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1
Klimiuk, Zbigniew. "Stosunki gospodarcze i handlowe ZSRR – Niemcy w latach 1918–1940 (część 2)." Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski 9, no. 2 (November 30, 2019): 27–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.31648/pw.2999.
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The author analyzes in his paper the economic and trade relations between Germany and the Soviet Union in the period of 1918–1944. During this period trade relations with Germany constituted a continuation of relations between Tsarist Russia and Germany before World War I. The German-Soviet Economic Agreement of October 12, 1925, formed special conditions for the mutual trade relations between the two countries. In addition to the normal exchange of goods, German exports to the Soviet Union were based, from the very beginning, on a system negotiated by the Soviet Trade Mission in Berlin under which the Soviet Union was granted loans for financing additional orders from Germany. Trade with the Soviet Union, promoted by the first credit-based operations, led to a dynamic exchange of goods, which reached its highest point in 1931. In the early 1930s, however, Soviet imports decreased as the regime asserted power and its weakened adherence to the disarmament requirements of the Treaty of Versailles decreased Germany’s reliance on Soviet imports. In addition, the Nazi Party’s rise to power increased tensions between Germany and the Soviet Union. In the mid-1930s, the Soviet Union made repeated efforts at reestablishing closer contacts with Germany. The Soviets chiefly sought to repay, with raw materials the debts which arose from earlier trade exchange, while Germany sought to rearm, therefore both countries signed a credit agreement in 1935. That agreement placed at the disposal of the Soviet Union until June 30, 1937 the loans amounting to 200 million Reichsmarks which were to be repaid in the period 1940–1943. The Soviet Union used 183 million Reichsmarks from this credit. The preceding credit operations were, in principle, liquidated. Economic reconciliation was hampered by political tensions after the Anschluss in the mid-1938 and Hitler’s increasing hesitance to deal with the Soviet Union. However, a new period in the development of Soviet-German economic relations began after the Ribbetrop–Molotov Agreement, which was concluded in August of 1939.
2
Miszewski, Dariusz. "Slavic idea in political thought of underground Poland during World War II." Review of Nationalities 7, no. 1 (December 1, 2017): 67–118. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/pn-2017-0003.
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Abstract After the German invasion in 1941, the USSR declared to be the defender of the Slavic nations occupied by Germany. It did not defend their allies, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, against the Germans in the 1938-1941. In alliance with Germans it attacked Poland in 1939. Soviets used the Slavic idea to organize armed resistance in occupied nations. After the war, the Soviet Union intended to make them politically and militarily dependent. The Polish government rejected participation in the Soviet Slavic bloc. In the Polish political emigration and in the occupied country the Slavic idea was really popular, but as an anti-Soviet idea. Poland not the Soviet Union was expected to become the head of Slavic countries in Central and South-Eastern Europe.
3
Klimiuk, Zbigniew. "Stosunki gospodarcze i handlowe ZSRR – Niemcy w latach 1918–1940 (część 1)." Przegląd Wschodnioeuropejski 9, no. 1 (June 1, 2018): 49–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.31648/pw.3364.
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The author analyzes in his paper the economic and trade relations between Germanyand the Soviet Union in the period of 1918–1944. During this period trade relations withGermany constituted a continuation of relations between Tsarist Russia and Germany beforeWorld War I. The German-Soviet Economic Agreement of October 12, 1925, formed specialconditions for the mutual trade relations between the two countries. In addition to the normalexchange of goods, German exports to the Soviet Union were based from the very beginningon a system negotiated by the Soviet Trade Mission to Berlin under which the Soviet Union wasgranted loans for financing additional orders from Germany. Trade with Soviet Union, promotedby the first credit-based operations, led to a dynamic exchange of goods, which reached itshighest point in 1931. In the early 1930s, however, Soviet imports decreased as regime assertedpower and its weakened adherence to the disarmament requirements of the Treaty of Versaillesdecreased Germany’s reliance on Soviet imports. In addition, the Nazi Party’s ascent to powerincreased tensions between Germany and the Soviet Union. In the mid-1930s, the Soviet Unionmade repeated efforts at reestablishing closer contacts with Germany. The Soviets chieflysought to repay, with raw materials, the debts which arose from earlier trade exchange, whileGermany sought to rearm, therefore both countries signed a credit agreement in 1935. The saidagreement placed at the disposal of the Soviet Union until June 30, 1937, the loans amountingto 200 million Reichsmarks, to be repaid in the period 1940–1943. The Soviet Union used183 million Reichsmarks from this credit. The preceding credit operations were, in principle,liquidated. Economic reconciliation was hampered by political tensions after the Anschluss inmid-1938 and Hitler’s increasing hesitance to deal with the Soviet Union. However, a new periodin the development of Soviet–German economic relations began after the Ribbetrop–MolotovAgreement, which was concluded in August of 1939.
4
Hannikainen, Lauri. "Finland’s Continuation War (1941–1944): War of Aggression or Defence? War of Alliance or Separate War?" Baltic Yearbook of International Law Online 17, no. 1 (December 20, 2020): 77–121. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/22115897_01701_006.
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In September 1939, after having included a secret protocol on spheres of influence in the so-called Molotov- Ribbentrop Pact, Germany and the Soviet Union invaded Poland and divided it between themselves. It was not long before the Soviet Union approached Finland by proposing exchanges of certain territories: ‘in our national interest we want to have from you certain territories and offer in exchange territories twice as large but in less crucial areas’. Finland, suspicious of Soviet motives, refused – the outcome was the Soviet war of aggression against Finland by the name of the Winter War in 1939–1940. The Soviet Union won this war and compelled Finland to cede several territories – about 10 per cent of Finland’s area. After the Winter War, Finland sought protection from Germany against the Soviet Union and decided to rely on Germany. After Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, Finland joined the German war effort in the so-called Continuation War and reoccupied the territories lost in the Winter War. Finnish forces did not stop at the old border but occupied Eastern (Soviet) Karelia with a desire eventually to annex it. By that measure, Finland joined as Germany’s ally in its war of aggression against the Soviet Union in violation of international law. In their strong reliance on Germany, the Finnish leaders made some very questionable decisions without listening to warnings from Western States about possible negative consequences. Germany lost its war and so did Finland, which barely avoided entire occupation by the Soviet Army and succeeded in September 1944 in concluding an armistice with the Soviet Union. Finland lost some more territories and was subjected to many obligations and restrictions in the 1947 Paris Peace Treaty, dictated by the Allies. This article analyses, according to the criteria of international law, Finland’s policy shortly prior to and during the Continuation War, especially Finland’s secret dealings with Germany in the months prior to the German attack against the Soviet Union and Finland’s occupation of Eastern Karelia in the autumn of 1941. After Adolf Hitler declared that Germany was fighting against the Soviet Union together with Finland and Romania, was the Soviet Union entitled – prior to the Finnish attack – to resort to armed force in self-defence against Finland? And was Finland treated too harshly in the aftermath of World War ii? After all, its role as an ally of Germany had been rather limited.
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Nefedov, Vyacheslav. "The influence of Soviet Union on the post-war culture development of Eastern Germany (1945–1949)." Tambov University Review. Series: Humanities, no. 178 (2019): 175–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.20310/10.20310/1810-0201-2019-24-178-175-181.
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The study of cultural problems in the countries of the socialist community has acquired considerable relevance in historical research recently. At the same time there are considerable gaps in the study of culture of German Democratic Republic. For the period from 1945 to 1949 it is especially true. Appeal to the sources of the Soviet period can make it partly up. Nevertheless, this is insufficient. A modern view of the culture of East Germany after Second World War is ne-cessary. The policy of Socialist Unified Party of Germany at the socialist culture formation period is the subject of this research. The consideration of the influence of Soviet Union and ideas of Oc-tober Revolution on the postwar cultural development of East Germany (1945–1949) is the aim of this research. The realization of research tasks based on the using of Soviet and German books, newspapers and magazines is achieved. Sociopragmatic method, that allows to objectively investigate the processes in Soviet occupation zone of German is the main in this work. Social processes that occurred from 1945 to 1949 in East Germany are investigated. The degree of influence of Soviet Union and the ideas of October Revolution on the cultural policy of Socialist Unified Party of Germany is determined. The study of the Soviet influence on the cultural policy of Socialist Unified Party of Germany in the German society allowed to determinate its level as quite high. The study confirms the conclusions of researchers that party persons of SUPG sought to conduct cultural policy in East Germany based on the Soviet sample.
