Academic literature on the topic '產業民主'

The year 1949 was a great divide in modern Chinese history. How Shanghai bankers responded to it is an interesting question to address. For those bankers who chose to leave Shanghai and settle in British Hong Kong, can we suppose they were permanently separated from China or Taiwan? It is generally assumed that once the Shanghai bankers confined themselves to their new home in Hong Kong or moved on to other locations in the United States or elsewhere, they immediately severed all ties with either mainland China under the ccp (Chinese Communist Party) or Taiwan under the kmt (Kuomintang or Guomindang). Such an assumption leads to a mistaken argument that the departure of Chinese bankers from Shanghai cut short their involvements in China politics. Perhaps it is true that some emigrant bankers never returned, but others remained in touch with their home in China, whether because they were solicited by the agents who were sent to the colony by the ccp in China and the kmt in Taiwan, or, because they took the initiative in reaching across the borders to mainland China or Taiwan. From their sanctuary in Hong Kong, how did the bankers conduct cross-border relations after 1949? This paper will go beyond the general assumption that the Shanghai bankers turned to Hong Kong solely for the colony’s being a sanctuary during the political and economic turmoil of the 1940s. Instead, these bankers continued to engage in political confrontation to the ccp and the kmt after they fled Shanghai. This paper argues that once they were in the colony, they had to address several problems. These included, first, to choose their final destination in either Shanghai, Hong Kong or Taipei; second, whether to continue or quit their banking careers and thirdly, to find a solution in order to counteract the alignment with either the ccp or the kmt. 1949年是中國近代史的分水嶺，上海銀行家對面對動盪不安的局勢會作出怎樣的回應，是一個很值得討論的問題。一旦銀行家選擇離開上海，轉移到英屬香港，他們就可完全脫離國共內戰的地理範疇──中國大陸或臺灣嗎？一般的研究無不認為已從香港轉移到香港的上海銀行家，目的為遠離包括在大陸執政的中國共產黨或撤退至臺灣的國民黨。本文指出，這樣的設想是對當時處於動盪政治經濟局勢的上海銀行家的錯誤理解。事實上，當時是有一部份從上海撤離的銀行家並不願意再被捲入政治，但是有更多已在境外的銀行家，透過自己在國共兩黨的代表，與中國大陸或臺灣保持緊密之聯繫，也有許多銀行家是主動地發展出跨境的管道來維持與中國大陸或臺灣的關係。值得探討的是，1949年之後，這些以英屬香港為基地的跨境聯繫是如何運作的呢？ 本文探討1940年代末在中國變動的政治與經濟局勢下，香港不僅為離開上海的銀行家提供一個安全的庇護所，同時更是這些銀行家在離開上海後繼續面對中國共產黨和國民黨，進行各種活動的最重要境外基地。本文指出這些上海銀行家在移居香港之際所要面對的諸多問題。首先，如何在上海、香港和臺北三地之間作出選擇，哪裏是他們最佳的落腳處？其次，是否要繼續和如何維持銀行的業務？最後，應如何因應中國共產黨和中國國民黨向他們的統戰而作出適當的反應？ (This article is in English).

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in English; abstract also in Chinese. 
 The present study investigates the sport policy between Australia, Singapore and Hong Kong. The objective is to contrast current Hong Kong sport policy with Australia, Singapore through their respective sport administrative experiences, policy recommendations were made to provide references to the Hong Kong sport policy development in the next decade. The findings demonstrated that Australian and Singapore central sport agencies have worked closely with government departments, national sporting organizations and private sectors to deliver a wide range of sports to their citizens and elite training. Furthermore, based upon the Singapore experience, government’s strategic blueprint and new visions for the future sport development is imperative to the success of sport culture. Finally, sport industry is playing a significant role in both elite and mass sport development. Other policy suggestions are made in the study based upon the lessons from Australia and Singapore.
 本文探討了澳洲、新加坡和香港的運動政策。目的是在運動管理系統、運動資金分配、競技運動與大眾運動參與等方面，分別將香港現行的運動政策與澳洲和新加坡的政策進行比較。最後藉著澳洲和新加坡的經驗，對香港未來十年的運動政策發展提出參考性的建議。研究發現澳洲和新加坡的主要管理機構都與政府部門、國家運動單項組織及私人機構長緊密合作，為國民提供了多元化的運動項目選擇和競技訓練。而且，新加坡的經驗進一步顯示政府的長遠規劃和新思維對運動成功發展具決定性影响。最後，運動產業化對競技運動和大眾運動參與的發揮了重要的作用。最後，文中亦基於澳洲和新加坡的經驗提出了其他政策建議。

