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Academic literature on the topic 'Afghanistan – 1979-1989 (Intervention soviétique)'
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Journal articles on the topic "Afghanistan – 1979-1989 (Intervention soviétique)"
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Sidos, Philippe. "La contre-insurrection soviétique en Afghanistan (1979-1989)." Stratégique N° 100-101, no. 2 (2012): 137. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/strat.100.0137.
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Ali, Imran, and Xiaochuan Dong. "The New Battlefield: The Hidden History of U.S Foreign Policy towards Afghanistan." Asian Social Science 12, no. 8 (2016): 18. http://dx.doi.org/10.5539/ass.v12n8p18.
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<p class="a"><span lang="EN-US">The United States foreign policy has been characterized as a long and zigzag history since the beginning of America in the late eighteenth century. This vital study is a part of this long history. During 1979 Soviets invaded Afghanistan and a Soviet-Afghan War was born, American’s major influence was to be towards this region and reforms in their foreign policy to expel the Soviets from Afghanistan. It took place between 1979 and 1989 about a decade. This study seeks to answer the following questions: “Which were the U.S key foreign policy in the context of Afghan-Soviet War during 1979 and 1989 under Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan Presidencies and how these Administrations provoked hard decisions against Soviet Union and established their own doctrines?” “How the U.S got the Afghan Mujahedeen’s confidence and funneled the billions of dollars and global dangerous weapons to them chest through Pakistani ISI to punish the Soviets in Afghanistan?” “How the U.S hidden actor’s played the key role in this war?” Results based on U.S recently declassified material regarding this war from 1979-89 and found that soon after the Soviets intervention of Afghanistan, U.S begun hidden supply to Afghan Mujahedeen chest through Pakistani ISI and both the U.S Presidents, Carter and Reagan, took hard decisions including established their doctrines to protect the Persian Gulf Region and its interests. In this game, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Charlie Wilson, William Casey, Howard Hart and Stansfield M Turner played the hidden role and finally expelled out the Soviets from Afghanistan.</span></p>
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Kovalkov, O. "THE ATTITUDES OF AFGHAN STUDENTS IN THE UKRAINIAN SSR TO THE SOVIET INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN AND WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS (1979 – 1989)." Bulletin of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. History, no. 145 (2020): 33–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.17721/1728-2640.2020.145.6.
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The article examines the political views of Afghan students studying in the Ukrainian SSR and their attitude towards the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from that country. The sources of the study were KGB analytical reports from the Branch Archive of the Ukrainian Security Service, documents of educational institutions in Kirovohrad where Afghans studied, from the State Archives of Kirovohrad region, texts of the Soviet-Afghan educational cooperation agreements, notices and diary records of the USSR ambassador in Afghanistan and other Soviet officials on meetings and conversation with Afghan politicians. It was proven that the studying of Afghans in the USSR was one of the means of the Soviet policy toward Afghanistan aimed at its forced socialist modernization. The studying of Afghans in the Soviet Union led to emergence of a large pro-Soviet stratum of the Afghan society. The factors that determined the different attitudes of Afghan students studying in the Ukrainian SSR to the armed Soviet intervention in the Afghan crisis in December 1979 were identified. Most Afghans endorsed the USSR's military intervention in the "Afghan crisis". They believed that this was necessary to protect the achievements of the "April Revolution" and to counter "world imperialism". Some of them expressed concern, fear, and even negative attitudes toward the USSR policies. These sentiments were influenced by a factional affiliation: supporters of the "Parcham" and the "Hulk" group associated with N. M. Taraki endorsed the Soviet intervention, while supporters of H. Amin condemned it. The Afghan students in the Ukrainian SSR largely rejected the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan in February 1989. Most of them viewed it as a betrayal by the Soviet Union. They were convinced that this would lead to the fall of M. Najibullah's regime and the defeat of the "April Revolution" in Afghanistan.
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Artwińska, Anna. "Ołowiane żołnierzyki, cynkowe trumny. Swietłany Aleksijewicz opowieść o wojnie w Afganistanie i granice świadectwa." Narracje o Zagładzie, specjalny (June 21, 2021): 255–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.31261/noz.2021.dhc.11.
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The novel Zinky Boys (1989; Polish editions in 2007 and 2015) by Belarusian author Svetlana Alexievich is more than just a story of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan (1979–1989) told from the perspective of the soldiers who participated in it. It also confronts readers with the contractual nature of the line that separates “artistic” and “documentary” prose and probes the complexities of the discourse on memory in Russian culture. This article discusses the key motifs of Zinky Boys: “zinc coffins” and “lead soldiers”. It also examines and ponders the reasons for the lawsuit against the author for the publication of passages from the novel. Drawing on Michael Rothberg, Anna Artwińska argues that, in order to be able to understand the drama of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, one needs to assume the position of an “implicated subject”, i.e., of a person who understands the need for shared ethical responsibility for traumatic past events, even though they neither participated in those events nor witnessed them.