6
ADOMEIT, HANNES. "The German Factor in Soviet Westpolitik." ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 481, no. 1 (September 1985): 15–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002716285481001002.
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The author begins with a broad overview of Russian-German relations and observes that Russian diplomacy has historically vacillated between close cooperation with Germany and the construction of alliances against Germany. The latter has always been important to the Soviet Union, especially since 1945. The first section of the article evaluates the importance of East Germany in Soviet policy. The second section evaluates Soviet-West German relations in terms of Soviet long- and short-term interests. The author argues that Soviet policies toward both Germanys in the late 1970s and early 1980s have failed to produce positive results. The campaign against West German “revanchism” and “militarism” lacks credibility. The recent Soviet attempt to limit intra-German relations is likely to be met with resistance. The Soviet approach has been a setback and an embarrassment. Soviet control over East Germany will become more difficult than it has been in the past.
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Butkus, Zenonas. "Attitudes of the Soviet Union and Germany Towards the Question of Vilnius Between the World Wars." Lithuanian Historical Studies 5, no. 1 (November 30, 2000): 131–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/25386565-00501008.
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The aim of this article is to examine the attitudes of the Soviet Union and Germany towards the problem of Vilnius in the period between the First and Second World Wars. The article is based mainly on unpublished documents from Lithuanian, Latvian, Estonian, German and Soviet archives. The problem under review emerged after the First World War, when Poland occupied the capital of Lithuania, Vilnius, and kept it under its control almost until the Second World War. Lithuania refused to recognize the situation, and between the two countries there arose a conflict, which was instigated by the Soviet Union and Germany, as they did not want the Baltic States and Poland to create a defence union. The Soviet Union and Germany worked hand in hand in dealing with this conflict. In the process of its regulation they acquired quite an extensive experience in diplomatic co-operation, which they applied successfully in establishing the spheres of their influence in the Baltic States in 1939.
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YEŞILBURSA BEHÇET, KEMAL. "FROM FRIENDSHIP TO ENMITY SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS (1945-1965)." History and Modern Perspectives 2, no. 1 (March 30, 2020): 92–105. http://dx.doi.org/10.33693/2658-4654-2020-2-1-92-105.
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On 26 February 1921, the Soviet Union signed a «Treaty of Friendship» with Iran which was to pave the way for future relations between the two states. Although the Russians renounced various commercial and territorial concessions which the Tsarist government had exacted from Iran, they secured the insertion of two articles which prohibited the formation or residence in either country of individuals, groups, military forces which were hostile to the other party, and gave the Soviet Union the right to send forces into Iran in the event that a third party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation there, use Iran as a base for operations against Russia, or otherwise threaten Soviet frontiers. Furthermore, in 1927, the Soviet Union signed a «Treaty of Guarantee and Neutrality» with Iran which required the contracting parties to refrain from aggression against each other and not to join blocs or alliances directed against each other’s sovereignty. However, the treaty was violated by the Soviet Union’s wartime occupation of Iran, together with Britain and the United States. The violation was subsequently condoned by the conclusion of the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance of 29 January 1942, which permitted the Soviet Union to maintain troops in Iran for a limited period. Requiring restraint from propaganda, subversion and hostile political groups, the treaty would also appear to have been persistently violated by the Soviet Union: for example, the various radio campaigns of «Radio Moscow» and the «National Voice of Iran»; the financing and control of the Tudeh party; and espionage and rumour-mongering by Soviet officials in Iran. Whatever the Soviet’s original conception of this treaty may have been, they had since used it one-sidedly as a treaty in which both countries would be neutral, with one being «more neutral than the other». In effect, both the 1921 and 1927 treaties had been used as «a stick to beat the Iranians» whenever it suited the Soviets to do so, in propaganda and in inter-governmental dealings. During the Second World War, the treaty between the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and Iran, dated 29 January 1942 - and concluded some 5 months after the occupation of parts of Iran by allied forces, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union were entitled to maintain troops in Iran, but the presence of such troops was not to constitute a military occupation. Nonetheless, Soviet forces in the Northern provinces used their authority to prevent both the entry of officials of the Iranian Government and the export of agricultural products to other provinces. The treaty also required military forces to be withdrawn not later than six months after «all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or on the conclusion of peace, whichever is the earlier». This entailed that the Soviet Union should have withdrawn its forces by March 1946, six months after the defeat of Japan. Meanwhile, however, there emerged in Iranian Azerbaijan, under Soviet tutelage, a movement for advanced provincial autonomy which developed into a separatist movement under a Communist-led «National Government of Azerbaijan». In 1945, Soviet forces prevented the Iranian army from moving troops into Azerbaijan, and also confined the Iranian garrison to barracks while the dissidents took forcible possession of key points. At the same time, Soviet troops prevented the entry of Iranian troops into the Kurdistan area, where, under Soviet protection, a Kurdish Republic had been set up by Qazi Mohammad. In 1946, after Iran had appealed to the Security Council, the Russians secured from the Iranian Prime Minister, Qavam es Saltaneh, a promise to introduce a bill providing for the formation of a Soviet-Iranian Oil Company to exploit the Northern oil reserves. In return, the Soviet Union agreed to negotiate over Azerbaijan: the Iranians thereupon withdrew their complaint to the Security Council, and Soviet forces left Azerbaijan by 9 May 1946. In 1955, when Iran was considering joining a regional defensive pact, which was later to manifest itself as the Baghdad Pact, the Soviet Government threatened that such a move would oblige the Soviet Union to act in accordance with Article 6 of the 1921 treaty. This was the «big stick» aspect of Soviet attempts to waylay Iranian membership of such a pact; the «carrot» being the conclusion in 1955 of a Soviet-Iranian «Financial and Frontier Agreement» by which the Soviets agreed to a mutually beneficial re-alignment of the frontier and to pay debts arising from their wartime occupation of Northern Iran. The Soviets continued their war of nerves against Iranian accession to the Pact by breaking off trade negotiations in October 1955 and by a series of minor affronts, such as the cancellation of cultural visits and minimal attendance at the Iranian National Day celebrations in Moscow. In a memorandum dated November 26, the Iranian Government openly rejected Soviet criticisms. Soviet displeasure was expressed officially, in the press and to private individuals. In the ensuing period, Soviet and Soviet-controlled radio stations continued to bombard their listeners with criticism of the Baghdad Pact, or CENTO as it later became. In early 1959, with the breakdown of the negotiations for a non-aggression pact, Iran-Soviet relations entered into a phase of propaganda warfare which intensified with the signature of the bilateral military agreement between Iran and the United States. The Soviet Union insisted that Iran should not permit the establishment of foreign military bases on its soil, and continued to threaten Iran despite the Shah’s assurance on this issue. Consequently, the Iranians denounced Articles 5 and 6 of the 1921 treaty, on the basis of which the Soviet Union was making its demands. Attempts by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to improve relations met with little success until September 1959, when Russia offered massive economic support on condition that Iran renounced its military agreements with the United States. This offer was rejected, and, as relations continued to become strained, the Soviets changed their demand to one neither for a written agreement that Iran would not allow its terrain to be used as a base of aggression nor for the establishment of foreign missile bases. The publication by the Soviet Union of the so-called «CENTO documents» did nothing to relieve the strain: the Soviet Union continued to stand out for a bilateral agreement with Iran, and the Shah, in consultation with Britain and the United States, continued to offer no more than a unilateral assurance. In July 1962, with a policy of endeavouring once more to improve relations, the Shah maintained his insistence on a unilateral statement, and the Soviet Government finally agreed to this. The Iranian undertaking was accordingly given and acknowledged on 15 September. The Instruments of ratification of the 1957 Agreements on Transit and Frontier Demarcation were exchanged in Moscow on 26 October 1962 and in Tehran on 20 December, respectively.
