Dissertations / Theses: 'Abuse of dominance'

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Kolarczyková, Eva. "Kolektivní dominance v soutěžním právu a její zneužití." Master's thesis, Vysoká škola ekonomická v Praze, 2012. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-196979.

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The aim of the diploma thesis is a comprehensive analysis of the concept of collective dominance, in particular with reference to the evaluation of its applicability and utility in practice. The first chapter deals with the main features of the oligopoly market and Czech and European legal provisions on the abuse of a dominant position and mergers within which it has evolved. On base of the analysis of Court of Justice and General Court judgements the second chapter explains the notion of the collective dominance and examines the obligatory conditions of the collective dominance, as well as the factors which influence these conditions. The third chapter concerns the concept of collective dominance with regard to competition law taxonomy. It compares not only the test of collective dominance applied pursuant to the article 102 TFEU with the test applied according to the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, but also the concept of collective dominance with the agreements pursuant to the article 101 TFEU. It also deals with abusive practices typical for oligopolies. Beside the explanation of the UK legislation the last two chapters illustrate decisions of competition authorities in the Czech Republic and in the United Kingdom and analyse and compare them. The diploma thesis is concluded by the analysis of main shortcomings of the concept of collective dominance and the evaluation of actual state of the examined topic with the aim to abstractly summarize knowledge gained through the thesis.

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Mallen, Guillaume. "L'appréhension des pratiques restrictives par les autorités françaises et européennes de la concurrence." Thesis, La Rochelle, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013LAROD033.

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Définies comme des pratiques contractuelles abusives dans les rapports entre professionnels, les pratiques restrictives amoindrissent considérablement la capacité concurrentielle du partenaire commercial. Le droit de la concurrence et plus particulièrement, le droit des pratiques anticoncurrentielles peut constituer une voie de droit permettant la répression de ces comportements. L’étude menée permet de s’interroger sur l’efficacité de l’entente et des abus de domination, entendus comme concepts d’accueil, afin de lutter contre les pratiques restrictives. Alors même que les abus de domination présentent des points de convergence importants avec la notion de «pratique restrictive », l’appréhension est profondément nuancée. Les exigences textuelles inhérentes à la démonstration de l’abus de position dominante (102 TFUE et art. L.420-2, al. 1er du Code de commerce) sont drastiques et l’appréciation de l’abus de dépendance économique en droit français (art. L.420-2, al. 2 du Code de commerce) est si étroite qu’elle ne permet pas de faciliter la captation positive des pratiques restrictives. En outre, la preuve de la restriction de concurrence est difficile à rapporter en présence de comportements qui atteignent, le plus souvent, le simple partenaire contractuel et non le marché entendu dans sa globalité. Paradoxalement, si l’entente apparaît comme un concept peu ressemblant dans ses composantes à la notion de «pratique restrictive », l’appréhension y est privilégiée. Afin de faciliter la mutation de la pratique en comportement concerté, les autorités de concurrence procèdent à une lecture généreuse du critère de la concertation. La restriction de concurrence fait également l’objet d’une appréciation compréhensive. Que l’appréhension soit opérée au titre de l’entente ou des abus de domination, des pistes de réflexion sont proposées afin de perfectionner le traitement concurrentiel des pratiques restrictives
Defined as unfair contractual practices in relations between professionals, restrictive practices significantly undermine the competitiveness of the trading partner. Competition law and, more specifically, antitrust law can be a remedy to the suppression of these behaviours. The study raises questions about the effectiveness of the cartel and abuse of dominance in the fight against restrictive practices. The analysis tends to gauge their understanding through the prism of the two concepts that are cartels and abuse of dominance. Even as abuse of dominance have important points of convergence with the concept of “restrictive practice”, apprehension is deeply nuanced. Textual requirements inherent in the demonstration of the abuse of dominant position (102 TFUE andart. L.420-2, al. 1 of the Commercial Code) are drastic and appreciation of the abuse of economic dependence in French law (art. L.420-2, al. 2 of the Commercial Code) is so narrow that it does not facilitate the positive uptake of restrictive practices. In addition, evidence of the competition restriction is difficult to bring in conduct that reach, in most cases, the mere contractual partner and not the market heard in its entirety. Paradoxically, if the cartels appears to be a bit like concept in its components to the concept of “restrictive practice ", apprehension is preferred. To facilitate the transfer of practice concerted behaviour, competition authorities proceed to a generous reading of the meeting of minds. Competition restriction is also the subject of a comprehensive appreciation. That apprehension is made under the cartel or abuse of dominant position, actionable insights are proposed to improve the competitive treatment of restrictive practices

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Lovdahl, Gormsen Liza. "Is there a tension between the goals of protecting economic freedom and the promotion of consumer welfare in the application of Article 82 EC?" Thesis, King's College London (University of London), 2007. http://www.manchester.ac.uk/escholar/uk-ac-man-scw:111421.

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Article 82 is traditionally analysed as a tool to integrate and liberalise the European Single Market and to protect competition from distortion. As such there is no comprehensive discussion of the tensions that lie at the centre of the objective of protecting competition in the current rethinking of Article 82. With regard to exclusionary abuses, DG Competition has articulated that the main objective of Article 82 is the protection of competition in the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. This statement may conflict with some of the case law protecting the economic freedom of the market players derived from ordoliberalism. The latter is a well respected German legal tradition that holds both that government needs to be restrained from abuse of power, and that the free market has its limits. Economic rights deserve protection and vigilance is needed to ensure economic power is not misused or abused, not only in the interests of consumer welfare, but also in the interests of the economic liberty of the individual. This thesis considers the tension between the goals of protecting economic freedom and the promotion of consumer welfare in the application of Article 82. Presupposing that economic freedom and consumer welfare are in opposition to one another, such tension is only set to intensify and must be given appropriate weight in considering the extent to which DG Competition can or should try to move to a consumer welfare standard. Changing the interpretation of protection of competition from economic freedom to consumer welfare within Article 82 can undermine a fundamental right if economic freedom is considered a fundamental right in the Community legal order. However, consumer welfare can also be seen as an opportunity, if properly debated or agreed to by the ECJ, to adopt a more economics-based approach to Article 82.

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Adeleke, Olufolahan. "Assessing Exclusionary Conduct in Abuse of Dominance: the relevance of the Extraterritoriality Rule and Public Interest for Developing Countries." Master's thesis, University of Cape Town, 2009. http://hdl.handle.net/11427/4637.

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Competition Law is governed by empowering legislation. Legislation in most developing and third world economies are mostly fashioned after the existing framework of legislation originating from the European Union (EU) or the United States of America (USA). While a lot of these pieces of legislation are often modified to suit the needs of these developing countries, it is usually not the case that a cautious approach is taken to ensure that imported legislation is designed to meet the specific national challenges of such a country. The Courts in most jurisdictions especially in the USA and the EU have attempted to deal with the lapse in competition legislations by giving landmark decisions on significant issues like dominant firms and their unilateral exclusionary behaviors. The big question to consider in this dissertation is how competition laws should apply to dominant firms. This question has raised much interest in recent years. Aside from establishing which firms have substantial market power that can harm competition, there have been difficulties in distinguishing competition on the merits from mere anticompetitive conduct. This is more obvious in the case of unilateral exclusionary behaviors and will be the central focus in this dissertation.

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Greiss, Mourad. "Evaluating the influence of EU competition rules and Islamic principles on the treatment of abuse of dominance under Egyptian competition law." Thesis, University of Sussex, 2011. http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/7581/.

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Egypt faced three central pressures to introduce its own competition law in 2005: first, EU/Egypt trade relations, second, introduction of the 1991 privatisation programme and third, its long-term desire by virtue of its Constitution to follow Islamic principles that condemn monopoly. However, Egypt was not forced to transplant EU rules as a result of EU/Egypt trade relations, although it is implicit that the EU deems it desirable to do so. By employing the functional method of comparative law for the purposes of the study on EU, Islamic, and Egyptian laws, the central argument of this thesis is that the Egyptian treatment of abuse of dominance is distinctive in three ways. First, Egyptian rules do not prohibit the practice of excessive pricing. Although in jurisdictions that prohibit it, most notably the EU system, competition authorities do not contemplate it as an investigation priority, it is argued that the lack of its prohibition raises Islamic law concerns and may lead to potential effects on the Egyptian economy. However, the difficulties which investigators face in settling such practice (as the South African Mittal case demonstrates) suggest that the Egyptian legislator may have adopted the right approach not to prohibit it; otherwise, this may have increased the likelihood of committing type II errors and, as a result, violate Islamic law principles of injustice. Second, in contrast with EU law, Egyptian rules do not cover the practice of below-cost margin squeeze. Although it is argued that its omission does not pose potential effects to the economy, it is suggested that it raises Islamic law concerns on the basis of fairness and intentions principles. Given that it is relatively easier to investigate, compared to excessive pricing, it is suggested that the Egyptian legislator should re-consider encompassing it in the future while drawing on the approach adopted in EU law. Third, the Egyptian Competition Law reflects the EU Commission‘s initiative of employing an effects-based approach to abuse of dominance. However, the Egyptian system, arguably influenced by the Islamic principles on market intervention, goes a little further to require an actual effects standard. Despite an effects-based analysis being difficult to employ in emerging economies with inadequate economic expertise like Egypt, it is argued in its favour for two reasons. First, it increases the chances of avoiding type II errors, which, similar to excessive pricing and margin squeeze, violate Islamic law and; second, the Egyptian Competition Authority‘s analysis in the Steel study shows that it is capable of employing this approach at this stage. For the purposes of re-considering the foregoing (gaps) in the future, the Egyptian Competition Authority should focus on increasing economic expertise and seek technical assistance from competition authorities of the developed world.

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Sundkvist, Hillevi. "Business Strategy or Abuse of Dominance : An Analysis of Different Approaches Towards Self-Preferencing Within the Meaning of Article 102 TFEU." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Juridiska institutionen, 2019. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-378389.

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An undertaking enjoying a dominant position on the internal market has many possibilities to flourish and develop. One way of increasing market power is to expand business activities to downstream markets. An undertaking that is dominant on the upstream market can thus take advantage of its dominance when engaging in business conduct on the downstream market. However, taking advantage of such a position can in some circumstances lead to an infringement of Article 102 TFEU. Recent cases from the EU courts and the EU Commission have, however, demonstrated uncertainties concerning the ways in which the article should be applied. The purpose of the thesis has been to examine different approaches towards the application of Article 102 TFEU in situations where vertically integrated dominant undertakings are favouring their own downstream operations to the prejudice of competitors. The research question concerns whether there exists a general duty for vertically integrated dominant undertakings not to discriminate in favour of their own downstream operations. The overall theme of the thesis is the difficulties in drawing a line between legitimate business strategies and abusive business conduct. When intervening against businesses, competition authorities have an important task in balancing the potentially conflicting interests of free competition and counteracting market imperfections. While it is important to encourage business development and innovation, it is also vital to ensure the functioning of the internal market. Discussions concerning these ideas are being held with reference to case law from the EU courts as well as from decisions and statements from the European Commission. The findings of the thesis show that there has been a noteworthy inconsistency in the application of Article 102 TFEU. A discrepancy in the approaches towards the article has been found, both concerning the main goals of the article as well as the circumstances in which it should be applied. The conclusion is that it is not possible to state that there is a general duty not to discriminate in favour of an undertaking’s own downstream operations. Nevertheless, indications in the direction of such a duty do exist. Finally, the outcome of the analysis suggests that the inconsistency and ambiguities in the law enforcement can result in an infringement of legal certainty.

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Ferrari, Ursula. "The Microsoft Case : A reflection on the tying of Windows Media Player and the Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 (Case-COMP/C-3/37.792)." Thesis, Jönköping University, Jönköping International Business School, 2005. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-104.

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Master’s Thesis in Competition Policy Title: ”The Microsoft Case – A reflection on the tying of Windows Media Player and the Commission Decision of 24 March 2004 (Case COMP/C- 3/37.792)” Author: Ursula Ferrari Tutor: Göran Wahlgren Date: [2005-05-23] Subject terms: Competition Policy, EU law, Abuse of dominance, tying Abstract This Master’s thesis is an analysis of the European Commission Decision in the Microsoft Case-COMP/C-3/37.792 and the tying as an abusive practice prohibited by Article 82 of the EC Treaty. In this case the European Commission (Commission) applied a rule-of-reason approach for the first time to Microsoft’s tying practice and considered it to be anticompetitive. Microsoft tied its Windows Media Player (WMP) to its client operating system Windows and after a thorough analysis done by the Commission, Microsoft was considered to have abused its dominant position. In the past the Commission and the European Court of Justice used a per se illegality approach to tying practices and it was enough to establish that a company which applied the tying strategy was dominant in the tying product market. The hostile approach taken by the Commission and the ECJ has been criticized by economists mainly because tying is a commonly applied business strategy in the world economy and companies apply this be-cause of the economic efficiencies that this business strategy leads to. The efficiency gains are indirectly past on to the consumers in the form of product quality and innovation, reduced transaction costs and lower prices. It is argued that tying in fact increase consumer welfare. Economists would therefore rather see a per se legality approach or at least a rule-of-reason approach in the future. Due to the complexity of the Microsoft case, the Commission had to do a thorough analysis of the actual impact that the tying of WMP had on the market and the foreclosure effects that this strategy might lead to. This was therefore the first time that a rule-of-reason approach was applied on the matter of tying. However, after the Commission’s Decision of the Microsoft case there is still uncertainty in this matter. There is a strong need for future clarification. Microsoft Corporation has lodged an appeal against the Commission’s Decision with the European Court of Justice but it will take several years before the ECJ will be able to give a final judgement of the case. Until then the legal certainty is yet still very unclear.

