Academic literature on the topic 'Adrianople, Treaty of'

Introduction. Diplomatic contacts between Russia and the Ottoman Empire between Adrianople (1713) and Constantinople (1720) treaties are explored. For Posolsky prikaz (Ambassadorial office), the main task was to keep peaceful relations between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, which gave the possibility to the tsar to concentrate on military operations in Pomerania. Methods. The study is based on the analysis of unpublished materials of the Posolsky prikaz and their comparison with notes of contemporaries and with other historical sources. Analysis and results. The absence of Russian diplomatic resident in Istanbul did not promptly allow to solve the problems caused by violations of the conditions of the Adrianople treaty: border conflicts and the entry of the tsarist army into Poland. After the Treaty of Passarowitz (1718), which ended the war of the Ottoman Empire with Venice and Austria, a new danger arose for the beginning of the Russo-Turkish war. In 1715 and 1718, the Ragusin on the Russian service Hieronymus Natali was twice sent to the Sublime Porte with the charters of Peter I. Along with handing the tsar’s charters to the Grand Vizier about border conflicts, Natalie had secret assignments connected with the prevention of a military conflict with the Ottoman Empire.

Abstract Since the Treaty of Adrianople 1829 the Lower Danube underwent major political, economic and territorial transformations. It changed from a quasi-closed river entirely under Ottoman rule into a site of Great Power intervention. This new found international interest mobilised sustained efforts to make the Danube from the Iron Gates to the Black Sea navigable. Within a few years the Lower Danube turned into an important commercial and communication hub of continental dimensions. It also turned into a place of pilgrimage for politicians, diplomats, merchants and hydraulic engineers from all over Europe enabling a vivid exchange of ideas. The goal of this article is twofold: on one hand it sets out to give an overview over the existing body of historical literature that places the Lower Danube into a transnational framework, and on the other it makes several suggestions for further studies.

From the half of the 4-th century to the end of the 4-th century a tribe of Goths – Westgoths, played a significant role in the politics of the Eastern and Western Roman Empire courts. Activities of the emperor valens against Goths showed that regardless of military measures, an equally effective form of compulsion could also be economic actions. It was supported by an exceptional effectiveness of the trade embargo which use turned out to be much more effective measure which forced the barbarians to the obedience than acts of war. The initial politics of containment of the Goths invasion within the framework of the so called Gothic „wars” exercised by Valens was replaced by politic of opening of the borders of the Empire for Gothic immigrants in hope of strengthening of the Roman army with conscription of barbarous recruits. Lack of ability of mastering the crowds of newcomers and providing them a basis for peaceful existence ended with the tra-gedy at Adrianople in 378. A treaty of alliance of 382 seemingly met the expecta­tions of both Parties, but for a short time only. Some attempts of the revision of the conditions of the treaty to the advantage of the Goths appeared as early as for a de­cade later. The key problem of the politics of the imperial courts in the Balkans at the turn of 4th and 5th century was the activity of the Visigothic king Alaricus who superbly made use of disagreements between Ravenna and Constantinople. Moreover, he made use of opportunities resulting from bestowing him a few times the rank of Roman magister militum. A controversial and still unexplained issue is, if Alaricus became the magister militum per Illyricum, already in 395 as result of negotiations with Rufin. Next disputable issue is, in which degree the ruler of the Visigoths led his own deliberate politics, and in which degree he remained a tool in hands of the politicians of the Eastern and Western Roman courts.

The article addresses written evidence of the Russian-Kalmyk relations in the early 18th century. It is to introduce into scientific use new documentary sources belonging that period when the epistolary written tradition of the Kalmyk nobility was at its apogee. While studying these sources, not only a brief historical description of the period has been provided, but also methods of paleographic identification of manuscripts and archaeographic analysis of the monuments of Old Kalmyk writing have been used. The article publishes transliteration, translation, and two copies of the original letters of Kalmyk Khan Ayuka: one addressed to the Emperor Peter Alekseevich, another to the Chancellor Gavriil Ivanovich Golovkin. Both letters have been found in the Kalmyk Affairs Foundation of the Russian State Archive of Ancient Acts. The letters were delivered to Moscow by the Kalmyk embassy led by Hojim (1714). Until now their contents have remained unknown to the wide array of researchers. The documents contain information on the difficult situation on the Russo-Turkish frontier after the signing of the Adrianople Peace Treaty in 1713. Participation of the 20,000 Kalmyk cavalry in the Kuban campaign against the Nogais (1711) incited the latter to retaliate. Kalmyk areas on the Lower Volga were constantly threatened the Kuban Nogais, which forced Ayuka Khan to ask for Russian military assistance. A distinctive feature of these sources is the fact that they are written in the old-Kalmyk writing “Todo bichig” (“clear writing”) and end with a red square stamp granted to Ayuka Khan by Dalai Lama VI in 1698. The letters are phrased in the traditional epistolary genre typical of the official correspondence of the Kalmyk nobility of the time: despite their brevity, they brim with truth, life, dynamism, and tension. Further identification and investigation of the Kalmyk letters in the Russian archives should be a comprehensive effort of various specialists, thus setting a promising trend in the scholarship.

