失常，在本期其他論文所論述的問題上也得到了印證和例示，諸如蔡昱所討論的臨床醫療決策權之歸屬問題，姜蘭姝等所關注的老人長期照護問題，鄧蕊所探討的倫理審查的制度歷史、運行現狀與困境問題，以及李菊萍所報告的DNA 親子鑒定的倫理與法律問題。最後，邊林深刻地指出，中國現在所具有的生命倫理學並不是、至少從根本意義上說還不是中國自己的生命倫理學，因為它所具有的並不是生長在與它應該相連的根系上，因而不能形成以此為基礎的本體論承諾。從這種意義上我們可以認為中國還沒有生命倫理學，所以中國的生命倫理學就必然產生需要建構的問題。DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 23 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.
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LIU, Jitong, and Dongqi ZHANG. "中國醫改實踐的生命倫理學困境與中國結構性倫理學視角." International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 9, no. 2 (January 1, 2011): 91–108. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.91508.
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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.改革開放以來，中國醫藥衞生體制改革實踐面臨諸多問題，其中包括政治、經濟、社會、文化和倫理議題。醫護人員的價值觀念、道德判斷、行為規範和專業精神的危機集中體現在生命倫理學結構性困境狀況之中。現時中國醫患關係空前絕後的結構性緊張狀況正是最典型的例證。本文試圖從中國道德哲學、道德社會史、中國社會史和醫學社會史等視角，運用文獻回顧、衞生政策比較研究和案例分析等方法，回顧西方倫理學史及其個人主義生命倫理學典範之歷史演變；並在中國社會結構性轉型與醫藥衞生體制改革的宏觀社會處境下，分析中國道德哲學和生命倫理學的思想傳統及其面臨的挑戰。文章根據醫藥衞生體制改革和生命倫理學實踐，提出具中國特色的“結構性倫理學和結構性生命倫理學”。作者試圖闡述“結構性倫理學與結構性生命倫理學”體系的內涵外延、構成要素、範圍內容、基本特點和結構性成因，尤其是這種體系對目前中國醫藥衞生體制改革政策之意義。The medical reform in China over the past decade is facing various challenges, such as physician-patient relations, healthcare allocation, and the ethics of medical professionalism. This paper attempts to argue that the medical situation in China today cannot be fully understood without examining its cultural, social, and political superstructure, which clarifies the situation in China in the current transitional stage. The studies described in the paper are based on documented literatures that include various “ideal types” in terms of moral philosophies and governmental policies intended to resolve the problems at the practical level. Nevertheless, the attempt to uncover what they refer to as a form of “structural bioethics” could directly influence the on-going medical reform today as well as the re-construction of bioethical theory in China. The approach taken in the paper is historical, textual, and sociological.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 61 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.
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FAN, Ruiping. "導言: 中美生命倫理學——幼稚與無聊." International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 4, no. 1 (January 1, 2002): 1–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.41417.
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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese“生命倫理學為何變得如此無聊？”這是美國的一位老牌生命倫理學家Albert Jonsen 在美國《醫學與哲學期刊》2000 年最後一期中的論文標題。在Jonsen 看來，美國的生命倫理學已經讓人不勝其煩，她的思想已無新意，問題和論証總是美國式的（domesticated ），而且太多的東西都轉不出美國的風水之外（too much at home in accustomed places）（頁691 ）。Jonsen似乎懷念生命倫理學的先驅人物Paul Ramsey和Joseph Fletcher 在20 世紀60 年代包打天下 ，與當時的家長主義醫學大戰幾個回合的英雄時代。他們的充沛的思想激蕩，敏銳的政治感覺和無尚的道德勇氣在當今的生命倫理學中已屬昨日黃花，盛景不再（頁692）。如何克服當今美國生命倫理學的無聊呢？ Jonsen 開出了一服包含兩味葯劑的處方。其一，走出自己的專業（倫理學）行當，更多地瀏覽一下其他學科的情況－－不僅包括生物學，醫學和法學，還包括社會學，人類學，經濟學，歷史學等社會科學。其二是走出國門，到其他文化中去觀賞一番。Jonsen認為，只有在外國生活過一段的人才能認識到祖國的重要特徵（頁696 ）。只有通過與別人的比較才能看清美國生命倫理學的價值承諾，榮辱得失和根木所在（頁698 ）。DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 14 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.
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LI, Hongwen. "莊子的生命自由觀及其生命倫理學意義." International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 6, no. 2 (January 1, 2008): 53–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.61463.
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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.莊子的生命自由觀是一種用自由來定義生命的哲學觀念，其核心內容是追求無待的絕對自由觀，以“吾喪我”來消解人的主體意識、“齊萬物”的平等精神，以及同生死的觀念。無待的自由是指一種絕對的、不依賴於外在條件的自由，它體現為無己、無功和無名。“無待”的主旨就是超越主觀和客觀的對立，超越有限的自我，達到無限而自由的自我。“喪我”便是摒棄偏執的我、固執的我。這個偏執的“我”是封閉的我，是假我；喪失了“我”的“吾”才是開放的我，才是拋棄了偏執的本真之我。莊子的“吾喪我”乃是一種消解主體意識的方式，超越了西方主體哲學的主觀和客觀的二元對立模式。“齊物論”闡發的是平等思想，它包括三個方面：即物物平等、人人平等、人與萬物平等。莊子認為人的生死是自然世界中的一個普通事件，人的身體乃是由外在物質世界元素（氣）假借而成，只是暫時的湊集，終究是要滅亡的。這些哲學觀念對中國生命倫理學的建構具有重要的意義，主要表現在：消解人的主體性和自主性，以區別於西方生命倫理學尊重自主性原則；物物平等、人人平等以及人與萬物平等的思想對生命倫理學提出了更高的要求；以貴生、養生的方法來善待生命，反對對生命的強干涉主義。Freedom is a key concept in the philosophy of Zhuangzi. This kind of freedom requires a deconstruction of the “subject…predicate” logic and an attitude that views all things equally. The ethical views of Zhuangzi focus on the notion of “losing oneself” or “forgetting oneself”, the purpose of which is to subvert the position between subject and object and to see things as they are. Unlike the Western idea of individual autonomy, Zhuangzi’s concept of freedom is based on the interconnectedness between individuals. This essay contends that the Daoist position on the meaning of human life and freedom can serve as a source of inspiration when we consider the many bioethical issues we face today—including the issue of life and death—and how to interpret those issues within the Chinese context.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 4268 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.
