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Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Analytic Philosophy'
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1
Adeosun, O. I. "The problem of consciousness in analytic philosophy." Thesis, Sumy State University, 2015. http://essuir.sumdu.edu.ua/handle/123456789/40388.
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Consciousness is a state of being awake and able to understand what is happening around one. It is characterized by having an awareness of one‘s environment and one‘s existence, sensations, and thoughts. It is one of the fundamental basis of our existence. It makes life worth living and it gets one going in life. Consciousness makes life and living life beautiful. Imagine as human beings, that our sense of feeling is dead. A hot object can then be put on our body and we will not be able to feel it at all. That means we have the chances of getting injured almost every time, and there will be scars all over our body.
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Christensen, Carleton B. "Self and world from analytic philosophy to phenomenology." Berlin New York, NY de Gruyter, 2008. http://d-nb.info/988967723/04.
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Rosenkrantz, Max Langan. "Sense, reference and ontology in early analytic philosophy /." Full text (PDF) from UMI/Dissertation Abstracts International, 2000. http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/utexas/fullcit?p3004369.
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Price, Michael. "The unnameable : limits of language in early analytic philosophy." Thesis, University of Oxford, 2015. https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:fabc2f3f-a35b-4631-8f01-c829af2a96b8.
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This thesis concerns the view, shared by Frege, Russell and the early Wittgenstein, that there are entities that cannot be named. Chapter 1 clarifies the particular form this commitment takes in the work of these three authors. The chapter also details a distinctive cluster of philosophical difficulties attending the view certain entities are unnameable, and explores the relation between unnameability and inexpressibility. The remaining chapters are devoted to investigating what grounds there are for countenancing the unnameable. The particular focus throughout is Frege's thesis that concepts cannot be named. Chapters 2 and 3 are devoted to giving a detailed hearing to two arguments for Frege's thesis distinguishable in the locus classicus, 'On Concept and Object'. The first argument concerns the relationship between co-reference and intersubstitutability; the second concerns the unity of thought. It is contended that these arguments fail to substantiate Frege's thesis. Chapters 4 and 5 examine two further arguments for Frege's rejection of singular reference to concepts. The first is based upon the alleged impossibility of expressing identities between objects and concepts; the second draws on upon considerations pertaining to diagonalization and Russell's paradox. It is contended that each of these arguments can be resisted in defence of singular reference to concepts.
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Brohan, Anthony. "Analytic bias in coocurrence restrictions." Thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/93026.
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Thesis: S.M., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, 2014.<br>Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.<br>Includes bibliographical references (pages 57-59).<br>The representation, content and learning of phonotactic constraints has spurred a lot of recent research phonology. This work concerns the constraints involved in the representation of place-based coocurrence restrictions. A single OCP-[PLACE] constraint is argued to compete in in constraint learning with other place-based and feature-based coocurrence constraints. The key prediction of this constraint participating in learning is generalization of a coocurrence restriction on to a novel place. This prediction, along with others, are tested in a series of artificial language learning experiments. A modification of the existing Hayes and Wilson (2008) phonotactic learner is presented (HWgain). This modified model is more robust in inducing gradient constraints, induces more general constraints and significantly improves on regression fit with English well-formedness ratings<br>by Anthony Brohan.<br>S.M.
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Machado, Oscar A. "A Philosophy of Architecture." Scholarly Repository, 2009. http://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/oa_theses/205.
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To evaluate specific architectural theories, an analytic methodology was used. The specific architectural theories evaluated all have in common the fact that their formative models can explain how their original ideas manifest in the practice of architectural works. Although these architectural theories researched are thousands or in some cases hundreds of years apart, a way to compare and contrast them was to use philosophies of art common to all. This contemporary approach to analysis was done with the use of ?analytic philosophy? for its effectiveness to clarify concepts. Central aspects of architectural theories will be analyzed in detail through the lenses of four contemporary theories of the philosophy of art. They are: formalism (including neo-formalism and theories that emphasize the connection between form and function), expression theories, representation theories (including neo-representational and mimetic accounts), and theories based on aesthetic experience. Looking at architecture from the viewpoint of analytic philosophy of art provides new insights into the nature of architecture and illuminates the field in significant ways. A recommendation for further study is enclosed.
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Beaney, Michael. "The bonds of sense : an essay in the history of analytic philosophy." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1990. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.305672.
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PETROVICH, EUGENIO. "THE FABRIC OF KNOWLEDGE. TOWARDS A DOCUMENTAL HISTORY OF LATE ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY." Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/2434/613334.
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The dissertation aims at presenting an innovative approach (called «documental history») to the study of the history of contemporary philosophy, focusing on the case of Late Analytic Philosophy (LAP). The methodological innovation consists in the application of citation analysis techniques, drawn from the field of scientometrics, to the analysis of the structure and the dynamics of LAP. The main empirical results are presented in four scientometric analyses of LAP, which focus, respectively, on the scientometric distributions of LAP, the co-citation mapping of LAP, the epistemological function of citations within LAP, and the aging of LAP literature. The main theoretical result is the «feedback hypothesis», according to which the «documental space» of LAP shapes the intellectual behavior of analytic philosophers. Thus, the documental space of LAP should be accounted as a factor of philosophical change, besides the traditional intellectual and sociological factors.
A key aspect of the dissertation is the interdisciplinary integration of distant fields, such as scientometrics, history of philosophy, and philosophy of science.
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Roller, Diane. "A factor analytic study of fundamental personality dimensions identifiable in self-report inventories." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 1986. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/5515.
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Akehurst, Thomas Lawrence. "Britishness, logic and liberty : the cultural politics of twentieth century analytic philosophy." Thesis, University of Sussex, 2007. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.439619.
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Wood, Elizabeth J. 1959. "Philosophical perceptions of art and education with emphasis on the analytic philosophy of Nelson Goodman." Thesis, McGill University, 1990. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=22396.
