Academic literature on the topic 'Affinity (Roman law)'

THE PROHIBITION OF INCEST IN ROMAN LAW AND CHURCH LEGISLATION (III-VI) Summary Roman Law enlarged the number of marital prohibitions based on kinship and affinity in the period from the end of third century to sixth century: there were prohibited marriages with nieces, between consobrini, and between related in the second degree of affinity in the collateral line. It is important to observe that only two Roman Church synods – in the period from the end of third century to sixth century – took into consideration incest problem. The Synod of Elvira (circa 295-306) banned the connection with the deceased wife’s sisters and with the stepdaughters. The Synod in Neocesarea (circa 314-319) excluded the successive woman’s marriage with two brothers. The influence of the Church law cannot explain the sharpening of Roman legislation applied to incest, neither the influence of bishops like St. Ambrose can explain emperors’ decisions. It should be rather assumed that pagan sexual morals became stricter under the influence of new political elites and stoicism.

The article characterizes the place and role of the Rus’ Truth in the history of the state and law of Ukraine and determines its influence on the formation and development of the Ukrainian legal tradition. It is noted that legal traditions are directly related to the state traditions of the Ukrainian people. The state-legal traditions of the Ukrainian people are a centuries-old continuous process of development of the Ukrainian people, aimed at the formation of the state, passed down from generation to generation and preserved for a long time. The state-legal traditions of the Ukrainian people have an uninterrupted duration, since it includes not only the periods of the existence of the state, but also the periods of struggle for its restoration, national liberation struggles. The state-legal traditions in Ukraine began with the state of Antes, later the state of Kyivan Rus’, the Galicia-Volyn state, continued during the time of the Ukrainian Cossack state, and in the 20th century were represented by the period of the revival of an independent state on Ukrainian ethnic lands in 1917–1921 in the form of the Ukrainian People’s Republic under the Central Council, the Ukrainian State under Pavlo Skoropadskyi, the Ukrainian People’s Republic under the Directory and the West Ukrainian People’s Republic, the declaration of statehood and rights of Carpathian Ukraine (1939), of the Ukrainian state (1941); quasi-states and rights of the USSR. The state-legal traditions of the Ukrainian people embodied the desire to have their own state and law, republican forms of people’s power, electability of the state power, democratic principles of state construction and local self-government, freedom, equality, justice and orderliness in social relations, respect for a person, their life, health, dignity, attachment to private property, to the legal method of protection of violated rights, etc. The Ukrainian people, even during periods of prolonged stay under the rule of foreign states, without having their own state, preserved and developed their own national state-legal traditions and always showed an affinity for the traditions of Western European statehood and law. The state-legal traditions of the Ukrainian people are closely related to such a formulation as «the centuries-old history of Ukrainian statehood», an important component of which was the centuries-old struggle of the Ukrainian nation as an indigenous, titular nation for the right to create its own state. The foundation of national statehood is a long-term, complex process of birth, formation and development of Ukrainian statehood, which results in the creation of a Ukrainian state as a result of the Ukrainian nation development. Considerable attention is paid to the characteristics of the origins of the Ukrainian legal tradition, which go back to the legal culture of the Kyivan Rus’ state, where the foundations of law and the legal worldview were laid. As mentioned above, the formation and functioning of the Ukrainian legal tradition during the period of the Kyivan Rus’ state was positively influenced by the law-making of the Kyiv princes, the application of customary law, the reception of Byzantine and, through it, Roman law, trade and political ties of the Kyivan Rus’ state with Byzantium, Germany, France and other countries. Ancient Ukrainian law was codified for the first time in the Kyivan Rus’ state, the result of which was the adoption of the first legal code – the Rus’ Truth, a source of knowledge of the state-legal development on Ukrainian lands in the 9th-12th centuries, reflecting the level of socio-political, economic and cultural relations of the ancient Ukrainian society. It reveals the generalized legal worldview of Ukrainians regarding the legal foundations of their development, the peculiarities of the regulation of social relations. The Rus’ Truth was the fundamental normative legal act in the Kyivan Rus’ state. The Rus’ Truth was an important normative legal act that influenced the process of formation of Ukrainian law. The formation and development of the legal system of Ukraine began with Ukrainian customary law, princely legislation, and especially the Rus’ Truth in the times of the Kyivan Rus’ state.

