Journal articles on the topic 'Abandon des études – Aspect social'

The article highlights the issue of clear terminology and inconsistent interpretation of the essence of governance as a phenomenon and a mean of democratization of the social environment. The results of the critical analysis of the works dedicated to the problem are highlighted. A logical and semantic analysis of the types of governance that appear in the modern domestic theoretical discourse. As a result of the analysis, a terminological contradiction was revealed, therefore, uncertainty in the subject field of the study of governance issues. It is emphasized that such terminological uncertainty is a significant methodological obstacle in providing adequate research on governance and carrying out recommendations for its successful solution, which is extremely important for modern Ukrainian society, which needs democratization. Governance is noted to be an unalterable means of democratizing the social environment. An interpretation of the essence of the basic principles of governance is done. It is recommended to abandon the pluralism of adjectives, which create a semantic contradiction and generate terminological uncertainty of governance and to stand with the term "governance" without any additional determinants. It is proposed to define governance as a democratic form of social governance based on the principles of openness, participation, accountability, efficiency, coherence, responsibility, partnership, accountability, integrity, fairness and distributed leadership. It is recommended to develop a broad public discourse around the problems that hinder the effective implementation of the principles of governance at various levels of the social hierarchy in Ukraine, including domestic universities.

Le premier tome de l’Histoire des femmes, consacré à l'Antiquité, illustre de façon particulièrement éloquente l'un des buts que s'étaient fixé les responsables du projet : analyser le discours sur les femmes et les mutations à l'œuvre dans ce discours. De fait, et si l'on met à part l'article de Claudine Leduc les études qui sont proposées dans ce volume abordent essentiellement, même si elles comportent des indications concrètes sur tel ou tel aspect de la place des femmes dans les sociétés anciennes, les représentations du féminin. Il va de soi que ces représentations, pour ce qui est de l'Antiquité, et plus précisément du monde gréco-romain, proviennent du regard masculin, étant donnée la nature des sources dont nous disposons. Et c'est ce regard masculin qu'il faut d'abord déconstruire, et cela justifie la place privilégiée donnée aux représentations. Il importe cependant de ne pas s'enfermer dans de telles limites, et l'article de C. Leduc est la preuve qu'il est possible de réintroduire les réalités concrètes dans l'analyse.

AbstractMarc Connelly's The Green Pastures play was one of the longest running dramas in Broadway history. Responses to the play by blacks and whites demonstrate its contested nature. Whites generally lauded the drama for its simplicity and its childlike depiction of black religion in the rural South. African Americans, though hopeful that its allblack cast would lead to more opportunities for blacks on stage, were divided between a general appreciation of the extraordinary display of talent by its actors and worries about the implications of a play that seemed to idealize the rural South as the natural environment of carefree overly religious blacks. Connelly's widely popular drama became a site of cultural debates about the significance of black migration to the urban North, the nature and importance of religion in black communities, and the place of blacks in the nation. Precisely when black social scientists were urging rural black Christians to abandon an otherworldly and emotional religion, white dramatists and literary artists were making more widely available what they saw as a picturesque and deeply rooted aspect of black folk culture.

Résumé À travers quarante années de publications anthropologiques sur le thème du tourisme, ce texte recherche les fondements de ce regard disciplinaire, les origines des tentatives de théorisation et leur déploiement, pour ensuite se centrer sur les analyses du tourisme comme facteur de changement social dans les sociétés réceptrices. L’accent est mis sur la recherche empirique des conséquences culturelles et socio-économiques du développement d’activités liées au tourisme dans les sociétés locales. L’auteur signale l’insuffisance conceptuelle se dégageant de la recherche sur les implications du tourisme dans les sociétés réceptrices à partir d’un hypothétique corpus théorique centré sur le tourisme. Pour faire avancer la réflexion sur le tourisme comme facteur de changement dans des sociétés réceptrices, il souligne la nécessité d’écarter le touriste de cet aspect de la recherche et de produire des études de cas fouillées et résolument enracinées dans leurs contextes particuliers, matière première indispensable pour avancer sur ce terrain encore mal connu.

AbstractThis article makes a case for Vietnam as a distinctive example of late- and post-socialist marketization, a painful experience that has brought widespread immiseration to rural societies within and beyond Asia. Building on extensive ethnographic fieldwork in a northern Vietnamese village, I explore a hitherto under-researched aspect of Vietnam's massive social and economic transformation in the 30 years since the onset of market transition or Renovation (Đổi mới): the surprising ways in which rural households have negotiated both the risks and opportunities of the state's push to de-cooperativize and marketize village livelihoods. The state expects that a minority of rich farmers will rapidly move into large-scale, mechanized farming, while the majority will abandon small-scale subsistence farming to specialize in trade or participate in industrial waged employment. Surprisingly, all village households insist on being đa gi năng, that is, on retaining multiple livelihood options instead of following the official modernization scripts. Their refusal to follow state plans is not market-averse ‘resistance’, but something rarely documented in the literature on peasant life in marketizing contexts: a local sense of agency and taking personal responsibility for the security and long-term welfare of their families, in the face of highly unpredictable state policies.

Courts frequently engage in the weighing of competing values; perhaps most obviously, such balancing constitutes an integral aspect of proportionality analysis in many states’ constitutional law. However, such balancing raises a difficult theoretical question: What does it mean that one value “outweighs” another in any particular case? If the values at issue are incommensurable — as they often will be — such balancing may appear to break down. As Justice Scalia has stated, balancing in the presence of incommensurable values “is more like judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.” It may appear that if a judge is asked in a particular case to decide, for example, whether a state interest is sufficiently strong to justify the limitation of a constitutional right, he will be forced to a) either abandon the notion of a genuine plurality of values, or b) make an arbitrary decision.This article argues that neither of these options need be accepted and that rational choice is indeed possible in the presence of incommensurable values. Specifically, it contends that the Nash bargaining solution provides a means, at least in certain circumstances, of rationally understanding and undertaking the weighing of distinct and mutually irreducible values which adjudication frequently requires. The Nash framework can both elucidate proportionality analysis by providing a social choice-based framework for understanding the structure of proportionality analysis and also justify proportionality analysis by demonstrating that the weighing of competing values is not necessarily mere judicial hand-waving.

The article discusses the features of the policy of the Russian Empire on the marital relationships of the Old Belivers in the 19th- the early 20th centuries. The issues of liberalisation, abandon oppression and harassment by government agencies. Attempts of improper activity of the government and the church to destroy the values of the Old Believers are considered. These are, in particular, family and marital values. These values are indispensable elements of the social structure of a community. Marital relations were considered the main social institution that preserved the tolerance of society. Particular attention was focused on the equalization of rights between the Old Believers and the Orthodox Christians on the part of the government and the church. The analysis highlights that apartness and matrimony were the main elements of the faith tradition of the Old Believers. The article shows that the laws of the Russian Empire influenced the mating and sexual behaviour of Old Believers. The gender perspective met the requirements of the agrarian aristocracy and this aspect was considered in action. Historically, the role of women in different spheres of society has gradually changed. Women could take on male work responsibilities, for example, as a business environment or judicial functions. On the topic of family education of Old Believers, this issue is subordinated to religious beliefs. Education children was a top priority for men. There were erudition, a high knowledge of religious literature, quotation, the lives of foremost saints and other important knowledge of the Old Believers and their children. This article analyzes cross-marriages between Old Believers and Orthodox Christians, but this was an exception. Endogamy was a major component of wed. People got married with the consent of their parents, while a significant other had to be an Old Believer and live in your or a neighboring village.

There is potential disconnect between a view of classification as historically and culturally contingent and the ethics of KO. For instance, Mai (2011) urges a shift away from the ‘modernity’ of received classification theory, towards a more pluralistic view that acknowledges the social, political, and historical contingency of classification as a practice. While this is a view shared by many, it is not evident how such an approach can support an ethics which prioritizes a commitment to truth, fairness, democracy, and the common good. A view of such values as merely contingent factors in classification activities would seem to undermine their use as ethical ideals, posing a choice between abandoning modernist tendencies and a workable ethics of KO. An ethics that is consonant with core methodological commitments is critical if we seek to preserve both disciplinary rigor and claim to serve the common good. Rorty's thought is presented as an ethics compatible with a view of classification as contingent. His suggestion of an ironic ethics is presented and distinguished from cynicism, which is a common misinterpretation of this aspect of his thought. Finally, his ethical principle of solidarity is shown to be broadly compatible with the traditional values of the field of LIS, while approaching it from a philosophical standpoint that doesn’t demand or encourage the universalizing tendencies which Mai and others have exhorted us to abandon. In short, this paper attempts to preserve the baby of a workable ethics while discarding the bathwater of universalism in knowledge organization.

RÉSUMÉLe Canada fait face à un défi important, soit de répondre aux besoins en soins de santé des personnes âgées manifestant des problèmes physiques et mentaux complexes. Les études montrent que les services de santé mentale en collaboration sont efficaces en ce qui concerne les divers besoins de santé de ce groupe. Cependant, un aspect négligé, néanmoins important, de la planification de la prestation de services pour cette population est de s’assurer que les personnes âgées ont suffisamment accès aux services de pratiques d’excellence offerts. Cet article présente un exercice national de réalisation de consensus mené par l’Initiative canadienne de collaboration en santé mentale – Seniors Working Group. L’objectif de la réalisation de consensus est de développer, à l’aide de renseignements provenant de tout le paysQ1: Ok, oui c bon je comprends. si ton cadre conceptuel est nationally informed, c’est que forcément il reçoit de l'info de partout dans le pays. C’est pourquoi je l’ai traduit comme ça. Pour rester plus proche de l'anglais, on pourrait mettre kekchose comme obtenant des renseignements sur le plan national..?, un cadre conceptuel sur les besoins d’accessibilité des personnes âgées relatifs aux soins de santé mentale en collaboration. Le cadre conceptuel a pour but de fournir aux planificateurs, administrateurs et fournisseurs les éléments nécessaires pour comprendre les besoins uniques des personnes âgées en matière d’accessibilité, en fonction de trois priorités (l’élément personnel, systémique, et les prestataires de soins), et de leur permettre d’implanter des stratégies pour résoudre ces problèmes, à l’intérieur d’initiatives collaboratives de santé mentale mises en place sur le terrain.

(This is the text of the SAFIGB Annual Lecture, delivered at the Courtauld Institute of Art, London, on 29 November 2010)This is a lecture about architecture and politics in the eleventh century. First, however, I would like to say a few words about another aspect of architectural history, namely style, because it does not feature in the body of the lecture and because of the criticism it currently faces and has faced for some time. I shall append my comments to two recollections. The first of these relates to a presentation in the 1990s at which the speaker identified the different kinds of expertise needed to understand a building, including that of the palaeographer for the documentary history, of the petrologist if it was a masonry structure, and so on to the architectural historian, who was given the task of dealing with style. The second recollection concerns a conference a few years later at which one of the participants said they wished that discussion of style could be banned. The two remarks taken together lead to an amusing conclusion, but they were separate utterances and so should be considered separately. As to the first, there are of course many other contributions that the architectural historian can make, not least in terms of social history, but I am pleased to see the task of assessing the relevance of style assigned to them because, if they do not undertake it, it is unlikely that anyone else will. On the second, I have some sympathy with the speaker, because style can be such a slippery concept that at times one might think it better to do without it. But, however justified such criticism, the varying stylistic characteristics found in objects carry so much information about the choices made by innumerable individuals in the course of human history that it would be counterproductive to abandon them, regardless of the difficulties.

A afetividade é um princípio muito importante no âmbito familiar, estando relacionado não, necessariamente, com o amor, mas com a ligação entre as pessoas da instituição familiar, tendo carga positiva, nesse caso, o amor entre os indivíduos dessa instituição, sejam consanguíneos ou adotivos e, negativamente, por intermédio do ódio.. A abordagem do estudo é sobre o abandono afetivo inverso, aquele em que os descendentes abandonam materialmente e afetivamente os genitores quando mais precisam da ajuda dos familiares mais próximos. Portanto, o presente trabalho tem como objetivo de analisar a responsabilização civil dos descendentes no abando afetivo dos genitores. A metodologia adotada foi a pesquisa bibliográfica narrativa, por meio do método dedutivo, com o auxílio de livros, artigos científicos, leis, jurisprudências, monografias, dissertações, teses e outros. Conclui-se que, primeiramente, foi abordado vários princípios constitucionais, os relacionados ao Direito de Família, muitos que embasam o relacionamento da família e levam à compreensão moral dos filhos ampararem seus genitores, tanto financeiramente como afetivamente; após, foi realizada a abordagem sobre os pressupostos que levam à responsabilidade civil, como a culpa presente, o nexo de causalidade o dano que, levados para o aspecto do abandono afetivo inverso, caso os filhos não amparem seus genitores, estará presente a culpa do agente, o nexo causal e o dano infringido ao genitores que, intuitivamente, quando não podem planejar a vida na velhice, ficando à mercê da boa vontade dos filhos, quando não de amigos e vizinhos; por fim, evidencia-se que o tema, abandono afetivo inverso é recente, sendo por enquanto mais presente em julgados quando algum genitor abandona afetivamente seus descendentes, podendo utilizar-se dos mesmos princípios na situação inversa, por isonomia, nos casos de abandono afetivo inverso, apenas deixando a ressalva que o amor é algo incondicional e não deve ser cobrado, mas sim os cuidados que a família deve ter com seus semelhantes sanguíneos ou adotivos, pois existe uma relação natural de solidariedade familiar e esta deve ser levada em consideração por estar de acordo com os demais princípios familiares que regem essa instituição social considerada a mais antiga da humanidade. Tudo isso leva à dificuldade dos tribunais deferirem o pedido de abandono afetivo por inconsistência dos fatos, bem diferente como abandono paternofilial que possui vastas decisões a favor do réu. Contudo, quando presente a responsabilidade civil do abandono afetivo do filho para com os genitores, por analogia aos casos de pais com seus filhos, deve-se ser feito o ressarcimento, apesar do Tribunal de Justiça do Rio de Janeiro não crer que possa ser quantificada essa situação com uma compensação monetária. Palavras-chave: Abandono Afetivo. Inverso. Responsabilidade Civil. Compensação. ABSTRACT: Affection is a very important principle in the family context, being related not necessarily to love, but to the connection between people in the family institution, having a positive charge, in this case, the love between the individuals of that institution, whether consanguineous or adoptive and, negatively, through hatred. The study's approach is about inverse affective abandonment, in which descendants abandon their parents materially and affectively when they need the help of their closest family members most. Therefore, the present work aims to analyze the civil liability of descendants in the affective care of their parents. The adopted methodology was the narrative bibliographic research, through the deductive method, with the aid of books, scientific articles, laws, jurisprudence, monographs, dissertations, theses and others. It is concluded that, first, several constitutional principles were addressed, those related to Family Law, many that support the family relationship and lead to the moral understanding of the children to support their parents, both financially and emotionally; afterwards, the approach was carried out on the assumptions that lead to civil liability, such as the present fault, the causal link and the damage that, taken to the aspect of reverse affective abandonment, if the children do not support their parents, the guilt of the child will be present. agent, the causal nexus and the damage inflicted on parents who, intuitively, when they cannot plan life in old age, being at the mercy of the goodwill of their children, if not of friends and neighbors; finally, it is evident that the theme, reverse affective abandonment is recent, being for the time being more present in judgments when some parent affects their descendants affectionately, being able to use the same principles in the inverse situation, by isonomy, in cases of affective abandonment conversely, just leaving the caveat that love is something unconditional and should not be charged, but the care that the family should have with their blood or adoptive counterparts, as there is a natural relationship of family solidarity and this must be taken into account by be in accordance with the other family principles that govern this social institution considered the oldest in humanity. All of this leads to the difficulty for the courts to grant the request for affective abandonment due to inconsistencies in the facts, quite differently as a paternofilial abandonment, which has vast decisions in favor of the defendant. However, when the civil liability of the child's emotional abandonment towards the parents is present, by analogy to the cases of parents with their children, reimbursement must be made, despite the fact that the Rio de Janeiro Court of Justice does not believe that it can be quantified. this situation with monetary compensation. Keywords: Affective Abandonment. Inverse. Civil responsability. Compensation.

l s’agit d’un volume paru comme résultat de l’initiative d’Anne-Laure Le Guern, Jean-François Thémines et Serge Martin, initiative qui, depuis 2013, a généré des manifestations scientifiques, des journées d’études organisées autour des carnets de l’IUFM, devenu ESPE et actuellement l’INSPE de Caen. Les carnets édités par la suite sont devenus un espace de réflexion, et un outil d’enseignement-apprentissage, un espace de recherche. Qu’est-ce qu’un carnet en didactique ? Les trois axes de recherche du volume Les carnets aujourd’hui… l’expliquent, avec de exemples des pratiques en classe ou dans le cadre d’autres types d’activités à dominante didactique. Un carnet peut être un objet en papier de dimensions et textures diversifiées, utilisé en différentes manières afin de susciter l’intérêt et la curiosité de l’apprenant. Parmi ses possibilités d’utilisation en classe : au lycée, qu’il s’agisse du lycée de culture générale ou du lycée professionnel, pour créer des liens entre littérature et écriture (« Lecture littéraire, écriture créative », avec des articles appartenant à Anne Schneider, Stéphanie Lemarchand et Yves Renaud) ; en maternelle et à l’école primaire (« Pratiques du carnet à l’école primaire », les articles liés à ce sujet appartenant à Catherine Rebiffé et Roselyne Le Bourgeois-Viron, Dominique Briand, Marie-Laure Guégan, Élise Ouvrard ; le carnet peut également passer du format papier à des adaptations modernes comme le téléphone mobile, le blog... (« D’une approche anthropologique à une approche culturelle », des recherches en ce sens venant de la part d’Élisabeth Schneider, Magali Jeannin, Corinne Le Bars). Sophie Hébert-Loizelet et Élise Ouvrard, ouvrent le volume avec le texte intitulé « Le carnet, une matérialité foisonnante et insaisissable », où elles partent de l’aspect physique d’un carnet vers ses contenus, tout en soulignant que, « depuis une quarantaine d’années » seulement, des spécialistes en critique génétique, des théoriciens des genres littéraires et des universitaires lui accordent l’importance méritée, dans la tentative de « répondre à cette simple question "qu’est-ce qu’un carnet" », parvenant ainsi à en démultiplier « les pistes intellectuelles, théoriques autant que pratiques » (Hébert-Loizelet, & Ouvrard 2019 : 9). La diversité des carnets détermine les auteures à souligner, et à juste titre, que le carnet « incarne matériellement et pratiquement une certaine forme de liberté, n’ayant à priori aucune contrainte à respecter et pouvant dès lors recevoir n’importe quelle trace », permettant ainsi « à son détenteur, de manière souvent impromptue, indirecte […], de se découvrir, par tâtonnements, par jaillissements » (Hébert-Loizelet, & Ouvrard 2019 : 10). Le premier contact avec un carnet étant d’ordre esthétique, on comprend bien la « magie » qu’il peut exercer sur l’élève, l’invitant ainsi, en quelque sorte, à sortir de la salle de cours, à se sentir plus libre. Le carnet est en même temps un bon aide-mémoire. Ses dimensions invitent à synthétiser la pensée, à la relecture, une « relecture à court terme » et une « relecture à long terme » (Hébert-Loizelet, & Ouvrard 2019 : 15), toutes les deux enrichissantes. Le carnet devient effectivement outil d’apprentissage et objet de recherche. Les contributions présentes dans ce livre, soulignent les auteures par la suite, représentent des regards croisés (du 23 mars 2016) sur « l’objet carnet, en proposant des recherches académiques, anthropologiques ou didactiques mais également des comptes rendus d’expériences sur le terrain » dans le but de « prendre en considération l’utilisation des carnets dans leur grande hétérogénéité de la maternelle à l’université pour rendre compte des voyages, mais aussi de lectures et d’apprentissage dans les disciplines aussi variées que le français, l’histoire, les arts visuels, ou les arts plastiques, et ce dans différents milieux institutionnels » (Hébert-Loizelet, & Ouvrard 2019 : 17). Prenons le premier axe de recherche mentionné plus haut, celui de la lecture littéraire et de l’écriture créative. Se penchant sur d’autorité de différents spécialistes dans le domaine, tels Pierre Bayard et Nathalie Brillant-Rannou, les deux premiers textes de cet axe insistent sur la modalité d’intégrer « l’activité du lecteur et son rapport à la littérature » par le carnet de lecture dans le cadre de la didactique de la littérature. Le troisième texte représente une exploitation du carnet artistique qui « favorise un meilleur rapport à l’écriture » et modifie la relation que les élèves de 15 à 17 ans du canton Vaud de Suisse ont avec le monde (Hébert-Loizelet, & Ouvrard 2019 : 19). Nous avons retenu de l’article d’Anne Schneider, l’exploitation de la notion de bibliothèque intérieure, telle qu’elle est vue par Pierre Bayard, bibliothèque incluant « nos livres secrets » en relation avec ceux des autres, les livres qui nous « fabriquent » (Schneider 2019 : 36). Ces livres figurent dans les carnets personnels, avec une succession de titres lus ou à lire, commentaires, dessins, jugements. Pour ce qui est de l’expérience en lycée professionnel (l’article de Stéphanie Lemarchand), on souligne l’attention accordée au « sujet lecteur » par le biais du carnet de lecture, plus exactement la réalisation d’une réflexion personnelle et les possibilités d’exprimer cette réflexion personnelle. Ici encore, il faut signaler la notion d’« autolecture » introduite par Nathalie Brillant-Rannou, l’enseignant se proposant de participer au même processus que ses élèves. En ce sens, la démarche auprès des élèves d’une école professionnelle, moins forts en français et en lecture, s’avère particulièrement intéressante. On leur demande d’écrire des contes que leurs collègues commentent, ou de commenter un film à l’aide du carnet de lecture qui devient carnet dialogique, non pas occasion du jugement de l’autre, mais d’observer et de retenir, devenant ainsi « un embrayeur du cours » (Lemarchand 2019 : 45). Le passage aux textes littéraires – des contes simples aux contes plus compliqués et des films de science-fiction aux livres de science-fiction – devient normal et incitant, permettant petit à petit le passage vers la poésie. L’utilisation du carnet dialogique détermine les élèves à devenir conscients de l’importance de leur point de vue, ce qui fait que ceux-ci commencent à devenir conscients d’eux-mêmes et à choisir des méthodes personnelles pour améliorer leur niveau de compétences, la démarche de l’enseignant devenant elle aussi de plus en plus complexe. Le premier article, du deuxième axe, celui visant les pratiques du carnet à l’école primaire, article signé par Catherine Rebiffé et Roselyne Le Bourgeois-Viron, présente le résultat d’une recherche qui « s’appuie sur les liens entre échanges oraux et trace écrite, mais aussi sur la dimension retouchable, ajustable de l’objet carnet réunissant dessins, photographies et dictée, afin d’initier les élèves à l’écrit » (Hébert-Loizelet, & Ouvrard 2019 : 19). Pour ce qui est de l’enseignement de l’histoire à des élèves du cycle 3, avec une pensée critique en construction et une difficulté de comprendre un vocabulaire plus compliqué et les langages spécialisés, Dominique Briand propose le carnet Renefer, un choix parfait à son avis, vu que « l’artiste qui réalise les estampes sur le conflit [de la Grande Guerre] s’adresse à une enfant [de huit ans], sa fille » (Briand 2019 : 97), appelée par Renefer lui-même « Belle Petite Monde ». Un autre aspect important est lié au message transmis par l’image envisagée dans cette perspective. Il s’agit en effet de filtrer l’information en sorte que la violence et la souffrance soient perçues à des degrés émotionnels différents, pour laisser à l’élève la possibilité de débats, de réflexions. Les textes qui accompagnent les images du carnet Renefer, succincts mais suggestifs, s’adaptent également au niveau d’âge et implicitement de compréhension. Les élèves sont sensibilisés, invités à voir le côté humain, le brin de vie et d’espoir qui peuvent se cacher derrière une situation réaliste. Le carnet Renefer didactisé amène les élèves « à apprendre l’histoire dans une démarche active et clairement pluridisciplinaire qui laisse une place importante à l’histoire des arts » (Briand 2019 : 105). Le carnet d’artiste comme instrument didactique, plus exactement celui de Miquel Barceló qui a séjourné en Afrique et dont les carnets d’artiste témoignent de ses voyages et de l’utilisation des moyens locaux pour peindre ou même pour faire sécher les peintures est proposé par Marie-Laure Guégan. En passant par des crayons aquarelles, Miquel Barceló va ajouter du relief dans les pages peintes de ses carnets (« papiers d’emballage, billets de banque [par leur graphisme ils peuvent devenir le motif textile d’une robe de femme, par exemple], paquets de cigarettes, boîtes de médicaments » qui sont collés ou bien collés et arrachés par la suite). Pour réaliser des nuances différentes ou une autre texture, il y rajoute des « débris de tabac ou de fibre végétale agrégés de la terre, du sable ou de pigments » (Guégan 2019 : 117). Il est aidé par l’observation profonde de la nature, des changements perpétuels, du mélange des matières qui se développent, se modifient le long des années. Ainsi, il intègre dans ses peintures « le temps long (des civilisations), le temps moyen (à l’aune d’une période politique), le temps court (à la dimension de l’individu) » (Guégan 2019 : 121), aussi bien que l’espace, la lumière, l’ombre, les matières, le corps, l’inventivité. Toutes ces qualités recommandent déjà l’auteur pour l’exploitation didactique dans le primaire, il y vient avec un modèle d’intégration de l’enfant dans le monde. L’article de Marie-Laure Guégan parle de l’intégration du travail sur les carnets de l’artiste dans la réalisation de la couverture d’un carnet de voyage par les élèves du cycle 3 en CM2, (cycle de consolidation). D’où la nécessité d’introduire la peinture ou les carnets d’artistes « non comme modèles à imiter, mais comme objets de contemplation et de réflexion » (Guégan 2019 : 128). Dans l’article suivant, Élise Ouvrard parle d’un type de carnet qui permet l’exploitation des pratiques interdisciplinaires à l’école primaire, domaine moins approfondi dans le cadre de ces pratiques ; le but spécifique est celui de la « construction de la compétence interculturelle » qui « s’inscrit plus largement dans l’esprit d’une approche d’enseignement-apprentissage par compétences » (Ouvrard 2019 : 132). L’accent mis sur la compétence est perçu par Guy de Boterf, cité par Élise Ouvrard, comme « manifestation dans l’interprétation », à savoir la possibilité de « construire sa propre réponse pertinente, sa propre façon d’agir » (Cf. Ouvrard 2019 : 132 cité de Le Boterf 2001 :40) dans un processus qui vise la création de liens entre les éléments assimilés (ressources, activités et résultats pour une tâche donnée). Le professeur devient dans ce contexte, la personne qui traduit des contenus en actions qui servent « à mettre en œuvre, à sélectionner des tâches de difficulté croissante qui permettront aux élèves de gagner progressivement une maîtrise des compétences » (Ouvrard 2019 : 133). Cette perspective fait du carnet « un outil permettant de tisser des liens entre la culture scolaire et les expériences hors de la classe, mais aussi de décloisonner des apprentissages, de s’éloigner de l’approche par contenus-matière » (Ouvrard 2019 : 133). C’est un cadre d’analyse qui intègre la perspective didactique du français aussi bien que l’anthropologie de l’écriture. L’activité pratique consiste dans le travail sur des carnets de voyage avec des élèves en CM1 et CM2, venant de deux écoles différentes et qui préparent et effectuent un voyage en Angleterre. Les étapes du parcours visent : - entretiens individuels pré- et post-expérimentation des quatre enseignants concernés ; - fiche de préparation des séances autour du carnet ; - questionnaire pré- et post-expérimentation soumis aux élèves ; - entretiens collectifs post-expérimentation des élèves ; - photographies des carnets à mi-parcours de l’expérimentation et à la fin du parcours. L’analyse des documents a prouvé que les élèves ont réagi de manière positive. Ils ont apprécié le carnet comme plus valeureux que le cahier. Le premier permet un rapport plus complexe avec le milieu social, avec la famille, avec la famille d’accueil dans le cadre du voyage, même des visioconférences avec la famille. À partir des carnets de voyage on peut initier le principe des carnets de l’amitié qui permet au carnet d’un élève de circuler dans un petit groupe et s’enrichir des ajouts des autres collègues. On peut avoir également l’occasion de découvrir des talents des élèves, de mieux les connaître, de mettre l’accent sur leur autonomie. Différentes disciplines peuvent s’y intégrer : le français, l’anglais, l’histoire, les mathématiques, la géographie, la musique, les arts. Important s’avère le décloisonnement des disciplines par le choix de créneaux distincts pour l’utilisation-exploitation des carnets de voyage. Le dernier groupement d’articles, axé sur le passage d’une approche anthropologique à une approche culturelle, tente d’envisager un avenir pour le carnet. En tant que spécialiste des pratiques scripturales adolescentes, partant de la théorie de Roger T. Pédauque pour le document, Elisabeth Schneider se concentre dans son article sur le téléphone mobile par ce qu’on appelle « polytopie scripturale qui caractérise l’interaction des processus d’écriture, des activités et des déplacements avec le téléphone mobile » (Hébert-Loizelet, & Ouvrard 2019 : 21), celui-ci s’encadrant du point de vue épistémologique, dans les catégories « signe », « forme » et « médium », tridimensionnalité qui permet de « comprendre les enjeux actuels concernant l’auctorialité, la structure du document, par exemple, mais aussi d’en revisiter l’histoire » (Schneider 2019 : 164). L’importance du blog pédagogique comme carnet médiatique multimodal, résultat du travail avec des étudiants sous contrat Erasmus ou type Erasmus venus à l’ESPE de Caen pour mettre en lumière l’expérience interculturelle, est démontrée par Magali Jeannin. Son article prend comme point d’encrage les notions d’« hypermobilité » pour les individus avec une identité « hypermoderne », en pleine « mouvance » et « liquidité » (Jeannin 2019 : 169), qui, des fois, dans le cas des étudiants, pourrait se concrétiser en « expérience interculturelle » et « tourisme universitaire ». L’intérêt de l’auteure va vers l’interrogation, « les enjeux et les moyens d’une didactique de l’implication du sujet en contexte interculturel » par un « blog pédagogique des étudiants étrangers » lié au cours sur les compétences interculturelles. Ainsi, parmi les enjeux du « blog pédagogique des étudiants à l’étranger » comme carnet multimodal comptent : donner à l’expérience culturelle la valeur subjective qui évite la réification du sujet en investissant « la langue et la culture cibles comme des faits et pratiques sociaux (inter)subjectifs » (Jeannin 2019 : 171) et même transsubjectifs d’après le modèle du blog libre ; le blog-carnet devient un espace de rencontre entre carnet de voyage et carnet de lecture, carnet d’expérience, carnet d’ethnographie (avec un mélange entre langue cible et langue source) ; il s’inscrit « dans une tradition de l’écriture de l’expérience en classe de FLE » (Jeannin 2019 : 173). Les écrits en grande mesure programmés du blog pédagogique sont ensuite exploités ; ils répondent en même temps « à des besoins personnels » et à des « fins universitaires » (Jeannin 2019 : 174). Par ce procédé, le réel est pris comme un processus non pas comme une simple représentation. Toujours avec une visée interculturelle, le dernier article de cette série fait référence à l’Institut régional du travail social Normandie-Caen, dont le but est de former « les futurs travailleurs sociaux » (Hébert-Loizelet, & Ouvrard 2019 : 21), par une recherche franco-québécoise qui concerne l’implication des mobilités internationales pour études. Ce volume représente un outil particulièrement important en didactique, un outil que je recommande chaleureusement en égale mesure aux enseignants et aux chercheurs spécialisés. Si je me suis arrêtée sur quelques articles, c’est parce qu’il m’a semblé important d’insister sur des côtés qui sont moins exploités par les enseignants roumains et qui mériteraient de l’être.

