Journal articles: 'Agency conflicts'

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Haslem, John A. "Mutual Fund Agency Conflicts." Journal of Index Investing 3, no. 2 (August 31, 2012): 12–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.3905/jii.2012.3.2.012.

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Putra, Wahyu Manuhara. "PENGARUH KONFLIK KEAGENAN TERHADAP CORPORATE GOVERNANCE DAN KINERJA PERUSAHAAN." MAKSIMUM 1, no. 2 (March 12, 2012): 109. http://dx.doi.org/10.26714/mki.1.2.2011.109-114.

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Abstract This study aimed to test whether the Corporate Governance associated the Agent- Conflicts This research Used exploratory principal components analysis and kanonikal analysis on 6 individual governance variables to get the 5 factors representing different dimensions of corporate governance and treasures the agent, conflict firms based on 7 agency conflict proxies used in the literature. Results of analysis found that Companies with greater agency conflict has a mechanism for better corporate governance, in particular that the low ownership structure has a high impact on institutional ownership. Overall the result support the theory that the existence and role of corporate governance mechanisms on firm is a function of agency Conflict in the company. Keyword : Agency Conflicts, Corporate Governance, exploratory principal components analysis, kanonikal analysis

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Douglas, Alan V. S. "Interactions between Corporate Agency Conflicts." Financial Review 44, no. 2 (May 2009): 151–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6288.2009.00214.x.

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Kumar, Praveen, and Alessandro Zattoni. "Agency Conflicts and Corporate Governance." Corporate Governance: An International Review 25, no. 4 (July 2017): 220–21. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/corg.12212.

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Morellec, Erwan, Boris Nikolov, and Norman Schürhoff. "Agency Conflicts around the World." Review of Financial Studies 31, no. 11 (February 28, 2018): 4232–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhy018.

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Morellec, Erwan, and Clifford W. Smith. "Agency Conflicts and Risk Management*." Review of Finance 11, no. 1 (January 1, 2007): 1–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rof/rfm001.

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SimanTov-Nachlieli, Ilanit, Nurit Shnabel, and Anael Mori-Hoffman. "Agents of Reconciliation." Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 43, no. 2 (December 8, 2016): 218–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0146167216678861.

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Conflicting parties experience threats to both their agency and morality, but the experience of agency-threat exerts more influence on their behavior, leading to relationship-destructive tendencies. Whereas high-commitment relationships facilitate constructive tendencies despite the conflict, we theorized that in low-commitment relationships, affirming the adversary’s agency is a prerequisite for facilitating more constructive tendencies. Focusing on sibling conflicts, Study 1 found that when commitment was low (rather than high), agency-affirmation increased participants’ constructive tendencies toward their brother/sister compared with a control/no-affirmation condition. A corresponding morality-affirmation did not affect participants’ tendencies. Study 2 replicated these results in workplace conflicts and further found that the positive effect of agency-affirmation in low-commitment relationships was mediated by participants’ wish to restore their morality. Study 3 induced a conflict between lab participants and manipulated their commitment. Again, in the low- (rather than high-) commitment condition, agency-affirmation increased participants’ wish to restore their morality, leading to constructive behavior.

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Romahi, Yazann S. "Agency Conflicts, Investment, and Asset Pricing." CFA Digest 38, no. 3 (August 2008): 13–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.2469/dig.v38.n3.6.

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ALBUQUERUE, RUI, and NENG WANG. "Agency Conflicts, Investment, and Asset Pricing." Journal of Finance 63, no. 1 (January 10, 2008): 1–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01309.x.

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Löffler, Clemens, Thomas Pfeiffer, and Georg Schneider. "The irreversibility effect and agency conflicts." Theory and Decision 74, no. 2 (October 3, 2012): 219–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-012-9331-6.

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Du Bois, Cind, Ralf Caers, Marc Jegers, Rein De Cooman, Sara De Gieter, and Roland Pepermans. "Agency conflicts between board and manager." Nonprofit Management and Leadership 20, no. 2 (December 2009): 165–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/nml.247.

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Federiuk, Carol S., and Kerth O'Brien. "Sources of Disagreement Among Public and Private Agency Paramedics." Prehospital and Disaster Medicine 10, no. 2 (June 1995): 92–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1049023x00041789.