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Kalinovsky, Artemy. "Decision-Making and the Soviet War in Afghanistan: From Intervention to Withdrawal." Journal of Cold War Studies 11, no. 4 (2009): 46–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/jcws.2009.11.4.46.
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The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan sparked acute Cold War tensions. The war soon became an undesirable distraction and burden for Soviet leaders, who did not expect to spend most of the 1980s propping up a client regime in Kabul. Drawing on archival sources and interviews, this article traces Soviet decision-making from the intervention in late 1979 to the final withdrawal in early 1989. The article shows that the supporters of the Soviet intervention believed that Soviet military and economic aid efforts were making progress and should not be aborted early. They warned that a premature withdrawal would undermine Soviet prestige in the Third World. Before Mikhail Gorbachev came to power and to some extent afterward, the supporters of intervention were usually able to silence or sideline their critics through deft political maneuvering.
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Krishnaiah, Jothik, Nancy Signorielli, and Douglas M. McLeod. "The Evil Empire Revisited: New York Times Coverage of the Soviet Intervention in and Withdrawal from Afghanistan." Journalism Quarterly 70, no. 3 (1993): 647–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/107769909307000315.
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This study examines the New York Times coverage of the Soviet intervention and withdrawal from Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. Changes in coverage are examined in the context of easing tensions between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union. Findings indicate that the treatment of major story elements was consistent with Herman and Chomsky's propaganda framework. However, changes in the tone of coverage may imply a slight weakening in the explanatory power of the propaganda framework as anti-Soviet ideology diminished.
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HALLIDAY, FRED. "Soviet foreign policymaking and the Afghanistan war: from ‘second Mongolia’ to ‘bleeding wound’." Review of International Studies 25, no. 4 (1999): 675–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0260210599006750.
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The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, lasting from 1979 to 1989, was one of the major chapters in the Cold War. Analysis of how Soviet policy was made has, hitherto, focused on the decision to intervene, in December 1979. Equally important, however, as an episode in the final stages of the Cold War, and as an example of Soviet policy formulation, was the decision to withdraw. Basing itself on declassified Soviet documents, and on a range of interviews with former Soviet and Afghan officials, this article charts the protracted history of the Soviet decision and sets it in context: as with the decision to invade, the withdrawal reflected assessment of multiple dimensions of policymaking, not only the interests and calculation of Soviet leaders, but also relations within the Afghan communist leadership on the one hand, and strategic negotiation with the West on the other.
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Rabush, Taisiya V. "Regional Russian Books of Memory as a Form of Preservation and Transfer of Cultural-Historical Memory about the Afghanistan War of 1979-1989." RUDN Journal of Russian History 20, no. 2 (2021): 247–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2312-8674-2021-20-2-247-257.
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The historical memory of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan (1979-1989) is studied through the prism of memory books dedicated to the participants of the war and those who died in it. The present paper is the first study of the Afghan books of memory that were published over the past decades in different regions of Russia. The first part of this paper analyzes the regional books of memory published in various regions of the Russian Federation from 1991 to the present day; the second part analyzes the books of memory published in small cities of Russia as a separate cultural phenomenon. In conclusion, the author describes the main features of regional Afghan books of memory, emphasizing that the memory books are published with the active participation of various regional organizations - from local archives to representatives of municipalities - revealing that the publication of these books is part of cultural policy in the regions. Many memory books have been reprinted, which indicates the continued collection and processing of information about the military casualties in Afghanistan. The regional books of memory are one of the most important forms of preserving and transmitting the historical memory of the Afghanistan war.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Afghanistan – 1979-1989 (Intervention soviétique)"
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Rochandel, Jalil. "Les Soviétiques en Afghanistan : spécificité d'une intervention militaire." Toulouse 1, 1989. http://www.theses.fr/1989TOU10010.
