Relevant bibliographies by topics / 1939-1945 Germany Soviet Union Soviet Union

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Academic literature on the topic '1939-1945 Germany Soviet Union Soviet Union'

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Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 4 February 2022

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Journal articles on the topic "1939-1945 Germany Soviet Union Soviet Union"

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Klimiuk, Zbigniew. "Stosunki gospodarcze i handlowe ZSRR – Niemcy w latach 1918–1940 (część 2)." Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski 9, no. 2 (November 30, 2019): 27–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.31648/pw.2999.

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The author analyzes in his paper the economic and trade relations between Germany and the Soviet Union in the period of 1918–1944. During this period trade relations with Germany constituted a continuation of relations between Tsarist Russia and Germany before World War I. The German-Soviet Economic Agreement of October 12, 1925, formed special conditions for the mutual trade relations between the two countries. In addition to the normal exchange of goods, German exports to the Soviet Union were based, from the very beginning, on a system negotiated by the Soviet Trade Mission in Berlin under which the Soviet Union was granted loans for financing additional orders from Germany. Trade with the Soviet Union, promoted by the first credit-based operations, led to a dynamic exchange of goods, which reached its highest point in 1931. In the early 1930s, however, Soviet imports decreased as the regime asserted power and its weakened adherence to the disarmament requirements of the Treaty of Versailles decreased Germany’s reliance on Soviet imports. In addition, the Nazi Party’s rise to power increased tensions between Germany and the Soviet Union. In the mid-1930s, the Soviet Union made repeated efforts at reestablishing closer contacts with Germany. The Soviets chiefly sought to repay, with raw materials the debts which arose from earlier trade exchange, while Germany sought to rearm, therefore both countries signed a credit agreement in 1935. That agreement placed at the disposal of the Soviet Union until June 30, 1937 the loans amounting to 200 million Reichsmarks which were to be repaid in the period 1940–1943. The Soviet Union used 183 million Reichsmarks from this credit. The preceding credit operations were, in principle, liquidated. Economic reconciliation was hampered by political tensions after the Anschluss in the mid-1938 and Hitler’s increasing hesitance to deal with the Soviet Union. However, a new period in the development of Soviet-German economic relations began after the Ribbetrop–Molotov Agreement, which was concluded in August of 1939.
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Miszewski, Dariusz. "Slavic idea in political thought of underground Poland during World War II." Review of Nationalities 7, no. 1 (December 1, 2017): 67–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/pn-2017-0003.

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Abstract After the German invasion in 1941, the USSR declared to be the defender of the Slavic nations occupied by Germany. It did not defend their allies, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, against the Germans in the 1938-1941. In alliance with Germans it attacked Poland in 1939. Soviets used the Slavic idea to organize armed resistance in occupied nations. After the war, the Soviet Union intended to make them politically and militarily dependent. The Polish government rejected participation in the Soviet Slavic bloc. In the Polish political emigration and in the occupied country the Slavic idea was really popular, but as an anti-Soviet idea. Poland not the Soviet Union was expected to become the head of Slavic countries in Central and South-Eastern Europe.
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Klimiuk, Zbigniew. "Stosunki gospodarcze i handlowe ZSRR – Niemcy w latach 1918–1940 (część 1)." Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski 9, no. 1 (June 1, 2018): 49–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.31648/pw.3364.