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AbstractIntroduction:The purpose of the study was to document the occurrence and causes of disagreements between paramedics in a tiered-response emergency medical services (EMS) system.Methods:This cohort analysis of disagreements between paramedics sampled 63 male public agency, 90 male private agency, and 41 female private agency paramedics. Paramedics responded to Likert-type items and one open-ended item concerning the occurrence of conflict between paramedics.Results:On-scene conflict between EMS personnel from public and private agencies was reported by 70% of the respondents. Conflicts that interfered with patient care were reported to occur more frequently between paramedics from different types of agencies. The most commonly mentioned subject of disagreement was patient treatment, followed by patient transport, interpersonal and interagency conflicts, and patient assessment.Conclusion:A majority of paramedics have experienced on-scene disagreements with other paramedics. Disagreements occur more frequently between paramedics from different agencies and encompass a wide range of issues concerning patient care and interpersonal relationships.

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Matyas, David. "HUMANITARIAN ACCESS THROUGH AGENCY LAW IN NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 69, no. 2 (April 2020): 451–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020589320000020.

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AbstractIn many conflicts, aid organisations have to navigate the international humanitarian law requirement that parties to the conflict must consent to assistance. In non-international armed conflicts this often frustrates efforts to provide relief, as States refuse to grant consent in order to uphold their claims to sovereignty. Looking at the Syrian Civil War, this article suggests that the law of agency can offer a fresh perspective on the challenges posed by the requirement of consent to humanitarian assistance. It suggests that agency law can provide a legal explanation of seemingly political decisions and a de lege ferenda justification for assistance in instances where consent is either absent or provided by a non-State armed group.

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Riazanova, N. "Financial Management Tools in Corporate Agency Conflicts." Economic Herald of the Donbas, no. 2 (64) (2021): 129–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.12958/1817-3772-2021-2(64)-129-135.

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The article provides the substantiation of the concept of agency theory from the position of financial management in the direction of the agency problem that exists between agents and owners in view of diverse interests, dispersion of equity capital in corporate structures. The influence of internal agency conflicts on the financial results of the company's activity, their relation to the implementation of financial management tools is considered. Consequently, there is a need to systematize agency relations into horizontal and vertical, which together form a system of external and internal relations, and also complement the classification of agency contradictions in the direction of collisions of interests between the head office and branches, functional divisions of the corporation, the parent organization and subsidiaries. An increase in the role of financial levers and indicators based on the distribution of net, operating, reinvested profits in solving the agency problem allows not only to reveal the specific characteristics of the contradictions between the management and the owners of the corporation on the distribution of financial resources, to structure intracorporate interactions, to determine the nature of the negative financial consequences for the owners of the corporation, but and set the direction for the development of financial management tools to eliminate them. The theoretical aspects of corporate agency relations and related conflicts are supplemented, from the angle of the agency problem of managers and shareholders, the expansion of the subject perspective of the study of the problematic of tools in solving corporate agency conflicts. The development of theoretical ones is continued, it is presented in the essence of intra-corporate agency conflicts, financial management tools in their solution, substantiation and development of methods in the development of the concept of agency theory.

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Safiq, Muhammad``, and Liasari Liasari. "Uji Persamaan Simultan Free Cash Flow, Struktur Kepemilikan, Kebijakan Hutang, Kebijakan Dividen, dan Risiko dengan Kerangka Teori Keagenan dan Pensignalan." Jurnal STEI Ekonomi 29, no. 01 (February 25, 2021): 51–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.36406/jemi.v29i01.337.

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This study explores the use of simultaneous regression, this research aims to examine the interdependence relationship between free cash flow, debt policy, dividend policy, risk and structure of ownership in manufacturing companies in Indonesia. This research used six regression model to represent the interdependence relationship related to agency conflict and agency costs due to the difference in interest between agents (managers) and principals (managerial and institutional shareholders). Each regression model in this research is represent the conflicts of interest between the agent and the principal. This research extends Ismiyanti and Hanafi (2003). The result indicate an interdependence relationship between free cash flow, debt policy, and managerial ownership. This study also shows the effect of substitution between managerial ownership and debt policy in accordance with agency theory. It can be concluded that the managerial ownership may be able to reduce the use of debt in reducing agency conflicts between agents and principals.

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Pande, Anadi S., and Ranjan Kumar. "Implications of Indian Philosophy and Mind Management for Agency Conflicts and Leadership: A Conceptual Framework." IIM Kozhikode Society & Management Review 9, no. 1 (August 3, 2019): 34–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/2277975219858864.