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Gross, Magdalena H. "Reclaiming the Nation: Polish Schooling in Exile During the Second World War." History of Education Quarterly 53, no. 3 (August 2013): 233–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/hoeq.12021.
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In the autumn of 1939, Poland was invaded and divided in half by the Third Reich and the Soviet Union. Nazi Germany took over western Poland, while the U.S.S.R. took over the southeast. The Soviet invasion of eastern Poland on September 17, 1939, pursuant to provisions of the secret protocol of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, came as a complete surprise to Poland's thirteen million residents and to diplomats around the world. In the months that followed, the Soviets imposed a complex administrative system in the region, with the goal of “Sovietizing” conquered territories. The dismantling of local religious institutions and the creation of Soviet schooling for millions of Polish, Ukrainian, Jewish, and Belorussian children were all part of this program. Additionally, starting in February 1940, the Soviet authorities carried out four punitive waves of deportation of some 320,000 Polish citizens (men, women, and children) into the interior of the U.S.S.R.
10
Ramdani, Muhamad Azisy, Nana Supriatna, and Yani Kusmarni. "Komunitas Muslim Uni Soviet Dalam Melawan Rezim Stalin 1941-1945 (Kajian Perlawanan Turkestan Legion)." FACTUM: Jurnal Sejarah dan Pendidikan Sejarah 8, no. 1 (September 23, 2019): 33–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.17509/factum.v8i1.20115.
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This research elaborated the Turkestan’s life Muslim community in 1941 – 1945 under the Soviet Union. This research made based on researcher’s interest in the history of the Soviet Union’s Muslim community especially the Muslim community in Turkestan whowere in an apprehensive extreme condition when they were under the Stalin regime rule. That was the reason why Turkestan’s Muslim community finally fought back. The research aimed to identify the Turkestan Legion’s effort in fighting back Stalin’s regime. The method was the historical method. Turkestan’s Muslim community fought backbecause Stalin made a discriminative rule and disserve Turkestan’s Muslim community, such as prohibiting the religious freedom and occupied over all natural resources in Turkestan, which resulting poverty and hunger for Turkestan’s Muslim community because Turkestan got nothing from them. Therefore, when Germany invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June 1942, it benefited the Turkestan Muslim community by made cooperation with Germany to fight The Stalin regime. The cooperation between Germany and Turkestan Muslim community marked by forming Germany voluntary soldier with a special member from Turkestan’s Muslim community named TurkestanLegion. Not only used by Germany in fighting in the Soviet Union, but Turkestan Legion also took part in the fighting in Western Front faced England and the United State of America in Normandy.
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Kirpenko, Pavlo. "International Situation in Europe and USSR’S Foreign Policy prior to and after the Outbreak of World War II." Diplomatic Ukraine, no. XXI (2020): 117–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.37837/2707-7683-2020-6.
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The article is devoted to the international situation in Europe and USSR’s foreign policy before and after the outbreak of World War II. The author states that from the very begin¬ning the fascist regime in Germany was favourably received by Stalin’s USSR. Hitler also claimed that the German government was ready to develop friendly relations with the Soviet Union. However, such a situation in the bilateral relations was short-lived. Seeking benevolence from Western European countries, Hitler assumed the role of an anti-communist crusader. With a view to strengthening the country’s security, countering Germany and fascism, Stalin gave up his ideological dogmas in line with the situation. Moscow came to vigorously support all politi¬cal forces, which were advocating closer relations with the USSR against fascism. After Germany attacked the Soviet Union, Stalin’s foreign policy suffered a total collapse, which was a devastating blow to the myth of his brilliance and sagacity. The glorification of fascism and the policy of its befriending came at a cost. Nearly 50 million Soviet citizens per¬ished in the war against the fascist Germany, of which 10 million were Ukrainian nationals. In Russia, both public officials and scholars still avoid the truth about the foreign policy activity of the Soviet leadership in 1939 and 1940s. In this regard, the Ukrainian histo¬rian and specialist in international relations, professor at Kyiv Pedagogical University Anatolii Trubaichuk was the first in the Soviet Union to tell the truth in his writings and lectures about the essence of the Soviet foreign policy before and after the beginning of World War II based on his profound scientific research. The author stresses that the search for full truth is to be continued. To that end, it is neces¬sary that all the archives in Russia be opened and access to documents relating to the period of World War II be provided. Keywords: World War II, foreign policy, Soviet Union, Stalin, Germany.
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Lazuto, Yurii. "Some Aspects of Working Practices at the Department of State Protocol of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine." Diplomatic Ukraine, no. XXI (2020): 137–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.37837/2707-7683-2020-7.
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Abstract. The article is devoted to the international situation in Europe and USSR’s foreign policy before and after the outbreak of World War II. The author states that from the very beginning the fascist regime in Germany was favourably received by Stalin’s USSR. Hitler also claimed that the German government was ready to develop friendly relations with the Soviet Union. However, such a situation in the bilateral relations was short-lived. Seeking benevolence from Western European countries, Hitler assumed the role of an anti-communist crusader. With a view to strengthening the country’s security, countering Germany and fascism, Stalin gave up his ideological dogmas in line with the situation. Moscow came to vigorously support all political forces, which were advocating closer relations with the USSR against fascism. After Germany attacked the Soviet Union, Stalin’s foreign policy suffered a total collapse, which was a devastating blow to the myth of his brilliance and sagacity. The glorification of fascism and the policy of its befriending came at a cost. Nearly 50 million Soviet citizens perished in the war against the fascist Germany, of which 10 million were Ukrainian nationals. In Russia, both public officials and scholars still avoid the truth about the foreign policy activity of the Soviet leadership in 1939 and 1940s. In this regard, the Ukrainian historian and specialist in international relations, professor at Kyiv Pedagogical University Anatolii Trubaichuk was the first in the Soviet Union to tell the truth in his writings and lectures about the essence of the Soviet foreign policy before and after the beginning of World War II based on his profound scientific research. The author stresses that the search for full truth is to be continued. To that end, it is necessary that all the archives in Russia be opened and access to documents relating to the period of World War II be provided. Keywords: World War II, foreign policy, Soviet Union, Stalin, Germany.
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Harviainen, Tapani. "The Jews in Finland and World War II." Nordisk Judaistik/Scandinavian Jewish Studies 21, no. 1-2 (September 1, 2000): 157–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.30752/nj.69575.
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In the years 1989–1944 two different wars against the Soviet Union were imposed upon Finland. During the Winter War of 1989–1940 Germany remained strictly neutral on the basis of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact&&Great Britain and France planned intervention in favour of Finland. When the second, so-called Continuation War broke out in the summer of 1041, Finland was co-belligerent of Germany, and Great Britain declared war on Finland in December 1941. De jure, however, Finland was never an ally of Germany, and at the end of the war, in the winter 1944–1945, the Finnish armed forces expelled the German troops from Lapland, which was devastated by the Germans during their retreat to Norway. Military service was compulsory for each male citizen of Finland. In 1939 the Jewish population of Finland numbered 1 700. Of these, 260 men were called up and approximately 200 were sent to serve at the front during the Winter War.
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Schweitzer, Vladimir. "USSR and Germany: on the Way to June 22, 1941." Contemporary Europe 99, no. 6 (November 1, 2020): 202–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.15211/soveurope62020202213.