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The author analyzes in his paper the economic and trade relations between Germanyand the Soviet Union in the period of 1918–1944. During this period trade relations withGermany constituted a continuation of relations between Tsarist Russia and Germany beforeWorld War I. The German-Soviet Economic Agreement of October 12, 1925, formed specialconditions for the mutual trade relations between the two countries. In addition to the normalexchange of goods, German exports to the Soviet Union were based from the very beginningon a system negotiated by the Soviet Trade Mission to Berlin under which the Soviet Union wasgranted loans for financing additional orders from Germany. Trade with Soviet Union, promotedby the first credit-based operations, led to a dynamic exchange of goods, which reached itshighest point in 1931. In the early 1930s, however, Soviet imports decreased as regime assertedpower and its weakened adherence to the disarmament requirements of the Treaty of Versaillesdecreased Germany’s reliance on Soviet imports. In addition, the Nazi Party’s ascent to powerincreased tensions between Germany and the Soviet Union. In the mid-1930s, the Soviet Unionmade repeated efforts at reestablishing closer contacts with Germany. The Soviets chieflysought to repay, with raw materials, the debts which arose from earlier trade exchange, whileGermany sought to rearm, therefore both countries signed a credit agreement in 1935. The saidagreement placed at the disposal of the Soviet Union until June 30, 1937, the loans amountingto 200 million Reichsmarks, to be repaid in the period 1940–1943. The Soviet Union used183 million Reichsmarks from this credit. The preceding credit operations were, in principle,liquidated. Economic reconciliation was hampered by political tensions after the Anschluss inmid-1938 and Hitler’s increasing hesitance to deal with the Soviet Union. However, a new periodin the development of Soviet–German economic relations began after the Ribbetrop–MolotovAgreement, which was concluded in August of 1939.
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Hannikainen, Lauri. "Finland’s Continuation War (1941–1944): War of Aggression or Defence? War of Alliance or Separate War?" Baltic Yearbook of International Law Online 17, no. 1 (December 20, 2020): 77–121. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22115897_01701_006.

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In September 1939, after having included a secret protocol on spheres of influence in the so-called Molotov- Ribbentrop Pact, Germany and the Soviet Union invaded Poland and divided it between themselves. It was not long before the Soviet Union approached Finland by proposing exchanges of certain territories: ‘in our national interest we want to have from you certain territories and offer in exchange territories twice as large but in less crucial areas’. Finland, suspicious of Soviet motives, refused – the outcome was the Soviet war of aggression against Finland by the name of the Winter War in 1939–1940. The Soviet Union won this war and compelled Finland to cede several territories – about 10 per cent of Finland’s area. After the Winter War, Finland sought protection from Germany against the Soviet Union and decided to rely on Germany. After Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, Finland joined the German war effort in the so-called Continuation War and reoccupied the territories lost in the Winter War. Finnish forces did not stop at the old border but occupied Eastern (Soviet) Karelia with a desire eventually to annex it. By that measure, Finland joined as Germany’s ally in its war of aggression against the Soviet Union in violation of international law. In their strong reliance on Germany, the Finnish leaders made some very questionable decisions without listening to warnings from Western States about possible negative consequences. Germany lost its war and so did Finland, which barely avoided entire occupation by the Soviet Army and succeeded in September 1944 in concluding an armistice with the Soviet Union. Finland lost some more territories and was subjected to many obligations and restrictions in the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, dictated by the Allies. This article analyses, according to the criteria of international law, Finland’s policy shortly prior to and during the Continuation War, especially Finland’s secret dealings with Germany in the months prior to the German attack against the Soviet Union and Finland’s occupation of Eastern Karelia in the autumn of 1941. After Adolf Hitler declared that Germany was fighting against the Soviet Union together with Finland and Romania, was the Soviet Union entitled – prior to the Finnish attack – to resort to armed force in self-defence against Finland? And was Finland treated too harshly in the aftermath of World War ii? After all, its role as an ally of Germany had been rather limited.
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Nefedov, Vyacheslav. "The influence of Soviet Union on the post-war culture development of Eastern Germany (1945–1949)." Tambov University Review. Series: Humanities, no. 178 (2019): 175–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.20310/10.20310/1810-0201-2019-24-178-175-181.