In this study we represent the bilingual language situation in the ethnolinguistic community of Serbs in Ingolstadt, recorded over the period of time from 2010 until 2013. The paper also addresses the occurrences of bilingualism and diglossia in the context of contact linguistics, their classification, as well as the samples of bilingualism in the researched corpus, with the accompanying phenomena of language contact. The obtained cross-section of the sociolinguistic and linguistic situation of the researched ethnolinguistic community, as well as the research results, refer to the specific community and specific corpus. Nonetheless, obtained results with certainty allow introspect into the life cycle dynamics tendency for the Serbo-German bilingual communities. Reflecting upon the research results we may conclude that our investigated sample, which can expand onto the entire research corpus, can be regarded as being almost in the second last phase of the language change process. A rather significant part of the corpus in the further development of the language change process would certainly be the third generation of working migrants. Further direction of the bilingual community development will most likely be dependent upon this generation, as well as other accompanying factors. In the researched sample we can observe different percentual representation of balanced bilinguals and dominant bilinguals, as well as passive and receptive bilinguals. The fact that there is a significant percentual presence of passive and receptive bilinguals among the third group of migrants explains the situation that one part of the second generation of working migrants in the researched community is powerless before the pressure of social networks, economic and social relations that we find in the social majority group. They abandon teaching their children the Serbian language, and they perceive the German language as the capital asset through which those who belong to the third generation of working migrants can gain top positions in the education system and in the market as well. In the language practice of bilingual speakers there is the phenomenon of language contact from the first to the third generation, specifically in the occurrence of transference (mixing of two language systems on the basis of phonetics, morphology, syntax) or in code switching (mixing of two languages from the communicative aspect). Transference, as a phenomenon in the direct and indirect language contact, may have multiple results which will be considered in future papers on the issue of language contact phenomenon. Finally, under the environmental effect (standard German language, German dialects), as well as the effect of different language community dialects the members of the first generation of working migrants come from, a new language is developed. This new language cannot be called the Serbian language spoken by the Serbs in the homeland but namely we propose a new term Serbian diaspora language in Germany. This language as such is then transferred onto the new generations and/or its use declines in one and sustains in other domains. Ultimately, at the end of this process, as many contact linguistic researches have illustrated, an inevitable situation may occur where a life cycle of the bilingual community might come to an end and there might be a complete language change of the minority with the majority community.

Les négociations salariales dans le cadre de l’accord interprofessionnel 2003-2004 vont prochainement débuter. Ce numéro de Regards Economiques se penche sur les enjeux, les raisons et les modalités de la modération salariale en Belgique. 1. Les enjeux Face à l’arbitrage entre salaire et emploi étayé ci-dessous, notre point de vue est qu’il faut davantage mettre l’accent sur le développement de l’emploi que sur la croissance des salaires. Cette priorité à l’emploi s’explique par le rôle de celui-ci dans l’insertion sociale et par le souci de sauvegarder une sécurité sociale efficace face au choc du vieillissement de la population et en présence de notre fort endettement public. Nous sommes bien conscients que l’emploi doit vérifier certaines caractéristiques pour être un vecteur d’insertion sociale. Même si nous n’abordons pas ces aspects ici, la négociation collective et la législation relatives aux conditions de travail sont donc essentielles elles aussi. 2. Les raisons L’analyse d’un éventail de données statistiques livrent plusieurs enseignements. Primo, ils rappellent que le niveau du coût salarial en Belgique est parmi les plus élevés en Europe. Secundo, il semble bien que la croissance du coût salarial en Belgique ait pu effectivement être maîtrisée depuis l’entrée en vigueur de la loi de 1996 relative à la promotion de l’emploi et à la sauvegarde préventive de la compétitivité. Les coûts salariaux unitaires ont cependant progressé plus rapidement que dans les pays voisins, provoquant ainsi une détérioration de la compétitivité de l’économie belge. Tertio, les performances d’emploi de la Belgique s’améliorent mais demeurent extrêmement préoccupantes pour une série de groupes de la population (travailleurs moins qualifiés, travailleurs de nationalité non européenne, travailleurs âgés). Toutes les études disponibles pour la Belgique aboutissent à la même conclusion : le niveau macroéconomique de l’emploi varie négativement avec celui des coûts salariaux. Cette relation est la résultante d’effets tantôt positifs, tantôt négatifs. Cette conclusion pourrait donc s’inverser si les coûts salariaux baissaient fortement. On n’en est cependant pas là. La modération du coût salarial n’est certainement pas la panacée pour répondre à la situation préoccupante des groupes de population mentionnés à l’instant. La stimulation de l’offre d’emploi que cette modération favorise est cependant un complément indispensable à un ensemble de mesures structurelles bien coordonnées (relèvement des qualifications les plus basses, poursuite des actions ciblées sur des sous-régions particulièrement meurtries, abandon des freins à la mobilité des travailleurs, révision du profil salarial en fonction de l’âge ou de l’ancienneté, accroissement de l’écart entre revenu en emploi et revenu d’allocation en jouant sur la (para-)fiscalité, etc.). Les perspectives conjoncturelles peu brillantes pour le futur immédiat renforcent la nécessité d’une modération salariale. On sait en effet qu’en ces périodes assez déprimées sur le plan de l’embauche, les plus qualifiés vont davantage prospecter les marchés du travail où ils sont en quelque sorte "sur-qualifiés". Promouvoir une offre d’emplois dynamique dans tout l’éventail des qualifications est alors une manière de limiter ce phénomène dont seuls les plus qualifiés tirent un parti clair. 3. Les modalités Depuis l’accord interprofessionnel de 1999-2000, la norme salariale est avant tout devenue "indicative". Elle est une recommandation des partenaires sociaux réunis au niveau national à l’égard des partenaires des négociations sectorielles et d’entreprise. Compte tenu des faits observés en Belgique depuis le premier choc pétrolier et des analyses réalisées depuis, il est fort plausible que se coordonner sur une norme, même fruste, est préférable à une absence de coordination. Pour que la modération salariale contribue le plus largement possible au développement de l’emploi, des aménagements complémentaires au système actuel nous semblent nécessaires. Ceux-ci se situent à trois niveaux. Pour favoriser la création d’emploi, il est primordial que les importants allégements structurels de cotisations sociales contribuent pleinement à la réduction du coût du travail. On recommande donc de maîtriser la croissance des salaires bruts afin que les baisses de cotisation structurelles allègent le coût salarial et stimule l’emploi. Cette maîtrise aurait une réciproque en ce sens que la réforme fiscale et les allégements de cotisations personnelles au bas de l’échelle salariale ne devraient pas être récupérées par les employeurs lors de la négociation du niveau des salaires bruts. Ces réformes pourraient alors pleinement jouer leurs rôles de soutien aux bas revenus et d’incitation à la recherche d’emploi et à la participation au marché du travail. L’indexation automatique assure tous les salariés contre le risque généré par des mouvements de prix et constitue à ce titre un mécanisme à préserver. Il faut toutefois souligner qu’en cas de hausse de prix des produits importés, l’appauvrissement collectif qui en résulte risque d’être aggravé par l’indexation automatique. Lorsque des biens importés qui ont un poids significatif dans l’"indice-santé" connaissent des hausses substantielles et durables de prix, il faudrait veiller à la suspension de l’indexation automatique des salaires sur ces prix et trouver d’autres modalités pour répondre à la dégradation de la situation socio-économique de certains groupes en présence de tels chocs. Tant la modération salariale que les allègements de la parafiscalité doivent faire l’objet d’une coordination au niveau européen. Sans une coordination forte au sein de l’UE, les dispositions prises au niveau de chaque Etat seront sous-optimales.

Les négociations salariales dans le cadre de l’accord interprofessionnel 2003-2004 vont prochainement débuter. Ce numéro de Regards Economiques se penche sur les enjeux, les raisons et les modalités de la modération salariale en Belgique. 1. Les enjeux Face à l’arbitrage entre salaire et emploi étayé ci-dessous, notre point de vue est qu’il faut davantage mettre l’accent sur le développement de l’emploi que sur la croissance des salaires. Cette priorité à l’emploi s’explique par le rôle de celui-ci dans l’insertion sociale et par le souci de sauvegarder une sécurité sociale efficace face au choc du vieillissement de la population et en présence de notre fort endettement public. Nous sommes bien conscients que l’emploi doit vérifier certaines caractéristiques pour être un vecteur d’insertion sociale. Même si nous n’abordons pas ces aspects ici, la négociation collective et la législation relatives aux conditions de travail sont donc essentielles elles aussi. 2. Les raisons L’analyse d’un éventail de données statistiques livrent plusieurs enseignements. Primo, ils rappellent que le niveau du coût salarial en Belgique est parmi les plus élevés en Europe. Secundo, il semble bien que la croissance du coût salarial en Belgique ait pu effectivement être maîtrisée depuis l’entrée en vigueur de la loi de 1996 relative à la promotion de l’emploi et à la sauvegarde préventive de la compétitivité. Les coûts salariaux unitaires ont cependant progressé plus rapidement que dans les pays voisins, provoquant ainsi une détérioration de la compétitivité de l’économie belge. Tertio, les performances d’emploi de la Belgique s’améliorent mais demeurent extrêmement préoccupantes pour une série de groupes de la population (travailleurs moins qualifiés, travailleurs de nationalité non européenne, travailleurs âgés). Toutes les études disponibles pour la Belgique aboutissent à la même conclusion : le niveau macroéconomique de l’emploi varie négativement avec celui des coûts salariaux. Cette relation est la résultante d’effets tantôt positifs, tantôt négatifs. Cette conclusion pourrait donc s’inverser si les coûts salariaux baissaient fortement. On n’en est cependant pas là. La modération du coût salarial n’est certainement pas la panacée pour répondre à la situation préoccupante des groupes de population mentionnés à l’instant. La stimulation de l’offre d’emploi que cette modération favorise est cependant un complément indispensable à un ensemble de mesures structurelles bien coordonnées (relèvement des qualifications les plus basses, poursuite des actions ciblées sur des sous-régions particulièrement meurtries, abandon des freins à la mobilité des travailleurs, révision du profil salarial en fonction de l’âge ou de l’ancienneté, accroissement de l’écart entre revenu en emploi et revenu d’allocation en jouant sur la (para-)fiscalité, etc.). Les perspectives conjoncturelles peu brillantes pour le futur immédiat renforcent la nécessité d’une modération salariale. On sait en effet qu’en ces périodes assez déprimées sur le plan de l’embauche, les plus qualifiés vont davantage prospecter les marchés du travail où ils sont en quelque sorte "sur-qualifiés". Promouvoir une offre d’emplois dynamique dans tout l’éventail des qualifications est alors une manière de limiter ce phénomène dont seuls les plus qualifiés tirent un parti clair. 3. Les modalités Depuis l’accord interprofessionnel de 1999-2000, la norme salariale est avant tout devenue "indicative". Elle est une recommandation des partenaires sociaux réunis au niveau national à l’égard des partenaires des négociations sectorielles et d’entreprise. Compte tenu des faits observés en Belgique depuis le premier choc pétrolier et des analyses réalisées depuis, il est fort plausible que se coordonner sur une norme, même fruste, est préférable à une absence de coordination. Pour que la modération salariale contribue le plus largement possible au développement de l’emploi, des aménagements complémentaires au système actuel nous semblent nécessaires. Ceux-ci se situent à trois niveaux. Pour favoriser la création d’emploi, il est primordial que les importants allégements structurels de cotisations sociales contribuent pleinement à la réduction du coût du travail. On recommande donc de maîtriser la croissance des salaires bruts afin que les baisses de cotisation structurelles allègent le coût salarial et stimule l’emploi. Cette maîtrise aurait une réciproque en ce sens que la réforme fiscale et les allégements de cotisations personnelles au bas de l’échelle salariale ne devraient pas être récupérées par les employeurs lors de la négociation du niveau des salaires bruts. Ces réformes pourraient alors pleinement jouer leurs rôles de soutien aux bas revenus et d’incitation à la recherche d’emploi et à la participation au marché du travail. L’indexation automatique assure tous les salariés contre le risque généré par des mouvements de prix et constitue à ce titre un mécanisme à préserver. Il faut toutefois souligner qu’en cas de hausse de prix des produits importés, l’appauvrissement collectif qui en résulte risque d’être aggravé par l’indexation automatique. Lorsque des biens importés qui ont un poids significatif dans l’"indice-santé" connaissent des hausses substantielles et durables de prix, il faudrait veiller à la suspension de l’indexation automatique des salaires sur ces prix et trouver d’autres modalités pour répondre à la dégradation de la situation socio-économique de certains groupes en présence de tels chocs. Tant la modération salariale que les allègements de la parafiscalité doivent faire l’objet d’une coordination au niveau européen. Sans une coordination forte au sein de l’UE, les dispositions prises au niveau de chaque Etat seront sous-optimales.

L’anthropologie médicale est un sous-champ de l’anthropologie socioculturelle qui s’intéresse à la pluralité des systèmes médicaux ainsi qu’à l’étude des facteurs économiques, politiques et socioculturels ayant un impact sur la santé des individus et des populations. Plus spécifiquement, elle s’intéresse aux relations sociales, aux expériences vécues, aux pratiques impliquées dans la gestion et le traitement des maladies par rapport aux normes culturelles et aux institutions sociales. Plusieurs généalogies de l’anthropologie médicale peuvent être retracées. Toutefois, les monographies de W.H.R. Rivers et d’Edward Evans-Pritchard (1937), dans lesquelles les représentations, les connaissances et les pratiques en lien avec la santé et la maladie étaient considérées comme faisant intégralement partie des systèmes socioculturels, sont généralement considérées comme des travaux fondateurs de l’anthropologie médicale. Les années 1950 ont marqué la professionnalisation de l’anthropologie médicale. Des financements publics ont été alloués à la discipline pour contribuer aux objectifs de santé publique et d’amélioration de la santé dans les communautés économiquement pauvres (Good 1994). Dans les décennies qui suivent, les bases de l’anthropologie médicale sont posées avec l’apparition de nombreuses revues professionnelles (Social Science & Medicine, Medical Anthropology, Medical Anthropology Quarterly), de manuels spécialisés (e.g. MacElroy et Townsend 1979) et la formation du sous-groupe de la Society for Medical Anthropology au sein de l’American Anthropological Association (AAA) en 1971, qui sont encore des points de références centraux pour le champ. À cette époque, sous l’influence des théories des normes et du pouvoir proposées par Michel Foucault et Pierre Bourdieu, la biomédecine est vue comme un système structurel de rapports de pouvoir et devient ainsi un objet d’étude devant être traité symétriquement aux autres systèmes médicaux (Gaines 1992). L’attention portée aux théories du biopouvoir et de la gouvernementalité a permis à l’anthropologie médicale de formuler une critique de l’hégémonie du regard médical qui réduit la santé à ses dimensions biologiques et physiologiques (Saillant et Genest 2007 : xxii). Ces considérations ont permis d’enrichir, de redonner une visibilité et de l’influence aux études des rationalités des systèmes médicaux entrepris par Evans-Pritchard, et ainsi permettre la prise en compte des possibilités qu’ont les individus de naviguer entre différents systèmes médicaux (Leslie 1980; Lock et Nguyen 2010 : 62). L’aspect réducteur du discours biomédical avait déjà été soulevé dans les modèles explicatifs de la maladie développés par Arthur Kleinman, Leon Eisenberg et Byron Good (1978) qui ont introduit une distinction importante entre « disease » (éléments médicalement observables de la maladie), « illness » (expériences vécues de la maladie) et « sickness » (aspects sociaux holistes entourant la maladie). Cette distinction entre disease, illness et sickness a joué un rôle clé dans le développement rapide des perspectives analytiques de l’anthropologie médicale de l’époque, mais certaines critiques ont également été formulées à son égard. En premier lieu, Allan Young (1981) formule une critique des modèles explicatifs de la maladie en réfutant l'idée que la rationalité soit un model auquel les individus adhèrent spontanément. Selon Young, ce modèle suggère qu’il y aurait un équivalant de structures cognitives qui guiderait le développement des modèles de causalité et des systèmes de classification adoptées par les personnes. Au contraire, il propose que les connaissances soient basées sur des actions, des relations sociales, des ressources matérielles, avec plusieurs sources influençant le raisonnement des individus qui peuvent, de plusieurs manières, diverger de ce qui est généralement entendu comme « rationnel ». Ces critiques, ainsi que les études centrées sur l’expérience des patients et des pluralismes médicaux, ont permis de constater que les stratégies adoptées pour obtenir des soins sont multiples, font appel à plusieurs types de pratiques, et que les raisons de ces choix doivent être compris à la lumière des contextes historiques, locaux et matériaux (Lock et Nguyen 2010 : 63). Deuxièmement, les approches de Kleinman, Eisenberger et Good ont été critiquées pour leur séparation artificielle du corps et de l’esprit qui représentait un postulat fondamental dans les études de la rationalité. Les anthropologues Nancy Scheper-Hughes et Margeret Lock (1987) ont proposé que le corps doit plutôt être abordé selon trois niveaux analytiques distincts, soit le corps politique, social et individuel. Le corps politique est présenté comme étant un lieu où s’exerce la régulation, la surveillance et le contrôle de la différence humaine (Scheper-Hughes et Lock 1987 : 78). Cela a permis aux approches féministes d’aborder le corps comme étant un espace de pouvoir, en examinant comment les discours sur le genre rendent possible l’exercice d’un contrôle sur le corps des femmes (Manderson, Cartwright et Hardon 2016). Les premiers travaux dans cette perspective ont proposé des analyses socioculturelles de différents contextes entourant la reproduction pour contrecarrer le modèle dominant de prise en charge médicale de la santé reproductive des femmes (Martin 1987). Pour sa part, le corps social renvoie à l’idée selon laquelle le corps ne peut pas être abordé simplement comme une entité naturelle, mais qu’il doit être compris en le contextualisant historiquement et socialement (Lupton 2000 : 50). Finalement, considérer le corps individuel a permis de privilégier l’étude de l’expérience subjective de la maladie à travers ses variations autant au niveau individuel que culturel. Les études de l’expérience de la santé et la maladie axées sur l’étude des « phénomènes tels qu’ils apparaissent à la conscience des individus et des groupes d’individus » (Desjarlais et Throop 2011 : 88) se sont avérées pertinentes pour mieux saisir la multitude des expériences vécues des états altérés du corps (Hofmann et Svenaeus 2018). En somme, les propositions de ces auteurs s’inscrivent dans une anthropologie médicale critique qui s’efforce d’étudier les inégalités socio-économiques (Scheper-Hughes 1992), l’accès aux institutions et aux savoirs qu’elles produisent, ainsi qu’à la répartition des ressources matérielles à une échelle mondiale (Manderson, Cartwright et Hardon 2016). Depuis ses débuts, l’anthropologie médicale a abordé la santé globale et épidémiologique dans le but de faciliter les interventions sur les populations désignées comme « à risque ». Certains anthropologues ont développé une perspective appliquée en épidémiologie sociale pour contribuer à l’identification de déterminants sociaux de la santé (Kawachi et Subramanian 2018). Plusieurs de ces travaux ont été critiqués pour la culturalisation des pathologies touchant certaines populations désignées comme étant à risque à partir de critères basés sur la stigmatisation et la marginalisation de ces populations (Trostle et Sommerfeld 1996 : 261). Au-delà des débats dans ce champ de recherche, ces études ont contribué à la compréhension des dynamiques de santé et de maladie autant à l’échelle globale, dans la gestion des pandémies par l’Organisation Mondiale de la Santé (OMS), qu’aux échelles locales avec la mise en place de campagnes de santé publique pour faciliter l’implantation de mesures sanitaires, telles que la vaccination (Dubé, Vivion et Macdonald 2015). L’anthropologie a contribué à ces discussions en se penchant sur les contextes locaux des zoonoses qui sont des maladies transmissibles des animaux vertébrés aux humains (Porter 2013), sur la résistance aux antibiotiques (Landecker 2016), comme dans le cas de la rage et de l’influenza (Wolf 2012), sur les dispositifs de prévention mis en place à une échelle mondiale pour éviter l’apparition et la prolifération d’épidémies (Lakoff 2010), mais aussi sur les styles de raisonnement qui sous-tendent la gestion des pandémies (Caduff 2014). Par ailleurs, certains auteur.e.s ont utilisé le concept de violence structurelle pour analyser les inégalités socio-économiques dans le contexte des pandémies de maladies infectieuses comme le sida, la tuberculose ou, plus récemment, l’Ébola (Fassin 2015). Au-delà de cet aspect socio-économique, Aditya Bharadwaj (2013) parle d’une inégalité épistémique pour caractériser des rapports inégaux dans la production et la circulation globale des savoirs et des individus dans le domaine de la santé. Il décrit certaines situations comme des « biologies subalternes », c’est à dire des états de santé qui ne sont pas reconnus par le système biomédical hégémonique et qui sont donc invisibles et vulnérables. Ces « biologies subalternes » sont le revers de citoyennetés biologiques, ces dernières étant des citoyennetés qui donnes accès à une forme de sécurité sociale basée sur des critères médicaux, scientifiques et légaux qui reconnaissent les dommages biologiques et cherche à les indemniser (Petryna 2002 : 6). La citoyenneté biologique étant une forme d’organisation qui gravite autour de conditions de santé et d’enjeux liés à des maladies génétiques rares ou orphelines (Heath, Rapp et Taussig 2008), ces revendications mobilisent des acteurs incluant les institutions médicales, l’État, les experts ou encore les pharmaceutiques. Ces études partagent une attention à la circulation globale des savoirs, des pratiques et des soins dans la translation — ou la résistance à la translation — d’un contexte à un autre, dans lesquels les patients sont souvent positionnés entre des facteurs sociaux, économiques et politiques complexes et parfois conflictuels. L’industrie pharmaceutique et le développement des technologies biomédicales se sont présentés comme terrain important et propice pour l’analyse anthropologique des dynamiques sociales et économiques entourant la production des appareils, des méthodes thérapeutiques et des produits biologiques de la biomédecine depuis les années 1980 (Greenhalgh 1987). La perspective biographique des pharmaceutiques (Whyte, Geest et Hardon 2002) a consolidé les intérêts et les approches dans les premières études sur les produits pharmaceutiques. Ces recherches ont proposé de suivre la trajectoire sociale des médicaments pour étudier les contextes d’échanges et les déplacements dans la nature symbolique qu’ont les médicaments pour les consommateurs : « En tant que choses, les médicaments peuvent être échangés entre les acteurs sociaux, ils objectivent les significations, ils se déplacent d’un cadre de signification à un autre. Ce sont des marchandises dotées d’une importance économique et de ressources recelant une valeur politique » (traduit de Whyte, Geest et Hardon 2002). D’autres ont davantage tourné leur regard vers les rapports institutionnels, les impacts et le fonctionnement de « Big Pharma ». Ils se sont intéressés aux processus de recherche et de distribution employés par les grandes pharmaceutiques à travers les études de marché et les pratiques de vente (Oldani 2014), l’accès aux médicaments (Ecks 2008), la consommation des produits pharmaceutiques (Dumit 2012) et la production de sujets d’essais cliniques globalisés (Petryna, Lakoff et Kleinman 2006), ainsi qu’aux enjeux entourant les réglementations des brevets et du respect des droits politiques et sociaux (Ecks 2008). L’accent est mis ici sur le pouvoir des produits pharmaceutiques de modifier et de changer les subjectivités contemporaines, les relations familiales (Collin 2016), de même que la compréhensions du genre et de la notion de bien-être (Sanabria 2014). Les nouvelles technologies biomédicales — entre autres génétiques — ont permis de repenser la notion de normes du corps en santé, d'en redéfinir les frontières et d’intervenir sur le corps de manière « incorporée » (embodied) (Haraway 1991). Les avancées technologiques en génomique qui se sont développées au cours des trois dernières décennies ont soulevé des enjeux tels que la généticisation, la désignation de populations/personnes « à risque », l’identification de biomarqueurs actionnables et de l’identité génétique (TallBear 2013 ; Lloyd et Raikhel 2018). Au départ, le modèle dominant en génétique cherchait à identifier les gènes spécifiques déterminant chacun des traits biologiques des organismes (Lock et Nguyen 2010 : 332). Cependant, face au constat que la plupart des gènes ne codaient par les protéines responsables de l’expression phénotypique, les modèles génétiques se sont depuis complexifiés. L’attention s’est tournée vers l’analyse de la régulation des gènes et de l’interaction entre gènes et maladies en termes de probabilités (Saukko 2017). Cela a permis l’émergence de la médecine personnalisée, dont les interventions se basent sur l’identification de biomarqueurs personnels (génétiques, sanguins, etc.) avec l’objectif de prévenir l’avènement de pathologies ou ralentir la progression de maladies chroniques (Billaud et Guchet 2015). Les anthropologues de la médecine ont investi ces enjeux en soulevant les conséquences de cette forme de médecine, comme la responsabilisation croissante des individus face à leur santé (Saukko 2017), l’utilisation de ces données dans l’accès aux assurances (Hoyweghen 2006), le déterminisme génétique (Landecker 2011) ou encore l’affaiblissement entre les frontières de la bonne santé et de la maladie (Timmermans et Buchbinder 2010). Ces enjeux ont été étudiés sous un angle féministe avec un intérêt particulier pour les effets du dépistage prénatal sur la responsabilité parentale (Rapp 1999), l’expérience de la grossesse (Rezende 2011) et les gestions de l’infertilité (Inhorn et Van Balen 2002). Les changements dans la compréhension du modèle génomique invitent à prendre en considération plusieurs variables en interaction, impliquant l’environnement proche ou lointain, qui interagissent avec l’expression du génome (Keller 2014). Dans ce contexte, l’anthropologie médicale a développé un intérêt envers de nouveaux champs d’études tels que l’épigénétique (Landecker 2011), la neuroscience (Choudhury et Slaby 2016), le microbiome (Benezra, DeStefano et Gordon 2012) et les données massives (Leonelli 2016). Dans le cas du champ de l’épigénétique, qui consiste à comprendre le rôle de l’environnement social, économique et politique comme un facteur pouvant modifier l’expression des gènes et mener au développement de certaines maladies, les anthropologues se sont intéressés aux manières dont les violences structurelles ancrées historiquement se matérialisent dans les corps et ont des impacts sur les disparités de santé entre les populations (Pickersgill, Niewöhner, Müller, Martin et Cunningham-Burley 2013). Ainsi, la notion du traumatisme historique (Kirmayer, Gone et Moses 2014) a permis d’examiner comment des événements historiques, tels que l’expérience des pensionnats autochtones, ont eu des effets psychosociaux collectifs, cumulatifs et intergénérationnels qui se sont maintenus jusqu’à aujourd’hui. L’étude de ces articulations entre conditions biologiques et sociales dans l’ère « post-génomique » prolonge les travaux sur le concept de biosocialité, qui est défini comme « [...] un réseau en circulation de termes d'identié et de points de restriction autour et à travers desquels un véritable nouveau type d'autoproduction va émerger » (Traduit de Rabinow 1996:186). La catégorie du « biologique » se voit alors problématisée à travers l’historicisation de la « nature », une nature non plus conçue comme une entité immuable, mais comme une entité en état de transformation perpétuelle imbriquée dans des processus humains et/ou non-humains (Ingold et Pálsson 2013). Ce raisonnement a également été appliqué à l’examen des catégories médicales, conçues comme étant abstraites, fixes et standardisées. Néanmoins, ces catégories permettent d'identifier différents états de la santé et de la maladie, qui doivent être compris à la lumière des contextes historiques et individuels (Lock et Nguyen 2010). Ainsi, la prise en compte simultanée du biologique et du social mène à une synthèse qui, selon Peter Guarnaccia, implique une « compréhension du corps comme étant à la fois un système biologique et le produit de processus sociaux et culturels, c’est-à-dire, en acceptant que le corps soit en même temps totalement biologique et totalement culturel » (traduit de Guarnaccia 2001 : 424). Le concept de « biologies locales » a d’abord été proposé par Margaret Lock, dans son analyse des variations de la ménopause au Japon (Lock 1993), pour rendre compte de ces articulations entre le matériel et le social dans des contextes particuliers. Plus récemment, Niewöhner et Lock (2018) ont proposé le concept de biologies situées pour davantage contextualiser les conditions d’interaction entre les biologies locales et la production de savoirs et de discours sur celles-ci. Tout au long de l’histoire de la discipline, les anthropologues s’intéressant à la médecine et aux approches de la santé ont profité des avantages de s’inscrire dans l’interdisciplinarité : « En anthropologie médical, nous trouvons qu'écrire pour des audiences interdisciplinaires sert un objectif important : élaborer une analyse minutieuse de la culture et de la santé (Dressler 2012; Singer, Dressler, George et Panel 2016), s'engager sérieusement avec la diversité globale (Manderson, Catwright et Hardon 2016), et mener les combats nécessaires contre le raccourcies des explications culturelles qui sont souvent déployées dans la littérature sur la santé (Viruell-Fuentes, Miranda et Abdulrahim 2012) » (traduit de Panter-Brick et Eggerman 2018 : 236). L’anthropologie médicale s’est constituée à la fois comme un sous champ de l’anthropologie socioculturelle et comme un champ interdisciplinaire dont les thèmes de recherche sont grandement variés, et excèdent les exemples qui ont été exposés dans cette courte présentation.

