Academic literature on the topic 'African Court of Human and People's Rights'

This thesis focuses on the establishment and operation of the latest regional Human Rights Court: The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. For the development of human rights protection mechanisms within regional organizations the governments of the member states are of special relevance. They pull the strings to either foster and develop a system or to disrupt it. Therefore, following a brief historical introduction, the first chapter gives an overview of the regional African organization, the former Organization of African Unity (OAU) and today's African Union (AU) which was instrumental in the establishment of the African Human Rights System and has now enhanced it by adding a judicial authority. However, it will become clear that is has taken a long time for the OAU to put human rights violations within the borders of its own member states on its agenda: Not until there was increasing international pressure due to never-ending excrescences of violence in the dictatorial regimes in Africa did the OAU carefully attend to this matter in the late 1970s. Its efforts culminated in the adoption of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the eponymous Banjul Charter) which entered into force in 1981. The body for the protection created by the Charter was the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights which took up its function in 1987. Since the newly established African Court is not supposed to replace the Commission but rather to strengthen it, the Court operates in concert with the Commission. Therefore the old protection system will still be applicable which deems a portrayal of the system in the following chapter necessary. Here, it will be outlined, that the competences of the Commission remain very limited and that its judicial impact on the State parties involved in its protection procedures has been nearly nil up to this very day. Against this background the next chapter focuses on the Protocol to the Banjul-Charter establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. First, the historical-political background and the protocol's juridical formulation process are examined. Here it will be shown that the end of global bipolarity has had a remarkable impact on the political protagonists in Africa with the effect that the increasing demands for a human rights Court within the OAU no longer remained completely unheard. It will also be outlined that the path towards the adoption of the protocol has been long and difficult. After a short survey of the organisational structure of the Court it will become clear that the protocol follows to a large extend its Inter-American counterpart concerning the institutional embodiment. However, a remarkable and, in international comparison, a unique achievement has also been achieved by the institutional regulations by making gender equality has one of the key issues to encompass when it comes to the nomination and election of judges. The following chapters outline the jurisdiction of the Court and the judicial process before the Court. In this connection the admissibility criteria will be highlighted in which two remarkable regulations stand out: First, it will become clear that in contrast to other regional human rights courts individuals and NGOs alike are entitled to file a complaint with the African Court (even though initially with the help of the Commission, since the protocol makes the complaint authority of individuals and NGOs dependent of a special declaration of acceptance of the State Parties concerned). Moreover, also unique compared to international two-tier human rights procedures, the protocol does not include a provision according to which a complainant would be obliged to go through a prior Commission procedure before filing a complaint with the Court. Individual complainants rather have direct access to the Court once a declaration of acceptance has been submitted by a State Party to the protocol. Following short remarks on the competence of the Court to issue provisional measures which, among other things, reveal that these measures have, in contrast to those of the ECtHR, binding effect the procedural termination of a complaint comes into focus. Here, the possible contents of the rulings and the control mechanisms for their implementation are being contemplated in a detailed fashion. This last aspect most probably will have great influence on the fate of the Court since the Commission for its part had to a large extent no success due to the fact that it had no conventional implementation procedures to rely on. Therefore, in the vast majority of cases the findings of the Commission trailed off without any State Party concerned paying any attention to it. The drafters of the protocol establishing the Court obviously have learned this lesson since the protocol provides for a quite remarkable implementation mechanism that may be able to impose political and legal pressure alike on State Parties if the Court deems that they have not properly complied with a Court's ruling. Even sanctions within the African Union against a recusant State come into question from a legal point of view - a quantum leap regarding the legal situation under the Banjul Charter. The last chapter rehearses the main findings of the thesis and concludes with a positive outlook on the future development of the African human rights system.