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The study of cultural problems in the countries of the socialist community has acquired considerable relevance in historical research recently. At the same time there are considerable gaps in the study of culture of German Democratic Republic. For the period from 1945 to 1949 it is especially true. Appeal to the sources of the Soviet period can make it partly up. Nevertheless, this is insufficient. A modern view of the culture of East Germany after Second World War is ne-cessary. The policy of Socialist Unified Party of Germany at the socialist culture formation period is the subject of this research. The consideration of the influence of Soviet Union and ideas of Oc-tober Revolution on the postwar cultural development of East Germany (1945–1949) is the aim of this research. The realization of research tasks based on the using of Soviet and German books, newspapers and magazines is achieved. Sociopragmatic method, that allows to objectively investigate the processes in Soviet occupation zone of German is the main in this work. Social processes that occurred from 1945 to 1949 in East Germany are investigated. The degree of influence of Soviet Union and the ideas of October Revolution on the cultural policy of Socialist Unified Party of Germany is determined. The study of the Soviet influence on the cultural policy of Socialist Unified Party of Germany in the German society allowed to determinate its level as quite high. The study confirms the conclusions of researchers that party persons of SUPG sought to conduct cultural policy in East Germany based on the Soviet sample.
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ADOMEIT, HANNES. "The German Factor in Soviet Westpolitik." ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 481, no. 1 (September 1985): 15–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002716285481001002.

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The author begins with a broad overview of Russian-German relations and observes that Russian diplomacy has historically vacillated between close cooperation with Germany and the construction of alliances against Germany. The latter has always been important to the Soviet Union, especially since 1945. The first section of the article evaluates the importance of East Germany in Soviet policy. The second section evaluates Soviet-West German relations in terms of Soviet long- and short-term interests. The author argues that Soviet policies toward both Germanys in the late 1970s and early 1980s have failed to produce positive results. The campaign against West German “revanchism” and “militarism” lacks credibility. The recent Soviet attempt to limit intra-German relations is likely to be met with resistance. The Soviet approach has been a setback and an embarrassment. Soviet control over East Germany will become more difficult than it has been in the past.
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Butkus, Zenonas. "Attitudes of the Soviet Union and Germany Towards the Question of Vilnius Between the World Wars." Lithuanian Historical Studies 5, no. 1 (November 30, 2000): 131–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/25386565-00501008.

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The aim of this article is to examine the attitudes of the Soviet Union and Germany towards the problem of Vilnius in the period between the First and Second World Wars. The article is based mainly on unpublished documents from Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, German and Soviet archives. The problem under review emerged after the First World War, when Poland occupied the capital of Lithuania, Vilnius, and kept it under its control almost until the Second World War. Lithuania refused to recognize the situation, and between the two countries there arose a conflict, which was instigated by the Soviet Union and Germany, as they did not want the Baltic States and Poland to create a defence union. The Soviet Union and Germany worked hand in hand in dealing with this conflict. In the process of its regulation they acquired quite an extensive experience in diplomatic co-operation, which they applied successfully in establishing the spheres of their influence in the Baltic States in 1939.
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YEŞILBURSA BEHÇET, KEMAL. "FROM FRIENDSHIP TO ENMITY SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS (1945-1965)." History and Modern Perspectives 2, no. 1 (March 30, 2020): 92–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.33693/2658-4654-2020-2-1-92-105.

