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Journal articles on the topic 'Agency problem'

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Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 30 January 2023

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1

Stróżyńska, Agnieszka. "The use of derivatives and agency problem." Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego Finanse, Rynki Finansowe, Ubezpieczenia 2015, no. 74/1 (April 30, 2015): 565–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.18276/frfu.2015.74/1-49.

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2

Halpern, Philip. "ERISA and the Agency Problem." Journal of Investing 2, no. 3 (August 31, 1993): 7–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.3905/joi.2.3.7.

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3

Berkich, Don. "The Problem of Original Agency." Southwest Philosophy Review 33, no. 1 (2017): 75–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/swphilreview20173318.

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4

Wall, Edmund. "The Problem of Group Agency." Philosophical Forum 31, no. 2 (June 2000): 187–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/0031-806x.00035.

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5

Tyson, Scott A. "The Agency Problem Underlying Repression." Journal of Politics 80, no. 4 (October 2018): 1297–310. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/698887.

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Aguilar Grieder, Hilda. "Problemas de ley aplicable en el marco de un contrato internacional de agencia comercial: comentario a la sentencia de la Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona (Sección 11ª) de 3 de julio de 2019 = Law applicable problems in the frame of international agency agreements: comments about the judgement issued by the Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona on 3 July 2019." CUADERNOS DE DERECHO TRANSNACIONAL 12, no. 1 (March 5, 2020): 435. http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/cdt.2020.5196.

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Resumen: El presente trabajo estudia un problema de Derecho aplicable susceptible de plantearse en el marco de los contratos internacionales de agencia comercial.Palabras clave: Unión Europea, Derecho internacional privado, Derecho aplicable, contratos internacionales de agencia comercial.Abstract: This study analyses a law applicable problem which arises in the frame of some international agency agreements.Keywords: European Union, Private International Law, Law applicable, international agency agreements.

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7

Otáhal, Tomáš. "The Agency Problem in New Institutional Economics." Politická ekonomie 57, no. 5 (October 1, 2009): 677–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.18267/j.polek.704.

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Aguilar Grieder, Hilda. "Sumisión de las partes a los tribunales belgas en el marco de un contrato internacional de agencia comercial: comentario a la sentencia de la Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona (Sección 1ª) de 21 de diciembre de 2018 = Submission of the parts to the Belgien tribunals about the international agency agreements: comments about the judgement issued by the Audiencia Provincial de Barcelona on 21 December 2018." CUADERNOS DE DERECHO TRANSNACIONAL 11, no. 2 (October 1, 2019): 380. http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/cdt.2019.4966.

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Resumen: El presente estudio analiza un problema frecuente de competencial judicial internacional que se plantea en el marco de los contratos internacionales de agencia comercial.Palabras clave: Unión Europea, Derecho Internacional Privado, competencia judicial internacional, sumisión expresa, contratos internacionales de agencia comercial.Abstract: This study analyses an international jurisdiction problem which arises frecuently in the frame of international agency agreements.Keywords: European Union, Private International Law, international jurisdiction, jurisdiction clauses, international agency agreements.

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9

SA’DIYAH, MAHMUDATUS, and NURUL HUDA. "STRATEGI PENANGANAN AGENCY PROBLEM PADA PEMBIAYAAN MUDHARABAH DI BMT." JEBI (Jurnal Ekonomi dan Bisnis Islam) 3, no. 2 (December 3, 2018): 171. http://dx.doi.org/10.15548/jebi.v3i2.176.