Toute théorie sociologique du droit se voit confrontée au problème éminemment complexe de la mise en relation des phénomènes juridiques et extrajuridiques, par exemple économiques. Ainsi, Max Weber, dans sa Rechtssoziologie (Sociologie du droit), poursuit notamment l'objectif d'une explicitation des liens existant entre la rationalisation formelle du droit et l'émergence du capitalisme. Les commentateurs de Weber sont toutefois fortement divisés sur l'appréciation de la valeur scientifique de cette réflexion : pour plusieurs d'entre eux, Weber se révèle incapable de démontrer l'existence d'un rapport effectif entre la rationalité formelle du droit et le développement de l'économie de marché. Le «problème anglais », en particulier, serait révélateur d'un échec théorique : le capitalisme étant d'abord apparu en Angleterre, soit dans un système juridique empirique et faiblement rationalisé en comparaison du droit continental, il s'avérerait pour le moins problématique de faire de la rationalisation formelle du droit une précondition de l’émergence du capitalisme. L'auteur tente, pour sa part, de démontrer que le prétendu problème anglais repose en fait sur une lecture discutable de la sociologie juridique de Weber. Ce dernier était en effet conscient—et ce, dès ses premiers travaux sur les mérites économiques respectifs du droit « germanique » et du droit « romain » tel qu'il a été reçu dans l'Occident médiéval—de la présence d'une dissociation entre la formalisation et la rationalisation du droit, et les attentes concrètes des intéressés au marché. Il importe de souligner ici que la notion de prévisibilité juridique ne peut recevoir un sens univoque chez Weber: elle caractérise soit la calculabilité du droit au regard de l'effet empirique attendu par les agents économiques, soit la possibilité d'inférence d'une solution adéquate du point de vue de la dogmatique juridique. Sur le plan empirique, la prévisibilité du droit représente une précondition essentielle à la genèse du capitalisme industriel du type concurrentiel : suivant l'auteur, dans la perspective même de Weber, tant la common law que le droit continental se sont révélés aptes à développer un degré satisfaisant de prévisibilité empirique. Sur le plan dogmatique, par contre, la prévisibilité ne connaît un plein épanouissement que dans des systèmes juridiques formellement rationnels, auxquels la common law ne peut être assimilée. Ce constat n'emporte cependant nulle conséquence déterminante du point de vue économique : seule une affinité élective peut en effet être tracée entre la rationalité formelle du droit et l’émergence du capitalisme. En outre, les sphères économique et juridique se rationalisent en fonction de logiques autonomes de développement, portées par des catégories sociales aux intérêts divergents ; les probabilités de rapports conflictuels entre le rationalisme économique et le rationalisme juridique demeurent donc élevées : ainsi, le droit formellement rationnel tend à s'émanciper des attentes pratiques, au point d'apparaître, dans certaines de ses conséquences, comme « irrationnel » du point de vue des agents économiques. Si le constat d'échec que certains imputent à Weber ne paraît en définitive guère convaincant, il n'en reste pas moins, souligne l'auteur, que la discussion relative au « problème anglais » présente l'intérêt d'obliger à un approfondissement d'aspects souvent négligés de la Rechtssoziologie et de contribuer ainsi à une consolidation des fondements théoriques de la sociologie du droit.

