Journal articles: '360103 Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations'

1

Russo, Philip A., and Arnold M. Howitt. "Managing Federalism: Studies in Intergovernmental Relations." CrossRef Listing of Deleted DOIs 15, no. 1 (1985): 180. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3329954.

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Benton, J. Edwin, and David C. Nice. "Federalism: The Politics of Intergovernmental Relations." CrossRef Listing of Deleted DOIs 17, no. 4 (1987): 219. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3330004.

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Editor, Jane Roberts,. "Intergovernmental relations. The new federalism: An assessment." National Civic Review 76, no. 5 (September 1987): 448–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/ncr.4100760511.

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Hollander, Robyn. "ESD, federalism and intergovernmental relations in Australia." Australasian Journal of Environmental Management 22, no. 1 (January 2, 2015): 21–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14486563.2014.1000405.

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Wright, Deil S. "Federalism, Intergovernmental Relations, and Intergovernmental Management: Historical Reflections and Conceptual Comparisons." Public Administration Review 50, no. 2 (March 1990): 168. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/976864.

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Goelzhauser, Greg, and David M. Konisky. "The State of American Federalism 2019–2020: Polarized and Punitive Intergovernmental Relations." Publius: The Journal of Federalism 50, no. 3 (2020): 311–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjaa021.

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Abstract The state of American federalism is characterized by polarization and punitiveness. As in previous years, political polarization continues to shape intergovernmental relations. But we also identify punitiveness as an increasingly prevalent aspect of vertical power sharing. Punitive federalism describes the national government’s use of threats and punishment to suppress state and local actions that run contrary to its policy preferences. In this Annual Review of American Federalism overview article, we introduce the concept of punitive federalism and discuss its application to contemporary public policy. We also highlight federalism implications concerning the COVID-19 pandemic; discuss recent policy developments concerning the environment, gender identity, health care, immigration, reproductive choice, and sexual orientation; and review recent Supreme Court decisions that impact intergovernmental relations.

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Auel, Katrin. "Intergovernmental relations in German federalism: Cooperative federalism, party politics and territorial conflicts." Comparative European Politics 12, no. 4-5 (May 5, 2014): 422–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/cep.2014.13.

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Volden, Craig. "Intergovernmental Political Competition in American Federalism." American Journal of Political Science 49, no. 2 (April 2005): 327–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2005.00126.x.

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Cameron, D., and R. Simeon. "Intergovernmental Relations in Canada: The Emergence of Collaborative Federalism." Publius: The Journal of Federalism 32, no. 2 (January 1, 2002): 49–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a004947.

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Steinman, E. "American Federalism and Intergovernmental Innovation in State-Tribal Relations." Publius: The Journal of Federalism 34, no. 2 (January 1, 2004): 95–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a005031.

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Olaiya, Taiwo Akanbi. "Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations in Africa: Retrospect and Prospects from Nigeria." Public Administration Research 5, no. 2 (October 30, 2016): 87. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/par.v5n2p87.

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This article diagnostically examined the several competing perspectives on the beleaguered nature of intergovernmental relations in Nigeria. Tracing the evolution of intergovernmental relation in Nigeria and espousing its legal, political and governance antecedents, the paper hazarded the undercurrent for the lingering conflicts between the center and the component units. The article also critically analyzed the impacts of the erstwhile British colonial strategy of division into regions as a means for administering the country and exploration of the mineral endowments in the 1950s on the composition and the current nature of predatory power that the center currently wields, much to the detriments and underfunding of the component units in the federation. The paper found evidences to showcase that because the British colonialists unduly queered the political pitch by allocating more seats to the North than to each of the other two regions at the center, intergovernmental relations in Nigeria has been quite contentious. If anything, a mutual suspicion between the North-dominated Federal Government and the Southern component units became a logical end. We concluded, among others, that notwithstanding the ample provisions in the 1999 Constitution for veritable intergovernmental relationship in Nigeria, there are still the intricate issues of regional domination of the center, leading to lack of political will to induce proper constitutional implementations.

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Chapman, Ralph J. K. "Australian Public Policy, Federalism, and Intergovernmental Relations: The Federal Factor." CrossRef Listing of Deleted DOIs 20, no. 4 (1990): 69. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3330293.