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Giesecke, Jacob. "Multiple Sides, Multiple Challenges : The Need for a Uniform Approach in Defining the Relevant Product Market in Abuse of Dominance Cases on Multi-Sided Markets." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Juridiska institutionen, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-363381.

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The study shows that multi-sided markets pose difficulties when the relevant product market is to be defined. These difficulties pertain to two questions. The first question is whether one or several markets should be defined. In this regard, it is not easy to extract a coherent method from the cases examined. Instead, the methods applied give the impression of ad hoc-solutions, where similar circumstances result in dissimilar outcomes. Indeed, it is hard to reconcile the different market definitions in Visa International MIF and MasterCard MIF. The uncertainties are not limited to these two cases, as the methods applied in Google Shopping too give rise to ambiguities. Why was the market for general search engine platforms separated into two distinct product markets, but the market for comparison shopping services encompassed both sides? Unfortunately, this discussion was not present in the decision. This only serves to reinforce the impression that these questions are solved on an ad hoc-basis. A clear method of approaching multi-sided markets is desirable, not least because the enforcement of competition rules must be characterized by consistency and foreseeability. Hopefully, the judgement in Google Shopping will bring further clarity to this. Nonetheless, the conclusion is that one market should be defined when differences between competitive constraints on the two sides are absent. E contrario, this means that two markets should be defined when such differences are present. This is true regardless of the market in question being a transaction or a non-transaction market. This method seems preferable to strictly adhering to the division of multi-sided markets into transaction or non-transaction markets. If the Commission’s analysis is correct in that there are no differences in competitive constraints on the two sides of comparison shopping services, in combination with crossing network effects, the platform’s multi-sidedness is a necessary trait for both sides. This means that a substitute has to be multi-sided in order for it to be included on the relevant product market, which minimizes the risk for false negatives. Vice versa, the definition of two markets allows for one-sided products to be included on the relevant product market, which minimizes the risk for false positives. This is important not only for the binary finding of dominance or non-dominance, but also the degree of dominance. As concluded above, incorrectly defining one market may artificially inflate the degree of dominance into false super-dominance, and incorrectly defining several markets may artificially dilute the degree of dominance. The second question is how substitutability should be measured. It is obvious from the cases examined that qualitative measures are used and not quantitative measures. The products’ characteristics, intended use, purpose, functionalities, users’ perceptions of the product, etc. were given much attention. The SSNIP test was not applied in any of the cases. The first conclusion to be drawn from the examination above is therefore that the difficulties regarding measuring substitutability on multi-sided markets mainly concern quantitative measures. The arguments against applying a SSNIP test related to the cellophane fallacy (in two different forms, one of which was deceivingly similar to the reverse cellophane fallacy) and differences in price sensitivities between the two sides. Network effects present an additional difficulty, which may lead to exaggerated results when measuring substitutability. The second conclusion to be drawn is that there exists a reluctance to apply a SSNIP test in a way that is tailored for multi-sided markets. One method that has been proposed is to apply the test on the total sum paid by both sides, while allowing the intermediary to adjust the increase in price in accordance with its price structure. The categorical dismissal of applying the test in this way suggests that adapted versions have some time to wait before being introduced into case law and decisional practice. If they, as their proponents argue, are a robust way of broadening the evidence of possible substitutability, this is unfortunate. The risk of defining the market overly narrow or overly broad is of course present in this regard as well. A broader spectrum of evidence therefore minimizes the risk of incorrectly finding both dominance and non-dominance.

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ANZINI, MARTINA. "Abuso di posizione dominante e tutela dell'accesso al farmaco: prospettive e limiti." Doctoral thesis, Università Politecnica delle Marche, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/11566/253174.

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Il quesito attorno al quale si articola il lavoro è se nell'interpretazione del diritto della concorrenza vi sia spazio per accordare rilevanza a regole e aspettative condivise nella società in cui esso trova applicazione. La questione è importante perché tali regole ed aspettative, che nel lavoro vengono denominate "valori sociali", trovano oggi ostruite le proprie tradizionali vie di accesso alla tutela giuridica. Si è quindi scelto di analizzare alcune recenti ipotesi di antitrust enforcement per verificare se il percorso interpretativo prospettato sia già stato intrapreso. Ciò ha reso necessario circoscrivere la domanda di ricerca al valore sociale "accesso al medicinale essenziale". Inoltre, l'analisi viene condotta in relazione alla sola fattispecie dell'abuso di posizione dominante, che, per svariati motivi, è più permeabile di altre ai valori sociali. L'analisi empirica concerne quindi alcune ipotesi di condotte unilaterali anticoncorrenziali recentemente riscontrate nel settore farmaceutico, il cui comune denominatore risiede in una lettura dell'art. 102 TFUE socialmente utile: nei casi Aspen e Pfizer-Flynn le autorità garanti hanno ravvisato negli aumenti di prezzo praticati dalle imprese, palesemente finalizzati a sfruttare i consumatori di farmaci essenziali, due ipotesi di unfair pricing; nei casi AstraZeneca e Pfizer, invece, le imprese in posizione dominante sono incorse nei rigori del diritto della concorrenza in virtù del loro comportamento opportunistico, consistente in una manomissione del sistema regolatorio del brevetto farmaceutico che ha danneggiato concorrenti, pazienti-consumatori e servizi sanitari-clienti. Al termine del percorso argomentativo la domanda riceve risposta positiva: l'antitrust ha conferito e può effettivamente conferire rilevanza a valori ed aspirazioni latenti nel tessuto sociale. Occorre, tuttavia, una precisazione: l'ermeneutica del diritto della concorrenza trova la propria cifra caratteristica nel carattere composito della fattispecie cui accede, rispetto alla quale la teoria economica svolge il ruolo fondamentale di co-definitrice della regola. Dovendo riflettere tale complessità, l'interpretazione non può limitarsi a tendere la lettera della norma in questo o quel senso, ma deve restituire una lettura economicamente solida della condotta d'impresa vietata. Ne deriva che la teoria economica concorre a tracciare le prospettive ed i limiti dell'antitrust rispetto alla tutela ai valori sociali.
The thesis aims at assessing whether social values are or can become relevant to competition law interpretation, thus constituting a theoretical effort to grant those values a further way of satisfaction. The exploration of such new path has gained importance in the last decades, due to the decline of the legal concepts that have traditionally protected the most basic social aspirations. The question needs, however, to be circumscribed if it is to be tested empirically. Therefore, the thesis focusses on whether access to essential drugs has gained relevance to the interpretation of the abuse of dominant position. Following the specification of the question, a few recent cases characterized by a socially oriented application of Art. 102 TFEU are examined in depth. Notably, the analysis concerns two cases of unfair pricing (Aspen and Pfzer-Flynn), as they were obviously useful to contrast the exploitative behaviour of the firms against consumers of essential medicines, as well as two cases of regulatory gaming. In our view, the latters are to be considered significant attempts to fight the opportunistic strategies of firms, which are equally detrimental to competitors as well as to patients-consumers and health care systems-clients. The analysis leads to the conclusion that competition law interpretation can, as suggested at the start of the essay, confer relevance to some shared aspirations running deep in the social context. An element needs, however, to be taken into due consideration: the hermeneutics of competition law find its distinctive mark in the complex nature of the norm, which is co-defined by law and economics, thus making it impossible to undertake a creative interpretative process while ignoring the identity of the forbidden conduct as elaborated by the economic theory. This leads to the conclusion that the boundaries of a socially oriented interpretation mainly identify with the limits of antitrust economics.

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Springall, Apiradee Kongcharoen. "Does ASEAN need a supranational approach to its competition law and policy to create a highly competitive AEC? : case studies on abuse of dominance in Singapore and Thailand." Thesis, University of Essex, 2017. http://repository.essex.ac.uk/19693/.

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ASEAN aimed to create a highly competitive, single market, production-based AEC in 2015 by applying strategic measures set out in the AEC Blueprint. However, after seven years of its adoption, the deadline has become merely the beginning of the AEC, not the finished line. Since November 2015, ASEAN has adopted the AEC Blueprint 2025 which aims to create a competitive, innovative, and dynamic AEC by 2025. One of the measures ASEAN uses is ensuring effective competition policy through greater harmonisation and convergence of national competition law. The key concept of this thesis is competitiveness. It applies Professor Michael E Porter’s concept of competitive advantage and gathers 15 years of data on the ASEAN Member States’ competitiveness. And it questions whether competition law and policy attribute to a nation’s competitiveness. If yes, to what extent. Then it questions whether it is necessary for ASEAN to take a supranational approach to become a competitive region because ASEAN has its own norm of cooperation, the ASEAN way, which is ingrained in ASEAN since its establishment. And it is now formally recognised in the ASEAN Charter. The results show that competition law and policy is not a sole key determinant of competitiveness. Having a low degree of market concentration, effective competition law and policy, and efficient goods market does not necessarily correlate to high competitiveness. A country’s competitiveness is affected by its stage of development too. Additionally, the political economy of a country has a certain degree of effect on efficiency in competition law enforcement. However, the determinant factor of efficient competition law enforcement lies on political will rather than type of the government administration as in the case of Taiwan and South Korea. The disparities in the economic development of AMSs are obvious. Therefore, trying to harmonise AMSs’ competition law and policy using an all-sector approach is not recommended and proved difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, a supranational approach is not compatible with the ASEAN way. Hence, a sectoral approach is more likely to help ASEAN achieve its goal. ASEAN has already begun its own sectoral approach to competitiveness in the aviation market. The Aviation Agreements which the AMSs have signed between them provide much more details and commitments on competition rules concerning this industry than in the Regional Guidelines 2010. The application of sectoral approach alongside with the comprehensive approach to competition law and policy to enhance competitiveness of the relevant market is practiced in many countries. Examples of how regulatory body in electricity in the US, the UK, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea collaborate with their competition agencies provide evidence that it is possible and efficient. Therefore, ASEAN does not need a supranational approach to improve its competitiveness regarding competition law and policy. This thesis suggests that ASEAN should pursue a sectoral approach in dealing with competition issues among member state the ASEAN way.

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Drago, Bruno de Luca. "Responsabilidade especial dos agentes econômicos dominantes." Universidade de São Paulo, 2015. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/2/2132/tde-15082016-165705/.

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Agentes econômicos com posição dominante são capazes de se conduzir de maneira independente na sua atividade comercial. Da mesma forma, possuem todos os incentivos para manutenção desta posição, em detrimento de seus concorrentes, fornecedores e clientes. O presente trabalho visa, inicialmente, em estudo comparado da doutrina e jurisprudência no Brasil, União Europeia e Estados Unidos, identificar os elementos de cognição da teoria do abuso de posição dominante para cinco modalidades de conduta. A partir daí traçamos seus elementos de correlação com o propósito de sugerir uma teoria aplicada ao ordenamento jurídico pátrio, que passa pelo reconhecimento da concorrência como garantia institucional, de forma a estabelecer-se igualdade material segundo a teoria da função social dos meios de produção. A presença constante da concorrência nos mercados deve ser tratada como presunção de bem-estar social. E finalmente, valendo-se destes elementos de suporte, propomos uma teoria da responsabilidade especial para agentes econômicos em posição dominante, que implicaria o dever de autoaplicação dos limites permitidos para sua conduta comercial, cujo descumprimento ensejaria presunção relativa de efeitos deletérios ao mercado, segundo os parâmetros propostos.
Firms enjoying dominant position are able to conduct themselves independently in their commercial activities. Likewise, they hold all due incentives to maintain such position, in detriment of their competitors, suppliers and clients. The present work aims, initially, through a comparative study of the Brazilian, the European Union and the United States\' legal doctrine and jurisprudence, to identify cognitive elements of the abuse of dominance theory, for five different natures of conducts. Subsequently, we identify their elements of connection with the purpose of suggesting a theory applicable to the local legal system, which includes the recognition of competition as an institutional guarantee, so to establish a material equality according to the theory of social function of productive assets. The constant presence of competition on the markets shall be treated as a presumption of social welfare. And finally, based on such supportive elements, we propose a theory of special responsibility for dominant firms that implies in a duty of self-application of the permitted limits for their commercial conduct, and which infringement would entail a relative presumption of harmful effects to the market, pursuant to the proposed parameters.

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Marquez, Carlos Pablo. "Abusive pricing policy for emerging economies : the case of excessive pricing and price predation in Latin America." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2012. http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:b7ac6524-5971-4181-a847-fe2f7035c395.

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For several years, the literature has discussed whether a country’s particular economic circumstances should be taken into account in competition law and policy design. This thesis discusses whether economic growth should be considered as the guiding principle for Latin American Emerging Economies’ competition law and policy design. It specifically explains why having economic growth as competition policy’s guiding principle makes a difference in choosing superior rules and standards, among the large range of efficient rules. In order to explain how economic growth as a guiding principle has an impact on competition policy design, this thesis studies whether the analysis and application of the prohibitions and standards of abuse of dominance in emerging Latin American economies are appropriate, and why, having regard to economic growth, a different approach might be justified. To engage in the study of such questions this thesis centres on the regulation of dominance and the law governing abuse of dominance, in particular on predatory pricing and excessive pricing. After a careful analysis of such institutions, an optimal rule for the regulation of pricing abuses in these emerging economies is proposed. Similarly, having regard to economic growth as the policy’s guiding principle, the mainstream standards on excessive pricing and price predation are evaluated and a different approach is found to be justified. It is concluded that economic growth should be the principle guiding Latin American emerging economies’ competition law and policy design and it is demonstrated that this will grant these economies policy soundness and identity.