<p class="Bodytext" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">By the year 2020, Malaysia aspires to become a fully developed nation. This lofty vision, known as Vision 2020, was unveiled by the former Prime Minister of Malaysia Tun Dr. Mahathir bin Mohamad on February 28, 1991. Currently, it is generally felt that the nation has achieved 50 to 60 percent of the objectives of Vision 2020. What needs to be done to achieve the vision and in what areas? These are the questions that we asked to 759 people living in Malaysia (Malaysians as well as Internationals) in a nationwide survey. As expected, the respondents touched upon a wide variety of issues pertaining to education, economy, technology, quality of life, law and order, R&amp;D, and so on. Upon compilation of all the articulated issues, an affinity diagram was developed. Subsequently, the Analytic Hierarchy Process has been applied in each component of the affinity diagram. This application identifies the main issues that need to be addressed in order to realize the objectives of Vision 2020. The present research findings are expected to provide useful guidelines to the policy makers at the national level in the course of fine tuning Vision 2020 strategies.</span></p><p class="Bodytext" style="margin: 0in 0in 0pt;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman;">http://dx.doi.org/10.13033/ijahp.v2i2.40<br /></span></p>

The promotion of conciliarist ideas in the reign of James I created a space for both liberal Arminian and conservative Laudian ideas to shape the Church of England’s self-identity under regal patronage, whilst largely excluding the influence of both Puritans and Roman Catholics. The Restoration Church after 1660 inherited these conciliarist ideas, while the conservative heirs of Laud emerged as the High Church party, a party which continued to articulate its ecclesiological vision into the eighteenth century and beyond, most notably in the writings of Henry Dodwell, George Bull, George Hickes, and William Law. However, conservative conciliarism failed to survive the demise of the ancient regime, and this can be seen in the affinity of some of the Tractarians with French ultramontanists.

A corollary of Hebraism’s orientation to this world is law as the vehicle by which to organize this world. This chapter examines the Hebraic understanding of law, its relation to tradition, and its national jurisdiction in contrast to the universal jurisdiction of Roman law and canon law. Regarding this contrast, the Lex Salica, François Hotman’s Francogallia, and Hugo Grotius’ Antiquity of the Batavian Republic are discussed briefly. The contrast does not mean that universal principles of justice are absent in national law, but the relation between those principles and a national jurisdiction presents a problem, as Edward Coke saw. Within the Christian tradition, the prototype of national law is the law of ancient Israel and subsequently Jewish law. In his examination of Jewish law, especially the Noahide laws of the Talmud, John Selden recognized an affinity between Jewish and English common law that supports Hebraism as a cultural category.

Miroslav Krleža’s novel Na rubu pameti (On the Edge of Reason) was published in German under a title that may at first sight seem curious: Ohne mich. Eine einsame Revolu-tion. According to certain sources Krleža had nothing against the title. Perhaps because of the word revolution. If one considers that Krleža’s expressionism offers one of the most im-portant starting points for the Yugoslav avant-garde, it will be easier to understand the affinity of his literary texts for the revolution and revolutionary topics. However, a signifi-cant change in the way he deals with these topics can be observed in different periods of his creative work. Whereas Hrvatska rapsodija (Croatian Rhapsody) offers revolutionary pro-gress depicted in a train that cannot and does not want to stop, On the Edge of Reason, the novel he wrote twenty years later, speaks of the disappointment of an individual who does not belong to the “revolutionary class”, but feels close to it. In this closeness, the concept of “justice” occupies the central position, diverging from the ethical content and questioning the unbearable social conditions. It crystallises the more than conspicuous discrepancy between justice and law in concrete legal proceedings. This knowledge will enable the anonymous narrator to thoroughly confront the institutions of the system. Shaken by the injustice of the court, the distinguished attorney will slide further and further into madness, as he moves away from his social class. Based on his advanced destruction, two things beco-me clear: not only the injustice towards lower classes of society, but also the injustice affec-ting him personally showing him what happens to those who oppose existing juridical con-stants. It seems we are told that his spiritual fabric, his melancholy and pessimism do not allow him to remain a revolutionary. Therefore, his revolution is paradoxically “lonely”, pe-trified in a status in which the materialisation of revolution is – impossible.