To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Agency problem.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Agency problem'
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the top 50 dissertations / theses for your research on the topic 'Agency problem.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Browse dissertations / theses on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.
1
Trzeciakiewicz, Agnieszka. "Essays on information asymmetry, agency problem, and corporate actions." Thesis, University of Hull, 2014. http://hydra.hull.ac.uk/resources/hull:10593.
Full textAbstract:
This study investigates the implications of the asymmetric information between managers and shareholders and the resulting costly agency problems. In doing so, it focuses on the heterogeneity of executive directors with respect to their trading behaviour and personal characteristics, and the corporate governance mechanisms which can help lessen the adverse effects of the manager-shareholder agency conflicts. The study recognises that executive directors cannot be treated as a homogenous group and their incentives and the ability to impact decisions differ significantly. Two top executive directors are considered throughout this study, namely Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Chief Finance Officers (CFOs). In this study, we address several important research questions. First, we consider whether executive directors have an informational advantage over outsiders. Second, we address if the heterogeneity of directors with respect to their role in the company and personal characteristics matters. Third, we examine whether internal corporate governance mechanisms play a significant role in moderating the manager-shareholder agency problem. Last but not least, we investigate if the nature of the interactions between asymmetric information, agency issues and corporate governance change during and after the global financial crisis of 2007-08. In carrying out our empirical analysis, we employ a unique dataset on the UK nonfinancial firms during the sample period 2000 to 2010. The detailed information about the corporate governance structure of firms and the personal characteristics of CEOs and CFOs enable us to carry out a comprehensive analysis of the research questions outlined above for three distinct periods, namely the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis periods. Our analysis shows that the position that directors hold in the company and their characteristics can help explain the subsequent market-adjusted returns on insider trading. We find that the returns to insider purchase transactions are generally positive. However, they are weaker in the longer term, possibly suggesting that the informative content of director trades is less significant than it is perceived by the market. The main finding of our analysis in relation to the link between insider trading and the probability of bankruptcy is that insider trading increases the predictive power of insolvency models. This study also reports that CEOs exert a greater influence on the leverage decision than CFOs in firms that seem to operate under their optimal leverage. However, we observe that the CFO’s characteristics become more significant in determining leverage after the recent financial crisis. Overall, the analysis of this study provides strong evidence for the view that the presence of asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders and the costly manager-shareholder agency conflict are central to our understanding of the corporate finance decision making process and its consequences. However, more importantly, the findings of this study provide a relatively new notion that considering the heterogeneity of top executive directors in the empirical analysis of corporate decisions is essential, especially in exploring modern corporations.
2
Holcomb, Nathan A. "The free will problem : from source to solution." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2003. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.289023.
Full text
3
Cargnello, Davide P. "The Problem of Agency and the concept of Action An Essay on Ethics and Agency in German Idealism." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2008. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.503953.
Full text
4
Chen, Xuanjuan. "Three essays on stock selection ability and agency problem of mutual funds /." View online ; access limited to URI, 2005. http://0-wwwlib.umi.com.helin.uri.edu/dissertations/dlnow/3186899.
Full text
5
Beaudoin, Cathy A. Agoglia Chris Tsakumis George T. "Earnings management : the role of the agency problem and corporate social responsibility /." Philadelphia, Pa. : Drexel University, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/1860/2805.
Full text
6
Hausknost, Daniel. "The limits to change : liberal democracy and the problem of political agency." Thesis, Keele University, 2011. http://eprints.keele.ac.uk/3832/.
Full textAbstract:
This thesis explores the limits to purposive change in liberal democracies. Its aim is to provide new analytical tools and concepts to understand better the basis of liberal democracy’s legitimacy, the mechanisms and limitations of political agency at work in it, and the ways in which societal change is delimited and channelled in what is today the most dominant form of political order. The thesis contains three conceptual innovations. The first concerns the nature of liberal democracy, which is shown to involve an ‘epistemic’ dimension of legitimacy on which the system’s stability relies. This explanatory account of legitimacy argues that in a modern democracy the paradoxical relation of the people to itself as both ruler and ruled can only be stabilised when both sides of the equation refer to the same ‘independent’ reality – a reality that has to be generated outside their precarious relationship and hence (for example) in the capitalist market economy. The second innovation regards an analytical distinction between three fundamental ‘modes’ of political agency – decision, choice and solution – whose deployment is strictly controlled by the systemic requirements of ‘epistemic legitimacy’. The result is shown to be an ‘agentic deadlock’ in liberal democracy, which inhibits purposive societal change. The third innovation concerns the very idea of ‘change’ itself. Based on Wittgenstein’s notion of grammar a concept of transformation is developed, which allows us to account for the subtle and long-term changes in the discursive structure of liberal-democratic societies. After comparing these conceptual innovations with the dominant aggregative, deliberative and radical approaches to democratic theory, the thesis concludes with a suggestion for an institutional innovation that might help break the agentic deadlock in liberal democracy.
7
Carson, Siri Granum. "The Fact of Reason : A linguistic-pragmatic approach to the Free Agency Problem." Doctoral thesis, Norges teknisk-naturvitenskapelige universitet, Filosofisk institutt, 2008. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:no:ntnu:diva-5181.
Full text
8
Luo, Haowen. "Is 100 Percent Debt Optimal? Three Essays on Aggressive Capital Structure and Myth of Negative Book Equity Firms." Thesis, University of North Texas, 2016. https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc862869/.
Full textAbstract:
This dissertation comprises of three related essays in regard of puzzling negative book equity phenomenon among U.S. public firms. In essay 1, I present the evidence that there is an increasing trend of negative book equity firms over the past 50 years, from 0.3% up to over 5% among publicly traded firms in US. In contrast to previous research which generally classify these firms as distressed firms with highly likelihood of bankruptcy, I propose a new method to separate Healthy Negative Book Equity Firms (HNBEF) from relatively more distressed negative book equity firms. The results show that HNBEF have much higher net income and interest coverage ratio, they survive longer, and pay more dividends. More interestingly, these firms are often actively increase share repurchases and debt issuance. These facts, combined with their strong profitability, indicate that managers of these firms are actively increasing their leverage and choose to be negative book equity firms.
To explain the existence of HNBEF, in essay 2, I investigate several possible reasons that may contribute to the extreme leverage of these firms. I find that HNBEF are substantially undervalued by their book assets as stated on the balance sheet. In addition, the value of intangible assets, especially those off-balance sheet intangible assets, is positively related to the probability of becoming HNBEF. Moreover, I find that characteristics of intangible assets and firms also play important role on existence of HNBEF. Specifically, I find that both liquidity and redeployability of intangible assets are positively related with the probability of becoming HNBEF. Also, firms associated with closer borrower-lender relationship are more likely to become HNBEF.