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An epistemological dichotomy involving two kinds of knowledge has evolved historically since the time of the Greeks. This has led to the isolating from one another of the functions of understanding and evaluation, and to the belief that understanding is necessary to science, whereas appreciation is the aim of art.<br>The arts, consequently, are either considered unteachable, or have focused on methods for teaching feeling and appreciation.<br>This thesis proposes an alternative philosophical approach, one which recognizes that the distinction between mediate and immediate experience may be illusory, that the emotions, rather than being dialectically opposed to cognition may be instruments of it, and that appreciation may be as secondary to understanding in the arts as in the sciences. It proposes that the above approach, forwarded by American philosopher Nelson Goodman, offers a new and fresh epistemological framework upon which positive advances in the education of the arts will flourish. (Abstract shortened by UMI.)
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Lauer, Dean W. "The place of ethical possibility: Language and the constitution of the world in Heidegger's existential analytic." Thesis, University of Ottawa (Canada), 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/29026.
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This thesis attempts to show a relevant correlation between Heidegger's conception of language, as rooted in the logos, and the possibility for ethical action. That language is the primary mode of disclosure for Dasein suggests that the character of language will inflect the disclosure, and so the constitution of the world, according to the shape and way we use language. In short, the character of the world disclosed will be coloured by the language of disclosure. Thus, possibilities for ethical acting, insofar as we live in a world primordially constituted by language, arise in language and remain there with its users.
As is well known, Heidegger does not address the issue of ethical possibilities directly. Therefore, this is an interpretive, though as I contend an entirely plausible, reading of Heidegger's works mainly before and around Sein und Zeit. The interpretation suggests that there are language-based ethical possibilities implicit in his philosophy.
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Evans, Daniel Carson. "Disputing an Analytic Construct of Philosophical Conservatism." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2012. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/539.
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This paper examines and ultimately objects to a version of political Conservatism as described in Geoffrey Brennan and Alan Hamlin’s paper “Analytic Conservatism.” Brennan and Hamlin’s argument makes several claims about economic forecasting and societal risk-aversion that ultimately uphold the status quo within society. This paper examines these claims and refutes them, while also considering counter-arguments Brennan and Hamlin could use to defend their theory. In conclusion, this paper supports the analytic dimension of Brennan and Hamlin’s theory while criticizing the trivial and arbitrary nature of valuing the status quo.
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Decauwert, Guillaume. "L'articulation des aspects logique et "mystique" du Tractatus de Wittgenstein : forme et origines de la distinction entre dire et montrer." Thesis, Grenoble, 2013. http://www.theses.fr/2013GRENP003.
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La présente thèse de doctorat propose une interprétation du Tractatus logico-philosophicus qui prend pour fil directeur l'analyse de la distinction opérée par Ludwig Wittgenstein entre « ce qui peut être dit » et « ce qui se montre ». Il s'agit, à partir d'une étude de la relation entre les développements logiques du Traité et son aspect « mystique » (c'est-à-dire ses considérations concernant la notion de valeur absolue), de poser le problème de son unité structurelle. L'unité du premier ouvrage de Wittgenstein s'avère étroitement liée à la distinction entre dire et montrer en laquelle résident selon l'auteur l'« argument principal » de son livre et le « problème cardinal de la philosophie ». Afin d'expliquer l'unité du Tractatus, ce travail de recherche s'efforce d'élucider la nature de la distinction dire/montrer, d'abord par une analyse de ses applications dans les remarques dont le Traité est composé, puis par une enquête sur ses origines dans les œuvres de Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Arthur Schopenhauer, Otto Weininger, William James et Léon Tolstoï. Selon la lecture du texte ici présentée, tous les emplois de cette distinction participent d'une forme commune qui est liée à la notion de réflexivité (ou d'autoréférence)<br>This PhD thesis deals with Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-philosophicus and intends to construct an interpretation of the book by using the distinction between ‘what can be said' and ‘what shows itself' as a central thread. Starting from a study of the relationship between the logical developments of the treatise and its ‘mystical' aspect (i.e. its remarks on the idea of an absolute value), the thesis raises the problem of the structural unity of Wittgenstein's early work. It appears that this unity is intimately related to the distinction between saying and showing, which is, according to Wittgenstein, the ‘main point' of his book and ‘the cardinal problem of philosophy'. To explain the unity of the Tractatus, the present work tries to elucidate the nature of the say/show distinction—first, through an analysis of its use in the book, and second, through an investigation into its origins in the works of Frege, Russell, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Weininger, James, and Tolstoy. According to the reading presented here, all the uses of this distinction pertain to a common form, which is linked to the concept of reflexiveness (or self-reference)
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Zorzetto, Silvia. "The analytic Philosophy de Umberto Scarpelli. From the analysis of the evaluative language to the principles of bioethics." Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2014. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/116479.
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It is a biographical article about Uberto Scarpelli and its main aim is to give a philosophical scheme of Scarpelli, commenting the most important aspects of his life, his main works and the itinerary of his thought. The article depicts as a transversal idea that for Scarpelli there is no side study between philosophy and the General Theory of Law; quite the contrary, both of them are always in complete joining and mutual feedback. That is the reason why the article shows a scarpellian sight of language analysis, epistemology, ethical deliberation and General Theory of Law.<br>El presente trabajo es un artículo biográfico sobre Uberto Scarpelli. Tiene por objetivo principal proporcionar un mapa de la filosofía de Scarpelli, comentando los aspectos más importantes de su vida, sus principales obras y el itinerario de su pensamiento. El artículo muestro como idea transversal que, para Scarpelli, ningún estudio es lateral respecto de la filosofía y la teoría general del derecho, sino que, por el contrario, proceden siempre en estricta unión y mutua retroalimentación. Es por ello que el texto nos muestra la visión scarpelliana del análisis del lenguaje, de la epistemología, de la reflexión ética y de la teoría general del derecho.