Doctor Legum - LLD<br>The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Right (the Court) is the most recent of the three regional Human Rights Bodies. Envisioned by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Right, its structures was not planned until the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) promulgated a protocol for its creation in 1998. The Court complements the protective mandate of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘The Commission’) and the Court has the competence to take final and binding decisions on human rights violations. Unlike its European and inter-American versions where their courts are integral parts of the cardinal instrument of the system ab initio, the establishment of the African Court was merely an afterthought. At the initial, protection of rights rested solely with the Commission upon African justice system which emphasises reconciliation as it is non-confrontational method of settlements of. The Commission is a quasi-judicial body modelled after the United Nations Human Right Committee without binding powers and with only limited functions covering examination of State reports, communications alleging violations and interpreting the Charter at the request of a State, the OAU or any organisation recognised by the OAU. The thesis answers the question whether the adoption of the African Court means that the African model of enforcing human rights has failed or whether having the Court constitute a concession to the triumph of the western model of law enforcement. The imperative of the 30th Ordinary Session of the OAU in 1994 where the creation of an African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights was viewed as the best way of protecting human rights across the region would be treated. The relevance of such an examination is highlighted by the fact that the African Charter did not make any provision for the establishment of a Court to enforce the rights guaranteed thereunder. If we are to assume that justice by reconciliation has failed and should be replaced by or complimented with justice by adjudication as the primary means of conflict resolution, what guarantees are there that the latter form of justice will not also fail? This thesis therefore will critically evaluate the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and assessed its potential impact on the African human rights system. It will also probe the power of the Court and see whether a clear and mutually reinforcing division of labour between it and the African Commission can be developed to promote and protect human rights on the continent. This research brings to focus an area that requires attention if the African human rights regime is to be effective. It put to test the criticism against the African Charter and the Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and also identified the present existing flaws in the African regional system. Furthermore, it ascertained whether or not, given the availability of other options, a regional Court is, in fact, the ideal mechanism for the protection of human rights in Africa.

Doctor Legum - LLD<br>The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Right (the Court) is the most recent of the three regional Human Rights Bodies. Envisioned by the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Right, its structures was not planned until the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) promulgated a protocol for its creation in 1998. The Court complements the protective mandate of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘The Commission’) and the Court has the competence to take final and binding decisions on human rights violations. Unlike its European and inter-American versions where their courts are integral parts of the cardinal instrument of the system ab initio, the establishment of the African Court was merely an afterthought. At the initial, protection of rights rested solely with the Commission upon African justice system which emphasises reconciliation as it is non-confrontational method of settlements of. The Commission is a quasi-judicial body modelled after the United Nations Human Right Committee without binding powers and with only limited functions covering examination of State reports, communications alleging violations and interpreting the Charter at the request of a State, the OAU or any organisation recognised by the OAU. The thesis answers the question whether the adoption of the African Court means that the African model of enforcing human rights has failed or whether having the Court constitute a concession to the triumph of the western model of law enforcement. The imperative of the 30th Ordinary Session of the OAU in 1994 where the creation of an African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights was viewed as the best way of protecting human rights across the region would be treated. The relevance of such an examination is highlighted by the fact that the African Charter did not make any provision for the establishment of a Court to enforce the rights guaranteed thereunder. If we are to assume that justice by reconciliation has failed and should be replaced by or complimented with justice by adjudication as the primary means of conflict resolution, what guarantees are there that the latter form of justice will not also fail? This thesis therefore will critically evaluate the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and assessed its potential impact on the African human rights system. It will also probe the power of the Court and see whether a clear and mutually reinforcing division of labour between it and the African Commission can be developed to promote and protect human rights on the continent. This research brings to focus an area that requires attention if the African human rights regime is to be effective. It put to test the criticism against the African Charter and the Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and also identified the present existing flaws in the African regional system. Furthermore, it ascertained whether or not, given the availability of other options, a regional Court is, in fact, the ideal mechanism for the protection of human rights in Africa.

