To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Airports – Security measures – United States.
Journal articles on the topic 'Airports – Security measures – United States'
Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles
Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Airports – Security measures – United States.'
Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.
You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.
Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.
1
Radomyski, Adam. "DIAGNOSIS OF THE CIVIL AVIATION PROTECTION SYSTEM AGAINST TERRORIST ATTACKS IN THE UNITED STATES." Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Morskiego XIII (January 24, 2020): 2–3. http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/01.3001.0013.7487.
Full textAbstract:
The article presents the results of research that focus on the problem of developing by the United States effective legal, organizational and technical so-lutions to increase the security of civil aviation, including passengers on board aircraft and at airports. An important part of scientific considerations was to characterize the organization of security systems at airports operating in the United States. The presented results are not limited to the theoretical aspects of counteracting terrorism, but also characterize practical organizational and technical projects implemented in the aviation security system in the USA
2
Fain, Stacie L. "2025." International Journal of Aviation Systems, Operations and Training 1, no. 1 (January 2014): 9–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijasot.2014010102.
Full textAbstract:
Several governmental entities: the Secretary of Transportation; the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and Commerce; the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA); National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA); and industry, aligned their resources to develop the Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen), a new approach to safety at airports in the United States (U.S.). NextGen places the responsibility for safety within airport management and changing the FAA's role from testing, inspecting, and certifying to approval and periodic audits of the Safety Management Systems (SMS) programs at U.S. airports. The purpose of the research was to determine, through a comprehensive literature review and evaluation, whether SMS will be used as the framework for U.S. airports to move safely into the year 2025. The researcher concluded that the vision for SMS implementation was well defined and the requirements fairly clear, but guidance and support for SMS implementation at U.S. airports are lacking.
3
STEZHKO, S., and T. SHEVCHENKO. "Current US experience in cyber security." INFORMATION AND LAW, no. 2(37) (June 23, 2021): 139–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.37750/2616-6798.2021.2(37).238349.
Full textAbstract:
The content and key aspects of the US Cyber Security Strategy are considered. The principles of the state cyber security policy of the USA are defined. Typical threats to the United States in cyberspace are outlined. The state priorities for strengthening the components of cyber defense in the United States are summarized. The issue of financing cyber security in the United States in 2021 is detailed. The principles of joint activities of American-Ukrainian relations in the field of cyber security are specified. The list of measures implemented in the United States to strengthen the state's capabilities in the field of cyber security has been identified.
4
Eichler, Rose Richerson. "Cybersecurity, Encryption, and Defense Industry Compliance with United States Export Regulations." Texas A&M Journal of Property Law 5, no. 1 (October 2018): 5–36. http://dx.doi.org/10.37419/jpl.v5.i1.2.
Full textAbstract:
Exports of technology and items containing technical information are regulated by the United States government. United States export control regulations exist to help protect national security, economic, and political interests. United States defense industry companies manufacture products and develop technologies and information that the United States has a particular interest in protecting. Therefore, defense industry companies must comply with United States export control regulations when exporting items and information to their international partners and customers. An “export” not only includes shipments of hardware or other tangible assets to foreign end-users but also includes the sharing of certain types of information with foreign recipients in the form of phone conversations, emails, meetings, conferences, presentations, and so on. Many employees of defense industry companies travel internationally with company issued laptops and cellphones containing company information that could be viewed by foreign persons. All of these activities are considered exports and may require prior authorization from the United States government under export control regulations. Failure to follow export regulations could result in a violation requiring a report to the United States government that may result in civil penalties or criminal charges. Additionally, intentional as well as unintentional releases of information to certain foreign persons could be detrimental to a defense industry company’s business and reputation and may even result in security concerns for the United States. Although the government has an interest in regulating defense industry companies’ technology and information, critics argue that strong export control regulations may result in invasions of privacy, violations of free speech, and a displacement of the United States as a leader in a world of technological advancement. However, despite current regulations, defense industry information is still at risk of cyberattacks and inadvertent data releases, creating potential threats to national security and the security of company technology and information. In an effort to secure company and sensitive information while exporting, defense industry companies utilize encryption and other cybersecurity measures. Advancing technologies in cybersecurity can help the government and defense industry companies by bolstering the security of their information. These same advancements can also aid attackers in breaking through cybersecurity defenses. Some advances in technology are even preventing law enforcement from gathering necessary information to conduct investigations when cyber-attacks occur, making it difficult to identify criminal actors and seek justice.The United States government faces challenges in creating and up- dating regulations to keep up with consistently advancing technology. Likewise, defense industry companies must adhere to government regulations by creating robust compliance programs, but they should also implement security and compliance measures above and beyond what the government requires to ensure more effective security for their technology and information. This Article discusses the effect of advancing cyber technology; United States export regulations; reporting requirements related to the export of encrypted items; and encryption technology in the defense industry. First, the Article defines encryption and encrypted items. Second, the Article explains United States regulations of ex- ports and specifically, regulations related to encryption and encrypted items. Third, the Article explains the need for defense industry companies to export and to use encrypted items. Fourth, the Article analyzes criticisms of export regulations and the differing views on United States controls. Fifth, the Article will discuss the complexities of com- plying with export regulations and defense industry compliance pro- grams. Sixth, the Article examines the outlook for encryption technology, the future of regulations related to cybersecurity, and the outlook for defense industry security measures and compliance with regulations. The United States government is beginning to recognize the need for more advanced security measures to protect domestically produced technology and information, especially information that puts national security at risk. Specifically, the technology and information produced by United States defense industry companies should be protected from getting into the hands of our foreign adversaries at all costs. In response to the growing need for security measures, the United States government has implemented new programs, commissions, agencies, and projects to create more robust security systems and regulations. The United States should employ the most talented and experienced cybersecurity professionals to innovate and produce security systems that protect our nation’s most sensitive information. The government should then provide these systems to its defense industry companies at minimal cost and should require companies to use the best technology in its security measures. With or without the government’s assistance, defense industry companies within the United States must also implement their own measures of protection. Current policies offer little protection of sensitive and export controlled information including encrypted items and in- formation. In addition, the government should also provide the defense industry companies better guidance and access to resources in order to assist them in protecting the important information and encrypted items.207 For example, any new systems or software purchased by the United States should be made available to defense industry companies as the standard. If the government truly wishes to protect its most important technology and information, it should provide the new systems at minimal cost to the defense industry. Advancements in security programs should be shared with defense industry companies as soon as they are available and ready for use. Nevertheless, the government may not want to provide defense industry companies with the best security technology because in the event that the government needs to conduct an investigation, a company utilizing strong cyber- security and encryption software is much more difficult to investigate. Alternatively, the United States could update current regulations to require that defense industry companies must utilize specific security measures or face a penalty for failing to do so. Such regulation could require defense companies to implement more robust security