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Berto, Hedda. "Sharing is Caring : An Examination of the Essential Facilities Doctrine and its Applicability to Big Data." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Juridiska institutionen, 2020. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-411945.

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Since the internet revolution, and with the ever-growing presence of the internet in our everyday lives, being able to control as much data as possible has become an indispensable part of any business looking to succeed on digital markets. This is where Big Data has become crucial. Being able to gather, but more importantly process and understand data, has allowed companies to tailor their services according to the unspoken wants of the consumer as well as optimize ad sales according to consumers’ online patterns. Considering the significant power over digital markets possessed by certain companies, it becomes critical to examine such companies from a competition law perspective. Refusal to supply, which is an abuse of a dominant position according to Article 102 TFEU, can be used to compel abusive undertakings to share a product or service, which they alone possess, and which is indispensable input in another product, with competitors. This is otherwise known as the Essential Facilities Doctrine. If the Big Data used by attention platforms such as Facebook or Google were to be considered such an indispensable product, these undertakings would be required to share Big Data with competitors. While Big Data enables the dominant positions held by powerful attention platforms today, there are certain aspects of it and its particular uses by such platforms that do not allow for the application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine. Considering the significance of Big Data for these undertakings, however, there may be need for a reform of the Essential Facilities Doctrine. From a purely competition standpoint, allowing the application of the Essential Facilities Doctrine to Big Data would be beneficial, particularly considering the doctrine’s effect on innovation. However, enforcing an obligation to share Big Data with competitors would be in breach of privacy policies within the EU. While competition decisions made by the Commission do not directly concern rules set forth in such policies, the Commission is still obligated to respect the right to privacy set forth in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Thus, while the significance of Big Data demands a change in how it is approached by competition law, the Essential Facilities Doctrine is not the appropriate remedy.

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14

Cascia, Giuseppe <1992&gt. "Abuso di posizione dominante caso: Amazon." Master's Degree Thesis, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, 2021. http://hdl.handle.net/10579/19143.

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Lo scopo di questa indagine e quella di analizzare la disciplina dell’abuso di posizione dominante dettata dalla normativa antitrust, comunitaria e nazionale, guardando anche il trattamento di questa oltre oceano. Ho deciso di dedicare maggiore attenzione ad un caso in particolare che ci aiuterà a rendere reale la sua applicazione, tuttora ancora in fase istruttoria, dell’azienda Amazon. Poi, introdurremo quello che la teoria ci ha insegnato riguardo la distinzione dei due estremi delle performance nel mercato: concorrenza e monopolio. Vedremo cosa accadrebbe se introducessimo maggiori informazioni riguardanti il consumatore, nel mercato monopolistico, con la discriminazione di prezzi. Inoltre, faremo chiarezza sui comportamenti predatori dell’impresa e sulle restrizioni verticali che questa può attuare. Poi, introdurremo il caso Amazon, provando a capire il modo di operare e a cosa deve la sua ascesa. Prenderemo in esame gli articoli che hanno scaturito sospetti al suo comportamento predatorio nei diversi mercati in cui opera, visioneremo i documenti che hanno causato questo allarmismo delle autorità di controllo e quello che sta accadendo all’interno delle big tech industriali nel mondo. Poi, esamineremo l’azione dell’Antitrust, come si presenta la disciplina e come questa tutela il mercato. Andremo ad esaminare la legge 102 del TFUE che riguarda l’abuso di posizione dominante. Successivamente proveremo, comparando alcuni casi precedentemente già studiati dalla disciplina, a capire l’impatto dannoso che può avere tale istruttoria. Poi, proveremo a identificare alcune caratteristiche generali e le nuove tendenze del mercato principalmente guidate dalle big tech, e come queste hanno portato ad una rivoluzione tecnologica di quello che sarà il mercato online nell’imminente futuro. In questo capitolo inoltre farò alcune riflessioni personali, sia sul caso trattato che sulle nuove tendenze, dato il forte interesse che ho verso la tecnologia.

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15

Landi, Valerio <1977&gt. "Autonomia privata e abuso di posizione dominante." Doctoral thesis, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, 2009. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/1320/1/Landi_Valerio_Tesi.pdf.

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Oggetto della ricerca sono l’esame e la valutazione dei limiti posti all’autonomia privata dal divieto di abuso della posizione dominante, come sancito, in materia di tutela della concorrenza, dall’art. 3 della legge 10 ottobre 1990, n. 287, a sua volta modellato sull’art. 82 del Trattato CE. Preliminarmente, si è ritenuto opportuno svolgere la ricognizione degli interessi tutelati dal diritto della concorrenza, onde individuare la cerchia dei soggetti legittimati ad avvalersi dell’apparato di rimedi civilistici – invero scarno e necessitante di integrazione in via interpretativa – contemplato dall’art. 33 della legge n. 287/1990. È così emerso come l’odierno diritto della concorrenza, basato su un modello di workable competition, non possa ritenersi sorretto da ragioni corporative di tutela dei soli imprenditori concorrenti, investendo direttamente – e rivestendo di rilevanza giuridica – le situazioni soggettive di coloro che operano sul mercato, indipendentemente da qualificazioni formali. In tal senso, sono stati esaminati i caratteri fondamentali dell’istituto dell’abuso di posizione dominante, come delineatisi nella prassi applicativa non solo degli organi nazionali, ma anche di quelli comunitari. Ed invero, un aspetto importante che caratterizza la disciplina italiana dell’abuso di posizione dominante e della concorrenza in generale, distinguendola dalle normative di altri sistemi giuridici prossimi al nostro, è costituito dal vincolo di dipendenza dal diritto comunitario, sancito dall’art. 1, quarto comma, della legge n. 287/1990, idoneo a determinare peculiari riflessi anche sul piano dell’applicazione civilistica dell’istituto. La ricerca si è quindi spostata sulla figura generale del divieto di abuso del diritto, onde vagliarne i possibili rapporti con l’istituto in esame. A tal proposito, si è tentato di individuare, per quanto possibile, i tratti essenziali della figura dell’abuso del diritto relativamente all’esercizio dell’autonomia privata in ambito negoziale, con particolare riferimento all’evoluzione del pensiero della dottrina e ai più recenti orientamenti giurisprudenziali sul tema, che hanno valorizzato il ruolo della buona fede intesa in senso oggettivo. Particolarmente interessante è parsa la possibilità di estendere i confini della figura dell’abuso del diritto sì da ricomprendere anche l’esercizio di prerogative individuali diverse dai diritti soggettivi. Da tale estensione potrebbero infatti discendere interessanti ripercussioni per la tutela dei soggetti deboli nel contesto dei rapporti d’impresa, intendendosi per tali tanto i rapporti tra imprenditori in posizione paritaria o asimmetrica, quanto i rapporti tra imprenditori e consumatori. È stato inoltre preso in considerazione l’aspetto dei rimedi avverso le condotte abusive, alla luce dei moderni contributi sull’eccezione di dolo generale, sulla tutela risarcitoria e sull’invalidità negoziale, con i quali è opportuno confrontarsi qualora si intenda cercare di colmare – come sembra opportuno – i vuoti di disciplina della tutela civilistica avverso l’abuso di posizione dominante. Stante l’evidente contiguità con la figura in esame, si è poi provveduto ad esaminare, per quanto sinteticamente, il divieto di abuso di dipendenza economica, il quale si delinea come figura ibrida, a metà strada tra il diritto dei contratti e quello della concorrenza. Tale fattispecie, pur inserita in una legge volta a disciplinare il settore della subfornitura industriale (art. 9, legge 18 giugno 1998, n. 192), ha suscitato un vasto interessamento della dottrina. Si sono infatti levate diverse voci favorevoli a riconoscere la portata applicativa generale del divieto, quale principio di giustizia contrattuale valevole per tutti i rapporti tra imprenditori. Nel tentativo di verificare tale assunto, si è cercato di individuare la ratio sottesa all’art. 9 della legge n. 192/1998, anche in considerazione dei suoi rapporti con il divieto di abuso di posizione dominante. Su tale aspetto è d’altronde appositamente intervenuto il legislatore con la legge 5 marzo 2001, n. 57, riconoscendo la competenza dell’Autorità garante per la concorrenza ed il mercato a provvedere, anche d’ufficio, sugli abusi di dipendenza economica con rilevanza concorrenziale. Si possono così prospettare due fattispecie normative di abusi di dipendenza economica, quella con effetti circoscritti al singolo rapporto interimprenditoriale, la cui disciplina è rimessa al diritto civile, e quella con effetti negativi per il mercato, soggetta anche – ma non solo – alle regole del diritto antitrust; tracciare una netta linea di demarcazione tra i reciproci ambiti non appare comunque agevole. Sono stati inoltre dedicati brevi cenni ai rimedi avverso le condotte di abuso di dipendenza economica, i quali involgono problematiche non dissimili a quelle che si delineano per il divieto di abuso di posizione dominante. Poste tali basi, la ricerca è proseguita con la ricognizione dei rimedi civilistici esperibili contro gli abusi di posizione dominante. Anzitutto, è stato preso in considerazione il rimedio del risarcimento dei danni, partendo dall’individuazione della fonte della responsabilità dell’abutente e vagliando criticamente le diverse ipotesi proposte in dottrina, anche con riferimento alle recenti elaborazioni in tema di obblighi di protezione. È stata altresì vagliata l’ammissibilità di una visione unitaria degli illeciti in questione, quali fattispecie plurioffensive e indipendenti dalla qualifica formale del soggetto leso, sia esso imprenditore concorrente, distributore o intermediario – o meglio, in generale, imprenditore complementare – oppure consumatore. L’individuazione della disciplina applicabile alle azioni risarcitorie sembra comunque dipendere in ampia misura dalla risposta al quesito preliminare sulla natura – extracontrattuale, precontrattuale ovvero contrattuale – della responsabilità conseguente alla violazione del divieto. Pur non sembrando prospettabili soluzioni di carattere universale, sono apparsi meritevoli di approfondimento i seguenti profili: quanto all’individuazione dei soggetti legittimati, il problema della traslazione del danno, o passing-on; quanto al nesso causale, il criterio da utilizzare per il relativo accertamento, l’ammissibilità di prove presuntive e l’efficacia dei provvedimenti amministrativi sanzionatori; quanto all’elemento soggettivo, la possibilità di applicare analogicamente l’art. 2600 c.c. e gli aspetti collegati alla colpa per inosservanza di norme di condotta; quanto ai danni risarcibili, i criteri di accertamento e di prova del pregiudizio; infine, quanto al termine di prescrizione, la possibilità di qualificare il danno da illecito antitrust quale danno “lungolatente”, con le relative conseguenze sull’individuazione del dies a quo di decorrenza del termine prescrizionale. In secondo luogo, è stata esaminata la questione della sorte dei contratti posti in essere in violazione del divieto di abuso di posizione dominante. In particolare, ci si è interrogati sulla possibilità di configurare – in assenza di indicazioni normative – la nullità “virtuale” di detti contratti, anche a fronte della recente conferma giunta dalla Suprema Corte circa la distinzione tra regole di comportamento e regole di validità del contratto. È stata inoltre esaminata – e valutata in senso negativo – la possibilità di qualificare la nullità in parola quale nullità “di protezione”, con una ricognizione, per quanto sintetica, dei principali aspetti attinenti alla legittimazione ad agire, alla rilevabilità d’ufficio e all’estensione dell’invalidità. Sono poi state dedicate alcune considerazioni alla nota questione della sorte dei contratti posti “a valle” di condotte abusive, per i quali non sembra agevole configurare declaratorie di nullità, mentre appare prospettabile – e, anzi, preferibile – il ricorso alla tutela risarcitoria. Da ultimo, non si è trascurata la valutazione dell’esperibilità, avverso le condotte di abuso di posizione dominante, di azioni diverse da quelle di nullità e risarcimento, le sole espressamente contemplate dall’art. 33, secondo comma, della legge n. 287/1990. Segnatamente, l’attenzione si è concentrata sulla possibilità di imporre a carico dell’impresa in posizione dominante un obbligo a contrarre a condizioni eque e non discriminatorie. L’importanza del tema è attestata non solo dalla discordanza delle pronunce giurisprudenziali, peraltro numericamente scarse, ma anche dal vasto dibattito dottrinale da tempo sviluppatosi, che investe tuttora taluni aspetti salienti del diritto delle obbligazioni e della tutela apprestata dall’ordinamento alla libertà di iniziativa economica.

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16

Landi, Valerio <1977&gt. "Autonomia privata e abuso di posizione dominante." Doctoral thesis, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, 2009. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/1320/.

