Academic literature on the topic 'Alternance (Political party : Senegal)'

A sparse literature examines African legislatures, generally thought to be weak and unimportant. Unlike many African countries that reintroduced multiparty politics in the 1990s, Senegal did so in the 1970s. In 2000, it joined the select group of African countries to experience democratic alternance. What role does the National Assembly play in light of these important steps in democratic consolidation? This article describes the operation of the National Assembly, with attention to its role in legislation, appropriations, executive oversight, constituent service and representation. The article concludes that despite Senegal's democratic advances, the operation of the National Assembly echoes much earlier studies of other African legislatures. These studies found that the legislatures did not play strong roles in legislation, appropriations or executive oversight, but instead played less formal roles such as constituent service and lobbying the administration for spending in their districts.

Constitutions and other legal frameworks are expected to ensure the protection of the fundamental and collective rights of citizens. In this respect, the regulation of political parties is a global phenomenon, which symbolises multi-party democracy, the rule of law and good governance. This article examines the phenomenon of the constitutional and legal regulation of political parties in the Central African Republic (hereafter CAR) and Senegal, two francophone countries with different trajectories and experiences of multi-party democracy. It identifies possible challenges and shortcomings of the regulation of political parties in the two countries, especially in relation to the actual implementation of the existing national frameworks. The article attempts to suggest possible frameworks for an effective implementation of the constitutional and legal rights of political parties, including the constitutionalisation of the enforcement mechanisms, which would undeniably protect the position of political parties in constitutional democracies. In conclusion, the article highlights the role of an independent judiciary in the promotion and protection of the constitutional and legal status of all political parties in the CAR and Senegal.

Abstract:Few scholars have taught us more about African voters, legislators, and legislatures than Joel Barkan. Drawing on Barkan’s analysis, the first part of this article argues that the African one-party state can be usefully viewed as a competitive-authoritarian system underpinned by a form of political linkage that allows for elements of coercion and competition. Building on this framework, the second part demonstrates that the political linkage structures that emerged in single-party systems such as those of Kenya, Senegal, and Tanzania have played an important role in shaping the dynamics of multiparty politics and the prospects for democratic reform.

Abstract Many observers believe that multi-party democracy increasingly represents the inevitable future of governance around the world, including Africa. Some countries such as South Africa, Ghana, Kenya, and Senegal have in fact made remarkable progress in instituting and moving toward consolidation of democratic systems. There has also been a history on the continent, however, of political systems that place de facto or de jure legal constraints on the ability of political parties to function. In fact, in recent years many African leaders have only grudgingly permitted multi-party politics under donor pressure. There remains a current of underlying skepticism toward political parties, and arguments exist against multi-party politics. This paper identifies and explains five key arguments. It then critiques them and determines that while individual elements of these arguments may have some validity, the conclusion that is drawn, i.e.that party activity should be constrained, if not prohibited, is not consonant with democratic governance. The final section presents suggestions of how weaknesses in political party functioning could be addressed without placing limits on the ability of parties to play their legitimate role in a democratic political process.

AbstractThis article examines the traditional initiation of the former Senegalese Minister of Agriculture. At the age of fifty-five the Catholic Minister was initiated into the secrets of the sacred grove and thus acquired the status of adult man. The article demonstrates that Jola ethnic discourse, in which male initiation has become an important symbol, forced the Minister to enter the grove. His initiation turned him into a full member of the Jola ethnic group and qualified him as a trustworhty man capable of representing the people. In the campaign of the Socialist Party internal elections the Minister's initiation nevertheless became a major issue. The electorate did not show unswerving loyalty to ‘their’ Minister and nominated a non-initiate. The electorate suddenly changed their standards of apt political representation. The article contributes to the contemporary debate on citizenship and primary patriotism by showing that the Senegalese easily shift their position from subject to citizen, and thus empower themselves vis-à-vis elusive politicians. It also shows that politicians penetrate Jola practices of secrecy and thereby further the Jola's integration into the national public sphere.