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Mudharabah financing is demanded by the transparency of both parties. If one of the parties, especially customers, does not transparently communicate matters related to yield, adverse selection activities can occur and moral hazard is an asymmetric information problem that causes agency problems. Agency problems in mudharabah financing need to be sought to solve the problem so that the owners of capital (shahibul mal / principal) and business actors (mudarib / agents) both benefit in fostering and capturing business partners. This study aims to 1) find out the agency problem that arises in the mudharabah financing scheme in BMT in Jepara Regency, 2) find an effective solution strategy from agency problems in mudharabah financing in BMT in Jepara Regency. This study uses a qualitative approach. Data collection with interviews, observations and documentation. Data analysis techniques use data reduction, data displays and conclusion drawing/verification. Agency The problem that arises in the financing of Mudharobah in the Jepara Regency BMT is that it comes from BMT as an agency, that is, it has not fully utilized management, besides that it is caused by moral standards, financing aspects, technical aspects, and efficiency issues. Effective problem solving strategies of agency problems in Mudharobah financing in BMT in Jepara Regency are project screening, screening mudhorib, compliance with shahibul maal and mundharib on sharia rules in mudaraba contracts.

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10

Geiler, Philipp, and Luc Renneboog. "Managerial Compensation: Agency Solution or Problem?" Journal of Corporate Law Studies 11, no. 1 (April 2011): 99–138. http://dx.doi.org/10.5235/147359711795344136.

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11

Sydie, R. A., and Margaret S. Archer. "Being Human: The Problem of Agency." Canadian Journal of Sociology / Cahiers canadiens de sociologie 27, no. 4 (2002): 585. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3341594.

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12

Himmelstrand, Ulf, and Margaret S. Archer. "Being Human: The Problem of Agency." Contemporary Sociology 31, no. 3 (May 2002): 359. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/3089723.

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13

Hartini, Hartini. "AGENCY PROBLEM PADA SAAT RIGHT ISSUE." Media Riset Bisnis & Manajemen 1, no. 2 (October 25, 2020): 171–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.25105/mrbm.v1i2.8063.

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Agency Problem is a potential confict interest between shareholders and manag- ers. Managers are agents of shareholders, they will take corporate actions that maximize their own utility, such as right issue, they made a right issue announce- ment because they require much money to make an investment or to expand the firm. These actions will not necessarily be consistent with firm value maximization. The shareholders want the fund to be paid as dividends. Theoretically, right issue announcement will be met with a negative shareholders reaction, which mean the stock price will decrease after the announcement of rightissue. The objective of this research is to verify empirically the existence of agency problem when right issue announcement. This research examines 63 firms that made right issue announce- ment. In the other hand, this research also examines 20 firms from banking sector made right issue announcement in Jakarta Stock Exchange during 1998 to June 2001. The analysis method is using Market Model, that apply to estimate the stock performances are market return, stock return, beta, alpha, abnormal retum and cumulative abnormal retum. Overall, the results of this research indicate that agency problem haven't happened when right issue announcement, because there are no significant differences statistically among cumulative abnomal retum before and after right issue announcement.

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14

Archer, Margaret. "Realism and the Problem of Agency." Alethia 5, no. 1 (July 15, 2002): 11–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1558/aleth.v5i1.11.

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15

Miracchi, Lisa. "Epistemic Agency and the Generality Problem." Philosophical Topics 45, no. 1 (2017): 107–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/philtopics20174516.

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16

Conover, C. Mitchell. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem." CFA Digest 34, no. 2 (May 2004): 22–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.2469/dig.v34.n2.1410.

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17

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, and Jesse M. Fried. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem." Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, no. 3 (August 1, 2003): 71–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/089533003769204362.

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This paper provides an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of a “managerial power” approach to executive compensation. Under this approach, the design of executive compensation is viewed not only as an instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself. Boards of publicly traded companies with dispersed ownership, we argue, cannot be expected to bargain at arm's length with managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is decoupled from managers' performance. We show that the managerial power approach can explain many features of the executive compensation landscape, including ones that many researchers have long viewed as puzzling. Among other things, we discuss option plan design, stealth compensation, executive loans, payments to departing executives, retirement benefits, the use of compensation consultants, and the observed relationship between CEO power and pay. We also explain how managerial influence might lead to substantially inefficient arrangements that produce weak or even perverse incentives.

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18

Seeman, D. "Being Human: The Problem of Agency." Common Knowledge 9, no. 1 (January 1, 2003): 167–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1215/0961754x-9-1-167-a.