Full text

Abstract:

Oggetto della ricerca sono l’esame e la valutazione dei limiti posti all’autonomia privata dal divieto di abuso della posizione dominante, come sancito, in materia di tutela della concorrenza, dall’art. 3 della legge 10 ottobre 1990, n. 287, a sua volta modellato sull’art. 82 del Trattato CE. Preliminarmente, si è ritenuto opportuno svolgere la ricognizione degli interessi tutelati dal diritto della concorrenza, onde individuare la cerchia dei soggetti legittimati ad avvalersi dell’apparato di rimedi civilistici – invero scarno e necessitante di integrazione in via interpretativa – contemplato dall’art. 33 della legge n. 287/1990. È così emerso come l’odierno diritto della concorrenza, basato su un modello di workable competition, non possa ritenersi sorretto da ragioni corporative di tutela dei soli imprenditori concorrenti, investendo direttamente – e rivestendo di rilevanza giuridica – le situazioni soggettive di coloro che operano sul mercato, indipendentemente da qualificazioni formali. In tal senso, sono stati esaminati i caratteri fondamentali dell’istituto dell’abuso di posizione dominante, come delineatisi nella prassi applicativa non solo degli organi nazionali, ma anche di quelli comunitari. Ed invero, un aspetto importante che caratterizza la disciplina italiana dell’abuso di posizione dominante e della concorrenza in generale, distinguendola dalle normative di altri sistemi giuridici prossimi al nostro, è costituito dal vincolo di dipendenza dal diritto comunitario, sancito dall’art. 1, quarto comma, della legge n. 287/1990, idoneo a determinare peculiari riflessi anche sul piano dell’applicazione civilistica dell’istituto. La ricerca si è quindi spostata sulla figura generale del divieto di abuso del diritto, onde vagliarne i possibili rapporti con l’istituto in esame. A tal proposito, si è tentato di individuare, per quanto possibile, i tratti essenziali della figura dell’abuso del diritto relativamente all’esercizio dell’autonomia privata in ambito negoziale, con particolare riferimento all’evoluzione del pensiero della dottrina e ai più recenti orientamenti giurisprudenziali sul tema, che hanno valorizzato il ruolo della buona fede intesa in senso oggettivo. Particolarmente interessante è parsa la possibilità di estendere i confini della figura dell’abuso del diritto sì da ricomprendere anche l’esercizio di prerogative individuali diverse dai diritti soggettivi. Da tale estensione potrebbero infatti discendere interessanti ripercussioni per la tutela dei soggetti deboli nel contesto dei rapporti d’impresa, intendendosi per tali tanto i rapporti tra imprenditori in posizione paritaria o asimmetrica, quanto i rapporti tra imprenditori e consumatori. È stato inoltre preso in considerazione l’aspetto dei rimedi avverso le condotte abusive, alla luce dei moderni contributi sull’eccezione di dolo generale, sulla tutela risarcitoria e sull’invalidità negoziale, con i quali è opportuno confrontarsi qualora si intenda cercare di colmare – come sembra opportuno – i vuoti di disciplina della tutela civilistica avverso l’abuso di posizione dominante. Stante l’evidente contiguità con la figura in esame, si è poi provveduto ad esaminare, per quanto sinteticamente, il divieto di abuso di dipendenza economica, il quale si delinea come figura ibrida, a metà strada tra il diritto dei contratti e quello della concorrenza. Tale fattispecie, pur inserita in una legge volta a disciplinare il settore della subfornitura industriale (art. 9, legge 18 giugno 1998, n. 192), ha suscitato un vasto interessamento della dottrina. Si sono infatti levate diverse voci favorevoli a riconoscere la portata applicativa generale del divieto, quale principio di giustizia contrattuale valevole per tutti i rapporti tra imprenditori. Nel tentativo di verificare tale assunto, si è cercato di individuare la ratio sottesa all’art. 9 della legge n. 192/1998, anche in considerazione dei suoi rapporti con il divieto di abuso di posizione dominante. Su tale aspetto è d’altronde appositamente intervenuto il legislatore con la legge 5 marzo 2001, n. 57, riconoscendo la competenza dell’Autorità garante per la concorrenza ed il mercato a provvedere, anche d’ufficio, sugli abusi di dipendenza economica con rilevanza concorrenziale. Si possono così prospettare due fattispecie normative di abusi di dipendenza economica, quella con effetti circoscritti al singolo rapporto interimprenditoriale, la cui disciplina è rimessa al diritto civile, e quella con effetti negativi per il mercato, soggetta anche – ma non solo – alle regole del diritto antitrust; tracciare una netta linea di demarcazione tra i reciproci ambiti non appare comunque agevole. Sono stati inoltre dedicati brevi cenni ai rimedi avverso le condotte di abuso di dipendenza economica, i quali involgono problematiche non dissimili a quelle che si delineano per il divieto di abuso di posizione dominante. Poste tali basi, la ricerca è proseguita con la ricognizione dei rimedi civilistici esperibili contro gli abusi di posizione dominante. Anzitutto, è stato preso in considerazione il rimedio del risarcimento dei danni, partendo dall’individuazione della fonte della responsabilità dell’abutente e vagliando criticamente le diverse ipotesi proposte in dottrina, anche con riferimento alle recenti elaborazioni in tema di obblighi di protezione. È stata altresì vagliata l’ammissibilità di una visione unitaria degli illeciti in questione, quali fattispecie plurioffensive e indipendenti dalla qualifica formale del soggetto leso, sia esso imprenditore concorrente, distributore o intermediario – o meglio, in generale, imprenditore complementare – oppure consumatore. L’individuazione della disciplina applicabile alle azioni risarcitorie sembra comunque dipendere in ampia misura dalla risposta al quesito preliminare sulla natura – extracontrattuale, precontrattuale ovvero contrattuale – della responsabilità conseguente alla violazione del divieto. Pur non sembrando prospettabili soluzioni di carattere universale, sono apparsi meritevoli di approfondimento i seguenti profili: quanto all’individuazione dei soggetti legittimati, il problema della traslazione del danno, o passing-on; quanto al nesso causale, il criterio da utilizzare per il relativo accertamento, l’ammissibilità di prove presuntive e l’efficacia dei provvedimenti amministrativi sanzionatori; quanto all’elemento soggettivo, la possibilità di applicare analogicamente l’art. 2600 c.c. e gli aspetti collegati alla colpa per inosservanza di norme di condotta; quanto ai danni risarcibili, i criteri di accertamento e di prova del pregiudizio; infine, quanto al termine di prescrizione, la possibilità di qualificare il danno da illecito antitrust quale danno “lungolatente”, con le relative conseguenze sull’individuazione del dies a quo di decorrenza del termine prescrizionale. In secondo luogo, è stata esaminata la questione della sorte dei contratti posti in essere in violazione del divieto di abuso di posizione dominante. In particolare, ci si è interrogati sulla possibilità di configurare – in assenza di indicazioni normative – la nullità “virtuale” di detti contratti, anche a fronte della recente conferma giunta dalla Suprema Corte circa la distinzione tra regole di comportamento e regole di validità del contratto. È stata inoltre esaminata – e valutata in senso negativo – la possibilità di qualificare la nullità in parola quale nullità “di protezione”, con una ricognizione, per quanto sintetica, dei principali aspetti attinenti alla legittimazione ad agire, alla rilevabilità d’ufficio e all’estensione dell’invalidità. Sono poi state dedicate alcune considerazioni alla nota questione della sorte dei contratti posti “a valle” di condotte abusive, per i quali non sembra agevole configurare declaratorie di nullità, mentre appare prospettabile – e, anzi, preferibile – il ricorso alla tutela risarcitoria. Da ultimo, non si è trascurata la valutazione dell’esperibilità, avverso le condotte di abuso di posizione dominante, di azioni diverse da quelle di nullità e risarcimento, le sole espressamente contemplate dall’art. 33, secondo comma, della legge n. 287/1990. Segnatamente, l’attenzione si è concentrata sulla possibilità di imporre a carico dell’impresa in posizione dominante un obbligo a contrarre a condizioni eque e non discriminatorie. L’importanza del tema è attestata non solo dalla discordanza delle pronunce giurisprudenziali, peraltro numericamente scarse, ma anche dal vasto dibattito dottrinale da tempo sviluppatosi, che investe tuttora taluni aspetti salienti del diritto delle obbligazioni e della tutela apprestata dall’ordinamento alla libertà di iniziativa economica.

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17

Santos, Dora Cristina Gonçalves dos. "O abuso de posição dominte." Master's thesis, FEUC, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10316/27515.

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Trabalho de projeto do mestrado em Economia (Economia Industrial), apresentado à Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra, sob a orientação de Adelino Fortunato e Elisabete Ramos.
Este trabalho tem como objetivo analisar o abuso de posição dominante tendo em consideração as suas implicações para economia, isto é, os efeitos da posição dominante das empresas em determinados mercados, nomeadamente no que respeita às suas implicações para consumidores, inovação tecnológica e política concorrencial. Ao longo deste trabalho irei falar sobre o mercado relevante, as ineficiências do poder de mercado, os tipos de posição dominante que existem (individual e coletiva), o abuso de posição dominante (abuso de exploração e de exclusão) e ainda será feita uma breve abordagem às licenças de tecnologia.

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18

Furtado, Rogério Dourado. "Abuso de posição dominante no Mercosul e na União Européia: uma análise da concorrência e seus efeitos." Pontifícia Universidade Católica de São Paulo, 2011. https://tede2.pucsp.br/handle/handle/5676.

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Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:20:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Rogerio Dourado Furtado.pdf: 437035 bytes, checksum: fc5f92d44263410f48d253c1436676df (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-09-29
Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico
Competition law was created in the United States due to the need to curb cartels and abuse of concentration of economic and market power. Since then, other countries have also incorporated the antitrust law in their jurisdictions, with the aim of ensuring a more just and lawful competition, thus shaping our times. It was no different in Brazil, beginning in the 1930s to the present day with Law number 8.884/94, the so called Brazilian antitrust law. This bill marks the beginning of the Brazilian system for protection of the competition, which although much criticized, attempts to exercise its role of ensuring a competitive benefit to society. In this dissertation we discourse about what is dominant position and its abuse in the legislational context, both internal and external. We proceed with an analysis of the competition in Mercosur and the European Union economic blocks. Finally we compare both economic blocks since their beginnings, going through their integrational role until supranationality. We analyze the problems encountered and possible solutions to a satisfactory Mercosur Common market, along the lines of the European Union
O direito da concorrência nasceu nos Estados Unidos decorrente da necessidade de coibir a formação de cartéis e o abuso de concentrações de poder econômico e de mercado. Desde então, legislações de outros Estados também incorporaram o direito antitruste em seus ordenamentos jurídicos com o escopo de zelar por uma concorrência mais justa e lícita, moldando-se assim aos tempos atuais. Não foi diferente no Brasil, começando na década de 1930 até os nossos dias com a Lei n° 8.884/94, a chamada Lei Antitruste Brasileira. Esta lei marca o início do Sistema Brasileiro de Defesa da Concorrência, que apesar de muito criticado tenta exercer o seu papel de zelar por uma concorrência benéfica à sociedade. Discorre-se sobre o que seja posição dominante e seu abuso no contexto legislacional tanto interno quanto externo. Adentra-se então nos blocos econômicos do Mercosul e da União Européia com uma análise da concorrência dos Estados em ambos os blocos e especificamente em determinados países. Por fim, faz-se uma comparação entre os blocos econômicos, desde o princípio de suas formações, passando pelo papel de integração até a supranacionalidade. Analisase os problemas encontrados e suas possíveis soluções para um Mercado Comum satisfatório no Mercosul, seguindo os moldes da União Européia

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19

Fröderberg, Shaiek Emma. "Excessive Data Collection as an Abuse of Dominant Position." Thesis, Stockholms universitet, Juridiska institutionen, 2021. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-194959.

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20

Andreetta, Stefano <1993&gt. "Abuso di posizione dominante: casi di imprese a confronto." Master's Degree Thesis, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10579/16597.

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La concorrenza è una componente fondamentale in un'economia di mercato, poiché offre una scelta di diversi servizi e prodotti alternativi. Un produttore non dovrebbe influenzare il mercato da solo, ma attraverso tutto il rapporto competitivo che mantiene con altri produttori. Questi rapporti possono per esempio portare a una diminuzione dei prezzi, ma allo stesso tempo il mercato si svilupperà stimolando gli acquirenti. Capita però in alcuni casi che, per ottenere e rafforzare una posizione dominante di mercato col fine di attirare molti più clienti ed eliminare i concorrenti, i commercianti utilizzino una varietà di azioni e atti illegali che minano gli equilibri di mercato. La posizione dominante di mercato non è una pratica illegale, lo è l’abuso di essa. Questi effetti hanno un impatto negativo su altri concorrenti e consumatori, motivo per cui l'Unione europea (UE) ha istituito un quadro legislativo in materia. L’abuso di dominanza è una delle forme più comuni di pratica illegale. L'obiettivo del presente documento è quello di presentare, da un approccio teorico e pratico con l’analisi di casi aziendali, le implicazioni e gli effetti di questo tipo di comportamento e anche per evidenziare i principali attori in questo processo. Verranno analizzati i principali elementi di abuso, le forme in cui si manifesta, gli effetti generati e le politiche che le istituzioni, in particolar modo quelle facenti parte l’Unione Europea, hanno messo in atto per contrastare questo problema. Nella prima parte vi sarà quindi un’analisi prettamente teorica del fenomeno, con un successivo capitolo centrale in cui verranno analizzati svariati casi, spesso diversi tra loro per periodo storico, tipologia di settore, grandezza dell’azienda ed altre variabili. In alcuni casi noteremo anche i limiti della politica anticoncorrenziale, dove le istituzioni non riescono ad imporsi come vorrebbero su coloro che abusano, a causa di motivazioni di differente natura. Successivamente verrà fatto uno studio specifico su questi casi, con confronti e parallelismi con l’ausilio di grafici per osservare più nel dettaglio la natura di questo fenomeno. Verrà prima fatta un’analisi settoriale relativa alla tipologia di abuso con una successiva osservazione di alcune dinamiche interne, come il grado di recidiva negli abusi commesse da imprese molto diverse tra loro sia a livello patrimoniale che di distribuzione geografica. Al termine di questo terzo capitolo verranno poi esposte le conclusioni.

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Le, Net. "Refusal to license : abuse of dominant position and switching costs." Thesis, London School of Economics and Political Science (University of London), 2004. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/2777/.