AbstractTheRes Gestaeof Ammianus Marcellinus poses numerous structural puzzles for the historian, among them the anomalous final book, numbered 31 in the manuscript tradition. This book, which treats the Gothic rebellion ofa.d.376–378 and the campaign of Adrianople, is loosely connected to the other extant books, which conclude with events ofa.d. 375. The present article argues that Book 31 was in origin a separate monograph, drafted in Greek at Antioch in the aftermath of the Roman defeat at Adrianople. Perhaps modelled on theScythicaof Dexippus, its contents reflect the Antiochene and Constantinopolitan polemic of its moment. For reasons that must remain speculative, Ammianus later translated his work into Latin and appended it to a finished draft of theRes Gestae.

While the first two chapters of Doucas's historical work present a meagre outline of world history - a sketch which becomes a little more detailed from 1261 on, when the narration reaches the history of the Turks and their conquests in Asia Minor - the third chapter deals with the well-known battle of Kosovo, which took place in 1389. From that point on, the Byzantine historian gives much important information on Serbia, as well as on the Ottoman advances in the Balkans, and thus embarks upon his central theme - the rise of the Turks and the decline of Byzantium. Doucas considers the battle of Kosovo a key event in the subjugation of the Balkan peoples by the Turks, and he shows that after the battle of Kosovo the Serbs were the first to suffer that fate. At the beginning, Doucas says that after the death of Orhan, the ruler (o archgos) of the Turks, his son and successor Murad conquered the Thracian towns, Adrianople and the whole Thessaly, so that he mastered almost all the lands of the Byzantines, and finally reached the Triballi (Triballous). He devastated many of their towns and villages sending the enslaved population beyond Chersonesus, until Lazar, son of King Stefan of Serbia (Serbias), who ruled (kraley?n) in Serbia at that time decided to oppose him with all the might he could muster. The Serbs were often called Triballi by Byzantine authors. For the fourteenth century writers Pachymeres, Gregoras, Metochites and Kantakouzenos the Serbs were Triballi. However, Pachymeres and Gregoras refer to the rulers of the Triballi as the rulers of Serbia. Fifteenth century writers, primarily Chalcondyles and Critobulos, use only that name. It seems, nevertheless, that Doucas makes a distinction between the Triballi and the Serbs. As it is known, the conquest of the Serbian lands by the Turks began after the battle on the river Marica in 1371. By 1387. the Turks had mastered Serres(1388) Bitola and Stip (1385), Sofia (1385), Nis (1386) and several other towns. Thus parts of Macedonia, Bulgaria and even of Serbia proper were reduced by the Turks by 1387. For Doucas, however, this is the territory inhabited by the Triballi. After the exposition of the events on Kosovo, Doucas inserts an account of the dispute of John Kantakouzenos and the regency on behalf of John V, which had taken place, as it is known, long before 1389. At the beginning of his description of the civil war, Doucas says that by dividing the empire Kantakouzenos made it possible for the Turks to devastate not only all the lands under Roman rule, but also the territories of the Triballi Moesians and Albanians and other western peoples. The author goes on to narrate that Kantakouzenos established friendly relations with the king Stefan Du{an, and reached an agreement with him concerning the fortresses towns and provinces of the unlucky Empire of the Romaioi, so that, instead of giving them over to the Roman lords, he surrendered them to barbarians, the Triballi and the Serbs (Triballoys te kai Serbous). When he speaks later how the Tatars treated the captives after the battle of Angora in 1402, Doucas points out that the Divine Law, honored from times immemorial not only among the Romaioi, but also among the Persians, the Triballi and the Scythians (as he calls Timur's Tatars), permitted only plunder, not the taking of captives or any executions outside the battlefield when the enemy belonged to the same faith. Finally, when he speaks of the conflict between Murad II and Juneid in Asia Minor, Doucas mentions a certain Kelpaxis, a man belonging to the people of the Triballi, who took over from Juneid the rule over Ephesus and Ionia. It seems, therefore, that Doucas, when he speaks of the land of the Triballi he has in mind a broad ethnical territory in the Balkans, which was obviously not settled by the Serbs only or even by the Slavs only. According to him Kelpaxis (Kelpaz?sis) also belonged to the Triballi, although the name can hardly be of Slavonic, i.e. Serbian origin. On the other hand, he is definitely aware of Serbia, a state which had left substantial traces in the works of Byzantine authors, particularly from the time when it usurped (according to the Byzantine view) the Empire. Writing a whole century after Dusan's coronation as emperor, Doucas is not willing, as we shall see later to recognize this usurpation. Although he ascribes to Serbia, in conformity with the Byzantine conception of tazis, a different rank, he considers Serbia and the Serbs, as they are generally called in his work (particularly when he describes the events after the Battle of Kosovo) an important factor in the struggle against the Turks. Therefore he makes a fairly accurate distinction between the Serbs and the other Triballi. In his case, the term may in fact serve as a geographical designation for the territory settled by many peoples, including the Serbs. When