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19

Setia, Bayu Indra, Erik Syawal Alghifari, Nugraha Nugraha, and Maya Sari. "AGENCY PROBLEM ANALYSIS FROM COMMITTEE AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES." Vol 14 No 1 (2022): April Edition 14, no. 1 (April 4, 2022): 92–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.23969/jrak.v14i1.4841.

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This study aims to determine the factors that influence the agency problem. A sample of 14 restaurant, hotel, and tourism sub-sector companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange during the 2010–2019 period with a total of 140 observations was used as the unit of analysis. The method used is descriptive and verified with panel data regression analysis. The results showed that the audit committee and independent commissioners had a positive and significant effect on agency problems, while managerial ownership and institutional ownership had a negative and significant effect on agency problems.

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20

Huerga, Angel, and Carlos Rodríguez-Monroy. "Mandatory Convertible Bonds and the Agency Problem." Sustainability 11, no. 15 (July 28, 2019): 4074. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su11154074.

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A large proportion of the academic literature about the agency problem focuses on corporate governance or the instruments that can be used to balance the incentives of shareholders and debt holders. Following the real options company valuation framework, one method to increase shareholder value involves increasing the intrinsic risk of the firm; however, such a practice reduces the bondholder value. We analyzed an innovative balance sheet instrument, the mandatory convertible bond, as a means to increase financial sustainability of companies, improving the value for shareholders without increasing the perceived default risk. The results of the empirical analysis illustrate that for companies in a weak credit position, the agency problem can be mitigated by the issuance of mandatory convertible bonds, which allows managers to increase company risk without being detrimental for bondholders. However, when the probability of distress is small, shareholders have less incentive to increase company risk than in a company funded by mandatory convertible bonds, being more aligned with bondholders. A better alignment of debt holders and shareholders incentives reduces inefficiencies, mitigates the probably of distress, and improves the long-term financial sustainability of companies and can promote stable growth and innovation.

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21

Mano, Toshiki. "Agency Problem in Long Term Care Market." Iryo To Shakai 14, no. 1 (2004): 17–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.4091/iken.14.1_17.

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22

Koo, Jeong-Ho, and Tae-Young Paik. "Relationship between Cost Stickiness and Agency Problem." International Journal of IT-based Management for Smart Business 3, no. 1 (December 30, 2016): 15–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.21742/ijitmsb.2016.3.03.

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23

Lee, Seok Weon. "Moral hazard, agency problem and ownership structure." Corporate Ownership and Control 3, no. 2 (2006): 116–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.22495/cocv3i2p12.

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Using a sample of recent Korean banking industry for 1994-2000, we examine how the effectiveness of managerial ownership is affected by the regulatory regimes in banking industry and the banks’ moral hazard incentives. We found that the managers of the banks in the higher moral-hazard group (the group of banks that are known to have greater moral hazard incentives in the literature such as the banks with lower charter value, greater asset size and lower equity capital) tend to have greater incentives to align their interests to those of stockholders by taking on more risk as managerial ownership rises, compared to the banks in the lower moral-hazard group, but only over the relatively deregulated period 1994-1997. Thus, in terms of only addressing the owner/manager agency problem, the owner/manager agency problem of banks can be easily addressed by changing their insider holdings or ownership structure, in particular when the banks have relatively higher moral-hazard incentives and banking regulations are loose. But we also found that this increased risk-taking has not ultimately resulted in better performance of the bank. This result may suggest a very important policy implication regarding the safety of the banking industry. If the increased risk-taking with greater managerial ownership does not contribute to improving the bank profitability, taking on more risk could end up with only increasing the possibility of failure of the bank. Therefore, the increase in insider holdings to address the owner/manager agency problem may have to be associated with closer and more frequent monitoring of the banks’ risk-taking behavior.

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24

Byun, Heejung, and Tae-Hyun Kim. "Principal-Principal Agency Problem and Shareholder Activism." Academy of Management Proceedings 2013, no. 1 (January 2013): 14840. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2013.7.