pro- grams with updated security software. This is a less effective solution as the advancement in cyberattack technology increases so rapidly, and reformed regulations will likely be outdated as soon as they are implemented. It makes more sense to require that defense companies must implement the most updated software and programs determined by government security experts and cyber-security experts. Also, by allowing defense companies to decide which security companies it will work with, the defense companies obtain the option to shop for the best and most expensive program, or the company could choose the cheapest option, resulting in less efficient security. Cybersecurity regulations that are too specific run the risk of being outdated quickly, whereas broad requirements leave the option for companies to implement the lowest of security measures. Even if the government declines these suggested measures, defense industry companies should make the protection of their sensitive in- formation and encrypted items top priority. This method would re- quire complete buy-in from the senior management within the company and a thorough flow-down of cultural beliefs among its employees. A change in norms must be implemented, and defense industry personnel should be inundated with reminders on the importance of information security. Companies should provide employees with easy access to guidance, training, and assistance in handling, sharing, protecting, and exporting sensitive and export controlled information. Changing company culture takes time, and failure to change personnel beliefs will result in a lack of understanding and potential violations of export control regulations. In the worst cases, data spills and cyberattacks could result in the loss of sensitive or even classified in- formation that could jeopardize national security. Huge unauthorized data releases of sensitive information will negatively affect a company’s reputation thus affecting its ability to generate revenue. The risks in using and exporting encryption technology and sensitive information should be a major concern for defense industry companies. This concern should motivate the government to invest significant resources into compliance programs. Resources such as dedicated and qualified personnel can create policy and procedure to ensure compliance with United States government regulations, and the procedures will provide guidance and training to all employees. In addition, companies should employ IT security, data security, and counterintelligence personnel to work with the compliance team in innovating preventive measures and in addressing any potential data releases and export violations. Immediate actions and counter measures should be prioritized not just among the compliance and security teams but should be a known, expected response from all employees. In other words, cybersecurity norms should be instilled company-wide and thoroughly policed from within the company. How a company chooses to implement such measures remains discretionary, but a better resourced compliance department dedicated to implementing effective policies and responding quickly to potential issues will prevent export control violations and data releases of important information. Defense industry companies transfer export controlled information that may subject the United States to security risks. The United States responds to this risk by implementing regulations to control the high- risk exports. Defense industry companies must comply with these regulations. Therefore, defense industry companies should approach exports and cybersecurity from the standpoint that technology is always advancing—failure to simultaneously advance security and compliance measures will leave the country and the company vulnerable to attack.
5
Stewart, Mark G., and John Mueller. "A risk and cost-benefit assessment of United States aviation security measures." Journal of Transportation Security 1, no. 3 (May 30, 2008): 143–59. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12198-008-0013-0.
Full text
6
Roach, Ashley. "Container and Port Security: A Bilateral Perspective." International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 18, no. 3 (2003): 341–61. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/092735203770223576.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractAs a follow-up to the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 and due to the threat that such attacks may be reiterated in different forms, the United States has taken several measures with the view to forestall terrorist attacks from the sea. The measures include the Container Security Initiative and measures to enhance port security. This presentation describes the content of such measures and the reaction of states and international organisations thereto. The question is raised whether such measures may be taken unilaterally or rather through international force.
7
Johnson, Letitia. "Gender and Medical Inspections at Ellis Island." Constellations 7, no. 1 (January 10, 2016): 15. http://dx.doi.org/10.29173/cons27053.
Full textAbstract:
For many immigrants to the United States, between 1892 and 1924, admission was contingent upon a medical inspection at an immigration centre, such as the one located at Ellis Island in the harbour of New York City. Much like passing through customs or security at airports today, these medical inspections were dreaded by immigrant travellers, and United States Government and Public Health Service (PHS) publications show that these medical inspections were escalating in intensity and emphasis during the early twentieth-century. The purpose of the PHS inspections becomes especially evident when looking at the gender considerations, or lack thereof, which arose during medical inspections at Ellis Island. A gender analysis of the PHS medical inspections, examined through the use of oral histories and photographs, provides a window into understanding the primary concern of the United States Public Health Service.
8
Ramsay, William C. "The United States and World Energy Markets." Energy Exploration & Exploitation 10, no. 2 (April 1992): 89–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/014459879201000204.
Full textAbstract:
The United States, dominating the world's energy markets as a producer and consumer is sensitive to changes in this market and intends to influence the development of global energy policy. Supply will be increased by nations such as Venezuela, Indonesia and perhaps in the future a United Yemen and the Commonwealth of Independent States, moving to freer market economies which will allow investment opportunities previously inaccessible to foreign companies. Although world energy demand will grow little of this will be in the US where, under the National Energy Strategy, comprehensive measures are being introduced to improve energy efficiency. The US energy security will be further improved by such measures as diversification of supply, larger domestic production and increasing interdependence between suppliers, traders and consumers.
9
Adebiaye, Richmond, and Taiwo Ajani. "INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY USAGE: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF SMARTPHONE SECURITY AWARENESS AND PRACTICES AMONG UNDERGRADUATE STUDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES." International Journal of Engineering Technologies and Management Research 5, no. 3 (February 16, 2020): 270–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.29121/ijetmr.v5.i3.2018.201.
Full textAbstract:
Mobile phone usage is growing at an unprecedented rate. The ability to remain connected, the ease of smart phone use and declining mobile costs have allowed this technology to expand at a very high rate globally. The study aimed to quantitatively determine the reasons for inactive practice of security measures of smart-phone usage among college students in the United States. The study also examined the Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC) level in relation to the level of smart-phone security measures, determined the levels of security measures on smart-phone (SP) by users, and establish the relationship between CFC level and the levels of smart-phone security measures among college students. Using a quantitative research survey and simple random sampling procedure, the methodology focused on analyzing data through testing of hypotheses. The t-test, Pearson’s correlation, regression coefficients and their respective p-values. The results showed 69.8% of college students set PIN, password and screen lock on their smart phones while 74.8% were cautious with smart phone applications and 6.2% practiced on setting of security software including rooting services. On the other hand, 35.4% protected their SP data through encryption, 47.4% had data checks and security alert while 46.2% had set Bluetooth applications and 41.4% had used backup storage for sensitive data. Use of Biometrics or other security unknown security adoptions were not included in the study. The study also found that lack of knowledge about technology or applications for SP security, lack of security habits and practices, rigorous involvement of setting SP security details like backups, encryption, security software etc., assumptions that SP are security and tamper-proof as well as lack of training, guidance and after sale services on SP security are significant reasons for lack of security measures practices concerning smart-phone usage by college students.
10
Signoret, José E. "On Cargo Security Measures and Trade Costs." Global Economy Journal 11, no. 3 (September 2011): 1850234. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1524-5861.1733.
Full textAbstract:
Can tighter cargo security measures lead to higher trade costs and increased trade frictions? This paper examines the impact of the Container Security Initiative (CSI), implemented by the United States in several foreign ports after the September 11 terrorist attacks. It analyzes monthly data for all containerized U.S. imports from 1999 to 2006, by foreign port and country of origin. The analysis exploits these longitudinal data at the port-level and the varying starting dates across CSI ports to identify the causal effect of the initiative. While higher import charges over time are observed, the results find no significant evidence of a “CSI effect” on either import costs or import flows.