To investigate if the aggressive capital structure adopted by HNBEF is optimal, in essay 3, I performed several tests to analyze how these firms differ from other firms in terms of operating performance, corporate governance and firm value. My research finds that compared to firms from same industry and with similar size, managers of HNBEF invest more heavily in their own firms, and HNBEF have better corporate governance. In addition, HNBEF are associated with better operating performance and higher value.
9
Sarenfält, Elin, and Palmqvist Anneli Larsson. "Skatteverket : Praktiska problem i kontrollerna av företag." Thesis, Mälardalens högskola, Akademin för ekonomi, samhälle och teknik, 2014. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:mdh:diva-25270.
Full textAbstract:
Uppsatsen avser att undersöka hur Skatteverkets kontroller av företagare går till praktiskt. Utifrån detta ska uppsatsen utreda vilka problem som finns i det praktiska arbetet som Skatteverket gör i de olika kontrollformerna. Studien bygger på en kvalitativ metod vilken valts för att få en djupare förståelse för studieämnet. Det empiriska materialet till studien har samlats in med hjälp av intervjuer med sammanlagt fem handläggare på Skatteverket. Material till den teoretiska referensramen har inhämtats från relevant litteratur och sökningar i databaser. Studien har kommit fram till att det finns problem i det praktiska arbetet med skattekontroll, som exempelvis svårighet att få in bokföring och att få svar på förfrågningar. De problem som framkommit i studien har en koppling till Skatteverkets bemötande av företagen samt företagarens beteende. Sambandet mellan bemötande och beteende har i studien analyserats med hjälp av en modell.The paper aims to investigate how the Tax Agency inspect business owners. Based on this, the essay will examine the problems involved in the practical work with various forms of control. The study is based on a qualitative approach which was chosen in order to gain a deeper understanding of the study subject. The empirical data for the study were collected through interviews with a total of five officers at the Tax Agency. Material for the theoretical framework has been obtained through database searches and literature. The study has concluded that there are problems in the practical work of the tax Agency, such as the difficulty to get accounts, and to obtain answers to queries. The problems identified in the study are connected to how the Tax Agency treat companies and also to corporate behavior. The relationship between attitude and behavior in the study were analyzed using amodel.
10
Condon, James Joseph. "Playing with lives theatricality, self-staging, and the problem of agency in Renaissance English revenge tragedy /." Diss., [Riverside, Calif.] : University of California, Riverside, 2009. http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?index=0&did=1957417671&SrchMode=2&sid=1&Fmt=2&VInst=PROD&VType=PQD&RQT=309&VName=PQD&TS=1269383638&clientId=48051.
Full textAbstract:
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, Riverside, 2009.Includes abstract. Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Title from first page of PDF file (viewed March 23, 2010). Includes bibliographical references (p. 193-202). Also issued in print.
11
Lin, Yu-ting, and 林宥廷. "The Agency Problem of Family Firms." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/29536874017751206937.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立高雄第一科技大學
會計資訊研究所
102
According to the research of the past, the types of firms are controlled over the family in Asian countries, so this study aims to explore the relevance of the family firms, agency problems and firm performance. This study aims to the agency costs between family and non-family firms, and to further explore the impact of a variety of oversight mechanisms of corporate governance on agency problems, and whether effective oversight mechanism can reduce the agency costs of debt or equity to enhance corporate value. The results indicate that when family involved in the management of the firm business, the traditional agency problem relatively non-family firms is low, and family firms through of unlisted companies can maintain then their control stake increase the degree of equity deviation. In the agency costs of debt, the family firms have low debt agency costs. But the agency costs of debt will increase when family actively participate in family business management.In the firm performance, the family firms have higher business performance, relatively non-family firms. Finally. The different governance mechanisms can effectively reduce the cost of different agency problems, and also help to improve corporate value.
12
Chang, Ya-Fang, and 張雅芳. "The Agency Problem of Financial Consultant." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/29673169399859475227.
Full textAbstract:
碩士靜宜大學
管理碩士在職專班
99
Taiwans 2010 GDP as high as 16,432 dollars, Peoples’ wealth is getting accumulative and low interest rate, People are no longer keep their deposit in the banks. The banks are no longer earn profit by interest spread, but developing wealth management center. We can see the VIP Banking Center, Platinum Wealth Management Center, everywhere in TAIWAN’s banks, the actual reflecting financial institutions are no longer unilateral act provides funding needs and those providers of communication between the bridge more to change the thinking, looking for the market all possible investment opportunities. Provide customers with tailor-made professional management consulting services and planning asset allocation, investing to create profit for customers, bank fee income increased. But the investment environment will fluctuations by economic situation . financial events occurred in recent years such as: the 1997 Asian financial crisis, 2000 .com bubble, 2008 Lehman Brothers caused the global financial crisis, let us consider the VIP Banking Centers are good managers to make the obligation to pursue the best profit for customers or not, and thus allow us to think about financial professionals on the agency in the implementation of financial business problems.
13
李宜臻. "Agency Problem and Earning Response Coefficient." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/63594626043260696476.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立彰化師範大學
商業教育學系
100
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impacts of agency problem on earning response coefficient. There are much traditional agency problem and core agency problem in Taiwan’s company. This study obtains sample companies from 2006 to 2010, and we take samples for four groups by agency problem to understand how agency problem influence earning quality. Our findings suggest that agency problems decrease the earning respond coefficient, and core agency problems have a greater impact than traditional agency problems.
14
Chang, I.-fan, and 張亦凡. "CORE AGENCY PROBLEM AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE." Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/54820703468814203096.
Full textAbstract:
碩士大同大學
事業經營學系(所)
101
Taiwan enterprises generate a series of crises, it is include financial crisis and poor management of the companies in each industry. When enterprises have a financial crisis or operating difficulties, the impact is not only enterprise itself but also affect the social, contains the upstream and downstream of industry will suffer the impact and generate the operating difficulties, also investors and creditors will be affected. Not only domestic enterprise generate many financial reporting false cases, and foreign enterprises as well, we also find the management and system loopholes in the corporate governance mechanism, for these loopholes in the companies have in common. In the pyramid structure, when cash flow rights and voting rights are more diverge, the agency problems will be more serious. Our study was discussed the corporate that used pyramid structure, the controlling shareholder will get too much private interests, therefore, we must to discuss that whether the controlling shareholder will tend to their own interest to allocate the corporate resources or not. The study also discusses, when controlling shareholder use the debt financing as a motivational incentive that are engaged in different types of expropriation active. While manager in order to avoid their shareholding be diluted, so we need to increase the debt level to increase the voting rights, that is why our study worth to discussing. When the corporate value increasing and the agency problems will generate, the debts in the pyramid structure, whether it has enough potential as a restraint mechanisms, as well as the leverage differences between pyramid structure corporate and non- pyramid structure corporate, whether its purpose is to reduce the tax. The generate risk profile when the subsidiary of the pyramid structure corporate lending from external creditors, it’s also part of our study need to discuss. Our study used data mainly from the listing of Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) financial databases, corporate governance database and ownership structure database, the study sample observation period 1996-2012, data are annual data, a total of 17,901 samples. Therefore, the increase in debt due to the company's stock market capitalization decreased, so using the pyramid structure or greater divergence of control rights and cash flow rights, the company's share price is lower. This research found that when companies use the pyramid structure or part of the family business, compared to not using pyramid structure or does not belong to the family business of the company, debt levels low. The higher the proportion tangibility, the debt of company will become more. When company’s profitability become better, the debt will become less, the more profitable of the company, it can use its ability to pay the expense. The market to book value of the enterprise's debt levels had no influence. Because of LSALES regression coefficient, showing a significant positive correlation, that is, the larger the company, the higher the debt ratio.