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The unceasing stream of corporate scams and financial misdemeanours establish that agency conflicts are a stark reality of the contractual relationship between principals and agents. Agency theory identifies four sources of agency conflicts at the leadership level: moral hazard, earnings retention, risk aversion and time horizon. The theory proposes an outcome- and/or behaviour oriented mitigating mechanism based on agency costs. However, as the real-world evidence shows, these mechanisms have been only partially effective. In this context, the present study conducts a diagnosis of agency conflicts at the leadership level, trying to understand its origin, sources, mitigating mechanism and its limitations. The paper then takes a novel approach for bridging the gap between the current state of conflicts and the desired state of absence from conflicts, by examining Indian philosophical systems. It identifies the characteristics of Indian philosophy rooted in the Vedic wisdom as integrative, holistic, stressing on a direct experience of vision of the truth, emphasising practicality, and promoting the goal of self-realization through mind management. The paper then leverages the pithy aphorisms ( sutras) from Indian philosophical texts to develop a mind management framework as a tool to mitigate agency conflicts.

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Schneider, Georg, Andreas Scholze, and Fabian Meißner. "Asymmetric taxation, limited liability, and agency conflicts." Management Accounting Research 51 (June 2021): 100739. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mar.2021.100739.

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Brastow, Raymond, and Bennie Waller. "Dual Agency Representation: Incentive Conflicts or Efficiencies?" Journal of Real Estate Research 35, no. 2 (January 1, 2013): 199–222. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10835547.2013.12091358.

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ALBUQUERUE, RUI, and NENG WANG. "Agency Conflicts, Investment, and Asset Pricing: Erratum." Journal of Finance 70, no. 5 (September 3, 2015): 2347–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12307.

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Tan, Yingxian, and Zhaojun Yang. "Growth option, contingent capital and agency conflicts." International Review of Economics & Finance 51 (September 2017): 354–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2017.06.006.

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Pyo, Unyong, Yong Jae Shin, and Howard E. Thompson. "Reducing agency conflicts with target debt ratios." Journal of Economics and Finance 39, no. 3 (March 22, 2013): 431–53. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12197-013-9256-0.

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Hope, Ole-Kristian, John Christian Langli, and Wayne B. Thomas. "Agency conflicts and auditing in private firms." Accounting, Organizations and Society 37, no. 7 (October 2012): 500–517. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2012.06.002.

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Akhbar, Taufik. "Simultaneous Effect on Debt and Managerial Ownership: Agency Theory Framework." KINERJA 21, no. 2 (September 16, 2017): 201. http://dx.doi.org/10.24002/kinerja.v21i2.1276.

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This study aims to examine the debt policy and managerial ownership as tools to control the agency conflict. Debt policy and managerial ownership used in controlling agency conflicts have several considerations such as the risk of the company, the company's growth and the presence of institutional ownership in a company. The variables used in this study include earnings volatility as a measure of corporate risk, growth companies, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, debt policy, and total assets as a control. Furthermore, an analysis by means of regression models with simultaneous Two Stage Least Square method was used. The results found in this study stated that the risk factors, the growth of the company, as well as the existence of institutional ownership affect debt policy and managerial ownership control of the company within the framework of the agency conflict. This indicates that the use of policies to control the agency conflict must consider these three factors. Keywords: agency conflict, debt policy, managerial ownership

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Ariyono, Bagus Dwi, and Bowo Setiyono. "Does Institutional Ownership and Bank Monitoring Affect Agency Conflicts? Evidence from an Emerging Market." Journal of Indonesian Economy and Business 35, no. 3 (September 16, 2020): 171. http://dx.doi.org/10.22146/jieb.53110.

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Introduction/Main Objectives: This study examines the effect of institutional ownership, proxied by government and private ownership, and bank monitoring on agency conflicts. Background Problems: The previous literature focused on agency conflicts, particularly those between managers and shareholders in developed markets, with much less evidence being presented from emerging ones. Novelty: We consider the role of creditors (the banks) in mitigating agency conflicts, and the managers’ irresponsible behavior, which in previous studies has been largely under-elaborated. Research Methods: Using 1,525 observations of 305 non-financial companies that were listed in the 2011-2015 period, we employ the generalized least squares method to deal with potential econometric concern such as autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Finding/Results: We find that institutional ownership and bank monitoring, proxied by the number of banks and the share of their loans, are negatively related to agency conflicts. Conclusion: Banks and institutional ownership lead to lower agency conflicts. However, one should mitigate free-rider problems emanated from these relationships.