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L'intervention militaire soviétique en Afghanistan, en 1979, présente des implications politiques considérables qui ont fait l'objet d'analyses multiples. Cette région fragile, est une région d'intérêt stratégique mondial ou s'affrontent indirectement l'est et l'ouest. La présente thèse fait face a de telles considérations, mais analyse plus particulièrement les modalités de l'intervention et la politique de "pacification" : c'est-a-dire les aspects stratégique et militaire comme les aspects politique et culturel. Elle suit le déroulement de la politique de pacification face à la résistance armée afghane (les Mujahidins) jusqu'aux accords de Genève d'avril 1988 et le retrait des troupes soviétiques<br>The soviet military intervention of 1979 in Afghanistan, has brought about some considerable political implications which have been the subject of multiple analyses. This fragile region is the region of international strategic interest where east and west affront indirectly. The present thesis deals with such considerations, but analyses more particularly the modality of the intervention and the pacification policy : i. E. The strategic and military aspects as well as political and cultural. It follows the evolution of the soviet pacification policy in front of the armed afghan resistance (the mujahidins), until the Geneva agreements of april 1988 and the russian pull out
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Uslubas, Fevzi. "L'intervention soviétique en Afghanistan et l'Islam en URSS." Doctoral thesis, Universite Libre de Bruxelles, 1989. http://hdl.handle.net/2013/ULB-DIPOT:oai:dipot.ulb.ac.be:2013/213230.
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Sidos, Philippe. "La guerre limitée du "Contingent de forces soviétiques en Afghanistan", 1979-1989." Paris, EPHE, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013EPHE4008.
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Les « victoires » limitées de l'armée soviétique en Afghanistan de 1979 à 1989 furent autant de défaites médiatiques et politiques. Malgré de lourdes difficultés, les Soviétiques n’ont pas subi de défaite face aux mouvements de résistance. Ils ont su adapter leurs méthodes opérationnelles, mais malgré l’emploi ponctuel de moyens puissants ils n'ont jamais pu chasser les moudjahidines de leurs zones refuges ni couper les lignes d’approvisionnement venant du Pakistan. L'intervention militaire soviétique fait suite à une longue politique de coopération et d'influence mais l’engagement de 1979 engagea les Soviétiques dans la guerre civile afghane. De nombreuses opérations démontrèrent que l'emploi de la force moderne classique parvenait à neutraliser localement les moudjahidines mais que leur vaine répétition et la résilience de l’insurrection devaient finalement conduire à un compromis, en particulier avec Massoud qui posa avec les Russes les bases d’une négociation. Les unités spéciales soviétiques démontrèrent une redoutable efficacité dans la lutte contre la résistance leur action démontre leurs capacités opérationnelles et l'excellence de leurs résultats malgré des effectifs nettement insuffisants. Les axes routiers logistiques furent l'objet d'un harcèlement constant qui contraignit les forces soviétiques à y consacrer de nombreuses ressources pour maintenir ouvertes leurs lignes de communication. Les Soviétiques initièrent avant et pendant leur intervention militaire des efforts de formation pour créer des forces de sécurité afghanes capables d'assurer la transition. Les résultats furent variables malgré un réel effort de coopération<br>The limited victories of the Soviet army in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989 were at the same time political and media defeats. Despite heavy difficulties the Soviets did not suffer a defeat at the hands of the mujahedin. They knew how to adapt their operational methods but despite the temporary use of powerful means they were never able to expel the mujahedin out of their safe heavens neither disrupt their lines of supplies from Pakistan. The Soviet military intervention follows a long policy of cooperation and influence but the 1979 involvement involved the Soviets into the Afghan civil war. Many operations demonstrated that the use of modern force could locally neutralize the mujahedin but their useless repetition and the resiliency of the insurrection finally led to a compromise, in particular with Massoud which prepared the ground for negotiations. The Soviet Special units demonstrated a formidable efficiency fighting the insurgents and their action proved their operational capacities and the excellence of their results despite obvious inadequate and insufficient strength. The logistical road network was the target of a permanent harassment which forced the Soviet forces to devote many resources to maintain open the lines of communications. The Soviets launched before and during their military intervention efforts to train and create Afghan security forces able to assure the transition. The results appeared to be mixed despite a real effort of cooperation
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Delmas, Guilhem. "Un hôpital dans les régions libérées d'Afghanistan : Wardak novembre 1987 - avril 1988." Montpellier 1, 1989. http://www.theses.fr/1989MON11207.
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Delmas, Bénédicte Weltman-Aron. "Découverte de l'Afghanistan au cours d'une mission médicale (Wardak novembre 87-avril 88) ou une autre façon d'exercer la médecine." Montpellier 1, 1989. http://www.theses.fr/1989MON11206.
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Naquet, Pascale. "La Chine et le conflit d'Afghanistan : 1979-1989." Paris 1, 2010. http://www.theses.fr/1998PA01A005.
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Bachardoust, Ramazan. "Diplomatie et la guerre d'Afghanistan." Toulouse 1, 1995. http://www.theses.fr/1995TOU10030.
