Relevant bibliographies by topics / A public contract

Contents

  1. Journal articles
  2. Dissertations / Theses
  3. Books
  4. Book chapters
  5. Conference papers
  6. Reports

Academic literature on the topic 'A public contract'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 27 April 2022

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the lists of relevant articles, books, theses, conference reports, and other scholarly sources on the topic 'A public contract.'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Journal articles on the topic "A public contract"

1

Williams, John F. "Public Contract Operations." Journal - American Water Works Association 89, no. 4 (April 1997): 8. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/j.1551-8833.1997.tb08201.x.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Ginter, C., and M. Kelve-Liivsoo. "Applying the Unfair Contract Terms Directive to Public Contracts." European Procurement & Public Private Partnership Law Review 16, no. 1 (2021): 65–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.21552/epppl/2021/1/9.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

O’Brien, Sean. "Border, Theory, Contract: An Interview with Angela Mitropoulos." Public 28, no. 55 (June 1, 2017): 84–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1386/public.28.55.84_1.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Bayram, Ayhan, and Ece Zeybek. "Organizational Identification and Psychological Contract Relationship between Public Employees." International Journal of Trade, Economics and Finance 7, no. 3 (June 2016): 56–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.18178/ijtef.2016.7.3.499.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Alexander, Jeffrey A., and Thomas G. Rundall. "Public Hospitals Under Contract Management." Medical Care 23, no. 3 (March 1985): 209–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.1097/00005650-198503000-00003.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Smith, Richard. "Contract compliance and public purchasing." Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy. Public Money 6, no. 4 (March 1987): 25–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09540968709387407.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Awad, Dr Farkad Abood. "The Legal Effects of the Public Works Contract in Iraq." International Journal of Psychosocial Rehabilitation 24, no. 02 (February 12, 2020): 2068–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.37200/ijpr/v24i2/pr200507.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Beuve, Jean, Marian W. Moszoro, and Stéphane Saussier. "Political contestability and public contract rigidity: An analysis of procurement contracts." Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 28, no. 2 (July 2, 2018): 316–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jems.12268.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Kusakari, Kozo. "Public Works and Contract Bond System." Hokengakuzasshi (JOURNAL of INSURANCE SCIENCE), no. 598 (2007): 73–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.5609/jsis.2007.598_73.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Potyraj, Marek. "Construction work contract in public procurements." Acta Iuris Stetinensis 15 (2016): 59–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.18276/ais.2016.15-04.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
More sources

Dissertations / Theses on the topic "A public contract"

1

Grach, Gaëtan. "L'unité des contrats privés et des contrats publics." Thesis, Aix-Marseille, 2014. http://www.theses.fr/2014AIXM1069.

Full text
Abstract:
La recherche d'une unité entre les contrats privés et les publics revient à vouloir démontrer l'existence d'un socle, d'un droit commun aux contrats privés et aux contrats publics au stade de leur formation. Cependant, si l'unité des éléments essentiels du contrat peut se révéler imparfaite entre le droit privé et le public, deux notions peuvent apporter une cohérence au phénomène juridique d'unité des contrats : la notion générale de contrat en sa qualité de principe fondateur du phénomène d'unité permet la recherche d'une définition unitaire du contrat dont l'expression est la notion de consentement ; alors que les notions d'objet et de cause se révèlent être des instruments d'identification principal et accessoire du phénomène d'unité des contrats. Ainsi, s'il existe une multitude de contrats, il n'existe qu'une notion de contrat. S'il existe une infinité d'objet, de cause et de moyen de consentir, il n'existe qu'une notion d'objet, de cause et de consentement. L'unité des contrats privés et des contrats publics est cela : la réduction d'une pluralité de notions à une notion-cadre fondamentale, la notion de contrat
Seeking unity between private and public contracts is ultimately intended to demonstrate the existence of a base, a law common to private and public contracts, at the stage of their conclusion. However, if the unity, in terms of private and public law, of the basic elements of the contract may prove to be imperfect, two concepts may bring cohesiveness to the legal phenomenon of the unity of contracts: the general concept of contract in its role as a founding principle of the phenomenon of unity enables a uniform definition for the contract to be sought, the expression of which is the concept of consent whereas the notions of object and cause reveal themselves to be main instruments of identification, ancillary to the phenomenon of the unity of contracts. Thus, if multiple contracts exist, there only exists one concept of the contract. If there are an infinite number of objects, causes and means of consent, there is only one concept of object, cause and consent. The unity of private contracts and public contracts is this: the reduction of a multiplicity of notions into one basic framework, the concept of the contract
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Pérez, Hualde Alejandro. "The Public Services Concession Contract as a "Long Term" Contract." Derecho & Sociedad, 2016. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/119148.