15
LIN, CHIA-YIN, and 林嘉音. "The Analysis of Circular Agency Problem." Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/4sw833.
Full textAbstract:
碩士朝陽科技大學
會計系
106
The agency problem has produced many issues that are worth discussing, but agency problem result from the fact that everyone is maximizing their own interests and asymmetric information. Many studies have been discussed and mechanisms have been developed for improvement. This paper will discuss the issues of circular agency. Because of the evolution of the transaction, a company's board of directors, external shareholders, and managers, they also acted as principals and agents at the same time, and this phenomenon has thus formed an interlocking relationship. This study found in the circular agency that the decision of the board of directors to determine the non-distribution of dividends under the second best solution will help expand the company’s scale of operation and the manager’s minimum wage, the rate of performance pay, effort, reputation, good financial information report and funds invested by external shareholders. When three participants - the board of directors, external shareholders, and managers - are all willing to participate, a circular agent will occur, so they will also be consistent with the company’s strategy of sustainable management. In this study, the topic of collusion was discussed under the circular agent to illustrate that when two of the three participants collude with each other and act as an agent under the relationship with another principal.
16
"Agency problem of corporate real estate holdings." 2008. http://library.cuhk.edu.hk/record=b5896860.
Full textAbstract:
Ko, Iat Meng.Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2008.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 53-55).
Abstracts in English and Chinese.
Abstract --- p.i
Acknowledgement --- p.iii
Chapter 1 --- Introduction --- p.1
Chapter 2 --- Research Method --- p.6
Chapter 2.1 --- Corporate Real Estate Holding Measures --- p.6
Chapter 2.2 --- Free Cash Flow Measure --- p.6
Chapter 2.3 --- Corporate Governance Measures --- p.9
Chapter 2.3.1 --- Outside Blockholder Ownership --- p.10
Chapter 2.3.2 --- CEO Compensation --- p.10
Chapter 2.4 --- Merger and Acquisition Effect --- p.11
Chapter 2.5 --- The Endogeneity Problem of Acquisition --- p.13
Chapter 3 --- The Data --- p.16
Chapter 4 --- Empirical Results --- p.19
Chapter 4.1 --- Free Cash Flow and Corporate Governance --- p.19
Chapter 4.2 --- M&A Effect --- p.20
Chapter 4.3 --- Self-Selection Correction --- p.21
Chapter 4.3.1 --- Estimating the Probability of Acquisition´ؤ Probit Estimation --- p.22
Chapter 4.3.2 --- Self-Selection Model --- p.23
Chapter 4.4 --- Effects of Target Firms --- p.24
Chapter 4.5 --- Changes in Profitability Around Acquisition --- p.25
Chapter 4.6 --- Sub-samples --- p.26
Chapter 4.6.1 --- Free Cash Flow and Corporate Governance --- p.27
Chapter 4.6.2 --- M&A Effect --- p.28
Chapter 4.6.3 --- Self-Selection Correction --- p.28
Chapter 4.6.4 --- Effects of Target Firms --- p.29
Chapter 4.6.5 --- Changes in Profitability Around Acquisition --- p.29
Chapter 5 --- Conclusion --- p.51
Bibliography --- p.53
17
"Dictatorship, agency problem and fall of dynasty." 2014. http://repository.lib.cuhk.edu.hk/en/item/cuhk-1291290.
Full textAbstract:
Zhao, Hao.Thesis M.Phil. Chinese University of Hong Kong 2014.
Includes bibliographical references (leaves 28-31).
Abstracts also in Chinese.
Title from PDF title page (viewed on 15, September, 2016).
18
Chang, Hao-feng, and 張皓楓. "Gender and Agency Problem on Managerial Performance." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/50966704372815349486.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立交通大學
經營管理研究所
102
Research of gender difference on firm performance has been reviewed, and evidence is found to prove women CEO lead the firm to better performance. However, gender gap in promotion opportunities and compensation remains unsolved. This research breakthrough regression method and use SEM to provide a view from unobservable cost, agency cost, to discuss gender difference by using S&P1000 data from 1992-2013 in Execucomp. It is found that comparing with male CEOs, female CEOs have higher firm performance with the same amount of spending on three different types of agency costs: bonding expenditure, monitoring expenditure, and residual loss. The implication of this study is that women compensation has been underestimated for the effort they pay.
19
CHIOU, LENG-YA, and 邱稜雅. "Banking Relationship, Agency Problem and Investment Risk." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/30811753435001615323.
Full textAbstract:
碩士銘傳大學
風險管理與保險學系碩士在職專班
104
Whether a company’s investment risk increases because it executes helpless investment as money readily available under closely banking relationship? Whether the association between banking relationship and investment risk exacerbates because of the company's severe agency problem? We use the proportion of a company's bank loans on total debt and banking number which a bank contacts to present banking relationship. The investment-cash flow sensitivity and over-investment are on behalf of the investment risk respectively. Agency problems are indicated by the dual of chief executive officer and controlling stockholder as well as the deviation of the control rights and cash flow rights. We find that the bank relationship will effect the imvestment risk positively. The company's agency problem will enhencethe positive relationship between abundant bank funds and investment risk, as the result of lacking oversights on managers.
20
Peng, Jane-Jane, and 彭珍珍. "Managerial Agency Problem and Incremental Capital Structure Decision." Thesis, 2001. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/90785626317453561946.
Full textAbstract:
碩士靜宜大學
企業管理學系
89
The purpose of this study is to investigate how the managers of Taiwan stock-listed company face the agency problems in financing selection. This study was designed further to examine weather the financing selection bring any stockholder’s wealth effect and what influential variables affect it. This study adapts Moral Hazard Theory (Jensen, 1986; Zwiebel, 1996), Adverse Selection Theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) and Static Trade-Off Theory to examine the hypothesis respectively. The methodology for analyzing financing selections used Logistic Regression, for the stockholder’s wealth effect assessed by Event Study and Cross-sectional Analysis. The sample is the event of Taiwan stock-listed company, which announce equity offerings or corporate bond issue from 1996 to 1999. There is a total of 360 samples. The empirical results show that, financing selection of the managers consistent with “Moral Hazard Theory” and “Static Trade-Off Theory”. However, “Adverse Selection Theory” have a converse conclusion. Furthermore, we find the stockholder’s wealth effect of financing selections (equity offerings and corporate bond issue) did not reach a significant level. Moreover, we found that the “announcement effect”, based on the Adverse Selection Theory, was partly significant in the variables of reflecting the market.
