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Journal articles on the topic 'Activist shareholder'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 1 February 2022

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1

Benton, Richard A., and Jihae You. "Governance monitors or market rebels? Heterogeneity in shareholder activism." Strategic Organization 17, no. 3 (2018): 281–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1476127018776482.

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Agency theory is the dominant theory of shareholder activism and argues that activist investors function as external governance monitors. Agency theory predicts that activist investors will tend to target firms who exhibit governance and performance problems. However, given limited resources and time, activist investors must often decide between selecting targets with particularly strong agency and performance problems and those where their activism efforts are most likely to succeed. Social movement scholars point out that, in social movement contexts, the corporate opportunity structure affe

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Sikavica, Katarina, Elise Perrault, and Kathleen Rehbein. "Who Do They Think They Are? Identity as an Antecedent of Social Activism by Institutional Shareholders." Business & Society 59, no. 6 (2018): 1228–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0007650318762752.

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Shareholder activists increasingly pressure corporations on social policy issues; yet, extant research provides little understanding of who these activists are and how they choose their corporate targets. In this article, we adopt an activist-centered approach and rely on hybrid organizational identity theory to determine, in a two-phase analysis, how shareholder activists define their economic and social identities and whether these identities are associated with specific target characteristics and tactical strategies. Our findings form the premise of a typology of institutional shareholder a

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Viviers, Suzette. "Individual shareholder activism in South Africa: The case of Theo Botha." Journal of Economic and Financial Sciences 9, no. 2 (2017): 247–369. http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/jef.v9i2.46.

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Shareholder activists play a key role in monitoring managerial behaviour. This study was undertaken given the paucity of research on the shareholder activism as practised by individual shareholders. Accordingly, the motives, modus operandi and sources of salience of Mr Theo Botha, a well-known shareholder activist in South Africa, were investigated. Document analysis and an in-depth interview conducted with Botha revealed that he not only has a clear goal, but is also very passionate about achieving his goal. Botha prepares meticulously before engaging companies across the economic spectrum. I

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Guimaraes, Paula, Ricardo P. C. Leal, Peter Wanke, and Matthew Morey. "Shareholder activism impact on efficiency in Brazil." Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 19, no. 1 (2019): 141–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/cg-01-2018-0010.

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Purpose This paper aims to investigate the long-term impact of shareholder activism on Brazilian listed companies. Design/methodology/approach This study uses a sample of 194 companies in 2010, 2012 and 2014 and a two-stage data envelopment analysis to generate an efficiency score based on corporate governance, ownership structure and financial characteristics of companies. In the second stage, the study applies a bootstrap truncated regression to identify whether there is a relationship between the efficiency scores and a company-level activism index. Findings The results show a negative corr

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LIN, Yu-Hsin. "When Activists Meet Controlling Shareholders in the Shadow of the Law: A Case Study of Hong Kong." Asian Journal of Comparative Law 14, no. 1 (2019): 1–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/asjcl.2019.12.

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AbstractShareholder activism has changed corporate governance around the world in the past decade. Conventional wisdom holds that shareholder activism is only effective in firms with dispersed ownership; there has been much less discussion on whether and how activism would work in firms with controlling shareholders. This article fills this gap by investigating whether and how legal mechanisms influence strategy planning and activism outcomes based on hand-collected data regarding activists’ initiatives against firms with concentrated ownership in Hong Kong from 2003 to 2017. This article find

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Cherkes, Martin, Jacob S. Sagi, and Z. Jay Wang. "Managed Distribution Policies in Closed-End Funds and Shareholder Activism." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 49, no. 5-6 (2014): 1311–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109014000544.

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AbstractIn closed-end funds, a managed distribution policy (MDP) is a dividend commitment potentially requiring the liquidation of assets. We argue that MDPs lower managerial claims on fund assets and, when the fund is at a discount, increase shareholder value. This transfer of wealth can be rationalized by managers wishing to deter a challenge from activist shareholders through a costly proxy vote. We find strong empirical evidence that managers respond to the presence of activists using MDPs, that MDPs constitute an effective wealth transfer to shareholders, and that activists are less likel

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Malinas, Mark. "The rise of shareholder activism—what you need to know." APPEA Journal 55, no. 2 (2015): 448. http://dx.doi.org/10.1071/aj14083.