Full text
Abstract:
In this article, the author highlights the benefits of incorporating the concepts “concession contract” and “long term contract” within the new Civil and Commercial Code of the Nation in Argentina. For the author, these contractual arrangements are fundamental in Administrative Law to understand the scope of the concession of public services, specifically in regard to the introduction of changes in the contract. This also means that foreign police concepts or theories as ius variandi, which only add authoritarian elements under the contract, are not longer required.
En el presente artículo, el autor resalta los beneficios de la incorporación de los conceptos “contrato de concesión” y “contrato de larga duración” dentro del nuevo Código Civil y Comercial de la Nación argentina. Así, para el autor, estas figuras contractuales son fundamentales en el Derecho Administrativo para poder comprender los alcances del contrato de concesión de servicios públicos, específicamente, en cuanto a la introducción de variaciones en la ejecución del contrato. Ello conlleva, además, que ya no se tenga que recurrir a conceptospoliciales extraños o a teorías como la del ius variandi que únicamente añaden elementos autoritarios en el marco del contrato.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Ackerman, David T. "International contracts a quantitative analysis of transnational contract formation." Honors in the Major Thesis, University of Central Florida, 2011. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETH/id/8.

Full text
Abstract:
Globalization is the promise of the future, and it presents, quite literally, a world of opportunities not available in the past. International collaborations in science, research, and business now enjoy increased probabilities of success, in part, because of the advance in technology and the possibility of instantaneous communications. The convenience, simplicity and affordability of technology are helping to make the world accessible to almost everyone. With new availability of international concerns and the growth of global partnerships in all areas of interest, an increased need arises for agreements that memorialize collaborators' commitments, responsibilities and obligations. There is a corresponding concern that the agreements be enforceable across national and international lines should anything go wrong. There is no collaboration, partnership or venture that will not be touched in some way by the law. Whose law governs and how rules and regulations of different nations will be applied are of escalating concern. Empirically examining the state of international contract law is the overarching focus of my research. Adopting a research methodology involving both quantitative and qualitative techniques, I am investigating whether any consistency exists between attorneys of different practice sectors (academic, government, corporate and private) considering choice of law, enforcement of contract provisions, and the inclusion of preventative measures of international contracts. My results contribute to the future success of international collaborations of all concerns by empirically identifying the need for increased education on various dispute resolution options, as well as the effect cultural awareness has on the drafting of international contracts.
ID: 030476559; System requirements: World Wide Web browser and PDF reader.; Mode of access: World Wide Web.; Accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for honors in the major in Legal Studies.; Thesis (B.A.)--University of Central Florida, 2011.
B.S.
Bachelors
Health and Public Affairs
Legal Studies
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Nguyen, Duc Anh. "Improving Public-Private Partnership Contracts through Risk Characterization, Contract Mechanisms, and Flexibility." Diss., Virginia Tech, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10919/78275.

Full text
Abstract:
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) have become a significant global phenomenon and governments are utilizing them more frequently to deliver projects that satisfy increasing societal demands in infrastructure sectors such as highways. Compared to traditional project delivery approaches, PPPs are long-term contracts between the public and the private sectors, where the private sector is engaged in more project tasks and accepts more risks. However, due to their long-term and complex nature, PPP contracts face many issues. Consequently, each project's contract becomes vital to project success because it: allocates risks, governs project relationships, and can align parties' interests. This dissertation examined 21 project contracts in the US highway PPP market to investigate risk allocation; contract designs and risk sharing mechanisms; and revenue risk guarantees. Using a content analysis framework, the allocation of 31 risks associated with highway PPPs was determined. These risks were mostly transferred to the private sector or shared between public and private parties, and project context had a significant influence on risk allocation. Assessment of contract designs indicated that the public sector imposes extensive monitoring and retains a majority of the decision rights to preclude opportunistic actions by the private sector; further, risk sharing mechanisms were complex and largely dependent on resolution during project implementation, which likely increases ex post transaction costs. Finally, revenue guarantees, commonly structured as standard options to mitigate revenue risk, were redesigned to incorporate exotic option features; quantitative analysis revealed that exotic structures can better serve chief PPP stakeholders' interests through increased robustness and flexibility.
Ph. D.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Fernández, Ruiz Jorge. "The Administrative Contract and the Public Tender." Derecho & Sociedad, 2015. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/118986.