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ENGELHARDT, H. Tristram. "意識形態與疾病學說." International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 1, no. 2 (January 1, 1998): 115–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.11338.
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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese臨床工作者在閱讀Margolis 教授的文章（1976, pp. 238-55）時，有可能會對“醫學是意識形態”（p. 253）的說法感到吃驚。即使把同性戀愛或多指畸形判斷為疾病是由於文化方面的偏見；但原發支氣管癌和傷寒仍確定無疑是疾病，與任何具體的文化或意識形態都無關。疾病狀態似乎有一個硬核，承認這種狀態並不是文化習慣的作用，更不是意識形態的作用。而且，這個硬核似乎相當大，包括大量的傳染病和代謝病一事實上包括所有危害人體基本功能、具有明顯軀體基礎的那些疾病。不只是臨床工作者，還有一些醫學哲學家們也會把Margolis的論點看作是關於疾病本性的一種危險的曲解，是根據文化方面的幻想，按照一時興致所在，對健康和疾病的概念重新下了定義。DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 17 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.
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LIU, Yunzhang, Jinping ZHAO, and Jia XIE. "從莊子生命哲學到生命倫理學四原則的互補整合." International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 8, no. 1 (January 1, 2010): 61–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.81485.
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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.構建中國生命倫理學基本原則所秉持的根本方法應是整合。筆者認為，莊子的生命哲學思想與比徹姆 (Tom L. Beauchamp) 和丘卓斯(James F. Childress) 的生命倫理四原則從不同的角度，為這種整合提供了理論資源。莊子的生命哲學內涵豐富，關注生命本身、關注生命的平等和關注生命存在的本真價值與意義；秉持生是適時，死是順應的自然主義生死觀；追求超越世俗的自由“逍遙”的生存狀態；重視“養生”、“可以盡年”，實踐無慾無為的養生觀；主張“以天地為棺槨”，反對“厚葬”的陋習等等，這些都具有積極意義。這些思想歸結起來就是要“和諧”。和諧是自然萬物的存在秩序，是人的身心健康的根本保障，也是我們在構建中國生命倫理學基本原則時所需要把握的核心價值。而比徹姆和丘卓斯的生命倫理四原則從醫療衞生事業的發展與醫療實踐的角度為我們提供了更清晰、更明確去解決生命倫理問題的原則指導。在此基礎上構建起來的中國生命倫理學基本原則是以“和諧”為中心的體現，在多領域中的原則總體，包括人與自然領域的“和諧生態”原則、人與社會領域的“和諧社會”原則、人與自身領域的“和諧人格”原則、人與醫學領域的“和諧醫學”原則等。運用這些基本原則指導人們的現實倫理生活，規範、分析和解決人們現實生活中存在的種種生命倫理問題，推進社會文明的進步與人類自我價值的提升。The four-principles approach to bioethics developed by Beauchamp and Childress in Principles of Biomedical Ethics is no doubt the most well known and influential example in the West of principle-based approaches to resolve ethical issues. The four principles are autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice. This essay explores whether the four principles can be considered a universal core of morality that can be used in China to deal with current bioethical issues. It argues that although the four principles provide general guidelines, their implementation is much more complex. This essay attempts to show that Daoist thought, particularly Zhuangzi’s philosophy of life and death, conveys a certain sense of bioethics and carries profound moral implications that can overcome some of the limitations of principle-based ethics. The synthesis of the two traditions may help contemporary China to deal with various kinds of moral dilemmas. The Daoist notion of the interconnection among human beings and between human beings and nature challenges the Western idea of individualism and individual autonomy.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 553 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.
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BIAN, Lin. "中國生命倫理學建構問題探論: 基於歷史與邏輯統一的視角." International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 8, no. 2 (January 1, 2010): 9–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.81489.
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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.任何事物的邏輯體系的構建必須與這個事物的實際發展過程和人類對它的認識過程相統一，才可能是正確的和合理的。所以歷史與邏輯的統一是考察具有哲學特性的生命倫理學學科建構的重要認識視角和方法根據。換言之，中國生命倫理學的形成與發展本質上應該是歷史與邏輯的統一。由於特定歷史階段的中國社會現實思想和人文環境的原因，中國大陸的生命倫理學在其形成階段就存在先天的缺陷，而在其發展過程中又因為先天缺陷沒有得到矯正而導致自身邏輯演化過程的某些失常，在當代中國社會轉型和科學技術快速發展引發生命倫理問題層出不窮的現實面前，中國應當構建具有自身傳統文化基礎和形而上學、真正屬於中國自己的生命倫理學。中國生命倫理學的進步，要在與哲學、與醫學和與社會三方面的對話能力的提升中實現。The rational logic of a thing is inevitably a reconstruction of its actual developing process in light of human understanding. That is to say, it is reasonable to investigate the circumstances and characteristics of a subject of matter from the perspective of the unity of its history and logic. Bioethics, a popular discipline in contemporary society, is no exception. This essay examines the shaping and development process of Chinese bioethics in the last thirty years.Western bioethics was launched in the United States in the early 1970s. The development of Western bioethics reflects reasonable Western religious, moral, and social reactions to changing bioemedical realities in Western society. In other words, Western bioethics embodies a unity of history and logic in the West. However, this is not the case for Chinese bioethics. When Western bioethics was introduced to China in the late 1970s, it was adopted as a fashionable reaction to new biomedical technologies and their divorce from Western religion, culture, and ethics as a system of values. This was partly because there were political and ideological restrictions in China at that time, and partly because Chinese scholars lacked a comprehensive understanding of Western history and culture. Initially then, the Chinese had a very limited understanding of Western bioethics.This defect has not been effectively overcome through the development of Chinese bioethics in the past thirty years. First, Chinese scholars have continued to introduce and discuss issues addressed in Western bioethics, and yet have ignored the biomedical and health care challenges confronting China. In analyzing Chinese issues, they have tended to copy Western bioethical theories, doctrines, and principles (especially the famous four principles proposed by Beauchamp and Childress), and to apply to them as norms. It seems that they have forgotten that China has long-standing moral traditions that are still pertinent to people’s lives in general, and to bioethical issues in particular. Fortunately, increasing numbers of Chinese scholars have recognized that a legitimate Chinese bioethics requires a reasonable reconstruction of Chinese metaphysical and ethical conceptions for dealing with contemporary Chinese problems. This is the only way to build a Chinese bioethics in its true sense of the unity of history and logic.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 75 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.