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Jha, Rajesh K. "Situating Federalism: Mechanisms of Intergovernmental Relations in Canada and India." Indian Historical Review 33, no. 2 (July 2006): 247–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/037698360603300226.

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Smith, Jennifer. "Intergovernmental Relations, Legitimacy, and the Atlantic Accords." Constitutional Forum / Forum constitutionnel 17, no. 1, 2 & 3 (July 11, 2011): 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.21991/c91h3k.

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Are the Atlantic Accords regarded as legiti- mate agreements in Canada? If not, why not? And does it matter? The purpose of this article is to answer these questions. Legitimacy resides in the eyes of the be- holder. Who is the beholder? Initially, one thinks mainly of citizens in this respect. How- ever, another beholder is government — other governments. In federations, governments of- ten deal directly with one another, a sphere of activity called executive federalism. When the central government negotiates agreements with one or more (but not all) regional governments, the rest are relegated to the status of observ- ers. As observers, they might well have ideas on the legitimacy of the activity, including the process used and the resulting agreement that is reached.

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ZHENG, YONGNIAN. "Explaining the Sources of de facto Federalism in Reform China: Intergovernmental Decentralization, Globalization, and Central–Local Relations." Japanese Journal of Political Science 7, no. 2 (June 23, 2006): 101–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1468109906002222.

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China does not have a federalist system of government. Nevertheless, with deepening reform and openness, China's political system in terms of central–local relations is functioning more and more like federalism. Federalism as a functioning system in China has been understudied. This paper defines the political system existing in China as de facto federalism, and attempts to explore the sources and dynamics of this de facto federalism. China's de facto federalism was mainly driven by two related factors, i.e. decentralization and globalization. This paper argues that while economic decentralization in the 1980s led to the formation of de facto federalism, globalization since the 1990s has accelerated this process and generated increasingly high pressure on the Chinese leadership to institutionalize existing de facto federalism.

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Klimanov, V., and A. Lavrov. "Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in Russia in the Present Time." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 11 (November 20, 2004): 111–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2004-11-111-125.

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The article considers the main changes in the intergovernmental fiscal relations in Russia in the beginning of the 2000s and current problems of the realization of the governmental Program of the Development of Fiscal Federalism in the Russian Federation till 2005. The experience of forming several funds for financial aid to sub-national budgets in the federal budget is examined, financial issues of the reform of federal relations and local self-government are analyzed.

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Rosenthal, Donald B., and James M. Hoefler. "Competing Approaches to the Study of American Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations." CrossRef Listing of Deleted DOIs 19, no. 1 (1989): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3330562.

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Baier, Gerald. "The EU's Constitutional Treaty: Federalism and intergovernmental relations – lessons from Canada." Regional & Federal Studies 15, no. 2 (June 2005): 205–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13597560500115550.

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Rosenthal, Donald B., and James M. Hoefler. "Competing Approaches to the Study of American Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations." Publius: The Journal of Federalism 19, no. 1 (1989): 1–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a037757.

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Painter, Martin. "Public Sector Reform, Intergovernmental Relations and the Future of Australian Federalism." Australian Journal of Public Administration 57, no. 3 (September 1998): 52–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8500.1998.tb01281.x.

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Daguerre, Anne, and Tim Conlan. "Federalism in a Time of Coronavirus: The Trump Administration, Intergovernmental Relations, and the Fraying Social Compact." State and Local Government Review 52, no. 4 (December 2020): 287–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0160323x21990881.

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This article examines Trump administration social welfare policies in order to better understand their implications for American federalism and the evolving welfare state. We focus particularly on the use of waivers and other administrative tools to promote work requirements and benefit restrictions in the two largest means tested spending programs: Medicaid and SNAP. These policies are accelerating the fragmentation of America’s welfare state and continued movement toward variable speed, “fend for yourself” federalism. This hyper-partisan, polarized, variegated model of federalism is resulting in increasingly diverse patterns of state implementation of national policies.

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Benz, Arthur, and Jared Sonnicksen. "Patterns of federal democracy: tensions, friction, or balance between two government dimensions." European Political Science Review 9, no. 1 (July 29, 2015): 3–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1755773915000259.