11
Schloenhardt, Andreas. "United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2240, 2312 & 2380." International Legal Materials 57, no. 1 (February 2018): 163–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ilm.2018.6.
Full textAbstract:
In response to the large number of irregular migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea from Libya to southern Italy, frequently using overcrowded, unseaworthy vessels, and often facilitated by migrant smugglers, on October 9, 2015, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 2240. This resolution authorizes member states to intercept, inspect, and seize vessels suspected of being used to smuggle migrants or to traffic persons. Initially limited to one year, these measures were renewed through two further UNSC resolutions on October 6, 2016, and October 5, 2017.
12
Terrence Hopmann, P. "The United States and the osce after the Ukraine Crisis." Security and Human Rights 26, no. 1 (December 29, 2015): 33–47. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18750230-02601007.
Full textAbstract:
Ever since negotiations on the Helsinki Final Act opened in Helsinki in 1973, the United States has regarded the Conference (later Organization) on Security and Co-operation in Europe with some ambivalence. The role of the Helsinki Final Act in establishing a normative regime that contributed significantly to undermining the authoritarian regimes in the former Warsaw Pact countries, eventually bringing an end to the Cold War, is widely recognized and appreciated in the United States. However, the expanded post-Cold War role of the osce has received less attention in us foreign policy and, with respect to issues of European security, has clearly been assigned a secondary role in that policy behind the nato Alliance. Those knowledgeable about the osce in the United States widely regard its role in positive terms on issues such as human rights, rights of persons belonging to minorities, rule of law, election monitoring and other “soft” security issues. However, the osce role in “hard” security issues has been given little attention and receives only limited support, due largely to its inability to achieve consensus on most serious security problems and its lack of resources to effectively implement those decisions that it takes. Nevertheless, the recent crisis in Ukraine has awakened us interest in the osce as the institutional framework best able to manage that crisis. The challenge for the German Chairmanship in 2016 will be to build upon this renewed us attention to the osce’s role in “hard” security issues, in promoting negotiated resolutions to this and other stalemated conflicts, in rebuilding the badly damaged regime of confidence-building measures and conventional arms control, as well as responding, within the multilateral osce framework, to new security threats, such as cyber warfare and countering violent extremism.
13
Laidler, Paweł. "How Republicans and Democrats Strengthen Secret Surveillance in the United States." Political Preferences, no. 25 (January 28, 2020): 5–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.31261/polpre.2019.25.5-20.
Full textAbstract:
The purpose of the paper is to assess the relationship between secrecy and transparency in the pre- and post-Snowden eras in the United States. The Author analyzes, from both political and legal perspectives, the sources and outcomes of the U.S. politics of national security with a special focus on domestic and intelligence surveillance measures. The core argument of the paper is that, due to the role of the executive which has always promoted the culture of secrecy, there is no chance for the demanded transparency in national security surveillance, despite the controlling powers of the legislative and judiciary. As the analysis proves, the United States in the post-Snowden era seems to be the most transparent and secretive state, at the same time.
14
Rathbone, Meredith, and Pete Jeydel. "United Nations Security Council Resolutions 2321, 2371, & 2375." International Legal Materials 56, no. 6 (December 2017): 1176–208. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/ilm.2017.40.
Full textAbstract:
As concerns grow that North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs are nearing the point of becoming an unacceptably dire threat to international peace and security, the United Nations, acting with unprecedented collective resolve, has imposed potentially suffocating international economic sanctions on North Korea. These sanctions are bolstered by even more stringent measures imposed unilaterally by the United States. The international community has not in recent memory come together in this way to seek to cut a country off from nearly all trade and investment. This will be a test of the effectiveness of economic sanctions in achieving a nonmilitary solution to what is arguably the most significant military threat impacting global interests since the end of the Cold War.
15
Knight, W. Andy. "The United Nations and International Security in the New Millennium." Perspectives on Global Development and Technology 4, no. 3 (2005): 517–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/156915005775093331.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThe end of the Cold War opened a window of opportunity for the United Nations to play a greater role in international security than it was allowed to play in the midst of the ideological conflict between the United States and the former Soviet Union. However, the expected "peace dividend" never materialized in the post-Cold War period. Instead, a number of civil conflicts erupted and new threats to security, particularly to human security, emerged. This chapter critically examines the evolution of the UN's role in addressing international security problems since 1945, including global terrorism. It also outlines recent attempts by the world body, through extension of its reach beyond the territorial constraints of sovereignty, to build sustained peace through preventive measures and protect human security globally.
16
Pape, Robert A. "Soft Balancing against the United States." International Security 30, no. 1 (July 2005): 7–45. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/0162288054894607.
Full textAbstract:
The George W. Bush administration's national security strategy, which asserts that the United States has the right to attack and conquer sovereign countries that pose no observable threat, and to do so without international support, is one of the most aggressively unilateral U.S. postures ever taken. Recent international relations scholarship has wrongly promoted the view that the United States, as the leader of a unipolar system, can pursue such a policy without fear of serious opposition. The most consequential effect of the Bush strategy will be a fundamental transformation in how major states perceive the United States and how they react to future uses of U.S. power. Major powers are already engaging in the early stages of balancing behavior against the United States, by adopting “soft-balancing” measures that do not directly challenge U.S. military preponderance but use international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic arrangements to delay, frustrate, and undermine U.S. policies. If the Bush administration continues to pursue aggressive unilateral military policies, increased soft balancing could establish the basis for hard balancing against the United States. To avoid this outcome, the United States should renounce the systematic use of preventive war, as well as other aggressive unilateral military policies, and return to its traditional policy governing the use of force-a case-by-case calculation of costs and benefits.
17
Christensen, Hanne. "Reform of the Backbone of the United Nations." Journal of Asian Research 3, no. 4 (September 19, 2019): p279. http://dx.doi.org/10.22158/jar.v3n4p279.
Full textAbstract:
This paper outlines what can be done to reform the backbone of the United Nations to further the work of the organization. That is the General Assembly, the Security Council and ECOSOC. It shows that the General Assembly can play a stronger role in international peace and security matters by suggesting peace proposals for potential conflicts, and inform the Security Council if, and when, it is not in agreement with measures taken by the Council. The paper comments on ongoing negotiations on Security Council reform and shows the difficulty of reforming the veto clause. It suggests that ECOSOC deals with both economic and social causes of conflicts and develops macro-economic and macro-social strategies to prevent conflict for the General Assembly to recommend to member states and onwards to the Security Council to act on. Some concrete examples are indicated to that effect.
18
Huxsoll, David L. "On-Site Inspection Measures and Interviews." Politics and the Life Sciences 14, no. 2 (August 1995): 238–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0730938400019158.
Full textAbstract:
In April 1991, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 687, which established the terms and conditions for a formal cease-fire between Iraq and the coalition of Member States. Resolution 687 states that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless—under international supervision—of all chemical and biological weapons; all stocks of agents, and all related subsystems and components; and all related research, development, support, and manufacturing facilities. The resolution further states that Iraq shall unconditionally undertake not to use, develop, construct, or acquire any of the items mentioned above, and it calls for the development of a plan for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance. To accomplish these objectives, Resolution 687 provided for the establishment of a Special Commission to carry out immediate on-site inspections of Iraq's capabilities, based on Iraq's declarations and the designation of any additional locations by the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) itself. Soon after it was established, the commission initiated a series of unprecedented inspections to eliminate Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.