Full text
Abstract:
To achieve its goals, the State requires the voluntary collaboration of individuals, which takes form of an administrative contract, whose award is often disrupted by administrative corruption. Public tendering stands out among the mechanisms to prevent and fight administrative corruption in the award of administrative contracts.
Para alcanzar sus fines, el Estado requiere de la colaboración voluntaria de los particulares, lo cual se concreta mediante el contrato administrativo, cuya adjudicación suele verse trastocadas por el flagelo de la corrupción. Entre los mecanismos utilizables para evitar y combatir la corrupción administrativa en la adjudicación de los contratos administrativos, destaca la licitación pública.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Micalef, Romain. "L'internationalisation du droit des contrats publics en France et au Canada." Thesis, Aix-Marseille, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018AIXM0525.

Full text
Abstract:
L’internationalisation du droit n’est pas indifférente aux contrats publics. Les deux pourraient même entrer en contact de manière privilégiée. Leur rencontre, voir leur confrontation, pourraient bien réinterroger des pans entiers du droit des contrats publics en France et au Canada. Si chacun des deux systèmes fait état d’un degré de perméabilité différent face à un tel phénomène, de sérieux arguments militent pour leur rapprochement sous l’effet de ce dernier. Il convient ainsi de proposer une étude approfondie des rapports d’influence entre ce phénomène et cette discipline afin de révéler la présence ou l’absence d’une internationalisation du droit des contrats publics en France et au Canada
The internationalization of law is not indifferent to public contracts. Both would have even come into contact in a privileged way. Their meeting, or even their confrontation, could well re-examine large parts of the law of public contracts in France and Canada. While each of the two systems reports a different degree of permeability in the face of such a phenomenon, there are serious arguments for their rapprochement under the effect of the latter. It will thus be necessary to propose an in-depth study of the relations of influence between this phenomenon and this discipline in order to reveal the presence or the absence of an internationalization of the law of public contracts in France and in Canada
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Hajjej, Ishak. "Contrat optimal pour les partenariats public-privé avec aléa moral : une approche de contrôle stochastique." Electronic Thesis or Diss., Institut polytechnique de Paris, 2020. http://www.theses.fr/2020IPPAG007.