21
Cheng, Ming-Chou, and 鄭明州. "Empirical Studies of Agency Problem and Corporate Performance." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/69238902757838326898.
Full textAbstract:
碩士清雲科技大學
國際企業管理研究所
98
This thesis selected 133 Taiwan listed companies ever having financial crisis between 2000 and 2008 and the same amount normally operating ones with the similar assets scale and in the same industry in that time, compared with the former , and furthermore, investigated which one(s) of the selected six indicators- financial structure, liquidity ability, operational performance, profitability, cash flow and corporate governance- is or are more useful to predict the corporate performance regarding to(with) the agency problem (here we focused on whether the director of board and general manager was the same one) by Lagit regression analysis. We found that on the one hand, if the ownership and management was the same one, liquidity ability, profitability and cash flow were the more useful indicators to predict the corporate performance and creditors got more guarantee with increased interest coverage ratio; on the other hand, if the ownership and management was not the same one, financial structure, operational performance, profitability, cash flow and corporate governance were the more useful indicators to predict the corporate performance and the avoidance of changing accountants enhanced the ability of external control and corporate governance to improve corporate performance. Overall, the empirical value and management implications of the thesis are for agency problem, corporate governance, financial forecasting and corporate performance.
22
Huang, Hsing-Hua, and 黃星華. "Capital Structure and Agency Problem－Contingent Claim Approach." Thesis, 2001. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/55405860482227298167.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立政治大學
金融學系
89
Based on Merton(1974) and Leland(1994), we construct a continuous- time capital structure model with subordinated debt. Quantitative results may serve the guidance of financial policy of the firm. Both endogenous bankruptcy and risk shifting behaviors are the agency problems between the equityholders and debtholders. Based on our model, the agency problems is considered and the agency costs are calculated. From the result of simulation, endogenous bankruptcy agency cost is small but sensitive to the volatility of unlevered asset value of the firm. Under renegotiation-proof, the senior debt is harmed by the issuance of the subordinated debt in our model. The risk premium of the subordinate debt is higher than that of the senior debt is confirmed by the model, however, when the firm is near bankruptcy, the behavior of "high risk high return" of both debts is reversed. The reason for the junk bond behavior may be explained as the negative effect of risk premiums due to the increase of the probability of bankruptcy is higher than the positive effect of the greater risk caused by higher volatility.
23
Hung, Chia-Sui, and 洪嘉穗. "A Study of Core Agency Problem in Taiwan." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/92892859319818432621.
Full textAbstract:
碩士淡江大學
會計學系碩士在職專班
104
The study is to survey the core agent problem of listed companies and over-the-counter companies in Taiwan, and to examine whether there are differences between the factors in affecting core agent problems under different controls of enterprises. Due to the specificities of ownership structure and the operations of family business in Taiwan, the pyramidal structure and cross shareholdings are utilized to control shareholders with strengthened predominance, and as well as the outer forces are employed to control the board of trustees, making deviations of control and the authorities of surplus distribution by direct management participation. To evaluate the magnitudes of encroachment of wealth of small shareholders by shareholders, the deviations of shares of control and authorities of surplus distribution are calculated, and to evaluate the strengths of encroachment effects and business incentives of shareholders, the deviations of seats control and authorities of surplus distribution are estimated. The results represent that enterprises with different types of control, the scales of enterprise, and industries would affect the magnitudes of deviation. Professional managers without family controls gives the greatest degree of deviation, and the same appearances would also be emerged in poor corporate performance, electronics industry, and listed companies; the larger the scale of company, the larger the degree of deviation. Furthermore, to compare with the enterprises without family control, the deviations of the surplus of shares and seats of family enterprises are low; it insinuates that family enterprises possess the utmost business incentives to eliminate agent conflicts. On the other hand, the deviation would be expanded when complicated reinvestment approaches such as pyramidal structure or cross shareholdings are utilized, manipulating the shareholders to jeopardize the interests of small shareholders via the spurs of self-interest incentives and making companies fall down in business performance eventually; the business performance is negative correlated to the seat control of the deviation of authorities of surplus distribution in family-control enterprises. There are 64.17% of family-control enterprises in the entire samples of study, it reveals that the ownership and franchise are over concentrated and as well as the manipulations of the seats of the board of trustees are usually adopted to intensify the controls of shareholders to accord cost effectiveness, which represents voting rights. The consequences demonstrate the relationships between the control of business decision of shareholders and the investments are low. On the other hand, different regulations are merely based upon the differentiation of listed companies and over-the-counter companies, or distinctions of industries by the supervision mechanism of domestic authorities, the study recommends that the supervision mechanism could be established by the basis of the degree of dispersion of equity, to prevent the losses of small shareholders and enterprises from the captures of shareholders with their self-interests.
24
Tremblay, Ginette. "Self-interpretation and agency in Shakespeare's problem plays." Thèse, 2012. http://constellation.uqac.ca/2610/1/030430409.pdf.
Full textAbstract:
Self-interpretation - the way human agents define themselves through a language of articulacy - is what my paper is about. I want to suggest, through a reading of Measure for Measure, All's Well That Ends Well, and Troilus and Cressida, that Shakespearean characters articulate their identities by being oriented toward what they contemplate as the higher good. My purpose is to demonstrate how Isabella, Bertram, and Hector's definitions of themselves influence their decisions and thus their actions. In the light of Charles Taylor's writings linking self-interpretation and ethics, I will examine the development of each character's identity in terms of what she or he considers as the ultimate life, more specifically and respectively the life of a virgin, the life of a soldier, and the life of a proud and famous leader. For Taylor, self-interpretation is shaped by the pursuit of a certain good deemed higher than the others. I also specifically draw on Mustapha Fahmi's particular views proposing that self-interpretation is one of the underlying conditions of agency in Shakespeare. Fahmi affirms that Shakespeare's characters are self-interpreting subjects; the way they define themselves is the scaffolding upon which their identity is constructed. Agents such as Isabella, Bertram, and Hector seem to act out of a certain assurance that the good they strive for is not only worthier and higher than all others, but more likely to lead them to happiness. All three characters have the capacity to make evaluations based on distinctions of worth.
