Academic literature on the topic 'Abuse of dominance'

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Journal articles on the topic "Abuse of dominance"

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Gjendemsjø, Ronny, Erling J. Hjelmeng, and Lars Sørgard. "Abuse of Collective Dominance: The Need for a New Approach." World Competition 36, Issue 3 (September 1, 2013): 355–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2013029.

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The purpose of this article is to discuss the application of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) Article 102 to abuse of collective dominance. We demonstrate that while the concept of collective dominance has developed in line with a sound economic approach focusing on coordinated effects, no genuine concept of abuse in such situations has been established. Instead, the concept of abuse has been closely linked to the abuse concept in single dominance cases. We argue that there is a need to adapt the concept of abuse to the particular challenges posed by collective dominance and that Article 102 TFEU should primarily focus on conduct having as its object or effect the strengthening of the collective dominant position by reinforcing the oligopolistic interdependence and the tightening of the oligopoly. In this respect, Article 102 represents an as yet underdeveloped tool.
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Friend, Mark. "LOYALTY REBATES AND ABUSE OF DOMINANCE." Cambridge Law Journal 77, no. 1 (March 2018): 25–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0008197318000193.

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THE recent judgment of the Court of Justice in Intel v Commission (Case C-413/14 P, EU:C:2017:632) deserves a cautious welcome for signalling a move to a more economics-based approach to the assessment of loyalty rebates under Article 102 TFEU, and for modulating the rigid legal presumptions that have characterised nearly four decades of case law. Yet it also represents a missed opportunity to provide a comprehensive analytical framework for one of the more unsatisfactory areas of EU competition law.
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Jianqin, Lei. "Legal Regulation on Abuse of Dominant Market Position in China’s Internet Field." Studies in Social Science Research 3, no. 4 (November 17, 2022): p152. http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/sssr.v3n4p152.

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The legal regulation of abuse of market dominance in the Internet field needs to comprehensively consider the characteristics of subject specificity, subjective malice, illegal behavior, and harmful consequences. The abuse of market dominance in the Internet field differs from other industries in behavior, mainly including monopoly prices, predatory pricing, restricted transactions, tying or attaching unreasonable trading conditions, differential treatment, etc. This paper analyzes the main abuse of market dominance in the Internet field through cases, and studies its relevant legal regulations and preventive measures.
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Dimitrova, Emilia. "Anti-Competitive Effect in the Context of Economic Competition Concepts." Yearbook of the Law Department 8, no. 9 (December 30, 2019): 290–317. http://dx.doi.org/10.33919/yldnbu.19.9.12.

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The anti-competitive effect is the hallmark of market dominance abuse. Neither the European Union Competition Law nor the Bulgarian Competition Law contains a legal definition of this term. It is linked to the term “competition“. The concept of competition is borrowed from economics. The interrelationship between market dominance and market dominance abuse outlines the subject-matter of this article. The present research examines the essence of the anticompetitive effect in the context of those economic concepts of competition that underlie the doctrines of market dominance.
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Fjell, Kenneth, and Lars SØrgard. "How to Test for Abuse of Dominance?" European Competition Journal 2, sup1 (July 2006): 69–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.5235/ecj.v2n1s.69.

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Oliveira, Gustavo de Paula e. "Abuse of dominance in the airport sector." Journal of Transport Literature 7, no. 1 (January 2013): 8–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/s2238-10312013000100002.

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This paper investigates the efficacy of the Competition Law in dealing the abuse of dominance in the European airport sector. Starting with discussion of whether airports are natural monopolies or may face real competition, it is followed by an analysis of special features about the sector and a comparison between the policies of the European Union Member States. It is found that above the variety of regulatory frameworks, scarce capacity issues and public subsidies, the EU Competition Law stands as a universal mechanism to protect customers from the abuse of the airports' dominant position. However, in reviewing the case law it concludes that EU Competition Law has been rarely enforced in the sector, which seems to be the result not only of the lack of incentives for airports to explore their dominant position but also of the risk of reducing the revenues generated from their commercial activities. Another possible reason is related to the fact that some airlines have shown that airport switching can be a credible threat. Finally, it follows the agreement that competition is a "first best" policy which provides the firms with the strongest incentives to give consumers what they need in terms of price and quality. In the airport sector, it can be a good instrument against a regulator that has been acting in the interests of the national airline or even be part of a liberalization process.
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Tolman, Richard M. "The Validation of the Psychological Maltreatment of Women Inventory." Violence and Victims 14, no. 1 (January 1999): 25–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1891/0886-6708.14.1.25.

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To evaluate the validity of the Psychological Maltreatment of Women Inventory (PMWI), 100 women were interviewed. Both PMWI subscales (dominance/isolation and emotional/verbal) successfully discriminated among three groups: physically abused women (BW) scored significantly higher than both relationship distressed/nonabused (RD) and relationship satisfied/nonabused women (RS). Both subscales of the PMWI were highly correlated with the nonphysical abuse subscale of the Index of Spouse Abuse (ISA). A 14-item short version of the PMWI also successfully discriminated between the BW and RD groups. When the battered women were divided into service seeking (SB) and nonservice seeking battered women (CB), a more complex picture emerged. The SB group scored significantly higher than the RD and RS group on all PMWI long and short subscales. However, the CB group differed from the RD group only on the short dominance/isolation subscale.
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Heimler, Alberto. "Abuse of Dominance: How Far are the EU and the US?" Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice 25, no. 1 (April 1, 2007): 31–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1332/251569207x15664516463925.