Full text
Abstract:
Dans cette thèse, on s’intéresse aux contrats de partenariat public-privé (PPP). Un PPP est un contrat à long terme entre une entité publique et une partie privée, aussi appelée consortium, dans lequel le public externalise la construction et/ou la gestion d’un bien public. Le consortium prend le risque et la responsabilité de gérer le projet. Le public s’engage en contre partie à lui verser une rente. Cependant, les efforts du consortium pour améliorer la valeur sociale du projet ne sont pas observables par le public. C’est un problème de principal agent avec aléa moral où le principal est le public et l’agent est le privé. On suppose que le public paie le consortium continûment et l’effort de l’agent affecte le drift de la valeur sociale du projet. On suppose que le public est neutre au risque et le consortium est adverse au risque. Dans le chapitre 2 de la thèse, on considère un contrat perpétuel entre une entité publique et un consortium. On caractérise le contrat optimal dans ce cadre d’aléa moral. On utilise une formulation forte : on considère différentes filtrations correspondant à différents niveaux d’informations comme dans le contexte de contrôle stochastique avec observation partielle. Dans cette approche, on utilise des méthodes de martingale et de contrôle stochastique. Dans le chapitre 3, on considère un problème du partenariat public-privé avec horizon aléatoire, dans lequel le public a la possibilité d’arrêter le contrat à une date aléatoire et donne une compensation au consortium. On résout ce problème de contrôle stochastique avec un problème d’arrêt optimal dans ce cadre d’aléa moral. Dans ce chapitre, on utilise la formulation faible : on suppose que le consortium change la distribution de la valeur sociale du projet en changeant son drift et cela revient à considérer une nouvelle mesure de probabilité qui dépend de l’effort de l’agent. Dans le chapitre 4, on s’intéresse aussi au problème de partenariat public-privé avec un horizon aléatoire mais en utilisant la formulation forte. Puis, on traite la cadre de partage de risque : on suppose que le public et le consortium ont les mêmes informations. On analyse numériquement la valeur d’information. Dans le chapitre 5, on étudie l’existence d’une solution de l’équation d’Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman qui apparaît dans notre étude théorique. Puis, on développe des résultats numériques pour la résolution numérique d’une équation Hamilton Jacobi-Bellman et l’inéquation variationnelle dans le cadre de notre étude numérique
In this thesis, we are interested in the contract with moral hazard for public private partnerships (PPP). PPP is defined as a long-term contract between a private party and a public entity, for the construction and/or the management of an asset or public service, in which the consortium takes the risks and a responsibility to manage the project. The public undertakes to pay him a rent. However, the effort that the consortium does to improve the social value of the project is not observable by the public. It is a principal-agent problem with moral hazard, in which the principal is the public and the agent is the consortium. We assume that the public pays the consortium continuously and the effort of the consortium affects the drift of the social value of the project. We assume that the agent is risk averse and the public is risk-neutral. In chapter 2 of the thesis, we consider a perpetual contract between a public entity and a consortium. We characterize the optimal contract in this moral hazard framework. We use the strong formulation : we consider different filtrations corresponding to the different level of information as in the context of stochastic control under partial observation. In this approach, we use martingale methods and stochastic control techniques. In chapter 3, we consider a public-private partnership problem with a random horizon, in which the public has the possibility to stop the contract at a fixed or a random time and gives compensation to the consortium. We solve this optimal stochastic control with optimal stopping problem in this context of moral hazard. We use the weak approach, that is the agent changes the distribution of the social value of the project by changing the drift and this amounts to considering a new probability that depends on the effort of the consortium. In the chapter 4, we also consider the problem of public-private partnership with a random horizon but using the strong formulation. Then, we deal with the risk-sharing framework, we assume that the public and the consortium have the same information. We analyze numerically the value of information. Chapter 5 focuses on the existence of a solution of the Hamilton Jacobi-Bellman equation that appears in our theoretical study. Then, we detail the numerical results for the numerical resolution of a Hamilton Jacobi-Bellman equation and variational inequality as part of our numerical study
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Lequet, Pierre. "L'ordre public environnemental et le contrat de droit privé." Thesis, Université Paris-Saclay (ComUE), 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019SACLV043.

Full text
Abstract:
La protection de l’environnement et le contrat de droit privé apparaissent tantôt antinomiques, tantôt complémentaires. En tant qu’instrument juridique des activités économiques, le contrat concourt à la crise écologique. Cette crise menace la pérennité des conditions d’une vie développée sur terre pour les générations présentes et futures. L’objectif de développement durable requiert l’élaboration d’un ordre public environnemental permettant de contrôler la conformité du contrat de droit privé à la conservation de l’intérêt environnemental.Induisant l’existence d’un ordre public environnemental de la multitude de règles impératives de protection de l’environnement, nous proposons une théorie générale de l’ordre public environnemental ainsi que son articulation avec le contrat de droit privé.Cette dernière révèle que si la validité du contrat de droit privé est conditionnée au respect de l’ordre public environnemental, la bonne réalisation de l’ordre public environnemental est conditionnée à la reconnaissance de la fonction environnementale du contrat
Protection of the environment and the contract appear to be sometimes contradictory, sometimes complementary. As a legal instrument for economic activities, the contract contributes to the ecological crisis. This crisis threatens the sustainability of the conditions for a life developed on earth for present and future generations. The objective of sustainable development requires the construction of an environmental public policy to control the conformity of the private law contract with the conservation of the environmental interest.Inducing the existence of an environmental public policy from the multitude of mandatory environmental protection rules, we propose a general theory of environmental public policy and its articulation with the private law contract.The latter reveals that while the validity of the private law contract is conditional on compliance with environmental public policy, the proper implementation of environmental public policy is conditional on recognition of the environmental function of the contract
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Ko, Chun Wa Johnason. ""Is adoption of Public Private Partnership (PPP) model in infrastructure contract an effective form of contract to minimize disputes?"." access abstract and table of contents access full-text, 2007. http://libweb.cityu.edu.hk/cgi-bin/ezdb/dissert.pl?ma-slw-b21844197a.pdf.

Full text
Abstract:
Thesis (M.A.)--City University of Hong Kong, 2007.
"Master of Art in arbitration and dispute resolution, LW6409 dissertation" Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on May 22, 2007) Includes bibliographical references.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Bermejo, Vera José. "The Procurement System of Public Administrations: Object, Evolution and Prospective of the Public Contract." Derecho & Sociedad, 2015. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/117419.