Wife (1975) is a novel ostensibly about immigration, but it is also about gender, ethnicity, and power. Bharati Mukherjee's well-known essay, "An Invisible Woman" (1981), describes her experience in Canada as one that created "double vision" because her self-perception was put so utterly at odds with her social standing (39). She experienced intense and horrifying racism in Canada, particularly in Toronto, and claims that the setting of Wife, her third novel, is "in the mind of the heroine...always Toronto" (39). Mukherjee concludes the article by saying that she eventually left Toronto, and Canada, because she was unable to keep her "twin halves" together (40). In thinking about "mixing," Mukherjee’s work provides entry points into "mixed" or interlocking structures of domination; the diasporic female subject in Mukherjee’s Wife struggles to translate this powerful "mix" in her attempt to move across and within national borders, feminisms, and cultural difference. "An Invisible Woman", in many ways, illuminates the issues that are at stake in Mukherjee's Wife. The protagonist Dimple Dagsputa, like Mukherjee, experiences identity crisis through the cultural forces that powerfully shape her self-perception and deny her access to control of her own life. I want to argue that Wife is also about Dimple's ability to grasp at power through the connections that she establishes between her mind and body, despite the social forces that attempt to divide her. Through a discussion of Dimple's negotiations with Western feminisms and the methods by which she attempts to reclaim her commodified body, I will rethink Dimple's violent response as an act of agency and resistance. Diasporic Feminisms: Locating the Subject(s): Mukherjee locates Wife in two very different geographic settings: the dusty suburbs of Calcutta and the metropolis of New York City. Dimple’s experience as a diasporic subject, one who must relocate and find a new social/cultural space, is highly problematic. Mukherjee uses this diasporic position to bring Dimple’s ongoing identity formation into relief. As she crosses into the space of New York City, Dimple must negotiate the web created by gender, class, and race in her Bengali culture with an increasingly multiple grid of inseparable subject positions. Avtar Brah points out that diaspora is useful as a "conceptual grid" where "multiple subject positions are juxtaposed, contested, proclaimed or disavowed" (208). Brah points to experience as the site of subject formation; a discursive space where different subject positions are inscribed, repeated, or contested. For Brah, and for Mukherjee, it is essential to ask what the "fields of signification and representation" are that contribute to the formation of differing subjects (116). Dimple’s commodification and her submission to naming in the Bengali context are challenged when she encounters Western feminisms. Yet Mukherjee suggests that these feminisms do little to "liberate" Dimple, and in fact serve as another aspect of her oppression. Wife is concerned with the processes which lead up to Dimple’s final act of murder; the interlocking subject positions which she negotiates with in an attempt to control her own life. Dimple believes that the freedom offered by immigration will give her a new identity: "She did not want to carry any relics from her old life; given another chance she could be a more exciting person, take evening classes perhaps, become a librarian" (42). She is extremely optimistic about the opportunities of her new life, but Mukherjee does not valourize the New World over the Old. In fact, she continually demonstrates the limited spaces that are offered on both sides of the globe. In New York, Dimple faces the unresolved dilemma between her desire to be a traditional Indian wife and the lure of Western feminism. Her inability to find a liveable place within the crossings of these positions contributes to her ultimate act of violence. At her first party in Manhattan, Dimple encounters the diaspora of Indian and Pakistani immigrants who provide varying examples of the ways in which being "Indian" is in conversation with being "American." She hears about Ina Mullick, the Bengali wife whose careless husband has allowed her to become "more American than the Americans" (68). Dimple quickly learns that Amit is sharply disapproving of women who go to college, wear pants, and smoke cigarettes: "with so many Indians around and a television and a child, a woman shouldn’t have time to get any crazy ideas" (69). The options of education and employment are removed from Dimple’s grasp as soon as she begins to consider them, leaving her wondering what her new role in this place will be. Mukherjee inserts Ina Mullick into Dimple’s life as a challenge to the restrictions of traditional wifehood: "Well Dimple...what do you do all day? You must be bored out of your skull" (76). Ina has adopted what Jyoti calls "women’s lib stuff" and Dimple is warned of her "dangerous" influence (76). Ina engagement with Western feminisms is a form of resistance to the confines of traditional Bengali wifehood. Mukherjee, however, uses Ina’s character to demonstrate the misfit between Western and Third World feminisms. Although the oppressions experienced in both geographies appear to be similar, Mukherjee points out that neither Ina nor Dimple can find expression through a feminism that forces them to abandon their Indianess. Western feminist discourse has been much maligned for its Eurocentric construction of a monolithic Third World subject that ignores cultural complexity. Chandra Talpade Mohanty’s "Under Western Eyes" (1988) is the classic example of the interrogation of this construction. Mohanty argues that "ethnocentric universality" obliterates the differences within the varied category of female (197), and that "Western feminist writings on women in the third world subscribe to a variety of methodologies to demonstrate the universal cross-cultural operation of male dominance and female exploitation" (208-209). Mukherjee addresses these problems through Ina’s struggle; Western feminisms and their apparent "liberation" fail to provide Ina with a satisfying sense of self. Ina remains oppressed because these forms of feminism cannot adequately deal with the web of cultural and social crossings that constitute her position as simultaneously "Indian" and "American." The patriarchy that Ina and Dimple experience is not simply that of the industrialized first world; they must also grapple with the ways in which they have been named by their own specific cultural context. Mohanty argues that there is no homogenous group called "women," and Mukherjee seems to agree by demonstrating that women's subject positions are varied and multi-layered. Ina’s apparently comfortable assimilation is soon upset by desperate confessions of her unease and depression. She contrasts her "before" and "after" self in caricatures of a woman in a sari and a woman in a bikini. These drawings represent, "the great moral and physical change, and all that" (95). Mukherjee suggests, however, that the change has been less than satisfactory for Ina, "‘I think it is better to stay a Before, if you can’...’Our trouble here is that we imitate badly, and we preserve things even worse’" (95). Ina’s confession alludes to her belief that she is copying, rather than actually living, a life which might be empowering. She has been forced to give up the "before" because it clashes with the ideal that she has constructed of the liberated Western woman. In accepting the oppositions between East and West, Ina pre-empts the possibility of being both. Though Dimple is fascinated by the options that Ina represents, and begins to question her own happiness, she becomes increasingly uncomfortable with the absolutes that Ina insists upon. Ina’s feminist friends frighten Dimple because of their inability to understand her; they come to represent a part of the American landscape that Dimple has come to fear through her mediated experience of American culture through the television and lifestyle magazines. Leni Anspach’s naked gums, "horribly pink and shiny, like secret lips, only more lecherous and lethal, set themselves up as enemies of decent, parsimonious living" (152). Leni’s discourse threatens to obliterate any knowledge that Dimple has of herself and her only resistance to this is an ironic reversal of her subservient role: "After Leni removed her cup Dimple kept on pouring, over the rim of Leni’s cup, over the tray and the floating dentures till the pregnant-bellied tea pot was emptied" (152). Dimple’s response to the lack of accommodation that Western feminism presents is tied to her feeling that Ina and Leni live with unforgiving extremes: "that was the trouble with people like Leni and Ina who believed in frankness, happiness and freedom; they lacked tolerance, and they abhorred discussions about the weather" (161). Like Amit, Ina offers a space through her example where Dimple cannot easily learn to negotiate her options. The dynamic between these women is ultimately explosive. Ina cannot accept Dimple’s choices and Dimple is forced to simplify herself in a defence that protects her from predatory Western feminisms: I can’t keep up with you people. I haven’t read the same kinds of books or anything. You know what I mean Ina, don’t you? I just like to cook and watch TV and embroider’...’Bravo!’ cried Ina Mullick from the sofa where she was sitting cross legged. ‘And what else does our little housewife do? ‘You’re making fun of me,’ Dimple screamed. ‘Who do you think you are?’ (169-170. Dimple lacks the ability to articulate her oppression; Ina Mullick can articulate it but cannot move outside of it. Both women feel anger, depression, and helplessness, but they fail to connect and help one another. Mukherjee demonstrates that women from the Third World, specifically those who come into contact with the diaspora, are not homogenous subjects; her various representations of negotiation with processes of identity constitution show how different knowledges of self are internalized and acted out. Irene Gedalof’s recent work on bringing Indian and Western feminisms into conversation proceeds from the Foucauldian notion that these multiple discursive systems must prevail over the study of woman or women within a single (and limiting) symbolic order (26). The postcolonial condition of diaspora, Gedalof and other critics have pointed out, is an interesting position from which to begin talking about these complex processes of identity making since it breaks down the oppositions of South and North, East and West. In crossing the South/North and East/West divide, Dimple does not abandon her Indian subject position, but rather attempts to keep it intact as other social forces are presented. The opposition between Ina and Dimple, however, is dissolved by the flux that the symbol "woman" experiences. This process emphasizes differences within and between their experiences in a non-hierarchical way. Rethinking the Mind/Body Dichotomy: Dimple’s Response This section will attempt to show how Dimple’s response to her options is far more complex than the mind/body dichotomy that it appears to be upon superficial examination. Dimple’s body does not murder in an act of senseless violence that is divorced from her mental perception of the world. I want to rethink interpretations like the one offered by Emmanuel S. Nelson: "Wife describes a weak-minded Bengali woman [whose]...sensibilities become so confounded by her changing cultural roles, the insidious television factitiousness, and the tensions of feminism that, ironically, she goes mad and kill her husband" (54-55). Although her sense of reality and fantasy become blurred, Dimple acts in accordance with the few choices that remain open to her. In slowly guiding us toward Dimple’s horrifying act of violence, Mukherjee attempts to examine the social and cultural networks which condition her response. The absolutes of Western feminisms offer little space for resistance. Dimple, however, is not a victim of her circumstances. She reclaims her body as a site of inscription and commodification through methods of resistance which are inaccessible to Amit or her larger social contexts: abortion, vomiting, fantasies of mutilating her physical self, and, ultimately, through using her body as a tool, rather than an object, of violence. These actions are responses to her own lack of power over self representation; Dimple creates a private world in which she can resist the ways her body has been encoded and the ways in which she has been constructed as a divided object. In her work on the body in feminist discourse, Elizabeth Grosz argues that postructuralist feminists such as Luce Irigaray, Helene Cixous, and Judith Butler conceptualize female bodies as: "crucial to understanding women’s psychical and social existence, but the body is no longer understood as an ahistorical, biologically given, acultural object. They are concerned with the lived body, the body insofar as it is represented and used in specific ways in particular cultures" (Grosz 18). In emphasizing difference within the sexes, these postructuralist thinkers reject the Cartesian dualism of mind and body and do much for Chandra Talpade Mohanty’s project of considering the ways in which "woman" is a heterogenously constructed and shifting category. Mukherjee presents Dimple’s body as a "social body": a "social and discursive object, a body bound up in the order of desire, signification and power" (Grosz 18-19). Dimple cannot control, for example, Amit’s desire to impregnate her, to impose a schema of patriarchal reproduction on her body. Yet, as I will demonstrate, Dimple resists in ways that she cannot articulate but she is strongly aware that controlling the mappings of her body gives her some kind of power. This novel demonstrates how the dualisms of patriarchal discourse operate, but I want to read Dimple’s response as a reclaiming of the uncontrollable body; her power is exercised through what Deleuze and Guattari would call the "rhizomatic" connections between her body and mind. Their book, A Thousand Plateaus (1980), provides a miscellany of theory which, "flattens out the relations between the social and the psychical," and privileges neither (Grosz 180). Deleuze and Guattari favour maps and rhizomes as conceptual models, so that all things are open, connectable, and subject to constant modification (12). I want to think of Dimple as an assemblage, a rhizomatic structure that increases in the dimensions of a multiplicity that changes as it expands its connections (8). She is able to resist precisely because her body and mind are inseparable and fluid entities. Her violence toward Amit is a bodily act but it cannot be read in isolation; Mukherjee insists that we also understand the mental processes that preface this act. Dimple’s vomit is one of the most powerful tropes in the novel. It is a rejection and a resistance; it is a means of control while paradoxically suggesting a lack of control. Julia Kristeva is concerned with bodily fluids (blood, vomit, saliva, tears, seminal fluid) as "abjections" which necessarily, "partake of both polarized terms [subject/object, inside/outside] but cannot be clearly identified with either" (Grosz 192). Vomiting, then, is the first act that Dimple uses as a means of connecting the mind and body that she has been taught to know only separately. Vomiting is an abjection that signifies Dimple's rhizomatic fluidity; it is the open and changeable path that denies the split between her mind and her body that her social experiences attempt to enforce. Mukherjee devotes large sections of the narrative to this act, bringing the reader into a private space where one is forced to see, smell, and taste Dimple’s defiance. She initially discovers her ability to control her vomit when she is pregnant. At first it is an involuntary act, but she soon takes charge of her body’s rejections: The vomit fascinated her. It was hers; she was locked in the bathroom expelling brownish liquid from her body...In her arrogance, she thrust her fingers deep inside her mouth, once jabbing a squishy organ she supposed was her tonsil, and drew her finger in and out in smooth hard strokes until she collapsed with vomiting (31) Dimple’s vomiting does contain an element of pathos which is somewhat problematic; one might read her only as a victim because her pathetic grasp at power is reduced to the pride she feels in her bodily expulsions. Mukherjee’s text, however, begs the reader to read Dimple carefully. Dimple acts through her body, often with horrible consequences, but she is resisting in the only way that she is able. In New York, as Dimple encounters an increasingly complicated sociocultural matrix, she fights to find a space between her role as a loyal Indian wife and the apparent temptations of the United States. Ina Mullick’s Western feminism asks her to abandon her Bengali self, and Amit asks her to retain it. In the face of these absolutes, Dimple continues to attempt her resistance through her body, but it is often weak and ineffectual: "But instead of the great gush Dimple had hoped for, only a thin trickle was expelled. It gravitated toward the drain, a small slimy pool full of bubbles. She was ashamed of it; it seemed more impersonal than a cooking stain" (150). Mukherjee asks us to read Dimple through her abjections--through both mind and body (not entirely distinct entities for Mukherjee)--in order to understand the murder. We must gauge Dimple's actions through the open and connectable relationships of body and mind. Her inability to vomit "pleasurably" signifies a growing inability to locate a space that is tolerable. Vomiting becomes a way for Dimple to tie her multiple subject positions together: "Vomiting could be pleasurable; thinking of all the bathrooms she had vomited in she felt nostalgic, almost middle-aged" (149). This moment at the kitchen sink occurs when Leni and Ina have fractured her sense of a stable Indian identity. In an interview, Mukherjee admits that Dimple’s movement to the United States means that she begins to ask questions about her oppression; she begins to ask herself questions about her own happiness (Hancock 44). These questions, coupled with Leni and Ina’s challenging presence, leads to Dimple to desire a reconnection and a sense of control. Undoubtedly, Dimple’s act of murder is misguided, but Mukherjee sensitively demonstrates that Dimple has very little choice left. Dimple does not simply break down into a body and mind that are unaware of their connections, rather she begins to operate on several levels of consciousness. Shen Mei Ma interprets Dimple’s condition as schizophrenic, and explores this as a prominent trope in Asian diaspora literatures. She uses R.D. Laing’s classic explanation of schizophrenia as a working definition: The term schizoid refers to an individual the totality of whose experience is split in two main ways: in the first place, there is a rent in his relation with his world, and, in the second, there is a disruption of his relation with himself...Moreover, he does not experience himself as a complete person but rather as ‘split’ in various ways, perhaps a mind more or less tenuously linked to a body, as two or more selves, and so on (Ma 43) Ma analyses this condition (which can be seen, like gender and race, as a socially constructed state of being), as a "defense mechanism" against an unbearable world; the separation in space and memory that the diasporic subject experiences results in a schizophrenic, or divisive, tendency. I agree with Ma's use of Laing's definition of schizophrenia in the sense that this understanding is certainly more useful than Emmanuel Nelson's insistence on Dimple's "madness." Reading Dimple's response with an interest in Deleuze and Guattari's conceptual rhizomes, however, leads me to resist using a definition that is linked to mental illness. This may be a prominent trope in Asian diaspora literature, but it is also necessary, and perhaps more useful, to recognize that Dimple's act of violence and her debatable "madness" are ultimately less important than reading her negotiation as a means of survival and her response as an act of resistance. Many critics interpret the final act of murder as "an ironic twist of Sati, the traditional self-immolation of an Indian wife on the funeral pyre of her husband" (Ma 58). This suggestion draws up Dimple’s teenage desire to be like Sita, "the ideal wife of Hindu legends" who walks through fire for her husband (6). The violence perpetrated against women who naturalize Sita’s tradition is wrenched into an act in which Dimple is able to exercise some control over her fate. The act of murder is woven with the alternate text of industrial/commercial culture in a way that demonstrates Dimple’s desperate negotiation with the options available to her: The knife stabbed the magical circle once, twice, seven times, each time a little harder, until the milk in the bowl of cereal was a pretty pink and the flakes were mushy and would have embarrassed any advertiser, and then she saw the head fall off - but of course it was her imagination because she was not sure anymore what she had seen on TV and what she had seen in the private screen of three A.M. (212-213) The tragedy of this conclusion surely lies in the events that are left unsaid: what is Dimple’s fate and how will society deal with her violent choice? Ma’s article on schizophrenia points to the most likely outcome--Dimple will be declared insane and "treated" for her illness. Yet my reading of this act has attempted to access a careful understanding of how Dimple is constructed and how this can contribute to rethinking her violent response. Dimple's mind is not an insane one; her body is not an uncontrollable, hysterical one. Murder is a choice for Dimple--albeit a choice that is exercised in a limited and oppressive space. "Mixing" is an urgent topic; as globalization and capitalist homogenization make the theorization of diaspora increasingly necessary, it is essential to consider how gendered and raced subject positions are constituted and how they are reproduced within and across geographies. This novel is important because it forces the reader to ask the difficult questions about "mixing" that precede Dimple’s act of spousal violence. I have attempted to address these questions in my discussion of Dimple’s negotiations and her resistance. Much has been written about this novel in terms of Dimple’s "split," but very few critics have tried to examine Dimple’s character in ways that penetrate our limited third person access to her. Mukherjee’s own writing in "An Invisible Woman" suggests the urgency of rethinking characters like Dimple and the particular complexities of immigration for non-English speaking housewives. Mukherjee’s relative position of privilege has given her access to far more choices than Dimple has, but notably, she avoids turning Dimple’s often suicidal violence inward. Instead, Mukherjee shows how the inward is inescapable from the outward: in murdering Amit, the violence Dimple perpetrates is, after all, a rearticulation of the violence from which her limited subject position cannot completely escape. Footnote: In thinking about Dimple's response, it is important to note that, of course, her actions and her words are always conditioned by the position that she has naturalized. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's "Can the Subaltern Speak?"(1988) argues that the subaltern subject cannot "speak" because no act of resistance occurs that can be separated from the dominant discourse that provides the language and the conceptual categories with which the subaltern voice speaks (Ashcroft et al 1998 217-218).The violence of Dimple's response must be seen as an ironic subversion of a television world that enforces patriarchal norms. References Ashcroft, Bill, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin. Key Concepts in Postcolonial Studies. London: Routledge, 1998. Brah, Avtar.Cartographies of Diaspora - Contesting Identities. London: Routledge, 1996. Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus - Capitalism and Schizophrenia. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 1980. Gedalof, Irene. Against Purity - Rethinking Idenity With Indian and Western Feminisms. London: Routledge, 1999. Grosz, Elizabeth. Volatile Bodies - Toward a Corporeal Feminism. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1994. Ma, Sheng-mei. Immigrant Subjectivities in Asian American and Asian Diaspora Literatures. Albany: State U of NY P, 1998. Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. "Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses." Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory: A Reader. Laura Chrisman and Patrick Williams, eds. NY: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993: 196-220. Mukherjee, Bharati. Wife. Toronto: Penguin, 1975. -- "An Invisible Woman." Saturday Night 1981, 96: 36-40. Nelson, Emmanual S. Writers of the Indian Diaspora - A Bio-Bibliographical Critical Sourcebook.Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1993. Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. "Can the Subaltern Speak?" Colonial Discourse and Postcolonial Theory: A Reader. Laura Chrisman and Patrick Williams, eds. NY: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993: 196-220.