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Abstract In recent years economic analysis has become more and more important in antitrust enforcement in Europe. First in merger control, then in vertical agreements the case by case approach based on a substantive appreciation of the restrictions of competition is becoming more and more prevalent. On abuse of dominance the difference between the US and the EU is still relevant. However, especially after the December 2005 publication by the European Commission of the Discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses the gap has been reduced, at least in terms of the general approach to abuse cases. In practice, even though the role of economic analysis is much more refined and relevant than in the past, the European Commission continues to be more interventionist than US antitrust enforcers. This outcome depends very much on the widespread use of presumptions and truncated analysis on both sides of die Atlantic. A number of examples are provided on predation, discounts, refusal to deal, tying and bundling.
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Kwok, Kelvin Hiu Fai. "Abuse of Dominance in the Hong Kong Television Sector." World Competition 45, Issue 4 (December 1, 2022): 445–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2022020.

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This article critically evaluates legal developments in relation to the regulation of abuse of dominance in the Hong Kong television sector, focusing on the milestone case of Television Broadcasts Ltd (TVB). The TVB case was decided under the previous sectoral competition regime under the Broadcasting Ordinance (BO) and has since 2015 been replaced by the crosssector Competition Ordinance (CO). Nevertheless, the decisions of the Communications Authority (CA) and the Court of First Instance (CFI) in 2013 and 2016 respectively provided important insights on the application of the small but significant and non-transitory decrease in quality (SSNDQ) test in two-sided markets and the ‘purpose/object’ and ‘effect’ tests to exclusivity practices, and more generally, the analysis of abuse of buyer power in a labour market setting. Hong Kong competition authorities are likely to be confronted with similar issues as they gradually expand their enforcement activities into digital markets and abuse of market power scenarios beyond the broadcasting sector. The purpose of this article is to subject the TVB decisions, in respect of their analysis of market definition, market power, the abusive conduct, and the remedial aspect, to in-depth critique. It situates the issues in the broader context of the crosssector CO under which future cases of abuse of dominance in Hong Kong will be scrutinized. abuse of dominance, Hong Kong, television, TVB, SSNDQ, two-sided markets, exclusivity, abuse of buyer power, labour, remedy
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Weber, Franziska, and Roger Van den Bergh. "The German Facebook Saga: Abuse of Dominance or Abuse of Competition Law?" World Competition 44, Issue 1 (March 1, 2021): 29–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2021003.

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This article provides a critical analysis of the German Facebook case and stresses the limits of competition law. Facebook’s terms and conditions regarding the use of Off-Facebook data were qualified as an exploitative abuse at various stages of the German Facebook proceedings. However, it is far from certain that Facebook would have written its terms any different if it was operating on a competitive market. From an economic viewpoint the market failure at hand is a pervasive information asymmetry rather than market power. Therefore, it is doubtful that the correct response lies within competition law. If competition rules must be rewritten in order to cope with market failures in digital markets, there is a serious risk that the abuse found is not an abuse of market power but an abuse of the market power provisions in competition law. Alternative routes that can be found in consumer contract, unfair competition or data protection laws might be viable options. The latter rules can be applied without a complicated finding of causality between market dominance and the use of ‘unfair’ contract terms. Admittedly, also the information paradigm can be called into question but amending rules of contract law avoids Herculean interpretations of competition law that go against a broadly supported ‘more economic approach’. Abusing competition law or enhancing contract law to improve the efficiency of digital markets, that is the question. Facebook case, goals of competition law, market failures, data law, information disclosure, consent, signing-without-reading problem, abuse of dominance, unfair contract terms, unfair commercial practice
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Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Abuse of dominance"

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Kolarczyková, Eva. "Kolektivní dominance v soutěžním právu a její zneužití." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2012. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-196979.

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The aim of the diploma thesis is a comprehensive analysis of the concept of collective dominance, in particular with reference to the evaluation of its applicability and utility in practice. The first chapter deals with the main features of the oligopoly market and Czech and European legal provisions on the abuse of a dominant position and mergers within which it has evolved. On base of the analysis of Court of Justice and General Court judgements the second chapter explains the notion of the collective dominance and examines the obligatory conditions of the collective dominance, as well as the factors which influence these conditions. The third chapter concerns the concept of collective dominance with regard to competition law taxonomy. It compares not only the test of collective dominance applied pursuant to the article 102 TFEU with the test applied according to the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, but also the concept of collective dominance with the agreements pursuant to the article 101 TFEU. It also deals with abusive practices typical for oligopolies. Beside the explanation of the UK legislation the last two chapters illustrate decisions of competition authorities in the Czech Republic and in the United Kingdom and analyse and compare them. The diploma thesis is concluded by the analysis of main shortcomings of the concept of collective dominance and the evaluation of actual state of the examined topic with the aim to abstractly summarize knowledge gained through the thesis.
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Mallen, Guillaume. "L'appréhension des pratiques restrictives par les autorités françaises et européennes de la concurrence." Thesis, La Rochelle, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013LAROD033.