The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCHPR) was created amidst great criticism to the ineffectiveness of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AfCmHPR) in protecting human rights on the content. After much debate, spanning four decades the Protocol on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the Protocol) was adopted by the Organisation of African Unity Assembly and entered into force on the 25th of January 2004. Later the 4th AU summit in January 2006 elected the eleven judges of the Court.<br>Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2011.<br>http://www.chr.up.ac.za/<br>nf2012<br>Centre for Human Rights<br>LLM

"The purpose of this study is to interrogate the doctrine of margin of appreciation as applied in the European Court of Human Rights and establish amenable lessos to the African human rights system. As such, the author will be able to draw appropriate and informed recommendations on the prospects of the doctrine in African context. In other words, the study proceeds from the approach that 'diversity' alone is not enough to guarantee application of margin of appreciation. Rather, a variety of factors come into consideration while weighing whether margin of appreciation should be granted to states. Indeed, such benchmarks will inform the discourse of this study, while at the same time acknowledging that a comparative study between European and African systems cannot be possible. The premise for disqualifying a comparison assumes that margin of appreciation presupposes a democratic society. Thus, while the member states of the ECHR have attained high levels of human rights records, some of their counterparts in Africa are still marred by embarrassing human rights records." -- Preamble. "Chapter one introduces the study and the context in which it is set. It highlights the basis and structure of the study. Chapter two makes reference to the connotation, origin and development of the doctrine of margin of appreciation. It discusses also contours and varying degrees of the doctrine's application with particular regard to respect of the rule of law. In addition, difficulties linked to the doctrine are highlighted. Chapter three highlights policy grounds underlying margin of appreciation in the European Court of Human Rights. It starts from most decisive policy grounds and moves to weaker ones. Chapter four examines the legal basis for application of the doctrine of margin of appreciation under the African Charter. It further notes the attitude of African states through their submissions claiming margin. The Prince case as the first of its kind to invoke margin of appreciation is discussed. Chapter five attempts to identify the defensibility and indefensibility of the doctrine in [the] African human rights system. Chapter six consists of a summary of the presentation and the conclusions drawn from the entire study." -- Introduction.<br>Prepared under the supervision of Prof. Gilles Cistac at the Faculty of Law, Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, Maputo, Mocambique<br>Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2006.<br>http://www.chr.up.ac.za/academic_pro/llm1/dissertations.html<br>Centre for Human Rights<br>LLM

Magister Legum - LLM<br>In many societies, a division between genders exist. This differentiation is attributed to a patriarchal culture which creates gender norms in sexualities.1 A set of cultural practices and expectations exist; these cultural practices and expectations assume that heterosexuality is the cornerstone of social unions - this phenomenon is known as heteronormativity.2 Heteronormativity affords that there are only two sexes with predetermined gender roles,3 creating the homophobia in societies. Human rights infringements on the basis of gender identity and sexual orientation has become noticeable across Africa.4 Homophobia in Africa is linked to the codification of laws that infringed on human rights under colonialism, which still forms part of the current norms around sexuality.5 Homosexuality is prohibited and is unlawful in most of the countries in Africa, South Africa being the only country that allows for the legal union of same-sex couples.6 There have been a number of academic texts debating the importance of culture against the right to equality in the South African context; 7 however, there is an inadequate amount of academic text available about this topic on an African level. Therefore, an ongoing debate about the protection of "sexual minorities" contrasted with the protection of cultural rights exists on an international scale. 8 The rights of sexual minorities are disregarded too often and they are often denied equal and fair access to the law. A large number of African countries believe that homosexuality is un African,9 thus choosing to exclude lesbians and gays from citizen rights. 10 Due to this belief, the practice of homosexuality in Africa is seen one that goes against the morals and values of the majority of society. This creates a stand-off between cultural rights and equality rights of sexual minorities.