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On 26 February 1921, the Soviet Union signed a «Treaty of Friendship» with Iran which was to pave the way for future relations between the two states. Although the Russians renounced various commercial and territorial concessions which the Tsarist government had exacted from Iran, they secured the insertion of two articles which prohibited the formation or residence in either country of individuals, groups, military forces which were hostile to the other party, and gave the Soviet Union the right to send forces into Iran in the event that a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation there, use Iran as a base for operations against Russia, or otherwise threaten Soviet frontiers. Furthermore, in 1927, the Soviet Union signed a «Treaty of Guarantee and Neutrality» with Iran which required the contracting parties to refrain from aggression against each other and not to join blocs or alliances directed against each other’s sovereignty. However, the treaty was violated by the Soviet Union’s wartime occupation of Iran, together with Britain and the United States. The violation was subsequently condoned by the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance of 29 January 1942, which permitted the Soviet Union to maintain troops in Iran for a limited period. Requiring restraint from propaganda, subversion and hostile political groups, the treaty would also appear to have been persistently violated by the Soviet Union: for example, the various radio campaigns of «Radio Moscow» and the «National Voice of Iran»; the financing and control of the Tudeh party; and espionage and rumour-mongering by Soviet officials in Iran. Whatever the Soviet’s original conception of this treaty may have been, they had since used it one-sidedly as a treaty in which both countries would be neutral, with one being «more neutral than the other». In effect, both the 1921 and 1927 treaties had been used as «a stick to beat the Iranians» whenever it suited the Soviets to do so, in propaganda and in inter-governmental dealings. During the Second World War, the treaty between the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and Iran, dated 29 January 1942 - and concluded some 5 months after the occupation of parts of Iran by allied forces, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were entitled to maintain troops in Iran, but the presence of such troops was not to constitute a military occupation. Nonetheless, Soviet forces in the Northern provinces used their authority to prevent both the entry of officials of the Iranian Government and the export of agricultural products to other provinces. The treaty also required military forces to be withdrawn not later than six months after «all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or on the conclusion of peace, whichever is the earlier». This entailed that the Soviet Union should have withdrawn its forces by March 1946, six months after the defeat of Japan. Meanwhile, however, there emerged in Iranian Azerbaijan, under Soviet tutelage, a movement for advanced provincial autonomy which developed into a separatist movement under a Communist-led «National Government of Azerbaijan». In 1945, Soviet forces prevented the Iranian army from moving troops into Azerbaijan, and also confined the Iranian garrison to barracks while the dissidents took forcible possession of key points. At the same time, Soviet troops prevented the entry of Iranian troops into the Kurdistan area, where, under Soviet protection, a Kurdish Republic had been set up by Qazi Mohammad. In 1946, after Iran had appealed to the Security Council, the Russians secured from the Iranian Prime Minister, Qavam es Saltaneh, a promise to introduce a bill providing for the formation of a Soviet-Iranian Oil Company to exploit the Northern oil reserves. In return, the Soviet Union agreed to negotiate over Azerbaijan: the Iranians thereupon withdrew their complaint to the Security Council, and Soviet forces left Azerbaijan by 9 May 1946. In 1955, when Iran was considering joining a regional defensive pact, which was later to manifest itself as the Baghdad Pact, the Soviet Government threatened that such a move would oblige the Soviet Union to act in accordance with Article 6 of the 1921 treaty. This was the «big stick» aspect of Soviet attempts to waylay Iranian membership of such a pact; the «carrot» being the conclusion in 1955 of a Soviet-Iranian «Financial and Frontier Agreement» by which the Soviets agreed to a mutually beneficial re-alignment of the frontier and to pay debts arising from their wartime occupation of Northern Iran. The Soviets continued their war of nerves against Iranian accession to the Pact by breaking off trade negotiations in October 1955 and by a series of minor affronts, such as the cancellation of cultural visits and minimal attendance at the Iranian National Day celebrations in Moscow. In a memorandum dated November 26, the Iranian Government openly rejected Soviet criticisms. Soviet displeasure was expressed officially, in the press and to private individuals. In the ensuing period, Soviet and Soviet-controlled radio stations continued to bombard their listeners with criticism of the Baghdad Pact, or CENTO as it later became. In early 1959, with the breakdown of the negotiations for a non-aggression pact, Iran-Soviet relations entered into a phase of propaganda warfare which intensified with the signature of the bilateral military agreement between Iran and the United States. The Soviet Union insisted that Iran should not permit the establishment of foreign military bases on its soil, and continued to threaten Iran despite the Shah’s assurance on this issue. Consequently, the Iranians denounced Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 treaty, on the basis of which the Soviet Union was making its demands. Attempts by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to improve relations met with little success until September 1959, when Russia offered massive economic support on condition that Iran renounced its military agreements with the United States. This offer was rejected, and, as relations continued to become strained, the Soviets changed their demand to one neither for a written agreement that Iran would not allow its terrain to be used as a base of aggression nor for the establishment of foreign missile bases. The publication by the Soviet Union of the so-called «CENTO documents» did nothing to relieve the strain: the Soviet Union continued to stand out for a bilateral agreement with Iran, and the Shah, in consultation with Britain and the United States, continued to offer no more than a unilateral assurance. In July 1962, with a policy of endeavouring once more to improve relations, the Shah maintained his insistence on a unilateral statement, and the Soviet Government finally agreed to this. The Iranian undertaking was accordingly given and acknowledged on 15 September. The Instruments of ratification of the 1957 Agreements on Transit and Frontier Demarcation were exchanged in Moscow on 26 October 1962 and in Tehran on 20 December, respectively.
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Gross, Magdalena H. "Reclaiming the Nation: Polish Schooling in Exile During the Second World War." History of Education Quarterly 53, no. 3 (August 2013): 233–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/hoeq.12021.