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25

Suwarni, Suwarni, and Elok Pakaryaningsih. "Pengaruh Agency Problem dan Inside Shareholdersterhadap Diversifikasi." Jurnal Riset Manajemen dan Bisnis 2, no. 2 (December 1, 2007): 117. http://dx.doi.org/10.21460/jrmb.2007.22.196.

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This research qamines the effect of agenqt problem and inside shareholder on company's diversification poliqt. It is also intent to etcamine the effect of diversification on firm value and the ffict of inside shareholder on agency problern. The inside shareholder will be divided into two categories which are:managerial owhership and stock held by the company subsidiaries. The Herfindahl Index will be used to measure the lertel of diuersiJication, whilst the agency problem will be measured using the ratio of selling and general administrative cost. Moreover, the existence of compalry eJccess value derivefro* the company's diversification will be used to identify the firm value. Using the purposive random sampling method, the total sample drawn fro*.The Jakarta Stock Exchange fro* 2002 to 2005 are 160 companies with the accdption for companies within the financial sectors. Using multiple linear regression, the result shows positive and significant effect of agency problem on company's diversification policy. On the contrary, the result fail to demonstrate the ffict of diversification on firm value as well as the effect of inside shareholders on both agenq) problem and diversification. These findings suggest that the existence of agenqt problem is very subtle in Indonesia and the existence of inside shareholder is not intended to reduce theagency problemKeywords : Agency Pr ob I em, Ins ide Sharehol der, Div ers iJic ation

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26

Svihla, Vanessa, Tryphenia Peele-Eady, and Amber Gallup. "Exploring Agency in Capstone Design Problem Framing." Studies in Engineering Education 2, no. 2 (December 21, 2021): 96. http://dx.doi.org/10.21061/see.69.

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27

ElKelish, Walaa Wahid. "Corporate governance risk and the agency problem." Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society 18, no. 2 (April 3, 2018): 254–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/cg-08-2017-0195.

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Purpose This study aims to investigate the relationship between corporate governance risk and agency costs across different countries. Design/methodology/approach Corporate governance risk indicators were obtained from the Institutional Shareholder Services Europe (S.A.) for 4,135 firms across 27 countries. Agency costs and other control variables were derived from companies’ annual financial reports using the DataStream database. Ordinary least squares multiple regression analysis model was used to test the study hypothesis. Findings Agency costs have a significant negative impact on corporate governance risk across countries. The extent of corporate governance mechanisms used, however, varies across geographic regions and industry types. The relationship between corporate governance risk and agency costs is more obvious in the non-financial than financial sector. These results were robust after several statistical checks. Practical implications The findings will help stakeholders, including corporate management, regulators and investors to improve corporate governance mechanisms and capital allocation decisions across countries. Originality/value Evidence is provided on the role of agency costs in corporate governance risk across geographic regions for financial and non-financial companies. The paper also overcomes common problems in corporate governance research such as construct validity, limited data and endogeneity.

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28

Tomm, Karl. "Externalizing the Problem and Internalizing Personal Agency." Journal of Strategic and Systemic Therapies 8, no. 1 (March 1989): 54–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1521/jsst.1989.8.1.54.

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Tomm, Karl. "Externalizing the Problem and Internalizing Personal Agency." Journal of Systemic Therapies 38, no. 3 (September 2019): 43–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.1521/jsyt.2019.38.3.43.

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30

Ott, Ursula F. "International joint ventures: a common agency problem." Global Business and Economics Review 2, no. 1 (2000): 67. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/gber.2000.006151.

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31

Greenland, Fiona. "Material culture and the problem of agency." American Journal of Cultural Sociology 7, no. 3 (February 5, 2018): 412–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/s41290-017-0054-6.

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32

D’Mello, Ranjan, and Mercedes Miranda. "Long-term debt and overinvestment agency problem." Journal of Banking & Finance 34, no. 2 (February 2010): 324–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2009.07.021.

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33

Skewes, J. C., and C. A. Hooker. "Bio-agency and the problem of action." Biology & Philosophy 24, no. 3 (September 20, 2008): 283–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-008-9135-9.