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Habbash, Murya. "Earnings management, audit committee effectiveness and the role of blockholders ownership: Evidence from UK large firms." Journal of Governance and Regulation 1, no. 4 (2012): 100–116. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/jgr_v1_i4_c1_p1.

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The existing literature documents that the quality of financial reporting is higher when firms have effective audit committees. However, recent studies find that audit committees are not effective in family firms where agency conflicts arise between controlling and non-controlling shareholders. This study extends the previous findings by investigating the effectiveness of audit committees in firms with similar agency conflicts when one owner obtains effective control of the firm. Compared to firms with a low level of block ownership, high-blockholder firms face less agency problems due to the separation of ownership and management, but more severe agency problems between controlling (blockholders) and non-controlling shareholders (minority shareholders). Using a unique hand-collected sample, this study tests the largest 350 UK firms for three years from 2005 to 2007, and shows that firms with effective audit committees have less earnings management. This study also documents that the monitoring effectiveness of audit committees is moderated in firms with high blockholder ownership. The results are not sensitive to the endogeneity test and hold for alternative specifications of both dependent and independent variables. Overall, these findings suggest that audit committees are ineffective in mitigating the majority-minority conflict compared to their effectiveness in reducing owners-managers conflicts. These conclusions, along with some recent similar evidence (e.g., Rose, 2009 and Guthrie and Sokolowsky, 2010), may raise doubts about the monitoring role of blockholders asserted by agency theorists and widely accepted in corporate governance literature.

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Zhou, Yuxun, Mohammad Mafizur Rahman, Rasheda Khanam, and Brad R. Taylor. "Alternative Method to Resolve the Principal–Principal Conflict—A New Perspective Based on Contract Theory and Negotiation." Mathematics 11, no. 2 (January 13, 2023): 442. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/math11020442.

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Liquidated damages mechanisms have been analyzed from a legal perspective and applied to real-world contracts. Due to the lack of application of LDs to common agency theory, this research explores whether the liquidated damages mechanism can resolve principal–principal conflicts under common agency. We combine the moral hazard model of common agency with non-cooperative dynamic game theory to analyze the influence of the liquidated damages mechanism on the agent and principals under the condition of complete information and incomplete information. We find that liquidated damages are the key factors affecting the optimal contract between the principal and agent. Since the agent does not terminate the current contract, a principal–principal conflict arises when another principal wishes to enter into a new contract with the common agent. We find that the agent terminates the existing contract and signs a new one with another principal. The injured party requires liquidated damages from the breaching party. Therefore, they will negotiate the number of liquidated damages. Liquidated damages cause the bargaining game to generate a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. We prove that only when liquidated damages belong to a specific interval does a mechanism generating the Pareto optimal solutions to solve the principal–principal conflicts under common agency exist. A common way to resolve this conflict is ensuring that the minority is subordinate to the majority. For the first time, we study how the liquidated damages mechanism solves multi-principal conflict. This is another perspective that can be used to solve the conflict. Therefore, our paper expands the method of resolving the conflict and extends the theory of common agency; we first show the delegation process. Our research can be applied to various situations and provide a rational decision-making basis for participants.

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Colbert, Janet L., and John S. Jahera, Jr. "The Role Of The Audit And Agency Theory." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 4, no. 2 (October 27, 2011): 7. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v4i2.6427.

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The audit function exists to monitor the activities of management and to attest to managements performance. The cost of the audit function is an example of an agency cost. This article discusses the role of the audit function within the context of agency relationships. Such relationships exist when one party is retained to act on behalf of and in the interest of another party. Given the natural preference to maximize ones own utility, conflicts are bound to arise. Knowledge of such potential conflicts can serve to reduce the cost of the resolution of these conflicts.

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Safiullah, Md. "Board governance, ownership structure and financing decisions in emerging market." Corporate Ownership and Control 13, no. 3 (2016): 355–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv13i3c2p8.

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This paper aims to contribute to the corporate governance literature by examining the effects of board governance and ownership structure on financing decisions in an emerging country context. Using hand collected corporate governance data from a panel sample of 110 publically-listed firms in Bangladesh over 2009-2012, this study finds that the corporate debt ratio is not related to standard board of directors mechanisms.The results indicate that board of directors play little role in resolving conflicts in an environment with the presence of strong principal-principal agency conflict. The study also finds no evidence of institutional investors’ activism in a manner that is consistent with the goals of other outside stockholders due to the weak regulatory and market discipline. This empirical evidence from the principal-principal agency conflicts (conflict of interest between majority shareholders and minority shareholders) offers insights to policy makers in emerging countries interested to protect minority shareholders’ rights and to ensure effective corporate governance of capital structure decisions.