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Définies comme des pratiques contractuelles abusives dans les rapports entre professionnels, les pratiques restrictives amoindrissent considérablement la capacité concurrentielle du partenaire commercial. Le droit de la concurrence et plus particulièrement, le droit des pratiques anticoncurrentielles peut constituer une voie de droit permettant la répression de ces comportements. L’étude menée permet de s’interroger sur l’efficacité de l’entente et des abus de domination, entendus comme concepts d’accueil, afin de lutter contre les pratiques restrictives. Alors même que les abus de domination présentent des points de convergence importants avec la notion de «pratique restrictive », l’appréhension est profondément nuancée. Les exigences textuelles inhérentes à la démonstration de l’abus de position dominante (102 TFUE et art. L.420-2, al. 1er du Code de commerce) sont drastiques et l’appréciation de l’abus de dépendance économique en droit français (art. L.420-2, al. 2 du Code de commerce) est si étroite qu’elle ne permet pas de faciliter la captation positive des pratiques restrictives. En outre, la preuve de la restriction de concurrence est difficile à rapporter en présence de comportements qui atteignent, le plus souvent, le simple partenaire contractuel et non le marché entendu dans sa globalité. Paradoxalement, si l’entente apparaît comme un concept peu ressemblant dans ses composantes à la notion de «pratique restrictive », l’appréhension y est privilégiée. Afin de faciliter la mutation de la pratique en comportement concerté, les autorités de concurrence procèdent à une lecture généreuse du critère de la concertation. La restriction de concurrence fait également l’objet d’une appréciation compréhensive. Que l’appréhension soit opérée au titre de l’entente ou des abus de domination, des pistes de réflexion sont proposées afin de perfectionner le traitement concurrentiel des pratiques restrictives
Defined as unfair contractual practices in relations between professionals, restrictive practices significantly undermine the competitiveness of the trading partner. Competition law and, more specifically, antitrust law can be a remedy to the suppression of these behaviours. The study raises questions about the effectiveness of the cartel and abuse of dominance in the fight against restrictive practices. The analysis tends to gauge their understanding through the prism of the two concepts that are cartels and abuse of dominance. Even as abuse of dominance have important points of convergence with the concept of “restrictive practice”, apprehension is deeply nuanced. Textual requirements inherent in the demonstration of the abuse of dominant position (102 TFUE andart. L.420-2, al. 1 of the Commercial Code) are drastic and appreciation of the abuse of economic dependence in French law (art. L.420-2, al. 2 of the Commercial Code) is so narrow that it does not facilitate the positive uptake of restrictive practices. In addition, evidence of the competition restriction is difficult to bring in conduct that reach, in most cases, the mere contractual partner and not the market heard in its entirety. Paradoxically, if the cartels appears to be a bit like concept in its components to the concept of “restrictive practice ", apprehension is preferred. To facilitate the transfer of practice concerted behaviour, competition authorities proceed to a generous reading of the meeting of minds. Competition restriction is also the subject of a comprehensive appreciation. That apprehension is made under the cartel or abuse of dominant position, actionable insights are proposed to improve the competitive treatment of restrictive practices
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Lovdahl, Gormsen Liza. "Is there a tension between the goals of protecting economic freedom and the promotion of consumer welfare in the application of Article 82 EC?" Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 2007. http://www.manchester.ac.uk/escholar/uk-ac-man-scw:111421.

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Article 82 is traditionally analysed as a tool to integrate and liberalise the European Single Market and to protect competition from distortion. As such there is no comprehensive discussion of the tensions that lie at the centre of the objective of protecting competition in the current rethinking of Article 82. With regard to exclusionary abuses, DG Competition has articulated that the main objective of Article 82 is the protection of competition in the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. This statement may conflict with some of the case law protecting the economic freedom of the market players derived from ordoliberalism. The latter is a well respected German legal tradition that holds both that government needs to be restrained from abuse of power, and that the free market has its limits. Economic rights deserve protection and vigilance is needed to ensure economic power is not misused or abused, not only in the interests of consumer welfare, but also in the interests of the economic liberty of the individual. This thesis considers the tension between the goals of protecting economic freedom and the promotion of consumer welfare in the application of Article 82. Presupposing that economic freedom and consumer welfare are in opposition to one another, such tension is only set to intensify and must be given appropriate weight in considering the extent to which DG Competition can or should try to move to a consumer welfare standard. Changing the interpretation of protection of competition from economic freedom to consumer welfare within Article 82 can undermine a fundamental right if economic freedom is considered a fundamental right in the Community legal order. However, consumer welfare can also be seen as an opportunity, if properly debated or agreed to by the ECJ, to adopt a more economics-based approach to Article 82.
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Adeleke, Olufolahan. "Assessing Exclusionary Conduct in Abuse of Dominance: the relevance of the Extraterritoriality Rule and Public Interest for Developing Countries." Master's thesis, University of Cape Town, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/4637.