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The question of this thesis is: "when is the rightholder's refusal to license a software interface an abuse of dominant position." Using the principles of law and economics, I will approach this question from the consumers' perspective. The critical themes of this thesis are the distinction between innovative/non-innovative markets and the role of indirect switching costs of consumers in anti-abuse cases. Developing the studies of Klemperer (1987) and other authors on switching costs, I hypothesise that a dominant software incumbent abuses his market power if he prejudices consumers without justification. The consumers will suffer a detriment when their switching costs (S) are higher than the maximum utility surplus brought to the consumers by an entrant's product, or when the incumbent intentionally raises switching costs without justification. To remedy this, the incumbent should grant the entrant a license to access any interfaces or data formats which could reduce S. A refusal to license may result in an abuse, unless it is justified on the grounds of sunk costs and free riding. The decision to grant should be made by striking a balance between the costs and the benefits of granting access, in a process whereby both the entrant and the incumbent share the burden of proof - the essentiality-justification mechanism. Cost-benefit analysis, case studies, information system study, game theory, expected utility and probability assessment are the toolkit in this research.

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Martínez, Mata Yolanda. "Abuso de dominio en el sector farmacéutico." Doctoral thesis, Universitat de Barcelona, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10803/482189.

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El sector farmacéutico es uno de los sectores empresariales en que la tensión entre el Derecho de la Competencia y el Derecho de la Propiedad Intelectual es más evidente. Los objetivos de cada uno de esos ámbitos normativos son, en su misma esencia, contrapuestos y, sin embargo, ambos son socialmente deseables. La aplicación del artículo 102 TFUE en el sector farmacéutico constituye una de las manifestaciones de esa tensión y, a pesar del extenso debate doctrinal habido al respecto, siguen sin estar claras las líneas divisorias entre uno y otro ámbito normativo. En esta tesis nos adentramos en la exploración de esas líneas divisorias, con la perspectiva que ofrece el transcurso de prácticamente una década desde que la Comisión Europea publicara los resultados de su investigación sectorial en el ámbito farmacéutico. Esa década ha ofrecido tan solo unos pocos asuntos y algunos de ellos están todavía pendientes de recurso ante los tribunales comunitarios. Sin embargo, aun siendo escasos, esos asuntos permiten ya atisbar algunas líneas de convergencia entre los distintos tipos de abuso en el sector farmacéutico y ofrecer una aproximación sistemática a la aplicación del artículo 102 TFUE a este sector. Los asuntos de abuso en los que la conducta del operador dominante ha buscado beneficiarse de una regulación sectorial fragmentaria sin ir más allá de cuanto esa regulación permitía, pero en contra de los objetivos del mercado interior (caso Glaxo Grecia y es posible que en un futuro también el caso Aspen), requieren un análisis de efectos. Al contrario, en los asuntos de abuso en los que la conducta del operador dominante ha perseguido ahondar la distorsión de la competencia derivada de la regulación, yendo más allá de los límites de esta (AstraZeneca y Servier), se ha recurrido a la lógica de las infracciones por objeto. El acierto de esta aproximación de cara a asuntos futuros dependerá, al menos en parte, de que las restricciones por objeto sean únicamente aquellas en las que no exista una explicación legítima plausible para la conducta del operador dominante más allá de su intención de eliminar a la competencia. Aun en esos casos, será necesario además que el operador dominante pueda desvirtuar esa determinación prima facie de la existencia de un abuso objetivo. Desde esta perspectiva, la aplicación del artículo 102 TFUE se limitaría a los asuntos en que la regulación sectorial o los DPI no permitan corregir las situaciones en que el sistema se utiliza para una finalidad distinta a la prevista por el legislador. En otras palabras, la casuística y jurisprudencia habidas hasta la fecha en el sector farmacéutico evidencian una clara opción de las instituciones y tribunales comunitarios por utilizar el Derecho de la Competencia y, en particular, el artículo 102 TFUE a modo de mecanismo corrector de las deficiencias de un sistema de patentes no armonizado, fragmentario y disperso y de una regulación sectorial todavía parcialmente nacional.
El sector farmacèutic és un dels sectors empresarials en què la tensió entre el Dret de la Competència i el Dret de la Propietat Intel·lectual és més evident. Els objectius de cadascun d’aquests àmbits normatius són, en la seva pròpia essència, contraposats i, tanmateix, tots dos són socialment desitjables. L’aplicació de l’article 102 TFUE al sector farmacèutic constitueix una de les manifestacions d’aquesta tensió i, malgrat l’extens debat doctrinal al respecte, continuen sense estar clares les línies divisòries entre un i altre àmbit normatiu. En aquesta tesi ens endinsem en l’exploració d’aquestes línies divisòries, amb la perspectiva que ofereix el transcurs de pràcticament una dècada d’ençà que la Comissió Europea publicà els resultats de llur investigació sectorial en l’àmbit farmacèutic. Aquesta dècada ha ofert només uns pocs assumptes i alguns d’ells estan encara pendents de recurs davant dels tribunals comunitaris. Malgrat ésser escassos, aquests assumptes permeten ja percebre algunes línies de convergència entre els diferents tipus d’abús en el sector farmacèutic i oferir una aproximació sistemàtica a l’aplicació de l’article 102 TFUE a aquest sector. Els assumptes d’abús en els quals la conducta de l’operador dominant ha cercat beneficiar-se d’una regulació sectorial fragmentària sense anar més enllà d’allò que aquella regulació permetia, però en contra dels objectius del mercat interior (cas Glaxo Grècia i és possible que en un futur també el cas Aspen), requereixen una anàlisi d’efectes. Al contrari, en els assumptes d’abús en què la conducta de l’operador dominant ha cercat aprofundir la distorsió de la competència derivada de la regulació, anant més enllà dels límits de la mateixa (AstraZeneca i Servier), s’ha utilitzat la lògica de les infraccions per objecte. L’encert d’aquesta aproximació de cara a assumptes futurs dependrà, com a mínim en part, de que les restriccions per objecte siguin únicament aquelles en què no existeixi una explicació legítima plausible per a la conducta de l’operador dominant més enllà de la seva intenció d’eliminar la competència. Inclús en aquests casos, serà necessari, a més a més, que l’operador dominant pugui desvirtuar aquesta determinació prima facie de l’existència d’un abús objectiu. Des d’aquesta perspectiva, l’aplicació de l’article 102 TFUE es limitaria als assumptes en què la regulació sectorial o els DPI no permetin corregir les situacions en què el sistema de patents s’utilitza per a una finalitat diferent de la prevista pel legislador. En d’altres paraules, la casuística i la jurisprudència existents a data d’avui evidencien una clara opció de les institucions i tribunals comunitaris per utilitzar el Dret de la Competència i, en particular, l’article 102 TFUE com a mecanisme corrector de les deficiències d’un sistema de patents no harmonitzat, fragmentari i dispers i d’una regulació sectorial encara parcialment nacional.
The pharmaceutical sector is one of the industrial sectors in which the tension between Competition Law and Intellectual Property Law becomes most apparent. The objectives of both sets of regulation are in opposition by their very nature and, nevertheless, they are both socially desirable. The application of Article 102 TFEU to the pharmaceutical sector evidences that tension and, despite copious doctrinal debate, the boundaries between both regulatory regimes are still unclear. In this PhD, we explore those boundaries in perspective because almost a decade has elapsed since the publication of the European Commission’s inquiry into the pharmaceutical sector. During this decade only a few cases have been analysed and some of them are still under judicial review. Despite the scarcity, these cases allow for some opinions on convergence lines among the different types of abuse in this sector and for a systematic approach to the application of Article 102 TFUE to this sector. Abuse cases in which the dominant undertaking sought to benefit from a disperse sectoral regulation without exceeding the limits of that regulation (Glaxo Greece case and possibly in a near future also Aspen case), but acting against the objectives of the internal market, require an effects analysis. Conversely, abuse cases in which the dominant undertaking sought to deepen the regulatory distortion of competition exceeding the limits of that regulation (AstraZeneca and Servier), a by-object infringement was deemed to exist. The wisdom of this approach in the prospect of future cases will depend, at least in part, on the limitation of by-object infringements to such behaviour for which there is no other plausible explanation than the intention to eliminate competitors. Even in the latter cases, the dominant undertaking must have the possibility to rebut this prima facie presumption of the existence of a by-object restriction. From this perspective, the application of Article 102 TFEU would be limited to those cases in which the sectoral regulation or the Intellectual Property legislation prove inadequate to overcome situations of regulatory misuse for an objective different from that of the legislator. In other words, so far precedents and case-law in the pharmaceutical sector evidence a clear choice from EU institutions and courts consisting of the use of Competition Law and, in particular, Article 102 TFEU as a correction mechanism against regulatory imperfections deriving from a non-harmonized and fragmented patent system and from a sectoral regulation that remains partially national.

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Mongouachon, Claire. "Abus de position dominante et secteur public : l'application par les autorités de la concurrence du droit des abus de position dominante aux opérateurs publics." Aix-Marseille 3, 2010. http://www.theses.fr/2010AIX32070.

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En raison des moyens exorbitants mis à la disposition du secteur public, les opérateurs publics se trouvent souvent dans une situation de force sur le marché. Cette position privilégiée engendre un risque accru de pratiques anticoncurrentielles pour les opérateurs publics et nécessite, corrélativement, une surveillance étroite de la part des autorités et juridictions en charge de la concurrence. De ce point de vue, la notion d'abus de position dominante, telle qu'elle découle de l'article 102 TFUE, revêt une place centrale. Loin de nier la spécificité des opérateurs du secteur public, le droit européen des abus de position dominante fonde un modèle à part entière dont la légimité mérite d'être défendue. Connu pour son expansionnisme, il inclut dans son champ d'application les opérateurs publics, explicitement visés par l'article 106 TFUE. Dès lors que les opérateurs publics répondent aisément aux critères de qualification de position dominante, le droit des abus de position dominante permet aux autorités et juridictions de la concurrence d'exercer un contrôle très approfondi sur leurs comportements de marché. Cette approche dirigiste du modèle européen de la concurrence s'explique par ses racines intellectuelles ordo-libérales. C'est, ainsi, à l'égard du secteur public que les concepts ordo-libéraux, sur lesquels repose la politique européenne de la concurrence, trouvent leur effectivité maximale. Mais l'article 102 TFUE n'a pas été épargné par le mouvement de modernisation qui irrigue le droit de la concurrence. Décriés pour leur sévérité et leur rigidité excessifs, les outils de contrôle habituellement pratiqués font l'objet d'un profond renouvellement doctrinal. Sous l'influence de l'analyse économique, les autorités nationales et la Commission européenne, sont désormais tentées de scruter les comportements anticoncurrentiels des entreprises dominantes à l'aune des effets concrets qu'ils produisent sur le marché. La défense du bien-être des consommateurs devient l'objectif ultime à viser. La Cour de justice se montre, en revanche, encore très attachée à sa conception traditionnelle des finalités assignées au contrôle des abus de position dominante. Elle défend un droit orienté vers la protection du processus concurrentiel. Ce modèle conserve une pertinence importante s'agissant d'appréhender les comportements spécifiques émanant du secteur public. Capable d'aménager ses raisonnements pour tenir compte des privilèges et des contraintes d'intérêt général liés à l'interventionnisme marchant, il se présente comme un moyen efficace de réguler la concurrence du secteur public
Because of the extraordinary means to which the public sector has access, public competitors often occupy a stronghold on the market. This privileged increases the risk of anticompetitive practices being adopted by public actors and therefore obliges the public and juridical authorities in charge of market competition to keep a particularly keen watch on this sector's activities. In this context, the abuse of a dominant position, as defined in article 102 of the TFUE, is a central issue. Far from overlooking the specificity of the public sector, the European Law on the abuse of a dominant position constitutes a model, which deserves to be upheld. The scope of this model, which is know to be particularly broad, includes the case of public actors, which is explicitly addressed in article 106 of the TFUE. Public competitors easily meet the criteria defining those in a market power, and the rules on abuse of a dominant position enable the authorities to control these players' market activities extremely closely. The regulatory approach adopted in the European model for competition can be explained in terms of the ordo-liberal intellectual background. It is in the public sector that this model has been expressed most effectively. However, article 102 of the TFUE has not been spared by the wave of modernisation which has pervaded competition law. The theoretical concepts underlying these widely used regulatory tools, which have been criticized for being too strict and too rigid, are being completely revised. National authorities and the European Commission, inspired by the latest economic analyses, are now tending to judge the anti-competitive behaviour of the most powerful firms in terms of its concrete effects on the market. Consumer welfare is becoming the ultimate goal. However, the European Court of Justice still maintains its traditional approach to preventing the misuse of competitive power: it supports a legal system designed to protect competitive structures. This model is still highly relevant when it comes to examine the public sector conducts. Since its premises are sufficiently flexible to be able to support both public privileges and general welfare, this model seems to provide an efficient means of regulating competition in the public sector

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Vougioukas, Dimitrios. "Le secteur de l’aviation et les règles de concurrence de l’Union européenne : étude des comportements et des rapprochements d’entreprises." Thesis, Lyon 3, 2012. http://www.theses.fr/2012LYO30011.