19
Westervelt, Steven, and Bibi van Ginkel. "The ethical challenges of implementing counterterrorism measures and the role of the OSCE." Security and Human Rights 20, no. 2 (2009): 123–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/187502309788254579.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractThe United Nations established a counterterrorism mechanism in the form of the Counterterrorism Committee when it adopted Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001). The Committee has so far worked with regional organizations and individual states in capacity building efforts to augment local counterterrorism abilities. However, ethical bottlenecks remain. The problem of ethics arises when laws lack legitimacy regarding criminality and state power and when they diverge from the rule of law and good governance. Regional organizations are keenly placed to ensure that states adopt legitimate counterterrorism measures, thus avoiding ethical bottlenecks. By working with states to maintain the moral high ground, regional organizations such as the OSCE can prevent unnecessary compromises between human rights and security.
20
NOONAN, ALEXANDER. "“What Must Be the Answer of the United States to Such a Proposition?” Anarchist Exclusion and National Security in the United States, 1887–1903." Journal of American Studies 50, no. 2 (February 16, 2016): 347–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021875816000451.
Full textAbstract:
This article examines the debates around anarchist restriction that shaped the eventual passage of the Immigration Act of 1903 and argues that domestically oriented conceptions of national security are both challenged and constituted by transnational and international processes and currents. While discussions of transnational immigration control became important features of both scholarly discourse and popular debate in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 2001, these discussions were not new. Similar debates about immigration policy, security, and civil liberties shaped discussions between the mid-1880s and early 1900s, when an unprecedented wave of attacks against heads of state fed rumors of wide-ranging conspiracies, and reports of anarchist outrages in cities far and wide spread fear. Anarchist exclusion was far more than an example of a rising nativist tide raising all boats and excluding a widening spectrum of undesirable aliens. Such measures set the foundation for restriction based on political beliefs and associations that, over subsequent decades, would become critical to suppressing political dissent. Consequently, understanding how the fear of anarchist violence helped shape the contours of the domestic and diplomatic debates over anarchist restriction is critical as these old questions of transnational immigration control reemerge.
21
Obado Ochieng, Mercy. "Elusive Legal Definition of Terrorism at the United Nations." Strathmore Law Journal 3, no. 1 (August 1, 2017): 65–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.52907/slj.v3i1.30.
Full textAbstract:
Terrorism is indisputably a serious security threat to states and individuals. Yet, by the end of 2016, there was still lack of consensus on the legal definition of terrorism at the United Nations (UN) level. The key organs of the UN, the Security Council (UNSC) and the General Assembly (UNGA), are yet to agree on a legal definition of terrorism. This disconnect is attributed partly to the heterogeneous nature of terrorist activities and ideological differences among member states. At the UN level, acts of terrorism are mainly tackled from the angle of threats to international peace and security. In contrast, at the state level, acts of terrorism are largely defined as crimes and hence dealt with from the criminal justice paradigm. This article argues that the lack of a concrete legal definition of terrorism at the UN level undermines the holistic use of the criminal justice paradigm to counter-terrorism at the state level. To effectively counter-terrorism the UNSC and the UNGA have to agree on a legal definition of terrorism in their resolutions. This will streamline efforts to combat terrorism at the state level and consolidate counter-terrorism measures at the international level. The draft comprehensive Convention on Measures to Eliminate Terrorism (the Draft Convention) should be tailored to fill gaps and provide for a progressive legal definition of acts of terrorism.
22
McCormack, Timothy L. H. "Anticipatory Self-Defence in the Legislative History of the United Nations Charter." Israel Law Review 25, no. 1 (1991): 1–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223700010256.
Full textAbstract:
Article 51 of the United Nations Charter states that:Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of selfdefense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.International lawyers are still arguing about the scope of the right of self-defence in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. Most of the arguments focus on the semantics of Article 51. Those who argue for a “restrictive view” of the provision emphasise the qualifying phrase “if an armed attack occurs”.
23
Kartasasmita, Giandi. "The Securitization of China's Technology Companies in the United States of America." Jurnal Ilmiah Hubungan Internasional 16, no. 2 (December 11, 2020): 159–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.26593/jihi.v16i2.4204.159-178.
Full textAbstract:
This paper aims to explain the securitization process of China’s technology companies by the U.S Government. Whilethe U.S has been aware of the cyber threat since 1998, before Trump's presidency, the U.S. Government had nevertaken drastic measures against foreign technology companies based on national security pretext. This paper revealedthat the U.S. Executive has succeeded in securitizing the Chinese hardware and software companies, proved by theincreasing number of U.S. Citizens, see China as a major threat to the U.S.
24
Stover, Eric, Miranda Sissons, Phuong Pham, and Patrick Vinck. "Justice on hold: accountability and social reconstruction in Iraq." International Review of the Red Cross 90, no. 869 (March 2008): 5–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1816383108000064.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractHaving invaded Iraq without UN Security Council authorization, the United States was unable to convince many countries to take a meaningful role in helping Iraq deal with its violent past. Always insisting that it would “go it alone”, the United States implemented accountability measures without properly consulting the Iraqi people. Nor did the United States access assistance from the United Nations and international human rights organizations, all of which possess considerable knowledge and experience of a wide range of transitional justice mechanisms. In the end, the accountability measures introduced by the Americans either backfired or were hopelessly flawed. What are needed in Iraq are a secure environment and a legitimate authority to implement a comprehensive transitional justice strategy that reflects the needs and priorities of a wide range of Iraqis. Such a strategy should contain several measures, including prosecutions, reparations, a balanced approach to vetting, truth-seeking mechanisms and institutional reform.
25
LEE, YONG-SHIK. "Three Wrongs Do Not Make a Right: The Conundrum of the US Steel and Aluminum Tariffs." World Trade Review 18, no. 3 (May 14, 2019): 481–501. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s147474561900020x.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractIn March 2018, the United States enacted tariff increases on a vast range of imported steel and aluminum products. The Trump administration cited national security concerns as the justification, claiming an exception under GATT Article XXI. In response to these tariffs, several WTO Members, including the European Union, Canada, Mexico, China, Russia, and Turkey, adopted their own tariffs against imports from the United States, justifying their tariffs under the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. Other Members, such as South Korea, Brazil, and Argentina opted for quota agreements on these exports with the United States in exchange for exemption from the tariffs. This article argues that none of these measures is consistent with WTO rules. The sweeping tariffs that the United States have adopted, the retaliatory measures that several Members have implemented, and the bilateral quota agreements that three Members concluded with the United States are indeed ‘three wrongs’ that do not make a right, but rather endanger the stability of the international trading system under WTO legal disciplines.