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Competition Law is governed by empowering legislation. Legislation in most developing and third world economies are mostly fashioned after the existing framework of legislation originating from the European Union (EU) or the United States of America (USA). While a lot of these pieces of legislation are often modified to suit the needs of these developing countries, it is usually not the case that a cautious approach is taken to ensure that imported legislation is designed to meet the specific national challenges of such a country. The Courts in most jurisdictions especially in the USA and the EU have attempted to deal with the lapse in competition legislations by giving landmark decisions on significant issues like dominant firms and their unilateral exclusionary behaviors. The big question to consider in this dissertation is how competition laws should apply to dominant firms. This question has raised much interest in recent years. Aside from establishing which firms have substantial market power that can harm competition, there have been difficulties in distinguishing competition on the merits from mere anticompetitive conduct. This is more obvious in the case of unilateral exclusionary behaviors and will be the central focus in this dissertation.
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Greiss, Mourad. "Evaluating the influence of EU competition rules and Islamic principles on the treatment of abuse of dominance under Egyptian competition law." Thesis, University of Sussex, 2011. http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/7581/.

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Egypt faced three central pressures to introduce its own competition law in 2005: first, EU/Egypt trade relations, second, introduction of the 1991 privatisation programme and third, its long-term desire by virtue of its Constitution to follow Islamic principles that condemn monopoly. However, Egypt was not forced to transplant EU rules as a result of EU/Egypt trade relations, although it is implicit that the EU deems it desirable to do so. By employing the functional method of comparative law for the purposes of the study on EU, Islamic, and Egyptian laws, the central argument of this thesis is that the Egyptian treatment of abuse of dominance is distinctive in three ways. First, Egyptian rules do not prohibit the practice of excessive pricing. Although in jurisdictions that prohibit it, most notably the EU system, competition authorities do not contemplate it as an investigation priority, it is argued that the lack of its prohibition raises Islamic law concerns and may lead to potential effects on the Egyptian economy. However, the difficulties which investigators face in settling such practice (as the South African Mittal case demonstrates) suggest that the Egyptian legislator may have adopted the right approach not to prohibit it; otherwise, this may have increased the likelihood of committing type II errors and, as a result, violate Islamic law principles of injustice. Second, in contrast with EU law, Egyptian rules do not cover the practice of below-cost margin squeeze. Although it is argued that its omission does not pose potential effects to the economy, it is suggested that it raises Islamic law concerns on the basis of fairness and intentions principles. Given that it is relatively easier to investigate, compared to excessive pricing, it is suggested that the Egyptian legislator should re-consider encompassing it in the future while drawing on the approach adopted in EU law. Third, the Egyptian Competition Law reflects the EU Commission‘s initiative of employing an effects-based approach to abuse of dominance. However, the Egyptian system, arguably influenced by the Islamic principles on market intervention, goes a little further to require an actual effects standard. Despite an effects-based analysis being difficult to employ in emerging economies with inadequate economic expertise like Egypt, it is argued in its favour for two reasons. First, it increases the chances of avoiding type II errors, which, similar to excessive pricing and margin squeeze, violate Islamic law and; second, the Egyptian Competition Authority‘s analysis in the Steel study shows that it is capable of employing this approach at this stage. For the purposes of re-considering the foregoing (gaps) in the future, the Egyptian Competition Authority should focus on increasing economic expertise and seek technical assistance from competition authorities of the developed world.
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Sundkvist, Hillevi. "Business Strategy or Abuse of Dominance : An Analysis of Different Approaches Towards Self-Preferencing Within the Meaning of Article 102 TFEU." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Juridiska institutionen, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-378389.

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An undertaking enjoying a dominant position on the internal market has many possibilities to flourish and develop. One way of increasing market power is to expand business activities to downstream markets. An undertaking that is dominant on the upstream market can thus take advantage of its dominance when engaging in business conduct on the downstream market. However, taking advantage of such a position can in some circumstances lead to an infringement of Article 102 TFEU. Recent cases from the EU courts and the EU Commission have, however, demonstrated uncertainties concerning the ways in which the article should be applied.   The purpose of the thesis has been to examine different approaches towards the application of Article 102 TFEU in situations where vertically integrated dominant undertakings are favouring their own downstream operations to the prejudice of competitors. The research question concerns whether there exists a general duty for vertically integrated dominant undertakings not to discriminate in favour of their own downstream operations.   The overall theme of the thesis is the difficulties in drawing a line between legitimate business strategies and abusive business conduct. When intervening against businesses, competition authorities have an important task in balancing the potentially conflicting interests of free competition and counteracting market imperfections. While it is important to encourage business development and innovation, it is also vital to ensure the functioning of the internal market. Discussions concerning these ideas are being held with reference to case law from the EU courts as well as from decisions and statements from the European Commission.   The findings of the thesis show that there has been a noteworthy inconsistency in the application of Article 102 TFEU. A discrepancy in the approaches towards the article has been found, both concerning the main goals of the article as well as the circumstances in which it should be applied. The conclusion is that it is not possible to state that there is a general duty not to discriminate in favour of an undertaking’s own downstream operations. Nevertheless, indications in the direction of such a duty do exist. Finally, the outcome of the analysis suggests that the inconsistency and ambiguities in the law enforcement can result in an infringement of legal certainty.
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Ferrari, Ursula. "The Microsoft Case : A reflection on the tying of Windows Media Player and the Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 (Case-COMP/C-3/37.792)." Thesis, Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, 2005. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-104.