Contemporary approaches to agency and film authorship, such as performativity and “techniques of the self,” (Staiger, 2003) provide an explanation for the expression of agency within the always-already-existing structure of the text, yet fail to account for, firstly, how the individual determines which agential choices to make and, then, interacts with society with causality and efficacy (Staiger, 2003). Critical Realism, in particular Archer’s 2003 theory of the internal conversation (Structure), provides an alternative theoretical framework to postmodernism by acknowledging both the existence of orders of reality that impact upon the individual’s choices, and the effects of cultural and societal structures. I would suggest that postmodernism has restricted our understanding of human agency and how individual choice is determined within the highly structured creative industries. Although interplay between agency and structure applies to all creative collaborators, in this essay I will focus on the agency of the screenwriter as author (an overlooked aspect of film authorship), as Adaptation (Spike Jonze, 2002) provides an excellent illustration of the function of the internal conversation in the development of a screenplay. Adaptation, written by highly regarded contemporary screenwriter Charlie Kaufman, also presents an interesting comment on the role of the screenwriter within the Hollywood film industry, and foregrounds the notion of creative film authorship. The film can be considered a postmodern film, in its intertextuality, deconstruction of both the subject and the filmic structure, the parodic theme and the oppositional characterisation. Charlie Kaufman even becomes his own textual creation represented in the film, and many of the other characters in the film are based on actual people. However, the film also contains representations of reality, conflicting accounts of authorial intent, and a positioning of the subject and object that realises reflexive deliberation and human agency. Thematically, the film expresses a philosophical concern with individual human identity, and societal interaction and development. I would suggest that, although the film is usually considered a fine example of the postmodern film, from a Critical Realist perspective, it can be read as providing a critique of the “postmodern condition”, in particular the repetitive, formulaic mainstream Hollywood film. Archer argues that there must of necessity be both a separation of the individual from society or culture and an acknowledged mingling of self and society. Agency is dependent upon engagement with social and cultural structures, but this could not happen unless there were other (non-social) identifiable aspects to the individual (Structure, 7). According to Archer, natural reality consists of three orders: nature, which concerns physical well-being; practice, where performative achievement is necessary for work; and the social, where the individual’s main concern is in the achievement of self-worth (Structure, 138). The sense of self, or continuity of consciousness, constitutes the natural human and is universal. Therefore the individual, although a part of society, does not exist because of society, but because of reality. Without this continuing sense of self, an individual would not be able to “appropriate social expectations and … recognise what is expected of them” (“Realism”, 13). For society to function effectively, people must have a continuity of consciousness that transcends society. Human agency “originates in people themselves, from their own concerns, forged in the space between the self and reality as a whole” (“Realism”, 12). This is a liminal space—that is, an unstructured area of imagination—in which a screenwriter who wishes to create original acts of authoring operates. The internal conversation takes the form of a dialogue conducted with oneself, not with society, but about society. The individual conducts a conversation between their subjective self, which asks a question, and their objective self, which provides the answer. The person is speaking to themselves, but occupying transitory positions in order to process information, thoughts, and possible courses of action. It is a method for arriving at self-knowledge and decisions through the process of “discernment, deliberation and dedication” (Archer, Structure, 138). Through this internal process, individuals prioritise their concerns, and how they will accommodate those other necessary aspects of reality that may impinge on what they care about most. This process develops and changes as individuals mature, and as they are affected by all aspects of reality. The internal conversation provides a conciliatory approach to the interplay between the filmic culture industry and the individual screenwriter. The screenwriter as author can be seen to negotiate personal projects within the structural constraints and enablements of the film production process, and to enact agency through personal reflexive deliberation, choice and thematic style. How socially efficacious the resulting screenplay is depends upon the screenwriter’s authorship skills, the story’s cultural resonance, societal relevance, and the freedoms and impositions encountered within the filmic industry structure. Adaptation can be read as illustrative of this process. The film opens with an inner dialogue. “Kaufman” (the character, as opposed to Charlie Kaufman, the writer) is questioning, and answering, himself regarding his concerns. He considers his current situation, and his ability as a screenwriter, then deliberates on possible strategies for improving himself. This inner conversation continues throughout the film, both as voiceover, and as a dual characterisation, that of “Kaufman” in relation to his identical twin brother, Donald. Immediately we are given an insight into “Kaufman’s” mind. He is concerned with his health, his work practices and his self-worth. The three orders of reality are then presented as themes in the film. Nature is addressed through the subject of the book: orchids and their adaptability, and how this relates to human beings and their mutability. Practice is seen in “Kaufman’s” and Donald’s opposite approaches to writing a screenplay, the effects of the accepted industry format and expectations, and the eventual resolution of the film. Finally, society itself is questioned through the contrasting self-worth of the characters. “Kaufman” compares himself to: Orlean, as a competent writer; Laroche, as possessor of self-esteem and passion; and Donald, as carefree and socially adept. That the film encompasses all orders of reality reinforces Archer’s point that individuals must conceive of projects that “establish … satisfactory practices in the three orders … [as this process is] the inescapable condition for human beings to survive or thrive” (Structure, 138). “Kaufman” entertains the project of adapting a book into a screenplay when he meets with Valerie, an attractive executive producer. However, once he has entered into the project, he must negotiate the limitations and possibilities of the cultural structures of both the film industry and the book. “Kaufman” is considered for the adaptation because of his reputation as an unusual screenwriter. However, when he states that he wants to let the movie exist, and not turn it into a typical Hollywood product with car chases, turning the orchids into poppies, cramming in sex and guns, and characters learning profound life lessons, Valerie suggests that Orlean and Laroche could fall in love. Immediately “Kaufman’s” ideas are constrained. He is subjected to the hierarchical structure of the Hollywood film industry where the producer holds power. The screenwriter is an employee, contracted to do a job: that is, write a screenplay that can be made into a high-grossing film. As well, “Kaufman” has read the book and wishes to stay true to Orlean’s story. This poses another limitation, especially given that The Orchid Thief is a non-fiction book, a factual account of a rather unique individual (John Laroche) who came to Orlean’s attention when Laroche was charged with orchid poaching from a Florida state preserve. The book has no narrative structure, but digresses among Laroche’s story, Orlean’s personal reflections, the passion orchids inspire in enthusiasts, and the history of orchids and orchid hunters. However, once “Kaufman” has accepted the project, he must begin his process of deliberation and creation, and negotiate his strategy for completing the screenplay. If we take the fictional identical twin brother Donald to be “Kaufman’s” alter-ego, the two characters can be seen as separate facets of “Kaufman’s” negotiation of The Orchid Thief project, and their conversation reflects an internal dialogue of deliberation. By juxtaposing Donald and “Kaufman” as both the subjective (or speaking) self, and the objective (or answering) self, we can follow the internal dialogue that “Kaufman” conducts during the film. This highlights “Kaufman’s” concerns and possible choices regarding the project he has undertaken. He questions the task ahead of him and weighs the options available. The easy way forward would simply be to write a repetitive generic Hollywood film, and still get paid a lot of money. But “Kaufman” has ideals, and values his writing as a craft: as creating a literary work. In contrast, Donald finds it easy to write a screenplay by following the accepted cultural order, whereas “Kaufman” has personal (authorial) concerns that he wishes to express. “Kaufman’s” specific interests take precedence in his work and can be seen as other orders of reality impinging upon the social order. In order to understand the book he is adapting (and also to fulfill his own personal concerns as agential author) “Kaufman” must attempt to encompass the natural-order theme of the book, and the social-order expectations of the film industry. He has to decide which is more important. Initially, “Kaufman’s” preference is for the reality of the book, the actuality of how the world is, and this is where his interests as both a writer and an individual lie. This focus can be seen through the themes of Charlie Kaufman’s other screenplays. In his films, his main thematic concern—as he himself states—is “issues of self and why I’m me and not that other person” (cited in Kennedy). Charlie Kaufman delves deep into the notion of subjectivity, agency and human consciousness. However “Kaufman” (and, the implication is, in real life Charlie) is constrained by the cultural order of Hollywood which, although he tries to evade it, continually imposes limitations upon the completion of this screenplay. Donald is that side of “Kaufman” which keeps reminding him that, although he has freedom as a respected screenwriter, there are some aspects of writing for film that cannot be discounted. “Kaufman” and Donald are two sides of the same coin. They represent “Kaufman’s” inner dialogue and his internal conflict. The twin screenwriting characters personify his struggle to produce a screenplay that satisfies his ultimate personal convictions as a unique and creative writer (to remain true to the thematic concerns of the book) and the need to conform to the accepted Hollywood ideal of a high-budget feature film. The film can also be read as the actual writing of the screenplay unfolding on the screen. As “Kaufman” writes it, this is what we see visually. For the first two acts of the film, “Kaufman” succeeds in portraying his thematic concerns with the progress of life, and the necessity of change, and his involvement in the process of screenwriting. In this he stays true to Orlean’s book, even including digressive “chapters” where he not only introduces the real characters (that is, the story of the book), but also investigates the history of orchids and the concept of adaptability. “Kaufman” balances these thematic interests against each other through his own process of writing the screenplay. He also addresses issues that are of concern to him personally. He deliberates on these through the juxtaposition of his character “Kaufman” with those of Orlean and Laroche. He regards Orlean as the consummate writer, shown comfortably working in her office, in contrast to “Kaufman” hunched over an old typewriter perched on a chair. Laroche is a passionate individual who becomes engrossed in projects, but can then abandon them completely. “Kaufman” finds this difficult, as he is a screenwriter who, although passionate about his craft, cannot distance himself from his project. These oppositions are further reinforced through the character of Donald, who adopts a formulaic approach to writing his own film, to finishing his thriller-screenplay, while “Kaufman” is still struggling with his own adaptation. Once Donald has completed his film, he divests himself of all interest in it except for how much money he will receive. Donald also shows passion, not for his craft, but for women, whereas “Kaufman” finds it difficult to maintain a continuing relationship and resorts to fantasy and masturbation. “Kaufman” becomes so involved in the writing of the screenplay that Orlean becomes a part of his sexual fantasies, yet he cannot bring himself to meet her face to face. The opposition and comparison of these three characters, “Kaufman”-and-Donald (as one composite character), Orlean, and Laroche, is also reflected in Donald’s screenplay, The Three. Donald’s screenplay is about a cop, trying to find a serial killer’s latest victim; she becomes his Holy Grail. However, Donald’s three characters are, in fact, all the one character, who is suffering from multiple personality disorder. In Adaptation, “Kaufman” is questioning himself about aspects of his personality and providing the answers to those queries through other characters. As the search for perfection is Laroche’s Holy Grail, and passion is Orlean’s, for “Kaufman” it is the completion of the screenplay with integrity and aplomb. What “Kaufman” questions about the filmic reality of, and complications with, Donald’s screenplay are in fact included in “Kaufman’s” own screenplay that we see unfolding on the screen. The two screenplays are questioning and answering each other, and represent an internal conversation. Through these characterisations (and in particular the dialogic interactions with Donald), “Kaufman” is diagnosing his circumstances. By the end of the second act, “Kaufman” is coming to a realisation that it would have been much easier to write something else, anything else (including The Three), than attempting to complete the project he has started, and maintain his stance regarding the truth of the book, and the reality of life. In the third act, “Kaufman” accepts that he cannot complete his project and admits he needs help. However, he cannot simply cease working, as this would reflect on his other concerns: those of his own well-being and his work ethic, as well as his social standing as a Hollywood screenwriter. He is dedicated to completing the screenplay, but has to reassess his methods, and his options. His deliberations become more conventional, in keeping with the need to accommodate the constraints of the Hollywood cultural structure, and it is here that “Kaufman” must abandon his idealistic approach and allow Donald to take over. “Kaufman” cannot sustain his original concern of staying true to Orlean’s book and also maintaining the screenplay structure. He has to negotiate the limitations and consider new possibilities. According to Archer, “Once an agential project has activated a constraint or enablement, there is no single answer about what is to be done, and therefore no one predictable outcome” (Structure, 131). This is illustrated in the film, through the variant scenic possibilities “Kaufman” imagines and attempts to coalesce into his screenplay. However, he cannot bring the screenplay to an acceptable (and therefore, satisfactory) climax and resolution. “Kaufman” becomes like the serial killer in Donald’s script, who, because he is forcing his victim to eat herself, is also eating himself to death. In the same way, the film begins to consume and kill the characters one by one. “Kaufman” has a problem that he must overcome. He achieves this by making the third act a fiction of reality, and the characters into caricatures. The third act, “Kaufman’s” Japanese paper ball which, when dropped into water turns into a flower, is a metaphor, where the film turns back on itself. Instead of showing the reality of the book, the book becomes a fiction of the film. Donald takes over, and the climax of the film provides all the conventions of a typical Hollywood film: much more like Donald’s generic thriller than “Kaufman’s” initial premise. All “Kaufman’s” detested conventions are included: Orlean and Laroche fall in love, the Ghost Orchid is a potent psychedelic, there are guns, car chases, and death. “Kaufman” as protagonist learns a profound life lesson, and the deus ex machina is included, not once, but twice. An unsuspecting Ranger causes an horrific car accident and Laroche gets attacked by an alligator. Orobouros has been let loose. The characters have turned on themselves and are being deconstructed to death. Charlie Kaufman’s screenplay both encompasses the postmodern and rejects it. Through his writing skill, his unique plot conventions and his character development, he lays bare the contemporary conceptions of reality, filmic reality, and the influence of Hollywood production on both the audience and the screenwriter. He addresses the oppositional: the creative voice and the clichéd utterance; reality and fiction; disappointment and fulfillment; entrapment and freedom; and creates a new totality, a unique film that provides an alternative to the tired screenwriting paradigm. That he has managed to adapt a non-fiction book, insert real people as characters within the film, and write a critically acclaimed screenplay, shows both his skill and craft as a screenwriter and his efficacious agency. He has posited that there is an alternative to the conventional Hollywood film and that film can pose the “big” questions, about life, about what it means to be human and why things don’t change. Charlie Kaufman has taken the postmodern film, turned it inside out, and managed to not only expose the fiction, but embrace the reality. Adaptation provides a visual example of both the interplay between individual agency and socio-cultural structure and the screenwriter as author. For most of the film, “Kaufman” occupies a liminal space that—although existing in reality—is separate from society and the natural world. This, it could be said, is the “in-between space” of the practice of the screenwriter. It is a creative area of communitas (in the case of the screenwriter, as singular, rather than as a group); an unstructured equality that exists between boundaries, and where meaning is found in the imagination of a writer. In this liminal space, the author lives in a world of images and words, of personal concerns and the desire to share stories, but is always mindful of the restricted, accepted, mainstream film structure. The screenwriter’s liminal space is both expressively free and creatively constricted. Yet, because of this, the screenwriter provides an excellent example of the role of the internal conversation in the mediation of agency within cultural and societal structures. A discussion of agency and authorship is not simply a matter of repetitive cultural discourses, or existing social structures, but an incorporation of all orders of reality. It is through the formulation of specific projects that agents interact with social and structural power. Adaptation presents the Critical Realist concept that human beings and society are continually changing and developing, and neither agents, nor structure, can restrict the other completely. The creative agent absorbs current shifts in culture and society, reflects topical concerns, and envisages and expresses alternative ideas, even those opposed to postmodernism. Authorial agency, and indeed all individual human agency, is an ongoing process of adapting, however, as Mahatma Ghandi stated, “Adaptability is not imitation. It means power of resistance and assimilation”. References Archer, Margaret S. “Realism and the Problem of Agency.” Journal of Critical Realism 5.1 (2002). 28 Aug. 2005 http://journalofcriticalrealism.org/archive/JCRv5n1_archer11.pdf>. ———. Structure, Agency and the Internal Conversation. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2003. Kaufman, Charlie and Kaufman, Donald. Adaptation 2000. 14 May 2005 http://www.beingcharliekaufman.com/adaptationnov2000.pdf>. Kennedy, L. “Charlie Kaufman: Confessions of an Original ‘Mind’”. Denver Post 26 Mar. 2004. Staiger, Janet. “Authorship Approaches.” In Authorship and Film. Eds David Gerstner and Janet Staiger. New York: Routledge, 2003. 27-59. Citation reference for this article MLA Style McMerrin, Michelle. "Agency in Adaptation." M/C Journal 10.2 (2007). echo date('d M. Y'); ?> <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0705/03-mcmerrin.php>. APA Style McMerrin, M. (May 2007) "Agency in Adaptation," M/C Journal, 10(2). Retrieved echo date('d M. Y'); ?> from <http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0705/03-mcmerrin.php>.

The carefully constructed record collection with detailed liner notes and displayable album cover art is little more than a quaint anachronism for the twenty-year-olds of 2003. For them, a music collection is more likely to be a fat, glovebox sized folder of anonymous CD ROMs. Affective investments in particular bands, releases, tracks, have been replaced by a desire for a sort of musical 'affluence' where the size and currency of the collection is valued, rather than the constituent components of the collection. The explanation for this transition from the collection of fetishised albums to the folder of disposable files lies in the increasing dissatisfaction with the CD album as a product, and the development of technology that enabled file sharing to become an effective music distribution method. A decade before music file-sharing became widespread, Frith (73) commented on “the changing place of music in leisure generally ... music is being used differently and in different, more flexible forms.” Frith was discussing home-taping. He recognised, as the record companies did not, that the explosion of home-taping was not simply a legal matter, a breach-of-copyright issue, but a production and marketing issue. The youth market, in particular, was using music in new and different ways, ways that demanded more flexibility in format and increased personalisation of music compilations. During the 90s music sales continued to decline, particularly in the youth segment. Fox & Wrenn report that “between 1991 and 2000, the overall market share of young consumers has declined substantially” dropping from eighteen per cent to thirteen per cent for fifteen to nineteen year olds, and with similar figures for the twenty to twenty-four year olds. (112). Global music sales fell from $41.5 billion in 1995 to $38.5 billion in 1999. While there is a good deal of market research that attempts to prove that file sharing was responsible for the declining CD sales, much of the analysis is suspect and there are indications that assuming a cause and effect relationship is inaccurate. The growth period for music file sharing was 2000 to 2001, and during this period CD sales actually rose five per cent. In 2002 one of the most downloaded artists was Eminem, with millions downloading The Eminem Show before its release, yet the CD went on to set sales records. Very little market research addresses consumer satisfaction with CDs as a music product. However, focus groups conducted with groups of first year university students suggest that young consumers in particular think that CDs are too expensive and that record companies are ripping them off, they don't like being forced to buy tracks that they do not want, in order to own the tracks that they like, many prefer a mix of artists rather than a whole CD of the same performer, some do not want the case and cover and resent having to pay for them, some want their music in chunks longer than the fifty minutes or so of the average CD, many feel that they get insufficient information about the artist and the track before they have to make the decision to buy. Overall the feeling was: "this is not a product I want, and it costs more than I think I should have to pay." Without a high level of consumer dissatisfaction with the music products on offer, peer-to-peer file sharing programs would not have been able to create the waves that they have in the music industry. Music file sharing is a social phenomenon, as well a technological revolution. Both the social function of music and the cooperative history of the Internet set the stage for music file sharing. Music consumption is grounded in a communal philosophy, and one of the pleasures of listening to music is that it connects the individual to a social group or subculture. The Internet’s first civilian uses were based in collective efforts, and content was made freely accessible to all users. Commercialisation came later. According to Segal, this development history has "bred an entitlement philosophy in Internet users" (97). From its beginning the Internet facilitated the sharing of files, text, graphics, software and music. However locating desired music files was only for the determined, and downloading them solely for the patient, until the development of compressed music formats like MP3 and specialised file sharing utilities such as Napster. Music consumers quickly discovered the benefits of music file sharing, and today's most popular services – KaZaA, Grokster, and Morpheus – have an estimated seventy million active users. Peer- to-peer music offers a different music consumption experience. First, it is free, and it is free in huge quantities. Endless numbers of tracks and albums are available from golden oldies to yet to be released, obscure examples of minor genres to the latest pop hit, major artists to you-haven't-heard-of-us-yet. This is inevitably changing consumers' relationship to music, with many "downloading music in an obsessive manner, without identifying with it or experiencing a passionate attachment" (Kasaras). Contributing to this is the uneven quality of files available for downloading – many have been uploaded with more enthusiasm than care, and may be misnamed, wrongly attributed, or of poor sound quality. Peer-to-peer music also provides an experience of community, as users chat about live performances and music related products, and exchange information on lyrics and concert listings. Another aspect of p-2-p music that has had an impact on the way consumers experience music is the play-list editor, which allows music files to be categorised and ordered into lists for playback. Play-lists can be organised by artist, genre, date or theme into several hours of back-to-back music – providing, in essence, a personal radio station. The music collection becomes an evanescent experience, rather than a valued commodity. The music industry's immediate reaction to changing consumer behaviour was to attempt to litigate the competition out of existence, or to buy them out. A belated response was to establish rival services. However MusicNet, PressPlay and the new commercial Napster have met with a lukewarm response from their target market. All have fairly limited lists of files available – no full albums, few recent releases – all are expensive for what they provide, and all have severe restrictions on how much can be downloaded, and how the downloaded files can be used. As a Time article commented “All three are so restrictive you would think you were downloading homeland‑security documents, not 'N Sync” (Taylor 74). The dissatisfaction with the commercial music file subscription services, and the decentralised nature of the new p-2-p networks has led the popular press to hail a democratic revolution in music distribution. However its optimism may be a little premature, as the current file-sharing networks are not without problems for the consumer. Industry providers will always have advantages over amateur file uploaders in the areas of standards, convenience and quality. Finding other than top‑forty tracks is still a time consuming activity, and downloading over a modem still takes time. When offered several choices of a track, only trial and error can determine which is the best choice. Making the wrong choice often means downloading an unplayable file. The current generation of file-sharing services may be more amorphous than those they replaced, but though they are distributed networks the file traffic is concentrated in a single direction. Only a small number of users actually contribute files, and of this group perhaps only 1% respond to requests for files. Because the music files are treated as a public good, most users feel entitled to download files without ever contributing files to the pool. When the majority ride free on the efforts of others the performance of the system is seriously degraded. Free riding also makes the system open to legal action. Though in theory the seventy million users are beyond law suits because of the anonymity of numbers, if only a few are uploading files then these few are vulnerable to service bans and litigation. As the number of users continues to grow the problem of free riding compounds, and if users don't contribute to the public good on which all depend, the system is in danger of collapse (Adar and Huberman). Peer-to-peer file sharing is therefore unlikely to replace industry mediated music consumption in the long term. However that does not mean that the CD will be restored to top place in consumer affections. The album is pretty much a seventies concept, largely dictated by the demands of producing, stocking and selling vinyl records. Increasingly young consumers are rejecting the concept. Digital technology and Internet distribution have made possible new ways of experiencing music, and consumers are becoming accustomed to new norms of music consumption: cheap or free, flexibility of formats, immediacy, breadth of choice, connections with artists and other fans, and access to related commodities. Increasingly they are looking to music as a service, rather than a product. The sheer amount and diversity of music available through p-2-p networks, has created a music consumer with immense, but reconfigured appetites. The industry's current business model is dependent on controlling the distribution of a physical product to a mass market. To meet the needs of the 'new' music consumer it will have to abandon this model and adopt the one-on-one interactive model of the Internet – music: any kind, anytime, anywhere. Works Cited Adar, Eytan, and Bernardo A. Huberman. “Free Riding on Gnutella.” First Monday 5.10 (2000). 13 Jan. 2003 <http://www.firstmonday.org/>. Fox, Mark, and Bruce Wrenn. “A Broadcasting Model for the Music Industry.” JMM 3.2 (2001): 112-9. Frith, Simon. “The Industrialisation of Popular Music.” Popular Music and Communication. Ed. James Lull. London: Sage, 1987. 53-77. Kasaras, Kostas. “Music in the Age of Free Distribution.” First Monday 7.1 (2002). 11 July 2002 <http://firstmonday.org/issue7_1/kasaras/index.php>. Segal, Adam. “Dissemination of Digitised Music on the Internet: A Challenge to the Copyright Act.” Computer and High Technology Law Journal 12 (1996): 97-138. Taylor, Chris. “Hitting All the Wrong Notes.” Time 159.8 (25 Feb. 2002): 74. Links http://firstmonday.org/issue7_1/kasaras/index.html http://firstmonday.org/issues/issue7_2/fox/index.html http://musicdish.com/mag/?id=7376 http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue5_10/adar/ http://www.firstmonday.org/ http://www.mp3newswire.net/stories/2002/teentrade.html http://www.pwcglobal.com/extweb/indissue.nsf/DocID/51457FCD520E3CC38525698800562CD http://www8.techmall.com/techdocs/TS0006151.html Citation reference for this article Substitute your date of access for Dn Month Year etc... MLA Style Kibby, Marjorie. "Shared Files" M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture< http://www.media-culture.org.au/0304/05-sharedfiles.php>. APA Style Kibby, M. (2003, Apr 23). Shared Files. M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture, 6,< http://www.media-culture.org.au/0304/05-sharedfiles.php>