26
Humphreys, Ian, and Graham Francis. "Traditional Airport Performance Indicators: A Critical Perspective." Transportation Research Record: Journal of the Transportation Research Board 1703, no. 1 (January 2000): 24–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.3141/1703-04.
Full textAbstract:
Airport managers require effective performance measures to enable them to plan and manage within the context of rapid passenger growth and the trend toward an expansion of commercial activities. Airport performance measurement in various ownership patterns from Europe and the United States is reviewed, bringing together a rich picture of different practices. The need to be aware of contingent circumstances to evaluate airport performance objectively is emphasized. Many measures currently in use are output variables and are usually quantitative and based on what is easy to measure instead of what is important to measure. The problems of discrepancies in the definition of key variables and of attempts to achieve direct comparability between airports are examined. Consideration is given to the dysfunctional effects of measurement systems and how they can be adapted to encourage innovation and organizational learning through such techniques as best-practice benchmarking. Airport planners, managers, and academics who have an interest in performance measurement and who wish to question the role of traditional measures will be interested in the discussion. Lessons from European experience in a postprivatization environment are considered. The research recommends the adoption of a performance measurement system for airports that examines processes as well as results and that considers antecedent variables as well as outcome variables. The conclusions indicate how airport planners and managers can gain new insight into the underlying processes behind quantitative indicators and how an understanding of these processes can stimulate organizational learning and innovation.
27
Slawotsky, Joel. "The Fusion of Ideology, Technology and Economic Power: Implications of the Emerging New United States National Security Conceptualization." Chinese Journal of International Law 20, no. 1 (March 1, 2021): 3–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/chinesejil/jmab007.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract The historical narrative of the national security exception in trade and investment has long been understood from the perspective of measures to defend the nation from military attack or territorial invasion. The cornerstone of the existing global governance model encourages non-discriminatory trade and vigorous cross-border investment, thus the security exception in international economic agreements was envisioned as a “last-resort” allowing a nation to override international economic obligations only if necessary and invoked in good-faith to protect essential security. However, in a world of emergent technology, with potentially devastating future effects, theorizing national security is more difficult and complex. Moreover, the two primary global powers are locked in a hegemonic struggle. The United States has in recent years aggressively resorted to national security to justify investment and trade policies against China. The foundational basis for doing so is a new conceptualization of national security constituting a fusion of interests encompassing the ideological, technological and economic. This re-conceptualization radically re-defines the understanding of national security. Taken to its logical conclusion, the new conceptualization of security risks an unfettered broadening of the exception, driving a transformative re-alignment in the global international economic architecture.
28
Fahmy, Walid. "The measures against the International Criminal Court (USA v. ICC): the perspective of International Law." RUDN Journal of Law 25, no. 1 (December 15, 2021): 309–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.22363/2313-2337-2021-25-1-309-332.
Full textAbstract:
Since its creation, the International Criminal Court has faced the refusal of the United States to cooperate, which, in addition to staying outside the Rome Statute, has undertaken a real strategy of weakening the Criminal Code. The argument put forward by the US Government against the Rome Statute is that an international treaty cannot create obligations for a non-party state and therefore the United States denies any jurisdiction of that jurisdiction over its nationals. As early as 2000, that country had unsuccessfully introduced a proposal before the Preparatory Commission to prevent bringing American military personnel to the Court. The American Service Members Protection Act (ASPA), bilateral immunity agreements and Security Council resolutions constitute the arsenal used by States at that time to neutralize the ICC. Recently, the United States signed an order authorizing the United States to prevent and penalize employees of the International Criminal Court from entering the country. The US administration, which has been critical of the ICC for months, is opposed to launching investigation into war crimes in Afghanistan. Is not that a sign of difficulty with the US Legal Justifications? In other words, does this weakness open up the possibility of prosecution in the event of a violation of international law by US?
29
Butt, Ali Azhar, John Harvey, Arash Saboori, Maryam Ostovar, Manuel Bejarano, and Navneet Garg. "Decision Support in Selecting Airfield Pavement Design Alternatives Using Life Cycle Assessment: Case Study of Nashville Airport." Sustainability 13, no. 1 (December 31, 2020): 299. http://dx.doi.org/10.3390/su13010299.
Full textAbstract:
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has taken measures to improve safety, reduce costs, increase resilience, and improve the sustainability of the United States (U.S.) airfield infrastructure by using a life-cycle cost analysis methodology to increase the efficient use of economic resources needed for expanding and preserving the airfield system. However, a life-cycle assessment (LCA) approach for evaluating the environmental impacts of decisions regarding airfield infrastructure has yet to be fully developed and applied. The objective of this study is to demonstrate the use of the airfield LCA framework that was developed for the FAA and can be used by U.S. airports. The comparison of alternative pavement designs at Nashville International Airport (BNA) is presented. The scope of the study was from cradle to laid; materials, materials transportation, and construction stages of the pavement life cycle are considered, and the maintenance, use and end of life stages are not considered. Primary data were acquired from BNA and secondary data were used in situations of unavailability of primary data. The case study showed that performing LCA provides opportunities for airports to consider energy use and environment-related impacts in the decision-making process.
30
Gill, Amandeep Singh. "Artificial Intelligence and International Security: The Long View." Ethics & International Affairs 33, no. 02 (2019): 169–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0892679419000145.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractHow will emerging autonomous and intelligent systems affect the international landscape of power and coercion two decades from now? Will the world see a new set of artificial intelligence (AI) hegemons just as it saw a handful of nuclear powers for most of the twentieth century? Will autonomous weapon systems make conflict more likely or will states find ways to control proliferation and build deterrence, as they have done (fitfully) with nuclear weapons? And importantly, will multilateral forums find ways to engage the technology holders, states as well as industry, in norm setting and other forms of controlling the competition? The answers to these questions lie not only in the scope and spread of military applications of AI technologies but also in how pervasive their civilian applications will be. Just as civil nuclear energy and peaceful uses of outer space have cut into and often shaped discussions on nuclear weapons and missiles, the burgeoning uses of AI in consumer products and services, health, education, and public infrastructure will shape views on norm setting and arms control. New mechanisms for trust and confidence-building measures might be needed not only between China and the United States—the top competitors in comprehensive national strength today—but also among a larger group of AI players, including Canada, France, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United Kingdom.
31
Hall, Charles, Yasushi Hamao, and Trevor S. Harris. "A Comparison of Relations Between Security Market Prices, Returns and Accounting Measures in Japan and the United States." Journal of International Financial Management & Accounting 5, no. 1 (February 1994): 47–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-646x.1994.tb00034.x.
Full text
32
FARAH, Marya, and Maha ABDALLAH. "Security, Business and Human Rights in the Occupied Palestinian Territory." Business and Human Rights Journal 4, no. 1 (December 17, 2018): 7–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/bhj.2018.27.