Full text
Abstract:
This paper discusses the basics and the ways that generally develops the «Public procurement system» between the government and private sector operators. If the material activity of the Public Administrations usually develops through its own means, economic, material and personal, it is also essential collaboration of the private sector through public procurement. The positive connection to the law is unavoidable in public contracts, but it is also very relevant public expenditure savings applying procurement rules to advertising, equal competition and competitiveness. It serves as a reference the substantive core of Spanish law which, as most of the states of Europe, faithfully follows the rules to compliance with the European Union, undoubtedly one of the forms of state integration policies with greater depth and success in the world.
En este trabajo se analizan los fundamentos y las formas en que se desenvuelve generalmente el «sistema de la contratación pública», una de las instituciones jurídicas en que se manifiesta más explícitamente la actuación colaborativa entre las Administraciones Públicas y los agentes económicos del sector privado. Si la actividad material de las Administraciones Públicas se desarrolla generalmente a través de sus propios medios, económicos, materiales y personales, también es fundamental la colaboración del sector privado a través de los contratos públicos.La vinculación positiva a la ley resulta ineludible en los contratos públicos, pero es muy relevante el ahorro de gasto público aplicando normas de contratación con publicidad, igualdad de concurrencia y competitividad. Sirve como referencia el núcleo sustancial del Derecho español que, como la mayor parte de los Estados de Europa, sigue fielmente las normas de obligado acatamiento de la Unión Europea, sin duda una de las fórmulas políticas de integración estatal con mayor calado y éxito en el mundo.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
More sources

Books on the topic "A public contract"

1

author, Davison William D., and National Institute of Governmental Purchasing (U.S.), eds. Contract administration. 2nd ed. Herndon, Virginia: National Institute of Governmental Purchasing, Inc. (NGIP), 2009.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Davison, William D. Contract management. Herndon, VA: National Institute of Governmental Purchasing, 2001.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Latham, Peter S. Government contract disputes. 2nd ed. Washington, D.C. (1 Lafayette Centre, Washington 20036): Federal Publications, 1986.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Managing contract changes. Riverwoods, IL: CCH, 2013.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Nash, Ralph C. Government contract changes. 2nd ed. Washington, D.C. (1120 20th St. N.W. Washington 20036): Federal Publications, 1989.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Nash, Ralph C. Government contract changes. 3rd ed. [St. Paul, Minn.]: Thomson/West, 2007.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Acret, James. California public construction contract manual. Colorado Springs, Colo: Shephards/McGraw-Hill, 1995.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Elements of contract administration: Practical advice on performing government contracts. Washington, DC: George Washington University Law School, Government Contracts Program, 1997.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Bedingfield, James P. Government contract accounting. 2nd ed. Washington, D.C. (1 Lafayette Centre, Washington 20036): Federal Publications, 1985.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Elmer, Brian C. Government contract fraud. Washington, D.C. (1 Layfayette Center, Washington 20036): Federal Publications, 1985.

Find full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
More sources

Book chapters on the topic "A public contract"

1

Helvacı, İlhan. "Public Promise." In Turkish Contract Law, 15–18. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-60061-1_2.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Anguelov, Lachezar G. "Contract Monitoring." In Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance, 1–6. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_1584-1.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Pegnato, Joseph A. "Outsourcing Contract." In Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance, 1–5. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_1606-1.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Davison, Bill, and Cliff McCue. "Contract Administration." In Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance, 1–4. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_2792-1.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Brunjes, Benjamin M. "Contract Design." In Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance, 1–6. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_3906-1.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Cruz, Carlos Oliveira, and Rui Cunha Marques. "Contract Management." In Infrastructure Public-Private Partnerships, 83–111. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-36910-0_4.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Atkinson, Christopher L. "Contract Administration Problems." In Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance, 1–5. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_1590-1.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Elkomy, Shimaa. "Contract Management Capacity." In Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance, 1–5. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-31816-5_3682-1.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Lieberwitz, Risa L. "Contract as Public Law." In Vulnerability and the Legal Organization of Work, 122–40. Abingdon, Oxon [UK] ; New York : Routledge, 2017. | Series: Gender in law, culture, and society: Routledge, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781315518572-10.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Arimoro, Augustine Edobor. "The public-private partnership contract." In Public-Private Partnerships in Emerging Economies, 51–74. 1 Edition. | New York : Routledge, 2020. | Series: Routledge research in finance & banking law: Routledge, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781003105701-3.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Conference papers on the topic "A public contract"