Introduction The term ‘resilience’ is on everyone’s lips - from politicians to community service providers to the seemingly endless supply of self-help gurus. The concept is undergoing a renaissance of sorts in contemporary Western society; but why resilience now? One possible explanation is that individuals and their communities are experiencing increased and intensified levels of adversity and hardship, necessitating the accumulation and deployment of ‘more resilience’. Whilst a strong argument could made that this is in fact the case, it would seem that the capacity to survive and thrive has been a feature of human survival and growth long before we had a name for it. Rather than an inherent characteristic, trait or set of behaviours of particularly ‘resilient’ individuals or groups, resilience has come to be viewed more as a common and everyday capacity, expressed and expressible by all people. Having researched the concept for some time now, we believe that we are only marginally closer to understanding this captivating but ultimately elusive concept. What we are fairly certain of is that resilience is more than basic survival but less than an invulnerability to adversity, resting somewhere in the middle of these two extremes. Given the increasing prevalence of populations affected by war and other disasters, we are certain however that efforts to better understand the accumulative dynamics of resilience, are now, more than ever, a vital area of public and academic concern. In our contemporary world, the concept of resilience is coming to represent a vital conceptual tool for responding to the complex challenges emerging from broad scale movements in climate change, rural and urban migration patterns, pollution, economic integration and other consequences of globalisation. In this article, the phenomenon of human resilience is defined as the cumulative build-up of both particular kinds of knowledge, skills and capabilities as well as positive affects such as hope, which sediment over time as transpersonal capacities for self-preservation and ongoing growth (Wilson). Although the accumulation of positive affect is crucial to the formation of resilience, the ability to re-imagine and utilise negative affects, events and environmental limitations, as productive cultural resources, is a reciprocal and under-researched aspect of the phenomenon. In short, we argue that resilience is the protective shield, which capacitates individuals and communities to at least deal with, and at best, overcome potential challenges, while also facilitating the realisation of hoped-for objects and outcomes. Closely tied to the formation of resilience is the lived experience of hope and hoping practices, with an important feature of resilience related to the future-oriented dimensions of hope (Parse). Yet it is important to note that the accumulation of hope, as with resilience, is not headed towards some state of invulnerability to adversity; as presumed to exist in the foundational period of psychological research on the construct (Garmezy; Werner and Smith; Werner). In contrast, we argue that the positive affective experience of hopefulness provides individuals and communities with a means of enduring the present, while the future-oriented dimensions of hope offer them an instrument for imagining a better future to come (Wilson). Given the complex, elusive and non-uniform nature of resilience, it is important to consider the continued relevance of the resilience concept. For example, is resilience too narrow a term to describe and explain the multiple capacities, strategies and resources required to survive and thrive in today’s world? Furthermore, why do some individuals and communities mobilise and respond to a crisis; and why do some collapse? In a related discussion, Ungar (Constructionist) posed the question, “Why keep the term resilience?” Terms like resilience, even strengths, empowerment and health, are a counterpoint to notions of disease and disorder that have made us look at people as glasses half empty rather than half full. Resilience reminds us that children survive and thrive in a myriad of ways, and that understanding the etiology of health is as, or more, important than studying the etiology of disease. (Ungar, Constructionist 91) This productive orientation towards health, creativity and meaning-making demonstrates the continued conceptual and existential relevance of resilience, and why it will remain a critical subject of inquiry now and into the future. Early Psychological Studies of Resilience Definitions of resilience vary considerably across disciplines and time, and according to the theoretical context or group under investigation (Harvey and Delfabro). During the 1970s and early 1980s, the developmental literature on resilience focused primarily on the “personal qualities” of “resilient children” exposed to adverse life circumstances (Garmezy Vulnerability; Masten; Rutter; Werner). From this narrow and largely individualistic viewpoint, resilience was defined as an innate “self-righting mechanism” (Werner and Smith 202). Writing from within the psychological tradition, Masten argued that the early research on resilience (Garmezy Vulnerability; Werner and Smith) regularly implied that resilient children were special or remarkable by virtue of their invulnerability to adversity. As research into resilience progressed, researchers began to acknowledge the ordinariness or everydayness of resilience-related phenomena. Furthermore, that “resilience may often derive from factors external to the child” (Luthar; Cicchetti and Becker 544). Besides the personal attributes of children, researchers within the psychological sciences also began to explore the effects of family dynamics and impacts of the broader social environment in the development of resilience. Rather than identifying which child, family or environmental factors were resilient or resilience producing, they turned their attention to how these underlying protective mechanisms facilitated positive resilience outcomes. As research evolved, resilience as an absolute or unchanging attribute made way for more relational and dynamic conceptualisations. As Luthar et al noted, “it became clear that positive adaptation despite exposure to adversity involves a developmental progression, such that new vulnerabilities and/or strengths often emerge with changing life circumstances” (543-44). Accordingly, resilience came to be viewed as a dynamic process, involving positive adaptations within contexts of adversity (Luthar et al. 543). Although closer to the operational definition of resilience argued for here, there remain a number of definitional concerns and theoretical limitations of the psychological approach; in particular, the limitation of positive adaptation to the context of significant adversity. In doing so, this definition fails to account for the subjective experience and culturally located understandings of ‘health’, ‘adversity’ and ‘adaptation’ so crucial to the formation of resilience. Our major criticism of the psychodynamic approach to resilience relates to the construction of a false dichotomy between “resilient” and “non-resilient” individuals. This dichotomy is perpetuated by psychological approaches that view resilience as a distinct construct, specific to “resilient” individuals. In combating this assumption, Ungar maintained that this bifurcation could be replaced by an understanding of mental health “as residing in all individuals even when significant impairment is present” (Thicker 352). We tend to agree. In terms of economic resilience, we must also be alert to similar false binaries that place the first and low-income world into simple, apposite positions of coping or not-coping, ‘having’ or ‘not-having’ resilience. There is evidence to indicate, for example, that emerging economies fared somewhat better than high-income nations during the global financial crisis (GFC). According to Frankel and Saravelos, several low-income nations attained better rates of gross domestic product GDP, though the impacts on the respective populations were found to be equally hard (Lane and Milesi-Ferretti). While the reasons for this are broad and complex, a study by Kose and Prasad found that a broad set of policy tools had been developed that allowed for greater flexibility in responding to the crisis. Positive Affect Despite Adversity An emphasis on deficit, suffering and pathology among marginalised populations such as refugees and young people has detracted from culturally located strengths. As Te Riele explained, marginalised young people residing in conditions of adversity are often identified within “at-risk” discourses. These social support frameworks have tended to highlight pathologies and antisocial behaviours rather than cultural competencies. This attitude towards marginalised “at risk” young people has been perpetuated by psychotherapeutic discourse that has tended to focus on the relief of suffering and treatment of individual pathologies (Davidson and Shahar). By focusing on pain avoidance and temporary relief, we may be missing opportunities to better understand the productive role of ‘negative’ affects and bodily sensations in alerting us to underlying conditions, in need of attention or change. A similar deficit approach is undertaken through education – particularly civics – where young people are treated as ‘citizens in waiting’ (Collin). From this perspective, citizenship is something that young people are expected to ‘grow into’, and until that point, are seen as lacking any political agency or ability to respond to adversity (Holdsworth). Although a certain amount of internal discomfort is required to promote change, Davidson and Shahar noted that clinical psychotherapists still “for the most part, envision an eventual state of happiness – both for our patients and for ourselves, described as free of tension, pain, disease, and suffering” (229). In challenging this assumption, they asked, But if desiring-production is essential to what makes us human, would we not expect happiness or health to involve the active, creative process of producing? How can one produce anything while sitting, standing, or lying still? (229) A number of studies exploring the affective experiences of migrants have contested the embedded psychological assumption that happiness or well-being “stands apart” from experiences of suffering (Crocker and Major; Fozdar and Torezani; Ruggireo and Taylor; Tsenkova, Love, Singer and Ryff). A concern for Ahmed is how much the turn to happiness or happiness turn “depends on the very distinction between good and bad feelings that presume bad feelings are backward and conservative and good feelings are forward and progressive” (Happiness 135). Highlighting the productive potential of unhappy affects, Ahmed suggested that the airing of unhappy affects in their various forms provides people with “an alternative set of imaginings of what might count as a good or at least better life” (Happiness 135). An interesting feature of refugee narratives is the paradoxical relationship between negative migration experiences and the reporting of a positive life outlook. In a study involving former Yugoslavian, Middle Eastern and African refugees, Fozdar and Torezani investigated the “apparent paradox between high-levels of discrimination experienced by humanitarian migrants to Australia in the labour market and everyday life” (30), and the reporting of positive wellbeing. The interaction between negative experiences of discrimination and reports of wellbeing suggested a counter-intuitive propensity among refugees to adapt to and make sense of their migration experiences in unique, resourceful and life-affirming ways. In a study of unaccompanied Sudanese youth living in the United States, Goodman reported that, “none of the participants displayed a sense of victimhood at the time of the interviews” (1182). Although individual narratives did reflect a sense of victimisation and helplessness relating to the enormity of past trauma, the young participants viewed themselves primarily as survivors and agents of their own future. Goodman further stated that the tone of the refugee testimonials was not bitter: “Instead, feelings of brotherliness, kindness, and hope prevailed” (1183). Such response patterns among refugees and trauma survivors indicate a similar resilience-related capacity to positively interpret and derive meaning from negative migration experiences and associated emotions. It is important to point out that demonstrations of resilience appear loosely proportional to the amount or intensity of adverse life events experienced. However, resilience is not expressed or employed uniformly among individuals or communities. Some respond in a resilient manner, while others collapse. On this point, an argument could be made that collapse and breakdown is a built-in aspect of resilience, and necessary for renewal and ongoing growth. Cultures of Resilience In a cross continental study of communities living and relying on waterways for their daily subsistence, Arvanitakis is involved in a broader research project aiming to understand why some cultures collapse and why others survive in the face of adversity. The research aims to look beyond systems of resilience, and proposes the term ‘cultures of resilience’ to describe the situated strategies of these communities for coping with a variety of human-induced environmental challenges. More specifically, the concept of ‘cultures of resilience’ assists in explaining the specific ways individuals and communities are responding to the many stresses and struggles associated with living on the ‘front-line’ of major waterways that are being impacted by large-scale, human-environment development and disasters. Among these diverse locations are Botany Bay (Australia), Sankhla Lake (Thailand), rural Bangladesh, the Ganges (India), and Chesapeake Bay (USA). These communities face very different challenges in a range of distinctive contexts. Within these settings, we have identified communities that are prospering despite the emerging challenges while others are in the midst of collapse and dispersion. In recognising the specific contexts of each of these communities, the researchers are working to uncover a common set of narratives of resilience and hope. We are not looking for the ’magic ingredient’ of resilience, but what kinds of strategies these communities have employed and what can they learn from each other. One example that is being pursued is a community of Thai rice farmers who have reinstated ceremonies to celebrate successful harvests by sharing in an indigenous rice species in the hope of promoting a shared sense of community. These were communities on the cusp of collapse brought on by changing economic and environmental climates, but who have reversed this trend by employing a series of culturally located practices. The vulnerability of these communities can be traced back to the 1960s ‘green revolution’ when they where encouraged by local government authorities to move to ‘white rice’ species to meet export markets. In the process they were forced to abandoned their indigenous rice varieties and abandon traditional seed saving practices (Shiva, Sengupta). Since then, the rice monocultures have been found to be vulnerable to the changing climate as well as other environmental influences. The above ceremonies allowed the farmers to re-discover the indigenous rice species and plant them alongside the ‘white rice’ for export creating a more robust harvest. The indigenous species are kept for local consumption and trade, while the ‘white rice’ is exported, giving the farmers access to both the international markets and income and the local informal economies. In addition, the indigenous rice acts as a form of ‘insurance’ against the vagaries of international trade (Shiva). Informants stated that the authorities that once encouraged them to abandon indigenous rice species and practices are now working with the communities to re-instigate these. This has created a partnership between the local government-funded research centres, government institutions and the farmers. A third element that the informants discussed was the everyday practices that prepare a community to face these challenges and allow it recover in partnership with government, including formal and informal communication channels. These everyday practices create a culture of reciprocity where the challenges of the community are seen to be those of the individual. This is not meant to romanticise these communities. In close proximity, there are also communities engulfed in despair. Such communities are overwhelmed with the various challenges described above of changing rural/urban settlement patterns, pollution and climate change, and seem to have lacked the cultural and social capital to respond. By contrasting the communities that have demonstrated resilience and those that have not been overwhelmed, it is becoming increasingly obvious that there is no single 'magic' ingredient of resilience. What exist are various constituted factors that involve a combination of community agency, social capital, government assistance and structures of governance. The example of the rice farmers highlights three of these established practices: working across formal and informal economies; crossing localised and expert knowledge as well as the emergence of everyday practices that promote social capital. As such, while financial transactions occur that link even the smallest of communities to the global economy, there is also the everyday exchange of cultural practices, which is described elsewhere by Arvanitakis as 'the cultural commons': visions of hope, trust, shared intellect, and a sense of safety. Reflecting the refugee narratives citied above, these communities also report a positive life outlook, refusing to see themselves as victims. There is a propensity among members of these communities to adapt an outlook of hope and survival. Like the response patterns among refugees and trauma survivors, initial research is confirming a resilience-related capacity to interpret the various challenges that have been confronted, and see their survival as reason to hope. Future Visions, Hopeful Visions Hope is a crucial aspect of resilience, as it represents a present- and future-oriented mode of situated defence against adversity. The capacity to hope can increase one’s powers of action despite a complex range of adversities experienced in everyday life and during particularly difficult times. The term “hope” is commonly employed in a tokenistic way, as a “nice” rhetorical device in the mind-body-spirit or self-help literature or as a strategic instrument in increasingly empty domestic and international political vocabularies. With a few notable exceptions (Anderson; Bloch; Godfrey; Hage; Marcel; Parse; Zournazi), the concept of hope has received only modest attention from within sociology and cultural studies. Significant increases in the prevalence of war and disaster-affected populations makes qualitative research into the lived experience of hope a vital subject of academic interest. Parse observed among health care professionals a growing attention to “the lived experience of hope”, a phenomenon which has significant consequences for health and the quality of one’s life (vvi). Hope is an integral aspect of resilience as it can act as a mechanism for coping and defense in relation to adversity. Interestingly, it is during times of hardship and adversity that the phenomenological experience of hope seems to “kick in” or “switch on”. With similarities to the “taken-for-grantedness” of resilience in everyday life, Anderson observed that hope and hoping are taken-for-granted aspects of the affective fabric of everyday life in contemporary Western culture. Although the lived experience of hope, namely, hopefulness, is commonly conceptualised as a “future-oriented” state of mind, the affectivity of hope, in the present moment of hoping, has important implications in terms of resilience formation. The phrase, the “lived deferral of hope” is an idea that Wilson has developed elsewhere which hopefully brings together and holds in creative tension the two dominant perspectives on hope as a lived experience in the present and a deferred, future-oriented practice of hoping and hopefulness. Zournazi defined hope as a “basic human condition that involves belief and trust in the world” (12). She argued that the meaning of hope is “located in the act of living, the ordinary elements of everyday life” and not in “some future or ideal sense” (18). Furthermore, she proposed a more “everyday” hope which “is not based on threat or deferral of gratification”, but is related to joy “as another kind of contentment – the affirmation of life as it emerges and in the transitions and movements of our everyday lives and relationships” (150). While qualitative studies focusing on the everyday experience of hope have reinvigorated academic research on the concept of hope, our concept of “the lived deferral of hope” brings together Zournazi’s “everyday hope” and the future-oriented dimensions of hope and hoping practices, so important to the formation of resilience. Along similar lines to Ahmed’s (Happy Objects) suggestion that happiness “involves a specific kind of intentionality” that is “end-orientated”, practices of hope are also intentional and “end-orientated” (33). If objects of hope are a means to happiness, as Ahmed wrote, “in directing ourselves towards this or that [hope] object we are aiming somewhere else: toward a happiness that is presumed to follow” (Happy Objects 34), in other words, to a hope that is “not yet present”. It is the capacity to imagine alternative possibilities in the future that can help individuals and communities endure adverse experiences in the present and inspire confidence in the ongoingness of their existence. Although well-intentioned, Zournazi’s concept of an “everyday hope” seemingly ignores the fact that in contexts of daily threat, loss and death there is often a distinct lack of affirmative or affirmable things. In these contexts, the deferral of joy and gratification, located in the future acquisition of objects, outcomes or ideals, can be the only means of getting through particularly difficult events or circumstances. One might argue that hope in hopeless situations can be disabling; however, we contend that hope is always enabling to some degree, as it can facilitate alternative imaginings and temporary affective relief in even in the most hopeless situations. Hope bears similarity to resilience in terms of its facilities for coping and endurance. Likewise the formation and maintenance of hope can help individuals and communities endure and cope with adverse events or circumstances. The symbolic dimension of hope capacitates individuals and communities to endure the present without the hoped-for outcomes and to live with the uncertainty of their attainment. In the lives of refugees, for example, the imaginative dimension of hope is directly related to resilience in that it provides them with the ability to respond to adversity in productive and life-affirming ways. For Oliver, hope “provides continuity between the past and the present…giving power to find meaning in the worst adversity” (in Parse 16). In terms of making sense of the migration and resettlement experiences of refugees and other migrants, Lynch proposed a useful definition of hope as “the fundamental knowledge and feeling that there is a way out of difficulty, that things can work out” (32). As it pertains to everyday mobility and life routes, Parse considered hope to be “essential to one’s becoming” (32). She maintained that hope is a lived experience and “a way of propelling self toward envisioned possibilities in everyday encounters with the world” (p. 12). Expanding on her definition of the lived experience of hope, Parse stated, “Hope is anticipating possibilities through envisioning the not-yet in harmoniously living the comfort-discomfort of everydayness while unfolding a different perspective of an expanding view” (15). From Nietzsche’s “classically dark version of hope” (in Hage 11), Parse’s “positive” definition of hope as a propulsion to envisaged possibilities would in all likelihood be defined as “the worst of all evils, for it protracts the torment of man”. Hage correctly pointed out that both the positive and negative perspectives perceive hope “as a force that keeps us going in life” (11). Parse’s more optimistic vision of hope as propulsion to envisaged possibilities links nicely to what Arvanitakis described as an ‘active hope’. According to him, the idea of ‘active hope’ is not only a vision that a better world is possible, but also a sense of agency that our actions can make this happen. Conclusion As we move further into the 21st century, humankind will be faced with a series of traumas, many of which are as yet unimagined. To meet these challenges, we, as a global collective, will need to develop specific capacities and resources for coping, endurance, innovation, and hope, all of which are involved the formation of resilience (Wilson 269). Although the accumulation of resilience at an individual level is important, our continued existence, survival, and prosperity lie in the strength and collective will of many. As Wittgenstein wrote, the strength of a thread “resides not in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres” (xcv). If resilience can be accumulated at the level of the individual, it follows that it can be accumulated as a form of capital at the local, national, and international levels in very real and meaningful ways. 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Anyone contemplating the role of a “hermeneutics of suspicion” in literary and cultural studies must concede that the phrase is rarely used—even by its most devout practitioners, who usually think of themselves engaged in something called “critique.” What, then, are the terminological differences between “critique” and “the hermeneutics of suspicion”? What intellectual worlds do these specific terms conjure up, and how do these worlds converge or diverge? And what is the rationale for preferring one term over the other?The “hermeneutics of suspicion” is a phrase coined by Paul Ricoeur to capture a common spirit that pervades the writings of Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche. In spite of their obvious differences, he argued, these thinkers jointly constitute a “school of suspicion.” That is to say, they share a commitment to unmasking “the lies and illusions of consciousness;” they are the architects of a distinctively modern style of interpretation that circumvents obvious or self-evident meanings in order to draw out less visible and less flattering truths (Ricoeur 356). Ricoeur’s term has sustained an energetic after-life within religious studies, as well as in philosophy, intellectual history, and related fields, yet it never really took hold in literary studies. Why has a field that has devoted so much of its intellectual energy to interrogating, subverting, and defamiliarising found so little use for Ricoeur’s phrase?In general, we can note that hermeneutics remains a path not taken in Anglo-American literary theory. The tradition of hermeneutical thinking is rarely acknowledged (how often do you see Gadamer or Ricoeur taught in a theory survey?), let alone addressed, assimilated, or argued over. Thanks to a lingering aura of teutonic stodginess, not to mention its long-standing links with a tradition of biblical interpretation, hermeneutics was never able to muster the intellectual edginess and high-wattage excitement generated by various forms of poststructuralism. Even the work of Gianni Vattimo, one of the most innovative and prolific of contemporary hermeneutical thinkers, has barely registered in the mainstream of literary and cultural studies. On occasion, to be sure, hermeneutics crops up as a synonym for a discredited model of “depth” interpretation—the dogged pursuit of a hidden true meaning—that has supposedly been superseded by more sophisticated forms of thinking. Thus the ascent of poststructuralism, it is sometimes claimed, signaled a turn away from hermeneutics to deconstruction and genealogy—leading to a focus on surface rather than depth, on structure rather than meaning, on analysis rather than interpretation. The idea of suspicion has fared little better. While Ricoeur’s account of a hermeneutics of suspicion is respectful, even admiring, critics are understandably leery of having their lines of argument reduced to their putative state of mind. The idea of a suspicious hermeneutics can look like an unwarranted personalisation of scholarly work, one that veers uncomfortably close to Harold Bloom’s tirades against the “School of Resentment” and other conservative complaints about literary studies as a hot-bed of paranoia, kill-joy puritanism, petty-minded pique, and defensive scorn. Moreover, the anti-humanist rhetoric of much literary theory—its resolute focus on transpersonal and usually linguistic structures of determination—proved inhospitable to any serious reflections on attitude, disposition, or affective stance.The concept of critique, by contrast, turns out to be marred by none of these disadvantages. An unusually powerful, flexible and charismatic idea, it has rendered itself ubiquitous and indispensable in literary and cultural studies. Critique is widely seen as synonymous with intellectual rigor, theoretical sophistication, and intransigent opposition to the status quo. Drawing a sense of intellectual weightiness from its connections to the canonical tradition of Kant and Marx, it has managed, nonetheless, to retain a cutting-edge sensibility, retooling itself to fit the needs of new fields ranging from postcolonial theory to disability studies. Critique is contagious and charismatic, drawing everything around it into its field of force, marking the boundaries of what counts as serious thought. For many scholars in the humanities, it is not just one good thing but the only conceivable thing. Who would want to be associated with the bad smell of the uncritical? There are five facets of critique (enumerated and briefly discussed below) that characterise its current role in literary and cultural studies and that have rendered critique an exceptionally successful rhetorical-cultural actor. Critique, that is to say, inspires intense attachments, serves as a mediator in numerous networks, permeates disciplines and institutional structures, spawns conferences, essays, courses, and book proposals, and triggers countless imitations, translations, reflections, revisions, and rebuttals (including the present essay). While nurturing a sense of its own marginality, iconoclasm, and outsiderdom, it is also exceptionally effective at attracting disciples, forging alliances, inspiring mimicry, and ensuring its own survival. In “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?” Bruno Latour remarks that critique has been so successful because it assures us that we are always right—unlike those naïve believers whose fetishes we strive to expose (225–48). At the same time, thanks to its self-reflexivity, the rhetoric of critique is more tormented and self-divided than such a description would suggest; it broods constantly over the shame of its own success, striving to detect signs of its own complicity and to root out all possible evidence of collusion with the status quo.Critique is negative. Critique retains the adversarial force of a suspicious hermeneutics, while purifying it of affective associations by treating negativity as an essentially philosophical or political matter. To engage in critique is to grapple with the oversights, omissions, contradictions, insufficiencies, or evasions in the object one is analysing. Robert Koch writes that “critical discourse, as critical discourse, must never formulate positive statements: it is always ‘negative’ in relation to its object” (531). Critique is characterised by its “againstness,” by its desire to take a hammer, as Latour would say, to the beliefs of others. Faith is to be countered with vigilant skepticism, illusion yields to a sobering disenchantment, the fetish must be defetishised, the dream world stripped of its befuddling powers. However, the negativity of critique is not just a matter of fault-finding, scolding, and censuring. The nay-saying critic all too easily calls to mind the Victorian patriarch, the thin-lipped schoolmarm, the glaring policeman. Negating is tangled up with a long history of legislation, prohibition and interdiction—it can come across as punitive, arrogant, authoritarian, or vitriolic. In consequence, defenders of critique often downplay its associations with outright condemnation. It is less a matter of refuting particular truths than of scrutinising the presumptions and procedures through which truths are established. A preferred idiom is that of “problematising,” of demonstrating the ungroundedness of beliefs rather than denouncing errors. The role of critique is not to castigate, but to complicate, not to engage in ideas’ destruction but to expose their cultural construction. Barbara Johnson, for example, contends that a critique of a theoretical system “is not an examination of its flaws and imperfections” (xv). Rather, “the critique reads backwards from what seems natural, obvious, self-evident, or universal in order to show that these things have their history” and to show that the “start point is not a (natural) given, but a (cultural) construct, usually blind to itself” (Johnson xv–xvi). Yet it seems a tad disingenuous to describe such critique as free of negative judgment and the examination of flaws. Isn’t an implicit criticism being transmitted in Johnson’s claim that a cultural construct is “usually blind to itself”? And the adjectival chain “natural, obvious, self-evident, or universal” strings together some of the most negatively weighted words in contemporary criticism. A posture of detachment, in other words, can readily convey a tacit or implicit judgment, especially when it is used to probe the deep-seated convictions, primordial passions, and heart-felt attachments of others. In this respect, the ongoing skirmishes between ideology critique and poststructuralist critique do not over-ride their commitment to a common ethos: a sharply honed suspicion that goes behind the backs of its interlocutors to retrieve counter-intuitive and uncomplimentary meanings. “You do not know that you are ideologically-driven, historically determined, or culturally constructed,” declares the subject of critique to the object of critique, “but I do!” As Marcelo Dascal points out, the supposedly non-evaluative stance of historical or genealogical argument nevertheless retains a negative or demystifying force in tracing ideas back to causes invisible to the actors themselves (39–62).Critique is secondary. A critique is always a critique of something, a commentary on another argument, idea, or object. Critique does not vaunt its self-sufficiency, independence, and autotelic splendor; it makes no pretense of standing alone. It could not function without something to critique, without another entity to which it reacts. Critique is symbiotic; it does its thinking by responding to the thinking of others. But while secondary, critique is far from subservient. It seeks to wrest from a text a different account than it gives of itself. In doing so, it assumes that it will meet with, and overcome, a resistance. If there were no resistance, if the truth were self-evident and available for all to see, the act of critique would be superfluous. Its goal is not the slavish reconstruction of an original or true meaning but a counter-reading that brings previously unfathomed insights to light. The secondariness of critique is not just a logical matter—critique presumes the existence of a prior object—but also a temporal one. Critique comes after another text; it follows or succeeds another piece of writing. Critique, then, looks backward and, in doing so, it presumes to understand the past better than the past understands itself. Hindsight becomes insight; from our later vantage point, we feel ourselves primed to see better, deeper, further. The belatedness of critique is transformed into a source of iconoclastic strength. Scholars of Greek tragedy or Romantic poetry may mourn their inability to inhabit a vanished world, yet this historical distance is also felt as a productive estrangement that allows critical knowledge to unfold. Whatever the limitations of our perspective, how can we not know more than those who have come before? We moderns leave behind us a trail of errors, finally corrected, like a cloud of ink from a squid, remarks Michel Serres (48). There is, in short, a quality of historical chauvinism built into critique, making it difficult to relinquish a sense of in-built advantage over those lost souls stranded in the past. Critique likes to have the last word. Critique is intellectual. Critique often insists on its difference from everyday practices of criticism and judgment. While criticism evaluates a specific object, according to one definition, “critique is concerned to identify the conditions of possibility under which a domain of objects appears” (Butler 109). Critique is interested in big pictures, cultural frameworks, underlying schema. It is a mode of thought well matched to the library and seminar room, to a rhythm of painstaking inquiry rather than short-term problem-solving. It “slows matters down, requires analysis and reflection, and often raises questions rather than providing answers” (Ruitenberg 348). Critique is thus irresistibly drawn toward self-reflexive thinking. Its domain is that of second-level observation, in which we reflect on the frames, paradigms, and perspectives that form and inform our understanding. Even if objectivity is an illusion, how can critical self-consciousness not trump the available alternatives? This questioning of common sense is also a questioning of common language: self-reflexivity is a matter of form as well as content, requiring the deployment of what Jonathan Culler and Kevin Lamb call “difficult language” that can undermine or “un-write” the discourses that make up our world (1–14). Along similar lines, Paul Bove allies himself with a “tradition that insists upon difficulty, slowness, complex, often dialectical and highly ironic styles,” as an essential antidote to the “prejudices of the current regime of truth: speed, slogans, transparency, and reproducibility” (167). Critique, in short, demands an arduous working over of language, a stoic refusal of the facile phrase and ready-made formula. Yet such programmatic divisions between critique and common sense have the effect of relegating ordinary language to a state of automatic servitude, while condescending to those unschooled in the patois of literary and critical theory. Perhaps it is time to reassess the dog-in-the-manger attitude of a certain style of academic argument—one that assigns to scholars the vantage point of the lucid and vigilant thinker, while refusing to extend this same capacity to those naïve and unreflecting souls of whom they speak.Critique comes from below. Politics and critique are often equated and conflated in literary studies and elsewhere. Critique is iconoclastic in spirit; it rails against authority; it seeks to lay bare the injustices of the law. It is, writes Foucault, the “art of voluntary insubordination, that of reflected intractability” (194). This vision of critique can be traced back to Marx and is cemented in the tradition of critical theory associated with the Frankfurt School. Critique conceives of itself as coming from below, or being situated at the margins; it is the natural ally of excluded groups and subjugated knowledges; it is not just a form of knowledge but a call to action. But who gets to claim the mantle of opposition, and on what grounds? In a well-known essay, Nancy Fraser remarks that critical theory possesses a “partisan though not uncritical identification” with oppositional social movements (97). As underscored by Fraser’s judicious insertion of the phrase “not uncritical,” critique guards its independence and reserves the right to query the actions and attitudes of the oppressed as well as the oppressors. Thus the intellectual’s affiliation with a larger community may collide with a commitment to the ethos of critique, as the object of a more heartfelt attachment. A separation occurs, as Francois Cusset puts it, “between academics questioning the very methods of questioning” and the more immediate concerns of the minority groups with which they are allied (157). One possible strategy for negotiating this tension is to flag one’s solidarity with a general principle of otherness or alterity—often identified with the utopian or disruptive energies of the literary text. This strategy gives critique a shot in the arm, infusing it with a dose of positive energy and ethical substance, yet without being pinned down to the ordinariness of a real-world referent. This deliberate vagueness permits critique to nurture its mistrust of the routines and practices through which the everyday business of the world is conducted, while remaining open to the possibility of a radically different future. Critique in its positive aspects thus remains effectively without content, gesturing toward a horizon that must remain unspecified if it is not to lapse into the same fallen state as the modes of thought that surround it (Fish 446).Critique does not tolerate rivals. Declaring itself uniquely equipped to diagnose the perils and pitfalls of representation, critique often chafes at the presence of other forms of thought. Ruling out the possibility of peaceful co-existence or even mutual indifference, it insists that those who do not embrace its tenets must be denying or disavowing them. In this manner, whatever is different from critique is turned into the photographic negative of critique—evidence of an irrefutable lack or culpable absence. To refuse to be critical is to be uncritical; a judgment whose overtones of naiveté, apathy, complacency, submissiveness, and sheer stupidity seem impossible to shrug off. In short, critique thinks of itself as exceptional. It is not one path, but the only conceivable path. Drew Milne pulls no punches in his programmatic riff on Kant: “to be postcritical is to be uncritical: the critical path alone remains open” (18).The exceptionalist aura of critique often thwarts attempts to get outside its orbit. Sociologist Michael Billig, for example, notes that critique thinks of itself as battling orthodoxy, yet is now the reigning orthodoxy—no longer oppositional, but obligatory, not defamiliarising, but oppressively familiar: “For an increasing number of younger academics,” he remarks, “the critical paradigm is the major paradigm in their academic world” (Billig 292). And in a hard-hitting argument, Talal Asad points out that critique is now a quasi-automatic stance for Western intellectuals, promoting a smugness of tone that can be cruelly dismissive of the deeply felt beliefs and attachments of others. Yet both scholars conclude their arguments by calling for a critique of critique, reinstating the very concept they have so meticulously dismantled. Critique, it seems, is not to be abandoned but intensified; critique is to be replaced by critique squared. The problem with critique, it turns out, is that it is not yet critical enough. The objections to critique are still very much part and parcel of the critique-world; the value of the critical is questioned only to be emphatically reinstated.Why do these protestations against critique end up worshipping at the altar of critique? Why does it seem so exceptionally difficult to conceive of other ways of arguing, reading, and thinking? We may be reminded of Eve Sedgwick’s comments on the mimetic aspect of critical interpretation: its remarkable ability to encourage imitation, repetition, and mimicry, thereby ensuring its own reproduction. It is an efficiently running form of intellectual machinery, modeling a style of thought that is immediately recognisable, widely applicable, and easily teachable. Casting the work of the scholar as a never-ending labour of distancing, deflating, and diagnosing, it rules out the possibility of a different relationship to one’s object. It seems to grow, as Sedgwick puts it, “like a crystal in a hypersaturated solution, blotting out any sense of the possibility of alternative ways of understanding or things to understand” (131).In this context, a change in vocabulary—a redescription, if you will—may turn out to be therapeutic. It will come as no great surprise if I urge a second look at the hermeneutics of suspicion. Ricoeur’s phrase, I suggest, can help guide us through the interpretative tangle of contemporary literary studies. It seizes on two crucial parts of critical argument—its sensibility and its interpretative method—that deserve more careful scrutiny. At the same time, it offers a much-needed antidote to the charisma of critique: the aura of ethical and political exemplarity that burnishes its negativity with a normative glow. Thanks to this halo effect, I’ve suggested, we are encouraged to assume that the only alternative to critique is a full-scale surrender to complacency, quietism, and—in literary studies—the intellectual fluff of aesthetic appreciation. Critique, moreover, presents itself as an essentially disembodied intellectual exercise, an austere, even abstemious practice of unsettling, unmaking, and undermining. Yet contemporary styles of critical argument are affective as well as analytical, conjuring up distinctive dispositions and relations to their object. As Amanda Anderson has pointed out in The Way We Argue Now, literary and cultural theory is saturated with what rhetoricians call ethos—that is to say, imputations of motive, character, or attitude. We need only think of the insouciance associated with Rortyan pragmatism, the bad-boy iconoclasm embraced by some queer theorists, or the fastidious aestheticism that characterises a certain kind of deconstructive reading. Critical languages, in other words, are also orientations, encouraging readers to adopt an affectively tinged stance toward their object. Acknowledging the role of such orientations in critical debate does not invalidate its intellectual components, nor does it presume to peer into, or diagnose, an individual scholar’s state of mind.In a related essay, I scrutinise some of the qualities of a suspicious or critical reading practice: distance rather than closeness; guardedness rather than openness; aggression rather than submission; superiority rather than reverence; attentiveness rather than distraction; exposure rather than tact (215–34). Suspicion, in this sense, constitutes a muted affective state—a curiously non-emotional emotion of morally inflected mistrust—that overlaps with, and builds upon, the stance of detachment that characterises the stance of the professional or expert. That this style of reading proves so alluring has much to do with the gratifications and satisfactions that it offers. Beyond the usual political or philosophical justifications of critique, it also promises the engrossing pleasure of a game-like sparring with the text in which critics deploy inventive skills and innovative strategies to test their wits, best their opponents, and become sharper, shrewder, and more sophisticated players. In this context, the claim that contemporary criticism has moved “beyond” hermeneutics should be treated with a grain of salt, given that, as Stanley Fish points out, “interpretation is the only game in town” (446). To be sure, some critics have backed away from the model of what they call “depth interpretation” associated with Marx and Freud, in which reading is conceived as an act of digging and the critic, like a valiant archaeologist, excavates a resistant terrain in order to retrieve the treasure of hidden meaning. In this model, the text is envisaged as possessing qualities of interiority, concealment, penetrability, and depth; it is an object to be plundered, a puzzle to be solved, a secret message to be deciphered. Instead, poststructuralist critics are drawn to the language of defamiliarising rather than discovery. The text is no longer composed of strata and the critic does not burrow down but stands back. Instead of brushing past surface meanings in pursuit of hidden truth, she dwells in ironic wonder on these surface meanings, seeking to “denaturalise” them through the mercilessness of her gaze. Insight, we might say, is achieved by distancing rather than by digging. Recent surveys of criticism often highlight the rift between these camps, underscoring the differences between the diligent seeker after buried truth and the surface-dwelling ironist. From a Ricoeur-inflected point of view, however, it is their shared investment in a particular ethos—a stance of knowingness, guardedness, suspicion and vigilance—that turns out to be more salient and more striking. Moreover, these approaches are variously engaged in the dance of interpretation, seeking to go beyond the backs of texts or fellow-actors in order to articulate non-obvious and often counter-intuitive truths. In the case of poststructuralism, we can speak of a second-order hermeneutics that is less interested in probing the individual object than the larger frameworks and conditions in which it is embedded. What the critic interprets is no longer a self-contained poem or novel, but a broader logic of discursive structures, reading formations, or power relations. Ricoeur’s phrase, moreover, has the singular advantage of allowing us to by-pass the exceptionalist tendencies of critique: its presumption that whatever is not critique can only be assigned to the ignominious state of the uncritical. As a less prejudicial term, it opens up a larger history of suspicious reading, including traditions of religious questioning and self-scrutiny that bear on current forms of interpretation, but that are occluded by the aggressively secular connotations of critique (Hunter). In this context, Ricoeur’s own account needs to be supplemented and modified to acknowledge this larger cultural history; the hermeneutics of suspicion is not just the brain-child of a few exceptional thinkers, as his argument implies, but a widespread practice of interpretation embedded in more mundane, diffuse and variegated forms of life (Felski 220).Finally, the idea of a suspicious hermeneutics does not invalidate or rule out other interpretative possibilities—ranging from Ricoeur’s own notion of a hermeneutics of trust to more recent coinages such as Sedgwick’s “restorative reading,” Sharon Marcus’s “just reading” or Timothy Bewes’s “generous reading.” Literary studies in France, for example, is currently experiencing a new surge of interest in hermeneutics (redefined as a practice of reinvention rather than exhumation) as well as a reinvigorated phenomenology of reading that elucidates, in rich and fascinating detail, its immersive and affective dimensions (see Citton; Macé). This growing interest in the ethos, aesthetics, and ethics of reading is long overdue. Such an orientation by no means rules out attention to the sociopolitical resonances of texts and their interpretations. It is, however, no longer willing to subordinate such attention to the seductive but sterile dichotomy of the critical versus the uncritical.ReferencesAnderson, Amanda. The Way We Argue Now: A Study in the Cultures of Theory. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2005.Asad, Talal. “Free Speech, Blasphemy, and Secular Criticism.” Is Critique Secular? Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech. Ed. Talal Asad, Wendy Brown, Judith Butler, and Saba Mahmood. Berkeley: Townsend Center for the Humanities, 2009. 20–63. Bewes, Timothy. “Reading with the Grain: A New World in Literary Studies.” Differences 21.3 (2010): 1–33.Billig, Michael. “Towards a Critique of the Critical.” Discourse and Society 11.3 (2000): 291–92. Bloom, Harold. The Western Canon: The Books and School of the Ages. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1994.Bove, Paul. Mastering Discourse: The Politics of Intellectual Culture. Durham: Duke UP, 1992. Butler, Judith. “The Sensibility of Critique: Response to Asad and Mahmood.” Is Critique Secular? Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech. Ed. Talal Asad, Wendy Brown, Judith Butler, and Saba Mahmood. Berkeley: Townsend Center for the Humanities, 2009. 101–136.Citton, Yves. Lire, interpréter, actualiser: pourqoi les études littéraires? Paris: Editions Amsterdam, 2007. Culler, Jonathan and Kevin Lamb, “Introduction.” Just Being Difficult? Academic Writing in the Public Arena. Ed. Jonathan Culler and Kevin Lamb. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2003. 1–14. Cusset, Francois. French Theory: How Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, & Co. Transformed the Intellectual Life of the United States. Trans. Jeff Fort. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota P, 2008.Dascal, Marcelo. “Critique without Critics?” Science in Context 10.1 (1997): 39–62.Felski, Rita. “Suspicious Minds.” Poetics Today 32.2 (2011): 215–34.Fish, Stanley. Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies. Durham: Duke UP, 1989.Foucault, Michel. “What is Critique?” The Political. Ed. David Ingram. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002. 191–211. Fraser, Nancy. “What’s Critical about Critical Theory? The Case of Habermas and Gender.” New German Critique 35 (1985): 97–131. Hunter, Ian. Rethinking the School: Subjectivity, Bureaucracy, Criticism. New York: St Martin’s Press, 1994.Johnson, Barbara. “Translator’s Introduction.” Jacques Derrida’s Dissemination. London: Continuum, 2004. vii–xxxv. Koch, Robert. “The Critical Gesture in Philosophy.” Iconoclash: Beyond the Image Wars in Science, Religion, and Art. Ed. Bruno Latour and Peter Weibel. Cambridge: MIT, 2002. 524–36. Latour, Bruno. “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern.” Critical Inquiry 30 (2004): 225–48.Macé, Marielle. Facons de lire, manières d’être. Paris: Gallimard, 2011. Marcus, Sharon. Between Women: Friendship, Desire, and Marriage in Victorian England. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2007.Milne, Drew. “Introduction: Criticism and/or Critique.” Modern Critical Thought: An Anthology of Theorists Writing on Theorists. Oxford: Blackwell, 2002. 1–22. Ricoeur, Paul. Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation. New Haven: Yale UP, 1970. Ruitenberg, Claudia. “Don’t Fence Me In: The Liberation of Undomesticated Critique.” Journal of the Philosophy of Education 38.3 (2004): 314–50. Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky. “Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading, Or, You’re So Paranoid, You Probably Think This Essay is About You.” Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity. Durham: Duke UP, 2003. 123–52. Serres, Michel and Bruno Latour. Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time. Trans. Roxanne Lapidus. Ann Arbor: U of Michigan P, 1995.Vattimo, Gianni. Beyond Interpretation: The Meaning of Hermeneutics for Philosophy. Trans. David Webb. Stanford: Stanford UP, 1997.