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Democracy and federalism are commonly viewed as complementary components of a political system. Conversely, a long-standing discourse claims the incompatibility of inevitable intergovernmental coordination in federalism with democracy, the former being viewed as an impediment or disruption to democratic governing. However, neither are the two inherently compatible nor inevitably incongruous. Instead, research and practice of democratic federations show that their relationship is one of multiple tensions. These may generate conflicts and impasses, yet can equally prove to be productive. To delineate these tensions, but also how different federal systems deal with them, this article examines federalism and democracy as two discrete, but interdependent institutional dimensions. Building upon this framework, we depict variants of coupling between institutions of federalism and democracy-based on selected cases. We demonstrate that particular modes of multilevel governance and intergovernmental relations are essential for linking the logics of federalism and democracy in loosely coupled, flexible patterns. Moreover, federal democracies can effectively cope with these tensions by continuously balancing power established in the two institutional dimensions.

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Prince, Michael J. "Canadian Federalism and Disability Policy Making." Canadian Journal of Political Science 34, no. 4 (December 2001): 791–817. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008423901778092.

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This article examines two types of collaboration in Canada between the federal and provincial governments in the disability policy sector and assesses their implications for the citizenship rights of persons with disabilities. One type of collaboration is across the levels of order in Canada and notable examples are the 1997 multilateral framework agreement on Employability Assistance for People with Disabilities and the 1999 Social Union Framework Agreement. The Provincial/Territorial Council on Social Policy Renewal, a structure established in 1995, illustrates the second type. This study suggests that each intergovernmental arrangement has a particular working model of citizenship associated with it. Contrary to the conventional view in the literature, the article argues that, for disability groups, the first form of federalism is enhancing political rights of citizenship along with the economic and social dimensions of membership in society. Further, the second kind of intergovernmental relations is more than just a fleeting movement of provincialism; it exhibits the potential to play a greater sustained role in shaping Canada's welfare state.

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Kincaid, John, and Richard L. Cole. "Is Federalism Still the “Dark Continent” of Political Science Teaching? Yes and No." PS: Political Science & Politics 47, no. 04 (October 2014): 877–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1049096514001218.

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ABSTRACTFederalism is a core principle of American government; yet, how much attention is given to federalism beyond introductory courses? A 1969 study described American federalism as the “dark continent” of political science teaching. Based on surveys of chairs of US departments of political science and members of the APSA’s section on federalism and intergovernmental relations in 2013, the authors found that these course offerings have increased markedly since 1969, that the courses cover a range of topics, and that many department chairs are interested in offering these courses in the future. However, the teaching of comparative federalism lags far behind American federalism. Thus, comparative federalism remains a “dark continent” of federalism teaching.

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Machado, Cristiani Vieira, Luciana Dias de Lima, Ana Luiza d'Ávila Viana, Roberta Gondim de Oliveira, Fabíola Lana Iozzi, Mariana Vercesi de Albuquerque, João Henrique Gurtler Scatena, Guilherme Arantes Mello, Adelyne Maria Mendes Pereira, and Ana Paula Santana Coelho. "Federalism and health policy: the intergovernmental committees in Brazil." Revista de Saúde Pública 48, no. 4 (August 2014): 642–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s0034-8910.2014048005200.

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OBJECTIVE To analyze the dynamics of operation of the Bipartite Committees in health care in the Brazilian states.METHODS The research included visits to 24 states, direct observation, document analysis, and performance of semi-structured interviews with state and local leaders. The characterization of each committee was performed between 2007 and 2010, and four dimensions were considered: (i) level of institutionality, classified as advanced, intermediate, or incipient; (ii) agenda of intergovernmental negotiations, classified as diversified/restricted, adapted/not adapted to the reality of each state, and shared/unshared between the state and municipalities; (iii) political processes, considering the character and scope of intergovernmental relations; and (iv) capacity of operation, assessed as high, moderate, or low.RESULTS Ten committees had advanced level of institutionality. The agenda of the negotiations was diversified in all states, and most of them were adapted to the state reality. However, one-third of the committees showed power inequalities between the government levels. Cooperative and interactive intergovernmental relations predominated in 54.0% of the states. The level of institutionality, scope of negotiations, and political processes influenced Bipartite Committees’ ability to formulate policies and coordinate health care at the federal level. Bipartite Committees with a high capacity of operation predominated in the South and Southeast regions, while those with a low capacity of operations predominated in the North and Northeast.CONCLUSIONS The regional differences in operation among Bipartite Interagency Committees suggest the influence of historical-structural variables (socioeconomic development, geographic barriers, characteristics of the health care system) in their capacity of intergovernmental health care management. However, structural problems can be overcome in some states through institutional and political changes. The creation of federal investments, varied by regions and states, is critical in overcoming the structural inequalities that affect political institutions. The operation of Bipartite Committees is a step forward; however, strengthening their ability to coordinate health care is crucial in the regional organization of the health care system in the Brazilian states.