1

Suwardiyati, Rumi, Setiawan Wicaksono, and Ranitya Ganindha. "Principle Of Freedom Of Contract In Public Contract." In 2018 International Conference on Energy and Mining Law (ICEML 2018). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/iceml-18.2018.62.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

De Lima, Órion Darshan Winter, and Nazareno Andrade. "Fairness in Risk Estimation of Brazilian Public Contracts." In VII Symposium on Knowledge Discovery, Mining and Learning. Sociedade Brasileira de Computação - SBC, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.5753/kdmile.2019.8789.

Full text
Abstract:
Brazilian government agencies are currently using machine learning models to make public contracts audition through risk estimation. Recent works have shown that decision making models, like risk estimation, may be unfair. Despite the fact that risk estimations of public contracts may be unfair, no studies evaluating model fairness have been found. This work contributes by analysing fairness over risk estimation of brazilian public contract. This article found that currently used models are unfair and biased towards a specific class. This means that people within this class may be negatively affected by these decision making models unfairness through risk estimation of their companies.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Ahmed, Abu Shohel, and Tuomas Aura. "Turning Trust Around: Smart Contract-Assisted Public Key Infrastructure." In 2018 17th IEEE International Conference On Trust, Security And Privacy In Computing And Communications/ 12th IEEE International Conference On Big Data Science And Engineering (TrustCom/BigDataSE). IEEE, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/trustcom/bigdatase.2018.00026.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Igrejas, Rafael, Leonardo Cordeiro, and Luiz E. Brandão. "When Is Abandonment Not an Option? Dealing with PPP Contract and Government Interests." In Second International Conference on Public-Private Partnerships. Reston, VA: American Society of Civil Engineers, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1061/9780784480267.038.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Xinyu, Guo. "Strengthening Public Affairs through Project Financing of the Franchise Contract Foreign Intervention." In 2014 International Conference on Public Management (ICPM-2014). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/icpm-14.2014.32.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Fragkos, Georgios, Nathan Patrizi, Eirini Eleni Tsiropoulou, and Symeon Papavassiliou. "Socio-aware Public Safety Framework Design: A Contract Theory based Approach." In ICC 2020 - 2020 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC). IEEE, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icc40277.2020.9148712.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Patrizi, Nathan, Georgios Fragkos, Eirini Eleni Tsiropoulou, and Symeon Papavassiliou. "Contract-Theoretic Resource Control in Wireless Powered Communication Public Safety Systems." In GLOBECOM 2020 - 2020 IEEE Global Communications Conference. IEEE, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/globecom42002.2020.9348200.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

"Cooperation Between Public and Private Players in the Swedish Public Real Estate Sector: Motives and Contract Types." In 16th Annual European Real Estate Society Conference: ERES Conference 2009. ERES, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.15396/eres2009_327.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Wilsoncroft, Charles. "NEC3: Managing Change." In ASME 2009 12th International Conference on Environmental Remediation and Radioactive Waste Management. ASMEDC, 2009. http://dx.doi.org/10.1115/icem2009-16380.

Full text
Abstract:
The Office of Government Commerce (OGC) has endorsed the use of NEC for all public sector contracts. The reason being is that it stimulates effective project management and enables the parties to manage risk and change more efficiently, which in turn serves to mitigate the cost and time effects of any risk event should it arise under the contract. In essence it facilitates a more collaborative working culture between the parties. The NEC3 contract is gaining in popularity and has been adopted for use in the decommissioning of nuclear power stations and the London Olympics, it also recently received support in the Tenth Special Report on Construction Matters by the House of Commons. It has strict time limits for the notification of compensation events as set out in the core clause 61.3 whereby the Contractor’s contract administration team needs to notify the project manager within an eight week period of becoming aware of the event. The contract also provides for an early warning procedure whereby the Contractor and the project manager will cooperate and proactively discuss how issues can be overcome in a collaborative manner. This NEC3 contract requires both the Contractor and the Employer to act positively and is welcomed as a possible solution to the entrenched disputes which have regularly occurred on major energy projects and if properly administered will hopefully result in an earlier and less fraught final account settlement process for both parties.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Ho Schar, Cathi. "Toward Public Sector Practice." In 2019 ACSA Teachers Conference. ACSA Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.35483/acsa.teach.2019.55.