he uses specific titles and when he speaks of the degrees of authority conveyed by them in individual territories Doucas is anxious to prove himself a worthy scion of the Romaioi, who considered that they had the exclusive right to the primacy in the Christian hierarchy with the Roman emperor at its top. He makes distinctions of rank between individual rulers. The Emperor in Constantinople is for him the only emperor of the Romans (basileys t?n R?mai?n). King Sigismund of Hungary is also styled emperor, but as basileys t?n R?man?n, meaning Latin Christians. The last Byzantine emperor Constantine XI Dragas Palaleologus is not recognized as an emperor, and the author calls his rule a despotic rule (despoteia). He has a similar view of the Serbs. Thus he says, erroneously that Lazar was the son of King Stefan of Serbia (yios Stefanoy toy kral? Serbias) and that he ruled Serbia at that time (o tote t?n Serbian kraley?n). Elsewhere, Doucas explains his attitude and says that o t?n Serb?n archgos etolm?sen anadusasthai kratos kai kral?s onomazesthai. Toyto gar to barbaron onoma exell?nizomenon basileys erm?neyetai. Lazar exercises royal power (kraley?n) in Serbia, which is appropriate, for the author thinks erroneously that Lazar was the son and successor of King Stefan Du{an. It is significant that he derives the werb kraley? from the Serbian title 'kralj', i.e. from the title which never existed in the Byzantine Empire. Moreover, there is no mention of this werb in any other Byzantine text. When he narrates how Serbia fell under the Turkish rule in 1439, Doucas says that Despot Djuradj Brankovic seeing his ravaged despotate (despoteian), went to the King of Hungary hoping to get aid from him. There can be no doubt that the term despoteia here refers to the territory ruled by Despot Djuradj Brankovic. Doucas correctly styles the Serbian rulers after 1402 as despots. The space he devotes to Serbia in his work, as well as the manner in which he speaks of it, seems to indicate, however, that he regarded it, together with Hungary as a obstacle of the further Turkish conquests in the Balkans. Doucas's text indicates that Serbia, though incomparably weaker than in the time of Dusan's mighty empire, was in fact the only remaining more or less integral state in the Peninsula. The riches of Serbia and, consequently, of its despots, is stressed in a number of passages. Almost at the very beginning Doucas says that Bayezid seized 'a sufficient quantity of silver talents from the mines of Serbia' after the Battle of Kosovo. When Murad II conducted negotiations with Despot Djuradj for his marriage with the Despot's daughter Mara, Doucas writes, no one could guess how many 'gold and silver talents' he took. Doucas also says that the Despot began to build the Smederevo fortress with Murad's permission. The building of a fortress has never been an easy undertaking and if we bear in mind that Despot Djuradj built the part of the Smederevo fortress called 'Mali Grad' (Small fortress) in two years only, we realize that his economic power was really considerable. When Fadulah, the counselor of Murad II, sought to persuade his lord to occupy Serbia, he stressed the good position of the country, particularly of Smederevo, and the country's abundant sources of silver and gold, which would enable Murad not only to conquer Hungary, but also to advance as far as Italy. After Mehmed II captured Constantinople, the Serbs undertook to pay an annual tribute of 12.000 gold coins, more than the despots of Mistra, the lords of Chios Mitylene or the Emperor of Trebizond. Already in 1454 the Despot's men brought the tribute to Mehmed II and also ransomed their captives. Critobulos's superb description of Serbia is the best testimony that this was not only Doucas's impression: 'Its greatest advantage, in which it surpasses the other countries, is that it produces gold and silver? They are mined everywhere in that region, which has rich veins of both gold and silver, more abundant than those of India. The country of the Triballi was indeed fortunate in this respect from the very beginning and it was proud of its riches and its might. It was a kingdom with numerous flourishing towns and strong and impregnable fortresses. It was also rich in soldiers and armies as well as in good equipment. It had citizens of the noblest rank and it brought up many youths who had the strength of adult men. It was admired and famous, but it was also envied, so that is was not only loved of many, but also disliked by many people who sought to harm It'. It is no wonder that George Sphrantzes once complains that Christians failed to send aid to Constantinople and that he singles out for particular blame that 'miserable despot, who did not realize that once the head is removed, the limbs, too disappear'. It may be said, therefore, that Doucas regarded Serbia as one of the few remaining allies of at least some ability to stem the Turkish advances, and that this opinion was primarily based on its economic resources. Serbia was clearly distinguished as a state structure, as opposed to most of the remaining parts of the Peninsula, inhabited by peoples which Doucas does not seem to differentiate precisely. According to him, the authority over a particular territory issued from the ruler's title, the title of despot, which was first in importance after the imperial title, also determined the rank of Serbia in the Byzantine theory of hierarchy of states. Doucas's testimony also shows that this theory not only endured until the collapse of the Empire, but that it also persisted even in the consciousness of the people who survived its fall.