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Li, Ji. "Guan, Zhiguo 關志國, Research on the Philosophy of Law of the Daoist Huang-Lao School 道家黃老學派法哲學研究." Dao 19, no. 1 (January 13, 2020): 145–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11712-019-09710-2.
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LEE, Shui Chuen. "中國文化中的人論與醫學: 儒家之醫學模式." International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 13, no. 2 (January 1, 2015): 49–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.131592.
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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.西方醫學界近年有學者提出新的「生物心理社會精神」醫藥模式以回應西方現代醫藥模式的問題。本文首先指出西方傳統之以醫藥為針對身體的正常功能之失效為主，而此一失能是身體之物理生理的表現，因而其他心理或精神的病狀或病態都必須能化約為身體的物理生理情狀，才被認可為疾病。此自然排除了心理或精神，以及由社會宗教價值失調而來的疾病。雖然此模式需要修訂，但此缺失不足以重新引入宗教教義作為診治疾病的判準。本文同時檢討了西方醫學以物種正常功能作為疾病的判準，以及近年流行的「實證醫學」政策診治模式所延續與隱含的仍然是以物理生理為主的醫藥模式，並不真能包含源自文化與價值的心理與心靈的疾病或病態。由於文化與價值的不同，中醫的醫藥模式與西方醫學不同。中國哲學以人為與天地萬物同出一源，人的生命與宇宙相對應，因此，疾病被理解為人身之小宇宙失調，而治療則以順大自然的運行法則而行。這是建立在中國傳統的儒與陰陽五行的哲學而來。儒家哲學以仁心貫通天人，因而中醫自始即不限於氣化流行的現象，而有深入了解天道運行的意義，視人為與宇宙一體的生命，身體官能之運作與宇宙之陰陽五行之氣化相應，而其中以仁心之天道貫通疾病與醫病之關係，構成中醫之儒醫理念與「醫乃仁術」的模式。心靈與心理的疾病有不同的病源和對治的方式，不能化約為物理生理的情況。在此模式中，社會文化與價值失調的疾病和病態可以被正視和治療，這亦反映了醫藥乃是文化的一環。A new conception of medicine has been proposed in response to some of the problems of the modern Western model of medicine. In this paper, I posit the view that modern Western medicine takes disease to be a bodily deviation from normal species functioning. Such malfunctioning is regarded as of the physical and physiological kind. Other types of deviations such as psychological or spiritual deviations must be reducible to symptoms before they are regarded as a disease in medical terms. Hence, psychological or mental disorders resulting from social or religious values are not catalogued as diseases, and are thus left untreated. I argue, however, that although this situation needs correction, there is no justification for introducing religious doctrine as a category of disease. This paper examines the presuppositions of the normal species functioning criterion and recent trends in evidence-based medicine, and reaches the conclusion that the present Western medical model does not readily admit some of the diseases of the human psyche caused by disorders in culture and values.Chinese medicine, which is grounded in a different culture and different values, takes a different approach to medicine. Chinese philosophy takes human beings to have the same source as the universe, and thus to represent the cosmos writ small. Disease is regarded as a disorientation of the bodily cosmos, and treatment is basically a restoration of the body and mind as a whole in harmony with natural cosmological operations. Chinese philosophy draws on Confucianism, Daoism, and the Yin-Yang School. Confucianism views empathy as unifying human beings with Heaven. Thus, in Chinese medicine the evolutionary process of the cosmos bears deeply humane and transcendental values. The correspondence between body and universe results in a conception of medicine as the operation of the principle of ren, or humanity. Accordingly, the physician is honored as a Confucian doctor, and medicine is seen as an art or humanity. Mental and psychological diseases can have independent sources, and should never be reduced to the physical and physiological. In the Chinese model, social, cultural, and value disorders are regarded as proper diseases, and can be treated as such. It allows full realization of the cultural factors at play in medicine.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 895 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.
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IP, King Tak. "儒家家庭價值的應用與生物科技倫理." International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 12, no. 1 (January 1, 2014): 21–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.121554.
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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.隨着科技的發展，當代社會出現了好些新的道德議題。學者嘗試從不同的宗教、哲學及文化傳統，如儒家角度，回應這些議題。部分學者在詮釋儒家傳統時，卻往往只選取某些儒家的重要概念，或引用某些儒家重要的經典，然後論證儒家在回應某議題的適切性。但是，儒家並非僅僅是一套哲學的系統。儒家在過往千多年，一直為中國社會提供生活的指導原則。所以，我們關注的，應是如果將儒家這些原則應用到今天相關議題時，將出現怎樣的狀况；以及這些原則在歷史上的應用又能否為當代建構儒家倫理提供在概念與經典外的資源。本文探索的，正是建構儒家倫理的方法問題。筆者嘗試從儒家的婚姻家庭價值及其在歷史上的具體應用，看它對當代中國在生物科技方面的抉擇帶來什麼影響。如果儒家是一個活傳統，其價值觀在過往的應用亦應可為今日的處境帶來洞見，同時亦展現出儒家倫理歷久不變的價值。In response to the challenges presented by ever-emerging moral issues in contemporary society, ethicists try to obtain input from different religious, philosophical and cultural traditions, and Confucianism is a popular choice. In following Confucian ethics, people grasp important Confucian concepts, quote important passages from the Classics and engage in exegesis to argue for the contemporary relevancy of Confucianism and Confucian ethics. However, because Confucianism is a living tradition that has guided Chinese life for years, other questions must be addressed when considering Confucian ethics. How have Confucian principles been applied historically to handle similar issues? Can these past applications serve as a source for addressing contemporary Confucian ethics? This paper considers how people adhere to Confucian ethics. The author determines how select Confucian family values have been applied in the past to help the Chinese to achieve major objectives related to marriage and family, and shows how they apply to the use of biotechnology in contemporary China. The paper contends that if Confucianism remains a living Chinese tradition, its past applications should give insights, however heuristic, into how people currently adhere to Confucian ethics.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 538 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.