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The past few years have seen a dramatic rise in shareholder activism in Europe and the US and it is a trend becoming more common in Australia. Companies operating in the oil and gas sector have been subject to particular attention and there are a growing number of examples of this in Australia. The targets of shareholder activism range in size and performance, but are often companies with perceived board weakness, those that are considered to adhere to outdated corporate governance, those whose strategic direction is in question or those that have an under-performing share price, though other

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Bariz, Historei, and Dirk Schiereck. "Market reactions on shareholder activism through open letters." Corporate Ownership and Control 18, no. 1 (2020): 69–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv18i1art6.

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To position themselves in the competitive landscape of fund collection, activist investors have to generate public awareness for their actions and differentiate themselves from other investors. Thereby, the activist investor Petrus Advisers predominantly uses the instrument of open letters in daily newspapers. By its concentration on this single instrument, Petrus Advisers allows us to analyze shareholder activism not only from an overall investor’s case study perspective but also with a focus on a single tool of activism. We examine market reactions caused by these open letters on the target

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Ong, Seow-Eng, Milena Tacheva Petrova, and Andrew Spieler. "Shareholder activism and director retirement plans repeals." Corporate Ownership and Control 7, no. 3 (2010): 193–209. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv7i3c1p4.

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We study proposals to repeal a potentially non-incentive compatible feature of outside director compensation contracts - director retirement plans. The reason for concern is that the required vesting period to receive benefits may instill complacency in director oversight. In the past, such pension plans were a common feature of compensation contracts until the mid-1990’s when shareholder attention shifted away from governance and toward compensation issues. Many firms removed/amended their plans voluntarily or from shareholder pressure. In a sample of 70 firms targeted by shareholders, we fin

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Ragas, Matthew W. "Agenda building during activist shareholder campaigns." Public Relations Review 39, no. 3 (2013): 219–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pubrev.2013.03.007.

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11

Chen, Siwen, and Emilie R. Feldman. "Activist-impelled divestitures and shareholder value." Strategic Management Journal 39, no. 10 (2018): 2726–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/smj.2931.

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12

Ivanova, Mila. "Shareholder activism and the ethical harnessing of institutional investors." critical perspectives on international business 12, no. 2 (2016): 189–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/cpoib-09-2013-0032.

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Purpose This study aims to foster a deeper understanding of socio-ethical shareholder activism by outlining the corporate campaigning strategies of a UK-based non-governmental organisation (NGO) and by assessing their impact on both institutional investors and the practices of two multinational companies. As we move into a world where shareholder ownership is becoming more democratised, shareholder activism is gaining prominence in the USA, Europe and Asia, opening new avenues for participation in corporate governance by stakeholders such as NGOs who have traditionally been uninvolved in corpo

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Kruse, Timothy A. "Minority shareholder treatment surrounding the Dell MBO." Managerial Finance 47, no. 8 (2021): 1077–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/mf-09-2019-0480.

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PurposeThis paper is a clinical examination of the October 2013 Management Buyout of Dell Inc. by founder Michael Dell and Silver Lake Partners for a total consideration of $13.88 per share. The proposed transaction was targeted by shareholders unhappy with the deal price and voting framework. Various shareholders went on to file an appraisal suit. Examining these events yields insights into shareholder rights issues in a major transaction.Design/methodology/approachThe paper examines events surrounding the acquisition including the negotiation process, go-shop period, shareholder activist dem

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Gorman, Louise, Theo Lynn, and Mark Mulgrew. "The influence of the newspaper media on the corporate governance practices of Irish listed PLCs." Corporate Ownership and Control 7, no. 3 (2010): 259–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv7i3c2p2.

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While a great deal of research has focused on the factors driving adoption of codes of best practice in corporate governance, only recently has the influence of the news media been considered. Corporate governance literature has largely converged upon internal monitoring and shareholder activist strategies as methods of shareholder protection following the decline of the market for corporate control. Commentators and activists alike have generally neglected the opportunity for an independent party, which watches over the management of companies, to guard shareholders’ interests. Ireland is jus

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Khorana, Ajay, Anil Shivdasani, and Gustav Sigurdsson. "The Evolving Shareholder Activist Landscape (How Companies Can Prepare for It)." Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 29, no. 3 (2017): 8–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jacf.12245.