Full text
Abstract:
In 2016, the University of Hawaii at Manoa School of Architecture established the University of Hawaii Community Design Center (UHCDC), working in close collaboration with a state legislator to meet the needs of the state government. This unique governmental alignment introduced a novel form of community design that opened up new academic and extramural space for the school and university, taking the form of a top-down public sector practice as distinct from its more common, bottom-up public interest alternative. This paper presents the results of three years of continuous dialogue with the state legislature and over $2 million in contracts with state agencies, by reflecting on the transformative effects of public sector practice on design pedagogy. This reflection follows three case study courses: an undergraduate basic design studio; an undergraduate concentration design studio; and an advanced professional practice course, all required within Hawaii’s undergraduate and graduate curricula. Each case study lists learning, teaching, and long term benefits that flowed from each public sector partnership, focusing on the potential of this model to strengthen and enrich professional education. The evolution of these courses maps the transition from working on projects to working on systems, also a move toward applying equitable academic and design rigor to marginalized project typologies—e.g. utility buildings, infrastructure, renovation, and repair and maintenance. In addition, UHCDC’s contract work represents an expanded field of practice, including social science research, service and strategy design, community engagement, information design, engineering, and development studies, demonstrating the broader disciplinary demands of the public sector. More importantly, the significant dividends from this three year-old public sector practice identifies an opportunity area for architectural education and practice—design in government.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles

Reports on the topic "A public contract"

1

Beuve, Jean, Marian Moszoro, and Pablo Spiller. Contractual Rigidity and Political Contestability: Revisiting Public Contract Renegotiations. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, February 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w28491.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Moszoro, Marian, Pablo Spiller, and Sebastian Stolorz. Rigidity of Public Contracts. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, May 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w21186.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Ayele, Seife, and Vianney Mutyaba. Chinese-Funded Electricity Generation in Sub-Saharan Africa and Implications for Public Debt and Transition to Renewable Energy. Institute of Development Studies (IDS), November 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.19088/ids.2021.063.

Full text
Abstract:
While China has been increasingly contributing to the recent growth in electricity generation in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the effects of China-funded investment on host countries’ debt burden and transition to renewable energy sources have not been sufficiently explored. Drawing on secondary data, combined with deep dive studies of Ethiopia and Uganda, this paper shows that despite significant liberalisation of the power sector in SSA, Chinese investments in the electricity industry continue to follow state-led project contract-based models. We show that this approach has failed to encourage Chinese firms to build compelling investment portfolios for competitive procurements within the region and, instead and inadvertently, it has exacerbated the debt burden of host country governments. Second, in spite of the global drive towards climate resilient energy generation, Chinese funding of electricity generation in SSA is not sufficiently channelled towards modern renewable energy sources such as wind and solar power that could reduce vulnerability to climate change. While recognising that the private sector-led competitive model of power generation is not without limitations, we argue that SSA’s electricity generation strategy that leads to less public debt and more climate resilience involves increased involvement of Chinese investment in the competitive model, with more diversification of such investment portfolios towards modern renewables such as wind and solar energy resources.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Ribeiro, João A., Paulo J. Pereira, and Elísio M. Brandão. A real options model to determine the optimal contractual penalty for a BOT project. CICEE. Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.26619/ual-cicee/wp06.2021.

Full text
Abstract:
Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) became one of the most common types of public procurement arrangements and Build-Own-Transfer (BOT) projects, awarded through adequate bidding competitions, have been increasingly promoted by governments. The theoretical model herein proposed is based on a contractual framework where the government grants leeway to the private entity regarding the timing for project implementation. However, the government is aware that delaying the beginning of operations will lead to the emergence of social costs, i.e., the costs that result from the corresponding loss of social welfare. This fact should motivate the government to include a contractual penalty in case the private firm does not implement the project immediately. The government also recognizes that the private entity is more efficient in constructing the project facility and also in running the subsequent operations. The model’s outcome is the optimal value for the legal penalty the government should include in the contract form. Sensitivity analysis reveals that there is a level for each of the comparative efficiency factors above which there is no need to impose a contractual penalty, for a given level of social costs. Finally, the effects of including a non-optimal penalty value in the contract form, which derives from overestimating or underestimating the selected bidder’s real comparative efficiency are examined, using a numerical example. Results demonstrate that overestimating (underestimating) the selected bidder’s real comparative efficiency leads to the inclusion of a below-optimal (above-optimal) value for the legal penalty in the contract and produces effects the government should prevent by estimating the comparative efficiency factors with full accurac.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Beach, Rachel, and Vanessa van den Boogaard. Tax and Governance in the Context of Scarce Revenues: Inefficient Tax Collection and its Implications in Rural West Africa. Institute of Development Studies (IDS), February 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.19088/ictd.2022.005.