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Zheng, Zemian. "Chen, Shaoming 陳少明, Doing Chinese Philosophy: Some Methodological Thoughts 做中國哲學──一些方法論的思考." Dao 16, no. 1 (December 27, 2016): 113–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11712-016-9537-3.
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Blake, Susan. "Wang, Xiaobo 王曉波, Dao and Fa: Explanation and Analysis of Legalist Thought and Huang-Lao Philosophy 道與法 : 法家思想和黃老哲學解析." Dao 8, no. 3 (June 26, 2009): 353–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11712-009-9123-z.
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HE, Zhaoxiong. "自殺的道德難題." International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 3, no. 2 (January 1, 2001): 51–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.31398.
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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.自殺的神秘性，一定程度來源於道德難題。自殺的預防與控制有三個階段：自殺預防對策，自殺危機對策，自殺事後對策。三個階段都存在道德難題。在自殺預防階段是人本主義還是自由主義。宗教人本主義和哲學人本主義都有贊成和反對的。自由主義則贊成自殺。因此又衍生自殺預防的有效性問題。在自殺危機干預階段，是救生論還是聽死論。在事後對策階段是人道主義還是功利主義，是動機論還是效果論。判別自殺行為的道德性是一種二難推論。這種二難推理，實際上是一種道德悖論，它不能邏輯方法解決，要用價值分析方法解決。定量分析與定性分析相結合。風險／效益是首選法。People recognized suicide as a mystery. It originates in a certain degree from ethical dilemma which exists in three stages of suicide prevention and controlling: prevention, intervention and postvention. There are so many ethical dilemmas in each stage. It appears as the dilemma between humanism and liberalism in prevention stage. In crisis intervention stage, between life saving and death letting. In postvention stage, between humanism and utilitarianism, motivism and effectism. Differentiate the morality of suicide behavior depends upon manipulating the dilemmas. Since the dilemma is actually a paradox, so that it cannot be solved in logical analysis but value analysis combined with quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 127 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.
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LEE, Hsien-Chung. "「指物」與「齊物」的認知觀點比較/Comparison of the Cognitive Perspective of “Referring to Things” and “Equality of Things”." Asian Studies, no. 1 (September 25, 2012): 45–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.4312/as.2012.-16.1.45-64.
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摘要「指物」是名家公孫龍的觀點，「齊物」是道家莊子的看法。莊子在〈齊物論〉中強烈批評公孫龍的「指物」思想。公孫龍的〈指物論〉基本上是主客二元認知模式，而莊子〈齊物論〉的認知觀點則是「道通為一」的感通模式。本文從認知的目的、方式、結果等方面進行比較；說明「指物」的認知觀點容易走入懷疑或不可知論，而莊子的「齊物」觀點，雖有神秘色彩，但在認知方法上，提供了階段性的「整體把握」。「指物」與「齊物」的認知觀點，在傳統中國哲學認知問題上具有相輔相成的意義。關鍵詞：指物、齊物、主客二元、道通為一While Gong Sun Longzi advocated the cognitive perspective of “referring to things”, (zhi wu 指物) Zhuangzi advocated the cognitive position of “equality of things” (qi wu 齊物), which strongly criticized the former. The cognitive model of Gong Sun Longzi is basically a subject-object dualism, but Zhuangzi’s cognitive perspective is that all things are penetrated into One by Dao. The purpose of this article is to compare the cognitive purpose, methods, and results between Gong Sun Longzi and Zhuangzi and to illustrate that the cognitive perspective of “referring to things” may easily fall into scepticism, or agnosticism, and Zhuang zi’s “equality of things” point of view is, although mysterious, a cognitive approach, providing a stage for “overall grasp”. Both of them have complementary significance of the cognitive problems in the traditional Chinese philosophy.
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DUH, Baurui. "中國哲學史方法論----以四方架構為中心/The Methodology of Chinese Philosophical History–Exemplifies by the Four Square Framework." Asian Studies 16, no. 1 (June 13, 2012): 3. http://dx.doi.org/10.4312/as.2012.16.1.3-27.
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LI, Zhenliang, and Qiang MA. "從《黃帝內經》看健康的中國概念." International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 15, no. 1 (January 1, 2017): 7–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.151625.
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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.健康是人的一種生存狀態，也是一個歷史和文化的概念。古老的東方醫學名著《黃帝內經》從天人合一的哲學觀念出發，把人的健康定義為：形與神俱，氣脈常通；形體不敝，精神不散；陰平陽秘，精神乃至。同時認為健康是一個個體化和動態的概念，因人的身份地位、年齡長幼和地理環境不同而有所差別。對於保持和追求健康的手段，強調人應當順應大自然的法則，包括人之常“平”、“法”於陰陽、“和”於術數、飲食有“節”、起居有“常”、“不妄”作勞、虛邪賊風“避”之有時以及精神“內守”等。與WHO 的健康概念相比，《黃帝內經》的健康概念更為生動和具體，且具有普遍的文化價值。Health is fundamental to the human condition. The concept of health is culture-dependent and historically developed in each culture. The Huangdi Neijing (The Yellow Emperor’s Classic of Internal Medicine) is an ancient Chinese masterpiece about human health and medical treatment. Based on the classical Chinese view of the unity of heaven and man, the Huangdi Neijing understands health as somatic and spiritual harmony: it emphasizes the smooth fluxing of the qi essence, the well-structured body, the fullness of vitality, and the equilibrium of yin and yang. In addition, health is an individual and dynamic concept, according to which the degree of one’s health depends on social standing, status, age, and geographic environment. To maintain and pursue health, humans must comply with the laws of nature, such as by staying emotionally calm, seeking the balance of yin and yang, controlling the diet, regulating living schedules, avoiding overwork, preventing evil factors, and pursuing internal spiritual orientation. These ideas of health are in many ways consistent with, and even comparable to, the holistic definition of health provided by the World Health Organization (WHO). However, they are characteristic of a particular Chinese culture, providing a more vivid and concrete account of health than the more general view of the WHO.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 1757 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.