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In the autumn of 1939, Poland was invaded and divided in half by the Third Reich and the Soviet Union. Nazi Germany took over western Poland, while the U.S.S.R. took over the southeast. The Soviet invasion of eastern Poland on September 17, 1939, pursuant to provisions of the secret protocol of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, came as a complete surprise to Poland's thirteen million residents and to diplomats around the world. In the months that followed, the Soviets imposed a complex administrative system in the region, with the goal of “Sovietizing” conquered territories. The dismantling of local religious institutions and the creation of Soviet schooling for millions of Polish, Ukrainian, Jewish, and Belorussian children were all part of this program. Additionally, starting in February 1940, the Soviet authorities carried out four punitive waves of deportation of some 320,000 Polish citizens (men, women, and children) into the interior of the U.S.S.R.
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Ramdani, Muhamad Azisy, Nana Supriatna, and Yani Kusmarni. "Komunitas Muslim Uni Soviet Dalam Melawan Rezim Stalin 1941-1945 (Kajian Perlawanan Turkestan Legion)." FACTUM: Jurnal Sejarah dan Pendidikan Sejarah 8, no. 1 (September 23, 2019): 33–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.17509/factum.v8i1.20115.

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This research elaborated the Turkestan’s life Muslim community in 1941 – 1945 under the Soviet Union. This research made based on researcher’s interest in the history of the Soviet Union’s Muslim community especially the Muslim community in Turkestan whowere in an apprehensive extreme condition when they were under the Stalin regime rule. That was the reason why Turkestan’s Muslim community finally fought back. The research aimed to identify the Turkestan Legion’s effort in fighting back Stalin’s regime. The method was the historical method. Turkestan’s Muslim community fought backbecause Stalin made a discriminative rule and disserve Turkestan’s Muslim community, such as prohibiting the religious freedom and occupied over all natural resources in Turkestan, which resulting poverty and hunger for Turkestan’s Muslim community because Turkestan got nothing from them. Therefore, when Germany invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June 1942, it benefited the Turkestan Muslim community by made cooperation with Germany to fight The Stalin regime. The cooperation between Germany and Turkestan Muslim community marked by forming Germany voluntary soldier with a special member from Turkestan’s Muslim community named TurkestanLegion. Not only used by Germany in fighting in the Soviet Union, but Turkestan Legion also took part in the fighting in Western Front faced England and the United State of America in Normandy.
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "1939-1945 Germany Soviet Union Soviet Union"

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Bennet, Victor Kenneth. "Public opinion and propaganda in national socialist Germany during the war against the Soviet Union /." Thesis, Connect to this title online; UW restricted, 1990. http://hdl.handle.net/1773/10371.

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Panthaki, Neville. "The Reichsmark & the ruble a study of two totalitarian systems and their economies in conflict /." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1998. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/tape17/PQDD_0027/MQ33502.pdf.

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Poupart, Ronald. "Les réactions des pays de l'axe face au pacte germano-russe de 1939 /." Thesis, McGill University, 1986. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=61274.

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This thesis is concerned with the diplomatic reaction of the Axis Countries, Italy, Japan, Spain and Hungary, to the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939. The immediate origins of the Pact were studied in order to put into context the individual responses of the various countries, known as the Axis Powers. Each of these countries was confronted with a dramatic change in the European situation and each had to adjust its relations with Germany in accordance with its own interests and expectations for the question of war or peace in Europe.
With the exception of Hungary, all were opposed to the Pact because it seemed to run contrary to their national interests and promised to upset the Balance of Power on the European, and indeed, the Asian continent. The thesis thus illustrates the special character of Hitler's diplomacy, in the last year of peace before the Second World War, which did not consider the interests of his partners when concluding his arrangements with the Soviet Union.
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Kay, Alex J. "Exploitation, resettlement, mass murder : political and economic planning for German occupation policy in the Soviet Union, 1940-1941 /." New York : Berghahn books, 2006. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb40227679v.