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Del Guercio, Diane, and Tracie Woidtke. "Can Strong Corporate Governance Selectively Mitigate the Negative Influence of “Special Interest” Shareholder Activists? Evidence from the Labor Market for Directors." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 54, no. 4 (2018): 1573–614. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0022109018001217.

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Union and public pension funds, the most prolific institutional activists employing low-cost targeting methods, are often accused of pursuing private benefits. Extant literature finds that unions representing workers, as stakeholders, are not aligned with shareholders. Limiting shareholder power may mitigate “special interest” activism but can also exacerbate managerial agency problems. In two different settings, majority approved and withdrawn shareholder proposals, we examine and find supportive evidence that the director labor market as a corporate governance mechanism can selectively mitig

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Jahnke, Patrick. "Ownership concentration and institutional investors’ governance through voice and exit." Business and Politics 21, no. 3 (2019): 327–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/bap.2019.2.

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AbstractDrawing on data collected in interviews with investors and corporates in the United States and Europe, this paper sheds light on the motives behind shareholder engagement. It explains why index funds engage in corporate governance, despite their apparent lack of financial incentive to do so. Applying Hirschman's concepts of exit and loyalty to the investment management industry, this paper suggests that for many institutional shareholders today, voice is more feasible than exit. For the largest index investors, the cost of engagement has fallen to a level where it is today negligible.

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Johnson, Travis L., and Nathan Swem. "Reputation and Investor Activism: A Structural Approach." Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017, no. 036r1 (2020): 1–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.17016/feds.2017.036r1.

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We measure the impact of reputation for proxy fighting on investor activism by estimating a dynamic model in which activists engage a sequence of target firms. Our estimation produces an evolving reputation measure for each activist and quantifies its impact on campaign frequency and outcomes. We find that high reputation activists initiate 3.5 times as many campaigns and extract 85% more settlements from targets, and that reputation-building incentives explain 20% of campaign initiations and 19% of proxy fights. Our estimates indicate these reputation effects combine to nearly double the valu

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Van der Elst, Christoph. "Shareholder activism in good and bad economic times." Corporate Ownership and Control 8, no. 2, Special issue (2011): 32–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv8i2sip3.

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Over the last few years the economy shifted from fast growth to a deep financial and economic crisis. Slowly companies are returning to growth rates in 2009-2010 after a sharp fall of profits in 2007-2009. This provides an excellent backdrop to assess trends in shareholder activism, how shareholders responded to the fall in profits and how they have exercised influence in these turbulent times. This paper focuses on the activism exerted by shareholders at annual general meetings of shareholders between 2007 and 2010 via their attendance and voting at AGMs in four European countries. The main r

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Subramanian, Ram. "Shareholder spring and social activism: a study of 2013-2015 proxy filings." Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 17, no. 3 (2017): 560–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/cg-08-2016-0170.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine social issue proxy filings by shareholders of US corporations in a period commonly referred to as the “shareholder spring” to understand who the filers are, what issues are typically the focus of the filings, what the dominant strategy is of various filers and the success rate of proxy-based shareholder social activism. Design/methodology/approach Using the shareholder-filed proxy as the unit of analysis, the study parsed the data from 410 proxies to gain insight into the process of shareholder social activism. Findings Religious groups, in contr

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Subramanian, Shanmugasundaram. "Proxy advisory industry in India." Corporate Ownership and Control 13, no. 2 (2016): 371–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv13i2clp5.

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Proxy advisory firms play a significant role in shareholder voting and in the formulation of corporate governance policy. This paper analyses the status of budding proxy advisory industry in India using a case study method. The paper first traces the history of the global proxy advisory industry and also reviews the literature. Then we study the Indian Proxy Advisory Industry, which was born when the market regulator SEBI came out with a regulation in 2010 on “mutual funds” shareholding resolution voting policy. Quickly, three proxy advisory firms came to the market with differing ownership st

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Benton, Richard A., and Jihae You. "Endogenous Dynamics in Contentious Fields: Evidence from the Shareholder Activism Network, 2006–2013." Socius: Sociological Research for a Dynamic World 3 (January 1, 2017): 237802311770523. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2378023117705231.