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Zhang, Ying Ping. "Benevolence, Justice and Law: The Basic Concept Structure of Xunzi's Philosophy of Law." CHUNGGUKSA YONGU (The Journal of Chinese Historical Researches) 128 (October 31, 2020): 1–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.24161/chr.128.1.
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LEI, Ruipeng. "中國文化視野中的人與動物關係問題——以異種移植為例." International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 5, no. 2 (January 1, 2007): 79–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.51446.
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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.在不同的文化中，關於如何對待動物是可接受的或者說人與動物的關係問題存在各種不同的觀點。本文主要從中國文化的視角來討論和分析這一倫理問題，梳理儒釋道三種思想體系中所包含的生態倫理思想，分析它們對人與動物關係問題的態度，尤其是對異種移植中使用動物問題的倫理論證的有益啟示。從儒家的視角，以貫穿儒家理論與實踐體系的仁愛思想為主線，揭示出由親而疏、由近及遠地踐行“仁”，是完善和提升人性的必要途徑，也是實現普遍的愛的現實的人類行動方式。儒家強調“愛物”的美德， 但不排斥在得到倫理辯護的基礎上使用動物﹔從佛家的視角，以“不殺生”的戒律和“十界論”的生命觀為基礎， 闡明佛家哲學對動物生命的絕對尊重與保護﹔從道家的視角，以“道法自然”和“ 厚德載物”思想為線索，釐清道家哲學崇尚自然、順乎自然的中心思想，以及對不干預自然秩序的強調。In different cultures there is a spectrnm of opinions regarding what it is acceptable to do to animals, including whether it is morally acceptable or not to use them as a source of organs or tissues for transplants. This essay attempts to discuss these ethical issues in the Chinese cultural context. Chinese culture is primarily the combination of Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism. There are diverse attitudes towards nature and differing views about the relationship of humans to animals. Confucianism emphasizes the principle of ren (benevolence) and demonstrates that the method of practicing ren is from near to far, from parents/siblings to other relatives, friends, co-workers, neighbors, patients, students etc, from present generation to future generations, from human beings to other animals, plants and eco-system or nature as a whole. On the other hand, Confucianism holds that humanity is most valuable in the world, certainly of a higher order than that of animals. These views would be compatible with the limited use of animals in medical procedures where the benefit to humans is clear, demonstrable and large. Buddhism emphasizes simple, non-violent, gentle living. Its first precept involves abstention from injury to life, and not depriving a living being of life. These views may entail a direct prohibition on the use of animals for medical purpose. Taoism places the harmony between human beings and nature in general in high esteem. It recognizes that human beings are not separate from nature but a small part of the natural world. Human beings should not seek to dominate or interfere with nature, but should instead stand in a relationship of care and concern for its continued flourishing. Accordingly, Daoism might regard any form of xenotransplantation as an unacceptable intervention with nature.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 239 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.
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WANG, Yungling. "對虐貓事件的儒家生命倫理學思考——兼論動物權利." International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 5, no. 2 (January 1, 2007): 65–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.51445.
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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.二O O 六年春，中國發生了一次女子虐貓引發民眾憤怒的事件。許多批評者措詞激烈，不少媒體也介入了對該事件的報道和評論。在這種報道和評論中，包括記者和專家在內，幾乎毫無例外地對女子虐貓的行為給予了否定，他們認為女子虐貓行為殘忍變態，激進者認為虐貓行為侵犯動物權利，中國應當對動物權利保護立法。但是這些認識和評論或者源於生活經驗，或者源於道德直覺，或者源於糢糊不清的道德認知，卻缺乏其正理性的深入的哲學或者倫理學思考，在儒家生命倫理學看來是荒謬的。對動物權利的主張起源於動物保護運動， 今天的主要代表人物是辛格和湯姆．雷根 (Tom Regan)。但在儒家生命倫理學看來，他們關於動物與人平等和動物享有權利的觀點都是站不住腳的。儒家生命倫理學認為， 萬物之中人為貴， 人的地位無可爭辯地高於動物。儒家思想家幾乎從來沒有把動物放在與人平等的地位上加以考慮， 而是把人放在差等之愛的最高地位。此外，在儒家思想體系中， 動物不但地位低下，而且其心智、認識、行為均不可與人相比。儒家思想家會同意湯姆．雷根關於人是“生活的主體”的觀點，但卻不承認動物也能成為“生活的主體”，理由很簡單，動物沒有父子之親，沒有男女之別，沒有行為規範。儒家經典著作認為，人獸之別，還在於人有禮，而動物則沒有。在儒家看來，道德與倫理只與人類生活有關，而與動物無闕，人與動物的關係不能成為道德之一倫。總之，動物權利無法得到儒家生命倫理學的辯護。動物權利論危害甚大。抬高動物的權利地位，其實質就是降低人類的權利地位，傷害人類，或者說反人類。主張為動物權利或動物福利立法，是十分危險的事情。In the spring of 2006, a Chinese woman maltreated a cat and caused indignation in Chinese society. Many individuals launched critiques on the woman with severe tongue, and public media took part in the report and critique of the incident. Some individuals argue that the woman infringed animal rights and the Chinese government should formulate a law to protect animal rights. This essay draws on Confucian moral and intellectual resources to contend that animals do not have rights and the Chinese government should not issue any law on animal rights.The proposition of animal rights came from the modern Western "animal-protecting movement". The primary representative scholars who attempt to argue for animal rights are Peter Singer and Tom Regan: they hold that human beings and animals are equal and animals should have rights. This view, however, cannot fit into Confucian bioethics. On the Confucian view, human beings are the noblest beings in the world. The status of human being is without question higher than the status of animals. Confucian scholars would never give a position to animals that would be same as human beings. Although Confucian scholars can agree with Tom Regan on the view that human beings are "the subjects of life," they cannot accept the view that animals could be "the subjects of life." The Confucian arguments are very clear: Animals do not have the virtue of qin (intimacy) between the father and the son; they do not have the virtue of bie (difference) between the male and the female; and they do not have behavior norms (de). In short, human beings and animals are essentially difference, on Confucianism, because human beings can cultivate the virtues based on the practice of rituals (li, 禮), while animals do not have the practice of rituals at all. Accordingly, from the Confucian perspective, morality or ethics is only related with human life, but is outside of animal life. The relationship between human beings and animals does not belong to the moral relationship. In a word, animal rights cannot be accepted by Confucian bioethics.Upholding animal rights is consequently undesirable. Heightening animal status is equivalent to debasing human status. This is to harm human beings. This paper concludes that legalizing animal rights is very dangerous.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 169 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.