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Blom-Hansen, J. "Macroeconomic Control of Subcentral Governments: Experience from the USA and Scandinavia." Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 16, no. 3 (June 1998): 323–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1068/c160323.

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Subcentral governments have gradually become more and more important in the general level of public economic activity in Western nations, To an increasing extent, macroeconomic management implies that the economic activity of subcentral governments is taken into account. But how can central governments coordinate the economic activity of numerous subcentral governments? What kind of intergovernmental arrangement is necessary? The author argues that fiscal federalism, the traditional approach to this problem, cannot answer these questions satisfactorily. The focus of fiscal federalism is on economic incentives in intergovernmental relations. The author argues that this is not sufficient. Fiscal federalism must be supplemented by a focus on political methods of influence. An analysis of Scandinavian and US ways of involving subcentral governments in macroeconomic management shows that the role played by subcentral government associations is crucial in the effectiveness of macroeconomic management.

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Mallinson, Daniel J. "Cooperation and Conflict in State and Local Innovation During COVID-19." American Review of Public Administration 50, no. 6-7 (July 13, 2020): 543–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0275074020941699.

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This essay discusses how scholarship on state politics and policy, intergovernmental relations, and federalism provides necessary context for understanding governmental responses to COVID-19. It also highlights how observing those responses can further push the bounds of existing scholarship and theory regarding policy innovation and cooperative and conflictual federalism. It argues that there is a space for mutual learning and sharing between scholars and practitioners.

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Klöti, Ulrich. "Political Ideals, Financial Interests and Intergovernmental Relations: New Aspects of Swiss Federalism." Government and Opposition 23, no. 1 (1988): 91–102. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0017257x00017024.

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WHEN SWISS CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS SPECIAL ISSUE LIMIT themselves to the presentation of a picture of modern Switzerland and leave it to the public to decide whether they want to learn something from the Swiss experience, two problems remain unsolved. First, in Switzerland we have neglected to some extent the analysis of the structures and the processes of the political system. We know more about the history of our political institutions than we do about their actual functioning. Normative theory is better developed than empirical research. This leads to the second problem: as many questions concerning the mechanics of the system are not answered in a sufficiently clear way, interpretations of the Confederatia Helvetica differ considerably between various analysts.

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Sacher, Martin. "The future of federalism – intergovernmental financial relations in an age of austerity." Regional & Federal Studies 28, no. 1 (December 27, 2017): 102–5. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2017.1417263.

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Agranoff, Robert. "Federalist No. 44: What Is the Role of Intergovernmental Relations in Federalism?" Public Administration Review 71 (November 14, 2011): s68—s77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2011.02464.x.

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Saxena, Rekha. "The Working of Cooperative and Collaborative Federalism in India: Understanding Intergovernmental Relations." Indian Journal of Public Administration 67, no. 2 (June 2021): 153–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00195561211026621.

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A federal constitution is based on at least two levels of governments— federal/union and provincial/state—which are generally constitutionally assigned exclusive as well as concurrent dominions, in addition to the residual powers. Consequently, union–state coordination is indispensable to negotiate and devise joint policies in field of shared jurisdictions. Moreover, such coordination is also essential for exclusive jurisdiction apparently because in the eras of ‘cooperative federalism’ and ‘collaborative federalism’, the federal government frequently utilises its usually bigger revenues to introduce centrally sponsored schemes of development and social policies with approval of state governments. These schemes may be entirely or partially financed by the union and executed by the states. Besides, residual powers or new policy areas that may emerge also need union–state cooperation, even though they are judicially adjudicated to go to any of the two levels of government. In an era of intergovernmental and global interdependence, functional link of governance may require cooperative action by different levels of governments besides the civil society organisations.

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Lavrovskii, B. L., and E. A. Goryushkina. "Fiscal federalism in Russia: To be or not to be?" Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 1 (January 12, 2021): 143–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2021-1-143-160.