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The article deals with the Soviet-German relations in the period of 1939‒1941. It is shoun that after signing of the Munich agreements in September, 1938, Germany generally defined its strategy of pressure on countries that fit into the Hitler’s concept of "Push to the East". Its victims in 1935 were Czechoslovakia and Poland. After the German occupation of Czechoslovakia, Great Britain and France sought to review the "policy of appeasement" of Hitler and were ready to join the USSR in the search for ways to prevent Hitler's expansion. However, the inconsistency and contradictoriness of this "change of milestones" strengthened the position of the Soviet leadership in favour of reaching agreements with Germany. The summer of 1939 was the apotheosis of fruitless negotiations between the "Troika" (the USSR, Great Britain and France), which objectively prompted Moscow to accept the German proposal for fundamentally new bilateral agreements (the Pact of August 23, 1939). Subsequent events up to June 22, 1941 showed the unreliability of agreements with Nazism, facilitated the fleeting victory of Germany over Poland and France, and the actual isolation of Great Britain. Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union did not remove from the Soviet leadership the historical guilt of being unprepared for war with fascism, for the colossal human and territorial losses of the first stage of the Great Patriotic War
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Uchaev, Anton N., Elena I. Demidova, and Natalia A. Uchaeva. "The Prime Minister of Canada William Lyon Mackenzie King’s Perception of the USSR during World War II: 1939–45." Herald of an archivist, no. 2 (2021): 593–602. http://dx.doi.org/10.28995/2073-0101-2021-2-593-602.
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The article analyzes the specificity of the Canadian Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King’s attitude to the Soviet Union during the Second World War. The study analyzes the frequency of the Prime Minister referencing the USSR in his diary from September 1, 1939 to September 2, 1945, as well as his reaction to a number of the most significant events of the Second World War associated with the Soviet Union: the German attack on the USSR, the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Canada, the battles of Stalingrad and Kursk, the victory over Germany. In the course of work, both general scientific methods (analysis, synthesis, inductive method, comparative method) and special methods (historical-chronological and content analysis) have been used to study the materials of the diary. The use of the historical-chronological method is due to the need to correlate information from the diary with the overall historical picture of the studied period, and the use of content analysis helps to create a more reliable picture of Canadian Prime Minister’s perception of the Soviet participation in World War II. The article has made allowances for the fact that Mackenzie King sought to create his own positive image in his diaries, planning their posthumous publication. But, since the USSR was not a key topic for the Prime Minister (as evidenced by keywords statistics), it can be stated that the leader of the Canadian liberals was quite frank, at least as frank as a person who, in his lifetime, was known as an extremely cautious politician could be. It is clear, that King was well aware of the significance of the events on the Eastern Front. But throughout the war he retained both a negatively neutral attitude towards the USSR (due to its communist nature) and his perception of the Soviet Union as part of Asia and thus a step below the Anglo-Saxon world, which had a higher level of culture and moral principles. The objective reality, i.e. absence of hostilities in Canada, its maneuvering between Great Britain and the United States, and priority of economic and domestic policy for King, explains that a lesser part of his attention was paid to the events in the USSR in comparison with processes associated with England and the United States.
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Biess, Frank. "“Pioneers of a New Germany”: Returning POWs from the Soviet Union and the Making of East German Citizens, 1945–1950." Central European History 32, no. 2 (June 1999): 143–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008938900020884.
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In early December 1945, the Communist Party functionary Karl Lewke sent an alarming report to the leadership of the German Communist Party (KPD). It was entitled “One million anti-Bolshevists are approaching. The democratic reconstruction of Germany is threatened by greatest dangers!” The report referred to the thousands of returning German POWs from the Soviet Union who daily entered the Soviet zone of occupation through Frankfurt an der Oder. Lewke's description of the mentality and the attitudes of these returning POWs was not very comforting for his party superiors in Berlin.
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Kaninskaya, Galina N., and Natalya N. Naumova. "The Soviet Press of the Great Patriotic War about the French Squadron “Normandie-Niemen“." Vestnik Yaroslavskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta im. P. G. Demidova. Seriya gumanitarnye nauki 15, no. 1 (March 11, 2021): 6. http://dx.doi.org/10.18255/1996-5648-2021-1-6-19.
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The article is devoted to the participation of French pilots of the Normandy squadron in battles on the Soviet-German front as part of the Red Army in 1943-1945. After the defeat of France at the first stage of World War II (1940), the occupation of its territory by Germany and the organization of the Resistance movement “Fighting France” in London by General Charles de Gaulle, the pilots joined him expressed a burning desire to fight the enemy in the skies over Soviet soil. Their participation in the ranks of the Soviet Air Force was a unique event in the history of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union (1945-1945). The article analyzes the information of the Soviet press during the war years about the French squadron “Normandie-Niemen”, which fought in the Soviet Air Force on the Soviet-German front. It is shown that Soviet readers during the Great Patriotic War could get a very complete and reliable idea of the military exploits of French pilots, find out the names of heroes, get acquainted with the military everyday life of officers, appreciate their patriotism and sincere friendly feelings for the Soviet Union and its people. Along with stories about the air battles of the Normandy, the articles of Soviet correspondents contained information about the history of France, how the pilots reacted to the defeat of their country, how and where they fought in the first stage of the Second World War. The press of the war years gave brief sketches of the everyday life of French fighters on Soviet soil, about the curious events that happened to the pilots of the squadron. On the example of newspaper publications 1943-1945. about the military alliance of our and French pilots, you can get an idea of how the cooperation of the countries of the anti-Hitler coalition developed and strengthened.
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Eremin, Sergey V. "Transformation of the image of the nazi regime in the soviet propaganda (23 august 1939 – june 1941): a source study aspect." Bulletin of Nizhnevartovsk State University 55, no. 3 (September 27, 2021): 106–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.36906/2311-4444/21-3/10.
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The article, based on a wide range of historical sources, examines the key events associated with changes in the coverage of the Nazi regime by Soviet propaganda bodies in connection with the signing of the Soviet-German treaties: on non-aggression (August 1939), on friendship and the border (September 1939 g.). It is noted that both sides tried to find common ground on a number of secondary, "peripheral" issues, that the turn in Soviet propaganda, which began in August 1939, gave an impetus to create a positive cultural image of the former enemy. However, for reasons, primarily of an ideological nature, it was not possible to fully use the expected advantages from this political rapprochement in order to develop cultural ties. The reasons for the unsuccessful attempt at cultural rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the Third Reich are analyzed. It points to the attempts of the Soviet leadership to study the experience of propaganda work in Germany with a view to further use. It is noted that, starting in the summer of 1940, in the conditions of a gradual deterioration in Soviet-German relations, the nature of the activities of propaganda structures is gradually changing. Increasingly, criticism of the Nazi regime is voiced in a veiled form. It is shown that in May June 1941, a new anti-Nazi turn in Soviet propaganda took place. It is concluded that if during the warming of relations with Germany in Soviet propaganda the class paradigm was temporarily replaced by a national or cultural-historical one, then the political and ideological campaign that unfolded in May-June 1941 had a clearly anti-German and anti-Nazi character.
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Zolov, Alexander. "Poland in the foreign policy of the USSR in 1941–1945." OOO "Zhurnal "Voprosy Istorii" 2021, no. 02 (February 1, 2021): 134–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.31166/voprosyistorii202102statyi16.
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Goldfield, David. "THE SELECTIVE MEMORY ОF US-SOVIET COOPERATION DURING WORLD WAR II." RSUH/RGGU Bulletin. Series Political Sciences. History. International Relations, no. 2 (2021): 37–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.28995/2073-6339-2021-2-37-54.
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By the time the US formally recognized the Soviet Union in 1933, the American economy was in desperate circumstances. President Roosevelt hoped that the new relationship would generate a prosperous trade between the two countries. When Germany, Italy, and Japan threatened world peace, a vigor- ous “America First” movement developed to keep the US out of the international conflicts. By the time the Germans invaded Poland in September 1939, this be- came increasingly difficult. The US, instead, became “the arsenal of democracy” and supported the efforts of the British and, by 1941, the Russians to defeat Nazi aggression, particularly through the Lend-Lease program. Although after the war, the Soviets tended to minimize American, the residual good will from that effort prevailed despite serious conflicts. The Cold War did not become hot, and even produced scientific and cultural cooperation on occasion.