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ENGELHARDT, H. Tristram. "走向中國生命倫理學——重審後基礎之醫學道德." International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 10, no. 1 (January 1, 2012): 11–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.101510.
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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.當代西方面臨多重挑戰，有些是理論層面的，有些是實踐層面的。目前佔主導地位的西方世俗文化的普世主義的道德和生命倫理學工程認為道德基礎可以從道德哲學系統中的有效論證來獲得。這種思維方式源於西元前5 世紀希臘的世俗化，並在13 世紀的西方獲得新生。其後的體系基於對理性的信仰，喪失了維繫西方基督教信仰的承諾，導致康德的理性主義道德工程。1970 和80 年代出現的西方生命倫理學對個體自主性的強調試圖得到這一道德工程的印證，但這種努力已經擱淺：期望依賴普世主義的術語，通過有效理性論證來確保具體內容的所有嘗試，到頭來都不過是乞題論證、循壞論證、或無窮後退，因為人們沒有可能通過對基本前提和證據規則的理性反思來必然地達成共識。人們總是需要進一步的背景前提和規則。從歷史的脈絡來看，一旦西方世俗道德反思拋棄其上帝之眼的視角，標杆化的世俗道德體系就會陷入麻煩。一切強調無名氏的道德視角，無論是以沒有境遇的道德主體身份出現，還是以大多數人的最大利益原則出現，都無法提出標杆化的規範內容。文章認為，西方現代社會-民主制福利國家醫療資源的配置方式所引發的財政上的不可持續的危機帶來三個基本難題：(1) 醫療權利一旦確立，它們所帶來的道德風險；(2) 依靠後人為今人交付醫療服務的做法所帶來的人口風險；(3) 社會保險計劃誘發政治家玩弄空頭支票所帶來的政治風險。西方社會所面臨的危機，無論是經濟上的，還是文化上的，都為我們提供了很好的理由說明我們需要重新考量構建在中國文化視域下的、更有能力迎接21 世紀倫理學挑戰的生命倫理學。Unnoticed by many bioethicists, the very foundations of the dominant Western secular morality, and by extension the foundations of the dominant secular bioethics of the West, have been brought into question. After Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and in the light of arguments by philosophers from G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831) to Richard Rorty (1931-2007) and Gianni Vattimo (1936-), it has become ever clearer that neither the content of the dominant Western secular morality nor the content of the dominant Western bioethics can be secured as canonical through sound rational argument. Western secular morality and Western secular bioethics have become foundationless. They are not secured by a canonical moral rationality or by being anchored in being as it is in itself. Theimplications are wide-ranging. This paper sketches both what it means to do bioethics after foundations, and what opportunities exist for rethinking the possibilities for a Chinese bioethics.Among the difficulties of the Enlightenment moral project is that it attempted to understand individuals in anonymously universalist terms. To do this, individuals had to be considered outside of their social and historical contexts. They were as a consequence portrayed as bare moral agents. This is most saliently the case with Immanuel Kant, who understands his morality in terms of the kingdom of ends, within which all members, save God, are fully interchangeable. The members of the kingdom of ends are persons without sex, sexual orientation, species-membership, history, or family. This state of affairs is tied to a universalist, egalitarian vision of persons and society, which in the West has been understood in terms of a social-democratic morality and political agenda. The difficulty is that it is now clear that there is a challenge to the financial sustainability of healthcare allocation within social-democratic welfare states. The difficulties stem from at least three challenges to its sustainability: (1) the moral hazard due to the inclination to overuse entitlements once they are established, (2) the demographic hazard due to relying on future generations to pay for the health care of current recipients (i.e., when there are fewer children, financing becomes difficult), and (3) the political hazard due to social insurance schemes that reward politicians for promising benefits even when sufficient funds may not be available.For scholars doing bioethics in China, this state of affairs means that Chinese bioethicists are freed from having to meet secular Western bioethicists on the terms established by secular Western bioethicists. Instead, they can fashion an authentically Chinese bioethics, which nests its own moral commitments within the traditional Confucian moral narrative of China. A Chinese bioethics need not, and should not, in content or form be like the bioethics of the dominant secular morality and bioethics of the West. Given the character of secular morality and bioethics, given its inability to establish a universal, canonical morality through sound rational argument, as well as given the particularity of all morality and bioethics that possesses content, and given the promising moral content salient in Chinese culture, a move by Chinese to establish a Chinese bioethics becomes quite plausible.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 46 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.
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LI, Hongwen. "道、技與自然——現代生物科技的莊子式批判." International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 9, no. 2 (January 1, 2011): 61–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.91506.