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34

Baldwin, John D. "Mead's Solution to the Problem of Agency." Sociological Inquiry 58, no. 2 (April 1988): 139–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-682x.1988.tb01052.x.

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35

Chen, Cheng. "Trade liberalization, agency problem and aggregate productivity." European Economic Review 111 (January 2019): 421–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2018.11.006.

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36

Berberian, B. "Man-Machine teaming: a problem of Agency." IFAC-PapersOnLine 51, no. 34 (2019): 118–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ifacol.2019.01.049.

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37

Vasilyev, S. I. "REASONS, FACTORS AND CONSEQUENCES OF AGENCY PROBLEM IN MODERN CONDITIONS." Vestnik of the Russian University of Cooperation, no. 1(43) (April 26, 2021): 21–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.52623/2227-4383-1-43-4.

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This article is about agency relationship which formed due to the delegation of part of the powers of shareholders to employees. Also, this article is about the emergence of an agency problem which is aggravated by behavioral and environmental factors. The main reason of the agency problem is the separation of ownership from control. The divergence of interests between owners and managers leads to an increase in agency costs in this area. The central issue in the theory of agency relations is agency costs. The purpose of the study is to analyze the history of the development of the theory of corporate governance and the theory of agency relations. The relevance of the agency problem and the problem of corporate governance lies in the study of theoretical and practical research of agency costs, sources and factors which influence on the investment activities of the company. As a result of the study, the emergence and formation of the concept of agency costs were considered

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38

Lowe, E. J. "Personal Agency." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53 (September 2003): 211–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100008341.

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Why does the problem of free will seem so intractable? I surmise that in large measure it does so because the free will debate, at least in its modern form, is conducted in terms of a mistaken approach to causality in general. At the heart of this approach is the assumption that all causation is fundamentally event causation. Of course, it is well-known that some philosophers of action want to invoke in addition an irreducible notion of agent causation, applicable only in the sphere of intelligent agency. But such a view is generally dismissed as incompatible with the naturalism that has now become orthodoxy amongst mainstream analytical philosophers of mind. What I want to argue is that substances, not events, are the primary relata of causal relations and that agent causation should properly be conceived of as a species of substance causation. I shall try to show that by thus reconceiving the nature of causation and of agency, the problem of free will can be made more tractable. I shall also argue for a contention that may seem even less plausible at first sight, namely, that such a view of agency is perfectly compatible with a volitionist theory of action.

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39

Selaković, Radmila, and Milan Zvezdanović. "Mechanisms for resolving the agency problem in contemporary corporation." Ekonomski pogledi 17, no. 4 (2015): 81–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.5937/ekopog1502081s.

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40

Rahmawati, Alni, M. Moeljadi, Djumahir, and Sumiati. "The effects of managerial ownership, leverage, dividend policy in minimizing agency problem." Investment Management and Financial Innovations 15, no. 4 (December 6, 2018): 273–82. http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/imfi.15(4).2018.22.

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The research intends to minimize agency conflict through causality effects of managerial ownership, leverage, and dividend policy, where agency conflict is still interesting issue to discuss, as it concerns the principals’ and agents’ interests. The research covers 33 go-public manufacturers in Indonesia Stock Exchange. It involves 198 samples in the period 2010–2015. It applies saturation sampling and balanced panel data. For analysis model, it applies Granger bidirectional/simultaneity analysis, with variables of managerial ownership, leverage and dividend policy.The research shows that: 1) there is no bidirectional causality between managerial ownership and leverage (5%); 2) there is no bidirectional causality between managerial ownership and dividend policy (5%); 3) there is no bidirectional causality between leverage and dividend policy (10%).

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Roziq, Ahmad. "Mengungkap Permasalahan Pembiayaan Sistem Bagi Hasil dan Islamisasi Teori Keagenan." Jurnal Darussalam: Jurnal Pendidikan, Komunikasi dan Pemikiran Hukum Islam 11, no. 2 (April 30, 2020): 464. http://dx.doi.org/10.30739/darussalam.v11i2.817.