Regional Particularism and State Formation in Africa: The Diola in Southern Senegal and Their Relationship with Dakar In the French daily newspaper “Libération” of 819 september 1990 I read : “Reveil de la guerilla en Casamance. Two clashes occurred between the Senegalese army and MFDC guerillas on the 22th of august and the 4th of september; 16 soldiers and 24 guerillas were killed”. A morbid déjà vu. At the end of 1983, as I did my practical training in the town of Ziguinchor, in the south of Senegal, I witnessed some fierce clashes between the same participants, causing the death of some 200 people. How could this be happening in one of the most democratic states of Africa? Didn’t the political arena of some 16 different parties give enough room for oppositional currents? The answer must be negative, in some cases. In this paper I want to show the reader that the articulation of local organizational structures and development policies of a modem state can cause many problems. In this case the typical dynamics of the Diola society in southern Senegal and the specific way of state formation in Senegal after Independence form an explosive mixture. In the first part of the paper a description is given of the dynamics of the Diola society by portraying the organizational structures in Diola villages before the colonial period. Then, in the colonial period, due to new influences as a result of the contacts with foreigners, some local organizational structures are politicized. Among the Diola this process of politicizing took place on a very low level because the Diola society has all the characteristics of a segmentary society. Each village formed an autonomous unit headed by elders. The use of power lays in the hands of a group rather than in the hands of an individual. For this reason the Diola never fully participated in the political arena, not even after Independence. After Independence in 196O the regimes in Dakar tried to impose their authority in all parts of the new state. First Leopold Senghor and then Abdou Diouf strived to form an omnipotent political party. A party in which all regional, ethnic and professional currants would be represented. This became the Parti Socialiste (PS). In the traditionally hierarchically organized societies in the North and the East of the state this was done by encapsulating powerful individuals. Once they joined the party they would bring along many followers or dependants as new members. But in the segmentary Diola society those political leaders did not exist. Therefore some individuals were dropped in the region by the PS to represent the inhabitants. These strangers were given a lot of power in the region. But it should be clear that these “representatives” were not accepted by local people who had the feeling of being colonized for the second time. This time by fellow countrymen from the North For the Dakar regimes, a way to impose their hegemony was connected to the say over land ownership. Since the adaption of the National Lands Act on the 17th of june 1964, all transactions concerning the control over land must be regulated via the local governments. One of the main consequences of this reform is that the state becomes the sole landlord of all the land. This implies that local, mostly ancient, land tenure systems have formally ceased to exist. With the case of the explosive growth of the city of Ziguinchor I show the impact of this reform on the surrounding Diola society. As control over local land is the crux of the organizational structures of Diola society, this new intrusion of the state caused an emotional reaction. Moreover because it was mostly done at random by politicians who had only eyes for their own goals. This being the result of the specific way the state strived for hegemony and attempted to graft new forms of organization on the segmentary Diola society. With explosively results!

AbstractIn contrast with the imperial period, historians have overlooked African exile politics during the subsequent decades of one-party and military rule. Focusing on the Malian case, this article proceeds in three parts. The first section explores the creation in Africa, in particular in Ivory Coast and Senegal, of clandestine opposition movements to Moussa Traoré's regime. The second section focuses on Europe, particularly France, where dissidents benefitted from an unparalleled openness of the political system compared to that seen in African countries. The final section investigates the influence of these networks spanning Africa and Europe on the formation of pro-democracy organizations in Mali and the final overthrow of the Traoré regime in 1991. Theorizing exile as a process which enabled activists to operate in abeyance despite repression – before being able to emerge more openly – refines our understanding of political transitions which were driven by the juncture of internal and external dynamics.

My aim is to examine one particular mode of political participation: the urban riot. In the West African context its importance is enhanced by the fact that there exist few, if any, other ways in which the mass of the population can participate in the political process and seek to bring some influence to bear upon governments. For most of the time, in the majority of states in the region, constitutional mechanisms for influencing governments have been largely absent due to the prevailing climate of political authoritarianism. Only in the Gambia have competitive parties operated throughout the last 10 years, although a few other states (Nigeria, Ghana, Burkina Faso, and Senegal) have had this type of democratic system for part of the time. For the rest, single-party or military rule has held sway, and opportunities for influencing, or indeed replacing, governments through the ballot box have been marked by their absence. Authoritarianism has extended not only to opposition parties — or, in the case of the military, any political organisation — but also to autonomous or semi-independent pressure groups, which have in general been fairly weak, even where not banned altogether.