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Silverberg, Laura. "East German Music and the Problem of National Identity." Nationalities Papers 37, no. 4 (July 2009): 501–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00905990902985710.
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Caught between political allegiance to the Soviet Union and a shared history with West Germany, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) occupied an awkward position in Cold War Europe. While other countries in the Eastern Bloc already existed as nation-states before coming under Soviet control, the GDR was the product of Germany's arbitrary division. There was no specifically East German culture in 1945—only a German culture. When it came to matters of national identity, officials in the GDR's ruling Socialist Unity Party (SED) could not posit a unique quality of “East Germanness,” but could only highlight East Germany's difference from its western neighbor. This difference did not stem from the language and culture of the past, but the politics and ideology of the present: East Germany was socialist Germany.
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Ilcev, Dimov Stojce. "The development of maritime radar. Part 2: Since 1939." International Journal of Maritime History 32, no. 4 (November 2020): 1008–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0843871420977964.
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This research note outlines advances in the development of shipborne radar in Britain, Germany, the US and the Soviet Union. It focuses on the inventions and innovations in electronic and radars techniques for military and commercial applications on the eve of the Second World War, during the war and in the post-war period.
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LAMMERS, KARL CHRISTIAN. "Introduction: The Nordic Countries and the German Question after 1945." Contemporary European History 15, no. 4 (October 6, 2006): 443–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0960777306003481.
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This article introduces Scandinavia (or the Norden, as the region is sometimes called) and describes the position of the five Nordic countries, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, during the Cold War. The Cold War created a new political situation in the Nordic region, and to some degree divided the Nordic countries between East and West and also on the German question. The introduction analyses how the Nordic countries dealt with Germany – that is with the two German states, the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic, and also describes the role of the Soviet Union and how it tried to influence the Nordic stance on the German question.
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Roberts, Cynthia. "German and Soviet Military Doctrinal Innovation before World War II." Journal of Cold War Studies 6, no. 4 (October 2004): 140–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/1520397042350946.
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In the lead-up to World War II, both Germany and the Soviet Union pursued important changes in military doctrine that proved crucial during the armed confrontation between the two countries in 1941–1945. Using a new book by the military historian Mary Habeck as a point of departure, this essay explains how the German and Soviet armed forces by the late 1930s had developed almost identical doctrines without extensively borrowing from each other. Although the doctrinal innovations that informed the German Blitzkrieg and the Soviet conception of “deep battle” have long attracted attention, Habeck's book is the first detailed comparison of the development of armored warfare in these two countries. Although the book does not provide a comprehensive explanation of the sources of innovation in military doctrine, it sheds a great deal of light on the revolutionary changes in German and Soviet military doctrines during the interwar years.
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Kmeťová, Marianna, and Marek Syrný. "The 1944 Warsaw Uprising." Journal of the Belarusian State University. History, no. 1 (January 31, 2020): 18–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.33581/2520-6338-2020-1-18-23.
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After the German campaign at the beginning of World War II (1939), Poland was divided between nazi Germany which occupied the west and center of the country, and the Soviet Union which occupying the Eastern regions. The controversial relationship with Moscow has seen several diametrical breaks from a positive alliance after the invasion of the Soviet Union by the Axis powers in 1941, to a very critical relationship with the USSR after the revelation of the so-called Katyn massacre in 1943. With the approach of the Eastern Front to the frontiers of pre-war Poland, massive Polish Resistance was also activated to get rid of nazi domination and to restore of pre-war Poland. The neutralization of possible claims by the Soviets on the disputed eastern areas (Western Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania), respectively to prevent the crushing sovietization of Poland, it was also intended to serve a clear and world-wide resistance act in the sense of liberating at least Warsaw from the German occupation. This was to prevent the repeat of the situation in the east of the country, where the Red Army and the Soviet authorities overlooked the merits and interests of the Polish Resistance and Polish authorities. The contribution will therefore focus on the analysis of the causes, assumptions, course and consequences of the ultimate outcome of the unsuccessful efforts of the Armia Krajowa and the Warsaw inhabitants to liberate the city on their own and to determine the free post-war existence of the country.
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Cordell, Karl. "The Role of the Evangelical Church in the GDR." Government and Opposition 25, no. 1 (January 1, 1990): 48–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.1990.tb00744.x.
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The Evangelical Church Faced Harassment and hostility from the state in the immediate aftermath of the foundation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in October 1949. Indeed, the struggle in which the Evangelical Church is today engaged can be seen as both a consequence and continuation of a struggle which began in 1949. The Soviet Union had gained control in 1945 of that part of Germany which was most staunchly Protestant. Initially there was no central authority for the Evangelical churches in postwar Germany. Instead there were a number of regional churches, eight of which were located in the Soviet Zone. However, in 1948 the Evangelical Church of Germany (EKD) was created as an umbrella organization for the whole country. Indeed the EKD remained intact as an all-German organization until 1969, despite the estrangement and mutual hostility which characterized inter-German relations until that year.
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Komolov, Dilshod P. "JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF UZBEKISTANIN THE YEARS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR." JOURNAL OF LOOK TO THE PAST 4, no. 8 (August 30, 2021): 27–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.26739/2181-9599-2021-8-4.
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This article describes the history of the judicial system of the Uzbek SSR in 1939-1945 on the basis of a comparative analysis of a large number of historical sources and legal documents. According to the Stalinist Constitution and the law on the judicial system adopted in 1938, changes in the judicial system of the Uzbek SSR, the national composition of judges, staff turnover and the factors that led to this were discussed. The article also describes the mobilization of judges from Uzbekistan to the front after the invasion of the Soviet Union by fascist Germany, increasing the competence of military tribunals, types of criminal and civil cases considered by courts of general jurisdiction, activities carried out in the field of training lawyers
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VOITIV, Hanna. "Portrait of a specific place and time: from the diary entries of 1939 by Olha Dolhun." Ukraine-Poland: Historical Heritage and Public Consciousness 12 (2019): 165–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.33402/up.2019-12-165-193.
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Is submitted the part of the diary Olha Dolhun (Hryniuk) (1914–1997), who lived in the Sokal city, located in the north of Lviv oblast on the border with Volyn. She was educated at the Teachers Seminary in Sokal. Her diary is a kind of private and public coverage of Sokal in 1939 against the backdrop of a major global shift ‑ the outbreak of World War II. The first entry in the diary was made on March 17, 1939, and the last ‑ on October 17. During this time, took place the proclamation of the Carpathian Ukraine, the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the invasion the Hitler's Germany and the Soviet Union to Poland and the Soviet annexation of Eastern Galicia. The author has shown a remarkable ability to correctly evaluate events, determine in them the place of their nation and own place. Has been published the part of the diary, with separate fragments from August 24 (information about the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) to the beginning of October (the author's first impressions about the new Soviet regime). In addition to global issues, the author draws attention to everyday life, social life, pre-war moods, national-patriotic orientation of Ukrainian youth. The diary is densely «populated» with multitude of Sokal people's names. The diary of Olha Dolhun, along with other examples of literature of this genre, make history alive, contribute to a deeper acquaintance of contemporary Ukrainians with the socio-cultural type of Galicia before and during the outbreak of World War II. Keywords Olha Dolhun, Sokal, Poland, Germany, Soviet Union, occupation.
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Cutter, Zdzisław. "Political-military alliances in shaping the security of Poland in 1918-1939." Scientific Journal of the Military University of Land Forces 196, no. 2 (June 26, 2020): 245–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0014.2530.