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L’application des règles de concurrence de l’Union européenne au secteur de l’aviation présente un caractère spécial. Les rapprochements des compagnies aériennes sous formes d’alliances ou concentrations sont à première vue indispensables, afin de garantir leur viabilité et mieux desservir les besoins des voyageurs. La pression concurrentielle exercée par les différents moyens de transports et la globalisation des échanges conduisent vers cette voie. Or, la consolidation du marché aérien peut avoir des conséquences néfastes au détriment des consommateurs. Structure oligopolistique, organisation des gros opérateurs en réseaux (hub-and-spoke system), insuffisance des infrastructures, coûts énormes d’exploitation ainsi que protectionnisme au niveau international, constituent des barrières considérables à l’entrée de nouveaux concurrents et peuvent conduire à des pratiques abusives. La transparence tarifaire et les accords de coopération peuvent favoriser les cartels entre transporteurs aériens. La Commission évalue la position des parties et les risques à la concurrence sur des liaisons déterminées (paires de villes). Cette méthode de délimitation du marché pertinent au transport aérien suscite une polémique de la part notamment des compagnies aériennes qui soutiennent une approche fondée sur la concurrence entre réseaux. Ce débat, montre l’évolution du secteur de l’aviation et la nécessité de prendre toujours en compte les nouvelles données. Le maintien d’une concurrence efficace au secteur de l’aviation n’est pas un objectif en soi, mais un instrument de la politique européenne pour la création du « ciel unique européen ». L’intervention des autorités de l’Union européenne au secteur de l’aviation ne se limite pas à une application rigoureuse des règles de concurrence mais vise à éliminer préalablement les phénomènes anticoncurrentiels par l’adoption d’un cadre législatif
The application of European Union’s competition rules to the aviation sector presents a special character. The rapprochement of air companies either by the formation of alliances or mergers seem to be necessary. Indeed, it can guarantee the existence of a company as well as it serves the needs of travellers. The competitive pressure exercised by the different existing means of transportation and the globalisation of exchanges lead to this behaviour. But this consolidation of the air market can have harmful consequences for consumers. Oligopolistic structures, the hub-and-spoke system, insufficiency of infrastructures, enormous costs of exploitation along with protectionism at an international level, constitute considerable barriers for new competitors and could lead to abusive practices. Tariff transparency and cooperative agreements can furtherer cartels in between air transporters. The Commission assesses the position of the parties and competitive risks on specific routes (city pairs). This method of delimitation of the market for air transport has created a polemic, especially from the airline companies supporting an approach based on competition between networks. This debate shows the evolution of the aviation sector and the necessity of always taking into consideration new data. The upholding of an efficient competition system within the aviation sector is not an objective in itself, but means of European politic for the creation of a “Single European Sky”. The intervention of European authorities within the aviation sector is not limited to a rigorous application of competition rules but aims first at eliminating anticompetitive phenomenon by adopting a legislative framework

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Corrêa, Mariana Villela. "Abuso de posição dominante: condutas de exclusão em relações de distribuição." Universidade de São Paulo, 2012. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/2/2132/tde-10042013-131710/.

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O objetivo do trabalho é estudar as situações em que práticas de distribuição tendentes à exclusão podem configurar ilícitos de abuso de posição dominante por parte de fornecedores de bens e serviços. Fornecedores de bens e serviços precisam identificar qual a forma mais eficiente de fazer que seus produtos cheguem até o consumidor final. Em determinadas circunstâncias, contudo, um fornecedor pode ocupar uma posição de domínio em determinados mercados e suas práticas de distribuição podem ter potenciais efeitos de exclusão, possivelmente causando efeitos indesejáveis sobre a concorrência. Ao longo do trabalho, buscamos contextualizar e compreender a ideia de exclusão, com recurso à análise do tratamento dado às condutas de exclusão por parte do direito antitruste dos Estados Unidos, do direito da concorrência comunitário europeu e do direito da concorrência brasileiro. Buscamos, ainda, traçar um panorama das principais linhas da teoria econômica que oferecem subsídios à compreensão da ideia de exclusão, bem como as contribuições específicas com referência ao tema. Examinamos, também, as principais práticas de distribuição tendentes à exclusão, que classificamos em tradicionais e não tradicionais, buscando compreender seus efeitos e motivações. Ao final, apresenta-se um diagnóstico e a conclusão. O tratamento das práticas de distribuição tendentes à exclusão deve encontrar um equilíbrio entre, de um lado, a repressão adequada dos abusos de posição dominante envolvendo relações de distribuição e, de outro, a preservação do incentivo para que fornecedores adotem formas eficientes, inovadoras e concorrenciais de estruturar seus sistemas de distribuição
The work seeks to examine situations in which distribution practices tending towards exclusion may characterize illicit acts of abuse of a dominant position by suppliers of goods and services. Suppliers of goods and services need to identify the most efficient way of getting their products to the end user. In certain circumstances, though, a supplier may occupy a dominant position in given markets, and its distribution practices may have effects of exclusion, possibly affecting competition unfavorably. Throughout the work, we attempt to contextualize and understand the idea of exclusion, using an analysis of the treatment given to exclusionary conducts under United States antitrust law, the competition law of the European community and Brazilian competition law. We also seek to sketch out an overview of the main lines of economic theory that assist in an understanding of the idea of exclusion, along with specific contributions making reference to the issue. We also examine the main distribution practices tending towards exclusion, which we classify into traditional and non-traditional, seeking to understand their effects and rationale. Lastly, a diagnosis and conclusion are presented. The treatment of distribution practices with a trend towards exclusion must strike a balance between, on the one hand, proper repression of abuses of a dominant position involving distribution relations and, on the other, the preservation of an incentive for suppliers to adopt efficient, innovative and competitive ways of structuring their distribution systems.

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Tassano, Velaochaga Hebert Eduardo. "The convergence between competition law and intellectual property rights." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2015. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/116244.

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Indecopi has within its functions the defense of free competition and the protection of intellectual property. This institutional design has the advantage of being able to see more clearly what are the points of convergence between the two subject-matter, harmonize them and achieve the goals they have in common. Within this convergence, there are sensitive issues as the granting of compulsory licenses. In this work, we highlight that compulsory licenses are exceptional measures and, to consider its granting, the State must have a procedure that provides confidence and predictability to citizens and clear definitions of what is meant by public interest, emergency and national security. Finally, it is proposed that the granting of compulsory licenses should be justified by a cost benefit analysis showing that is the best choice.
El Instituto Nacional de Defensa de la Competencia y de la Protección de la Propiedad Intelectual (IndecopI) tiene entre sus funciones tanto la defensa de la libre competencia como la protección de la propiedad intelectual. Este diseño institucional tiene la ventaja de permitir apreciar con mayor claridad cuáles son los puntos de convergencia entre ambas materias, armonizarlos y conseguir los objetivos que tienen en común. Dentro de esta convergencia, existen temas sensibles, como el otorgamiento de licencias obligatorias, por lo que en el presente trabajo se destaca su carácter de medida excepcional y se plantea que, para considerar su otorgamiento, el Estado debe contar con un procedimiento que brinde confianza y predictibilidad a la ciudadanía y con definiciones claras sobre qué debemos entender por interés público, emergencia y seguridad nacional. Finalmente, se propone que su otorgamiento tenga justificación en un análisis costo beneficio que arroje como resultado que, en efecto, era la opción más adecuada.

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Aretakis, Nicolas. "Abuse of Dominant Position in China and the EU : A Comparative Legal Study." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Institutionen för lingvistik och filologi, 2017. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-313600.

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This thesis presents the Chinese and European competition laws on abuse of dominant position. The thesis starts with an introduction, and goes on to present the purpose of the study, which is to determine the similarities and differences between the Chinese and European prohibitions on ADP. After the introductory part, consisting of background, method, material and previos research, the respective prohibitions are described in different aspects. The aspects are namely system, purpose, scope of application, what constitutes dominance and what constitutes abuse. Thereafter, the two prohibitions are compared. In the comparison, similarities are presented such as similar purposes, similar scope of application, very similar in what constitutes a dominant position and abuse. The systematics however differ more, and so do the rules on extraterritorial application. In the concluding remarks, the results of the thesis are highlighted and the author shortly analyses the results..

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Adel, Fatma El-Zahraa. "L'effectivité du droit égyptien de la concurrence : essais de mise en perspective." Thesis, Paris 1, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019PA01D014.

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Après des décennies de mise en œuvre d’une politique économique protectionniste et enfermée, l’Égypte a opté en 1991 pour l’économie du marché et l’ouverture de ses frontières aux échanges internationaux. Dès lors, il manquait une pièce importante de lutte contre les cartels et le pouvoir de marché de manière générale. En 2005, l’Égypte a finalement adopté sa première législation de concurrence. Au regard de l’importance de l’Égypte au niveau régional et mondial, sur le plan économique et politique, il est opportun de s’intéresser à l’effectivité du droit égyptien de la concurrence, dans le but d’apprécier ses avancées et ses faiblesses et de proposer des pistes de perfectionnement. Cette étude cible des aspects qu’elle juge prioritaires : les règles substantielles, procédurales et institutionnelles visant la lutte contre les ententes secrètes, les abus de position dominante et les concentrations. Les appréciations et propositions sont faites à partir d’une mise en perspective de systèmes juridiques qui ont été choisis en référence : ceux de deux pays en développement (Brésil et Afrique du sud) et ceux des pays développés (Union européenne, la France et, à titre subsidiaire, les États-Unis). Elles entendent également tirer profit des travaux d’organisations internationales
After decades of adopting a protective and closed economic policy, Egypt has finally opted in 1991 for the market economy and the opening of its borders to international trade. However, an important aspect was missing ; the fight against cartels and market power in general. In 2005, Egypt has finally adopted its first competition law. Given the importance of Egypt at the regional and global levels, from both economic and political perspectives, it is timely to pay attention to the effectiveness of Egyptian competition law in order to evaluate its level of progress and its weaknesses and to propose methods and means of enhancement. This study is targeting issues and matters that are considered to be priorities: substantive, procedural and institutional rules aiming for fighting against cartels, abuse of dominance and mergers. The assessments and proposals set out in this study have been made in perspective of legal systems that have been chosen as reference: those of two developing countries (Brazil and South Africa) and those of developed countries (European Union, France and, alternatively, the United States). They also intend to benefit from the work of international organizations

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Marceau-Welschinger, Béatrice. "L'abus de position dominante en droit communautaire." Paris 1, 1991. http://www.theses.fr/1991PA010275.

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L'abus de position dominante est un concept juridique, a savoir l'abus de droit, applique a la notion economique de position dominante detenue par une entreprise sur un marche. Dans le cadre de l'article 86 cee, le concept d'abus de position dominante doit, en outre, permettre d'atteindre les objectifs particuliers du traite de rome
The abuse of a dominant position is a legal concept (the abuse of rights) applied to the economic concept of the dominant position enjoyed by an enterprise on a market. Within the meaning of article 86 eec treaty, the concept of abuse of a dominant position should also allow the pursual of the specific goals of the treaty of rome

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Choné, Anne-Sophie. "Les abus de domination : Essai en droit des contrats et en droit de la concurrence." Paris 2, 2009. http://www.theses.fr/2009PA020036.

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L’abus de domination est la pratique par laquelle le détenteur d’une situation de domination l’exploite abusivement. Le droit de la concurrence et le droit des contrats l’appréhendent par le truchement d’autres notions telles que l’abus de position dominante, l’abus de dépendance économique, la lésion, les clauses abusives, la violence économique. . . En dépit des nombreuses voies mises à la disposition des autorités de concurrence et du juge judiciaire, la lutte menée contre les abus de domination manque parfois son objectif. Cette insuffisance s’explique essentiellement par leur mauvaise répartition au sein de la division des droits. Ainsi, lorsque la sanction vise davantage à rééquilibrer la relation contractuelle qu’à réguler le marché, l’abus devrait être appréhendé, non par le droit de la concurrence, mais par le droit des contrats. Améliorer leur traitement suppose de le réorganiser. Deux abus de domination doivent être distingués, sur le modèle de l’abus de position dominante qui sépare l’abus d’éviction de l’abus d’exploitation. Le premier, appelé « abus au service du marché », est celui qui, en nuisant aux concurrents, restreint la concurrence sur le marché. Pour cette raison, il revient au droit de la concurrence de le sanctionner dans le respect de la logique afférente à cette discipline. Le second, appelé « abus au service du contrat », affecte l’équilibre contractuel, en portant atteinte au contractant placé en situation de dépendance. Sa sanction, parce qu’elle sert le contrat, revient au droit des contrats.

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Santos, Bruno Miguel Reis Martins Figueiredo dos. "Modernização da política de concorrência comunitária : a proposta da Alemanha, França e Polónia é uma resposta pertinente aos desafios do século XXI?" Master's thesis, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, 2020. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/21003.

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Mestrado em Economia Internacional e Estudos Europeus
Um dos instrumentos que torna a integração europeia possível no âmbito económico é a política de concorrência, que deve ser eficaz e adaptável aos novos desafios que o Espaço Económico Europeu enfrenta. Nesta dissertação será feito uma contextualização dos objetivos da política de concorrência, e um breve enquadramento histórico da evolução da Política de Concorrência da União Europeia. Após este capítulo, será detalhada a legislação europeia atual na área da concorrência, e quais alguns dos seus desafios mais pertinentes no século XXI. No último capítulo será analisada a proposta de modernização da política de concorrência comunitária apresentada pela Alemanha, França e Polónia, com o objetivo de se concluir o seu nível de pertinência e aplicabilidade ao panorama descrito. A conclusão retirada após esta análise indica que esta proposta é parcialmente pertinente como resposta aos desafios apresentados, pois enquanto alguns dos seus aspetos são uma resposta efetiva às novas realidades económicas, os contributos relacionados com a criação de "campeões europeus" são considerados irrealistas.
One of the instruments that makes European integration possible on an economic level is competition policy, which should be effective and adaptable to the new challenges that the European Economic Area faces. This dissertation includes a contextualization of the goals of competition policy, and a brief historical review of the evolution of the European Union's Competition Policy. After this chapter, the current legal framework of competition in the EU and the current challenges it faces in the 21st century will be detailed. The last chapter consists in the analysis of the proposal of modernization of the European competition policy presented by Germany, France and Poland, with the goal of concluding its level of pertinence and applicability to the described panorama. The conclusion reached after this analysis indicates that this proposal is partially relevant as a solution to the stated challenges, as while some of its aspects are an effective response to the new economic reality, the contributions related with the creation of "European champions" are considered unrealistic.
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

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Elftorp, Kristian. "Abuse of a dominant position : The legal position of tying practices within European Competition Law." Thesis, Jönköping University, JIBS, Commercial Law, 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-12245.