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Nyanda, D. "The hard questions of consciousness in analytic philosophy (D. Dennett, D. Chalmers and J. Searle)." Thesis, Sumy State University, 2015. http://essuir.sumdu.edu.ua/handle/123456789/40264.
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Day to day activities of the human being focuses on consciousness. We are told that from the time we wake up to the time we sleep or die the human body is always conscious of its surroundings. Consciousness is the most important part of any daily human activity; it ranges from waking up to even by the time we are sleeping. We say that even dreaming is a form of consciousness at work.
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Åhlfeldt, Lina. "A Dangerous or Necessary Style? : An examination of the relevance of style in philosophy." Thesis, Uppsala universitet, Filosofiska institutionen, 2018. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-353129.
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No form of philosophy is without literary style. This is not always appreciated and opponents of style within philosophy often seem to be unaware of the role of style. Arguments that style is bad, good, or that diversity of styles is good needs to be investigated so that the underlying presuppositions and the meaning of different literary styles becomes clear. This thesis examines three arguments for and against style within philosophy and the relevance of literary style for the philosophical method. I investigate what arguments and fundamental assumptions about language that underlies the judgments that literary style in philosophy is either 1.) bad, 2.) good or, 3.) both bad and good (a diversity position). An analysis of three different positions to the question of the relevance of style will be performed. The analysis focuses on the basic understandings of what language is and does and reveals the underlying presuppositions of the attitudes towards style in philosophy. Only then can the different positions and attitudes towards style be defended and examined in an interesting and relevant way. The debate about philosophical style often misses a significant point because many are unaware of the philosophical presuppositions behind the arguments, and the argumentation risks to be flawed in relation to this. Firstly, a presentation of three different attitudes towards the relevance of style to the philosophical method is outlined. The approaches are represented by a reading of philosophers who either describe the relevance of literary style as 1.) bad, or not important for the method, 2.) important/necessary for the method, or 3.) that diversity is good for philosophy. Secondly, I examine how these three approaches are affected by the underlying philosophy of language with a focus on theories of metaphor. Depending on how one believes that language is related to reality and ourselves, one will assess style as a more, or less, relevant and contributing aspect of the philosophical work and method. The analysis shows that metaphors and other literary stylistic tools might sometimes be necessary and mediate something that cannot be expressed in another way: language can never capture the full potential of reality.
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Declos, Alexandre. "La métaphysique de Nelson Goodman." Thesis, Université d'Ottawa / University of Ottawa, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10393/37095.
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Cette thèse de doctorat est consacrée à la pensée du philosophe américain Nelson Goodman (1906-1998). Nous y défendons, à l’encontre de la plus grande partie de la critique, une lecture métaphysicienne de son œuvre. Il est démontré que Goodman, dans tous ses travaux, développe une métaphysique technique et méconnue, dont les piliers sont le nominalisme, le pluralisme, le perdurantisme, l’actualisme, et l’universalisme méréologique. Cette lecture permet de réévaluer l’ensemble de la pensée goodmanienne. Elle établit aussi ses liens insoupçonnés avec la métaphysique analytique contemporaine.
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Марченко, Анна Вікторівна, Анна Викторовна Марченко та Anna Viktorivna Marchenko. "Специфіка стилю аналітичної філософії у контексті дослідження соціального інтеракціонізму". Thesis, Cумський державний університет, 2016. http://essuir.sumdu.edu.ua/handle/123456789/47586.
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Незважаючи на той факт, що аналітичний стиль сучасного
філософствування вважається атрибутом англо-американської
традиції, останнім часом спостерігається значне збільшення інтересу
до стилю і методу аналітичної філософії і у континентальній Європі
[1, 26]. Окрім того, розширюються, власне, контексти застосування
таких методів, тим самим ще раз підтверджуючи те, що для спільними
для філософів-аналітиків різних напрямків є не доктринні установки
щодо першочергових питань онтології, а сам аналітичний стиль
філософствування.
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Byle, Nicholas. "Divine Temporality: Bonhoeffer's Theological Appropriation of Heidegger's Existential Analytic of Dasein." Scholar Commons, 2016. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/6196.
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This dissertation’s guiding question is: What was the impact of Martin Heidegger’s early philosophy on Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s theology? I argue that Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein, his technical term for human existence, provides Bonhoeffer with important conceptual tools for developing his Christology, from which the rest of his theology follows.
Part of recognizing Heidegger’s importance to Bonhoeffer involves understanding the latter’s critiques of previous notable philosophers such as Kant, Hegel, Husserl, and Scheler. As Bonhoeffer evaluates these philosophers, they lead to theologically unacceptable positions. Heidegger, in contrast, has come to a theologically profitable understanding of human existence and epistemology. Though there are theologically useful elements in Heidegger’s philosophy, there are elements that require significant alteration, and even rejection. Heidegger recognizes that epistemology must be based on actual human existence, and he can account for the historical continuity of human existence; however, because of Heidegger’s anthropocentric philosophy, he cannot account for God’s transcendence necessary for proper theology. Bonhoeffer then applies the conceptual tools he has appropriated from Heidegger to revelation, Christology, and the church. This eliminates the anthropocentrism that made transcendence impossible, while maintaining the benefits of Heidegger’s philosophy in order to account for Christian existence.
Understanding Bonhoeffer’s appropriation of Heidegger is additionally important for understanding Heidegger’s potential relation to theology. This dissertation concludes by placing Bonhoeffer in the context of other theological appropriations of Heidegger. In light of this context and Heidegger’s own understanding of philosophy’s relation to theology, I argue that Bonhoeffer represents one, viable theological use of Heidegger.