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Poland was forming allied relations in the twenties and thirties of the twentieth century due to the state’s weakness, mainly in military and economic terms. The Polish state’s situation regarding political and military security guarantees on the part of other subjects of the international community was neither stable nor advantageous during that period. That was influenced, among others, by the following phenomena: changes in the international arena that were unfavorable for the Second Republic of Poland, diplomatic activities of Germany and the USSR aimed at revising the borders of the Polish state, political and military rapprochement between the USSR and Germany in the area of economic and military cooperation, conciliatory and ineffective international policy of the Western powers (mainly the French Republic) towards Germany in the late 1920s, impermanence and low effectiveness of bilateral agreements and declarations concluded by Poland with its eastern neighbor – the Soviet Union and its western neighbor – Germany, ineffectiveness of the political-military alliances concluded by Poland with France, Romania, and the United Kingdom, and significant disproportions between Polish and German and Soviet industrial and military potential, combined with the inability of the western powers to fulfil their allied obligations in practical terms.
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Sliužinskas, Rimantas. "Folklore Life in Multicultural City of Klaipeda (1990-2015)." English version, no. 10 (October 22, 2018): 200–216. http://dx.doi.org/10.51515/issn.2744-1261.2018.10.200.
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The fatal social disasters have taken place in the city of Klaipėda by the end of the Second World War. After 1945, very few local bilingual (Lithuanian and German speaking) people could be found in Klaipėda. Almost all of the survivors had moved to Germany to escape the Soviet occupation. Soviet authorities created favourable social conditions for skilled volunteers, who came to deserted city from other regions of Lithuania, and from all over the Soviet Union, to work in Klaipėda port and to restore the entire marine industry in the 1950s–1960s period. The Russian, Belorussian, German, Jewish, Ukrainian, Polish, Latvian, Tartar, Armenian, Azerbaijani, and other national minorities have become an integral part of the social and cultural life in contemporary Klaipėda. In the light of these historical facts, the goal of the article is to discuss the possibilities of the most representative national societies to maintain and promote their ethnic roots, traditions and the authentic folklore in the city at present times.
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Prazmowska, Anita. "Polish Military Plans for the Defeat of Germany and the Soviet Union, 1939–41." European History Quarterly 31, no. 4 (October 2001): 591–608. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/026569140103100404.
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Morozov, S. V. "Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Subcarpathian Rus in the context of the prehistory and consequences of the Munich Conference of 1938." Rusin, no. 63 (2021): 173–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.17223/18572685/63/9.
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The article examines the circumstances, details, and elements of the struggle among Poland, Hungary and the ruling circles of Czechoslovakia for the influence on Subcarpathian Rus to use it in their own political expediency. Since Subcarpathian Rus was faced with the German military threat and involved in the “small collective security system” along with France and the Soviet Union in May 1935, it had to solve the problem of strategic interaction with the latter. As there were no common border between Subcarpathian Rus and the Soviet Union, the problem was solved by constructing a strategic railroad through the territory of Romania. As a result, Subcarpathian Rus, which located in the east of Czechoslovakia, found itself at the forefront of the interaction, largely forced, yet vitally necessary for the political leadership of Prague. The activity of Warsaw and Budapest, which intensified after the Munich conference, together with some other factors ended up in mid-March of 1939 with the proclamation of the independent “Subcarpathian Ukraine” and its immediate occupation by Hungary with the tacit permission of Germany.
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Il’In, Yu V. "Commissariats of Military Industry during the Great Patriotic War." MGIMO Review of International Relations, no. 2(41) (April 28, 2015): 26–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2015-2-41-26-36.
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Strengthening national defense by building up military and economic potential was the most important vital task of the Soviet Union during the whole period of its existence. The price of enormous effort of labor, research and design teams, huge material and financial costs in the course of the prewar five-year plans in the Soviet Union was paid and incurred to create the military-industrial complex (MIC) - sector of social production, designed to provide security for the state in armed struggle. The core of the DIC were four industry: Commissariat of Aviation Industry (NCAP), the People’s Commissariat of ammunition (NBC) weapons Commissariat (IEC) and the People's Commissariat of the shipbuilding industry (NCSP), formed in accordance with the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on January 11, 1939 by separation of the People's Commissariat of Defense Industry of the USSR. They became a separate group of central government, designed to provide measures for the implementation of strategic decisions of the military and political leadership of the country. Objective assessment of commissariats effectiveness were the results of their operations in wartime. From this point of view it is necessary to ascertain performance of its mission - to supply front with modern means of warfare. Largely due to this fact, the Soviet Union won in serious confrontation with the military-industrial complex military industry of Nazi Germany and its satellites. On the basis of archival documents and testimony of contemporaries the article shows the contribution of the defense industry in the Soviet Union's victory in the Great Patriotic War.
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Kotelenets, Elena A., and Maria Yu Lavrenteva. "The British Weekly: a case study of British propaganda to the Soviet Union during World War II." RUDN Journal of Studies in Literature and Journalism 24, no. 3 (December 15, 2019): 486–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2312-9220-2019-24-3-486-498.
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The research investigates a publishing history of the Britansky Souyznik (British Ally) weekly (further - British Weekly) in Russian language, which was published in the Soviet Union by the UK Ministry of Information in the Second World War years and to 1950. This newspaper published reports from fronts where British troops fought against Nazi Germany and its allies, articles on British-Soviet military cooperation, materials about British science, industry, agriculture, and transport, reports on people’s life in the UK, historical background of British Commonwealth countries, cultural and literature reviews. British Weekly circulation in the USSR was 50,000 copies. The main method used for the research was the study of the newspaper’s materials, as well as the propaganda concepts of its editorial board and their influence on the audience. The researched materials are from archives of the Soviet Foreign Ministry as well as of the UK Ministry of Information and Political Warfare Executive (1940-1945), declassified by the British Government only in 2002, on the basis of which an independent analysis is conducted. The British Weekly played a bright role in the formation of techniques and methods of British foreign policy propaganda to Soviet public opinion in 1942-1945. Results of the research indicates that the British government launched foreign policy propaganda to the USSR immediately after breaking-out of World War II and used the experience of the British Weekly for psychological warfare in the Cold War years.
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Batunaev, Eduard V. "Khalkhin-Gol: Military and Political Cooperation of the USSR and the MNR (1939-1945)." Tyumen State University Herald. Humanities Research. Humanitates 5, no. 3 (October 30, 2019): 173–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.21684/2411-197x-2019-5-3-173-184.
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Despite the numerous contemporary studies of military-political cooperation between the USSR and Mongolia, a lot of questions remain requiring deeper understanding and analysis. They include issues relating to the geopolitical situation, bilateral Soviet-Mongolian cooperation in the military-political and economic spheres on the eve of the Second World War. The contemporary Russian and Mongolian researchers believe that the events at Khalkhin-Gol marked the beginning of this war. Thus, this article aims to analyze the entire spectrum of the military-political and economic cooperation between the USSR and Mongolia, taking into account both domestic and international factors during the events in Khalkhin-Gol. The methodological basis of this study involves the principles of historicism and objectivism, which allowed to establish an objective geopolitical situation associated with the exacerbation of the situation in the Far East in connection with the aggressive plans of Japan. The latter threatened the national sovereignty and security not only of Mongolia, but also of the USSR first. Under these conditions, the USSR was the only guarantor of the preservation of Mongolian statehood. The main conclusions include the following. One of the decisive armed confrontations on the eve of the Second World War was the events on the Khalkhin-Gol River, during which the combined forces of the USSR and Mongolia managed to win a decisive victory over the Japanese-Manchurian troops. The main task of the USSR was to protect its borders in the Far East, while Mongolia was a reliable ally against the aggressive plans of Japan. The 1936 Protocol of Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the Mongolian People’s Republic is an example of a mutually beneficial union of two states directed against external aggression. The victory at Khalkhin-Gol had not only great importance on changing the balance of power, the conclusion of the Soviet-German Pact of 1939, but it also contributed to the formation of Mongolian statehood, strengthening the Soviet-Mongolian military-political union. According to the results of the Yalta Conference of 1945, the “status quo” of Mongolia was finally defined, which marked the beginning of its independence and international recognition.
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BRODIE, THOMAS. "German Society at War, 1939–45." Contemporary European History 27, no. 3 (July 23, 2018): 500–516. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0960777318000255.