Les personnages de Shakespeare sont des sujets auto-interprétateurs, c'est-à-dire que la façon dont ils se définissent est l'échafaudage sur lequel est construite leur identité1. L'auto-interprétation, définie par Mustapha Fahmi comme étant la manière par laquelle l'agent se donne sens à travers un langage d'expressions riches, est le sujet de mon mémoire. C'est en prenant appui sur les écrits de Mustapha Fahmi sur l'auto-interprétation que sera examiné le développement identitaire de Isabella de Measure for Measure, de Bertram de All's Well that Ends Well et de Hector de Troilus and Cressida. J'aurai aussi recours aux recherches du philosophe Charles Taylor pour sa vision particulière qui lie F auto-interprétation et l'éthique. Pour Taylor, l'auto-interprétation est façonnée par la poursuite d'un « bien » estimé supérieur aux autres. Or, la capacité à évaluer des biens est le critère sous-jacent de l'agentivité dans les oeuvres de Shakespeare. Comme nous pourrons le voir dans les trois pièces ci-haut mentionnées, Isabella, Bertram et Hector sont des agents dans le sens où ils agissent selon certains critères à savoir que le bien qu'ils poursuivent est non seulement supérieur aux autres biens, mais aussi enclin à les mener vers le bonheur.
25
Lu, Shangshiou, and 呂尚修. "Agency Problem, Underwriters Reputation And Underpricing Of IPOs." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/24001030770932339660.
Full textAbstract:
碩士靜宜大學
會計學系
100
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationships among corporate agency problem and Underwriters Reputation on initial public offering （hereafter IPO） underpricing. The research is targeted to the IPO in Taiwan from 2005 to 2010 and we explore traditional agency problems which separation of business and ownership in the Jensen and Meckling (1976) and core agency problems which controlling shareholder exploited the interests of minority shareholders in the La Porta et al (1999). The empirical results confirmed that when the company exists in two kinds of agency problems at the same time, the agency problem significantly increase the IPO underpricing. In addition, this paper also finds that the company exists in two kinds of agency problems, when the company commissioned by the reputation of the better underwriters underwriting, it can reduce the information asymmetry between external investors and internal operators, and then reducing the IPO underpricing that the two kinds of agency problems increased. In conclusion, we find the important factor when the company exists in two kinds of agency problems at the same time to affect the IPO underpricing and when the company commissioned by the reputation of the better underwriters underwriting, it can reduce the IPO underpricing that the two kinds of agency problems increased.
26
Chang, Wei-Hsien, and 張巍獻. "Board Structure, Core Agency Problem and Earnings Management." Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/86161574051213179767.
Full textAbstract:
博士逢甲大學
商學博士學位學程
101
The purpose of this paper is to examine the relation of board structure as well as core agency problem on earnings management in Taiwan listed companies during 2002-2011 to investigate. The ownership of listed companies are generally controlled and concentrated by controlling shareholders, core agency problems will be easily formed caused by incentive predatory towards minority shareholders; Moreover, managers will use earnings management behavior to encroach on the rights of minority shareholders while planning to meet the earnings benchmarks. For board structure, a company would recruit more board members or appoint more independent directors in the Board of Directors to help fortify the structure of the board. Thus, this study will discuss about whether the board structure and core agency problem would affect the managers’ behavior on earnings management. This study indicates the managers will reduce the manipulation to accruals earnings management, but they still perform real earnings management to cross the threshold of earnings. From the perspective on the deviation between controlling rights and cash flow rights increases for the controlling shareholders, managers will increase significantly on participating earnings management because the bigger the board size is, the more core agency problems exist. Increased the number of members for the board will improve the fiscal oversight abilities in the Board of Directors, and other shareholders with higher cash flow rights in the same company also prefer to strengthen the same competence for controlling shareholders. Over all, the managers will decrease the behaviors of earnings management. Further, according to aspects of the increasing deviation between controlling seats and cash flow rights for controlling shareholders, managers will reduce significantly on participating earnings management since the stronger board independence is, the lower core agency problems turn out. However, controlling shareholders still have the voting rights to make the list of independent directors; the core agency problem won’t be decreased. After that, the managers will still perform the manipulation to real earnings management because of more independent directors in the Board of Directors. Overall, this research is aimed to provide a line of discussion on how the strengthening of corporate governance depends on the monitoring effect from the board structure. However, the relevant agencies of Taiwan probably need to make more efforts on the independent directors’ abilities to expand the capacity of existing programs and services.
27
Chen, Yu-Lin, and 陳裕霖. "Central Agency Problem，Institutional Investor and Information Disclosure." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/38607552894870124450.
Full textAbstract:
碩士大葉大學
企業管理學系碩士班
103
ABSTRACT This study explores the relationship between the central agency problem and the disclosure of information, and also investigates that the role of institutional investors and their interaction effect with central agency problem. The research period covers from year 2005 to 2010 for all Taiwanese listed companies. Data source is derived from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database and governmental "Listed Companies Information Disclosure Evaluation" system. The empirical results show that those companies with serious central agency problem have no significant relationship with their responding degree of information disclosure. However, institutional investors did play a role for supervising information disclosure. The institutional ownership is positively related with information disclosure. Furthermore, this study examines the interaction effect of the central agency problem. The evidence shows that the supervisory power of institutional investors is not strong yet. This finding may imply that institutional ownership is not high enough in Taiwan, unable to reverse the insignificant relationship between agency problem and information disclosure. Key Words:Central agency problem, Institutional Investor, Information Disclosure
28
Horng, Kong-feng, and 洪國峰. "On the decision of risky investment with agency problem." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/57938632588557486521.
Full textAbstract:
碩士朝陽科技大學
財務金融系碩士班
94
This paper will investigate the problem that a risk aversive manager invariably invest in riskless projects when making decisions. But the principle will not willing to see it due to preferring the project with positive net present value to riskless projects. To solve this equity-agent problem, principle will design a contract to induce manager to choose the best project, and hence diminish the agency problem. Here we will take the study of Lambert (1986) as a base, and separate the agency problem into two parts. By using the game theory analysis, we are going to discuss the problem that how the principle designs the contract, and how the manager makes the decision when facing the contract.
29
Liu, Jai-Chun, and 劉家昌. "The Relation Between the Callable Bond and Agency Problem." Thesis, 1997. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/79147408068989037526.
Full text
30
Chen, Chun-tsung, and 陳俊宗. "The relation between central agency problem and earnings management." Thesis, 2004. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/13369923277220325186.
Full text
31
Chen, Yen-yu, and 陳衍佑. "Agency Problem, Investment Cash Flow Sensitivity and Information Asymmetry." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/77895575250363654080.
Full textAbstract:
碩士靜宜大學
會計學系研究所
98
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationships among corporate agency problem, information asymmetry and investment cash flow sensitivity. Our findings suggest that agency problems increase the degree of investment cash flow sensitivity, and core agency problems have a greater impact than traditional agency problems. In addition, this paper also finds that companies with greater transparency will decrease the degree of investment cash flow sensitivity arising from agency problems by reducing information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. In sum, this is consistent with the findings of Pawlina and Renneboog (2005) and Wei and Zhang (2008). Besides, we find that the core agency problems are the key determinant of the investment-cash flow sensitivity, which is our major contribution in the literature.
32
Chang, Yin-Yu, and 張吟羽. "Conservatism, assets impairment, and the agency problem of ownership." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/52717136885731570150.