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Humphreys, Christopher. "On Black Anger: An Analytic-Philosophical Response to the Problem of Social Value." Scholarship @ Claremont, 2018. http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/1848.
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The fact of racial injustice in the US presents the difficult question of which emotional responses are (conceptually) appropriate to the perpetration of that injustice. Given that our answer must be informed by the nature of the injustice, this paper takes up Christopher Lebron’s diagnosis of the persistence of racial injustice against blacks in the US as a problem of social value in order to analyze a candidate response on the part of black americans. If Lebron’s theory accurately describes the problem, then it seems that anger appropriately responds to the injustice. The paper’s aim, then, is to give a positive account of black anger in response to the problem of social value. The account is informed by an analysis of “angry black literature,” i.e. a selection of essays from W. E. B. Du Bois, James Baldwin, and Audre Lorde. Approaching the subject within the framework of analytic philosophy, the paper concludes that anger is appropriate in virtue of its being a response to specific moral failures, and further notes that anger offers the ameliorative benefit of pointing out where those failures have taken place, and how we can avoid them in the future.
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Ottaviani, Osvaldo. "Modality, ontology, and phenomenology : Leibniz’s multiple views on existence : a historical and analytic reconstruction." Doctoral thesis, Scuola Normale Superiore, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/11384/86155.
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Biagi, Scott. "Ethnomethodology, Brandom's pragmatism and ordinary language philosophy : a reflection on the status of formal-analytic work." Thesis, Manchester Metropolitan University, 2018. http://e-space.mmu.ac.uk/620025/.
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This thesis examines the relationship between Garfinkel’s initiatives and the motivating insights of ordinary language philosophy, in terms of which it aims to give a coherent and philosophically satisfying account of Garfinkel’s attitude to “formal analysis” in the study of social life. It diagnoses confusion in the reception of ethnomethodology as stemming from a misconstrual of a central practice of ethnomethodological research: indifference to problems that arise for the analyst. On the face of it, there is much in common between Wittgenstein’s critique of philosophy and the idea of a “methodogenesis” (Garfinkel) of problems of formal analysis. Three interpretations suggest themselves: (1) Ethnomethodology relies on ordinary language philosophy for a motivating argument against Durkheimian sociology. (2) Garfinkel’s initiatives situate Wittgenstein’s critique of philosophy in the broader context of an ethnomethodological critique of formal analysis. (3) At the level of motivating insights, ethnomethodology and ordinary language philosophy are one and the same project. This thesis argues for (3). It approaches the interpretative issue in terms of an analogy between Durkheimian sociology and analytic philosophy of language. Both rely on a rule of method on the following lines: things of interest to the analyst (social facts, meanings) are to be regarded as separable from historic actions. Ethnomethodology and ordinary language philosophy deny such separability. The interpretative task is to clarify the role of criticism of formal analysis in reflection on members’ work. This thesis argues that criticism serves to remove formal-analytic obstructions to a member’s understanding of practical actions. Brandom’s pragmatism is considered as an example. In accordance with Garfinkel’s programmatic statements, the project of Making It Explicit is regarded in this thesis both as an obstruction to understanding and as a possible subject matter for ethnomethodological research. The overall aim is to rid this kind of two-sided treatment of formal analysis of the air of a paradox.
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Alsamaani, Nader Ahmed M. "An analytic philosophical approach to Ibn Arabi's conception of ultimate reality." Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2017. http://etheses.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/7827/.
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In my thesis, I aim to develop a systematic and philosophically coherent thesis of ultimate reality for Ibn Arabi. In this pursuit, I adopt the style of analytic philosophy, seeking to employ and utilise some of its methods and theories. The philosophical aspects of Ibn Arabi’s doctrine are in dire need of conceptual clarification and systematic analysis with a closer focus on argumentation. The analytic tradition will prove most helpful in this regard. In my thesis, I begin by tracing Ibn Arabi’s related views and concepts as they are dispersed throughout his writings. I then clarify, sharpen and, in many cases, develop these views and concepts into fully constructed forms. Finally, I weave the developed concepts and views into a systematic thesis or set of sub-theses. Where necessary, I provide my own (or borrowed) arguments and concepts to help substantiate and strengthen the structure of Ibn Arabi’s thesis. I propose that Ibn Arabi’s various, and sometimes apparently inconsistent, views are best presented in terms of three main concepts: the concept of ultimate reality as existence (wujud), which has long been known as Ibn Arabi’s thesis of the oneness of existence (wahdat al-wujud); the concept of ultimate reality as the Divine Self (dhat); and the concept of ultimate reality as God (ilah). The three concepts neither represent different ultimate realities nor different perspectives of the same ultimate reality. Instead, they represent the same ultimate reality but each one has its own unique scope and encompassment. The three concepts are aimed at encompassing Ibn Arabi’s various views and concepts of ultimate reality in a consistent and systematic manner.
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Arnold, Raymond Douglas. "An analytic philosophy of design and design education : major paradigms and implications for art & design education." Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1989. http://hdl.handle.net/2429/28149.
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This study is based on the premise that both the theoretical and practical work of curriculum development requires the support of generally understood and agreed concepts and terminology. The use of the term 'design' within the fields of design methodology, art & design education, and the design professions is analyzed for the purpose of distinguishing and correlating the various domains of attached meanings. This 'Analytic Philosophy' seeks to clarify to what extent the term 'design' is reliable when applied to the task of determining the purpose and content of design-related activities within art curricula.
Two major paradigms related to the notions of design as a 'problem-solving-process' and as a 'basic human capacity' are isolated and offered as dominant orientations towards design methodology and design curriculum development. Assumptions, beliefs, claims, and counter-claims seen to undergird these paradigms are mapped and analyzed along with the design-related content of Canadian provincial secondary art curriculum guides.