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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.現代生物科技的廣泛應用引發了一系列社會、法律和倫理問題，它帶來的負面效應正如它的正面效果一樣多。現代生物科技的基本邏輯體現在：它採取還原論的思維模式，秉承改善生命的宗旨，以及持有技術樂觀主義的態度。作者運用莊子的哲學思想對現代生物科技展開一般性批評。作者指出，現代生物科技首先表現出強烈的反自然性，它向自然提出過分要求，干擾、阻止事物順其自然、按其本性來展示自己。現代生物科技還表現出異化特徵，主要體現在物質化和資本化兩個方面。物質化將人的活動限制在物的層面，片面追求物的有用性；資本化則導致生物資本主義的發展。用莊子道家的語言，技術的非自然性和異化的直接原因是“道”“技”分離。因此，為了走出現代生物技術的陷阱，應該採取莊子“道技合一”的方式，實現“技不離道”、“以道馭技”、“道法自然”之完美結合。Biotechnology is a field of applied biology that involves the use of living organisms and bioprocesses such as engineering, technology, and medical research. This paper highlights the social, legal, and moral issues brought about by modern biotechnology. It is particularly concerned with materialism, capitalism, and commercialism where biotechnological means are explored and exploited without ethical boundaries. The result of biotechnological abuse is that we human beings will become increasingly alienated from our authentic nature and being.Daoism was one of the major philosophical traditions of ancient China, based on the teaching of Laozi and Zhuangzi. This paper focuses on the Daoist view of human life and its relation to the natural world from Zhuangzi’s perspective. It will be contended that we must put “human flourishing” – the Dao – first, before we care about the utility of science and technology – the Ji. According to Daoism, true human self-realization depends on the unity between the Dao and the Ji.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 138 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.
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LIU, Dachun. "當代科學與迷信之哲學反思." International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 3, no. 3 (January 1, 2001): 45–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.31405.
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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.可檢驗性是區分科學與偽科學的一個關鍵。它至少包含三層意思：第一，它意味着科學實驗是最基本的科學實踐活動，實驗方法是科學的標誌。第二，它為科學假說提供了一個基本的方法論原理，不論是提出假說還是鑒別假說。第三，它是科學發現獲得社會承認的基本條件。如果一個假說在原則上是不可檢驗的，那它就不能稱為科學。偽科學乃是打着科學旗號、冒充科學的虛假的東西，我們需要仔細分辨，予以揭露。同時，我們也需要認識到，在現代社會的複雜系統中，雖然科學起着主導作用，但科學不是全體，是不是一切。有許多非科學的東西，如宗教、藝術、習俗等，對於社會發展是十分重要的，不能一概否定。但它們也不必硬說成是科學。There is an important way to distinguish science from pseudo-science：empirical testability. It has three basic implications. First, scientific experiments are the fundamental scientific activities, and the method of experiment marks empirical science. Second, empirical testability constitutes the first methodological principle for proposing or affirming a scientific hypothesis. Finally, it is also a basic condition for a scientific discovery to be accepted by society. If a hypothesis cannot be tested even in principle, it cannot be termed as a scientific hypothesis.In contemporary Chinese society, there are varieties of pseudo-sciences. They use the name of science to identify themselves, but cannot pass the serious requirement of empirical testability. We should carefully examine such pseudo-sciences and disclose the nature of their hypotheses and activities as non- or anti-science. At the same time, we should also recognize that, although science is dominant in contemporary society, it is not everything valuable. There are a great deal of other items, such as religion, art, and customs, which are nonscientific but are extremely important to the development of society. We should not deny the value of non-scientific theories or activities. Neither should we mark them as science.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 28 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.
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CHAN, Jonathan. "從道家的道德視域看人權與生命倫理." International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 6, no. 2 (January 1, 2008): 109–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.61466.
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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.於 2005 年9 月30 日至10 月2 日期間，在加拿大蒙特利爾(Montréal) 一個討論人權及基本藥物獲取的研討會上，與會者草擬了一份名為〈蒙特利爾獲取基本藥物的人權宣言〉 (以下簡稱〈宣言〉)。該〈宣言〉主要是針對貧窮國家的人民無法獲得基本藥物去治療一些普通的疾病，而備受痛苦煎熬的狀況，並指出“我們有責任去達成一種社會的和國際的秩序，在這種秩序中的人權，包括取得基本藥物的權利，是獲得充分實現的。這項責任必須在制度和政制策劃上確認及體現出來。在個別國家及全球層面上，那些政策、規則和制度必須促使‘取得基本藥物’這一權利得以實現。”本文並不反對為貧國人民爭取合理的待遇，本文所要探討的是〈宣言〉把社會及國際秩序奠基在人權 (包括取得基本藥物的權利) 是否有充分的理論根據這一問題。本文的基本論旨是：人權倘若被理解為一種自由主義式的自然權利，那麼人權就並非人類的共同道德的核心。本文通過泰勒 (Charles Taylor) 稱之為“原子論 ”(Atomism) 的一種社會哲學觀點來說明自由主義式的自然權利的性質，並由此而證成上述論旨。如此一來，〈宣言〉把社會及國際秩序奠基在人權(包括取得基本藥物的權利)是否有充分的理論根據就不無疑問。An international workshop entitled Human Rights and Access to Essential Medicines: The Way Forward was held from September 30 to October 2, 2005 in Montréal, Canada. At the conclusion of the workshop, the participants drafted the Montréal Statement on the Human Right to Essential Medicines, which was reprinted in a paper written by Thomas Pogge. Article 3 of the statement claims that we have a responsibility to achieve a social and international order in which human rights—including the right to essential medicines—are fully realized and that this obligation must be recognized and reflected in the design of institutions and policies. I examine that claim in this essay, and argue that if the concept of rights is understood as liberal rights, then the claim is dubious. Liberal rights imply an individualistic moral perspective that not all moral traditions endorse, including Daoism. This will be shown by analyzing the nature of liberal rights in terms of atomism, the philosophical doctrine that Charles Taylor uses to characterize liberal thought.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 234 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.
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ZHANG, Xianglong. "王鳳儀倫理療病闡析——儒家生命倫理之活例." International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 12, no. 2 (January 1, 2014): 9–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.121560.