Explorations of the intersecting terrain between the resources (or mining) sector and gendered socialisation are gaining currency (Laplonge and Albury; Lahiri-Dutt). Some argue that mine workers and their families are particularly vulnerable to divorce, suicide, drug and alcohol abuse, injury, violence and worksite conflict, mental health struggles, financial over-extension, isolation, and loss of familial and community connection (Ashby; Paddenburg 14). Others contradict anecdotal evidence to support these concerns (Clifford 58; BHP Billiton 11-5). Substantive research on the emotional cost of mining remains sparse and contested (Windsor 4). Of concern to some, however, is that mining companies may be placing pressure on employees to generate a profit (Brough 10), while failing to acknowledge the cost of “hypermasculinised” mechanisms of domination that characterise mining cultures (Laplonge, Roadshow). I refer to these characteristic mechanisms of domination throughout this paper as “malestream norms” (O’Brien 62). In this paper, I argue that mining cultures have become prime examples of unsustainable practices. They forfeit relationally and ecologically sensitive modes of production that would otherwise celebrate and indeed prioritise a holistic level of care for the Earth, mining cultures, work colleagues and the self. Here, the term “sustainable” refers to a broader spectrum of social, cultural, psychological and ecological needs of mine workers, mining culture, and the environment upon which mining profits depend. I posit that mining communities that tend to the psycho-social needs of mine workers beyond malestream norms are more likely to implement sustainable mining practices that are not only considerate of the broader needs of mine workers, not only profitable for mining companies, but care for the Earth as well. Granted, employee assistance mechanisms do include substantial support services (such as health and wellness programmes, on-site counselling and therapy, mining family support networks, shorter rosters, improved access to family contact from site, etc.). However, these support services—as they may be offered by individual mining companies—do not adequately address the broader psycho-social impact of mining on mine site communities, the relational integrity of mine workers with their families, or how mine workers are faring within themselves in light of the pressures that abound both on-swing and off (Lahiri-Dutt 201). Discussions of a “softer” approach to mining fail to critically analyse malestream norms (Laplonge, Roadshow). In other words, attempts to make mining more sustainable have at-best been superficial by, for example, seeking to increase numbers of women on-site but then “jamming” these new women into cultures of hypermasculinism in hopes that a “trickle-down affect” of softening mining communities of practice will ensue (Laplonge, "You Can't Rely"). A comprehensive approach to sustainable mining practices must begin with deeper psycho-social care for mine workers (both women and men), and shift mining culture towards environmental care as well—an approach to mining that reflects a holistic and integrated model for pursuing profitable company development that is more caring than is currently the norm throughout the corporate world (Anderson). To accomplish this, we must specifically challenge malestream norms as they manifest in mining (Laplonge, Roadshow). In response, I introduce ecological masculinism as a relational approach to softening the malestream norms that pervade mining. To begin, it is recognised that mining masculinities—like all practices of masculinity—are pluralised social constructions that are not fixed but learned (Connell). Ecological masculinism is explored as a path towards fresh systemic practices that can steer men in mining towards masculine identities that are relationally attuned, emotionally articulate, and environmentally aware. It is argued that the approach to mining masculinities introduced here can help the resources sector become more sustainable for men, more conducive to greater numbers of women, more profitable for mining companies over longer periods of time, and gentler on the Earth. Where Are All the Ecomasculinists in Mining? Ecology as a science of relationships can serve as a guide towards the order that emerges among complex systems such as those that pervade mining (Capra). I suggest that Ecology can assist us to better understand and redefine the intricacies of gender dynamics in mining. It would be easy to presume that Ecology is oppositional to mining. I argue that to the contrary, the relational focus of Ecology has much to teach us about how we might reconfigure malestream norms to make it possible for mining cultures to demonstrate deeper care for others and the self at work and at home. An ecological analysis of malestream norms (and their impacts on Earth, community, others and the self) is not new. Richard Twine initiated some of the earliest explorations of the intersecting terrain between men, masculinities and the Earth. This discourse on the need for an “ecologisation” of masculinities grew out of the “broad church” of ecological feminism that explored so called Logics of Dualism that malestream norms construct and maintain (Plumwood 55-59). For more than 40 years, ecological feminism has served as a specialised discourse interrogating the mutual oppression of women and Nature by the male-dominated world. In his contribution to the Essex Ecofem Listerv, Twine posted the following provocative statement: Where are all the ecomasculinists? … there does not seem to be any literature on how the environmental and feminist movements together form a strong critique of the dominant Western masculine tradition. Does anyone know of any critical examinations … of this position, particularly one that addresses masculinity rather than patriarchy? (Twine et al. 1) Twine highlighted the need for a new discourse about men and masculinities that built on the term “ecomasculinity.” This term was originally coined by Shepherd Bliss in his seminal paper Revisioning Masculinity: A Report on the Growing Men's Movement (1987). I suggest that this intersecting terrain between Ecology and masculinities can guide us beyond the constraints of malestream norms that are entrenched in mining and offer us alternatives to mining cultural practices that oppress women and men as well as the environment upon which mining depends. However, these early investigations into the need for more nurturing masculinities were conceptual more so than practical and failed to take hold in scholarly discourses on gender or the pluralised praxes of modern masculinities. Coupled with this, the dominating aspects of malestream norms have continued to characterise mining cultures resulting in, for example, higher than average injury rates that are indicators of some negative consequences of a hypermasculinised workplace (Department of Health, WA 18; Laplonge, Roadshow). Further, the homophobic elements of malestream norms can give many men cause to hesitate seeking out emotional support if and where needed for fear of peer-group ridicule. These are some of the ways that men are subject to “men’s oppression” (Smith; Irwin et al.; Jackins; Whyte; Rohr), a term used here not to posit men as victims but rather as individuals who suffer as a result of their own internalised sense of superiority that drives them to behave inequitably towards other men, women and the Earth. Men’s Oppression Men’s oppression is a term used to illuminate the impact of malestream norms on men’s lives. Richard Rohr noted that: Part of our oppression as men ... is that we are taught to oppress others who have less status than we do. It creates a pecking order and a sense of superiority. We especially oppress racial minorities, homosexuals, the poor and women. (28) Men’s oppression is harmful to men, women and the ways that we mine the Earth. It is consequently of great importance that we explore the impacts of men’s oppression on mining masculinities with an emphasis on deconstructing the ways that it shapes and maintains malestream norms in mining culture. Men’s oppression pressures men to behave in ways that can constrain the spectrum of permissible behaviours that they adopt. Men’s oppression is ego-driven, based in comparing and competing against each other and pressure them to work tirelessly towards being better, higher, stronger, more virile, smarter, richer, more powerful, outwardly composed and more adored by others through status and material wealth often acquired at the expense of others and indeed the compromising of their own capacities to care for others and the self. These products of malestream norms validate an inner sense of feeling good about oneself at the expense of relational connection with others, including the Earth. As mentioned previously, malestream norms enable men to acquire socioeconomic and political advantages. But this has occurred at what has proven to be a terrible cost for all others as well as men themselves. Many men, especially those most strongly immersed in malestream norms, don’t even know that they are subject to this internalise superiority nor do they recognise it as an oppression that afflicts them at the same time and through the same mechanisms that assures their primacy in a world.. Notably, the symptoms of men’s oppression are not unique to mining. However, this form of oppression is intensely experienced by miners precisely because of the isolated and hypermasculine nature of minthat men (and increasing numbers of women) find themselves immersed in when on-site. Unfortunately, perceiving and then countering men’s oppression can undermine men’s primacy (Smith 51-52). As a consequence many men have little reason to want to take a stand against malestream norms that can come to dominate their lives at work and home. But to refuse to do so can erode their health and well-being and set them on a path of perpetration of oppressive thoughts, words and deeds towards others. Pathways to Ecological Masculinism The conceptual core of ecological masculinism is constructed on five precepts (that I refer to as the ADAMN model). These precepts help guide modern Western men towards greater care for others and the self in tangible ways (Pulé). Accompanying these precepts is the need for a plurality of caring behavioural possibilities for men to emerge. Men are encouraged to pursue inner congruency (aligning head with heart and intuition) as a pathway to their fuller humanness so that more integrated and mature masculinities can emerge. In this sense, ecological masculinism can be adapted to any work or home situation, providing a robust and versatile model that redresses gendered norms amongst mining men despite the diversity of individuals and resistances that might characterise some mining cultures. The ADAMN model draws on the vernacular encouragement for men to “give a damn” about all others and themselves. The five key instructions of masculine ecologisation are: A: Accept the central premise that you were born good and have an infinite capacity to care and be caring D: Don’t separate yourself from others; instead strengthen and rebuild your sense of connection with others and yourself A: Amend your own past hurts and any you have caused to others M: Model mature modern masculinity. Construct your masculine identity on caring thoughts, words and actions that nurture the relational space between yourself and others by seeking a life of service for the common good N: Normalise men’s care; support all men to show their care as central features of being a mature modern man Collectively, these key instructions of the ADAMN model are designed to raise men’s capacities to care for others and the self. They are aspects of ecological masculinism that are introduced to men through large group presentations, working with teams and at the level of one-on-one coaching in order to facilitate the recovering of the fuller human self that emerges through masculine ecologisation. This aspect of ecological masculinism offers tangible alternatives to malestream norms that dominate mining cultures by subverting the oppressive aspects of malestream norms in mining with more integrated levels of care for all others and the self. The ADAMN model is drawn as a nested diagram where each layer of this work forms the foundations of and is imbedded within the next, taking an individual man on a step-by-step journey that charts a course towards a heightened relational self and in so doing shifts the culture of masculinities within which he is immersed (see Figure 1). Trials of the ADAMN model over the past three years have applied ecological masculinism to groups of miners, at first in larger groups where hypermasculinised men can remain anonymous. From there masculine ecologisation drills down into the personal stories of individual men’s lives to uncover the sources of individual adherence to malestream norms—interrogating the pressures at play for them to have donned the “armour” that malestream norms demand of them. Stepping further towards the self, we then explore group and team dynamics for examples of hypermasculinism in the context of its benefits and costs to individual men’s lives in a support group type setting, and finally refine the transformational elements of this exploratory in one-on-one coaching of men across the spectrum from natural leaders to those in crises. At this final level of intensive personal reflection, an individual man is coached towards integrative alignment of his head, heart and intuition so that he can discover fresh perspectives for accessing his caring self. The project’s hope is that from this place of heightened “inner congruency” the ecologised man can more easily awaken and engage his care for others and himself not only as a man, but as an active and engaged citizen whose life of service to his employer, community, family, friends, and himself, becomes a central fixture of the ways he interacts with others at work and at home. Effectively, ecological masculinism reaches beyond the constraints of hypermasculinism as it commonly pervades mining by “peeling the onion” of malestream norms in a step-wise manner. It is hoped that, if the ADAMN model is successful, that the emerging “ecomen” become more sensitive to the needs, wants and intrinsic rights of others, develop rich emotional vocabularies, embrace the value of abstract thinking and a strong and engaged intuition concurrently, engage with others compassionately, educate themselves about their world at work and home, willingly assume leadership on the job, within their families and throughout their communities and grow proactively through the process. Such men embody a humanistic worldview towards all of life. They are flexible, responsive, and attentive to the value of others and themselves. Such is the ecoman I suggest might best benefit resource companies, mining cultures, mining families and miners.Figure 1 Conclusion Central to a more gender-aware future for men in mining is hope—hope that we will adapt to the challenges of mining culture swiftly by reaching beyond engineered solutions to the problems that many mine workers face; hope that our responses will be humanistic, creative and transgress malestream norms; hope that those responses are inclusive of softer and more caring approaches mining masculinities. This hope hinges on the willingness of resource companies to support such a shift in mining culture towards greater care for all others and the self. One path towards this fresh future for mining is through ecological masculinism as I have introduced it here. This new conversation for mining men and masculinities gives priority to the ending of men’s oppression for the benefit of individual mining men as well as all those with whom they share their lives at work and at home. In this paper, my intention has been to emphasise a more caring approach to mining. It is my earnest belief that through such work, mining will become more sustainable for men, women and the Earth. The ecologised mining man will have an important role to play in such a transformation.ReferencesAnderson, Ray. Our Sustainability Journey – Mission Zero. 2008. 29 April 2013 ‹http://www.interfaceglobal.com/Sustainability/Interface-Story.aspx›. Ashby, Nicole. The Need for FIFO Families. Personal Interview. 11 Dec 2012. BHP Billiton. 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Property as both an idea and a practice has been interpreted through the prism of a liberal, law and economics paradigm since at least the 18th century. This dominant (and domineering) perspective stresses the primacy of individualism, the power of exclusion, and the values of private commodity. By contrast, concepts of property that evolved out of the counterculture of the 1960s and early 1970s challenged this hegemony. Countercultural, or Aquarian, ideas of property stressed pre-liberal, long forgotten property norms such as sociability, community, inclusion and personhood, and contested a private uniformity that seemed “totalizing and universalizing” (Blomley, Unsettling 102). This paper situates what it terms “Aquarian property” in the context of emergent property theory in the 1960s and 1970s, and the propertied practices these new theories engendered. Importantly, this paper also grounds Aquarian ideas of property to location. As legal geographers observe, the law inexorably occurs in place as well as time. “Nearly every aspect of law is located, takes place, is in motion, or has some spatial frame of reference” (Braverman et al. 1). Property’s radical yet simultaneously ancient alter-narrative found fertile soil where the countercultural experiment flourished. In Australia, one such place was the green, sub-tropical landscape of the New South Wales Northern Rivers, home of the 1973 Australian Union of Student’s Aquarius Festival at Nimbin. The Counterculture and Property Theory Well before the “Age of Aquarius” entered western youth consciousness (Munro-Clark 56), and 19 years before the Nimbin Aquarius Festival, US legal scholar Felix Cohen defined property in seminally private and exclusionary terms. To the world: Keep off X unless you have my permission, which I may grant or withhold.Signed: Private citizenEndorsed: The state. (374) Cohen’s formula was private property at its 1950s apogee, an unambiguous expression of its centrality to post-war materialism. William Blackstone’s famous trope of property as “that sole and despotic dominion” had become self-fulfilling (Rose, Canons). Why had this occurred? What had made property so narrow and instrumentalist to a private end? Several property theorists identify the enclosure period in the 17th and 18th centuries as seminal to this change (Blomley, Law; Graham). The enclosures, and their discourse of improvement and modernity, saw ancient common rights swept away in favour of the liberal private right. Property diversity was supplanted by monotony, group rights by the individual, and inclusion by exclusion. Common property rights were rights of shared use, traditionally agrarian incidents enjoyed through community membership. However, for the proponents of enclosure, common rights stood in the way of progress. Thus, what was once a vested right (such as the common right to glean) became a “mere practice”, condemned by its “universal promiscuity” and perceptions of vagrancy (Buck 17-8). What was once sited to context, to village and parish, evolved into abstraction. And what had meaning for person and place, “a sense of self; […] a part of a tribe’ (Neeson 180), became a tradable commodity, detached and indifferent to the consequences of its adverse use (Leopold). These were the transformed ideas of property exported to so-called “settler” societies, where colonialists demanded the secure property rights denied to them at home. In the common law tradition, a very modern yet selective amnesia took hold, a collective forgetting of property’s shared and sociable past (McLaren). Yet, property as commodity proved to be a narrow, one-sided account of property, an unsatisfactory “half right” explanation (Alexander 2) that omits inconvenient links between ownership on the one hand, and self and place on the other. Pioneering US conservationist Aldo Leopold detected as much a few years before Felix Cohen’s defining statement of private dominance. In Leopold’s iconic A Sand County Almanac, he wrote presciently of the curious phenomenon of hardheaded farmers replanting selected paddocks with native wildflowers. As if foreseeing what the next few decades may bring, Leopold describes a growing resistance to the dominant property paradigm: I call it Revolt – revolt against the tedium of the merely economic attitude towards land. We assume that because we had to subjugate the land to live on it, the best farm is therefore the one most completely tamed. These […] farmers have learned from experience that the wholly tamed farm offers not only a slender livelihood but a constricted life. (188)By the early 1960s, frustrations over the constrictions of post-war life were given voice in dissenting property literature. Affirming that property is a social institution, emerging ideas of property conformed to the contours of changing values (Singer), and the countercultural zeitgeist sweeping America’s universities (Miller). Thus, in 1964, Charles Reich saw property as the vanguard for a new civic compact, an ambitious “New Property” that would transform “government largess” into a property right to address social inequity. For Joseph Sax, property scholar and author of a groundbreaking citizen’s manifesto, the assertion of public property rights were critical to the protection of the environment (174). And in 1972, to Christopher Stone, it seemed a natural property incident that trees should enjoy equivalent standing to legal persons. In an age when “progress” was measured by the installation of plastic trees in Los Angeles median strips (Tribe), jurists aspired to new ideas of property with social justice and environmental resonance. Theirs was a scholarly “Revolt” against the tedium of property as commodity, an act of resistance to the centuries-old conformity of the enclosures (Blomley, Law). Aquarian Theory in Propertied Practice Imagining new property ideas in theory yielded in practice a diverse Aquarian tenure. In the emerging communes and intentional communities of the late 1960s and early 1970s, common property norms were unwittingly absorbed into their ethos and legal structure (Zablocki; Page). As a “way out of a dead-end future” (Smith and Crossley), a generation of young, mostly university-educated people sought new ways to relate to land. Yet, as Benjamin Zablocki observed at the time, “there is surprisingly little awareness among present-day communitarians of their historical forebears” (43). The alchemy that was property and the counterculture was given form and substance by place, time, geography, climate, culture, and social history. Unlike the dominant private paradigm that was placeless and universal, the tenurial experiments of the counter-culture were contextual and diverse. Hence, to generalise is to invite the problematic. Nonetheless, three broad themes of Aquarian property are discernible. First, property ceased being a vehicle for the acquisition of private wealth; rather it invested self-meaning within a communitarian context, “a sense of self [as] a part of a tribe.” Second, the “back to the land” movement signified a return to the country, an interregnum in the otherwise unidirectional post-enclosure drift to the city. Third, Aquarian property was premised on obligation, recognising that ownership was more than a bundle of autonomous rights, but rights imbricated with a corresponding duty to land health. Like common property and its practices of sustained yield, Aquarian owners were environmental stewards, with inter-connected responsibilities to others and the earth (Page). The counterculture was a journey in self-fulfillment, a search for personal identity amidst the empowerment of community. Property’s role in the counterculture was to affirm the under-regarded notion of property as propriety; where ownership fostered well lived and capacious lives in flourishing communities (Alexander). As Margaret Munro-Clark observed of the early 1970s, “the enrichment of individual identity or selfhood [is] the distinguishing mark of the current wave of communitarianism” (33). Or, as another 1970s settler remarked twenty years later, “our ownership means that we can’t liquefy our assets and move on with any appreciable amount of capital. This arrangement has many advantages; we don’t waste time wondering if we would be better off living somewhere else, so we have commitment to place and community” (Metcalf 52). In personhood terms, property became “who we are, how we live” (Lismore Regional Gallery), not a measure of commoditised worth. Personhood also took legal form, manifested in early title-holding structures, where consensus-based co-operatives (in which capital gain was precluded) were favoured ideologically over the capitalist, majority-rules corporation (Munro-Clark). As noted, Aquarian property was also predominantly rural. For many communitarians, the way out of a soulless urban life was to abandon its difficulties for the yearnings of a simpler rural idyll (Smith and Crossley). The 1970s saw an extraordinary return to the physicality of land, measured by a willingness to get “earth under the nails” (Farran). In Australia, communities proliferated on the NSW Northern Rivers, in Western Australia’s southwest, and in the rural hinterlands behind Queensland’s Sunshine Coast and Cairns. In New Zealand, intentional communities appeared on the rural Coromandel Peninsula, east of Auckland, and in the Golden Bay region on the remote northwestern tip of the South Island. In all these localities, land was plentiful, the climate seemed sunny, and the landscape soulful. Aquarians “bought cheap land in beautiful places in which to opt out and live a simpler life [...] in remote backwaters, up mountains, in steep valleys, or on the shorelines of wild coastal districts” (Sargisson and Sargent 117). Their “hard won freedom” was to escape from city life, suffused by a belief that “the city is hardly needed, life should spring out of the country” (Jones and Baker 5). Aquarian property likewise instilled environmental ethics into the notion of land ownership. Michael Metzger, writing in 1975 in the barely minted Ecology Law Quarterly, observed that humankind had forgotten three basic ecological laws, that “everything is connected to everything else”, that “everything must go somewhere”, and that “nature knows best” (797). With an ever-increasing focus on abstraction, the language of private property: enabled us to create separate realities, and to remove ourselves from the natural world in which we live to a cerebral world of our own creation. When we act in accord with our artificial world, the disastrous impact of our fantasies upon the natural world in which we live is ignored. (796)By contrast, Aquarian property was intrinsically contextual. It revolved around the owner as environmental steward, whose duty it was “to repair the ravages of previous land use battles, and to live in accord with the natural environment” (Aquarian Archives). Reflecting ancient common rights, Aquarian property rights internalised norms of prudence, proportionality and moderation of resource use (Rose, Futures). Simply, an ecological view of land ownership was necessary for survival. As Dr. Moss Cass, the Federal environment minister wrote in the preface to The Way Out: Radical Alternatives in Australia, ‘”there is a common conviction that something is rotten at the core of conventional human existence.” Across the Tasman, the sense of latent environmental crisis was equally palpable, “we are surrounded by glistening surfaces and rotten centres” (Jones and Baker 5). Property and Countercultural Place and Time In the emerging discipline of legal geography, the law and its institutions (such as property) are explained through the prism of spatiotemporal context. What even more recent law and geography scholarship argues is that space is privileged as “theoretically interesting” while “temporality is reduced to empirical history” (Braverman et al. 53). This part seeks to consider the intersection of property, the counterculture, and time and place without privileging either the spatial or temporal dimensions. It considers simply the place of Nimbin, New South Wales, in early May 1973, and how property conformed to the exigencies of both. Legal geographers also see property through the theory of performance. Through this view, property is a “relational effect, not a prior ground, that is brought into being by the very act of performance” (Blomley, Performing 13). In other words, doing does not merely describe or represent property, but it enacts, such that property becomes a reality through its performance. In short, property is because it does. Performance theory is liberating (Page et al) because it concentrates not on property’s arcane rules and doctrines, nor on the legal geographer’s alleged privileging of place over time, but on its simple doing. Thus, Nicholas Blomley sees private property as a series of constant and reiterative performances: paying rates, building fences, registering titles, and so on. Adopting this approach, Aquarian property is described as a series of performances, seen through the prism of the legal practitioner, and its countercultural participants. The intersection of counterculture and property law implicated my family in its performative narrative. My father had been a solicitor in Nimbin since 1948; his modest legal practice was conducted from the side annexe of the School of Arts. Equipped with a battered leather briefcase and a trusty portable typewriter, like clockwork, he drove the 20 miles from Lismore to Nimbin every Saturday morning. I often accompanied him on his weekly visits. Forty-one years ago, in early May 1973, we drove into town to an extraordinary sight. Seen through ten-year old eyes, surreal scenes of energy, colour, and longhaired, bare-footed young people remain vivid. At almost the exact halfway point in my father’s legal career, new ways of thinking about property rushed headlong and irrevocably into his working life. After May 1973, dinnertime conversations became very different. Gone was the mundane monopoly of mortgages, subdivisions, and cottage conveyancing. The topics now ranged to hippies, communes, co-operatives and shared ownerships. Property was no longer a dull transactional monochrome, a lifeless file bound in pink legal tape. It became an idea replete with diversity and innovation, a concept populated with interesting characters and entertaining, often quirky stories. If property is a narrative (Rose, Persuasion), then the micro-story of property on the NSW Northern Rivers became infinitely more compelling and interesting in the years after Aquarius. For the practitioner, Aquarian property involved new practices and skills: the registration of co-operatives, the drafting of shareholder deeds that regulated the use of common lands, the settling of idealistic trusts, and the ever-increasing frequency of visits to the Nimbin School of Arts every working Saturday. For the 1970s settler in Nimbin, performing Aquarian property took more direct and lived forms. It may have started by reading the open letter that festival co-organiser Graeme Dunstan wrote to the Federal Minister for Urban Affairs, Tom Uren, inviting him to Nimbin as a “holiday rather than a political duty”, and seeking his support for “a community group of 100-200 people to hold a lease dedicated to building a self-sufficient community [...] whose central design principles are creative living and ecological survival” (1). It lay in the performances at the Festival’s Learning Exchange, where ideas of philosophy, organic farming, alternative technology, and law reform were debated in free and unstructured form, the key topics of the latter being abortion and land. And as the Festival came to its conclusion, it was the gathering at the showground, titled “After Nimbin What?—How will the social and environmental experiment at Nimbin effect the setting up of alternative communities, not only in the North Coast, but generally in Australia” (Richmond River Historical Society). In the days and months after Aquarius, it was the founding of new communities such as Co-ordination Co-operative at Tuntable Creek, described by co-founder Terry McGee in 1973 as “a radical experiment in a new way of life. The people who join us […] have to be prepared to jump off the cliff with the certainty that when they get to the bottom, they will be all right” (Munro-Clark 126; Cock 121). The image of jumping off a cliff is a metaphorical performance that supposes a leap into the unknown. While orthodox concepts of property in land were left behind, discarded at the top, the Aquarian leap was not so much into the unknown, but the long forgotten. The success of those communities that survived lay in the innovative and adaptive ways in which common forms of property fitted into registered land title, a system otherwise premised on individual ownership. Achieved through the use of outside private shells—title-holding co-operatives or companies (Page)—inside the shell, the norms and practices of common property were inclusively facilitated and performed (McLaren; Rose, Futures). In 2014, the performance of Aquarian property endures, in the dozens of intentional communities in the Nimbin environs that remain a witness to the zeal and spirit of the times and its countercultural ideals. Conclusion The Aquarian idea of property had profound meaning for self, community, and the environment. It was simultaneously new and old, radical as well as ancient. It re-invented a pre-liberal, pre-enclosure idea of property. For property theory, its legacy is its imaginings of diversity, the idea that property can take pluralistic forms and assert multiple values, a defiant challenge to the dominant paradigm. Aquarian property offers rich pickings compared to the pauperised private monotone. 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IllegitimacyBack in 1987, Gregory Bateson argued that:Kurt Vonnegut gives us wary advice – that we should be careful what we pretend because we become what we pretend. And something like that, some sort of self-fulfilment, occurs in all organisations and human cultures. What people presume to be ‘human’ is what they will build in as premises of their social arrangements, and what they build in is sure to be learned, is sure to become a part of the character of those who participate. (178)The human capacity to marginalise and discriminate against others on the basis of innate and constructed characteristics is evident from the long history of discrimination against people whose existence is ‘illegitimate’, defined as being outside the law. What is inside or outside the law depends upon the context under consideration. For example, in societies such as ancient Greece and the antebellum United States, where slavery was legal, people who were constructed as ‘slaves’ could legitimately be treated very differently from ‘citizens’: free people who benefit from a range of human rights (Northup). The discernment of what is legitimate from that which is illegitimate is thus implicated within the law but extends into the wider experience of community life and is evident within the civil structures through which society is organised and regulated.The division between the legitimate and illegitimate is an arbitrary one, susceptible to changing circumstances. Within recent memory a romantic/sexual relationship between two people of the same sex was constructed as illegitimate and actively persecuted. This was particularly the case for same-sex attracted men, since the societies regulating these relationships generally permitted women a wider repertoire of emotional response than men were allowed. Even when lesbian and gay relationships were legalised, they were constructed as less legitimate in the sense that they often had different rules around the age of consent for homosexual and heterosexual couples. In Australia, the refusal to allow same sex couples to marry perpetuates ways in which these relationships are constructed as illegitimate – beyond the remit of the legislation concerning marriage.The archetypal incidence of illegitimacy has historically referred to people born out of wedlock. The circumstances of birth, for example whether a person was born as a result of a legally-sanctioned marital relationship or not, could have ramifications throughout an individual’s life. Stories abound (for example, Cookson) of the implications of being illegitimate. In some social stings, such as Catherine Cookson’s north-eastern England at the turn of the twentieth century, illegitimate children were often shunned. Parents frequently refused permission for their (legitimate) children to play with illegitimate classmates, as if these children born out of wedlock embodied a contaminating variety of evil. Illegitimate children were treated differently in the law in matters of inheritance, for example, and may still be. They frequently lived in fear of needing to show a birth certificate to gain a passport, for example, or to marry. Sometimes, it was at this point in adult life, that a person first discovered their illegitimacy, changing their entire understanding of their family and their place in the world. It might be possible to argue that the emphasis upon the legitimacy of a birth has lessened in proportion to an acceptance of genetic markers as an indicator of biological paternity, but that is not the endeavour here.Given the arbitrariness and mutability of the division between legitimacy and illegitimacy as a constructed boundary, it is policed by social and legal sanctions. Boundaries, such as the differentiation between the raw and the cooked (Lévi-Strauss), or S/Z (Barthes), or purity and danger (Douglas), serve important cultural functions and also convey critical information about the societies that enforce them. Categories of person, place or thing which are closest to boundaries between the legitimate and the illegitimate can prompt existential anxiety since the capacity to discern between these categories is most challenged at the margins. The legal shenanigans which can result speak volumes for which aspects of life have the potential to unsettle a culture. One example of this which is writ large in the recent history of Australia is our treatment of refugees and asylum seekers and the impact of this upon Australia’s multicultural project.Foreshadowing the sexual connotations of the illegitimate, one of us has written elsewhere (Green, ‘Bordering on the Inconceivable’) about the inconceivability of the Howard administration’s ‘Pacific solution’. This used legal devices to rewrite Australia’s borders to limit access to the rights accruing to refugees upon landing in a safe haven entitling them to seek asylum. Internationally condemned as an illegitimate construction of an artificial ‘migration zone’, this policy has been revisited and made more brutal under the Abbot regime with at least two people – Reza Barati and Hamid Khazaei – dying in the past year in what is supposed to be a place of safety provided by Australian authorities under their legal obligations to those fleeing from persecution. Crock points out, echoing the discourse of illegitimacy, that it is and always has been inappropriate to label “undocumented asylum seekers” as “‘illegal’” because: “until such people cross the border onto Australian territory, the language of illegality is nonsense. People who have no visas to enter Australia can hardly be ‘illegals’ until they enter Australia” (77). For Australians who identify in some ways – religion, culture, fellow feeling – with the detainees incarcerated on Nauru and Manus Island, it is hard to ignore the disparity between the government’s treatment of visa overstayers and “illegals” who arrive by boat (Wilson). It is a comparatively short step to construct this disparity as reflecting upon the legitimacy within Australia of communities who share salient characteristics with detained asylum seekers: “The overwhelmingly negative discourse which links asylum seekers, Islam and terrorism” (McKay, Thomas & Kneebone, 129). Some communities feel themselves constructed in the public and political spheres as less legitimately Australian than others. This is particularly true of communities where members can be identified via markers of visible difference, including indicators of ethnic, cultural and religious identities: “a group who [some 585 respondent Australians …] perceived would maintain their own languages, customs and traditions […] this cultural diversity posed an extreme threat to Australian national identity” (McKay, Thomas & Kneebone, 129). Where a community shares salient characteristics such as ethnicity or religion with many detained asylum seekers they can become fearful of the discourses around keeping borders strong and protecting Australia from illegitimate entrants. MethodologyThe qualitative fieldwork upon which this paper is based took place some 6-8 years ago (2006-2008), but the project remains one of the most recent and extensive studies of its kind. There are no grounds for believing that any of the findings are less valid than previously. On the contrary, if political actions are constructed as a proxy for mainstream public consent, opinions have become more polarised and have hardened. Ten focus groups were held involving 86 participants with a variety of backgrounds including differences in age, gender, religious observance, religious identification and ethnicity. Four focus groups involved solely Muslim participants; six drew from the wider Australian community. The aim was to examine the response of different communities to mainstream Australian media representations of Islam, Muslims, and terrorism. Research questions included: “Are there differences in the ways in which Australian Muslims respond to messages about ‘fear’ and ‘terror’ compared with broader community Australians’ responses to the same messages?” and “How do Australian Muslims construct the perceptions and attitudes of the broader Australian community based on the messages that circulate in the media?” Recent examples of kinds of messages investigated include media coverage of Islamic State’s (ISIS’s) activities (Karam & Salama), and the fear-provoking coverage around the possible recruitment of Australians to join the fighting in Syria and Iraq (Cox). The ten focus groups were augmented by 60 interviews, 30 with respondents who identified as Muslim (15 males, 15 female) and 30 respondents from the broader community (same gender divisions). Finally, a market research company was commissioned to conduct a ‘fear survey’, based on an established ‘fear of rape’ inventory (Aly and Balnaves), delivered by telephone to a random sample of 750 over-18 y.o. Australians in which Muslims formed a deliberative sub-group, to ensure they were over-sampled and constituted at least 150 respondents. The face-to-face surveys and focus groups were conducted by co-author, Dr Anne Aly. General FindingsMuslim respondents indicate a heightened intensity of reaction to media messages around fear and terror. In addition to a generalised fear of the potential impact of terrorism upon Australian society and culture, Muslim respondents experienced a specific fear that any terrorist-related media coverage might trigger hostility towards Muslim Australian communities and their own family members. According to the ‘fear survey’ scale, Muslim Australians at the time of the research experienced approximately twice the fear level of mainstream Australian respondents. Broader Australian community Australian Muslim communityFear of a terrorist attackFear of a terrorist attack combines with the fear of a community backlashSpecific victims: dead, injured, bereavedCommunity is full of general victims in addition to any specific victimsShort-term; intense impactsProtracted, diffuse impactsSociety-wide sympathy and support for specific victims and all those involved in dealing with the trauma and aftermathSociety-wide suspicion and a marginalisation of those affected by the backlashVictims of a terrorist attack are embraced by broader communityVictims of backlash experience hostility from the broader communityFour main fears were identified by Australian Muslims as a component of the fear of terrorism:Fear of physical harm. In addition to the fear of actual terrorist acts, Australian Muslims fear backlash reprisals such as those experienced after such events as 9/11, the Bali bombings, and attacks upon public transport passengers in Spain and the UK. These and similar events were constructed as precipitating increased aggression against identifiable Australian Muslims, along with shunning of Muslims and avoidance of their company.The construction of politically-motivated fear. Although fear is an understandable response to concerns around terrorism, many respondents perceived fears as being deliberately exacerbated for political motives. Such strategies as “Be alert, not alarmed” (Bassio), labelling asylum seekers as potential terrorists, and talk about home-grown terrorists, are among the kinds of fears which were identified as politically motivated. The political motivation behind such actions might include presenting a particular party as strong, resolute and effective. Some Muslim Australians construct such approaches as indicating that their government is more interested in political advantage than social harmony.Fear of losing civil liberties. As well as sharing the alarm of the broader Australian community at the dozens of legislative changes banning people, organisations and materials, and increasing surveillance and security checks, Muslim Australians fear for the human rights implications across their community, up to and including the lives of their young people. This fear is heightened when community members may look visibly different from the mainstream. Examples of the events fuelling such fears include the London police killing of Jean Charles de Menezes, a Brazilian Catholic working as an electrician in the UK and shot in the month following the 7/7 attacks on the London Underground system (Pugliese). In Australia, the case of Mohamed Hannef indicated that innocent people could easily be unjustly accused and wrongly targeted, and even when this was evident the political agenda made it almost impossible for authorities to admit their error (Rix).Feeling insecure. Australian Muslims argue that personal insecurity has become “the new normal” (Massumi), disproportionately affecting Muslim communities in both physical and psychological ways. Physical insecurity is triggered by the routine avoidance, shunning and animosity experienced by many community members in public places. Psychological insecurity includes fear for the safety of younger members of the community compounded by concern that young people may become ‘radicalised’ as a result of the discrimination they experience. Australian Muslims fear the backlash following any possible terrorist attack on Australian soil and describe the possible impact as ‘unimaginable’ (Aly and Green, ‘Moderate Islam’).In addition to this range of fears expressed by Australian Muslims and constructed in response to wider societal reactions to increased concerns over radical Islam and the threat of terrorist activity, an analysis of respondents’ statements indicate that Muslim Australians construct the broader community as exhibiting:Fear of religious conviction (without recognising the role of their own secular/religious convictions underpinning this fear);Fear of extremism (expressed in various extreme ways);Fear of powerlessness (responded to by disempowering others); andFear of political action overseas having political effects at home (without acknowledging that it is the broader community’s response to such overseas events, such as 9/11 [Green ‘Did the world really change?’], which has also had impacts at home).These constructions, extrapolations and understandings by Australian Muslims of the fears of the broader community underpinning the responses to the threat of terror have been addressed elsewhere (Green and Aly). Legitimate Australian MuslimsOne frustration identified by many Muslim respondents centres upon a perceived ‘acceptable’ way to be an Australian Muslim. Arguing that the broader community construct Muslims as a homogenous group defined by their religious affiliation, these interviewees felt that the many differences within and between the twenty-plus national, linguistic, ethnic, cultural and faith-based groupings that constitute WA’s Muslim population were being ignored. Being treated as a homogenised group on a basis of faith appears to have the effect of putting that religious identity under pressure, paradoxically strengthening and reinforcing it (Aly, ‘Australian Muslim Responses to the Discourse on Terrorism’). The appeal to Australian Muslims to embrace membership in a secular society and treat religion as a private matter also led some respondents to suggest they were expected to deny their own view of their faith, in which they express their religious identity across their social spheres and in public and private contexts. Such expression is common in observant Judaism, Hinduism and some forms of Christianity, as well as in some expressions of Islam (Aly and Green, ‘Less than equal’). Massumi argues that even the ways in which some Muslims dress, indicating faith-based behaviour, can lead to what he terms as ‘affective modulation’ (Massumi), repeating and amplifying the fear affect as a result of experiencing the wider community’s fear response to such triggers as water bottles (from airport travel) and backpacks, on the basis of perceived physical difference and a supposed identification with Muslim communities, regardless of the situation. Such respondents constructed this (implied) injunction to suppress their religious and cultural affiliation as akin to constructing the expression of their identity as illegitimate and somehow shameful. Parallels can be drawn with previous social responses to a person born out of wedlock, and to people in same-sex relationships: a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ kind of denial.Australian Muslims who see their faith as denied or marginalised may respond by identifying more strongly with other Muslims in their community, since the community-based context is one in which they feel welcomed and understood. The faith-based community also allows and encourages a wider repertoire of acceptable beliefs and actions entailed in the performance of ‘being Muslim’. Hand in hand with a perception of being required to express their religious identity in ways that were acceptable to the majority community, these respondents provided a range of examples of self-protective behaviours to defend themselves and others from the impacts of perceived marginalisation. Such behaviours included: changing their surnames to deflect discrimination based solely on a name (Aly and Green, ‘Fear, Anxiety and the State of Terror’); keeping their opinions private, even when they were in line with those being expressed by the majority community (Aly and Green, ‘Moderate Islam’); the identification of ‘less safe’ and ‘safe’ activities and areas; concerns about visibly different young men in the Muslim community and discussions with them about their public behaviour and demeanour; and women who chose not to leave their homes for fear of being targeted in public places (all discussed in Aly, ‘Australian Muslim Responses to the Discourse on Terrorism’). Many of these behaviours, including changing surnames, restricting socialisation to people who know a person well, and the identification of safe and less safe activities in relation to the risk of self-revelation, were common strategies used by people who were stigmatised in previous times as a result of their illegitimacy.ConclusionConstructions of the legitimate and illegitimate provide one means through which we can investigate complex negotiations around Australianness and citizenship, thrown into sharp relief by the Australian government’s treatment of asylum seekers, also deemed “illegals”. Because they arrive in Australia (or, as the government would prefer, on Australia’s doorstep) by illegitimate channels these would-be citizens are treated very differently from people who arrive at an airport and overstay their visa. The impetus to exclude aspects of geographical Australia from the migration zone, and to house asylum seekers offshore, reveals an anxiety about borders which physically reflects the anxiety of western nations in the post-9/11 world. Asylum seekers who arrive by boat have rarely had safe opportunity to secure passports or visas, or to purchase tickets from commercial airlines or shipping companies. They represent those ethnicities and cultures which are currently in turmoil: a turmoil frequently exacerbated by western intervention, variously constructed as an il/legitimate expression of western power and interests.What this paper has demonstrated is that the boundary between Australia and the rest, the legitimate and the illegitimate, is failing in its aim of creating a stronger Australia. The means through which this project is pursued is making visible a range of motivations and concerns which are variously interpreted depending upon the position of the interpreter. The United Nations, for example, has expressed strong concern over Australia’s reneging upon its treaty obligations to refugees (Gordon). Less vocal, and more fearful, are those communities within Australia which identify as community members with the excluded illegals. The Australian government’s treatment of detainees on Manus Island and Nauru, who generally exhibit markers of visible difference as a result of ethnicity or culture, is one aspect of a raft of government policies which serve to make some people feel that their Australianness is somehow less legitimate than that of the broader community. AcknowledgementsThis paper is based on the findings of an Australian Research Council Discovery Project (DP0559707), 2005-7, “Australian responses to the images and discourses of terrorism and the other: establishing a metric of fear”, awarded to Professors Lelia Green and Mark Balnaves. The research involved 10 focus groups and 60 individual in-depth interviews and a telephone ‘fear of terrorism’ survey. The authors wish to acknowledge the participation and contributions of WA community members and wider Australian respondents to the telephone survey. ReferencesAly, Anne. “Australian Muslim Responses to the Discourse on Terrorism in the Australian Popular Media.” Australian Journal of Social Issues 42.1 (2007): 27-40.Aly, Anne, and Lelia Green. “Fear, Anxiety and the State of Terror.” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33.3 (Feb 2010): 268-81.Aly, Anne, and Lelia Green. “Less than Equal: Secularism, Religious Pluralism and Privilege.” M/C Journal 11.2 (2008). 15 Oct. 2009 ‹http://journal.media-culture.org.au/index.php/mcjournal/article/view/32›.Aly, Anne, and Lelia Green. “‘Moderate Islam’: Defining the Good Citizen”. M/C Journal 10.6/11.1 (2008). 13 April 2008 ‹http://journal.media-culture.org.au/0804/08-aly-green.php›.Aly, Anne, and Mark Balnaves. “‘They Want Us to Be Afraid’: Developing a Metric for the Fear of Terrorism. International Journal of Diversity in Organisations, Communities & Nations 6.6 (2008): 113-122.Barthes, Roland. S/Z. Oxford: Blackwell, 1990.Bassio, Diana. “‘Be Alert, Not Alarmed’: Governmental Communication of Risk in an Era of Insecurity.” Annual Conference Australian and New Zealand Communication Association, Christchurch, New Zealand, 2005. ‹http://www.anzca.net/documents/anzca-05-1/refereed-proceedings-9/247-be-alert-not-alarmed-governmental-communication-of-risk-in-an-era-of-insecurity-1/file.html›.Bateson, Gregory, and Mary Catherine Bateson. “Innocence and Experience”. Angels Fear: Towards an Epistemology of the Sacred. New York: Hampton Press, 1987. 167-182. 11 Sep. 2014 ‹http://www.oikos.org/baten.htm›.Cookson, Catherine. Our Kate. London: Corgi, 1969.Cox, Nicole. “Police Probe ‘Die for Syria’ Car Stickers”. WA Today 11 Sep. 2014. 11 Sep. 2014 ‹http://www.watoday.com.au/wa-news/police-probe-die-for-syria-car-stickers-20140911-10fmo7.html›.Crock, Mary. “That Sinking Feeling: Correspondence”. Quarterly Essay 54 (June 2014): 75-79.Douglas, Mary. Purity and Danger. London: Routledge and Keagan Paul, 1978 [1966].Gordon, Michael. “New UN Human Rights Chief Attacks Australia over Asylum Seeker Rights ‘Violations’.” Sydney Morning Herald 7 Sep. 2014. 11 Sep. 2014 ‹http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/new-un-human-rights-chief-attacks-australia-over-asylum-seeker-rights-violations-20140907-10dlkx.html›.Green, Lelia. “Bordering on the Inconceivable: The Pacific Solution, the Migration Zone and ‘Australia’s 9/11’”. Australian Journal of Communication 31.1 (2004): 19-36.Green, Lelia. “Did the World Really Change on 9/11?” Australian Journal of Communication 29.2 (2002): 1-14.Green, Lelia, and Anne Aly. “How Australian Muslims Construct Western Fear of the Muslim Other”. Negotiating Identities: Constructed Selves and Others. Ed. Helen Vella Bonavita. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2011. 65-90. Karam, Zeina, and Vivian Salama. “US President Barack Obama Powers Up to Shut Down Islamic State”. The Australian 11 Sep. 2014. 11 Sep. 2014 ‹http://www.theaustralian/world/%20us-president-barak-obama-powers-up-to-shut-down-islamic-state-20140911-10f9dh.html›.Lévi-Strauss, Claude. The Raw and the Cooked: Mythologiques, Volume 1. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1969.Massumi, Brian. “Fear (the Spectrum Said).” Positions 13.1 (2005): 31-48.McKay, Fiona H., Samantha, L. 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Recently, on the alt.zines newsgroup there was a discussion that centred around the perception that zines were experiencing a decline in popularity. This followed a period, at least in the US, of intense scrutiny of zines and their editors by the corporate mass media. For a brief time, newsstands and distributors had been willing to stock these non-commercial independent publications -- with their sometimes illegible fonts, cut'n'paste layouts, and personal diatribes -- alongside the glossy covers and slick production values of Rolling Stone and Vanity Fair. After commercial magazines had exhausted the novelty factor of zines and their editors, a reluctance by commercial enterprises to continue to sell zines ensued. Following the thread "**Zines Fading from Popularity? Why?" some contributors to the newsgroup wondered whether the alleged decrease in interest reflected an overall decline in the standards of zines being made. While other contributors offered evidence to refute an emergent lack of interest in zines, 'Kris from Menace Publishing & Manufacture' suggested that "zines are a very adolescent medium, and I think a lot of people just outgrow them, both producers and readers" ('Kris'). Kris's point in using the term adolescent was to account for a presence among zine editors of those who were not committed to producing zines in the long term. He employs a notion of adolescence as a developmental stage at the end of which one becomes an adult. Although it would appear that Kris makes zines, he uses adolescence as a pejorative term to describe them as the expression of a transient stage of human development which it is expected one will leave behind. Kris's linking of zines and adolescence as a developmental stage becomes complicated while there are people who don't outgrow zines. Jeff Potter responds directly to Kris's analogy between adolescence and zines when he writes: I like the 'playing for keeps' aspect of true art. The 'it's just a phase' sector is perhaps the weakening one. Altho I have nothing against ephemera or one offs or whatever. Pop, kiddy, groupie stuff tho: ferget it [sic]. (Potter) While Potter does nothing to dispel the prevailing societal disdain for adolescents and youth in general -- he trivialises their zines as "pop" and "kiddy" --, he introduces another understanding of transience in his reference to "one-offs" and "ephemera", one that is not so easily dismissed as when the association with adolescence is made. The use of 'adolescent' to dismiss some zines, while valorising the ephemeral characteristic of others, is intriguing. In response it might be argued that adolescence offers a model for zines and the identities and communities that surround them; evolving structures that are also characteristic of ephemeral cultural products. In the Brisbane-based Australian zine Fried Trash Tabouli, Cathy Tabouli considers the notion of adolescence as a pejorative description applied to zines and people who make them: I mean this maybe the last fried trash tabouli cos a kinda friend got me thinking about how fucked zines are and how kiddie they are but hell I'm a kid! I'm a kid who just so happens to be of adult age and responsibility. I realised how stupid their opinion can be... (Tabouli, n.pag.) This example shows how Tabouli reappropriates the state of being "kiddie" and takes it with her into adulthood. The conclusions that Tabouli draws, which enable her to adopt adolescence as an ongoing way of being in the world, are evocative of the understanding of adolescence articulated by Julia Kristeva. Kristeva speaks about adolescence as a period when having a subjectivity-in-process is socially acceptable. As a teenager, one is able to restlessly reject role after role, to try on a number of identities, each of which is lived as authentic. An adolescent represents, "naturally", "a crisis structure within the ideal and consistent law" of the social world (Kristeva 136); the adolescent is able to transgress the boundaries of difference within society without incurring penalty. Kristeva describes the adolescent as an open-structure personality and she suggests that the on-going process of the adolescent stage of development is an ideal model for writing because through the practice of writing one is able to explore the possibilities of identity without encountering judgment. As a community that is organised around writing it is possible to identify the open-structure of adolescence in zines -- not just in the youthfulness of many (although certainly not all) of those who write and read them, but also in the constant process of exploring ways of being in the world that fill their pages. On a nominative level one can quickly identify instances of a restless rejection of roles in the way that many zine editors, through the pages of their zines, adopt new names, and thus "a new living identity" (Kristeva 137). In The Life and Times of Mavis McKenzie the editor, 'Jason', pretends he is an elderly woman, Mavis McKenzie. Mavis sends letters to local councils, celebrities and businesses exercising her civic duty to hilarious effect. That Mavis receives replies to her ridiculous enquiries and outrageous opinions exposes the inanity of many bureaucracies and (star) systems, and enables 'Jason' to critique current events and to make fun of "the never-ending procession of dumb celebrities and companies" ('Jason'). Further examples of new identities configured through producing a zine are evident in pseudonyms like Kylie Gusset of the e-zine Gusset; Kylie Purr, formerly of PURRzine and now Kat Pounce; Chris Dazed of Dazed and Swarming and Coughing Up Legomen; and Flea, who in her transition from the seminal zine Grot Grrrl to Thunderpussy has adopted the latter title as a surname. The association of many zine editors with more than one zine title is worth noting in a discussion of the open-structured adolescent quality of zines. In the 'Idiotorial' of Kat Pounce/PURRzine #4 Kylie Purr explains the reasoning behind the name change of her zine: soooo much has changed!! A new name has been adopted, for the purpose of separating my 2 projects, zine-purr and band-purr, but Purr broke so its [sic] just a fresh exciting new start. I've lived in three more houses since #3, but I am now, in theory, settled for awhile [sic]. In this shocking era of tranquility I have established a herb garden, honed my drawing skills, learnt to touchtype (30wpm and counting!!), expanded my cooking repetoire [sic] and deliberated over a musical future. I laughed at the State Rail Authority and their free entry to central (via Country terminal ramp) for several moths [sic]. I became much louder and more frequent in my verbal abuse of TV. I became happier and more bitter. I've gotten really sick of loser fuck ups, no more patience with that I'm afraid. I met a lot of really nice people who aren't loser fuck ups so I just hang out with them!! (Purr, n.pag.) Although the name change in Purr's zine was initially for pragmatic reasons, it came to represent a substantial shift, not only in terms of the number of residences she lived in over eighteen months, but also in her perspective on life. Chris Dazed cited a similar evolution in his perspective in a conversation I had with him at the recent National Young Writers Festival in Newcastle. Chris's decision to abandon Dazed and Swarming and start Coughing Up Legomen was motivated by a deeper philosophical understanding that had emerged as a consequence of beginning university. Chris felt that Dazed and Swarming zine could no longer contain or express the evolution of his self and ideas. While some zine editors accommodate a shift in identity by leaving one zine and beginning another, others such as 'Jason' from The Life and Times of Mavis McKenzie make more than one zine -- a multiplicity of writing which captures in print an adolescent structure of subjectivity that is constantly in process or on trial; in a state of (r)evolution. In 'Jason's' case additional zines are one-offs of more personal writing. More recently he has been involved in producing a zine on electronic pop music in collaboration with some friends. Often the parameters of other people's zines provide the space for the articulation of a different voice. A negative use of this willingness in zines to accept contributions from outside sources is related in a US zine, Escargot: Leslie Gaffney (Popwatch) told us about another zine editor who once offered to write reviews for Popwatch because he decided reviews were too passé for inclusion in his own zine, but if he wrote reviews for another zine, he could protect his own editorial principles and still get the free promos. (Billus & McKinney, n.pag.) While this example is instructive, in an Australian context it also appears to be atypical. Generally, it might be said that the manner in which zine editors avail their pages to a constant input of ideas from many individuals and sources (contributions and stealing images etc.) goes beyond an expression of multiple and evolving identities towards facilitating an aesthetic, and a community that is predicated on the open-structure personality of the adolescent. While aesthetically zines are never only one thing; the forms zines take are many and varied: photocopied and glossy, illegible and streamlined, within their pages there is a genuine exchange between writers and readers. In zines feedback moves beyond the mere printing of letters to the editor, to blur, perhaps even abolish, the distinction between a passive reader and an active producer. The idea that anyone, even with the most minimal of resources -- scissors, glue, pens and paper -- can create a zine eliminates the barriers which restrict access to other, more costly forms of cultural production (Simon Turnbull of Some Underground Machine). Those who contributed to the alt.zines newsgroup thread mentioned earlier express an appreciation of the role of the 'newbie', the new zine editor. New readers and fans that become writers and editors sustain the zine community. While some zine editors may go on to pursue other interests, or as in the US begin to make money from their zines, the reasons people do zines will, as Seth Friedman of Factsheet Five has pointed out, ensure that new people constantly enter into the zine community ("Zine and Not Herd"), to "push on ... jaded old-timers", and "question [the existing] structure" (Crye). To this end, zines are an adolescent medium; they are predicated on, and facilitate an open-structure (r)evolutionary mode of being in the world. References Billus, J., and K. McKinney. "A Zine in the Hand Is Worth Two in the Putsch... Or, What's Really Going On in the Zine Revolution." Escargot Summer 1997: 14-18. Crye, Michael. <mcrye@ket.org> "Re: **Zines fading from popularity? Why?" 5 June 1998 <alt.zines>. Guillory, Sean. <guillory@ix.netcom.com> "**Zines fading from popularity? Why?" 5 June 1998 <alt.zines>. 'Jason'. "Re: hmmm, don't know really." Personal email. 7 Oct. 1998. 'Kris from Menace Publishing & Manufacture'. <menace@ziplink.net> "Re: **Zines fading from popularity? Why?" 5 June 1998 <alt.zines>. Kristeva, Julia. New Maladies of the Soul. New York: Columbia UP, 1995. Potter, Jeff. <jp@glpbooks.com> "Re: **Zines fading from popularity? Why?" 5 June 1998 <alt.zines>. Purr, Kylie. Kat Pounce #4 (n.d.). Tabouli, Cathy. Fried Trash Tabouli #4 (n.d.). Turnbull, Simon. Personal interview. 8 Oct. 1998. "Zine and Not Herd." Attitude. Australian Broadcasting Corporation. ABC, Brisbane. 27 Aug. 1994. Citation reference for this article MLA style: Kirsty Leishman. "Being (R)evolutionary: A Consideration of the Adolescent Nature of Zines." M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 1.3 (1998). [your date of access] <http://www.uq.edu.au/mc/9810/zine.php>. Chicago style: Kirsty Leishman, "Being (R)evolutionary: A Consideration of the Adolescent Nature of Zines," M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 1, no. 3 (1998), <http://www.uq.edu.au/mc/9810/zine.php> ([your date of access]). APA style: Kirsty Leishman. (199x) Being (r)evolutionary: a consideration of the adolescent nature of zines. M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 1(3). <http://www.uq.edu.au/mc/9810/zine.php> ([your date of access]).