It is shown that the term 'design' commonly finds different meanings within different contexts and that agreement regarding the meaning of the term is difficult to establish both within and across the various design and art & design education domains. It is also evident that many of the claims which work to support the theoretical frameworks of the paradigms cannot be substantiated. It is concluded that the notion of 'design', as a result, remains conceptually and contextually vague and ambiguous.
It is further concluded that while such conceptual confusion might be of little consequence to the practical activities of the design professions, it can serve to complicate and inhibit communications and work particularly related to design education issues and curriculum development. Therefore the term 'design' is seen as unreliable when applied to the task of determining the purpose and content of design-related activities within art curricula.<br>Education, Faculty of<br>Curriculum and Pedagogy (EDCP), Department of<br>Graduate
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Olen, Peter Jackson. "Sellars in Context: An Analysis of Wilfrid Sellars's Early Works." Scholar Commons, 2012. http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/4191.
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Although Wilfrid Sellars's work holds a prominent place in recent analytic philosophy, little work has been done to situate his early approaches to normativity and the philosophy of language in their proper context. What little work has been done tends to emphasize Sellars's connection to a then dominant logical empiricism at the expense of marginalizing other American philosophical schools. On top of this historical issue, most scholars attempting to explain Sellars's systematic philosophy tend to ignore a developmental picture of Sellars's positions and focus on explicating the systematic character of his thought. My dissertation attempts to correct both of these tendencies by offering a historically situated account of Sellars's early papers that presents his views in relation to logical empiricism, the "Iowa School" of philosophy as embodied in Gustav Bergmann's and Everett Hall's writings, and some aspects of traditional American philosophy. By fleshing out the context of Sellars's early papers, it becomes clear that the "strong" normativist project present in his later essays developed out of his shift from his attempt to fit "traditional" philosophical problems into a formalist approach to language. My thesis acts as a "correction" to the previous interpretive points by presenting a more complex characterization of the contextual influences on Sellars's early papers and creating a foundation for a developmental account of Sellars's later views. I do this by examining evidence from Sellars's unpublished correspondence and works from a myriad of archival sources in conjunction with an analysis of his early publications.
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Carlson, Brian Matthew. "NIHILIST PERDURANTISM: A NEW ONTOLOGY OF MATERIAL OBJECTS." UKnowledge, 2017. http://uknowledge.uky.edu/philosophy_etds/17.
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Ordinary material objects, such as guitars and houses, do not seem to pose any serious philosophical problems. However, the nature of the material objects and their part-whole relation raises serious questions about fundamental ontologies. Furthermore, part-whole relations are not necessarily spatial; they can be temporal as well.
My dissertation investigates the problems posed by ordinary material objects, and the different ontological views that attempt to provide answers to these problems. I then present a new and radical view, which I call Nihilist Perdurantism (NP). NP claims that objects have temporal parts, but not spatial parts. I arrive at this view by first exploring and arguing against different views on composition, with a focus on arguments against common sense ontologies of ordinary objects. I then discuss the nature of mereological simples and argue against several views that claim that qualitatively heterogeneous simples are possible (Markosian and McDaniel). Next, I present my arguments against perdurantist, endurantist, and presentist view of persistence. I especially focus on endurantism, and use the aforementioned argument against the possibility of qualitatively heterogeneous simples to construct a similar argument against endurantism. Finally, I argue in favor of my view, NP. This view combines a mereological nihilist view (defended at various times by Unger, Van Inwagen, Merricks, and Sider) about spatial parts with a perdurantist view (defended at various times by Lewis, Hawley, Heller, and Sider) of temporal parts. Therefore, according to NP, there are no guitars, trees, or houses.
The only objects that exist are NP objects; these are line-shaped objects that extend through spacetime. With respect to the three spatial dimensions, these objects have no parts. However, with respect to the temporal dimension, NP objects do have parts in the form of points and line segments. My work shows that NP has better solutions to many of the puzzles and problems posed by material objects, such as the puzzle of change, over the three standard views. Hinchliff argues that change is puzzling because in order for there to be real change, then the following four intuitions must be true: (1) The candle persists through the change. It existed when it was straight, and it exists now when it is bent…(2) Shapes are properties not relations. They are one-placed, not many-placed…(3) The candle itself has the shapes. Not just a part but the candle itself was straight, and not just a part but the candle itself is bent…(4) The shapes are incompatible. If the shapes were compatible, there need not have been a change. The puzzle of change is the mutual inconsistency of these four intuitions. I argue that perdurantists must deny intuition (3), endurantists must deny intuition (2), and presentists must deny intuition (1). I then argue that only NP can accommodate all four intuitions about both macroscopic and microscopic change while resolving the inconsistency of the four intuitions.
My dissertation presents a new view that provides a fresh perspective on the debate about the nature of material objects. My development of NP touches on a number of other philosophical problems. In Chapter One, I discuss the role of intuitions in metaphysics, and argue that many supposedly “common sense” intuitions are already philosophical positions. In Chapter 2, I argue against Korman’s and Markosian’s common sense ontologies of ordinary objects. In Chapter 3, I argue that the endurantist view of persistence is inconsistent and should be rejected. In addition to making the case for NP and its solution to the puzzle of change in Chapter 4, I also argue that NP can solve the problem of motion in a homogenous substance. Finally, in Chapter Five, I argue against the possibility of both gunky and junky material objects.
28
Di, Rocco Valdecantos Florencia. "La métaphysique comme branche de la littérature fantastique : une lecture wittgensteinienne de Borges." Thesis, Paris 1, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017PA01H230/document.