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The ratio of the total volume of taxes coming from the territory to the budget system of the country and the expenses of the territorial budget illustrates the fundamental possibility or impossibility of forming intergovernmental relations in the spirit of fiscal federalism. The article tests its initial message: tax and non-tax revenues produced by the territory (given the administrative-territorial division of the country) should be, at minimum, sufficient to balance the budget and solve regional budget problems. It is shown that at present in 40% of Russian regions total revenues are enough to ensure budget surplus, the participation of these regions in solving national problems. In the remaining 60% of the regions, all revenues from the territory to the budget system are not able to balance budget revenues and expenses. The picture of intergovernmental relations was fundamentally changed, because in most regions that had deficit budgets in 2015, revenues in 2018 began to exceed expenses. The paper considers the opportunities to qualitatively change the state of regional budgets.

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Braun, Dietmar. "Between Market-Preserving Federalism and Intergovernmental Coordination: The Case of Australia." Swiss Political Science Review 12, no. 2 (June 2006): 1–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/j.1662-6370.2006.tb00387.x.

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Rodriguez, Cristina. "Enforcement, Integration, and the Future of Immigration Federalism." Journal on Migration and Human Security 5, no. 2 (June 2017): 509–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/233150241700500215.

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The federal government has a monopoly over the terms of immigration law, and it superintends the nation's singular immigration enforcement bureaucracy. But our federalism nonetheless provides a vital playing field for sharp debates over the status of immigrants in American life. The forms of state and local involvement in immigration policy are varied, but they fall into two basic categories of mutually dependent and re-enforcing policies: enforcement federalism and integration federalism. Whereas enforcement federalism concerns the extent to which localities should assist or resist federal removal policies, integration federalism encompasses measures designed to assist immigrants, regardless of status, to plant roots and acculturate to life in the United States. Both forms of immigration federalism take shape through a wide variety of intergovernmental relations, not only between the federal government on the one hand and states and localities on the other, but also between states and the cities within them — an increasingly important dimension of immigration federalism today. These relations have important legal characteristics, and constitutional and statutory law bring them into being and mediate them. But the nature of any given intergovernmental dynamic will be shaped just as much by a combination of ideology and institutional imperatives. These elements can either unite the center and the periphery in common cause or produce the sort of conflict that has made immigration federalism a high-profile issue for decades. Given the density of the intergovernmental dynamics that shape the country's immigration policy, developing a comprehensive strategy for immigration federalism requires more than a predilection toward or away from centralization of government authority. It requires a clear view on the appropriate metes and bounds of immigration enforcement, as well as a set of beliefs about the proper place in the social order of immigrants with different legal statuses. While this essay remains largely (though not entirely) agnostic on these questions, it offers four basic principles to frame any future federalism agenda. First, when it comes to enforcement federalism, the federal government ought to acknowledge the reasons that localities might resist federal enforcement efforts, at least as a matter of politics, and if only to ensure that federal policy is subjected to accountability checks by competing, external pressures. Second, whatever the value of resistance to enforcement, a federalism agenda should include efforts by all levels of government to identify a manageable equilibrium that reconciles the federal government's constitutional and statutory responsibilities for maintaining an enforcement regime with the local politics of immigration and the lived realities of immigrant communities. Third, when it comes to integration federalism, the problem of illegal immigration must be solved, and only the federal government can do so decisively. Federalism can only mediate the political conflict over status and help set the terms for its ultimate resolution. And yet, the structural reasons that have given rise to integration federalism should re-enforce the country's commitment to locally driven integration policy, supported by a national-level commitment to information sharing, coordination, and resource support. Finally, because both enforcement and integration policy require systemic flexibility, it is important not to confuse arguments on the merits of immigration policy with structural claims. In other words, scholars, advocates, or policymakers should exercise humility and circumspection when developing conversation-stopping claims that a certain intergovernmental relation is required by law, especially in a context as charged as immigration policy.

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Shvetsov, Yu G. "A deadlock of Russian fiscal federalism." Regional Economics: Theory and Practice 18, no. 4 (April 15, 2020): 709–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.24891/re.18.4.709.