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Cette recherche est consacrée à l'étude de l'activité diplomatique - au sens large de ce terme - qui a accompagné le déroulement de la guerre d'Afghanistan de 1979 à 1992. La première partie analyse d'abord la façon dont se sont articulées l'intervention militaire et la stratégie diplomatique de l'URSS, tandis que la seconde évoque les réactions diplomatiques des états les plus concernés par ces événements pour des raisons géographiques, idéologiques ou stratégiques : les Etats-Unis, le Pakistan et l'Iran. La description et l'analyse des politiques diplomatiques de ces différents acteurs, en relation avec les normes juridiques régissant la société internationale, s'accompagnent d'une réflexion sur les processus de décision et les facteurs qui en ont influencé la forme et le contenu<br>This research is dedicated to the study of diplomatic activity. Liberally in a broad sense which accompanied the unfolding of the Afghanistan war from 1979 to 1992. The first part analyses initially how was the Russian military intervention and diplomatic strategy are linked, while the second evokes the diplomatic reactions from the states most concerned by these events for geographic ideology, or strategic reasons : the United States, the Pakistan, the Iran. The description and analyses of the diplomatic politics of these different participants, a relation with the legal norms which govern the international society, is accompanied with a reflection on the decision process and the factors which influenced its form and content
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Dorronsoro, Gilles. "La Révolution afghane : du Jihad à la guerre civile." Paris, EHESS, 1995. http://www.theses.fr/1995EHES0034.
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A partir d'une etude de terrain menee entre 1988 et 1993. L'auteur montre dans un premier chapitre les fondements de la socio-genese de l'etat afghan. La revolte qui suit l'arrivee du gouvernement communiste en 1978 conduit a une mise en recit des actions, au depart isolees. Dans une logique de jihad que les partis islamistes peuvent facilement reprendre a leur compte. Les autorites locales qui emergent de la lutte. Les commandants, ont une legitimite de nature differente selon qu'ils sont passes par le lycee (ou l'universite). Proprietaires terriens, ulema ou pir une typologie des modes de pouvoirs selon les commandants fait ressortir la difference fondamentale entre pouvoir de type patrimonial et institutionnel. Distinction qui fonde une typologie des partis afghans. La concentration du pouvoir qui nait de la concurrence entre les parts et les commandants aboutit a une territorialisation des partis. La quetion de l'ethicite devient alors centrale puisque les partis entreprennent une mobilisation de type nationaliste a partir d'identites ethniques souvent mal definies. Le discours des partis a donc des consequences importantes sur les relations inter-ethniques et l'auto-definition des individus<br>This work is based on a field study carried out from 1988 to 1993. In the first chaper. We show the process of institutionalization of the afghan state. The popular revolts after the communist coup in 1978. Largely uncoordinated at the beginning. Vere understood by the people therselves as part of a jihed. The local authorities or "commandant" vho have energed during the war. Have different types of legitimacy. Depending on their social status (notables. Ulema, pir or educated). Our typology is precisely based on the difference between "patrimonial" power and "institionalized" pover. Besides, the process of concentration of power goes tovard a more territorialized type of political system in afghanistan. The issue of ethnicity is then becoming more and more decisive because the political parties are trying to mobilize the people in the name of so-called nation ou ethny that are generally not well-defined. The discourse of the parties have huge consequences on the state of inter-ethnies relationskip and on the self perception of the individuals
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Akram, Assem. "La guerre d'Afghanistan (1978-1992) : les causes et les effets de l'intervention soviétique en Afghanistan, de la primature de Daoud à l'après-guerre (1953-1996)." Paris 4, 1996. http://www.theses.fr/1996PA040061.