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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.本文首先介紹王鳳儀的人生，說明其開悟體驗如何塑成他的倫理療病術，並闡釋這種不尋常醫術的特點、哲理基礎、具體方法和一些案例，繼而分析倫理療病的作用機制和條件、它與中醫和西醫的相通與不同處，以及它的適用範圍。另外，本文還集中介紹王鳳儀的追隨者――劉有生對此術的繼承和發展。最後，文章總述這種倫理療病術的儒家性，表明倫理療病可以直接作用於人的生命倫理學。First, this paper presents the life of Feng-yi Wang (1864-1937), a peasant thinker who lived in northeastern China and shows how Wang’s experiences of enlightenment enabled him to invent an ethical cure. A serious disease with which Wang had been afflicted for more than 10 years was healed overnight by his sudden recognition that the origin of his illness was not the immorality of his brothers but his own hatred for them and by his profound repentance for this mistake. As a result of this experience, he realized that no universal principles exist for family relationships. Wang underwent two more experiences of enlightenment: the first during a desperate attempt to save a moral friend, and the second during three years spent besides his father’s tomb as an expression of filial love.Second, the characteristics, philosophical foundations and concrete applications of this unusual therapy are explained and some examples are provided. Wang identified the causes of illnesses in disorders of family and other ethical relations, and treated these illnesses by correcting the corresponding ethical disorders. Wang proposed that every human life has three dimensions, heavenly, psychological and desirous. Disease occurs when an individual’s heavenly disposition is obscured or damaged by passionate emotions arising from psychological states and/or desire. It has been argued that Wang regarded the heavenly dimension of human nature as embodied in family bonds, exemplified by the parent-child relationship. Wang’s method of treatment had three steps. First, the patient was encouraged to recognize the potentially fatal nature of her/his situation, and thus to speak with complete sincerity and commitment to finding a cure. Second, the patient’s way of life, especially her/his familial and other ethical relationships, were examined to determine the cause of her/his illness. Third, the patient was told why his/her behavior toward others was immoral and urged to repent thoroughly in front of the offended party, whether a living family member or an ancestor’s memorial tablet. Physical reactions to the treatment such as vomiting and weeping were taken as signs that the method had worked and the illness had been alleviated or cured.The third aim of this paper is to identify the mechanisms of Wang’s ethical treatment, the conditions for its success and the scope of its application. According to the Doctrine of the Mean, complete sincerity is the necessary condition for Wang’s treatment to succeed. A timely and skillful diagnosis arouses a patient’s conscience and encourages her/him to speak sincerely. Therefore, adequate communication is necessary between the diagnostician and the patient. Although Wang’s ethical treatment may seem better suited to psychic than physical ailments, Wang’s followers argue that it can be used to cure physical injuries. In the third section of the paper, Wang’s ethical approach is briefly compared with traditional Chinese medicine and modern Western medicine.Fourth, attention is paid to one of Wang’s followers, You-sheng Liu. In the fifth and final section of the paper, the Confucian properties of Wang’s ethical treatment are described and his approach to medicine is shown to directly affect the ethics of human life.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 468 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.
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WONG, Wai-ying. "生命倫理之方法論的考察." International Journal of Chinese & Comparative Philosophy of Medicine 3, no. 4 (January 1, 2001): 5–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.24112/ijccpm.31409.
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LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.在後設倫理學以至生命倫理學上，一直存在著脉絡主義與原則倫理之爭辧。脉絡主義者解決道德問題的方式，是首先審視個別事件發生的脉絡細節，作出道德判斷後再將之用於其他相類事件；原則倫理者卻試圖將一般的道德原則應用於特殊事件上。前者可視為一種「自下而上」的方式，後者則可名為「自上而下」。很多道德哲學家都指出這兩種進路各有利弊。R.M. Hare藉著引介兩層道德思維結構，來論證上述二者其實並不矛盾，相反地，它們在不同的道德思維層面，分別扮演重要角色。在本文中，我嘗試檢視Hare的論証是否成立，又是否會在實踐上引生另外的問題。最後，我將指出，中國的儒家倫理中的「經」、「權」觀念，如何可以幫助解決詠絡主義與原則倫理的問題。There has been controversy between particularism and generalism in metaethics in general and bioethics in particular. Particularists (e.g. contextualists) attempt to solve moral problems by firstly working with particular cases in all of their contextual details and then by applying these results to other similar cases, whereas generalists (principled ethicists) try to apply the general normative principles to particular cases. The former approach can be viewed as a "bottom-up" and the latter "top-down" way. As indicated by many moral philosophers, both of these approaches have shortcomings. Principled ethics have been challenged for their impotence in providing guidance in a moral decision. The challenge is in twofold: Firstly, there is scepticism that one can reach a moral judgment by reasoning deductively from general ethical principles; secondly, these theories are insensitive to and thus do not give due weight to the contextual variabilities in a specific situation. By contrast, contextualism emphasizes the relative importance of inductive method in moral reasoning. However, how to resolve moral issues by employing the inductive method remains a problem. Therefore, while it accuses principled ethics of its inability to guide moral decision, contextualism itself cannot provide any guidance.With respect to the rival views of principled ethics and contextualism, R.M. Hare thinks that both theories have grasped the truth, but only part of it. For instance, contextualism has caught hold of an important truth, that one has to judge each situation on its own merit. But if contextualism persists in asserting that in morals one cannot appeal to general principles, then it is mistaken. This is a mistaken view in that it ignores another obvious truth that some situations are similar in some morally relevant respects, and also in that it holds that these two truths are incompatible. Hare conceives that this mistake arises from confusing the concepts of universality and generality and also from failing to make the distinction between the two levels of moral thinking. By introducing the intuitive level and critical level of moral thinking, Hare argues that the two kinds of metaethical theories are not in real conflict. Contrarily, they both play important roles in our moral thinking, though at different levels. In this paper, I am going to examine to what extent, if ever, Hare's attempt is successful, and furthermore, what are the steps that should be taken to remedy the deficiency, if any. Finally, I try to show that the ideas of "jing" and "quan" in Confucian ethics operate in the two levels of moral thinking in Hare's structure, and hope that these two ideas may help to solve the issue discussed in this paper.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 23 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.
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"兼儒墨、合名法──《尸子》的哲學思想及其論辯." NTU Philosophical Review, no. 36 (2008): 29–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ntuphilreview2008362.
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Liu, Xuetao. "Wang, Baofeng 王寶峰, Introduction to Future Chinese Philosophy: Paradigm and Methodology 未來中國哲學導論: 範式與方法論." Dao, January 5, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11712-020-09770-9.
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