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Master’s Thesis in Competition Policy Title: ”The Microsoft Case – A reflection on the tying of Windows Media Player and the Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 (Case COMP/C- 3/37.792)” Author: Ursula Ferrari Tutor: Göran Wahlgren Date: [2005-05-23] Subject terms: Competition Policy, EU law, Abuse of dominance, tying Abstract This Master’s thesis is an analysis of the European Commission Decision in the Microsoft Case-COMP/C-3/37.792 and the tying as an abusive practice prohibited by Article 82 of the EC Treaty. In this case the European Commission (Commission) applied a rule-of-reason approach for the first time to Microsoft’s tying practice and considered it to be anticompetitive. Microsoft tied its Windows Media Player (WMP) to its client operating system Windows and after a thorough analysis done by the Commission, Microsoft was considered to have abused its dominant position. In the past the Commission and the European Court of Justice used a per se illegality approach to tying practices and it was enough to establish that a company which applied the tying strategy was dominant in the tying product market. The hostile approach taken by the Commission and the ECJ has been criticized by economists mainly because tying is a commonly applied business strategy in the world economy and companies apply this be-cause of the economic efficiencies that this business strategy leads to. The efficiency gains are indirectly past on to the consumers in the form of product quality and innovation, reduced transaction costs and lower prices. It is argued that tying in fact increase consumer welfare. Economists would therefore rather see a per se legality approach or at least a rule-of-reason approach in the future. Due to the complexity of the Microsoft case, the Commission had to do a thorough analysis of the actual impact that the tying of WMP had on the market and the foreclosure effects that this strategy might lead to. This was therefore the first time that a rule-of-reason approach was applied on the matter of tying. However, after the Commission’s Decision of the Microsoft case there is still uncertainty in this matter. There is a strong need for future clarification. Microsoft Corporation has lodged an appeal against the Commission’s Decision with the European Court of Justice but it will take several years before the ECJ will be able to give a final judgement of the case. Until then the legal certainty is yet still very unclear.

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Giesecke, Jacob. "Multiple Sides, Multiple Challenges : The Need for a Uniform Approach in Defining the Relevant Product Market in Abuse of Dominance Cases on Multi-Sided Markets." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Juridiska institutionen, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-363381.

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The study shows that multi-sided markets pose difficulties when the relevant product market is to be defined. These difficulties pertain to two questions. The first question is whether one or several markets should be defined. In this regard, it is not easy to extract a coherent method from the cases examined. Instead, the methods applied give the impression of ad hoc-solutions, where similar circumstances result in dissimilar outcomes. Indeed, it is hard to reconcile the different market definitions in Visa International MIF and MasterCard MIF. The uncertainties are not limited to these two cases, as the methods applied in Google Shopping too give rise to ambiguities. Why was the market for general search engine platforms separated into two distinct product markets, but the market for comparison shopping services encompassed both sides? Unfortunately, this discussion was not present in the decision. This only serves to reinforce the impression that these questions are solved on an ad hoc-basis. A clear method of approaching multi-sided markets is desirable, not least because the enforcement of competition rules must be characterized by consistency and foreseeability. Hopefully, the judgement in Google Shopping will bring further clarity to this. Nonetheless, the conclusion is that one market should be defined when differences between competitive constraints on the two sides are absent. E contrario, this means that two markets should be defined when such differences are present. This is true regardless of the market in question being a transaction or a non-transaction market. This method seems preferable to strictly adhering to the division of multi-sided markets into transaction or non-transaction markets. If the Commission’s analysis is correct in that there are no differences in competitive constraints on the two sides of comparison shopping services, in combination with crossing network effects, the platform’s multi-sidedness is a necessary trait for both sides. This means that a substitute has to be multi-sided in order for it to be included on the relevant product market, which minimizes the risk for false negatives. Vice versa, the definition of two markets allows for one-sided products to be included on the relevant product market, which minimizes the risk for false positives. This is important not only for the binary finding of dominance or non-dominance, but also the degree of dominance. As concluded above, incorrectly defining one market may artificially inflate the degree of dominance into false super-dominance, and incorrectly defining several markets may artificially dilute the degree of dominance. The second question is how substitutability should be measured. It is obvious from the cases examined that qualitative measures are used and not quantitative measures. The products’ characteristics, intended use, purpose, functionalities, users’ perceptions of the product, etc. were given much attention. The SSNIP test was not applied in any of the cases. The first conclusion to be drawn from the examination above is therefore that the difficulties regarding measuring substitutability on multi-sided markets mainly concern quantitative measures. The arguments against applying a SSNIP test related to the cellophane fallacy (in two different forms, one of which was deceivingly similar to the reverse cellophane fallacy) and differences in price sensitivities between the two sides. Network effects present an additional difficulty, which may lead to exaggerated results when measuring substitutability. The second conclusion to be drawn is that there exists a reluctance to apply a SSNIP test in a way that is tailored for multi-sided markets. One method that has been proposed is to apply the test on the total sum paid by both sides, while allowing the intermediary to adjust the increase in price in accordance with its price structure. The categorical dismissal of applying the test in this way suggests that adapted versions have some time to wait before being introduced into case law and decisional practice. If they, as their proponents argue, are a robust way of broadening the evidence of possible substitutability, this is unfortunate. The risk of defining the market overly narrow or overly broad is of course present in this regard as well. A broader spectrum of evidence therefore minimizes the risk of incorrectly finding both dominance and non-dominance.
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ANZINI, MARTINA. "Abuso di posizione dominante e tutela dell'accesso al farmaco: prospettive e limiti." Doctoral thesis, Università Politecnica delle Marche, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/11566/253174.