Full textAbstract:
AbstractBusinesses have increasingly recognized their responsibility to respect human rights in their operations. This has been in part guided by international initiatives, such as the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, as well as guidance and regulations from states. Although these measures recognize risks associated with conflict-affected areas, contexts of occupation present unique concerns. These issues become even more complex when states send mixed messages to businesses. This is most evident when examining the discourse on and regulation of business operations linked to Israel’s prolonged occupation of Palestinian territory, especially those with operations and relationships related to ‘security’. This article seeks to highlight the frequent disregard of human rights responsibilities and obligations by states and businesses related to the occupied Palestinian territory and population, which has created a gap in accountability that civil society has attempted to address.
33
Aksenov, Pavel A. "The US Foreign Investment Regulation: Trade War Restrictions." International Trade and Trade Policy, no. 4 (January 3, 2020): 31–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.21686/2410-7395-2019-4-31-41.
Full textAbstract:
Over the past several years, the United States has taken a leading position in the world in attractiveness to foreign investors, largely due to the policy of favoring foreign investment and the absence of significant restrictions on incoming FDI. Currently the United States are trying to find a balance between openness to foreign investment and emerging issues related to the economy and national security. As a result of the adoption of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act in 2018, the authority of the US Foreign Investments Committee was significantly expanded and the requirements for transactions were tightened, in particular, monitoring and verification of compliance with national security requirements. Despite the fact that these measures affected all incoming FDI in the United States, they are primarily an instrument of competition between the United States and China. Restrictions on outbound investment by China, as well as new requirements on the part of the United States, have significantly reduced the flow of FDI from China to the United States, especially in high-tech industries and infrastructure projects. Meanwhile, the US direct investment in China has remained stable over the past few years. In addition, there are some industry regulations on the share of foreign investors in the capital of energy companies, broadcasting companies, banks and others. Investment relations between the two countries, according to the investors, despite political and trade contradictions, remain quite close.
34
Welton, Evonn, Shernavaz Vakil, and Bridgie Ford. "Beyond Bullying: Consideration of Additional Research for the Assessment and Prevention of Potential Rampage School Violence in the United States." Education Research International 2014 (2014): 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2014/109297.
Full textAbstract:
For approximately 15 years there have been a number of episodes of rampage school violence in elementary/high school and higher education in the United States. Initial responses included implementation of antibullying programs, disciplinary measures, and increased law security measures. As the incidences have continued, it has become apparent that a more collaborative and interdisciplinary approach is needed for prevention. This paper offers a review of research literature as it applies to proposed innovative strategies for collaborative research, prevention, and intervention in the school setting.
35
Gordon, Joy. "Introduction." Ethics & International Affairs 33, no. 3 (2019): 275–77. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0892679419000340.
Full textAbstract:
It is hard to imagine a threat to international security or a tension within U.S. foreign policy that does not involve the imposition of economic sanctions. The United Nations Security Council has fourteen sanctions regimes currently in place, and all member states of the United Nations are obligated to participate in their enforcement. The United States has some thirty sanctions programs, which target a range of countries, companies, organizations, and individuals, and many of these are autonomous sanctions that are independent of the measures required by the United Nations. Australia, Canada, the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and others also have autonomous sanctions regimes, spanning a broad range of contexts and purpose. Most well-known are those concerning weapons proliferation, terrorism, and human rights violations; but sanctions are also imposed in such contexts as money laundering, corruption, and drug trafficking. States may also impose sanctions as a means to achieve foreign policy goals: to pressure a foreign state to bend to the sanctioner's will, to punish those who represent a threat to the sanctioner's economic or political interests, or to seek the end of a political regime toward which the sanctioner is hostile, to give but a few examples.
36
Farrelly, Matthew C., and Paul R. Shafer. "Comparing Trends Between Food Insecurity and Cigarette Smoking Among Adults in the United States, 1998 to 2011." American Journal of Health Promotion 31, no. 5 (August 4, 2016): 413–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0890117116660773.
Full textAbstract:
Purpose: Previous studies have shown that cigarette smoking is associated with higher rates and severity of food insecurity but do not address how population-level smoking rates change in response to changes in food security. Design: Trend analysis of serial cross-sectional data. Setting: Data from a representative survey of US households. Participants: Adults within households participating in both the Food Security Supplement and Tobacco Use Supplement of the Current Population Survey during 5 overlapping administrations from 1998 to 2011. Measures: A “current smoker” is defined as someone who indicated that they currently smoke on “some days” or “every day.” A household’s food security is coded as “secure” or “insecure,” according to responses to a food security scale, interpreted using a US Department of Agriculture standard. Analysis: Descriptive comparison of the roughly triennial trends in the prevalence of food insecurity and current smoking from 1998 to 2011. Results: The prevalence of food insecurity increased by 30% among adults overall versus 54% among current smokers, with most of the changes occurring following the economic recession of 2008 and 2009. Over this same period, the prevalence of current smoking declined by 33% among food-secure adults and only 14% among food-insecure adults. Conclusion: Food insecurity increased more markedly among adult smokers than nonsmokers, and the prevalence of smoking declined more slowly in food-insecure households, indicating that more low-income smokers are facing hunger, which may at least partly be due to buying cigarettes.
37
ZHURAVEL, VALERY P. "NEW THREATS TO RUSSIA’S NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE ARCTIC: PROBLEMS OF COUNTERACTION." Scientific Works of the Free Economic Society of Russia 226, no. 6 (2020): 85–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.38197/2072-2060-2020-226-6-85-98.
Full textAbstract:
The article reveals real and potential threats to the national security of the Russian Federation in the Arctic region by the NATO. According to the author, these include: the strengthening of the military presence in the Arctic of the Arctic Ocean coastal States and other NATO countries; the increase in the combat capabilities of groups of coalition and national Armed Forces (Navy) of the United States and NATO; the development of naval-based missile defences and early warning systems; the expansion of the United States military satellite constellation to the Arctic; increased activity by the special services of foreign states in conducting intelligence activities in the Arctic and in the frontier territory of the Russian Federation; conduct of multinational military exercises and transfer of combat training areas to the Arctic; the desire of a number of foreign countries to give the Northern Sea Way the status of an international transport highway, and of the Norwegian leadership to change the status of Spitsbergen, to reduce and eventually completely displace the Russian Federation from the archipelago; increasing attempts to discredit the activities of the Russian Federation in the Arctic. The article discusses the measures of the Russian Federation to strengthen the defensive capability in the Arctic direction, paying special attention to the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
38
JIANAKOPLOS, NANCY AMMON, and VICKIE L. BAJTELSMIT. "Dual private pension households and the distribution of wealth in the United States." Journal of Pension Economics and Finance 1, no. 2 (July 2002): 131–55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1474747202001063.
Full textAbstract:
Using data from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances, this paper examines the impact of dual private pension households on the distribution of household wealth in the United States. This paper builds on three lines of previous research: inquiries into ‘assortative mating’, i.e., the tendency for people with similar characteristics to marry; studies emphasizing the importance of pensions as a component of household wealth; and recent research examining how wives' earnings alter the distribution of household income. Evidence of ‘assortative private pensions’, i.e., the tendency for people with private pensions to be married to people with private pensions, is presented. Estimates of the expected value of private pension and social security wealth are added to measures of household non-retirement net worth to obtain the value household wealth. These data indicate that wives' private pensions in dual private pension households contribute marginally to greater equality in the wealth distribution.