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The actions, attitudes and experiences of German society between 1939 and 1945 played a crucial role in ensuring that the Second World War was not only ‘the most immense and costly ever fought’ but also a conflict which uniquely resembled the ideal type of a ‘total war’. The Nazi regime mobilised German society on an unprecedented scale: over 18 million men served in the Wehrmacht and Waffen SS, and compulsoryVolkssturmduty, initiated as Allied forces approached Germany's borders in September 1944, embraced further millions of the young and middle-aged. The German war effort, above all in occupied Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, claimed the lives of millions of Jewish and gentile civilians and served explicitly genocidal ends. In this most ‘total’ of conflicts, the sheer scale of the Third Reich's ultimate defeat stands out, even in comparison with that of Imperial Japan, which surrendered to the Allies prior to an invasion of its Home Islands. When the war in Europe ended on 8 May 1945 Allied forces had occupied almost all of Germany, with its state and economic structures lying in ruins. Some 4.8 million German soldiers and 300,000 Waffen SS troops lost their lives during the Second World War, including 40 per cent of German men born in 1920. According to recent estimates Allied bombing claimed approximately 350,000 to 380,000 victims and inflicted untold damage on the urban fabric of towns and cities across the Reich. As Nicholas Stargardt notes, this was truly ‘a German war like no other’.
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Lebedeva, Nataliia. "Deportations from Poland and the Baltic States to the Ussr in 1939–1941: Common Features and Specific Traits." Lithuanian Historical Studies 7, no. 1 (November 30, 2002): 95–112. http://dx.doi.org/10.30965/25386565-00701005.
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The aim of this article is to compare repression policies of the Stalinist regime on the territories annexed by the Soviet Union in September 1939 and June–August 1940. The planning and implementation of deportations from the west of Ukraine and Belorussia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia had much in common. All the deportations were prepared and carried out on the basis of decisions carefully worked out by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist (Bolshevik) Party and was an important element of the sovietization policy on these territories. Deportation was a part of measures designed to destroy political, judicial, social, economic, national, cultural and moral fundamentals and to impose the Soviet order in the annexed territories. Methods of their organization and implementation were absolutely identical. All these deportations were crimes against humanity. At the same time there were certain differences. The planned capture of armies did not take place at the time of the Soviet invasion of the Baltic states. There were no such mass shootings of officers, policemen and jail inmates as in case of Poland. The scale of deportation was not as large as on territories of eastern Poland. This could be explained by the fact that the peoples of the Baltic states considered Sovietization as national humiliation to much larger extent than the peoples who had suffered under Polish or Romanian yoke. It forced the Stalinist ruling elite of the USSR at first to demonstrate a certain respect towards local customs, carry out nationalization of industry and banking slowly and more cautiously, to refrain from collectivization and not carry out mass deportation until the very eve of war between the Soviet Union and Hitler’s Germany.
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Vlasov, Alexey V. "The Image of the Ally and the Practice of Interaction with Representatives of the Union Administrations in the Daily Life of SMAG Employees in 1945–1949." Izvestiya of Saratov University. New Series. Series: History. International Relations 20, no. 3 (2020): 332–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.18500/1819-4907-2020-20-3-332-336.
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The article examines how during the occupation of Germany after World War II, employees of the Soviet military administration interacted with former allies in the anti-Hitler coalition. Based on memories of the employees, various images of allies were identified. The author comes to the inference that the practices of interaction between Soviet employees and representatives of the allied administrations depended on the logic of the Cold war development.
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Salata, Oksana. "INFORMATION CONFRONTATION OF NAZI GERMANY AND THE USSR IN HISTORIOGRAPHY." Kyiv Historical Studies, no. 1 (2018): 52–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.28925/2524-0757.2018.1.5262.
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The second world and its constituent German-Soviet wars became the key events of the 20th century. Currently, the study of domestic and foreign historiography in the context of the disclosure of the information policy of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, the information confrontation of the Nazi and Soviet systems of information and psychological infl uence on the enemy population is relevant. Thanks to the work of domestic and foreign scholars, the attraction of new archival materials and documents, the world saw scientifi c works devoted to various aspects of the propaganda activities of Nazi Germany, including in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine. Among them are the works of Ukrainian historians: A. Podolsky, Y. Nikolaytsya, P. Rekotov, O. Lysenko, V. Shaikan, M. Mikhailyuk, V. Grinevich; Russian historians M. I. Semiaryagi, E. Makarevich, V. I. Tsymbal and G. F. Voronenkova. An analysis of scientifi c literature published in Germany, England and the United States showed that the eff ectiveness and negative eff ects of German information policy are revealed in the works of German historians and publicists O. Hadamovsky, N. Muller, P. Longerich, R. Coel, et al. Along with the works devoted to armed confrontation, one can single out a study in which the authors try to show the information technologies and methods of psychological action that were used by the governments of both countries to infl uence the consciousness and the moral and psychological state of their own population and the enemy’s population, on the results of the Second World War. Most active in the study of Nazi propaganda and information policy of the Third Reich, in general, were the German historians, in particular E. Hadamovskie , G. Fjorsterch and G. Schnitter, and others. The value of their work is to highlight the process of the creation in 1933–1945 of the National Socialist Party in Germany of an unprecedented system of mass manipulation in the world’s history, fully controlled by the Nazi leadership of the information space. Thus, an analysis of the works of domestic and foreign scholars shows that the information confrontation between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union was extremely powerful, since both warring parties possessed the most up-to-date information and ideological weapon. Unfortunately, today there is no comprehensive study of this problem that could reveal all aspects of the information confrontation in the modern information world.
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Kiknadze, V. G. "History of the Second World War: Countering Attempts to Falsify and Distort to the Detriment of International Security." MGIMO Review of International Relations, no. 4(43) (August 28, 2015): 74–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2015-4-43-74-83.
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One of the negative phenomena of the modern world are attempts to falsify history and the results of the Second World War, 1939-1945., is an important component of the ideological confrontation in the information space of neoliberal forces of Russian society with patriotic and non-violent, is a tool for achieving geopolitical goals of a number of states. United States, European Union and Ukraine tend to distort the results of the Second World War to remove the history of the Great Patriotic War, the feat of the Soviet people, who saved the world from fascism, and the Soviet Union (Russian Federation), together with Nazi Germany put in the dock of history, accusing all the troubles of the XX century. At the same time attempts to rehabilitate fascism and substitution postwar realities lead to the destruction of the entire system of contemporary international relations and, as a consequence, to the intensification of the struggle for the redivision of the world, including military measures. China is actively implementing the historiography of the statement that World War II began June 7, 1937 and is linked to an open aggression of Japan against China. Given these circumstances, the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation noted that the trend of displacement of military dangers and military threats in the information space and the inner sphere of the Russian Federation. The main internal risks attributable activity information impact on the population, especially young citizens of the country, which has the aim of undermining the historical, spiritual and patriotic traditions in the field of defense of the Fatherland.
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Freedman, Lawrence D., and Mary Habeck. "Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919-1939." Foreign Affairs 82, no. 6 (2003): 157. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/20033777.
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Spence, Richard. "Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919–1939." History: Reviews of New Books 32, no. 1 (January 2003): 27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03612759.2003.10527685.
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Myagkov, M. Yu. "USSR in World War II." MGIMO Review of International Relations 13, no. 4 (September 4, 2020): 7–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2020-4-73-7-51.