In its latest attempt to curb the plight of unconstitutional changes of government in Africa, the African Union (AU) is in the process of empowering the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples’ Rights (African Court) to prosecute perpetrators of unconstitutional changes of government in member states. This study considers the prospects and challenges of such prosecution by the proposed African Court. The study first identifies the normative and institutional framework developed by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and later the AU to address unconstitutional changes of government in the continent. It then analyses the AU’s response to unconstitutional changes of government in member states, taking Guinea, The Comoros, Niger, Tunisia, Egypt and Libya as case studies. In doing so, it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the AU’s response to the changes in these countries, including the capability of the AU’s normative and institutional framework to address all forms of unconstitutional changes in the region. Most importantly, the study addresses the challenges and prospects of prosecuting unconstitutional changes of government by the proposed African Court and whether the Court would be able to overcome the short-comings identified in the case studies. It finally concludes and recommends based on the findings of the study.<br>Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2012.<br>gm2014<br>Centre for Human Rights<br>unrestricted

"First, this dissertation proposes to explore the practice of amnesties in dealing with violations of human rights vis-à-vis the obligation of states to punish and to prosecute gross violations of human rights and to guarantee effective remedies for victims. Secondly, it seeks to inquire, for purposes of meeting the first objective, into the validity of amnesties in international law with specific reference to the African Charter. Thirdly, on the strength of a selected case studies: South Africa and Moçambique, and informed by relevant jurisprudence drawn from the Inter-American human rights system and elsewhere, a critique informative of the recommendations as to how the African Court should deal with cases arising out of such amnesty situations will be attempted. Equally, similar reference will be made, albeit in an abridged way, to how amnesties could be dealt with at the political levels of the African Union (AU). Fourthly, the dissertation will inquire into why amnesties, which have been used to advance utilitarian ends of the communal good (national reconciliation) thereby ‘trumping individuals’ rights’, cannot at the same time, be so fashioned as to reconcile these especially relating to effective remedies for violations of human rights the amnesty seeks to address. Fifthly, in drawing on the foregoing, this study will, by way of recommendations, seek to outline criteria or conditionalities upon which amnesty should, if ever, be granted. ... The study consists of five chapters. Chapter one will provide the context in which the study is set. It highlights the basis and structure of the study. Chapter two endeavours to outline some of the basic concepts central to the study; amnesty, pardon as instruments of national reconciliation and the various avenues through which these has been effected in the past. In the main, the chapter attempts a problematisation of the concept of amnesty by which its validity and place in international law will be examined. Chapter three outlines the approaches to amnesty in South Africa and Moçambique and the countervailing state obligations to ensure rights protected in human rights instruments: to prosecute and punish violators and the rights of victims and their relatives to effective remedies. In the case of South Africa, the right to effective remedies is discussed within the context of the decision of the South African constitutional court in AZAPO. Chapter four attempts to grapple with the possibility of bringing a case before the African Court of Human Rights and how this case may, and should be decided in light of existing decisions of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and available comparative jurisprudence on the subject. Chapter five will consist of a summary of the presentation and the conclusions drawn from the entire study. It will also make some recommendations as to how amnesty should be dealt with both at political level (AU) and at the level of the African Court in relation to human rights violations. In furtherance of this, it attempts an outline of directive criteria that should be applied." -- Chapter 1.<br>Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa)) -- University of Pretoria, 2004.<br>http://www.chr.up.ac.za/academic_pro/llm1/dissertations.html<br>Centre for Human Rights<br>LLM

The purpose of the study is to determine the extent to which Benin’s Constitutional Court gives effect to the right to reparation under the African Charter and to examine relevant routes for the Court to discharge its duty fully and accurately. Ultimately, the study envisions suggesting Benin’s Constitutional Court a more genuine approach to the right to reparation with an emphasis on the content and scope of the right to reparation, competent remedial institutions and determination of the quantum in cases of monetary compensation.<br>Mini Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2007.<br>http://www.chr.up.ac.za/<br>Centre for Human Rights<br>LLM