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Gao, Xinzi, T. J. Wong, Lijun Xia, and Gwen Yu. "Network-Induced Agency Conflicts in Delegated Portfolio Management." Accounting Review 96, no. 1 (May 22, 2020): 171–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.2308/tar-2015-0422.

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ABSTRACT Social ties between mutual funds and the companies in which they invest (investees) can both facilitate information transfers and encourage favoritism. Using the investment choices of mutual funds in China, we compare investment performance of holdings in companies that are socially connected to mutual funds versus those that are not. We find that funds allocate more investment to connected investees' stocks, especially when a fund is weakly monitored. This overweighting is greater in times of poor investee performance, when the benefits of additional investment to the connected investees are high. Weakly monitored funds' preference for connected stocks hurts the returns of these funds, yielding a 6.6 percent lower annualized risk-adjusted return, relative to closely monitored funds. These results suggest that, absent sufficient monitoring, agency conflicts generated by social networks can dominate the information advantages of these networks. JEL Classifications: G10; G11; G14.

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Smovzhenko, T. S., and O. B. Denys. "AGENCY COSTS AS FINANCIAL GROUNDS OF CORPORATE CONFLICTS." Financial and credit activity: problems of theory and practice 2, no. 23 (December 30, 2017): 213–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.18371/fcaptp.v2i23.122718.

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Kim, Hwa‐Sung. "Investment Decisions, Debt Renegotiation Friction, and Agency Conflicts." International Review of Finance 20, no. 2 (July 2, 2018): 493–504. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/irfi.12208.

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Ben Ali, Chiraz. "Corporate Governance, Principal-Principal Agency Conflicts, And Disclosure." Journal of Applied Business Research (JABR) 30, no. 2 (February 27, 2014): 419. http://dx.doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v30i2.8412.

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<p>This study investigates the relation between corporate governance and disclosure quality in a context of principal-principal conflicts and poor investor protection. Overall, the empirical results suggest that minority expropriation risk harms disclosure quality. Specifically, we find that disclosure quality is negatively associated with ownership concentration, major shareholder voting rights, the existence of double voting rights, and family control. The results obtained also evidence a positive relationship between disclosure quality and the existence of executive stock option plans giving support that this mechanism plays a key role in corporate transparency.</p>

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Notko, Marianne, and Eija Sevón. "Conflicts in Family Relations, Children's Emotions and Agency." Children & Society 32, no. 1 (September 25, 2017): 61–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/chso.12227.

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Mauer, David C., and Sudipto Sarkar. "Real options, agency conflicts, and optimal capital structure." Journal of Banking & Finance 29, no. 6 (June 2005): 1405–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2004.05.036.

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Giat, Yahel, Steve T. Hackman, and Ajay Subramanian. "Investment under Uncertainty, Heterogeneous Beliefs, and Agency Conflicts." Review of Financial Studies 23, no. 4 (November 23, 2009): 1360–404. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhp096.

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Burkart, Mike, and Fausto Panunzi. "Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection." Journal of Financial Intermediation 15, no. 1 (January 2006): 1–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfi.2004.12.004.

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Teng, Min, and Toyohiko Hachiya. "Agency Problems and Stock Repurchases: Evidence from Japan." Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies 16, no. 03 (September 2013): 1350016. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0219091513500161.

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This paper examines stock repurchases from an agency perspective by identifying agency costs across three dimensions — interest conflicts and information asymmetry, managerial discretion, and the use of alternative mechanisms to mitigate agency conflicts. We use ownership structure as a proxy for interest conflicts and information asymmetry, employ cash balance and free cash flow as two measures of managerial discretion, and consider cash dividends and interest-bearing liabilities as alternative vehicles for distributing cash. We find that a monitoring structure motivates managers to mitigate agency costs through stock repurchases. Particularly, monitored firms with higher levels of cash balance prefer cash dividends to stock repurchases, whereas monitored firms with more cash dividends repurchase more shares because of their stronger incentive to mitigate agency costs. However, when firms have a very high level of dividends, they substitute stock repurchases for dividends to avoid a dividend cut in the future.

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Masullo, Juan. "Refusing to Cooperate with Armed Groups Civilian Agency and Civilian Noncooperation in Armed Conflicts." International Studies Review 23, no. 3 (January 9, 2021): 887–913. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/isr/viaa090.