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This thesis intends to analyze and clarify the legal position regarding abuse of a dominant position and particularly tying practices. The practice is central within European competition law and has been highly discussed in literature recently. In Article 102 TFEU it is explicitly stated that supplementary obligations which have no connection with the subject of such contracts, shall be considered as a way of abusing a position of strength. Although the method is often reasonable and very common within many business areas, it might be pursued as a tactic of excluding competition. The General Court’s decision in Microsoft led to some confusion as regards to the European approach towards tying practices. Prior to that judgment, the EU Courts appeared quite negative to the practice and seemed determined that the practice was in fact anticompetitive. For an example, in Hilti the Court found it sufficient that the company had deprived its costumers of a choice. The effects on competition were not analyzed in great detail and in most cases the EU Courts fined the undertaking involved in such business methods. However, in Microsoft the General Court took a new approach and focused on the actual effects that followed from the practice. Many argues that European competition law has moved from a per se approach to a rule of reason approach. In my opinion however, it seems relatively unclear whether or not this new approach shall apply to all versions of tying or if it was applied due to the certain circumstances involved in Microsoft. The tying practice involved a form of technical tying, i.e. an integration of two distinctive products. Cases prior to Microsoft mostly concerned a form of contractual tying and were treated very differently by the EU Courts. My opinion on the matter is therefore that it is not possible to declare a clear legal position regarding the practice of tying. There is a need for new judgments and official guidelines since the current situation deprives companies of legal security as concerns the practice of tying within European competition law.

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Rosochowicz, Patricia Hanh. "Deterring cartel and abuse of dominant position activity in the European Union : a comparative study." Thesis, University of Reading, 2005. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.428301.

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Marko, Goikoetxea Izarne <1990&gt. "Compulsory licensing of Standard Essential Patents to remedy abuses of dominant position." Doctoral thesis, Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, 2019. http://amsdottorato.unibo.it/9089/1/PhD%20thesis%2030%20Sept%202019%20%28Izarne%20Marko%20Goikoetxea%29.pdf.

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When implementers use Standard Essential Patents (SEPs) without obtaining licenses – because parties cannot agree on royalties –, patent owners are entitled to bring infringement actions against them, seeking prohibitory injunctions and the recall of products. However, as SEP holders gave commitments to grant licenses to third parties on Fair, Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (FRAND) terms, alleged infringers accuse SEP owners of abusing their dominant positions for bringing the aforementioned actions. Due to an absence of express guidance from Standard Setting Organizations’ patent policies, there was a considerable degree of uncertainty as to the lawfulness of SEP holders’ behaviour. Accordingly, the European Commission – in Samsung and Motorola – and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) – in Huawei v. ZTE – pronounced on the issue. Both treated that conduct as a specific and novel category of abuse within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU. Nevertheless, it should have been treated as a refusal to deal – to grant SEP licenses. In order to do that, it must be argued that bringing those infringement actions by SEP holders constitutes a ‘constructive’ refusal to grant licenses, in consistency with a critical review of IMS Health – issued by the ECJ. In this way, Huawei v. ZTE would be consistent with the ECJ’s case law on refusal to deal. Consequently, the compulsory license would emerge as the most proportionate and necessary remedy to end effectively the infringement of Article 102 TFEU committed by SEP owners. In US, de facto compulsory licenses – ‘ongoing royalties for future infringements’ – are also employed, although to remedy patent infringements. Nevertheless, that divergence between US and EU illustrates that when parties fail to enter into licensing agreements on FRAND terms, the compulsory license might be ‘the tool’ to make SEP licenses available to all stakeholders.

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Noda, Yamada Carlos Ramón. "La relación entre las prohibiciones del abuso de posición dominante y de las restricciones verticales." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2006. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/115453.

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Pechberty, Sébastien. "Abuse of a dominant position under Article 82 of the E.C.Treaty, in the air transport sector." Thesis, McGill University, 2002. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=78224.

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The air transport sector is one that is particularly conducive to market dominance, and therefore to potential abuse thereof. Characterised, for several decades, by the omnipresence of barriers attributable to the preferential treatment enjoyed by undertakings under the sponsorship of their respective governments, European civil air transport has undergone progressive liberalisation over the years, under the auspices of the European institutions.
The object of the present thesis is to assess how the provisions of Article 82 of the E.C. Treaty have applied to the air transport sector prior and subsequent to deregulation, and how they remain indispensable, in the wake of emerging new factors that tend to keep the market of scheduled air services oligopolistic.

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Stetsenko, Olena. "Política de concorrência na UE/Portugal : o caso Nestlé." Master's thesis, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/7576.

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Mestrado em Economia Internacional e Estudos Europeus
O tema do presente trabalho passa pela política de concorrência em vigor na União Europeia e em Portugal. Começa por analisar as vantagens da concorrência para a economia, tentando perceber qual a lógica de um comportamento não concorrencial das empresas e dos Estados. Neste contexto, são apresentadas as principais linhas de força das políticas da concorrência europeias, ao proibirem os acordos anticoncorrenciais (em especial, as práticas de cartelização), os abusos de posição dominante nos mercados, as fusões e aquisições e as ajudas públicas indevidas. A título de exemplo, analisa-se um caso concreto de política de concorrência em Portugal o "Caso Nestlé", que se insere numa prática anticoncorrencial de abuso de posição dominante, através do qual se pode melhor compreender a intervenção da entidade reguladora da concorrência (Autoridade da Concorrência).
This paper deals with competition policy both in the European Union and in Portugal. It analyses the benefits of competition to the economy and it investigates why enterprises and States adopt non-competitive behaviors. To this purpose, it presents the main European competition policy tenets: prohibition of anti-competitive agreements (cartels), of abuse of dominant position, of mergers and acquisitions and of illegal State aids. A specific example of competition policy in Portugal "the Nestlé Case" is developed in this context. The case illustrates an anti-competitive practice of abuse of dominant position and enables us to understand the intervention of the Portuguese Competition Authority.

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Kazakevič, Diana. "Abuse of dominant position: abusive tying practices under European Union and United States of America competition law." Master's thesis, Lithuanian Academic Libraries Network (LABT), 2013. http://vddb.laba.lt/obj/LT-eLABa-0001:E.02~2013~D_20130205_090329-46202.

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This thesis deals with abusive tying practices and its concept under European Union law and United States of America law. Author tries to define concept of abusive tying practices and find necessary elements for legal assessment of tying. Moreover, author carries on the comparative analysis of the Microsoft tying cases in European Union and in United States of America, in order to find whether same elements of tying practices conditions the same outcome in the case law.
Šis darbas nagrinėja piktnaudžiaujančio susiejimo praktiką ir jos sąvoką pagal Europos Sąjungos ir Jungtinių Amerikos Valstijų teisės aktus. Autorė bando nustatyti piktnaudžiaujančio susiejimo veiklos koncepciją ir rasti susiejimo teisiniam įvertinimui reikalingus elementus. Be to, autorė atlieka lyginamąją analizę Microsoft susiejimo bylos Europos Sąjungos ir Jungtinių Amerikos Valstijų teismuose, su tikslu nustatyti ar tie patys elementai abiejose jurisdikcijose lemia tapačią teismų praktiką.

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SQUITIERI, MAURO. "Monopolizzazione ed abuso di posizione dominante: analisi comparata della legislazione dell'Unione Europea e degli Stati Uniti d'America." Doctoral thesis, Università Bocconi, 2011. https://hdl.handle.net/11565/4054139.

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Torres, Rafael Nery. "Direito concorrencial na República Popular da China: abuso de posição dominante das empresas estatais chinesas no cenário internacional." reponame:Biblioteca Digital de Teses e Dissertações da UFRGS, 2016. http://hdl.handle.net/10183/165160.

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O Direito Internacional da Concorrência é o ramo do direito que protege o exercício da liberdade de concorrência. Liberdade esta que, com o desenvolvimento do mundo globalizado, vem sendo atacada pelas multinacionais, causando prejuízo às economias tanto locais quanto internacionais, assim como aos consumidores, se fazendo necessária a intervenção estatal para regulação desses conflitos. Entretanto, emerge um novo conflito quando o Estado detém o controle acionário de uma empresa, como é o caso das empresas estatais. Tal panorama vem se agravando e causando conflitos concorrenciais no cenário global. A China, país em que tradicionalmente o governo detinha controle de todas as empresas nele constituídas, após a abertura de mercado, vem adotando constantes reformas de políticas de mercado com o viés de introduzir a alta tecnologia e expandir as relações comerciais com os demais países do mundo. Hodiernamente, após as reformas comerciais e estruturais das empresas estatais, a China determinou que setores-chave considerados importantes para segurança econômica chinesa serão de controle estatal, isto é, com monopólio estatal. Isto posto, a presente investigação procurou verificar se as empresas estatais chinesas estariam abusando de sua posição dominante para além das fronteiras e infringindo, sobretudo, a própria legislação concorrencial da China, cuja promulgação fora exigida pelos demais membros da Organização Mundial do Comércio. A investigação se dividiu em três partes essenciais: primeiro sobre as transformações econômicas, mercantis, sociais e jurídicas chinesas, principalmente no período posterior ao século XX; na segunda parte, se tratou do direito concorrencial na China, confrontando-o com as empresas estatais; e no último capítulo, foram verificados casos administrativos e judiciais perante os órgãos de regulamentação concorrencial. Pretendeu-se, pelo método dedutivo de pesquisa, verificar se a dicotomia formada entre a proteção governamental às empresas estatais fere a liberdade de um mercado competitivo. Buscou-se, assim, verificar se a atividade das empresas estatais chinesas ocupou fatia relevante de mercado a ponto de abusar da sua posição dominante e se é a China um palco para a aplicação de penalidades, visando à ordem e à liberdade concorrencial. Conclui-se que ocorre tratamento desigual na imposição de penalidades por práticas de abuso de posição dominante quando se tratam de empresas estrangeiras e empresas estatais chinesas. Denotou-se por meio da análise casuística que os esforços dos órgãos de fiscalização concorrencial chineses no combate a práticas anticoncorrenciais são alcançados, até o presente momento, quando versam sobre empresas estrangeiras, enquanto que as empresas estatais recebem tratamento dessemelhante e permissivo às práticas monopolistas.
The International Competition Law is the law that protects the freedom of competition. Freedom of which, with the development of the globalized world, comes under attack by multinationals, causing damage to the economies both local and international, as well as consumers, making it necessary the state intervention to regulate these conflicts. However, emerges into a new conflict when the state holds a controlling stake of the company, such as state-owned enterprises. This scenario has been growing worse and causing conflicts competitive on the global stage. China, which traditionally held control of all companies set up in it, after the opening of the market, has been adopting constant market policy reforms with the bias to introduce high technology and expanding trade relations with other countries worldwide. In our times, after trade and structural reforms of state-owned enterprises, China has determined that key sectors of the economy considered important to China's economic security will be of state control. Accordingly, the present investigation sought to ascertain whether chinese state-owned enterprises were abusing their dominant position beyond the borders and in particular violating China's own competition law, which was demanded by the other members of the World Trade Organization The investigation was divided into three essential parts: first on the chinese economic, mercantile, social and legal transformations, mainly in the period after the twentieth century; on the second part, it dealt with competition law in China, confronting it with state enterprises; and in the last chapter, administrative and judicial cases were verified before the regulatory bodies of competition. It was intended, by the deductive method of research, to verify if the dichotomy formed between governmental protection of state-owned enterprises hurts the freedom of a competitive market. It was therefore sought to ascertain whether the activity of Chinese state-owned enterprises occupied a relevant market share to the extent of abusing its dominant position and whether China is a stage for the application of penalties for order and competitive freedom. It is concluded that there is unequal treatment in the imposition of consequences for abuse of dominant positions when dealing with foreign companies and chinese state-owned enterprises. The case-by-case analysis has shown that the efforts of Chinese competition authorities in the fight against anticompetitive practices have so far been reached when dealing with foreign companies, while state-owned enterprises are treated differently and permissively from monopoly practices.

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Nicolet, Sandra Véronique Christel. "L' abus de dépendance économique en droit des affaires." Montpellier 1, 2008. http://www.theses.fr/2008MON10006.

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Viktorsson, Anni. "When member states create abuse of a dominant position : a study of the combined articles 106(1) and 102 TFEU." Thesis, Stockholms universitet, Juridiska institutionen, 2015. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-118730.

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Silva, Alberto Luis Camelier da. "Desenho industrial: abuso de direito e o reflexo na concorrência do mercado de reposição." Universidade de São Paulo, 2012. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/2/2132/tde-02042013-111046/.