Ghana could be described as an island of peace in an ocean of conflicts. This is because most of Ghana’s West African neighbours have experienced (and some are still experiencing) various forms of national civil conflicts which have never occurred in Ghana. In the last three decades, the West Africa sub-region has been plagued with many intra-state conflicts. In Liberia, Sierra-Leone, Côte d’Ivoire and Mali, conflicts have escalated into full scale war, bringing with it numerous loss of lives, destruction of property and causing social despair for the citizenry. The peace of some countries like Senegal, Nigeria, Niger and recently Burkina Faso also continues to be threatened by different dissident groups and popular uprisings. While most of these countries’ democracies remain fragile due to the conflicts within these states, Ghana remains one of few examples whose current democratic structures have stood the test of time for the last three decades. This study inquired into Ghana’s conflict resistance capacities and its ability to continue to sustain its democracy as a country. Mixed methods approach was employed to select 132 community residents from 3 purposefully sampled conflict-prone communities in Ghana, and 5 key informants as well as 462 political party delegates for interviewing and data collection for the study.The study found that the very nature of Ghana’s internal conflicts with respect to their geographical limitations, the conflict parties involved as well as the issues at stake contribute to confine these internal conflicts within their areas of occurrence. In addition, some conscious social and institutional measures (put in place) in the Ghanaian democratic system help to promote peace and maintain order. Finally, majority of the respondents (63.6%) were of the opinion that Ghana is unlikely to have a national civil war because its democratic institutions are effective. It was suggested that politicians should avoid interfering in local conflicts and increase coverage for peace education programmes and conflict intervention initiatives in the country, among others.

Political parties proliferated in Senegal and other competitive authoritarian regimes in post-Cold War Africa. This dissertation examines the causes and consequences of that proliferation. Why do so many politicians create their own parties in this context and what are the consequences of party proliferation for opposition party behavior and presidential turnover? The dissertation addresses these questions with original data collected over sixteen months of fieldwork in Senegal, including over one hundred interviews, material from party archives, local press clippings, political biographies, and data on elections and party behavior. Party formation, strategy, and competition are shaped by the "uneven playing field," a hallmark of competitive authoritarian regimes that entails systematic, deep advantages for the ruling party in terms of access to political finance, media, and the state. Focused on Senegal, a critical case of party proliferation, the dissertation traces how the uneven playing field not only empowers the president to create incentives for proliferation; it also renders life in the opposition so difficult that many politicians form parties to negotiate their way into the state. A significant subset of Senegalese party leaders is primarily concerned not with competing in elections; they focus instead on patronage negotiation, which does not necessarily entail vote-seeking. Moreover, because most party leaders minimize their involvement in elections that are difficult to win, they rarely function as the consistent opposition parties that bolster liberal democracy. Party leaders rarely possess the endowments that foster such behavior- namely, prior experience as high-level state administrators and access to international private financing. Finally, in the absence of consistent opposition parties, ex-regime insiders often constitute the president's most serious electoral challengers. Insider opposition candidates' previous access to the state provides opportunities for political advancement that outsiders lack.
Government