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Shareholder activism is a contentious field where investors confront management over governance and social responsibility matters. Most prior research on shareholder activism focuses on firm traits, such as performance, that explain targeting. We argue that shareholder activism also reflects endogenous dynamics. Although activists target firms because of their characteristics, activists also choose targets based on their position in the relational field. We develop a network approach to mapping contentious fields: Shareholder activism is a social network whose topology reflects self-organizing

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Kuek, Thiam-Yong, I.-Chi Chen, Yuen-Onn Choong, Saw-Chin Khor, Mei-Peng Low, and Timothy Tzen-Vun Yap. "STUDY OF PAST DECADE (2010 - 2020) SELECTED LITERATURE ON MINORITY SHAREHOLDER AND SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM IN MALAYSIA." Advanced International Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship and SMEs 3, no. 7 (2021): 49–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.35631/aijbes.37005.

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Due to its vitality in preserving the stability, transparency, and sound management of businesses, corporate governance continues to play a dominant role in many Malaysian companies. This will give the country and foreign countries good opportunities to invest in Malaysia and provide an investment-friendly environment. It adds color to the existing soft stock market in Malaysia as a result of the economic instability, the political turmoil, and the pandemic effects of Covid-19. Two main elements of corporate governance in Malaysia, minority shareholders, and shareholder activities will be addr

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Byrd, John, and Elizabeth S. Cooperman. "Let's talk: an analysis of the “vote vs. negotiated withdrawal” decision for social activist environmental health shareholder resolutions." Journal of Sustainable Finance & Investment 4, no. 3 (2014): 230–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/20430795.2014.928998.

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Fournès, Christine. "Lucien Bailly (1871–1940): An eccentric troublemaker and a real precursor. A short story of shareholders’ activism in France at the beginning of the twentieth century." Accounting History 25, no. 4 (2019): 518–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1032373219882434.

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The article highlights the role of an eccentric troublemaker at the beginning of the twentieth century – Lucien Bailly. The Pont-à-Mousson company’s archives, one of the major joint stock companies in the mining industry at that time, provide a wealth of information about this very interesting character. It is argued that Lucien Bailly paved the way for present-day activism. While the nature of shareholder-activists is far different today, there is a similar dichotomy between private and public or cooperative and hostile actions. This is the true legacy of Lucien Bailly. He was also the pionee

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Rutterford, Janette. "The Shareholder Voice: British and American Accents, 1890–1965." Enterprise & Society 13, no. 1 (2012): 120–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1467222700010958.

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This article discusses the interaction between directors and small shareholders who made up the majority of names on the share ledgers of many companies in both the UK and the USA. It is concerned with the period 1890–1965 and concentrates on the management/shareholder relationship in the context of the annual general meeting and shareholder activism. I argue that there were significant differences between shareholder activism in the UK and the USA, due to the difference in relative numbers of the shareholders themselves, to legal and geographic differences, to corporate culture, and to the ea

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Jansson, Andreas. "No exit!: The logic of defensive shareholder activism." Corporate Board role duties and composition 10, no. 2 (2014): 16–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cbv10i2art2.

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This paper examines the issue of what motivates shareholder activism. The standard explanation portrays shareholder activism as a response to poor corporate performance, but the empirical literature provides inconclusive support, indicating the need for alternative or complementary explanations. This paper contributes to the literature by showing, with the help of a case study, that shareholder activism can also be a response to increasing costs for exiting the investment, making outside shareholders increasingly exposed to expropriation risks. Significant expropriation risk can antecede a def

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Bouaziz, Souha Siala, Ines Ben Amar Fakhfakh, and Anis Jarboui. "Shareholder activism, earnings management and Market performance consequences: French case." International Journal of Law and Management 62, no. 5 (2020): 395–415. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijlma-03-2018-0050.