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Il quesito attorno al quale si articola il lavoro è se nell'interpretazione del diritto della concorrenza vi sia spazio per accordare rilevanza a regole e aspettative condivise nella società in cui esso trova applicazione. La questione è importante perché tali regole ed aspettative, che nel lavoro vengono denominate "valori sociali", trovano oggi ostruite le proprie tradizionali vie di accesso alla tutela giuridica. Si è quindi scelto di analizzare alcune recenti ipotesi di antitrust enforcement per verificare se il percorso interpretativo prospettato sia già stato intrapreso. Ciò ha reso necessario circoscrivere la domanda di ricerca al valore sociale "accesso al medicinale essenziale". Inoltre, l'analisi viene condotta in relazione alla sola fattispecie dell'abuso di posizione dominante, che, per svariati motivi, è più permeabile di altre ai valori sociali. L'analisi empirica concerne quindi alcune ipotesi di condotte unilaterali anticoncorrenziali recentemente riscontrate nel settore farmaceutico, il cui comune denominatore risiede in una lettura dell'art. 102 TFUE socialmente utile: nei casi Aspen e Pfizer-Flynn le autorità garanti hanno ravvisato negli aumenti di prezzo praticati dalle imprese, palesemente finalizzati a sfruttare i consumatori di farmaci essenziali, due ipotesi di unfair pricing; nei casi AstraZeneca e Pfizer, invece, le imprese in posizione dominante sono incorse nei rigori del diritto della concorrenza in virtù del loro comportamento opportunistico, consistente in una manomissione del sistema regolatorio del brevetto farmaceutico che ha danneggiato concorrenti, pazienti-consumatori e servizi sanitari-clienti. Al termine del percorso argomentativo la domanda riceve risposta positiva: l'antitrust ha conferito e può effettivamente conferire rilevanza a valori ed aspirazioni latenti nel tessuto sociale. Occorre, tuttavia, una precisazione: l'ermeneutica del diritto della concorrenza trova la propria cifra caratteristica nel carattere composito della fattispecie cui accede, rispetto alla quale la teoria economica svolge il ruolo fondamentale di co-definitrice della regola. Dovendo riflettere tale complessità, l'interpretazione non può limitarsi a tendere la lettera della norma in questo o quel senso, ma deve restituire una lettura economicamente solida della condotta d'impresa vietata. Ne deriva che la teoria economica concorre a tracciare le prospettive ed i limiti dell'antitrust rispetto alla tutela ai valori sociali.
The thesis aims at assessing whether social values are or can become relevant to competition law interpretation, thus constituting a theoretical effort to grant those values a further way of satisfaction. The exploration of such new path has gained importance in the last decades, due to the decline of the legal concepts that have traditionally protected the most basic social aspirations. The question needs, however, to be circumscribed if it is to be tested empirically. Therefore, the thesis focusses on whether access to essential drugs has gained relevance to the interpretation of the abuse of dominant position. Following the specification of the question, a few recent cases characterized by a socially oriented application of Art. 102 TFEU are examined in depth. Notably, the analysis concerns two cases of unfair pricing (Aspen and Pfzer-Flynn), as they were obviously useful to contrast the exploitative behaviour of the firms against consumers of essential medicines, as well as two cases of regulatory gaming. In our view, the latters are to be considered significant attempts to fight the opportunistic strategies of firms, which are equally detrimental to competitors as well as to patients-consumers and health care systems-clients. The analysis leads to the conclusion that competition law interpretation can, as suggested at the start of the essay, confer relevance to some shared aspirations running deep in the social context. An element needs, however, to be taken into due consideration: the hermeneutics of competition law find its distinctive mark in the complex nature of the norm, which is co-defined by law and economics, thus making it impossible to undertake a creative interpretative process while ignoring the identity of the forbidden conduct as elaborated by the economic theory. This leads to the conclusion that the boundaries of a socially oriented interpretation mainly identify with the limits of antitrust economics.
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Springall, Apiradee Kongcharoen. "Does ASEAN need a supranational approach to its competition law and policy to create a highly competitive AEC? : case studies on abuse of dominance in Singapore and Thailand." Thesis, University of Essex, 2017. http://repository.essex.ac.uk/19693/.