Full textAbstract:
碩士東吳大學
會計學系
94
This study use the “earnings-return” model that Basu arise in 1997 to measure the conservatism of corporations. Beginning from Conservatism, search out whether conservatism will affect the money amount of assets impairment losses that the company recognized. Then from the contracting explanations and the shareholder litigation, explore the relationship between the agency problem of ownership and conservatism. Our study samples are on listed companies in the end of 2003, excluding the finance and insurance industry. We use the Basu model to estimate each company’s conservatism in 2003, as the basis to decide the level of the sample company’s conservatism, to study the money amount of assets impairment losses. And use each company’s 3 years data from 2001-2003 to estimate its agency cost of ownership in order to compare their conservatism level. According to the results of our study, we find after the SFAS No.35, if the conservatism level of the company is higher, it will recognize higher money amount of assets impairment. We infer this is because the special nature of the high conservatism companies is “the verification requirement to recognize bad news is lower so that the reaction is faster”, so they will recognize more assets impairment losses after the SFAS No.35. Then, we find if the company’s agency problem of ownership is higher, its conservatism will be lower, but this result doesn’t have the obvious evidence to support it. The first contribution of our study is to offer a basis for financial statement users to evaluate the quality of financial information that provided by companies. We find if the company’s agency problem of ownership is lower, its conservatism will be higher, then its assets value report will be more reliable. But if the company’s agency problem of ownership is higher, its conservatism will be lower, then its assets value report will be less reliable. So when reading financial statements, users should take the relationship among the company’s agency problem of ownership, conservatism and assets impairment into consideration. The second contribution of our study is to provide the financial reporting standard setters and regulators to evaluate the influence of the announcement of the SFAS No.35.
33
Wu, Chia-Ming, and 吳家銘. "Corporate Social Responsibility and Earnings Management: Signalling or Agency Problem." Thesis, 2012. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/m39985.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立臺北科技大學
經營管理系碩士班
100
Besides the social responsibility enterprises assuming, what other motivations the enterprises have to assume the corporate social responsibility (CSR) secretly? Previous studies point out that enterprises could manage earnings through CSR activities and hence lead the agency problem occur. On the other hand, scholars also indicate that the earnings management(EM) could be a signal in order to decrease the information asymmetry. For the most part of prior researches, they adopt dummy variable to be a proxy of CSR, and there is no research to analyze the earnings announced by enterprises through Benford’s law. According to these, our study uses the CSR performance to instead the dummy to analyze the relation between CSR and earnings management. Furthermore, we also explore the interrelation between CSR and EM by directly examining the digital distribution of the firm-specific earnings with Benford’s law to confirm the information contents of CSR and EM. In addition, our study separates earnings management into three kinds of motivation which are earnings smoothing, earnings aggressiveness, and earnings losses avoidance, and investigates the relation between CSR and the three kinds of earnings management motivation including agency problem causing, signaling or both based on agency theory and signalling theory. Our results show that CSR performance has significant positive relation with earnings management and corporate has all three kinds of motive to manage earnings. These means that managers may manipulate earnings through CSR activities and these earnings management behaviors not only signal transmission but also causing agency problem. Our results find the reason why managers increased the CSR performance to provide the supervisors to make regulations to restrain the earnings manipulation of managers and hence make sure the implementation effect of corporate governance.
34
Cheng, Chia-yi, and 鄭佳怡. "Empirical study of relationship between agency problem and financial policy." Thesis, 2006. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/85438498380070946721.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立雲林科技大學
財務金融系碩士班
94
The agency problem between managers and stockholders has been examined intensively. Most studies use insider’s ownership as proxy for potential agency problem. However, especially in Asia, the family type business and cross-shareholdings have make insiders to control and entrench outside stockholder’s interest by less ownership. In this study, we utilize three kinds of measures of ownership divergence to observe the potential agency problem. The three measures include (1) the divergence of ownership and cash flow right, (2) the divergence of voting right and cash flow right, (3) the divergence of voting right and ownership. There are several findings. First, the higher degree divergence of ownership/voting right between cash flow right, the higher debt ratio. Second, the higher degree of three measures of ownership divergence, the higher cash dividend. Third, the higher degree divergence of ownership/voting right between cash flow right, the higher stock dividend payout ratio.
35
Hsu, Lin-Huang, and 許琳凰. "Investigating Central Agency Problem by Second-Order Earning Management Model." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/59511425417481918453.
Full textAbstract:
碩士逢甲大學
會計所
98
Previous studies ignore information dimensions and decision making property when discussion the relationship between earning management and agency problem. In this studies use second-order conversion earning management index which include two information dimensions and the views of investor to discussion agency problem. The result shows that 1) second-order conversion earning management index has more structure than previous studies that use one dimension earning management index.2) traditional agency problem has change to central agency problem and exist in Taiwan capital market.
36
Hsu, Cheng I., and 徐政義. "The Public Disclosure by Securities Information Agencies and Agency Problem." Thesis, 1993. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/37522187432987610527.
Full text
37
Shih, Huang-Wei, and 施鍠瑋. "The Factors of Foreclosure and Agency Problem for Mortgage Loan." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/92098125896799321874.
Full textAbstract:
碩士朝陽科技大學
財務金融系碩士班
99
The Real Estate broker and Land Administration Agent play a crucial role in mortgage loan market. The loans originated from real estate broker always have a certain favor that financial institutions give, just like higher loan amount, lower spread or less/no document. In order to make the transactions completely or search for the loans for customers successfully, Do they just simply transfer the default risk to financial institutions, and lead to the agency problem occurred, or they will make a initial selection about the customers for financial institutions to reduce the further default risk? This study accounts for the bad loan loss and spread with the factors like distribution channel, income(finance) certification..., with Multiple Regression Model and finds out the bad loan loss will be the most that loans originated from real estate broker or land administration agent but the least spread they have. Generally, as we know higher risk asset should comply with higher risk premium, but over competition leads to pricing distortion in Taiwan. The financial institutions have to review the distribution channel of customers., evaluate their credits separately and develop the best contract to lower the risk of past-due loan occurred.
38
柯慧鈺. "The Empirical Study of Agency Problem 、Information Disclosure and Information Efficiency." Thesis, 2014. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/x4yfrq.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立彰化師範大學
財務金融技術學系
102
The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of agency problem on company's capital investment efficiency. This study obtains samples from 2005 to 2012 of stock listed companies in Taiwan, we examine that whether traditional agency problem and core agency problem affect company's capital investment efficiency. Our findings suggest core agency problems have the impact on company's capital investment efficiency. The traditional agency problem is not significantly affected. In addition, this study uses the results as dummy variable that Securites &; Futures set up Institute Information Disclosure and Transparency Ranking System (IDTRS).this research also finds companies with greater transparency will decrease the degree of core agency problem affect capital investment efficiency.