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This study aims to reveal the problem of the profit-sharing system and the solution to the problem. This research uses a qualitative approach and a kasyif analysis. A qualitative approach is used to reveal empirically to find solutions to the problem of profit-sharing system financing. Meanwhile, the kasyif approach is used to analyze the problems and financing solutions for the profit-sharing system based on the perspective of Islamic law. This study uses a case of implementation of profit-sharing systems in Islamic banking. The results of the study concluded that it is necessary to internalize the values of sharia (Islamic sharia ethics) in agency theory or it is necessary to reconstruct agency theory into "sharia agency theory" so that it is more appropriate in explaining agency problems in the production sharing system financing contract.

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Panda, Brahmadev, and N. M. Leepsa. "Agency theory: Review of Theory and Evidence on Problems and Perspectives." Indian Journal of Corporate Governance 10, no. 1 (June 2017): 74–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0974686217701467.

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This article intends to review the theoretical aspects and empirical evidences made on agency theory. It is aimed to explore the main ideas, perspectives, problems and issues related to the agency theory through a literature survey. It discusses the theoretical aspects of agency theory and the various concepts and issues related to it and documents empirical evidences on the mechanisms that diminish the agency cost. The conflict of interest and agency cost arises due to the separation of ownership from control, different risk preferences, information asymmetry and moral hazards. The literatures have cited many solutions like strong ownership control, managerial ownership, independent board members and different committees can be useful in controlling the agency conflict and its cost. This literature survey will enlighten the practitioners and researchers in understanding, analysing the agency problem and will be helpful in mitigating the agency problem.

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43

Jeong, Seong-Jun, and Dong-Beom Choi. "ESG and Managerial Agency Problems*." Korean Journal of Financial Studies 51, no. 4 (August 31, 2022): 417–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.26845/kjfs.2022.08.51.4.417.

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Criticism of conventional shareholder supremacy triggered urges for incorporating the stakeholder perspective and the Environmental(E), Social(S) and Governance(G) issues in managerial decisions. However, the corporations in Korea still lack proper corporate governance to protect shareholder benefits from managerial agency problems. In that case, adopting vague, not readily assessable objectives may lead to a lack of managerial accountability and exacerbate the agency problem. We find that Tobin’s Q of firms without good governance declined when their environmental and social ratings improved, suggesting “E,” “S,” and “G” are not independent. Corporations should prioritize establishing

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44

Tsaruk, Vasyl. "Ways to solve agency problems in corporate structures with using accounting information: non-institutional aspects." INNOVATIVE ECONOMY, no. 7-8 (November 2019): 145–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.37332/2309-1533.2019.7-8.21.

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Purpose. The aim of the article is to analyse and substantiate the ways to solve the consequences of an agency problem in corporate structures based on the use of accounting information. Methodology of the research. The theoretical basis of the research is the scientific works of domestic and foreign scientists on the problems of accounting information formation in the issues of solving agency problems in corporate structures. The following methods are used to achieve the goal of the study: general scientific methods (abstraction, comparison, generalization, analysis, synthesis) – to know the basic elements of accounting information; critical analysis and systematic approach – when disclosing the characteristics of the main elements of solving an agency problem in corporate structures; abstract and logical method – to formulate the conclusions of the study. Findings. The types of opportunistic behaviour regarding the moment of contracting according to agency theory are substantiated. The role of accounting information at the pre-contractual stage of activity of corporate structures is determined. The features of understanding of accounting as one of the basic elements of the corporate governance system, which allows to minimize the consequences of an agency problem, are revealed. The role of accounting information at the post-contracting stage of corporate structures activity is determined. Originality. The possibility of using accounting information for the implementation of opportunistic behaviour by agents in the activity of corporate structures is substantiated. The ability of the accounting system to counteract the hidden intentions that agents may have after contracting has been identified. A matrix classification of approaches to solving the consequences of agency problems in corporate structures has been developed. Practical value. Implementation of the components of accounting information proposed in the study will allow to substantiate the role of accounting information in the application of each of the selected approaches to solving the consequences of the agency problem in corporate structures. Key words: corporate governance; agency problem; adverse selection; moral hazard; accounting information.