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ASEAN aimed to create a highly competitive, single market, production-based AEC in 2015 by applying strategic measures set out in the AEC Blueprint. However, after seven years of its adoption, the deadline has become merely the beginning of the AEC, not the finished line. Since November 2015, ASEAN has adopted the AEC Blueprint 2025 which aims to create a competitive, innovative, and dynamic AEC by 2025. One of the measures ASEAN uses is ensuring effective competition policy through greater harmonisation and convergence of national competition law. The key concept of this thesis is competitiveness. It applies Professor Michael E Porter’s concept of competitive advantage and gathers 15 years of data on the ASEAN Member States’ competitiveness. And it questions whether competition law and policy attribute to a nation’s competitiveness. If yes, to what extent. Then it questions whether it is necessary for ASEAN to take a supranational approach to become a competitive region because ASEAN has its own norm of cooperation, the ASEAN way, which is ingrained in ASEAN since its establishment. And it is now formally recognised in the ASEAN Charter. The results show that competition law and policy is not a sole key determinant of competitiveness. Having a low degree of market concentration, effective competition law and policy, and efficient goods market does not necessarily correlate to high competitiveness. A country’s competitiveness is affected by its stage of development too. Additionally, the political economy of a country has a certain degree of effect on efficiency in competition law enforcement. However, the determinant factor of efficient competition law enforcement lies on political will rather than type of the government administration as in the case of Taiwan and South Korea. The disparities in the economic development of AMSs are obvious. Therefore, trying to harmonise AMSs’ competition law and policy using an all-sector approach is not recommended and proved difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, a supranational approach is not compatible with the ASEAN way. Hence, a sectoral approach is more likely to help ASEAN achieve its goal. ASEAN has already begun its own sectoral approach to competitiveness in the aviation market. The Aviation Agreements which the AMSs have signed between them provide much more details and commitments on competition rules concerning this industry than in the Regional Guidelines 2010. The application of sectoral approach alongside with the comprehensive approach to competition law and policy to enhance competitiveness of the relevant market is practiced in many countries. Examples of how regulatory body in electricity in the US, the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea collaborate with their competition agencies provide evidence that it is possible and efficient. Therefore, ASEAN does not need a supranational approach to improve its competitiveness regarding competition law and policy. This thesis suggests that ASEAN should pursue a sectoral approach in dealing with competition issues among member state the ASEAN way.
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Books on the topic "Abuse of dominance"

1

Competition, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Joint Group on Trade and. Competition and trade effects of abuse of dominance. Paris: OECD, 2000.

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Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Joint Group on Trade and Competition. Competition and trade effects of abuse of dominance. Paris, France: OECD, 2000.

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Williams, Stanley Tookie. Gangs and the abuse of power. New York: PowerKids Press, 1996.

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Refusal to license intellectual property rights as abuse of dominance. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2010.

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Gormsen, Liza Lovdahl. A principled approach to abuse of dominance in European competition law. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

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Gormsen, Liza Lovdahl. A principled approach to abuse of dominance in European competition law. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

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A principled approach to abuse of dominance in European competition law. New: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

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The German and Romanian abuse of market dominance in the light of Article 102 TFEU. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011.

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Bureau, Canada Competition. Enforcement guidelines on the abuse of dominance provisions (sections 78 and 79 of the Competition Act). Hull, QC: Competition Bureau = Bureau de la concurrence, 2001.

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García, Ernesto Rengifo. Del abuso del derecho al abuso de la posición dominante. 2nd ed. Bogotá: Universidad Externado de Colombia, 2004.

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Book chapters on the topic "Abuse of dominance"

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Akman, Pinar. "Abuse of Dominance." In Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 2–10. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7753-2_561.

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Akman, Pinar. "Abuse of Dominance." In Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, 1–9. New York, NY: Springer New York, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_561-1.

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Adam, Markus. "Price Abuse Due to Market Dominance." In SpringerBriefs in Law, 61–73. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-44884-8_4.

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Rodger, Barry J., and Angus MacCulloch. "The Control of Abuse of Dominance." In Competition Law and Policy in the EU and UK, 222–93. 6th ed. London: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780429955181-6.

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Rodger, Barry, and Andreas Stephan. "Anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance." In Brexit and Competition Law, 19–41. London: Routledge, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9781351105446-2.

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Beneke Avila, Francisco Eduardo. "Entry Analysis in Abuse of Dominance Cases." In Market Entry and Competition Law in Latin America, 107–57. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-62347-3_8.

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Gupta, Indranath, Vishwas H. Devaiah, and Dipesh A. Jain. "CCI’s Investigation of Abuse of Dominance: Adjudicatory Traits in Prima Facie Opinion." In Complications and Quandaries in the ICT Sector, 185–200. Singapore: Springer Singapore, 2017. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-6011-3_9.

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Jenny, Frederic. "Abuse of Dominance by Firms Charging Excessive or Unfair Prices: An Assessment." In Excessive Pricing and Competition Law Enforcement, 5–70. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-92831-9_2.

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Marshall, Vida, and Suman Niranjan. "Domestic Violence in College Students: The Effects of Male Dominance and Substance Abuse." In Global Business Transcendence, 1–15. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781137412591_1.

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Lamping, Matthias. "Refusal to Licence as an Abuse of Market Dominance: From Commercial Solvents to Microsoft." In MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 121–45. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54704-1_7.