39
Chen, Hsiu-Chin, and 陳秀景. "Independent Director, Agency Problem and Credit Risk Models：Evidence on Group Company." Thesis, 2013. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/24499727412186212449.
Full textAbstract:
碩士健行科技大學
國際企業管理研究所
102
Abstract This study takes the listed and over-the-counter (OTC) companies which had credit risks in group companies during 2000 to 2012 as samples, and uses logistic regression statistics to construct a group companies credit risk model. Considering agency problem, this paper hopes to provide this predictive model for outside investors, financial institutions and related creditors to predict the probability of financial risks before they occur, so as to reduce the financial risk losses and achieve early warning and risk management. In empirical analysis, the 28 financial indicator variables and 4 corporate governance variables are analyzed by K-S test, M-U test and logistic regression, so as to determine the significant variables influencing the company performance. The empirical result suggests when the ownership and management right are unified, the primary variables influencing the company performance include debt paying ability, operational capacity, profitability and corporate governance index. The forecast accuracy rate in the first three years is 95.2%, 92.9% and 95.2% respectively. This paper suggests that increasing the current ratio, time interest earned ratio, accounts receivable turnover, fixed asset turnover, rate of operating margin and net profit after taxation can improve the business solvency, operational capacity and profitability. Setting independent directors and supervisors as early as possible can enhance the corporate governance capability, so as to improve the company performance. In terms of empirical value and managerial implications, the group companies should set independent directors and supervisors as early as possible, pay attention to insider supervision, and reduce the agency problem, so as to enhance the corporate governance capability and reduce the probability of corporate credit risks.
40
BO-DA, Chen, and 陳柏達. "Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance, Core Agency Problem and Earnings Management." Thesis, 2015. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/44353932174555821173.
Full textAbstract:
碩士真理大學
經濟學系財經碩士班
103
This article will be divided into the core agency problem, equity agency problem problems.The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationship between agency problem and earnings management behavior, whether has been affected by D&O insurance, and use the information of Taiwan-listed companies during 2008-2012. Also discussed through the supervisory role of the Board of Directors properties under different managers and controlling shareholders arising under insurance D&O Insurance whether it will make this an oversight effect is reduced or improved. The empirical results show that there are insurance D&O insurance sample companies, the companies under the supervision of insurance companies can effectively solve the problems caused by the core agent. Agents from equity agent problem, the empirical results D&O Insurance will reduce the liability of Directors and Managers, and thus they are possible to neglect the corporate governance responsibilities for their own interests, and have a higher incentive to engage in earnings management. Finally, the board characteristics, size of the company's board of directors found that the participants downward earnings management; while chairman concurrently general manager, chairman may lose its oversight function, thus increasing earnings management behavior manager; however external directors and supervisors seats the ratio of the impact on earnings management is not significant.
41
Chiang, Yeh-Tang, and 江葉通. "The Impact of Agency Problem and Board Structure on Corporate Performance." Thesis, 2017. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/zkxd3w.
Full textAbstract:
碩士大葉大學
管理學院碩士在職專班
105
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of agency problem and board structure on corporate performance. The sample of the study consists of public cement companies in Taiwan for the period from 2008 to 2015. The main feature of this study is that we divide agency problem into core agency problem and equity agency problem, and we explore the relation between corporate governance and corporate performance. Overall, this paper expects to explain corporate governance can reduce agency problem and the efficient corporate governance can increase corporate performance. The empirical results indicate as follows: First, managerial ownership is positively related to corporate performance and hence supports convergence-of-interest hypothesis. Second, as controlling right deviates from cash flow right, corporate performance is getting worse, that is, core agency problems become more serious in the firm. Finally, the number of board directors, chairman served CEO and the ratio of busy independent directors have negative relationship with corporate performance, but the ratio of independent directors have positive relationship with corporate performance.
42
張峻挺. "A Study on Family Enterprise, Executive Agency Problem and Corporate Diversification." Thesis, 2016. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/41999910510149192135.
Full text
43
Lin, Ya-Chiung, and 林雅瓊. "The relation between central agency problem ， financial statement and earnings management." Thesis, 2008. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/20191263187910407808.
Full textAbstract:
碩士元智大學
管理研究所
96
In recent years， there are more and more phenomena of enterprise fraudulence and misappropriation which result from the non-transparency of the enterprise information. However， Taiwan economy is in turmoil because the supervision of Taiwan government and the execution of management of the company are obviously insufficient， and inquiring into its reason ， it might be central agency and the behavior of earnings management. Therefore this article is to study the corporate governance (traditional agency and central agency) and earnings management of the listed company in Taiwan from 1997 to 2006 ， further to study the impact of the quality of financial statement on earnings management， and to get a more complete research. So Taiwan government and the enterprise can put great emphasis on corporate governance and help the government enterprise to set up the mechanism to avoid the principal to harm other investors’ rights because of the personal interest. The research discovers the following results: 1. In traditional agency， pledged share ratio and family holding ratio are significantly negative related to enterprise value and earnings management. Managerial stockholdings and block holder stock holding ratio are significantly positive related to enterprise value and earnings management. 2. In central agency， the higher Deviation Rate between cash flow and voting rights， there are negative entrenchment effects when stockholders do not coincide in interest. The higher Deviation Rate between control stockholder rights and cash flow， the more degree the control stockholder exploit minor stockholder 3. Times of financial restatement， and auditors opinion are significantly negative related to earnings management. 4. the mediating effect of financial statement quality
44
Dong, Cheng Hsiu, and 鄭修棟. "Equity-connected Investment Trust-The Agency Problem of Mutual Fund Investment." Thesis, 2003. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/58081583451343687295.
Full textAbstract:
碩士輔仁大學
管理學研究所
91
In the past, U.S. mutual fund gives people a healthier and sound image compared to Wall Street’s financial institution. Unfortunately, this situation has been changed due to constant financial scandals happened last year which brought SEC’s high attention to closely monitor on it.Taiwan has similar situation in recent years. A research regarding Taiwan stock ownership structure indicates that family members are the central control in decision making in most of the stocks. Based on this theory, the purpose of this research is to study if above stated situation result to investment fund agency problem which damages the benefits of the public stock holders/investor. This research covers the period from Jan 01 2001 until Dec., 31, 2001 contains four parts. The first step is to analysis the structure of Taiwan equity connected Investment Trust. Next step is to survey the relationship between the board member of investment fund and the public stocks. Based on the method brought up by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1999), the next step is to get the controlling shareholders of firm to calculate their cash flow rights which is a foundation to observe the equity-connected fund and equity-disconnected fund buy and sell the stock monthly revenue.The final stage is to verify if investors are affected by agency problem based on equity connected issues. Research indicated that regardless investment trust exists the equity-connected relationship, revenue performance should not be affected significantly. However, individual equity-connected fund does come up with poor performance by the equity-connected stock. More research points out that equity-connected investment trust utilize some better funds as coverage to attract finance support for investors to buy the equity-connected stock in order to help equity-connected shareholders selling their stocks faster and easier. Bottom line is above activity leads to the result of poor (CI, CF) performance and public investors are the biggest victim in this war.