A partir des cas burkinabè, béninois et sénégalais, la présente Thèse se propose d‟analyser les règles constitutionnelles et électorales qui déterminent le mode d‟accession et d‟exercice du pouvoir d‟Etat. Elle pose la question du rôle de ces règles et des institutions dans la survenue de l‟alternance démocratique d‟une part et de celui de l‟environnement social et politique de même que de l‟audace et de l‟autorité des juges constitutionnels dans son avènement ou dans sa remise en cause d‟autre part. Les Etats africains se sont, en effet, dotés de mécanismes normatifs et institutionnels permettant la tenue régulière d‟élections démocratiques sous la conduite d‟institutions électorales indépendantes chargées de garantir des changements véritablement démocratiques de gouvernement.Cependant, au regard de l‟actualité politique ambiante marquée par un reflux du nouveau constitutionnalisme lequel est caractérisé par une remise en cause de l‟édifice institutionnel issu de la vague de démocratisation des années 1990, on peut se demander si les principes consacrés dans les nouvelles constitutions peuvent être des facteurs de réalisation de l‟alternance démocratique. Comme on le voit, l‟ordre constitutionnel est aujourd‟hui constamment rompu soit par des révisions constitutionnelles, soit par des coups d‟Etat, soit encore par des accords politiques qui ont la particularité de participer à un processus de « déconstitutionnalisation ».Non seulement l‟élan constitutionnel qui devait propulser les Etats sur la voie de la démocratie constitutionnelle a été stoppé ou ralenti au profit d‟un présidentialisme prégnant, mais également l‟on observe que même là où l‟expérience de l‟alternance démocratique a été vécue, les conquêtes démocratiques n‟ont pas été suivies de la satisfaction de la demande sociale qui, pourtant, a généralement inspiré les réformes. La Thèse, tout en mettant le doigt sur les failles des dispositifs normatifs et politico-institutionnels mis en place, comme étant des facteurs favorisant les manipulations dévoyées des normes, insiste aussi sur la figure du juge constitutionnel marquée par sa faible contribution à la consolidation de la démocratisation
At present cases Burkinabè, Beninese and Senegalese, we propose to analyze the constitutional and electoral rules that determine the mode of accession and the exercise of state power. It raises the question of the role of these rules and these institutions in the avenue of the democratic alternation and that of the social environment and the policy of the audit and the authority of the constitutional judges in its advent or his questioning on the other hand. The United States has, in fact, opposed standards and institutions. They have been authenticated by democratic electoral institutions. This is a new time of a new constitution, is this is a self-review, as to it, as work of the building of the edition of 1990, as-it-it-it be carriers of institutions able to promote the occurrence of democratic alternation. As we can see, the constitutional order is today constantly paraded. The constitutional impulse that has propelled states towards the path of constitutional democracy has halted or slowed down in many states in favor of a pregnant presidentialism, but it is also observed that 'democratic alternation has been experienced, democratic conquests have not have not been followed by the satisfaction of the social demands that have yet been inspired. The Thesis, while finger-pointing on the flaws of normal and institutional, so that the manipulations are directed towards norms, also insists on the figure of the constitutional judge

This chapter examines how international factors may influence elite-led transitions, from direct military pressures and even intervention to the effects of international institutions and diffusion. The discussion is organized around Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way's distinction between leverage and linkage as sources of international influence. In four cases—Cyprus (1983), Grenada (1984), Panama (1989), and Haiti (1994)—outside intervention took a military form and directly displaced incumbents and/or established new democratic governments. Regime changes in Grenada and Panama came in the wake of U.S. military interventions that ousted the governments of Bernard Coard and Manuel Noriega, respectively. In the case of some low-income African countries, democratic transitions were motivated by threats or withdrawal of political and military support and economic aid—including from multilateral institutions. The chapter also considers the domestic politics of elite-led transitions, institutional transitions, and transitions in dominant party systems in Senegal and Mexico.

If language is the mucilage of culture, religion is its manifesto. Any revelation of identity through language happens only when the speaker begins talking, and even then that identity remains in doubt except perhaps to the most experienced ear. Is that skilled KiSwahili speaker a Mijikenda from the Kenya coast or a Kamba from the interior? Is that cultivated French speaker a citizen of Senegal or a resident of Paris? Did those fellows at the bar in São Paulo mix some Brazilian terms with their Japanese, and are they mobals rather than visitors? Religious affiliation is another matter. Hundreds of millions of people routinely proclaim their religion through modes of dress, hairstyles, symbols, gestures, and other visible means. To those who share a faith, such customs create a sense of confidence and solidarity. To those who do not profess that faith, they can amount to provocation. For the faithful, religion is the key to identity. And such identity is part of the impress of place. Religion and place are strongly coupled, not only through the visible and prominent architecture of places of worship but also because certain orthodox believers still proclaim that their god “gave” them pieces of real estate whose ownership cannot therefore be a matter of Earthly political debate. To some, the Holy Land is a place where Jesus walked. To others, it is a gift from God. To the latter, it is worth dying for. Countless millions have perished for their faith, but comparatively few for their language. Dutch schoolchildren of a former generation used to learn the story of a captured boatload of medieval mercenaries plying the Zuider Zee. To a man, the captives claimed to be Dutch. The captain of the boarding party had a simple solution: any real Dutchman would be able to pronounce the word Scheveningen, a fishing port on the North Sea coast. Those who got it right were given amnesty. Those who failed were thrown overboard and drowned. It is an unusual tale. Language, dialect, accent, and syntax can confer advantage, open (or close) doors to opportunity, and engender social judgments. But they are not historically linked to mass annihilation.