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Texte remanié de: Thesis Ph. D.--Philosophical Faculty I--Berlin--Humboldt-Universität, 2005. Titre de soutenance : Neuordnung and Hungerpolitik : the development and compatibility of political and economic planning within the Nazi hierarchy for the occupation of the Soviet Union, July 1940-July 1941.
Bibliogr. p. 222-234.
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Zellhuber, Andreas. ""Unsere Verwaltung treibt einer Katastrophe zu - " : das Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete und die deutsche Besatzungsherrschaft in der Sowjetunion 1941-1945 /." München : Vögel, 2006. http://bvbr.bib-bvb.de:8991/F?func=service&doc_library=BVB01&doc_number=014784199&line_number=0001&func_code=DB_RECORDS&service_type=MEDIA.

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Foisy, Cory A. "Soviet war-readiness and the road to war : 1937-41." Thesis, McGill University, 2003. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=79938.

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This is a study of the foreign and domestic policies of the USSR as they pertain to its war-readiness, as well as the degree to which these policies presumably opened the door to the European conflagration and, in 1941, to the Nazi-Soviet war. Topics to be discussed include: (1) the crash industrialization of the Soviet Union and industrial war preparations from 1928--41; (2) the development of Soviet military doctrine before and after 12 June 1937; (3) a critical re-examination of the popularly accepted reasons for the devolution of the Soviet armed forces; and (4) Soviet foreign policy from 1937--41. The chronological end of the paper (1941) is followed by a brief epilogue discussing the evident success of the Soviet industrialization program by reference to Soviet industrial performance during the Nazi-Soviet war. Furthermore, the epilogue will challenge the popular depiction of the German invasion as an effortless, seamless advance into the Soviet heartland.
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Bélanger, Nicolas 1978. "Le conflit germano-soviétique, 1941-1945 : analyse des principaux enjeux militaires, politiques et stratégiques." Thesis, McGill University, 2005. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=83173.

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In spite of the crucial importance of the Russian front in the outcome of the Second World War, this aspect of the conflict has been studied relatively little in the West since 1945. This omission can be attributed to several factors including linguistic complexity, the difficulty of access to Soviet archives, and the political constraints caused by the ideological climate of the Cold War. Since the time of glasnost' and the collapse of the Soviet block, however, a new era has begun for historians thanks to the release of many documents which had been secret and to the improved ideological climate.
The present work aims to summarise the current situation of the debate in this rapidly expanding field of historiography. Some of the most controversial military, political, and strategic questions are examined, most frequently from a Soviet perspective. These include the Soviet preparations for war and their shortcomings; the German campaign of 1941 and the reasons for its failure; the turning of the tide in 1942-1943, especially the battles of Kursk and Stalingrad; the Yalta conference and the "division of the world"; the role of Stalin and his regime in the "Great Patriotic War"; the human and material losses of the Soviet Union during the conflict; and finally the importance of the Soviet contribution to the victory of the Allies.
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Fourestier, Jeffrey de. "The Hitler-Stalin pact : discussion of the Non-Aggression Treaty and the secret protocols." Thesis, McGill University, 1992. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=61284.

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This thesis re-examines the Non-Aggression Treaty of August 1939 arrived at between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in light of the changes which occurred in Eastern Europe since 1989. It is based on a systematic analysis of primary and secondary source materials. It is demonstrated that, contrary to the popular viewpoint, the Soviet Union played a central role in the events leading up to the treaty and the outbreak of World War Two. Stalin's efforts to draw Germany into an agreement and its consequences are discussed.
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Pfeifer, Justin Thomas. "The Soviet Union through German Eyes: Wehrmacht Identity, Nazi Propaganda, and the Eastern Front War, 1941-1945." University of Toledo / OhioLINK, 2014. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=toledo1417426182.

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Givens, Seth. "Cold War Capital: The United States, the Western Allies, and the Fight for Berlin, 1945-1994." Ohio University / OhioLINK, 2018. http://rave.ohiolink.edu/etdc/view?acc_num=ohiou1515507541865131.