45
Chiang, Chang-Chia, and 江長佳. "Central Agency Problem, Share Collateralization, and the Timing of Share Repurchases." Thesis, 2010. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/60316847463380867524.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立高雄應用科技大學
商務經營研究所
98
Previous study had investigated the motivations of share repurchase and the effect of share price after repurchase announcement, but none of study about share repurchased timing measures. This study focuses on timing of share repurchase in Taiwan’s listed companies. Besides, according to the regulation which the board of directors decides whether repurchase shares or not. This study analyzes how central agency problem and shares collateralized affect timing of share repurchases. This study collects research data from 2001 to 2008 and adopts event study method, four factors model and regression model. The empirical results indicate that there is negative relation between share prices and repurchase volume. When share prices worse, the company will repurchase share more volumes. It means that companies have timing of share repurchases. This study also analyze the central agency problem, the relationship of collateralized shares and repurchase timing through the relative repurchase price and relative cost of repurchase share. This study found that when company has more serious central agency problem or higher proportion of collateralized shares, they will have the significantly relative high cost in company repurchase share and have the negative effect in repurchase stock. Furthermore, companies usually raise the share price through share repurchase when there is high proportion of collateralized shares.
46
Lo, Lin-Chen, and 羅琳珍. "An Empirical Study of Family Firms, Agency Problem and Corporate Performance." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/34074499826619425710.
Full textAbstract:
碩士清雲科技大學
國際企業管理研究所
99
After 2008 financial tsunami crisis, financial order reorganization and industrial change are emerging everywhere in the world. The companies with bad corporation constitution not only tend to have financial crisis but also have the danger of delisting and bankruptcy which brings huge impact to the society. If we can construct some financial prediction model with statistics, those supervisors of the listed companies can earlier find the warnings of the financial crisis, and investors and related business owners can make proper investment decision with the financial prediction model. This research samples are the listed companies of TSE from 2000 to 2009 and have occurred financial crisis. Using Binary Logit regression analysis to identify family and non family firms significantly improve corporate performance variables. The results of this research are as follows: The key variables to predict family firms corporate performanc are financial structure, solvency, management ability, profitability, cash flow and company governance indicators; CEO duality should be avoided, hiring professional managers, the implementation of corporate governance, increase corporate competitiveness, and to improve corporate performance. Liability ratio should be increased to improve the financial structure, to increase cash flow can improve the company solvency, management ability and earning ability, reducing the likelihood of financial distress. The key variables to predict non family firms performance are debt-paying ability and profitability; non family firms should raise the interest cover ratio to enhance the debt-paying ability of the company to protect their debtors. Moderately reduce the ratio of internal reserves to increase corporate profitability and corporate performance. The empirical value and management implications of this paper is the family firms should be implemented corporate governance, reduce the agency problems and improve company performance.
47
Shih, Yu-Pei, and 施妤佩. "The Relationship between Collateralized Shares, Central Agency Problem and Earnings Management." Thesis, 2011. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/63163510619468605371.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立中正大學
會計與資訊科技研究所
99
This study investigates the relationship between collateralized shares, central agency problem and earnings management. The data we need is form TEJ database. And our sample is the listed company at stock exchange market in Taiwan from 2005 to 2009. We analyze the correlation between collateralized shares rate and the deviation of ownership and control right and the result indicates that there’s a positive relationship between them. We further investigate the relationship between the deviation of ownership and control right, collateralized shares rate and earnings management. The result indicates that there’s an inverse relationship between earnings management and the deviation of ownership and control right. And there is no relationship between earnings management and collateralized shares.
48
Yuo-Chen, Shen, and 沈攸貞. "Agency Problem and the Occurrence of Negative Corporate Social Responsibility Events." Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/r88s9z.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立雲林科技大學
會計系
106
This study examines the influence of controlling shareholders’ divergence of control rights and cash flow rights on the occurrence of negative corporate social responsibility events. Note that high divergence of control rights and cash flow rights will deteriorate a firm’s corporate governance, which in turn, result in internal control weakness. If the occurrence of negative corporate social responsibility events signals a firm’s poor effectiveness of internal control, it is expected that high divergence of control rights and cash flow rights will be positively associated with the occurrence of negative corporate social responsibility events. The empirical result shows that, as conjectured, controlling shareholders’ divergence of control rights and cash flow rights is positively associated with the occurrence of negative corporate social responsibility events. This result suggests that agency conflict between large and minority shareholders indeed weakens a firm’s corporate governance and/or effectiveness of internal control and supports the predatory hypothesis of controlling shareholders. The study examines several sensitivity tests and reveals the empirical results are robust to various specifications.
49
Chen, Yi-Wen, and 陳依雯. "The Effects of Financing Decision on Information Asymmetry and Agency Problem." Thesis, 2018. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/7m3tdn.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立臺灣科技大學
企業管理系
106
This study is the effects of financing decision on information asymmetry and agency problem. The information asymmetry is formed through the principal component. The free cash flow is used as the variable of the agency problem. Using the ordinary least square method and panel data to analyze 33 companies from 2010 to 2016. The conclusion of this study are as follows:1.The level of information asymmetry is positively related to the level of debt financing when firms have financing deficit, that is, financing decisions tend to use debt financing when firms have the higher level of information asymmetry.2.The level of agency problem is negatively related to the level of debt financing when firms have financing deficit, t hat is, financing decisions tend to reduce debt financing when firms have the higher level of agency problem.3.Considering information asymmetry and agency problem, the agency problem can explain the financing decision better than information asymmetry.
50
Ni, Chia-Sheng, and 倪家聲. "Agency Problem, Membership Welfare, and Financial Transparency: Credit Unions of the U.S." Thesis, 2005. http://ndltd.ncl.edu.tw/handle/42030122209068324759.
Full textAbstract:
碩士國立臺北大學
合作經濟學系
93
Due to the accounting fraud of Enron, much of the earnings management (EM) research focus on profit organizations. Do non-profit organizations also exist any dishonesty? We examine the Credit Unions of the U.S. The paper first discusses that as credit unions add unrelated groups and expand, the prospects for separation between ownership and control increase, creating potential agency problems. We finds that agency problems grow as credit union add membership and members. Second, we studies three kinds of EM: earnings losses avoidance, earnings aggressiveness, and earnings smoothing. We find agency problems may exacerbate EM and thus insiders (managers) will engage in higher extent of EM to mask their rent-seeking activities from outsiders (members). This paper examines the relationship between the agency problem, membership welfare, and financial transparency of credit unions. Financial data are available from NCUA (National Credit Union Administration) custom report data base for 61,541 cu (credit union) -years between 1994 and 2003. And we find that the higher level of agency problem, the higher level of EM and the lower level of financial transparency. But managers may promote member’s welfare by way of earnings smoothing.