Full textAbstract:
La métaphysique comme branche de la littérature fantastique : une lecture wittgensteinienne de Borges. L'une des formules de Borges tient que la "métaphysique" n'est qu'une branche de la littérature fantastique. Caractérisant la logique borgésienne d'une "ludique" herméneutique - celle de lire les textes philosophiques à partir des narrativités qu'ils autorisent- cette remarque semble pourtant soulever une question proprement philosophique : celle du statut de notre concept ordinaire d'objet. D'après la proposition wittgensteinienne, notre concept d'objet physique n'est qu'un concept "logique". La question demeure ainsi de savoir si nos jeux de langage ordinaire épuisent sa grammaire, et dans quelle mesure les fictions et les essais de Borges, qui jouent avec celle-ci, devraient être considérés comme un élargissement, ou bien comme une distorsion de la grammaire ordinaire de l'objet. Il s'agira ainsi d'interroger, d'un côté, si les textes borgésiens tolèrent une lecture analytique ; d'un autre, de démontrer comment la fiction, en recadrant à chaque fois le partage entre dire et montrer, permet d'en détourner, ou bien d'en dépasser la "logique"<br>Metaphysics as a branch of fantastic literature: a Wittgensteinian reading of Borges. One of Borges' slogans holds that "metaphysics" is only a branch of fantastic literature. Characterizing the Borgesian logic behind a playful hermeneutics -i.e., the possibility to read philosophy througout the narrativities it authorizes- this remark seems to raise a strictly philosophical question, namely that of the status of our ordinary concept of object. According to Wittgenstein, our concept of physical object is just a "logical" concept. The question thus remains whether our ordinary language games exhaust its grammar, and to what extent Borges' fictions and essays, as an attemp to play with it, should be regarded as an extension, or rather as a distortion of the ordinary grammar of the object. It will thus be necessary to inquiry, on the one hand, whether the Borgean texts tolerate an analytic reading; on the other, to show how each fiction, by reframing all over again the split between saying and showing, makes it possible to divert or rather to go beyond its "logic"
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Yates, Alexander. "Frege's case for the logicality of his basic laws." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2017. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/12252.
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Frege wanted to show that arithmetical truths are logical by proving them from purely logical basic laws. But how do we know that these basic laws are logical? Frege uses generality and undeniability to make a prima facie case for logicality—if a truth is general and undeniable, then it's likely logical. I argue that Frege could, did, and had to make a deeper case for why we're right in recognizing his basic laws as logical. Implicit in his work is a view of logical laws as epistemically analytic—his arguments for his basic laws serve to elicit a reflective awareness of the fact that understanding them is sufficient for recognizing them to be true. This view both fits with Frege's comments concerning the connection between logic, truth, and normativity, and serves to explain why and in what sense he took logic to be general and conceptually undeniable. In my view, semantics must play a distinctive role in any rational reconstruction of Frege's case for logicality—the aforementioned “reflective awareness” must be an explicit appreciation of how the truth of formulas expressing Frege's laws follows quickly from his stipulations governing terms which figure in those formulas. Opposing this view is the elucidatory interpretation of Thomas Ricketts, Warren Goldfarb, and Joan Weiner, which holds that Frege's arguments for his basic laws can't be taken at face value, and must serve the merely elucidatory purpose of easing us into the language. Another reading is the correctness interpretation of Richard Heck and Jason Stanley, which holds that Frege's primary purpose in his arguments is justifying the claim that Frege's axioms, qua formulas, are true. I argue against both of these interpretations, and in doing so clarify the role and limits of semantics in Frege's enterprise.
30
Wilson, Aaron. "The metaphysics of privileged properties." Thesis, University of Manchester, 2016. https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/en/theses/the-metaphysics-of-privileged-properties(3e025ad0-b4c5-4a71-b2dd-e04520da54c8).html.
Full textAbstract:
Objects are characterised by their properties. If an object is a red postbox, then it has the property of being red, and the property of being a postbox. This thesis is an attack on a particular view of the metaphysics of properties, according to which some properties are privileged over others. The most well-known theories of privileged properties are Armstrong’s theory of sparse immanent universals (1979b) and Lewis’ natural properties (1983). According to their supporters, only privileged properties perform certain jobs, such as featuring in laws of nature, or grounding similarity between objects. Metaphysical posits are theoretically virtuous if they can account for a range of different phenomena in a relatively parsimonious manner. The ability of privileged properties to perform a range of worthwhile ‘work’, therefore, is what justifies a belief in them. The conclusion I reach is that a single group of properties is not capable of satisfying the key roles commonly attributed to the privileged properties. Without satisfying these roles in concert, a belief in mainstream versions of privileged properties is not justified. The first part of this thesis is devoted to an explication of privilege and the roles which privileged properties are taken to perform. I conclude that three roles in particular, Supervenience, Similarity and Magnetism are key roles for mainstream theories of privilege. In part two, I show that the properties which satisfy the Supervenience role are not the same as those which satisfy the Similarity and Magnetism roles. In the final chapter of this thesis I discuss the implications of my findings for support for theories of privilege.
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Friedman-Biglin, Noah. "Carnap's conventionalism : logic, science, and tolerance." Thesis, University of St Andrews, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/10023/6334.
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In broadest terms, this thesis is concerned to answer the question of whether the view that arithmetic is analytic can be maintained consistently. Lest there be much suspense, I will conclude that it can. Those who disagree claim that accounts which defend the analyticity of arithmetic are either unable to give a satisfactory account of the foundations of mathematics due to the incompleteness theorems, or, if steps are taken to mitigate incompleteness, then the view loses the ability to account for the applicability of mathematics in the sciences. I will show that this criticism is not successful against every view whereby arithmetic is analytic by showing that the brand of "conventionalism" about mathematics that Rudolf Carnap advocated in the 1930s, especially in Logical Syntax of Language, does not suffer from these difficulties. There, Carnap develops an account of logic and mathematics that ensures the analyticity of both. It is based on his famous "Principle of Tolerance", and so the major focus of this thesis will to defend this principle from certain criticisms that have arisen in the 80 years since the book was published. I claim that these criticisms all share certain misunderstandings of the principle, and, because my diagnosis of the critiques is that they misunderstand Carnap, the defense I will give is of a primarily historical and exegetical nature. Again speaking broadly, the defense will be split into two parts: one primarily historical and the other argumentative. The historical section concerns the development of Carnap's views on logic and mathematics, from their beginnings in Frege's lectures up through the publication of Logical Syntax. Though this material is well-trod ground, it is necessary background for the second part. In part two we shift gears, and leave aside the historical development of Carnap's views to examine a certain family of critiques of it. We focus on the version due to Kurt Gödel, but also explore four others found in the literature. In the final chapter, I develop a reading of Carnap's Principle - the `wide' reading. It is one whereby there are no antecedent constraints on the construction of linguistic frameworks. I argue that this reading of the principle resolves the purported problems. Though this thesis is not a vindication of Carnap's view of logic and mathematics tout court, it does show that the view has more plausibility than is commonly thought.