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Etude essentiellement basée sur des sources afghanes. L'intervention soviétique de 1979 en Afghanistan résultait à la fois d'une réponse conjoncturelle à la chute imminente du régime communiste, arrivé au pouvoir en avril 1978, et, d'autre part, d'une volonté ancienne d'expansion vers le sud. Moralement soutenus par la communauté internationale et financièrement appuyés par certains états à travers le monde (Etats-Unis, Arabie saoudite), les afghans trouvèrent suffisamment de force pour résister à la superpuissance soviétique en se ralliant à l'appel du jihad. Mais les moudjahidines afghans demeurèrent divisés aussi bien sur des questions religieuses qu'idéologiques. Tandis que ces différends étaient moins visibles durant la guerre, ils prirent de l'importance à partir de leur prise du pouvoir en avril 1992, aboutissant à une guerre civile qui dure jusqu'à aujourd'hui (1996). Le Pakistan joua un rôle clef durant la guerre, mais l'inter-services intelligence, chargée de la redistribution des aides financières et militaires, mena une politique plus favorables aux buts stratégiques d’Islamabad qu'à ceux des afghans. La période de l'après-guerre voit la confrontation de deux alliances sur la scène afghane : l'une inclut New-Delhi, Kaboul et Moscou, avec des extensions remarquables vers Téhéran et Douchanbé, tandis que l'autre comprend Islamabad, Riad, Tachkent et des groupes de l'opposition afghane (talibans, Dostom, etc)<br>Study mainly based on afghan sources. The soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 was the result, on one hand, of a timely answer to the foreseeable crack-down of the communist regime which took power on April 1978 and, on the other hand, of soviet-Russian long-standing strategic views aiming at an endless expansion to the south. Morally backed by the international community and financially sustained by some governments across the world (USA and Saudi Arabia), afghans found enough strength to resist the soviet superpower, standing under the jihad flag. But, the afghan mujahidin stood divided both religiously and ideologically. While these differences were less visible during the war, they became more prevalent when they gained power in April 1992. As a result, the country entered an era of civil war which continues today (1996). Pakistan played a key role during the war, but the inter-services intelligence, in charge of dispatching the military and financial aid, favored a policy more useful to the strategic goals of Islamabad rather the ones of the Afghans. The post-war era witnesses the opposition of two main alliances on the afghan scene: one is including New Delhi, Kabul and Moscow, with a new interesting extension to Khomeini’s Teheran and Russian-protected Dushanbe
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Cavanna, Thomas. "La politique étrangère américaine vis-à-vis de l’Inde et du Pakistan dans les années 1970." Paris, Institut d'études politiques, 2012. http://www.theses.fr/2012IEPP0035.
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Cette thèse a pour objectif de décrire les principales composantes de la politique étrangère des Etats-Unis vis-à-vis de l’Inde et du Pakistan durant les années 1970. Elle se divise en quatre grandes parties correspondant aux grands tournants de la diplomatie régionale américaine durant la décennie : Le conflit indo-pakistanais de 1971 / L’essai nucléaire indien de 1974 / Les changements de régime et/ou de leader dans les trois pays durant l’année 1977 / L’invasion soviétique de l’Afghanistan, en 1979. Pour chacun de ces grandes parties, l’objectif est d’analyser quels furent les déterminants des choix effectues par les Américains dans le sous-continent et d’explorer l’influence mutuelle de Washington, New Delhi et Islamabad. Ce travail a pour ambition de montrer la manière dont les Etats-Unis, par le caractère extrêmement erratique de leur politique (degré d’implication, choix des acteurs à soutenir, modalités d’influence), et du fait qu’ils ignorèrent ou méprisèrent les réalités d’une région à laquelle ils ne s’intéressèrent le plus souvent que dans la mesure où celle-ci était l’objet d’enjeux de guerre froide la dépassant (lutte d’influence contre l’URSS, rapprochement avec la Chine…), contribuèrent à saper leur crédibilité auprès de l’Inde comme du Pakistan, et, surtout, à déstabiliser la région sur le long terme (nucléaire, montée de l’islamisme, renforcement du sentiment d’impunité pakistanais…)<br>The objective of this dissertation is to describe the main components of the American foreign policy towards India and Pakistan in the 1970s. This work is divided in four parts corresponding to the turning points of Washington’s regional diplomacy : The 1971 Indo-Pakistani conflict / The 1974 Indian nuclear test / The 1977 regime or leadership changes in the three countries / The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. For each of these components, the objective is to analyze the main determinants of the choices made by the Americans in the region, and to explore the mutual influence of Washington, New Delhi and Islamabad. The ambition of this work is to show the way the United States lost their credibility in both India and Pakistan and contributed to the destabilization of the Indian subcontinent, because of an extremely erratic policy (degree of implication in the area, choice of the local partners, means of influence) and because they often ignored or dismissed the very geopolitical realities of a region in which they had some interest only as far as the latter was a scene of the cold war global struggle for influence (rivalry with Moscow, rapprochement with China…). These flaws had important consequences in the long run, especially with respect to nuclear issues, the rise of Islamism, and the persistence of a feeling of impunity in the Pakistani ruling circles
Books on the topic "Afghanistan – 1979-1989 (Intervention soviétique)"
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Karzai: The failing American intervention and the struggle for Afghanistan. John Wiley, 2007.
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Bradsher, Henry S. Afghan communism and Soviet intervention. Oxford University Press, 1999.
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