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Purpose The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of the relationship between shareholder activism and earnings management on the market performance of French companies. Design/methodology/approach This study used 385 firm-year observations drawn from a sample of French companies belonging to the SBF 120 index from 2008 to 2012. Data was collected from annual reports of sample companies. To measure earnings management, this study used the model of Raman and Shahrur (2008). The relationship between shareholder activism, earnings management and market performance using the panel dat

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Uche, Chinyere, Emmanuel Adegbite, and Michael John Jones. "Institutional shareholder activism in Nigeria." Corporate Governance 16, no. 4 (2016): 680–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/cg-12-2015-0172.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to investigate institutional shareholder activism in Nigeria. It addresses the paucity of empirical research on institutional shareholder activism in sub-Saharan Africa. Design/methodology/approach This study uses agency theory to understand the institutional shareholder approach to shareholder activism in Nigeria. The data are collected through qualitative interviews with expert representatives from financial institutions. Findings The findings indicate evidence of low-level shareholder activism in Nigeria. The study provides empirical insight into the rea

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Abdul Razak, Muhammad Umar, Wan Zulhafiz Wan Zahari, Abdul Mu'iz Abdul Razak, Azlan Roni, and Nurul Ula Ulya. "The Legal Framework of Shareholders Activism in Malaysia in Promoting Environmental, Sustainability and Governance (ESG)." Environment-Behaviour Proceedings Journal 6, no. 16 (2021): 203–8. http://dx.doi.org/10.21834/ebpj.v6i16.2663.

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Environmental, sustainability and governance (ESG) are components in a corporate sustainability reporting. This paper analysed the legal framework in Malaysia to promote ESG. It employed library-based doctrinal study and comparative legal analysis in a descriptive, analytic and prescriptive manner. Despite the availability of legal framework, the shareholder’s proposal is mostly turned down in general meeting. Nevertheless, there is a growing trend of shareholders activist advocating ESG-related matters. This paper contributes to the discussion on strengthening the framework to promote ESG rep

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Musa, Maizatul Akmal, and Shahril Eashak Ismail. "Shareholder Activism, Institutional Shareholders and Agency Problems in Malaysia." Global Journal of Business and Social Science Review (GJBSSR) Volume 4 (2016: Issue-3) 4, no. 3 (2016): 30–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.35609/gjbssr.2016.4.3(5).

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Objective - The aim of this paper is to study the effectiveness of institutional shareholder activism in controlling corporate behaviours in Malaysia. Methodology/Technique - this study is investigated by critical reviewing previously published articles. Findings - Earlier researchers have viewed poor corporate governance as one of the main contributing factors to a major corporate disaster. The best practice of corporate governance suggests that shareholders should actively be engaged and involved with the investee companies to provide check and balance to the governance mechanism. This is pa

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Mohamed Albakoush, Ali, and Zuaini Ishak. "Role of No-Voting shareholder activism in corporate governance in a developing Arab country." Problems and Perspectives in Management 17, no. 1 (2019): 289–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/ppm.17(1).2019.25.

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Because of agency conflict in firms with dispersed ownership, governance mechanisms to mitigate this agency cost, such as shareholders’ active monitoring of the firm’s management, have been developed. However, shareholder activism is contextual; therefore, the characteristics of shareholder activism in corporate governance practices in Libyan listed companies we explored. The data were collected from the 42 non-financial and 22 financial companies listed in the Libyan stock market during 2007–2016. Data envelopment analysis was done to generate an efficiency score based on corporate governance

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Islam, Ajaz Ul. "Do Shareholder Activism Effect Corporate Governance and Related Party Transactions: Evidences from India?" Indian Journal of Corporate Governance 13, no. 2 (2020): 165–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0974686220966810.

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The study investigates the relationship between corporate governance performance, related party transactions and shareholder activism among listed firms in India. The study provides valuable insights into the impact of shareholder activism on corporate governance performance (CGP) and the occurrence of related party transactions (RPTs). Results infer a significant difference in overall CGP between the firms subjected to shareholder activism and firms not subjected to shareholder activism. The study proposes significant evidence on the close monitoring of the governance practices of the firm by

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Beebeejaun, Ambareen, and Jushveer Koobloll. "An assessment whether shareholder activism can be a corporate governance driver in the case of Mauritius." International Journal of Law and Management 60, no. 6 (2018): 1313–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/ijlma-07-2017-0154.