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Oktar, Sibel. "On The Possibility Of Wittgensteinian Language Of Ethics." Phd thesis, METU, 2008. http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12609421/index.pdf.
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In this study, the standpoint that discourse on ethics is impossible is examined. As Ludwig Wittgenstein is the first philosopher who explicitly said that ethics is inexpressible, the main concentration is on Wittgenstein&rsquo<br>s conception of ethics. Analytic philosophy&rsquo<br>s questions regarding ethics are about the meaning of the expressions of value rather than conduct. It is generally recognized that the distinction between these questions and the emphasis on the definition of value judgements starts with G.E. Moore&rsquo<br>s Principia Ethica (PE). So G.E. Moore is included in the scope of this study. Wittgenstein&rsquo<br>s manifestation of the inexpressibility of metaphysical and ethical utterances influenced logical positivists. Hence, it is necessary that our scope should also include the Logical Positivist&rsquo<br>s two main meta-ethical theories, i.e., the emotive theory of ethics and naturalistic ethics. Wittgenstein&rsquo<br>s conception of ethics in his early and later periods are examined separately. This is because it is generally believed that his later works could provide a means of saying what &ldquo<br>cannot be said&rdquo<br>for early Wittgenstein. It is concluded that the conception of a language-game reflects well how we may have a discourse on ethics.
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Ross, Barry. "A fundamental explanation of musical meaning in terms of mental states." Thesis, Stellenbosch : University of Stellenbosch, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/10019.1/5429.
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Thesis (MMus (Music))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010.<br>ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study concerns the widespread phenomenon that music is perceived as meaningful to the
listener in some sense. The study adopts a style of conceptual clarification and investigation
that is current in the analytic philosophy of language, and is further informed by recent
research into the fundamental biology of human musicality, which suggests that musicality
and language are neurologically related.
The problem of musical meaning is approached as a problem of communicative behaviour,
and is hence conceptually related to the concept of meaningfulness in the various modalities
of linguistic communication. ‘Communication’ is defined in terms of the intended
consequences of communicative acts – that is, a communicative act is an attempt on the
behalf of the utterer to cause some sort of change in the listener’s mental states. From this
premise, meaning in both musical and linguistic acts is defined in terms the mental states
elicited in the mind of the listener. Two classes of mental state are identified: cognitive states,
which are propositional in nature; and affective states, which are essentially nonpropositional.
It is proposed that meaning in both music and language (as well as in other
communicative acts) can be explained in terms of the elicitation of these classes of mental
states in the minds of competent listeners, and that in any linguistic or musical act, a
competent listener will entertain a composite of these mental states that will be perceived as
meaning.
The mechanisms responsible for the elicitation of these states are discussed, and it is
concluded that the causal powers of the communicative act, as it is represented in the mind,
are responsible for the elicitation of these mental states. Directly causal means are responsible
for affective states: there is a relationship of direct causation between relevant features of the
communicative act, as represented in the mind, and affective states. Affective states are nonpropositional,
in that they cannot be subjected to deductive or propositional operations in the
mind. By virtue of their being non-propositional, such states are also considered to be beyond
verbal explication (‘ineffable’). Cognitive states, on the other hand, are propositional in
nature. The mechanisms by which they are realised are complex in terms of propositional
computation: the relevant propositional features of the communicative act, as represented in
the mind of the listener, undergo manipulation by mental processes (for instance, the
computational system for linguistic syntax). Cognitive states are expressible in propositional
terms, and are hence expressible in language.
Whereas linguistic communication is efficacious for the elicitation of cognitive states,
musical utterances tend to elicit affective states to a far greater degree. Furthermore, whereas
the syntax of language aids communication in the facilitation of semantics, the syntactic
dimension of music is principally a means of implementing affective states in the listener.
Therefore, any explanation of musical meaning must take the syntactical dimension of music
into account. It is also argued that there are features of performance common to both
language (in its spoken modality) and musical utterances that serve to elicit affective states.<br>AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie ondersoek die verskynsel dat musiek deur die meeste luisteraars as
betekenisvol ervaar word. ’n Styl van konseptuele verduideliking en ondersoek word gebruik
wat eie is aan die analitiese filosofie van taal. Terselfdertyd word die jongste navorsing op die
gebied van die fundamentele biologie van menslike musikaliteit in aanmerking geneem, wat
suggereer dat taal en musikale vermoë neurologies met mekaar verwant is.