日本2019年5月1日從「平成」改元到「令和」後，平成30年的歷史就此落下帷幕。到現在為止的30年間，日本經濟從平成元年（1989年）泡沫經濟的頂峰開始，經過消費稅增稅、亞洲貨幣危機、平成金融危機、IT泡沫的崩潰、雷曼危機等時期。破產以及企業再建的數量隨著經濟結構的改變而發生變化，經濟不景氣破產就會增加，景氣變好破產就會減少。如果從經濟結構方面探討，可以用熊彼得的經濟結構被資本主義內在力量破壞的理論來表現，即「創造性破壞」。<br />

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English.中國農村貧困地區衛生保健面臨籌資與組織等方面的問題，尤其是貧困地區經濟發展滯後，嚴重影響了衛生保健需求的購買力，因而形成了因病致貧和因貧致病的惡性循環，嚴重阻礙着生產力的發展。儘管貧困地區的政府對衛生保健的投資力度不大，但衛生資源的利用極不充分，表現為人力過剩，業務量不足，設備閑置。調查中發現，貧困地區農民在煙酒、求神拜佛、請客送禮等方面的開支甚大，故仍存在保健籌資的潛力。在保健制度方面，合作醫療比例不大，婦幼保償制和免疫保償制覆蓋面低，病人流向在不同保健制度之間差別較大。調查中發現，經濟與保健有着雙向互制作用。衛生保健應與經濟發展同步。政府應承擔發展保健事業的主要責任，加大對保健的投入，引導農民調整消費結構，改善籌資環境，普及健康教育，同時採取分步到位的辦法，逐步建立合作性質的保健制度，並建立相應的法規。Approximately sixty million Chinese people live in China's poverty-stricken rural areas (annual income per capita is lower than 400 Chinese yuan, or US $50). Most people in these areas do not have any level of health insurance. About 72.6% of the individuals who need to visit physicians are not unable to do so because of financial difficulties. The death rate of newborns is as high as 10%. Many households are caught up in a vicious circle: they contract disease because of poverty, and they become poor because of disease.It is vitally important to establish a basic level of health care insurance for these people. According to our investigation and calculation, it requires about 18 hundred million Chinese yuan per year in total (based on medical prices in 1993) to provide a minimum amount of health care for these people, including four prenatal care visits and delivery service, vaccine shots for children (thirteen times total for every child before the age of 13), and basic medical care (including three clinic visits and half a day hospitalization per capita per year). In our investigation, most people in these areas support such a plan for basic health care insurance and express their willingness to pay part of premium.Currently, the average health care spending per capita per year in these areas is 17.40 yuan, or 3.75% of the annual income per capita. Accordingly, there should be no serious difficulty for everyone to pay 2.50% of their annual income for health insurance, except for those whose annual income is lower than 200 yuan. In addition, our investigation found that about 28% of the average household expenditures in these areas are spent for tobacco and liquor. Individuals can be encouraged to save this type of spending for their medical care. Currently, from individual premiums (2.50% of annual income), particular funds from villages and towns, and special government financial subsidies, the total amount of funding can reach about 10 hundred million yuan yearly. In order to obtain 18 hundred million yuan as required, about 8 hundred million yuan a year needs to be raised.China used to attempt to provide basic medical care for people by way of providing financial support to health care providers, i.e., hospitals and clinics, so that they could offer cheap medical care for patients. This has not turned out to be a good strategy. The government should, instead, directly provide financial support to health care recipients, especially those living in poverty-stricken rural areas, so that they will financially be able to set up basic health care insurance for themselves. In contemporary times, it is vitally important to help them establish a basic amount of health care insurance.DOWNLOAD HISTORY | This article has been downloaded 14 times in Digital Commons before migrating into this platform.