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45

Nurmalasari, Made Ratih, and I. Gde Kajeng Baskara. "Dividend policy, leverage, and institutional ownership as agency problem control mechanisms in privatized Indonesian state-owned enterprises." International research journal of management, IT and social sciences 6, no. 5 (August 23, 2019): 118–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.21744/irjmis.v6n5.708.

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This study aims to test the agency theory in privatized Indonesian State-Owned Enterprises. The agency problem in this study was proxied by firm value (Tobin's Q) while the agency problem control mechanism was proxied by institutional ownership, leverage, and dividend policy. This study examines the interchangeable relations between the three variables. The data used in this study are secondary data sourced from the Indonesia Stock Exchange. The research sample is all SOEcompanies that meet the criteria and are listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in the 2013-2017 observation period. The analytical tool used in this study was 2SLS (Two-Stage Least Square) with panel data techniques and simultaneous models. The results showed that dividend policy and institutional ownership have a substitution relationship in reducing agency problems, whereas leverage and dividend policy, as well as institutional ownership and leverage, do not have a substitute relationship in reducing agency problems.

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Tsaruk, Vasyl. "Agency problem in management as a challenge for the corporation accounting system." Herald of Ternopil National Economic University, no. 4(94) (December 3, 2019): 103–15. http://dx.doi.org/10.35774/visnyk2019.04.103.

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Introduction. Corporate governance, as a basis for ensuring the efficient use of corporate resources, can be built on a range of models that have both advantages and disadvantages. Neo-institutional theory, in particular its separate component is agency theory. It is one of the theories that allows to substantiate the reasons for the decline in the quality of implemented corporate governance systems and to formulate ways to improve it, in particular, taking into account the role of accounting in ensuring the effectiveness of their functioning. Purpose. The aim of the article is to monitor essence and peculiarities of manifestation of agency problem in corporate governance and substantiation of place of accounting in its solution. Methods. The range of research methods related to the solution of the agent problem in the corporate governance system is applied. Dialectical method of cognition and the systematic approach to the interpretation of corporate governance, the monographic method for monitoring the positions of scientists in the sphere of solving the agent problem, the abstract and logical method for theoretical generalizations and formulation conclusions are used in the research. Results. The necessity of accounting development in solving the agency problem in corporate management is substantiated. The peculiarities of the development of neo-institutional theory as a theoretical basis of corporate governance are revealed. The necessity to study agency theory as a means of solving problems in corporate governance is substantiated. The essence of agency problem in corporate structures is revealed and the causes of its occurrence are identified. The theoretical principles of agency problem in corporate structures are highlighted. Cases of manifestation of agency problem in corporate structures are analyzed. The basic directions of improvement of the accounting system of the corporate structure with the purpose of minimizing consequences of occurrence of agency problem are highlighted. Discussion. It is advisable to focus on optimizing specific elements of the corporate accounting system in further research in order to avoid agency issues in the corporate governance system.

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Majid, M. Shabri. "Can Debt Mitigate Majority-Minority Shareholders Agency Problem?" Montenegrin Journal of Economics 17, no. 1 (January 13, 2021): 121–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.14254/1800-5845/2021.17-1.9.

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Chen, Chiung-Jung. "The Agency Problem and Sell-Off Market Return." Academy of Management Proceedings 2018, no. 1 (August 2018): 13777. http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/ambpp.2018.13777abstract.

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Sadler, Victoria L. "Military Reports and the Problem with Technological Agency." Canadian Journal for Studies in Discourse and Writing/Rédactologie 22, no. 1 (July 1, 2008): 72–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.31468/cjsdwr.551.

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Carlsnaes, Walter. "The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis." International Studies Quarterly 36, no. 3 (September 1992): 245. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2600772.

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