After the agreements signed between tsarist Russia and Iran and Turkey in the 19th century (The Gulustan Peace Treaty of 1813, Turkmenchay Peace Treaty of 1828 and Edirne Peace Treaty (The Treaty of Adrianople) of 1829), very serious political processes took place in NorthAzerbaijan. As a result of the tsarism’s resettlement policy, which served the plan to Russify and Christianize the region, a large number of Germans, Russians, Armenians, Poles, Greeks and other ethnic groups were resettled in the region. New settlements and villages were built for some of them, and some of them were settled on lands, villages and settlements belonging to local people. This, in turn, led to the migration of the local population, leaving their ancestral lands. Bazing on sources and literature is made attempts in the article to analyze these political events that have a significant impact on the ethno-demographic structure of North Azerbaijan.

The interwar philosopher, economist and sociologist Stefan Zeletin1, professor at the “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University of Iași, has special contributions in various domains related to the social sciences. The merit of the interwar thinker consists in giving meaning and significance to some economic phenomena and events. Subsequently, the valences of events of economic importance were analysed, up to the implications they have on historical processes. More precisely, Zeletin shows us that we can understand the historical purpose of some peoples, namely of the Romanian nation, based on treaties or economic decisions in the international system. The Treaty of Adrianople (1829) is analysed by the Romanian intellectual in terms of the implications of English trade and capital on the Romanian Principalities.

AbstractSince the Treaty of Adrianople 1829 the Lower Danube underwent major political, economic and territorial transformations. It changed from a quasi-closed river entirely under Ottoman rule into a site of Great Power intervention. This new found international interest mobilised sustained efforts to make the Danube from the Iron Gates to the Black Sea navigable. Within a few years the Lower Danube turned into an important commercial and communication hub of continental dimensions. It also turned into a place of pilgrimage for politicians, diplomats, merchants and hydraulic engineers from all over Europe enabling a vivid exchange of ideas. The goal of this article is twofold: on one hand it sets out to give an overview over the existing body of historical literature that places the Lower Danube into a transnational framework, and on the other it makes several suggestions for further studies.

This chapter discusses the negotiations for the Treaty of Adrianople, the response of the other powers, and the implications Russia's Balkan crossing had for future strategy. When news of the peace of Adrianople arrived in St Petersburg the sense of euphoria was understandable. The treaty — through its strategic annexations and extension of Russia's commercial and political rights — served to weaken the Ottoman Empire while preserving its existence, thus complementing perfectly the committee's decision. The chapter also considers the British reaction to Adrianople and the execution and revision of Adrianople in 1830–32.