Since their first encounter with colonial administrators in 1963, approximately 2,000 indigenous people living in the Nimakot region of central New Guinea have been struggling with a tension between their indigenous way of life and the imperatives of the state. It is not just that they are on the international border between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia and therefore difficult to categorise into this or that country. It is that they do not habitually conceptualise themselves and others in categorical terms. They value and focus on relationships rather than categories. In their struggle to adapt the blooming buzzing complexities of their semi-nomadic lifestyle and relational logic to the strict and apparently static lines, grids, and coordinates of rationalistic statecraft they have become torn by duelling conceptions of “kantri” itself (Melanesian Tok Pisin for “country”). On the one hand, kantri invokes an unbroken rural landscape rich with personal and cultural memories that establish a firm and deep relationship with the land and the ancestors. Such a notion fits easily with local conceptions of kinship and land tenure. On the other hand, kantri is a bounded object, part of an often frustrating and mystifying system of categorization imposed by strict and rationalist mechanisms of statecraft. The following analyses this tension based on 22 months of intensive and intimate participant observation in the region from 1999-2006 with a special focus on the uses and impacts of writing and other new communication technologies. The categorical bias of statecraft is enabled, fostered, extended, and maintained by the technology of writing. Statecraft seeks (or makes) categories that are ideally stable, permanent, non-negotiable, and fit for the relative fixity of print, while the relationships emphasised by people of Nimakot are fluid, temporary, negotiable, contested and ambiguous. In contrast to the engaged, pragmatic, and personal view one finds in face-to-face relationships on the ground, the state’s knowledge of the local is ultimately mediated by what can be written into abstract categories that can be listed, counted and aggregated, producing a synoptic, distanced, and decontextualising perspective. By simplifying the cacophonous blooming buzzing complexities of life into legible categories, regularities, and rules, the pen and paper become both the eyes and the voice of the state (Scott 2). Even the writing of this paper is difficult. Many sentences would be easier to write if I could just name the group I am discussing. But the group of people I am writing about have no clear and uncontested name for themselves. More importantly, they do not traditionally think of themselves as a “group,” nor do they habitually conceptualise others in terms of bounded groups of individuals. The biggest challenge to statecraft’s attempts to create a sense of “country” here is the fact that most local people do not subjectively think of themselves in categorical terms. They do not imagine themselves to be part of “adjacent and competitive empires” (Strathern 102). This “group” is most widely known as the western “Atbalmin” though the name is not an indigenous term. “Atbalmin” is a word used by the neighbouring Telefol that means “people of the trees.” It was adopted by early patrol officers who were accompanied by Telefol translators. As these early patrols made their way through the “Atbalmin” region from east to west they frequently complained about names and their inability to pin or pen them down. Tribal names, clan names, even personal names seemed to change with each asking. While such flexibility and flux were perfectly at home in an oral face-to-face environment, it wasn’t suitable for the colonial administrators’ relatively fixed and static books. The “mysterious Kufelmin” (as the patrol reports refer to them) were even more frustrating for early colonial officers. Patrols heading west from Telefomin searched for decades for this mysterious group and never found them. To this day nobody has ever set foot in a Kufelmin village. In each valley heading west patrols were told that the Kufelmin were in the next valley to the west. But the Kufelmin were never there. They were always one more valley to the west. The problem was that the administrators wrongly assumed “Kufelmin” to be a tribal name as stable and categorical as the forms and maps they were using would accept. Kufelmin simply means “those people to the West.” It is a relational term, not a categorical one. The administration’s first contact with the people of Nimakot exposed even more fundamental differences and specific tensions between the local relational logic and the categorical bias of statecraft. Australian patrol officer JR McArthur crested the mountain overlooking Nimakot at precisely 1027 hours on 16 August 1963, a fact he dutifully recorded in his notebook (Telefomin Patrol Report 12 of 1962/63). He then proceeded down the mountain with pen and paper in hand, recording the precise moment he crossed the Sunim creek (1109 hours), came to Sunimbil (1117 hours), and likewise on and on to his final destination near the base of the present-day airstrip. Such recordings of precise times and locations were central to McArthur's main goal. Amidst the steep mountains painted with lush green gardens, sparkling waterfalls, and towering virgin rainforests McArthur busied himself examining maps and aerial photographs searching for the region’s most impressive, imposing, and yet altogether invisible feature: the 141st Meridian East of Greenwich, the international border. McArthur saw his work as one of fixing boundaries, taking names, and extending the great taxonomic system of statecraft that would ultimately “rationalise” and order even this remote corner of the globe. When he came to the conclusion that he had inadvertently stepped outside his rightful domain he promptly left, noting in his report that he purchased a pig just before leaving. The local understanding of this event is very different. While McArthur was busy making and obeying categories, the people of Nimakot were primarily concerned with making relationships. In this case, they hoped to create a relationship through which valuable goods, the likes of which they had never seen, would flow. The pig mentioned in McArthur's report was not meant to be bought or sold, but as a gift signifying the beginning of what locals hoped would be a long relationship. When McArthur insisted on paying for it and then promptly left with a promise that he would never return, locals interpreted his actions as an accusation of witchcraft. Witchcraft is the most visible and dramatic aspect of the local relational logic of being, what might be termed a relational ontology. Marilyn Strathern describes this ontology as being as much “dividual” as individual, pointing out that Melanesians tend to conceptualise themselves as defined and constituted by social relationships rather than independent from them (102). The person is conceptualised as socially and collectively constituted rather than individuated. A person’s strength, health, intelligence, disposition, and behaviour depend on the strength and nature of one’s relationships (Knauft 26). The impacts of this relational ontology on local life are far reaching. Unconditional kindness and sharing are constantly required to maintain healthy relations because unhealthy relations are understood to be the direct cause of sickness, infertility, and death. Where such misfortunes do befall someone, their explanations are sought in a complex calculus examining relational histories. Whoever has a bad relation with the victim is blamed for their misfortune. Modernists disparage such ideas as “witchcraft beliefs” but witchcraft accusations are just a small part of a much more pervasive, rich, and logical relational ontology in which the health and well-being of relations are conceptualised as influencing the health and well-being of things and people. Because of this logic, people of Nimakot are relationship experts who navigate the complex relational field with remarkable subtleness and tact. But even they cannot maintain the unconditional kindness and sharing that is required of them when their social world grows too large and complex. A village rarely grows to over 50 people before tensions lead to an irresolvable witchcraft accusation and the village splits up. In this way, the continuous negotiations inspired by the relational ontology lead to constant movement, changing of names, and shifting clan affiliations – nothing that fits very well on a static map or a few categories in a book. Over the past 45 years since McArthur first brought the mechanisms of statecraft into Nimakot, the tensions between this local relational ontology and the categorical logic of the state have never been resolved. One might think that a synthesis of the two forms would have emerged. Instead, to this day, all that becomes new is the form through which the tensions are expressed and the ways in which the tensions are exacerbated. The international border has been and continues to be the primary catalyst for these tensions to express themselves. As it turns out, McArthur had miscalculated. He had not crossed the international border before coming to Nimakot. It was later determined that the border runs right through the middle of Nimakot, inspiring one young local man to describe it to me as “that great red mark that cuts us right through the heart.” The McArthur encounter was a harbinger of what was to come; a battle for kantri as unbounded connected landscape, and a battle with kantri as a binding categorical system, set against a backdrop of witchcraft imagery. Locals soon learned the importance of the map and census for receiving state funds for construction projects, education, health care, and other amenities. In the early 1970s a charismatic local man convinced others to move into one large village called Tumolbil. The large population literally put Tumolbil “on the map,” dramatically increasing its visibility to government and foreign aid. Drawn by the large population, an airstrip, school, and aid post were built in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Locally this process is known as “namba tok,” meaning that “numbers (population, statistics, etc.) talk” to the state. The greater the number, the stronger the voice, so locals are now intent on creating large stable villages that are visible to the state and in line for services and development projects. Yet their way of life and relational cultural logics continue to betray their efforts to create such villages. Most people still navigate the complexities of their social relations by living in small, scattered, semi-nomadic hamlets. Even as young local men trained in Western schools become government officials in charge of the maps and census books themselves, they are finding that they are frustrated by the same characteristics of life that once frustrated colonial administrators. The tensions between the local relational ontology and the categorical imperatives of the state come to rest squarely on the shoulders of these young men. They want large stable villages that will produce a large number in the census book in order to bring development projects to their land. More importantly, they recognise that half of their land rests precariously west of that magical 141st Meridian. A clearly defined and distinct place on the map along with a solid number of names in the census book, have become essential to assuring their continued connection with their kantri. On several occasions they have felt threatened by the possibility that they would have to either abandon the land west of the meridian or become citizens of Indonesia. The first option threatens their sense of kantri as connection to their traditional land. The other violates their new found sense of kantri as nationalistic pride in the independent state of Papua New Guinea. In an attempt to resolve these increasingly pressing tensions, the officers designed “Operation Clean and Sweep” in 2003 – a plan to move people out of their small scattered hamlets and into one of twelve larger villages that had been recognised by Papua New Guinea in previous census and mapping exercises. After sending notice to hamlet residents, an operation team of over one hundred men marched throughout Nimakot, burning each hamlet along the way. Before each burning, officers gave a speech peppered with the phrase “namba tok.” Most people listened to the speeches with enthusiasm, often expressing their own eagerness to leave their hamlet behind to live in a large orderly village. In one hamlet they asked me to take a photo of them in front of their houses just before they cheerfully allowed government officers to enter their homes and light the thatch of their rooftops. “Finally,” the officer in charge exclaimed triumphantly, “we can put people where their names are.” If the tension between local relational logics and the categorical imperatives of the state had been only superficial, perhaps this plan would have ultimately resolved the tension. But the tension is not only expressed objectively in the need for large stable villages, but subjectively as well, in the state’s need for people to orient themselves primarily as citizens and individuals, doing what is best for the country as a categorical group rather than acting as relational “dividuals” and orienting their lives primarily towards the demands of kinship and other relations. This tension has been recognised in other contexts as well, and theorised in Craig Calhoun’s study of nationalism in which he marks out two related distinctions: “between networks of social relationships and categories of similar individuals, and between reproduction through directly interpersonal interactions and reproduction through the mediation of relatively impersonal agencies of large-scale cultural standardization and social organization” (29). The former in both of these distinctions make up the essential components of relational ontology, while the latter describe the mechanisms and logic of statecraft. To describe the form of personhood implicit in nationalism, Calhoun introduces the term “categorical identity” to designate “identification by similarity of attributes as a member of a set of equivalent members” (42). While locals are quick to understand the power of categorical entities in the cultural process of statecraft and therefore have eagerly created large villages on a number of occasions in order to “game” the state system, they do not readily assume a categorical identity, an identity with these categories, and the villages have consistently disintegrated over time due to relational tensions and witchcraft accusations born from the local relational ontology. Operation Clean and Sweep reached its crisis moment just two days after the burnings began. An influential man from one of the unmapped hamlets scheduled for burning came to the officers complaining that he would not move to the large government village because he would have to live too close to people who had bewitched and killed members of his family. Others echoed his fears of witchcraft in the large government villages. The drive for a categorical order came head to head with the local relational ontology. Moving people into large government villages and administering a peaceful, orderly, lawful society of citizens (a categorical identity) would take much more than eliminating hamlets and forced migration. It would require a complete transformation in their sense of being – a transformation that even the officers themselves have not fully undertaken. The officers did not see the relational ontology as the problem. They saw witchcraft as the problem. They announced plans to eradicate witchcraft altogether. For three months, witchcraft suspects were apprehended, interrogated, and asked to list names of other witches. With each interrogation, the list of witches grew longer and longer. The interrogations were violent at times, but not as violent or as devastating as the list itself. The violence of the list hid behind its simple elegance. Like a census book, it had a mystique of orderliness and rationality. It stripped away the ugliness and complexity of interrogations leaving nothing but pure categorical knowledge. In the interrogation room, the list became a powerful tool the officer in charge used to intimidate his suspects. He often began by reading from the list, as if to say, “we already have you right here.” But one might say it was the officer who was really trapped in the list. It ensnared him in its simple elegance, its clean straight lines and clear categories. He was not using the list as much as the list was using him. Traditionally it was not the witch that was of concern, but the act of witchcraft itself. If the relationship could be healed – thereby healing the victim – all was forgiven. The list transformed the accused from temporary, situational, and indefinite witches involved in local relational disputes to permanent, categorical witches in violation of state law. Traditional ways of dealing with witchcraft focused on healing relationships. The print culture of the state focuses on punishing the categorically “guilty” categorical individual. They were “sentenced” “by the book.” As an outsider, I was simply thought to be naïve about the workings of witchcraft. My protests were ignored (see Wesch). Ultimately it ended because making a list of witches proved to be even more difficult than making a list for the census. Along with the familiar challenges of shifting names and affiliations, the witch list made its own enemies. The moment somebody was listed all of their relations ceased recognising the list and those making it as authoritative. In the end, the same tensions that motivated Operation Clean and Sweep were only reproduced by the efforts to resolve them. The tensions demonstrated themselves to be more tenacious than anticipated, grounded as they are in pervasive self-sustaining cultural systems that do not overlap in a way that is significant enough to threaten their mutual existence. The relational ontology is embedded in rich and enduring local histories of gift exchange, marriage, birth, death, and conflict. Statecraft is embedded in a broader system of power, hierarchy, deadlines, roles, and rules. They are not simply matters of belief. In this way, the focus on witches and witchcraft could never resolve the tensions. Instead, the movement only exacerbated the relational tensions that inspire, extend, and maintain witchcraft beliefs, and once again people found themselves living in small, scattered hamlets, wishing they could somehow come together to live in large prosperous villages so their population numbers would be great enough to “talk” to the state, bringing in valuable services, and more importantly, securing their land and citizenship with Papua New Guinea. It is in this context that “kantri” not only embodies the tensions between local ways of life and the imperatives of the state, but also the persistent hope for resolution, and the haunting memories of previous failures. References Calhoun, Craig. Nationalism. Open UP, 1997. Knauft, Bruce. From Primitive to Postcolonial in Melanesia and Anthropology. Ann Arbor: U Michigan P, 1999. McArthur, JR. Telefomin Patrol Report 12 of 1962/63 Strathern, Marilyn. The Gender of the Gift. U California P, 1988. Scott, James. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. Yale UP, 1998. Wesch, Michael. “A Witch Hunt in New Guinea: Anthropology on Trial.” Anthropology and Humanism 32.1 (2007): 4-17.