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Abstract Conflict scholars have increasingly stressed the importance of taking civilian agency seriously for understanding how conflicts operate on the ground and the social legacies they leave behind. Among the different expressions of civilian agency that this scholarship has studied, instances in which civilians refuse to collaborate with armed groups have captured particular attention. While this development is to be praised, the proliferation of neighboring terms (e.g., “voice,” “autonomy,” “civil action,” “oppositional agency,” “resilience,” and “resistance”) menaces the further progression of this intellectually stimulating and policy relevant field of inquiry. In dialogue with the growing literature on civilian agency, and drawing on an established literature on concept formation, I propose civilian noncooperation as the root concept to capture these instances and specify its meaning by identifying both necessary and accompanying attributes. I discuss the advantages of this concept and assess it vis á vis alternative terms and conceptualizations. Finally, I illustrate how these conceptual foundations provide a more solid basis for empirical research by introducing a descriptive typology and a database of civilian noncooperation campaigns in the Colombian civil war. Research on noncooperation holds great potential to improving existing theories of conflict, as well as to inform crucial policy debates, including the protection of civilians, peace-building, and post-conflict reconstruction. Conceptual rigor is central to fulfilling this potential.

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Mishurova, Irina, Elena Panfilova, and O. Nesterova. "SPECIFICATION OF CORPORATE CONFLICTS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE "AGENCY THEORY"." Russian Journal of Management 8, no. 2 (September 23, 2020): 36–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.29039/2409-6024-2020-8-2-36-40.

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The article describes the specification of corporate conflicts from the position of the classic line of agency problem within the framework of the "Principal- Agent" model, and in the new line of agency model "Principal - Principal" between majority shareholders and minority shareholders, including shareholder interactions with stakeholders under the Principal-Stakeholders model and board interactions with stakeholders through Agent-Stakeholders, and interactions between company management, mid-level managers and employees within the Agency-Agent model, which makes it possible to classify different characteristics of corporate conflicts. The article clarifies the content and functional specifics of corporate conflicts (gnoseological function, diagnostic, procedural, preventive, predictive), which allows you to systematize the essential characteristics of corporate conflicts and determine the adaptability of the application of various methods and methods of their management taking into account the main stages of the life cycle of corporate conflicts (stage of emergence, development and completion).

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Lestari, D. Lili, and Mudjilah Rahayu. "Debt Policy, Institutional Ownership, Company Values, and Assets Utilization as Intervening Variables in Manufacturing Companies in Indonesia." Jurnal Manajemen Teori dan Terapan | Journal of Theory and Applied Management 11, no. 2 (November 29, 2018): 147. http://dx.doi.org/10.20473/jmtt.v11i2.10486.

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Separation of functions between owners and management creates agency conflicts where the manager's decision is not necessarily in line with the owner. The manager no longer prioritizes the interests of the owner over his personal interests. Management as an insider effectively controls the company and knows more information than the owner as an outsider. In Asian countries, there is a tendency for majority ownership to take control in management. So that the agency conflict that occurs is no longer pure between managers and capital owners, but between majority and minority shareholders. This management system allows for expropriation by majority shareholders against minorities. The control mechanism is needed to suppress agency conflicts that exist within the company so that shareholders remain prioritized over the manager's personal interests.This study uses a sample of 123 manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in 2013-2016. The results of the study show that debt has a significant negative effect on the utilization of assets and company value. While institutional ownership has a significant positive effect on asset utilization and company value.

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Imam Muhayat. "Efforts to Handle Conflict in Madrasah." EDUKASI : Jurnal Pendidikan Islam (e-Journal) 10, no. 1 (June 9, 2022): 119–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.54956/edukasi.v10i1.313.

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The purpose of this study is to explain in overcoming conflict in madrasas. The method used in this research is qualitative. The learning technique used is the study of the movement of the study room. The final result of the study confirms that there are several indicators of conflict that develop in madrasas. Conflict assets come from the different values and goals that develop from each agency and are not directed at communication. The forms or efforts to resolve conflicts that occur within the organization include: determining goals in overcoming organizational conflicts. Conflict control is achieved through mediators in getting closer to conflict actors and the use of accommodation methods. The effects of conflict can foster high-five college jobs even though many non-publics are now no longer helping college progress.