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Books on the topic "1939-1945 Germany Soviet Union Soviet Union"

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Red storm on the Reich: The Soviet march on Germany, 1945. London: Routledge, 1991.

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Red storm on the Reich: The Soviet march on Germany, 1945. New York: Da Capo Press, 1993.

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Duffy, Christopher. Red storm on the Reich: The Soviet march on Germany, 1945. London: Routledge, 2000.

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Duffy, Christopher. Red storm on the Reich: The Soviet march on Germany, 1945. New York: Atheneum, 1991.

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Kolasky, John. Partners in tyranny: The Nazi-Soviet Nonagression Pact, August 23, 1939. Toronto: The Mackenzie Institute, 1990.

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Kolasky, John. Partners in tyranny: The Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact, August 23, 1939. Toronto, Ont: Mackenzie Institute, 1990.

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Roberts, Geoffrey. The Soviet Union and the origins of the Second World War: Russo-German relations and the road to war, 1933-1941. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1995.

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Denazification in Soviet-occupied Germany: Brandenburg, 1945-1948. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000.

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Poland betrayed: The Nazi-Soviet invasions of 1939. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2011.

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Mulligan, Timothy Patrick. The politics of illusion and empire: German occupation policy in the Soviet Union, 1942-1943. New York: Praeger, 1988.

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Book chapters on the topic "1939-1945 Germany Soviet Union Soviet Union"

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Wettig, Gerhard. "The Kremlin’s Impact on the Peaceful Revolution in East Germany (August 1989–March 1990)." In The Soviet Union in Eastern Europe, 1945–89, 150–74. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-23234-5_9.

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Naimark, Norman M. "The Soviets and the Christian Democrats: the Challenge of a ‘Bourgeois’ Party in Eastern Germany, 1945–9." In The Soviet Union and Europe in the Cold War, 1943–53, 37–56. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-25106-3_3.

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Robertson, Esmonde M. "German Mobilisation Preparations and the Treaties Between Germany and the Soviet Union of August and September 1939." In Paths to War, 330–66. London: Macmillan Education UK, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-20333-8_11.

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Slepyan, Kenneth. "Mass Production and Mass Dictatorships: The Economics of Total War in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, 1933–1945." In The Palgrave Handbook of Mass Dictatorship, 293–308. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-43763-1_24.

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Young, John W., and John Kent. "20. Europe and the Former Soviet Union." In International Relations Since 1945. Oxford University Press, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/hepl/9780199693061.003.0026.

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This chapter examines important developments in Europe and the former Soviet Union. The collapse of communism paved the way for the greatest changes in Europe since 1919, with the political disintegration of three Eurasian countries: the then USSR with localized outbreaks of violence; Yugoslavia with several years of bloody civil war; and Czechoslovakia where the Czechs and Slovaks peacefully agreed to go their own way as of January 1993, in the so-called ‘velvet divorce’. Communism’s demise also brought reunification to a divided nation: Germany. The chapter first considers the German reunification before discussing the break-up of the USSR and the Wars of Succession, Yugoslavia’s break-up and the Bosnian War, NATO and European security, and the emergence of the European Union that replaced the European Community.
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Young, John W., and John Kent. "20. Europe and the Former Soviet Union." In International Relations Since 1945, 475–502. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/hepl/9780198807612.003.0020.

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This chapter examines important developments in Europe and the former Soviet Union. The collapse of communism paved the way for the greatest changes in Europe since 1919, with the political disintegration of three Eurasian countries: the then USSR, with localized outbreaks of violence; Yugoslavia, with several years of bloody civil war; and Czechoslovakia, where the Czechs and Slovaks peacefully agreed to go their own way as of January 1993, in the so-called ‘velvet divorce’. Communism’s demise also brought reunification to a divided nation: Germany. The chapter first considers the German reunification, before discussing the break-up of the USSR and the Wars of Succession, Yugoslavia’s break-up and the Bosnian War, NATO and European security, and the emergence of the European Union, which replaced the European Community.
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Weinberg, Gerard L. "2. World War II begins." In World War II: A Very Short Introduction, 20–32. Oxford University Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780199688777.003.0003.