39
Ефремов, Андрей, and Andrey Efremov. "THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE USA LEGISLATION ON THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM AFTER 11 SEPTEMBER 2001." Journal of Foreign Legislation and Comparative Law 3, no. 3 (July 10, 2017): 86–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/article_593fc343c391e2.71878517.
Full textAbstract:
The article is devoted to development of the USA legislation on the fight against terrorism. The author considered the objectives and tasks of the state in a particular historical period; analyzed the laws passed by the USA Congress aimed at combating home and international terrorism; identifies the main directions of the state policy of the USA in the field of counter-terrorism. The article covers the events after 11 September 2001 to the present. The author gives a brief overview of the events of 11 September 2001, discusses the Patriot Act and other laws, aimed at combating terrorism. The Patriot Act allows the Federal Bureau of Investigation to intercept telephone, verbally and electronic communications relating to terrorism, computer and mail fraud; introduces special measures to combat money-laundering; expands immigration rules, in particular, mandatory requirement of detention of persons suspected of terrorism appeared; reveals the procedure of multilateral cooperation to combat terrorism, strengthening measures to investigate terrorist crimes; established rewards for information on terrorism; introduces the procedure of identification of DNA of persons charged for committing terrorist crimes or any violent crime; introduced the concept of domestic terrorism and Federal crimes of terrorism, the prohibition on harboring terrorists and material support; there is a new crime — terrorist and other acts of violence against public transportation systems. The law abolished for the statute of limitations for crimes of terrorist orientation. In 2002 5 laws wer adopted: “Homeland Security Act of 2002”, “Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002”, “Aviation and Transportation Security Act“, “Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002”, “Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002”. The Palestinian Anti-Terrorism Act was adopted in 2006. This law restricted the financial assistance to the Palestinian national authority; Haqqani Network Terrorist Designation Act of 2012 included the Haqqani Network in the list of international terrorist organizations; the political act of refusal of admission to the United States representative to the United Nations, because he was accused of the occupation of the espionage or terrorist activities against the United States and poses a threat to the national security interests of the United States.
40
Waldron, Jonathan K., and Jeanne M. Grasso. "Security and the Law in the Wake of September 11, 2001." International Oil Spill Conference Proceedings 2003, no. 1 (April 1, 2003): 467–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.7901/2169-3358-2003-1-467.
Full textAbstract:
ABSTRACT Everything has changed since the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001. With more than 360 ports and 3,700 terminals handling passengers and cargo, the U.S. government quickly realized that the maritime industry was vulnerable and that the apparent gaping hole in our national security must be fixed. Numerous initiatives, including legislative, regulatory, and ad hoc actions, are being implemented to ensure the maritime industry is ready in case it is the “next target.” Concomitant with these efforts, come changes in existing standards and liabilities, including reduced rights and enhanced enforcement. This paper discusses the maritime-related implications of the emerging security regime in the United States post-September 11 including: (1) new and proposed legislation affecting vessel and facility owners and operators, (2) how increased security inspections may be used to enhance enforcement efforts, and (3) how the terrorist attacks have “raised the bar” with regard to owner and operator liability. Pollution preparedness and liability implications are also explored, including changes in liability and response actions resulting from a terrorist attack. Lastly, recommendations on appropriate preventive measures are provided.
41
Birkett, Daley J. "Asset Freezing at the European and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights: Lessons for the International Criminal Court, the United Nations Security Council and States." Human Rights Law Review 20, no. 3 (September 2020): 502–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/hrlr/ngaa022.
Full textAbstract:
Abstract This article examines the human rights implications of the asset freezing processes available to the International Criminal Court and the United Nations Security Council. It does so through the lens of the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, from whose jurisprudence, although not uniform, a number of principles can be distilled. By scrutinising a series of cases decided under the European Convention on Human Rights and American Convention on Human Rights, respectively, the article demonstrates that the rights to the peaceful enjoyment of property and to respect for one’s private and family life, home and correspondence are necessarily implicated by the execution of asset freezing measures in criminal and administrative contexts. The article concludes that, considering the human rights constraints placed on the exercise of their powers, both the International Criminal Court and United Nations Security Council, as well as States acting at their request, must pay attention to this case law with a view to respecting the human rights of those to whom asset freezing measures are applied.
42
Gavin, Francis J. "Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation." International Security 40, no. 1 (July 2015): 9–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00205.
Full textAbstract:
The United States has gone to extraordinary lengths since the beginning of the nuclear age to inhibit—that is, to slow, halt, and reverse—the spread of nuclear weapons and, when unsuccessful, to mitigate the consequences. To accomplish this end, the United States has developed and implemented a wide range of tools, applied in a variety of combinations. These “strategies of inhibition” employ different policies rarely seen as connected to one another, from treaties and norms to alliances and security guarantees, to sanctions and preventive military action. The United States has applied these measures to friend and foe alike, often regardless of political orientation, economic system, or alliance status, to secure protection from nuclear attack and maintain freedom of action. Collectively, these linked strategies of inhibition have been an independent and driving feature of U.S. national security policy for more than seven decades, to an extent rarely documented or fully understood. The strategies of inhibition make sense of puzzles that neither containment nor openness strategies can explain, while providing critical insights into post–World War II history, theory, the causes of nuclear proliferation, and debates over the past, present, and future trajectory of U.S. grand strategy.
43
Henderson, Christian. "II. INTERNATIONAL MEASURES FOR THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS IN LIBYA AND CÔTE D'IVOIRE." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 60, no. 3 (July 2011): 767–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020589311000315.
Full textAbstract:
The interpretation of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter has been the elephant in the room, or more accurately the chamber of the Council, since the bitter divisions over the ‘revival argument’ and the invasion of Iraq in 2003.1 Although there has been some evidence of an increase in the specificity of UNSC resolutions in an effort to avoid the same difficulties reoccurring,2 the margin of appreciation provided to States in interpreting the mandates provided to them has recently come into focus again.
44
Lehto, Martti. "The Cyberspace Threats and Cyber Security Objectives in the Cyber Security Strategies." International Journal of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism 3, no. 3 (July 2013): 1–18. http://dx.doi.org/10.4018/ijcwt.2013070101.
Full textAbstract:
Threats in cyberspace can be classified in many ways. This is evident when you look at cyber security on a multinational level. One of the most common models is a threefold classification based on motivational factors. Most nations use this model as a foundation when creating a strategy to handle cyber security threats as it pertains to them. This paper will use the five level model: cyber activism, cybercrime, cyber espionage, cyber terrorism and cyber warfare. The National Cyber Security Strategy defines articulates the overall aim and objectives of the nation's cyber security policy and sets out the strategic priorities that the national government will pursue to achieve these objectives. The Cyber Security Strategy also describes the key objectives that will be undertaken through a comprehensive body of work across the nation to achieve these strategic priorities. Cyberspace underpins almost every facet of the national functions vital to society and provides critical support for areas like critical infrastructure, economy, public safety, and national security. National governments aim at making a substantial contribution to secure cyberspace and they have different focus areas in the cyber ecosystem. In this context the level of cyber security reached is the sum of all national and international measures taken to protect all activities in the cyber ecosystem. This paper will analyze the cyber security threats, vulnerabilities and cyber weaponry and the cyber security objectives of the Cyber Security Strategies made by Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States.