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The article offers an overview of modern historical data on the origins, causes of World War II, the decisive role of the USSR in its victorious end, and also records the main results and lessons of World War II.Hitler's Germany was the main cause of World War II. Nazism, racial theory, mixed with far-reaching geopolitical designs, became the combustible mixture that ignited the fire of global conflict. The war with the Soviet Union was planned to be waged with particular cruelty.The preconditions for the outbreak of World War II were the humiliating provisions of the Versailles Peace Treaty for the German people, as well as the attitude of the "Western democracies" to Russia after 1917 and the Soviet Union as an outcast of world development. Great Britain, France, the United States chose for themselves a policy of ignoring Moscow's interests, they were more likely to cooperate with Hitler's Germany than with Soviet Russia. It was the "Munich Agreement" that became the point of no return to the beginning of the Second World War. Under these conditions, for the USSR, its own security and the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with Germany began to come to the fore, defining the "spheres of interests" of the parties in order to limit the advance of German troops towards the Soviet borders in the event of German aggression against Poland. The non-aggression pact gave the USSR just under two years to rebuild the army and consolidate its defensive potential and pushed the Soviet borders hundreds of kilometers westward. The signing of the Pact was preceded by the failure in August 1939 of the negotiations between the military missions of Britain, France and the USSR, although Moscow took the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations with all seriousness.The huge losses of the USSR in the summer of 1941 are explained by the following circumstances: before the war, a large-scale modernization of the Red Army was launched, a graduate of a military school did not have sufficient experience in managing an entrusted unit by June 22, 1941; the Red Army was going to bleed the enemy in border battles, stop it with short counterattacks by covering units, carry out defensive operations, and then strike a decisive blow into the depths of the enemy's territory, so the importance of a multi-echeloned long-term defense in 1941 was underestimated by the command of the Red Army and it was not ready for it; significant groupings of the Western Special Military District were drawn into potential salients, which was used by the Germans at the initial stage of the war; Stalin's fear of provoking Hitler to start a war led to slowness in making the most urgent and necessary decisions to bring troops to combat readiness.The Allies delayed the opening of the second front for an unreasonably long time. They, of course, achieved outstanding success in the landing operation in France, however, the enemy's losses in only one Soviet strategic operation in the summer of 1944 ("Bagration") are not inferior, and even exceed, the enemy’s losses on the second front. One of the goals of "Bagration" was to help the Allies.Soviet soldiers liberated Europe at the cost of their lives. At the same time, Moscow could not afford to re-establish a cordon sanitaire around its borders after the war, so that anti- Soviet forces would come to power in the border states. The United States and Great Britain took all measures available to them to quickly remove from the governments of Italy, France and other Western states all the left-wing forces that in 1944-1945 had a serious impact on the politics of their countries.
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Delaney, John J. "Totalitarianism: Racial Values vs. Religious Values:Clerical Opposition to Nazi Anti-Polish Racial Policy." Church History 70, no. 2 (June 2001): 271–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3654454.
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Hitler's wars for living space sent millions of Germans abroad and aggravated a severe labor shortage at home. German authorities recruited or forcibly transported up to seven million foreign workers to the Reich from 1939 to 1945. A great many of these civilian workers, POWs, and slave laborers came from Poland, the Ukraine, and western areas of the Soviet Union, that is, homelands the Nazi regime stigmatized as particularly “inferior.” Nazi racial thinking and wartime security concerns produced an extensive set of discriminatory measures aimed at the subjugation and strict control of Slavs. Nazi edicts required Poles and so-called Eastern Workers (Ostarbeiter) to wear a purple “P” or “Ost” badge on their outer clothing. Restrictive measures limited allowable movement to their immediate area of residence and work. The regime also imposed a system akin to apartheid. Racial law thus prohibited unnecessary social contact between members of the so-called master race and their “racial inferiors.”
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Tilli, Jouni. "‘Deus Vult!’ The Idea of Crusading in Finnish Clerical War Rhetoric, 1941–1944." War in History 24, no. 3 (February 14, 2017): 362–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0968344515625683.
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Finland’s Winter War (1939–40) against the Soviet Union had been defensive, but the so-called Continuation War that broke out in June 1941 was not. This offensive operation in alliance with Nazi Germany demanded a thorough justification. The Lutheran clergy were important in legitimizing the war because the priests were de jure officials of the state, as well as of the church. Also, nearly 96 per cent of Finns belonged to the Lutheran Church. This article analyses how the Lutheran clergy used crusading imagery in the Continuation War, 1941–4, strategically shifting the emphasis as the war progressed.
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Borisov, A. Y. "Diplomatic History of the Great Patriotic War and the New World Order." MGIMO Review of International Relations, no. 3(42) (June 28, 2015): 9–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.24833/2071-8160-2015-3-42-9-20.
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From ancient times, war was called "the creator of all things". And winners created the postwar world order. The article reveals the backstage, the diplomatic history of the Great Patriotic War, which make the picture of the main events of the war, that culminated in victory May 1945 in the capital of the defeated Third Reich, complete. The decisive role of the Soviet Union and its armed forces in the defeat of Nazi Germany and its allies was the strong foundation on which to build the strategy and tactics of Soviet diplomacy during the war. It was implemented in the course of negotiations with the Western Allies - the United States and Britain, led by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. World history teaches, large and small wars have been fought on Earth for centuries for specific political interests. In this context, the Second World War has been a shining example not only to curb the aggressor states, the liberation of peoples from the Nazi tyranny, but also an attempt by the victor to organize a new, better postwar world order to guarantee a durable and lasting peace based on the cooperation of the allied states. But the allies in the war did not become allies in the organization of the postwar world. Their collaboration briefly survived the end of hostilities and was overshadowed start turning to the Cold War. It was largely due to the US desire to realize their material advantages to the detriment of the Soviet Union after the war and build a system that would be a one-sided expression of the interests of Washington. Americans, especially after the death of President Roosevelt, and during his successor Truman understood international cooperation as an assertion of its global leadership while ignoring the interests of the Soviet Union, which bore the brunt of the war.
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Starry, Donn A. (Donn Albert). "Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919-1939 (review)." Journal of Military History 67, no. 4 (2003): 1313–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/jmh.2003.0335.
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Schwartz, Thomas A. "The “Skeleton Key” — American Foreign Policy, European Unity, and German Rearmament, 1949–54." Central European History 19, no. 4 (December 1986): 369–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s000893890001116x.
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An older colleague recently observed to me that today we stand further removed in time from the end of World War II than Americans at the beginning of that conflict were from the Spanish American War. To those Americans of 1939, he said, the war with Spain seemed almost antediluvian, while to us World War II lives vividly in memory, and its consequences still shape our lives. As a student of modern American foreign policy, I found my colleague's observation particularly appropriate. American and Soviet soldiers still face each other in the middle of Germany, and Europe remains divided along the lines roughly set by the liberating armies. Yet could we now be facing major changes? Will an agreement to eliminate nuclear weapons in Europe, and glasnost in the Soviet Union transform this environment? Will the postwar division of Europe come to an end? What will be the consequences for the United States?
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Mawdsley, Evan. "Book Review: Storm of Steel: The Development of Armor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 1919-1939." War in History 13, no. 2 (April 2006): 258–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/096834450601300216.
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Sher, S. A., T. V. Yakovleva, and V. Yu Al’bitskiy. "About history and significance of the eugenic ideas." Kazan medical journal 99, no. 5 (December 15, 2018): 855–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.17816/kmj2018-855.
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Aim. To show the short history of the origin and development of the eugenic ideas at the beginning of the 20th century.
Methods. Historical-genetic and historical-comparative methods were used.
Results. The article presents the results of historical and medical research that demonstrated that close by the tasks to medicine eugenics studied inherited properties, their social manifestations and historical changes. Science eugenics gained wide circulation and recognition in 1920s in USSR. The ideas became popular that achievements of the Soviet health care, its preventive direction lead to creation of higher sanitary culture and realization of eugenic tasks for creation of the harmonious Soviet identity. Since the early 1930s in the Soviet Union the eugenics underwent severe criticism. The eugenic ideas were completely discredited by Nazi programs of fascist Germany in 1933-1945 when millions of people were exterminated. In the end of the 20th century interest in eugenics has renewed because of development of genetics.
Conclusion. Despite the ambiguous past, the eugenics had played a certain positive role as it allowed understanding genetic and anthropological human features, and served as an incentive for development of medical genetics and study of genetic diseases.