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Subject. Highly regulated financial system, where only federal budget's interests are observed, is inefficient. It entails irrational use of taxable capacity of regions and municipalities and contributes to inflation upturn. This urgent problem requires the earliest solution, as about one third of able-bodied citizens of the Russian Federation are involved in its public sector. Objectives. The aim of the study is to review the status of intergovernmental fiscal relations in the Russian Federation and underpin the need for cardinal changes. Methods. The study rests on the systems approach, methods of scientific knowledge and statistical techniques. Results. The paper provides a rationale for the crisis state of the budgetary regulation system in Russia and shows prospects to overcome it; reveals and analyzes gaps in the current order of inter-budget relations formation; defines the need for a shift towards the principles of decentralization of budget organization. Conclusions and Relevance. The study will contribute to substantiation of the change-over to the liberal model of inter-budget relations, which corresponds to world standards.

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Painter, Martin. "The Council of Australian Governments and Intergovernmental Relations: A Case of Cooperative Federalism." CrossRef Listing of Deleted DOIs 26, no. 2 (1996): 101. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3330674.

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Benton, J. Edwin. "Challenges to Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations and Takeaways Amid the COVID-19 Experience." American Review of Public Administration 50, no. 6-7 (July 15, 2020): 536–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0275074020941698.

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The American democratic system of government is being put to its greatest test since the Great Depression of the 1920s and 1930s, as the country endeavors to cope with the fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic. That is, considerable pressure continues to build up at the fault lines of governance inherent in the country’s unique federal form of government which explicitly and implicitly expects national, state, and local levels to work together while they also may function as separate, autonomous entities to promote and provide for the general welfare. These fault lines exist where governance and service provision matters necessitate the collective attention and action of two or more levels of government. Both cooperation and conflict are possible interactive outcomes in these situations. This article provides an early assessment of how national, state, and local governments have worked together since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequently a “report card” of sorts on the functioning of intergovernmental relations in the U.S. at the present time. More specifically, the article will examine the current condition of interstate, interlocal, state-local, and national-state relations. While the findings and observations reported here are certainly enlightening, they should be viewed as preliminary. Followed up research should be conducted to determine if there have been any policy learning has occurred and if such information has been used in improve the quality of governance in keeping with citizen expectations of American federalism.

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Painter, M. "The Council of Australian Governments and Intergovernmental Relations: A Case of Cooperative Federalism." Publius: The Journal of Federalism 26, no. 2 (January 1, 1996): 101–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.pubjof.a029844.

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Simeon, Richard. "Recent trends in federalism and intergovernmental relations in Canada: Lessons for the UK?" Round Table 89, no. 354 (April 2000): 231–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00358530050007248.

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Conlan, Timothy. "Intergovernmental Relations in a Compound Republic: The Journey from Cooperative to Polarized Federalism." Publius: The Journal of Federalism 47, no. 2 (2017): 171–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjw036.

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Smith, Troy E. "Divided Publius: Democracy, Federalism, and the Cultivation of Public Sentiment." Review of Politics 69, no. 4 (2007): 568–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0034670507000964.

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AbstractAlexander Hamilton and James Madison agreed in the Federalist that the Constitution authorizes both political and judicial processes to define and safeguard the boundaries of federalism, but disagreed on public opinion's role in a republic and how to cultivate public sentiment for the Constitution. Hamilton preferred resolving intergovernmental disputes via political and public processes because public endorsement would legitimize broad national powers. Madison favored building public sentiment for the Constitution through strict limits on the national government enforced in part by the judiciary. He thought resolving intergovernmental disputes via public processes would confirm widespread suspicions of imperium in imperio and might provoke a popular backlash that would upset the constitutional equilibrium and undermine even legitimate national powers. This difference foreshadows Hamilton and Madison's later constitutional disagreements, reveals fundamental ambiguities in America's federal system, and confirms the need to consider how institutions and policies affect public sentiment for the constitutional order.

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Ryabova, Elena. "The Constitutional Principle of Uniform Economic Area and Centralization of Public Finance in the Russian Federation: Analysis of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court’s Rulings." Russian Law Journal 7, no. 4 (December 15, 2019): 151–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.17589/2309-8678-2019-7-4-151-175.