Full text
Abstract:
In recent years, domestic and international policy attention has often focused on broadening the tax base in order to include a greater share of the population in the ‘tax net’. This is based, in part, on the hope that the expansion of taxation will result in positive ‘governance dividends’ for taxpayers. However, the implications of extending the tax base in rural areas in low-income countries has been insufficiently considered. Through the case studies of Togo, Benin, and Sierra Leone, we demonstrate that extending taxation to rural areas is often highly inefficient, leading to few, if any, revenue gains when factoring in the costs of collection. Where revenues exceed the costs of collection, they often only cover local government salaries with little remaining for the provision of public goods and services. The implications of rural tax collection inefficiency are thus significant for revenue mobilisation, governance and public service delivery, accountability relationships with citizens, and taxpayer expectations of the state. Accordingly, we question the rationale for extending taxation to rural citizens in low-income countries. Instead, we argue for a reconceptualisation of the nature of the fiscal social contract, disentangling the concept of the social contract from the individual. Rather, a collective social contract places greater emphasis on the taxation of wealth and redistribution and recognises that basic rights of citizenship are not, or should not, be contingent on paying direct taxes to the government. Rather than expanding taxation, we argue for the expansion of political voice and rights to rural citizens, through a ‘services-first’ approach.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Spiller, Pablo. An Institutional Theory of Public Contracts: Regulatory Implications. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, August 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w14152.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Moszoro, Marian, and Pablo Spiller. Third-Party Opportunism and the Nature of Public Contracts. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, December 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.3386/w18636.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

San Miguel, Joseph G., and Donald E. Summers. Using Public-Private Partnerships and Energy Savings Contracts to Fund DoD Mobile Assets. Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Technical Information Center, September 2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.21236/ada459747.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Prats, Joan, Helen Harris, and Juan Andrés Pérez. Political Determinants of Public-Private Partnerships. Inter-American Development Bank, September 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.18235/0003619.

Full text
Abstract:
During the last three decades, Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) have emerged as a new contractual arrangement to provide infrastructure investment and services. Examining the evolution of PPPs contracts in emerging countries, this paper analyses the role played by political institutions and partisanship showing that: (i) PPPs are more used when governmental and legislative transaction costs increase; and (ii) political partisanship does not explain the use and consolidation of PPPs as a contractual arrangement. The paper also confirms the relevance of macroeconomic and institutional quality variability variables found in previous literature and sheds new light regarding the political economy of PPPs, especially on how political governance structures shape incentives for using PPPs as a contractual mechanism.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Javed, Umair, Aiza Hussain, and Hassan Aziz. Demanding Power: Contentious Politics and Electricity in Pakistan. Institute of Development Studies (IDS), June 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.19088/ids.2021.047.

Full text
Abstract:
This paper explores Pakistan’s electricity supply crisis that lasted from 2007 to 2015, and the ensuing contention that shaped public discourse and political events in the country. During this period, which witnessed electricity outages of up to 14 hours per day, 456 incidents of contention took place, with just under 20 per cent escalating into some form of violence. Electricity became the number one political issue in the country and was integral in shaping the outcomes of the 2013 General Election. Following the election, public authorities undertook extensive investment to expand capacity and ensure consistency in supply while evading questions about affordability and sustainability. On the surface, this appears to be a case of extensive protest working towards shaping state responsiveness. And it is true that the state now sees supply as a non-negotiable aspect in the social contract with citizens. However, a range of factors contributed to the chronology and the selective, generation-focused nature of this response. On the other hand, citizen inclusion and participation in decision-making, and issues of affordability and sustainability, which impact vulnerable and disempowered groups the most, remain absent from the political and policy conversation around energy. This suggests that while protests were useful in generating a short-term response, their long-term legacy in empowerment related outcomes is less visible.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
You might also be interested in the extended bibliographies on the topic 'A public contract' for particular source types:
Journal articles Dissertations / Theses Books
We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!

To the bibliography