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Purpose “Shareholder activism works when shareholders understand something about the characteristics of the business that the board doesn’t”. As complex the term shareholder activism may seem, it demonstrates a very simple phenomenon of how shareholder take control of a situation to turn it in their favor. The whole world has taken an activism “twist” where every person has a word to say. The same characteristic of the society is showcased in this paper where engagement of shareholder is questioned whether it helps to promote effective corporate governance. Given the fact that Mauritius has a

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Sharma, Sunita Upendra. "A Study of Small Shareholders’ Attitude towards Small-shareholder Activism." Indian Journal of Corporate Governance 9, no. 1 (2016): 67–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0974686216635788.

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Barua, Abhijit, K. Raghunandan, and Dasaratha V. Rama. "Shareholder Votes on Auditor Ratification and Subsequent Auditor Dismissals." Accounting Horizons 31, no. 1 (2016): 129–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/acch-51512.

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SYNPOSIS The Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession (ACAP [DoT 2008]), appointed by the U.S. Department of Treasury, recommended that regulators require public companies to have shareholder voting on auditor ratification. However, the SEC has sided with companies that sought to exclude proposals from shareholders seeking greater say in the auditor selection process. We use data from 12,664 shareholder votes on auditor ratification during 2011–2014 and find that subsequent auditor dismissals become more likely with increases in the proportion of shareholders not ratifying the auditor. Th

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Marinetto, Michael. "The shareholders strike back: Issues in the research of shareholder activism." Environmental Politics 7, no. 3 (1998): 125–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09644019808414412.

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Habersack, Mathias. "Non-frustration Rule and Mandatory Bid Rule – Cornerstones of European Takeover Law?" European Company and Financial Law Review 15, no. 1 (2018): 1–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/ecfr-2018-0001.

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With the non-frustration rule and the mandatory bid rule, the Takeover Bid Directive contains two principles which have strongly influenced British takeover law for approximately 50 years. However, the changes of the economic and legal framework of the market for corporate control which have occurred since the adoption of the Directive call into question the legitimacy of both principles. Although the non-frustration rule is capable of disciplining board members, it generates misguided incentives and is, at the most, suitable as a disciplining tool of last resort. The dominant idea of relying

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Liu, Li-Lin, K. Raghunandan, and Dasaratha Rama. "Financial Restatements and Shareholder Ratifications of the Auditor." AUDITING: A Journal of Practice & Theory 28, no. 1 (2009): 225–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/aud.2009.28.1.225.

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SUMMARY: Regulators and legislators have focused significant attention on financial statement restatements in recent years, and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and financial statement users view restatements as audit failures. The SEC (2000, 2003a) suggests that shareholder voting on auditor ratification will be impacted by perceptions of audit quality. In this paper we examine shareholder voting on auditor ratifications in 2005 or 2006 following restatement announcements by SEC registrants. We find that shareholders are more likely to vote against auditor ratification after

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Ezzamel, Mahmoud, Jason Zezhong Xiao, and Rongli Yuan. "Can Small Shareholders Protect Their Interests from Expropriation: The Case of a Chinese Bank." Management and Organization Review 16, no. 1 (2019): 139–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/mor.2019.23.

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ABSTRACTThis article examines how small shareholders protected their interests from large shareholders’ expropriation by forming an alliance and taking collective action to block a convertible bonds issue by a Chinese bank that they considered harmful. Forming an alliance strengthened small shareholders’ network density, enhanced their salience (power, legitimacy, and urgency), and reduced the bank's centrality. This enabled small shareholders to change their strategy from being a subordinator to a compromiser and forced the controlling shareholders and their representatives to change their st

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Goranova, Maria, and Lori Verstegen Ryan. "Shareholder Activism." Journal of Management 40, no. 5 (2013): 1230–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0149206313515519.