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Belén Lozano, Maria. "Agency problems in the public contracting context." Corporate Ownership and Control 5, no. 3 (2008): 9–14. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv5i3p1.

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This survey synthesizes the study of public contracts from an agency perspective, detecting possible inefficiencies in the contracting context between government and firms. In this sense, we offer a clear analysis framework in order to improve efficiency in contracting processes. To do this, we have divided this situation into two conflicts of interest. On the one hand, we have the conflict between citizens and the firm with which the services will be contracted (fundamentally when there is a divergence in the price determination) and, on the other hand, the difference in interests between citizens and public officials. This analysis from a managerial perspective allows us to delve more deeply into a topic scarcely treated in the literature: the relationship of firms to the public sector. It also allows us to reflect on the efficient (or inefficient) behavior which firms are subject to in the contracting process

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Iqbal, Amjad, Xianzhi Zhang, Muhammad Zubair Tauni, and Khalil Jebran. "Principal–principal agency conflicts, product market competition and corporate payout policy in China." Journal of Asia Business Studies 14, no. 3 (January 10, 2020): 265–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jabs-02-2018-0038.

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Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the interaction between competition and corporate payout policy and more specifically to answer the question that whether competition mitigates the principal–principal agency conflicts and influences firms to distribute dividends to shareholders in Chinese corporations. Design/methodology/approach This research models measures of competition with scaled measures of dividends and analyzes a sample of 16,730 firm-year observations from Chinese-listed manufacturing firms for the period spanning 2003 to 2016. Further, this research uses the Tobit model (a censored regression) to empirically test the proposed hypotheses. Findings This research finds that intense competition not only mitigates agency problems and forces firms to disgorge cash but also increases a firm’s likelihood to pay dividends and weakens the negative association between agency conflicts and dividends. Practical implications The results show an important policy implication for the industry. As the principal–principal agency conflict restrains the dividends, the regulatory authorities could encourage a competitive environment and a more diverse ownership structure to induce a higher dividend rate and protect the minority shareholders. In addition, this study also has implications for other emerging markets characterized by concentrated ownership and principal–principal agency problems. Originality/value This study adds to the literature related to the disciplinary role of competition and identifies competition as a significant determinant of corporate payout policy. Furthermore, this research extends earlier research on corporate payout decisions that besides firm-level corporate governance and country-level legal system, industry-level competition also influences corporate payout decisions, significantly.

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Mcgrail, Ewa. "“It's a Double-Edged Sword, this Technology Business”: Secondary English Teachers’ Perspectives on a Schoolwide Laptop Technology Initiative." Teachers College Record: The Voice of Scholarship in Education 108, no. 6 (June 2006): 1055–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/016146810610800601.

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In response to national technology mandates, schools across the United States have committed themselves to laptop technology programs as a way to encourage student-centered learning and critical thinking in collaborative classrooms. Most secondary English teachers in this study did not reject technology per se; rather, they saw some benefits of laptop technology in English instruction. Unfortunately, however, when asked to describe their overall experiences and attitudes toward technology, these teachers revealed a great deal of ambivalence about it in their instruction, especially in the context of a schoolwide laptop technology initiative. Four larger clusters of conflict contributed to this ambivalence: (1) conflicts surrounding institutional control in implementing the laptop program and teacher agency; (2) conflicts surrounding standardized testing's uncertain relationship with technology mandates; (3) conflicts surrounding technology uses in the general curriculum and technology allocation in specific class types; and (4) conflicts surrounding professional identity and the challenges that both student and teacher technology use brought to this identity. The study concludes that these teachers needed to be given greater agency in planning and implementing the laptop technology initiative and in revising their curriculum to embrace this new technology, and the necessary professional development to prepare them for such an educational innovation.

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Cisłak, Aleksandra. "Impact of Conflict Resolution Strategies on Perception of Agency, Communion and Power Roles Evaluation." Polish Psychological Bulletin 45, no. 4 (December 1, 2014): 426–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/ppb-2014-0052.

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Abstract Two experiments probed the role of strategies used in social conflicts on perception of agency and communion. In study 1, persons who revealed prosocial orientation were perceived as less agentic, but more communal than those who revealed competitive orientation. In study 2 these findings were replicated in the context of organizational conflict, those who decided to use confrontational strategies were also perceived as more agentic, although less communal than these who used cooperative strategies. In line with the theory of power effects on objectification of social targets, the perceived agency and communion were differently linked to superior’s and subordinate’s evaluation. While perceived agency predicted the subordinate’s evaluation, perceived communion predicted superior’s evaluation, but not the other way round. Moreover, perception of communion (but not agency) mediated the negative effect of confrontational strategies on supervisor’s evaluation. On the other hand, perceived agency suppressed the effect of strategies on subordinate’s evaluation.