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Conference papers on the topic "Abuse of dominance"

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Salomão e Ribeiro, Ana Letícia. "Abuse of the dominant position: function versus structure in outwardly equal contractual relationships." In XXVI World Congress of Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy. Initia Via, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.17931/ivr2013_wg139_02.

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Chen, Jiyin, and Lanfang Fei. "Research on the Burden of Proof in Litigation of Abuse of Dominant Market Position." In 7th Annual International Conference on Social Science and Contemporary Humanity Development (SSCHD 2021). Paris, France: Atlantis Press, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.211215.016.

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Arsov, Boris. "The mobile telecom operator T-Mobile Macedonia AD Skopje abuses its dominant position harmful for the mobile telecom operators ONE and VIP in the telecom market." In University for Business and Technology International Conference. Pristina, Kosovo: University for Business and Technology, 2015. http://dx.doi.org/10.33107/ubt-ic.2015.85.

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Vučković, Jelena. "PRUŽANjE MEDIJSKIH USLUGA I PRAVO PRIVATNOSTI." In XV Majsko savetovanje: Sloboda pružanja usluga i pravna sigurnost. University of Kragujevac, Faculty of Law, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.46793/xvmajsko.601v.

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The development of the Internet creates new forms of communication, which provide the possibility of equalizing media content and global media influence. The Internet, as a new platform for broadcasting the program, changed the conditions of media functioning and created a disbalance between the freedom of the media and the rights of those to whom the information relates. The number of media service, providers and their need for profit-making has led to the fact that sensationalism has become a dominant way of attracting public attention. In this regard, the information from the private lives of individuals, whether ordinary citizens or public figures, come to the center of interest, and often cross the limits prescribed by the norms of the laws and codes of media service providers that regulate this field. Moreover, the quality of this information is controversial from the aspect of their accuracy (truthfulness) and completeness (objectivity). On the other hand, the existence of media legislation is not a guarantee of the existence of independent media. Media and media content can only be a facade of latent abuse of state, political, economic, or religious power. One of the ways to draw attention to contemporary social issues is an overflowing influence in the private sphere of citizens, and they themselves, often unconsciously, participate in this process, leaving data from their private lives, excessive interest etc. The lack of adequate and effective media legislation creates space for the state's arbitrariness and an unlimited and "discretionary" power of political power.
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Plotnic, Olesea. "INTERACTION BETWEEN CONSUMER LAW AND COMPETITION LAW IN PANDEMIC TIMES." In International Jean Monnet Module Conference of EU and Comparative Competition Law Issues "Competition Law (in Pandemic Times): Challenges and Reforms. Faculty of Law, Josip Juraj Strossmayer University of Osijek, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.25234/eclic/18835.

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If in the case of consumer law, as protected persons are the consumers, then in the case of competition law, the protected entities are the competitors. A combination of actions in competition law presupposes that the same commercial offer satisfies several individual interests of consumers. In the strictest sense, such a combination implies the same legal fact, simultaneously opening up more possibilities for the consumer to choose due to loyal offers from a professional, if he is monopolistic or dominant in the market. More broadly, it can also be accepted that offers can be combined from several competing professionals relating to the same product or service and concerning the same individual interest of a consumer. The possible complementary effects of common law, which would justify the non-limitation of a specific piece of legislation, can never lead to a new monopoly. In some cases this will make competition law more effective and, in other cases, provide marginal and non-exclusive protection to consumers who do not have a direct right guaranteed by competition law. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate the interdependent relationship between competition law and consumer law, from the perspective that both have the same common goal, namely to limit abuses by professionals in their economic activity, especially during pandemic times.
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Soņeca, Viktorija. "Tehnoloģiju milžu ietekme uz suverēnu." In The 8th International Scientific Conference of the Faculty of Law of the University of Latvia. University of Latvia Press, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.22364/iscflul.8.1.18.

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In the last two decades, we have seen the rise of companies providing digital services. Big Tech firms have become all-pervasive, playing critical roles in our social interactions, in the way we access information, and in the way we consume. These firms not only strive to be dominant players in one market, but with their giant monopoly power and domination of online ecosystems, they want to become the market itself. They are gaining not just economic, but also political power. This can be illustrated by Donald Trump’s campaigns, in which he attempted to influence the sovereign will, as the sovereign power is vested in the people. The Trump campaigns' use of Facebook's advertising tools contributed to Trump's win at the 2016 presidential election. After criticism of that election, Facebook stated that it would implement a series of measures to prevent future abuse. For example, no political ads will be accepted in the week before an election. Another example of how Big Tech firms can effect the sovereign is by national legislator. For example, Australia had a dispute with digital platforms such as Facebook and Google. That was because Australia began to develop a News Media and Digital Platforms Mandatory Code. To persuade the Australian legislature to abandon the idea of this code, Facebook prevented Australian press publishers, news media and users from sharing/viewing Australian as well as international news content, including blocking information from government agencies. Such action demonstrated how large digital platforms can affect the flow of information to encourage the state and its legislature to change their position. Because of such pressure, Australia eventually made adjustments to the code in order to find a compromise with the digital platform. Also, when we are referring to political power, it should include lobbying and the European Union legislator. Tech giants are lobbying their interests to influence the European Union’s digital policy, which has the most direct effect on member states, given that the member states are bound by European Union law.
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