45
Sow, Mouhamadou, and Christina Gehrke. "Evaluating Information Security System Effectiveness for Risk Management, Control, and Corporate Governance." Business and Economic Research 9, no. 1 (January 28, 2019): 164. http://dx.doi.org/10.5296/ber.v9i1.13994.
Full textAbstract:
Using Grounded Theory, this study addresses factors related to forensic accounting, as well as various issues that can arise due to lack of security measures. The study identifies issues related to lack of security measures and cybersecurity crimes, and their impact on corporate-governance practices within organizations. This qualitative research study was phenomenological in nature and participants included a group of twelve employees in the field of forensic accounting, auditing, and information security systems across several organizations in the Southwest United States who were interviewed about cybersecurity and information security. Specific research literature provides a framework for this study, indicating the need for information technology that reinforces data safety and increases the effectiveness of corporate governance. The forensic accounting system depends on auditing and risk-control factors because in their absence, organizations may be unable to keep data confidential. Larger firms must adopt security measures that advanced technology provides within the accounting system to help develop fairness and transparency within the forensic accounting system. The study proposes means of increasing good corporate-governance practices and decreasing the risk in larger organizations using the latest technology.
46
Jeong, Seokjin, Dae-Hoon Kwak, Byongook Moon, and Claudia San Miguel. "Predicting School Bullying Victimization: Focusing on Individual and School Environmental/Security Factors." Journal of Criminology 2013 (July 10, 2013): 1–13. http://dx.doi.org/10.1155/2013/401301.
Full textAbstract:
Bullying behavior continues to be a salient social and health-related issue of importance to educators, criminal justice practitioners, and academicians across the country. While discourse on school bullying is abundant, previous studies are limited in explaining the predictive effect of factors such as individual/demographic variables, school environmental variables, and school antibullying preventive measures. Using a nationally representative sample of 12,987 private and public school students in the United States, the current study examines school safety measures and students’ perceptions about school environments (or climate), especially school rules and punishment. Findings reveal that the variables of security guards, fairness and awareness of school rules, gangs and guns at school, students misbehaving, and teachers’ punishment of students were statistically significant predictors of bullying victimization. Implications of these findings for school anti-bullying programs as well as directions for future research are discussed.
47
Weiss, Cornelia, and Eva María Rey Pinto. "Twenty Years After UNSCR 1325: Equal Access to Military Education in the Western Hemisphere?" Estudios en Seguridad y Defensa 15, no. 30 (December 30, 2020): 303–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.25062/1900-8325.280.
Full textAbstract:
Twenty years after the unanimous adoption of UNSCR 1325 and the beginning of the women, peace and security agenda, the UN Security Council, for the first time, explicitly addressed equal access to education for uniformed female personnel. On August 28, 2020, the UN Security Council issued resolution 2538, and with it, the need by Member States to provide equal access to education, training and capacity building to all uniformed women.
This paper explores the importance of providing equal access to education for uniformed women, it identifies barriers erected against women’s access to education in the defense sector in the Western Hemisphere, and it recommends proactive measures to eliminate barriers. This research is supported by a review of primary and secondary sources, autoethnography, and an analysis of data from countries such as the United States, Colombia, Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Brazil.
48
Bhandari, Ravneet S., Sanjeev Bansal, and Lakhwinder K. Dhillon. "Understanding Sino–US Trade War: An American Government Perspective." Management and Economics Research Journal 5 (2019): 1. http://dx.doi.org/10.18639/merj.2019.958453.
Full textAbstract:
To comprehend Sino–US trade relations, this research article decrypts the trade relations among China and the United States from the American government perspective (Presidency of Donald Trump). The American government claims that the Chinese government's high import levies and subsidies to Chinese firms cause the Sino–US trade war, bringing about economic misfortunes in the United States. The American government thus contends that forcing high levies on Chinese products (imports) can be corrective measures for Chinese governments' actions. This research article discovers that the American administration overestimates the deficits. Measures for diminishing China's imports cannot raise the American employment rate; on the contrary, China furnishes the United States with high caliber and low-cost products and services. Although China is one of the top investors for the United States, Chinese capitalists tend to capitalize the surplus by investing in American ventures and bonds. However, American administration limits Chinese capitals because of security concerns supported by various other nations (i.e., France, Germany, Britain, Australia, the European Union, Australia, Canada, and Japan). The fear for Chinese capitalists due to China's moving up to the high end of the value chain is an outcome of economic advancement. Consequently, the two nations should restrategize Sino–US trade patterns by developing trade and economic co-ordination by means of trade arrangements.
49
Urs, Priya. "The Role of the Security Council in the Use of Force against the ‘Islamic State’." Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online 19, no. 1 (May 30, 2016): 65–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18757413-00190004.
Full textAbstract:
The destabilization of Iraq and Syria by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and Al Nusrah Front has ignited extensive global debate about how to quell the group’s territorial gains in the region, and, preferably, to do so in a manner that is compliant with international law. In June 2014, the isil proclaimed the formation of an Islamic caliphate, boasting swathes of territory straddling the border between Iraq and Syria. A growing number of States have joined forces in a United States-led coalition against the isil, with varying contributions including airstrikes, military aid and humanitarian assistance. The on-going crisis in the Middle East presents international lawyers with an opportunity to re-evaluate the system of collective security envisaged in the 1945 Charter of the United Nations. This article evaluates the Security Council’s approach in addressing the situation in the Middle East as an ongoing threat to international peace and security, focusing on three areas in which it may play significant roles: 1. its participation, if any, in the exercise of self-defence under Art. 51; 2. its authorization of forcible and non-forcible measures under Chapter vii; and 3. the enduring obligation of multilateral cooperation it imposes upon States in the context of terrorism.
50
Krahmann, Elke. "The United States, PMSCs and the state monopoly on violence: Leading the way towards norm change." Security Dialogue 44, no. 1 (February 2013): 53–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0967010612470292.
Full textAbstract:
The proliferation of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in Iraq and Afghanistan has raised many questions regarding the use of armed force by private contractors. This article addresses the question of whether the increased acceptance of PMSCs indicates a transformation of the international norm regarding the state monopoly on the legitimate use of armed force. Drawing on theoretical approaches to the analysis of norm change, the article employs four measures to investigate possible changes in the strength and meaning of this norm: modifications in state behaviour, state responses to norm violation, the promulgation of varying interpretations of the norm in national and international laws and regulations, and changes in norm discourse. Based on an analysis of empirical evidence from the United States of America and its allies, the article concludes that these measures suggest that the USA is leading the way towards a transformation of the international norm of the state monopoly on violence, involving a revised meaning. Although this understanding has not yet been formally implemented in international law, it has allowed a growing number of countries to tolerate, accept or legalize the use of armed force by PMSCs in the international arena.