While exploring the virtual world Second Life one day, I received a group message across the in-world communication system – “there’s a griefer on the beach. Stay away from the beach till we catch him.” There was no need to explain; everyone receiving the message knew what a griefer was and had a general idea of the kinds of things that could be happening. We’d all seen griefers at work before – someone monopolising the chat channel so no one else can communicate, people being “caged” at random, or even weapons fire causing so much “overhead” that all activity in the area slows to a crawl. These kinds of attacks are not limited to virtual worlds. Most people have experienced griefing in their everyday lives, which might best be defined as having fun at someone else’s expense. More commonly seen examples of this in the real world include teasing, bullying, and harassment; playground bullies have long made other children’s free time miserable. More destructive griefing includes arson and theft. Griefing activities happen in all kinds of games and virtual worlds. Griefers who laugh at new users and “yell” (so that all players can hear) that they stink, have followed new users of Disney’s tween-popular ToonTown. Griefers pose as friendly, helpful players who offer to show new users a path through difficult parts of a game, but then who abandon the new user in a spot where he or she does not have the skills to proceed. In World of Warcraft, a popular massively multiplayer online role playing game (MMORPG) created by Blizzard with more than seven million registered, if not active, users, griefers engage in what is known as corpse camping; they sit by a corpse, killing it over and over every time the player tries to get back into the game. The griefer gets a small number of experience points; the player being killed gets aggravated and has to wait out the griefing to play the game again (Warner & Raiter). Griefing in World of Warcraft was featured in an award nominated episode of the television program South Park, in which one character killed every other player he met. This paper considers different types of griefing, both in online games and virtual worlds, and then looks at the actions other players, those being griefed, take against griefers. A variety of examples from Second Life are considered because of the open-structure of the world and its developing nature. Definitions and Types Griefing in online environments such as video games and virtual worlds has been defined as “purposefully engaging in activities to disrupt the gaming experience of other players” (Mulligan & Patrovsky 250). The “purposeful” part of the definition means that accidental bumping and pushing, behaviours often exhibited by new users, are not griefing (Warner & Raiter). Rossingol defines a griefer as, “a player of malign intentions. They will hurt, humiliate and dishevel the average gamer through bending and breaking the rules of online games. ...They want glory, gain or just to partake in a malignant joy at the misfortune of others.” Davis, who maintains a gaming blog, describes Second Life as being populated by “those who build things and those who like to tear them down,” with the latter being the griefers who may be drawn to the unstructured anything-goes nature of the virtual world (qtd. in Girard). Definitions of griefing differ based on context. For instance, griefing has been examined in a variety of multi-player online games. These games often feature missions where players have to kill other players (PvP), behaviour that in other contexts such as virtual worlds would be considered griefing. Putting a monster on the trail of a player considered rude or unskilled might be a way to teach a lesson, but also an example of griefing (Taylor). Foo and Koivisto define griefing in MMORPGs as “play styles that disrupt another player’s gaming experience, usually with specific intention. When the act is not specifically intended to disrupt and yet the actor is the sole beneficiary, it is greed play, a subtle form of grief play” (11). Greed play usually involves actions that disrupt the game play of others but without technically breaking any game rules. A different way of looking at griefing is that it is a sign that the player understands the game or virtual world deeply enough to take advantage of ambiguities in the rules by changing the game to something new (Koster). Many games have a follow option; griefers pick a victim, stand near them, get as naked as possible, and then just follow them around without talking or explaining their actions (Walker). Another example is the memorial service in World of Warcraft for a player who died in real life. The service was interrupted by an attack from another clan; everyone at the memorial service was killed. It is not clear cut who the griefers actually were in this case – the mourners who chose to have their peaceful service in an area marked for player combat or the attackers following the rules for that area and working to earn points and progress in the game. In the case of the mourners, they were changing the rules of the game to suit them, to create something unique – a shared space to mourn a common friend. But they were definitely not playing by the rules. The attackers, considered griefers by many both in and outside of the game, did nothing that broke any rules of the game, though perhaps they broke rules of common decency (“World”); what they did does not fit into the definition of griefing, as much as do the actions of the mourners (Kotaku). Reshaping the game can be done to embed a new, sometimes political, message into the game. A group named Velvet Strike formed to protest US military action. They went into Counter Strike to bring a “message of peace, love and happiness to online shooters by any means necessary” (King). They placed spray painted graphics containing anti-war messages into the game; when confronted with people from other teams the Velvet Strike members refused to shoot (King). The group website contains “recipes” for non-violent game play. One “recipe” involved the Velvet Strike member hiding at the beginning of a mission and not moving for the rest of the game. The other players would shoot each other and then be forced to spend the rest of the game looking for the last survivor in order to get credit for the win. Similar behaviour has been tried inside the game America’s Army. Beginning March, 2006, deLappe, an artist who opposes the U.S. government’s involvement in Iraq, engaged in griefing behaviour by filling (spamming) the in-game text channel with the names of the people killed in the war; no one else can communicate on that channel. Even his character name, dead-in-Iraq, is an anti-war protest (deLappe). “I do not participate in the proscribed mayhem. Rather, I stand in position and type until I am killed. After death, I hover over my dead avatar’s body and continue to type. Upon being re-incarnated in the next round, I continue the cycle” (deLappe n.p.). What about these games and virtual worlds might lead people to even consider griefing? For one thing, they seem anonymous, which can lead to irresponsible behaviour. Players use fake names. Characters on the screen do not seem real. Another reason may be that rules can be broken in videogames and virtual worlds with few consequences, and in fact the premise of the game often seems to encourage such rule breaking. The rules are not always clearly laid out. Each game or world has a Terms of Service agreement that set out basic acceptable behaviour. Second Life defines griefing in terms of the Terms of Service that all users agree to when opening accounts. Abuse is when someone consciously and with malicious intent violates those terms. On top of that limited set of guidelines, each landowner in a virtual world such as Second Life can also set rules for their own property, from dress code, to use of weapons, to allowable conversation topics. To better understand griefing, it is necessary to consider the motivations of the people involved. Early work on categorising player types was completed by Bartle, who studied users of virtual worlds, specifically MUDs, and identified four player types: killers, achievers, socialisers, and explorers. Killers and achievers seem most relevant in a discussion about griefing. Killers enjoy using other players to get ahead. They want to do things to other people (not for or with others), and they get the most pleasure if they can act without the consent of the other player. Knowing about a game or a virtual world gives no power unless that knowledge can be used to gain some advantage over others and to enhance your standing in the game. Achievers want power and dominance in a game so they can do things to the game and master it. Griefing could help them feel a sense of power if they got people to do their will to stop the griefing behavior. Yee studied the motivations of people who play MMORPGs. He found that people who engage in griefing actually scored high in being motivated to play by both achieving and competition (“Facets”). Griefers often want attention. They may want to show off their scripting skills in the hope of earning respect among other coders and possibly be hired to program for others. But many players are motivated by a desire to compete and to win; these categories do not seem to be adequate for understanding the different types of griefing (Yee, “Faces of Grief”). The research on griefing in games has also suggested ways to categorise griefers in virtual worlds. Suler divides griefers into two types (qtd. in Becker). The first is those who grief in order to make trouble for authority figures, including the people who create the worlds. A few of the more spectacular griefing incidents seem designed to cause trouble for Linden Lab, the creators of Second Life. Groups attacked the servers that run Second Life, known as the grid, in October of 2005; this became known as the “gray goo attack” (Second Life; Wallace). Servers were flooded with objects and Second Life had to be taken off line to be restored from backups. More organised groups, such as the W-hats, the SL Liberation Army, and Patriotic Nigas engage in more large scale and public griefing. Some groups hope to draw attention to the group’s goals. The SL Liberation Army wants Linden Lab to open up the governance of the virtual world so that users can vote on changes and policies being implemented and limit corporate movement into Second Life (MarketingVox). Patriotic Nigas, with about 35 active members, want to slow the entry of corporations into Second Life (Cabron, “Who are Second Life’s”). One often discussed griefer attack in Second Life included a flood of pink flying penises directed against land owner and the first person to have made a profit of more than one million United States dollars in a virtual world, Anshe Chung, during a well-publicised and attended interview in world with technology news outlet CNET (Walsh, “Second Life Millionaire” ). The second type proposed by Suler is the griefer who wants to hurt and victimise others (qtd. in Becker). Individual players often go naked into PG-rated areas to cause trouble. Weapons are used in areas where weapons are banned. Second Life publishes a police blotter, which lists examples of minor griefing and assigned punishment, including incidents of disturbing the peace and violating community standards for which warnings and short bans have been issued. These are the actions of individuals for the most part, as were the people who exploited security holes to enter the property uninvited during the grand opening of Endemol’s Big Brother island in Second Life; guests to the opening were firebombed and caged. One of the griefers explained her involvement: Well I’m from The Netherlands, and as you might know the tv concept of big brother was invented here, and it was in all the newspapers in Holland. So I thought It would be this huge event with lots of media. Then I kinda got the idea ‘hey I could ruin this and it might make the newspaper or tv. So that’s what set me off, lol. (qtd. in Sklar) Some groups do grief just to annoy. The Patriotic Nigas claim to have attacked the John Edwards headquarters inside SL wearing Bush ‘08 buttons (Cabron, “John Edwards Attackers”), but it was not a political attack. The group’s founder, Mudkips Acronym (the name of his avatar in SL) said, “I’m currently rooting for Obama, but that doesn’t mean we won’t raid him or anything. We’ll hit anyone if it’s funny, and if the guy I want to be president in 2008’s campaign provides the lulz, we’ll certainly not cross him off our list” (qtd. in Cabron, “John Edwards Attackers”). If they disrupt a high profile event or site, the attack will be covered by media that can amplify the thrill of the attack, enhance their reputation among other griefers, and add to their enjoyment of the griefing. Part of the definition of griefing is that the griefer enjoys causing other players pain and disrupting their game. One resident posted on the SL blog, “Griefers, for the most part, have no other agenda other than the thrill of sneaking one past and causing a big noise. Until a spokesperson comes forward with a manifesto, we can safely assume that this is the work of the “Jackass” generation, out to disrupt things to show that they can“ (Scarborough). Usually to have fun, griefers go after individuals, rather than the owners and administrators of the virtual world and so fit into Suler’s second type of griefing. These griefers enjoy seeing others get angry and frustrated. As one griefer said: Understanding the griefer mindset begins with this: We don’t take the game seriously at all. It continues with this: It’s fun because you react. Lastly: We do it because we’re jerks and like to laugh at you. I am the fly that kamikazes into your soup. I am the reason you can’t have nice things … . If I make you cry, you’ve made my day. (Drake) They have fun by making the other players mad. “Causing grief is the name of his game. His objective is simple: Make life hell for anyone unlucky enough to be playing with him. He’s a griefer. A griefer is a player bent on purposely frustrating others during a multiplayer game” (G4). “I’m a griefer. It’s what I do,” the griefer says. “And, man, people get so pissed off. It’s great” (G4). Taking Action against Griefers Understanding griefing from the griefer point of view leads us to examine the actions of those being griefed. Suler suggests several pairs of opposing actions that can be taken against griefers, based on his experience in an early social environment called Palace. Many of the steps still being used fit into these types. He first describes preventative versus remedial action. Preventative steps include design features to minimise griefing. The Second Life interface includes the ability to build 3D models and to create software; it also includes a menu for land owners to block those features at will, a design feature that helps prevent much griefing. Remedial actions are those taken by the administrators to deal with the effects of griefing; Linden Lab administrators can shut down whole islands to keep griefer activities from spreading to nearby islands. The second pair is interpersonal versus technical; interpersonal steps involve talking to the griefers to get them to stop ruining the game for others, while technical steps prevent griefers from re-entering the world. The elven community in Second Life strongly supports interpersonal steps; they have a category of members in their community known as guardians who receive special training in how to talk to people bent on destroying the peacefulness of the community or disturbing an event. The creators of Camp Darfur on Better World island also created a force of supporters to fend off griefer attacks after the island was destroyed twice in a week in 2006 (Kenzo). Linden Lab also makes use of technical methods; they cancel accounts so known griefers can not reenter. There were even reports that they had created a prison island where griefers whose antics were not bad enough to be totally banned would be sent via a one-way teleporter (Walsh, “Hidden Virtual World Prison”). Some users of Second Life favour technical steps; they believe that new users should be held a fixed amount of time on the Orientation island which would stop banned users from coming back into the world immediately. The third is to create tools for average users or super users (administrators); both involve software features, some of which are available to all users to help them make the game good for them while others are available only to people with administrator privileges. Average users who own land have a variety of tools available to limit griefing behaviour on their own property. In Second Life, the land owner is often blamed because he or she did not use the tools provided to landowners by Linden Lab; they can ban individual users, remove users from the land, mute their conversation, return items left on the property, and prevent people from building or running scripts. As one landowner said, “With the newbies coming in there, I’ve seen their properties just littered with crap because they don’t know protective measures you need to take as far as understanding land control and access rights” (qtd. in Girard). Super users, those who work for Linden Lab, can remove a player from the game for a various lengths of time based on their behaviour patterns. Responses to griefers can also be examined as either individual or joint actions. Individual actions include those that land owners can take against individual griefers. Individual users, regardless of account type, can file abuse reports against other individuals; Linden Lab investigates these reports and takes appropriate action. Quick and consistent reporting of all griefing, no matter how small, is advocated by most game companies and user groups as fairly successful. Strangely, some types of joint actions have been not so successful. Landowners have tried to form the Second Life Anti-Griefing Guild, but it folded because of lack of involvement. Groups providing security services have formed; many event organisers use this kind of service. (Hoffman). More successful efforts have included the creation of software, such as SLBanLink.com, Karma, and TrustNet that read lists of banned users into the banned list on all participating property. A last category of actions to be taken against griefers, and a category used by most residents of virtual worlds, is to leave them alone—to ignore them, to tolerate their actions. The thinking is that, as with many bullies in real life, griefers want attention; when deprived of that, they will move on to find other amusements. Yelling and screaming at griefers just reinforces their bad behaviour. Users simply teleport to other locations or log off. They warn others of the griefing behaviour using the various in-world communication tools so they too can stay away from the griefers. Most of the actions described above are not useful against griefers for whom a bad reputation is part of their credibility in the griefer community. The users of Second Life who staged the Gray Goo denial of service attack in October, 2005 fit into that category. They did nothing to hide the fact that they wanted to cause massive trouble; they named the self-replicating object that they created Grief Spawn and discussed ways to bring down the world on griefer forums (Wallace) Conclusion The most effective griefing usually involves an individual or small group who are only looking to have fun at someone else’s expense. It’s a small goal, and as long as there are any other users, it is easy to obtain the desired effect. In fact, as word spreads of the griefing and users feel compelled to change their behaviour to stave off future griefer attacks, the griefers have fun and achieve their goal. The key point here is that everyone has the same goal – have fun. Unfortunately, for one group – the griefers – achieving their goal precludes other users from reaching theirs. Political griefers are less successful in achieving their goals. Political creative play as griefing, like other kinds of griefing, is not particularly effective, which is another aspect of griefing as error. Other players react with frustration and violence to the actions of griefers such as deLappe and Velvet-Strike. If griefing activity makes people upset, they are less open to considering the political or economic motives of the griefers. Some complaints are relatively mild; “I’m all for creative protest and what not, but this is stupid. It’s not meaningful art or speaking out or anything of the type, its just annoying people who are never going to change their minds about how awesome they think war is” (Borkingchikapa). Others are more negative: “Somebody really needs to go find where that asshole lives and beat the shit out of him. Yeah, it’s a free country and he can legally pull this crap, but that same freedom extends to some patriot kicking the living shit out of him” (Reynolds). In this type of griefing no one’s goals for using the game are satisfied. The regular users can not have fun, but neither do they seem to be open to or accepting of the political griefer’s message. This pattern of success and failure may explain why there are so many examples of griefing to disrupt rather then the politically motivated kind. It may also suggest why efforts to curb griefing have been so ineffective in the past. Griefers who seek to disrupt for fun would see it as a personal triumph if others organised against them. Even if they found themselves banned from one area, they could quickly move somewhere else to have their fun since whom or where they harass does not really matter. Perhaps not all griefing is in error, rather, only those griefing activities motivated by any other goal than have fun. People invest their time and energy in creating their characters and developing skills. 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