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O direito antitruste, atualmente ditado pela Lei 12.529 de 30 de novembro de 2011, e o direito da propriedade intelectual permeiam o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro buscando regrar condutas e procedimentos com vistas a tutelar, de um lado, a livre concorrência e, de outro, estimular a inovação e o desenvolvimento tecnológico do país. No exercício de ambos os direitos, muitas vezes observam-se conflitos, que aparentemente revelam uma contradição: a concessão de exclusividade de exploração de bens intangíveis, tais como patentes e desenhos industriais, conflita com a livre concorrência, sendo uma excludente da outra. Entretanto, essa contradição, como se verá, encontra-se superada. Em nosso sistema jurídico não há direitos absolutos que possam justificar a dominância pura e simples de um sobre o outro sem medir as consequências. O equilíbrio é buscado através da vedação legal aos abusos de direito, especialmente abusos de direito de propriedade intelectual e o exercício abusivo de poder econômico. Adicionalmente, a Constituição Federal subordina o uso da propriedade à sua função social. O presente estudo analisa as questões que envolvem esse aparente conflito e os abusos decorrentes do exercício desses direitos. O tema é introduzido com a análise da interface entre o direito da propriedade intelectual e o antitruste e as questões de direito dela decorrentes. A seguir, são analisados o abuso de direito, o abuso de poder econômico e o abuso de posição dominante, com destaque para o entendimento da existência de venda casada mesmo que o vínculo ocorra com diferimento no tempo. O estudo prossegue discorrendo sobre a livre iniciativa e a livre concorrência, bem como o instituto do desenho industrial e seu eventual uso abusivo. Também são analisados o mercado de reposição de peças e partes de produtos complexos e sua repercussão no Brasil e no exterior, e a posição do CADE sobre eventuais condutas anticompetitivas. A jurisprudência comentada ilustra as diversas posições doutrinárias acerca da matéria. O monopólio decorrente de direito de propriedade intelectual seria benéfico para a eficiência e regulação dos mercados, apesar de seus eventuais efeitos contra os interesses do consumidor? Este ensaio procura responder essa indagação, aprofundando o debate sobre o conflito entre o monopólio concedido por desenho industrial às peças de reposição de objetos complexos e a liberdade de escolha do consumidor. Oferece ainda uma proposta legislativa que visa assegurar o equilíbrio entre os direitos dos envolvidos.
The antitrust law, currently under Law 12,529, of November 30, 2011, and the intellectual property law is within the Brazilian juridical ordination, seeking to rule conducts and procedures intended to protect the free competition, on one hand, and to stimulate the innovation and technological development of the country, on the other hand. In the performance of both rights, conflicts are many times observed, which apparently reveal a contradiction: the granting of exclusivity for the exploitation of intangible goods, such as patents and industrial designs, conflicts with the free competition, excluding one another. Said contradiction, however, has been overcome, as it will be noticed. Our juridical system encompasses no absolute rights liable to justify the pure and simple dominance of one on the other, without assessing the consequences. The balance is searched by means of the legal prevention of the abuses of right, especially the abuses of the intellectual property law and the abusive exercise of the economic power. In addition, the Federal Constitution subordinates the use of property to its social function. This study analyzes the issues involving this apparent conflict and the abuses resulting from the enforcement of said rights. The theme is introduced with the analysis of the interface between the intellectual property right and the antitrust one and the resulting legal issues. Then, the abuse of right, the abuse of economic power and the abuse of the dominant position are analysed, pointing out the understanding of the existence of a tying arrangement, even though the binding occurs with deferral in time. The study proceeds by analyzing the free initiative and the free competition, as well as the industrial design institute and its eventual abusive use. The parts reposition and parts of complex products and their repercussion in Brazil and overseas, the CADE´s position as to eventual anticompetitive conducts are also analyzed. The commented jurisprudence illustrates the several opinion of jurists on this matter. Would the monopoly resulting from the intellectual property right benefit the market efficiency and regulation, despite the eventual effects against the consumer interests ? This paper seeks to reply such a question, by deepening the debate on the conflicts between the monopoly granted by industrial design to spare parts of complex objects and the consumer´s free choice. It also offers a legislative proposal intended to ensure the balance between the involved parties´ rights.

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Combaluzier, Audrey Lysiane Françoise. "Contribution à la définition de la notion de partie faible dans les contrats." Montpellier 1, 2008. http://www.theses.fr/2008MON10065.

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Séguier, Valérie. "L'application du droit de la concurrence aux sociétés de gestion collective des droits d'auteur dans le domaine musical." Toulouse 1, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013TOU10009.

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Depuis les quarante dernières années, l’univers de la musique a connu une véritable révolution en raison des évaluations technologiques. Le marché territorial de la protection des œuvres musicales qui était jusqu’à lors national est devenu mondial en raison de la facilitation de la circulation des œuvres musicales via des supports de plus en plus dématérialisés. Dans ce contexte, le rôle des sociétés de gestion collective, sociétés chargées de défendre le droit des auteurs et de leur assurer une juste rémunération en contrepartie de l’utilisation de leurs œuvres, a considérablement évolué. Ainsi, dès le début des années 70, les Institutions Européennes ont eu à examiner l’application des règles du droit de la concurrence aux litiges mettant en cause le monopole national de ces sociétés. Alors que l’équilibre entre les intérêts des auteurs et l’intérêt collectif semble avoir été résolu par le droit de la concurrence a dû s’adapter. L’avenir des sociétés de gestion collective de droits d’auteur et plus généralement la protection des œuvres musicales par le droit d’auteur dans l’environnement numérique repose désormais sur l’adoption de nouveaux schémas concurrentiels
Since the last forty years, the emergence of online music distribution services has created challenges for the music industry. The traditional system of licensing copyright initially national became international due to the new forms of exploitation, as internet and news medias. Collecting societies have traditionally administered licences on a territorial basis. In addition, collecting societies have traditionally licensed the entire repertoire in their national territories. In this context, the role of collecting societies, companies responsible for defending the rights of authors and to ensure fair compensation for the use of their works, has changed. Thus, in the early 70s, the European Institutions considered the application of the competition’s rules involving the national monopoly of these companies. While the balance between the interests of authors and the collective interest seems to have been resolved by the competition law regarding the offline environment of collective management societies, the digital environment has raised new issues which the competition law had to adapt to. The future of collective management societies for copyright protection and, more generally works by musical copyright in the digital environment is now based on the adoption of new competitive patterns

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Gauthier, Julien. "Bilan sur les opérations de concentration en France à l'aune de la transparence." Nice, 2008. http://www.theses.fr/2008NICE0007.

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En organisant la transparence des relations juridiques entre les entreprises parties à une future opération de concentration, la loi sur les nouvelles régulations économiques du 15 mai 2001 ne s'est pas limitée à établir certaines règles relatives à la communication des conditions d'organisation du projet de concentration économique. Elle a organisé une véritable procédure de formation et de négociation des contrats de regroupement d'entreprises avec les autorités de concurrence. De même au niveau européen, le Règlement européen n° 139/2004 du 20 janvier 2004 est venu réformer le système de 1989 en modernisant le critère d'analyse de fond des opérations de concentration en fonction de la théorie économique et de la réalité des structures de marché, en harmonisant les pouvoirs d'investigation de la Commission avec les règles adoptées en matière de lutte contre les ententes et les abus de position dominante et enfin en assouplissant le système d'allocation des cas entre autorités communautaires et nationales. L'une des fonctions de la transparence est de discipliner les contrats de regroupement d'entreprises afin de préserver l'effectivité et l'efficacité du jeu de la concurrence. Sa raison d'être est de résoudre un paradoxe fondamental de l'ordre juridique concurrentiel selon lequel le contrat est à la fois le moteur essentiel de la concurrence et le principal facteur de son dysfonctionnement. .
By organizing the transparency of the legal relations between companies left to the future operation of concentration, the law on the new economic regulations of May 15th, 2001 did not limit to establish certain rules relative to the communication of the conditions of organization of the project of economic concentration. It organized a real procedure of formation and negotiation of companies grouping contracts with the authorities of competition. Also at the European level, the European Regulation number 139/2004 of January 20th 2004 came to reform the system of 1989 by modernizing the criterion of thorough analysis of the concentration operations according to the economic theory and to the reality of the market structures, by harmonizing the powers of investigation of the Commission with rules adopted in fight against the agreements and the abuses of dominant position and finally by softening the system of allowance of the cases between community and national authorities. One of the functions of transparency is to discipline the contracts of companies grouping to protect competition game effectiveness and efficiency. Its meaning of life is to resolve a fundamental paradox of the competitive legal order according to which the contract is both the essential engine of the competition and the main factor of its dysfunction. .

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Bergström, Johanna. "Pharmaceutical Patent Strategies : The Competition between Originator and Generic Companies within the European Union." Thesis, Internationella Handelshögskolan, Högskolan i Jönköping, IHH, Rättsvetenskap, 2010. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-19695.

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The pharmaceutical market is a billon euro industry and the competition on the market is highly intensive. Primarily there are two competitors on the market, partly the originators which provide the market with new drugs, and partly the generics which produce copies of the originators‟ drugs. The originators are able to be granted patent protection of the drug under the European patent system, provided that the drug fulfils the requirements for patentability. During the period of patent protection the generics are not able to produce copies of the drug, but once the duration of the patent has expired the generics are able start the production. Thus, in order to hinder the generics to make copies of the drug, the originators apply various patent strategies. This has been noted by the European Commission, which conducted a sector inquiry of the pharmaceutical market in 2009. The presentation of the competition within the market focused on the applied strategies by the originator and concluded that all measures will be taken to hinder restrictions on the competition. In conjunction, the General Court judged in a recent case that the originator AstraZeneca constituted an infringement of the competition law when their strategies were applied. The complexity of determine whether a strategy is lawful or not, is due to the interface between the intellectual property law and the EC competition law. This implies that the strategy can be lawful under the IP law but unlawful under the competition law. The Court has established that any strategy, regardless of its legality under the IP law, constitutes an infringement of the competition law if it might restrict the competition. The Courts do not provide sufficient guidelines of the conditions that constitute the infringement. Consequently, the strategies‟ legality is at present time uncertain.

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48

Garrido, Delgado Carlos. "Estándares de determinación de conductas exclusorias en el derecho de la competencia." Tesis, Universidad de Chile, 2018. http://repositorio.uchile.cl/handle/2250/152492.

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Memoria (licenciado en ciencias jurídicas y sociales)
En materia de abusos exclusorios, la dificultad que enfrentan las agencias de competencia para determinar cuándo la conducta agresiva de un competidor dominante reñiría con las reglas de la competencia, ha devenido en variados test económicos y jurídicos que buscan robustecer el análisis de los órganos adjudicadores y dotar de predictibilidad a sus decisiones. El Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia ha transitado por una jurisprudencia cada vez más sofisticada, que permite identificar elementos comunes a los test comparados de determinación de abuso de posición dominante. En la presente investigación, se analizan dichos estándares a la luz de la experiencia nacional, para concluir cómo nuestras autoridades de competencia podrían sancionar la comisión de abusos exclusorios, sin disuadir a quienes por sus propios méritos compiten férreamente en el mercado. PALABRAS CLAVE: Abuso de Posición Dominante – Libre Competencia – Test Económicos – Competencia en los méritos – Tribunal de Defensa de la Libre Competencia – Precios Predatorios.

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49

Beaudoin, Guillaume. "Pratiques anticoncurrentielles et droit d'auteur." Thesis, Paris 10, 2012. http://www.theses.fr/2012PA100040/document.

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De tous les droits de propriété intellectuelle, le droit d’auteur était celui qui semblait le plus éloigné des préoccupations économiques des autorités de concurrence. Conçu à l’origine dans un souci de protection de la création littéraire et artistique, il apparaît aujourd’hui davantage comme un outil de puissance économique tourné vers la protection de l’investissement et, plus généralement, un vecteur de l’activité économique. C’est à ce titre que l’application des règles de concurrence à des pratiques mettant en cause l’exercice ou la gestion de droits d’auteur est désormais considérée comme incontournable. Cette application se doit cependant d’être mesurée. Elle bouscule parfois les principes de la propriété littéraire et artistique et conduit à s’interroger sur une définition plus appropriée des contours de la protection offerte par le droit d’auteur. En outre, la remise en cause, au nom du principe de libre concurrence, de pratiques par ailleurs conformes aux règles du droit d’auteur, n’est pas sans risque. Elle contribue à modeler les contours du droit d’auteur selon une conception propre au droit de la concurrence et peut tendre, parfois, vers un amenuisement des prérogatives des titulaires de droits ou un affaiblissement du niveau de leur protection. À terme, la création pourrait s’en trouver menacée. Il convient donc de rechercher, en toute hypothèse, un équilibre permettant de satisfaire aussi bien à l’exigence de concurrence sur les marchés qu’à l’impératif d’efficacité de la protection du droit d’auteur
Among all intellectual property rights, copyright seemed to be initially far away from the economic concerns of competition authorities. Originally designed with a view to protecting literary and artistic creation, it now appears more as a tool of economic power turned to investment protection, and, more generally, as a vehicle of economic activity. As such, the application of competition rules to practices based on exercise or management of copyright is now regarded as unavoidable. However, such application must be performed with care and caution as it sometimes bumped into the principles of literary and artistic property and raises questions about a more appropriate definition of the protection offered by copyright. Moreover, the modification of practices complying with copyright rules, in the name of free competition, is not without risk. It leads to draw the outlines of copyright according to considerations designed for competition laws and can aim, sometimes, towards an erosion of the rights of copyright’s owners or a decline of their level of protection. Eventually, creation could be threatened. In any event, it is therefore essential to look for an equilibrium which would satisfy both the requirements and principles of free market competition and the necessity to effectively protect copyright

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50

Akbari, Haddis. "Is there a requirement for 'good faith' or a 'duty of honesty' under article 102 TFEU, as regards misuse of public procedures and regulations, when establishing an abuse of dominant position?" Thesis, Internationella Handelshögskolan, Högskolan i Jönköping, IHH, Rättsvetenskap, 2012. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:hj:diva-19205.

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Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Abuse of dominance'

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