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The paper is devoted to the issue of centralization in public finance in Russia, and highlights one of the problems of interpretation of the Russian Constitution clauses. The Rulings of the Russian Federation Constitutional Court from the period 1997–2006 created legal grounds for the process of centralization and reduction of the regional powers regarding budgeting and taxation. But all arguments of the Court are debatable. Wherein, the centralization is justified by the constitutional principle of uniform economic area. The author argues that the Russian Constitution does not have clauses establishing the uniform budget and tax systems directly, and any model of intergovernmental relations might comply with the Russian Constitution. Uniformity of economic area does not imply uniformity in taxation and budgeting in the sense of sameness. Study of foreign practices shows different approaches to the understanding of uniformity in economy, and in taxation and budgeting. The contemporary Russian public finance law is formed under the influence of the Constitutional Court’s legal positions, and the process of centralization is still evolving. The Russian history of intergovernmental relations (1991–1997) shows another model of fiscal federalism – the decentralized federalism. Replacement of the fiscal federalism models is determined by the political considerations, not by constitutional requirements.

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Bukhvald, E. "Russian Federalism at the Critical Stage of Development." Voprosy Ekonomiki, no. 9 (September 20, 2008): 70–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.32609/0042-8736-2008-9-70-83.

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Transformations in the sphere of federal relations concern the most important directions of the reforming processes in the country. However, not all proposed and actually developing components of the federal reform seem well-argued and corresponding to long-term, strategic interests of the Russian statehood. The basic course of reform should meet the objective requirements of further decentralization of governing economic and social processes and the need to ensure strengthening the responsibility of RF subjects’ executive bodies and local self-management for steady social and economic development of their territories. The solution of these problems calls for a new model of federal policy of regional development, specification of some important components of the municipal reform as well as inserting certain amendments into the system of intergovernmental fiscal relations in order to stir up their stimulating function.

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Happaerts, Sander, Simon Schunz, and Hans Bruyninckx. "Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations: The Multi-Level Politics of Climate Change Policy in Belgium." Journal of Contemporary European Studies 20, no. 4 (December 2012): 441–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/14782804.2012.737662.

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Prince, Michael J. "A cancer control strategy and deliberative federalism: Modernizing health care and democratizing intergovernmental relations." Canadian Public Administration/Administration publique du Canada 49, no. 4 (December 2006): 468–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1754-7121.2006.tb01994.x.

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Keating, Michael. "Intergovernmental Relations and Innovation: From Co-Operative to Competitive Welfare Federalism in the UK." British Journal of Politics and International Relations 14, no. 2 (April 3, 2012): 214–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856x.2011.00484.x.

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Wise, Charles, and Rosemary O'Leary. "Intergovernmental Relations and Federalism in Environmental Management and Policy: The Role of the Courts." Public Administration Review 57, no. 2 (March 1997): 150. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/977063.

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Rodden, Jonathan, and Erik Wibbels. "Beyond the Fiction of Federalism: Macroeconomic Management in Multitiered Systems." World Politics 54, no. 4 (July 2002): 494–531. http://dx.doi.org/10.1353/wp.2002.0016.

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Recent research on federalism is extremely divided. While some tout the benefits of “market-preserving” federalism, others point to the fragmentation and incoherence of policy in federal states. This research bridges the divide by analyzing the political andfiscalstructures that are likely to account for the highly divergent economic experiences of federal systems around die world. To test these propositions, the authors use an original data set to conduct analyses of budget balance and inflation infifteenfederationsaround the world from 1978 through 1996. The empirical research suggests that the level of fiscal decentralization, the nature of intergovernmental finance, and vertical partisan relations all influence macroeconomic outcomes. The find- ings have broad implications for the widespread move toward greater decentralization and for the theoretical literatures on federalism and macroeconomics.

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O‘Beirne, Allison. "Intergovernmental Relations‘ Third Wheel: The Role of the Supreme Court in an Era of Collaborative Federalism." Federalism-E 10, no. 1 (April 1, 2009): 1–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.24908/fede.v10i1.13629.

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The Supreme Court of Canada has an absolutely undeniable role in intergovernmental relations. As the country‘s only constitutionally entrenched body charged with the resolution of division-of-powers disputes, its decisions and rulings are always certain to influence the way in which governments interact with each other. Recently, however, the Supreme Court has come to be less highly regarded as a method of resolving the disputes that arise between governments [...]

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Ellison, Brian A. "Intergovernmental Relations and the Advocacy Coalition Framework: The Operation of Federalism in Denver Water Politics." CrossRef Listing of Deleted DOIs 28, no. 4 (1998): 35. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3331141.

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Journal articles on the topic '360103 Federalism and Intergovernmental Relations'

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