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Spatt, Chester S. "Conflicts of Interest in Asset Management and Advising." Annual Review of Financial Economics 12, no. 1 (November 1, 2020): 217–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-110118-123113.

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This review addresses, from a unified perspective, the important role of conflicts of interest in various facets of asset management and advising, including managing individual portfolios, institutional asset management, and order routing. I use an agency framework to highlight the sources of the underlying incentive conflicts, the nature of efficient solutions, the role of the structure of compensation in mitigating (or creating) the agency problem, and the use of benchmarks as a solution. I also highlight several contemporary contexts in which conflicts of interest are important.

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Kronenburg García, Angela. "Territorial Conflicts, Agency and the Strategic Appropriation of Interventions in Kenya’s Southern Drylands." Sustainability 10, no. 11 (November 12, 2018): 4156. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su10114156.

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A number of scholars have noted that interventions, such as development programmes and climate change adaptation projects, that simplify complex social realities and thus lose sight of the relational dynamics beyond the target or beneficiary group, risk contributing to conflict. This article examines how a series of interventions in a particular dryland area in southern Kenya became embroiled in a long-running territorial conflict between the Loita Maasai (the beneficiary community) and their neighbours, the non-beneficiary Purko Maasai. Based on ethnographic research and by taking a historical perspective, it shows how Loita Maasai leaders systematically appropriated these outside interventions, used and reworked them with the strategic aim of stopping land loss to ongoing Purko encroachment. The analysis reveals two ways in which Loita leaders realized this: (a) by using interventions to stake out spatial claims to land; and (b) by capitalizing on the tendency of interventions to simplify local contexts. This article contributes to the debate on the linkages between intervention and conflict by highlighting the agency of intervention beneficiaries and showing that, through their actions, interventions may unwittingly reproduce and even aggravate existing conflicts.

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Banchita, Azilawati, Abdul Jabbar Abdullah, and Jati Kasuma Ali. "Agency Conflicts in Asean 5: Are the Conflicts Between Principal–Agent or Principal–Principal?" Advanced Science Letters 23, no. 9 (September 1, 2017): 8180–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1166/asl.2017.9857.

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Peng, Cheng, Huiling Zhou, and Huan Chang. "Real Option, Debt Agency Conflicts and Corporate Investment Decisions." Journal of Business Theory and Practice 7, no. 2 (April 26, 2019): p76. http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/jbtp.v7n2p76.

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This paper studies enterprise investment decisions under debt agency conflicts by the method of real option. It is different from the existed literatures that this paper considers not only the influence of investment goals alienation on investment decisions without bankruptcy agency, but also analyzes the investment decisions distortion under bankruptcy agency conflicts. The study result shows that enterprises with debt usually exist overinvestment; on the one hand, the overinvestment comes from excessive pursuing of the tax benefits under the investment goals alienation, on the other hand, it comes from the protection for shareholders’ investment risk under strategic default bankruptcy. What’s more, under the lower debt level, the former is the dominant mechanism for investment decisions distortion; while under the higher debt level, the influence of the later is prominent.

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Bhabra, Gurmeet Singh, and Chris Wood. "Agency conflicts and the wealth effects of proxy contests." Corporate Ownership and Control 12, no. 1 (2014): 8–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv12i1p1.

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We examine the shareholder wealth impact of proxy contests and find that over the three years preceding the contest, target stock prices significantly underperform their industry peers. In addition, consistent with the monitoring role of proxy contests, the announcement and full contest periods result in a positive stock price reaction suggesting that the market views the initiation of a proxy contest as good news. Interesting differences emerge between firms in which dissidents win seats and those where they do not win seats. While target firm stock prices appreciate for all firms at the announcement, such wealth gains are permanent only for the subsample of targets which not only are afflicted with elevated levels of agency problems but also make significant reduction in discretionary expenditures. When dissidents do not win seats, no attempt to reduce agency costs is apparent, and as a result, these firms experience a sustained wealth loss over the years surrounding the contest. The steps taken to reduce agency costs primarily in firms in which dissidents win seats suggests that proxy contests fulfil their intended role of disciplining the board and improve firm performance.

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Journal articles on the topic 'Agency conflicts'

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