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The German attack on Poland began on September 1 1939, and triggered the declaration of war on Germany by Britain, France, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the Union of South Africa. Germany and the Soviet Union were agreed on a dual attack on Poland from the West and East, which left Poland unable to defend itself. An important aspect of the war between Germany and the Allies was the war of the oceans. The battles between warships, targets on merchant ships, and the use of submarines in the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans continued from 1939 up until Germany's surrender in May 1945 and drew in many Baltic and Scandinavian countries.
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Crawford, Timothy W. "Germany Divides the USSR from Britain and France, 1939." In The Power to Divide, 111–32. Cornell University Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501754715.003.0008.

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This chapter describes Germany's successful attempt to stop the USSR from allying with Britain and France in 1939. Adolf Hitler's policy was informed by two beliefs about Soviet strategic weight. The first was that Soviet neutrality was necessary for victory in a war against Poland that included British and French intervention. Soviet neutrality would diminish the effects of the allied strategy of economic blockade and punishment. The second was that the shock of Moscow's neutralization would likely compel Britain and France to abandon their commitments to Poland and thus allow Germany to attack it isolated. As German leaders foresaw, despite the apparent long odds, their policy to accommodate the Soviet Union might work because they could extend strategic benefits to Moscow that the Allies' alliance plans could not. Other conditions, captured in the theory, strongly favored success. First, Germany's policy tried to induce a low degree of alignment change. The Soviet Union was uncommitted; the German goal was to solidify this in a formal arrangement. Second, Germany faced low alliance constraints at the time. Its closest (and only formal) military ally, Italy, was weak relative to Germany and had little direct influence or interests at stake in the elements of the bargain, and it favored compromise with USSR for the same general reasons Germany did.
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Kelanic, Rosemary A. "The Oil Strategies of Nazi Germany." In Black Gold and Blackmail, 92–114. Cornell University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.7591/cornell/9781501748295.003.0006.

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This chapter analyzes four cases that span the Nazi era in Germany. From the beginning of the Nazi regime in March of 1933 until its defeat in April of 1945, the chapter identifies three major turning points: (1) Adolf Hitler's announcement of the Four-Year Plan in September of 1936; (2) the imposition of an Anglo-French naval blockade against Germany on September 3, 1939; and (3) the shift from blitzkrieg to attrition warfare against the Soviet Union in December of 1941. This divides the case into four distinct periods: March 1933 to August 1936; September 1936 until September 3, 1939; September 4, 1939, until the end of December 1941; and January 1942 through the end of the war in April 1945. Hitler's anticipatory strategies changed over time, in tandem with his country's coercive vulnerability, intensifying from self-sufficiency before World War II to indirect control at the war's start to, finally, direct control after Operation Barbarossa failed to speedily defeat the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics). One would expect that Hitler, as the most expansionist leader of the twentieth century, would engage in conquest to get oil; yet primarily, he sought oil security through less extreme measures.
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Riehle, Kevin. "Conclusion." In Soviet Defectors, 263–84. Edinburgh University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/edinburgh/9781474467230.003.0007.

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Several lessons emerge from these defectors’ revelations. First, the motivations of defectors changed based on the circumstances around them, which reflected Soviet policy changes. Those policy changes, such as purges and increased domestic repression, were often at the foundation of defector’s motivations. Second, vetting standards for Soviet personnel assigned to sensitive national security positions fluctuated, depending on the stability in the Soviet government and the level of urgency for hiring new personnel. When the Soviet Union was stable, it had the luxury of enforcing strict standards. When the Soviet Union needed a lot of people fast—such as during purges or wartime—it did not vet them as thoroughly. Finally, the Soviet perception of threat evolved, beginning with Great Britain as the primary threat in the early Soviet era, and joined by Germany after 1933, although Stalin never abandoned hope for an accommodation with Hitler. However, even before Germany was defeated in 1945, Soviet intelligence began targeting its wartime allies. By the late 1940s, when the United States assumed the role of the leader of the democratic world, the label “main enemy” was coined and applied to the United States, which stuck for the rest of the Soviet era.
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