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Spraakman, Gary P., Alison Kemper, and Ken Ogata. "How Audited Financial Statements Facilitated Shareholder Activism for the Colonization of Western Canada." Accounting Historians Journal 46, no. 2 (2019): 41–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/aahj-52527.

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ABSTRACT In 1863, ownership of the Hudson's Bay Company (HBC) was transferred from a small group of patient shareholders to a much larger group of rent-seeking investors. These new shareholders obliged the HBC to introduce audited financial statements beginning in 1866. These shareholders assumed that audited financial statements were credible artifacts for sharing in the HBC's wealth (by facilitating the sale of the HBC's Charter to the Canadian Government, thereby enabling the creation of Western Canada). This paper contributes to the literature by showing how audited financial statements en

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Dasgupta, Sudipto, and Thomas H. Noe. "Does Pay Activism Pay Off for Shareholders? Shareholder Democracy and Its Discontents." Management Science 65, no. 4 (2019): 1810–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2854.

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Tanyi, Paul N., Dasaratha V. Rama, K. Raghunandan, and Gregory W. Martin. "Shareholder Dissatisfaction and Subsequent Audit Outcomes." Accounting Horizons 34, no. 4 (2020): 181–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/horizons-18-167.

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SYNOPSIS This study examines the association between shareholder dissatisfaction, as proxied using auditor ratification voting, and subsequent auditor effort and audit quality. We document that increases in shareholder dissatisfaction are associated with (1) higher audit fees and longer audit report lags, and (2) lower abnormal accruals and reduced likelihood of financial statement misstatements, in the subsequent period. These findings inform the debate about auditor ratification voting, as governance activists and some regulators argue to increase the role of shareholders in auditor selectio

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Viviers, S., and E. VdM. Smit. "Institutional proxy voting in South Africa: Process, outcomes and impact." South African Journal of Business Management 46, no. 4 (2015): 23–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/sajbm.v46i4.106.

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This study investigated the nature of institutional shareholder activism in South Africa with a particular focus on proxy voting as a public form of shareholder discontent. A total of 24 510 votes cast by 17 local investment managementcompanies in 2013 were analysed. Interviews were also conducted with selected investment managers to gain more insight into the proxy voting process at their companies. Based on this data, it was concluded that investment managers preferred to engage with investee companies in private and viewed proxy voting as the last link in the shareholder activism chain. As

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Zhang, Feng, Lei Zhu, and Liqun Wei. "Shareholder involvement and firm innovation performance." Chinese Management Studies 14, no. 3 (2020): 833–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/cms-01-2019-0029.

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Purpose Whether shareholders’ involvement in management benefits the organization’s performance remains inconclusive. The purpose of this study is to reconcile the conflicting results by exploring whether and under which contexts shareholder involvement may impact firm innovation performance. Design/methodology/approach This study attempts to combine previous theoretical views (reactance and agency theories) to examine a curvilinear effect of shareholder involvement on firm innovation performance based on governance related to cost-benefit analysis. Drawing on data from 174 Chinese manufacturi

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Bassen, Alexander, Dirk Schiereck, and Christian Thamm. "Activist shareholders and the duration of supervisory board membership: Evidence for the German Aufsichtsra." Corporate Ownership and Control 13, no. 2 (2016): 521–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv13i2c3p3.

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We study the fixed term nature of the German supervisory board appointment hypothesizing that the timing of the upcoming election has an impact on the credibility of effort by activist investors. More credible approaches should consequently be associated with higher wealth effects. An average abnormal return that is up to 6.9 percent higher can be observed when potential activists consider the timing of the next supervisory board election. Capital markets apparently perceive an activist effort within one to two years prior to the election as being most credible. Quite contrary to intuition it

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Artiga González, Tanja, and Paul Calluzzo. "Clustered shareholder activism." Corporate Governance: An International Review 27, no. 3 (2019): 210–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/corg.12271.

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Levit, Doron. "Soft Shareholder Activism." Review of Financial Studies 32, no. 7 (2018): 2775–808. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhy119.

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Perrault, Elise, and Cynthia Clark. "Environmental Shareholder Activism." Organization & Environment 29, no. 2 (2015): 194–211. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1086026615571939.

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