Die probleem van betekenis in musiek word as ʼn probleem van kommunikatiewe gedrag
benader, en is dus konseptueel verbind aan die konsep van betekenisvolheid in die verskeie
modaliteite van kommunikasie deur middel van taal. ‘Kommunikasie’ word in terme van die
geïntendeerde uitkomste van kommunikatiewe aksies/dade gedefinieer. Met ander woorde, ʼn
kommunikatiewe aksie/daad is ʼn poging deur die spreker om uiteindelik ʼn verandering in die
geestesgesteldheid (‘mental state’) van die luisteraar teweeg te bring. Op hierdie basis word
twee tipes geestesgesteldheid onderskei: ʼn kognitiewe gesteldheid, wat proposisioneel van
aard is, en ʼn affektiewe gesteldheid, wat nie-proposisioneel is. Daar word voorgestel dat
betekenis in beide musiek en taal, soos ook in ander vorme van kommunikasie, verduidelik
kan word as die belewenis van sodanige geestesgesteldhede aan die kant van die bedrewe
luisteraar. Dit impliseer dat die betekenis van enige uiting in taal of musiek as ʼn bepaalde
kombinasie van hierdie twee geestesgesteldhede deur die bedrewe luisteraar ervaar word.
Die meganismes wat hierdie geestesgesteldhede ontlok word bespreek, en die gevolgtrekking
word gemaak dat dit die kousale mag van die kommunikatiewe daad is, soos dit in die
bewussyn (‘mind’) neerslag vind, wat hierdie twee tipes geestesgesteldheid ontlok. Daar
word beweer dat ʼn proses van direkte kousaliteit verantwoordelik is vir ʼn affektiewe
gesteldheid: daar is ’n oorsaaklike verhouding tussen die onderskeie kenmerke van die
kommunikatiewe daad, soos dit in die bewussyn voorgestel word, en die uiteindelike
affektiewe geestesgesteldheid. ʼn Affektiewe geestesgesteldheid is nie-proposisioneel omdat
dit nie in terme van deduktiewe of proposisionele prosesse in die bewussyn verstaan kan
word nie. Omdat dit nie-proposisioneel is word die kenmerke van hierdie affektiewe
geestesgesteldheid as onsegbaar (‘ineffable’) deur die luisteraar beleef. Daarteenoor is ʼn
kognitiewe geestesgesteldheid proposisioneel van aard. Die meganismes wat veroorsaak dat
hierdie geestesgesteldheid gerealiseer word is kompleks: die onderskeie kenmerke van die
kommunikatiewe daad, soos dit in die bewussyn van die luisteraar voorgestel word,
ondergaan manipulasie deur denkprosesse wat proposisioneel van aard is (bv., die denkproses
wat die sintaktiese dimensie van taal moet verwerk). ʼn Kognitiewe geestesgesteldheid kan in
proposisionele terme weergegee en gevolglik in taal verwoord word.
Terwyl kommunikasie deur middel van taal effektief is om ʼn kognitiewe geestesgesteldheid
te ontlok, is musikale uitdrukking veel eerder geskik om ʼn affektiewe geestesgesteldheid te
ontlok. Verder, terwyl die sintaksis van taal bydra tot verwesenliking van semantiese
betekenis, dra die sintaktiese dimensie van musiek eerder daartoe by om ʼn affektiewe
geestesgesteldheid by die luisteraar te vestig. Dus moet elke verduideliking van musikale
betekenis die sintaktiese dimensie van musiek in aanmerking neem. Verder word beweer dat
daar algemene kenmerke in sowel taal (in die gesproke modaliteit) as musiek voorkom wat
spesifiek ʼn affektiewe geestesgesteldheid tot stand bring.
34
Liucci-Goutnikov, Nicolas. "Les voies de la singularité : pour une généalogie des oeuvres d'art." Thesis, Aix-Marseille, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015AIXM3081.
Full textAbstract:
S’il n’existe pas d’« objet esthétique », comme l’ont soutenu Genette et Schaeffer, mais simplement des « relations esthétiques », comment définir ce que sont ou ce que font les œuvres d’art ? Un concept élémentaire, présent de façon diffuse dans de nombreux écrits sur l’art, se révèle opératoire : le concept de singularité. La singularité peut expliquer nombre des qualités attribuées aux œuvres d’art, notamment leur capacité maintes fois relevée à arrêter l’attention. Comme l’ont souligné de nombreux penseurs, de Kant à Goodman, l’œuvre d’art tient l’esprit en éveil : dans la relation aux œuvres d’art, écrit ce dernier, « le moteur est la curiosité et le but est d’obtenir des lumières » [Nelson Goodman, Langages de l’art (1968), trad. J. Morizot]. Exigeant que l’attention se porte sur l’objet en tant qu’individu, la singularité met à mal les généralités formulées sur les œuvres d’art, tout en inscrivant chacune d’entre elles dans l’histoire. Pour percevoir et comprendre une singularité, il est nécessaire de connaître le « monde de l’art » contre lequel elle s’affirme : l’établissement d’une généalogie se révèle indispensable. Renversant la logique de l’origine, l’identification de la parenté immédiate d’une œuvre d’art permet de saisir des relations d’identité entrelacées, croisées, mais aussi et surtout ces différences déterminantes grâce auxquelles l’œuvre peut affirmer sa propre singularité… et peut-être de susciter à son tour une descendance. Plusieurs études de cas s’attachent à le montrer - textes sur l’art de Greenberg, Rosenberg ou Judd, et œuvres d’art de Warhol, Levine ou Sehgal –, cherchant à tracer ainsi, de façon généalogique, les voies de la singularité<br>If there is no such object as an “aesthetic object”, as Genette and Schaeffer have argued, but only “aesthetic relations”, how to define what an artwork is or does? An elementary concept, present in a pervasive manner in many writings about art, appears to be operative: the concept of singularity. Singularity can explain a lot of the qualities, which are usually assigned to artworks, in particular their ability to draw attention on them. As many authors have emphasized, from Kant to Goodman, an artwork keeps the mind active: in our relation to artworks, writes the latter, “the drive is curiosity and the aim enlightenment”.Given that this sort of attention requires to focus on the object as an individual, singularity jeopardizes the generalities, which are usually stated about artworks, though inscribing each of them in history. In order to perceive and to understand a singularity, it is necessary to know against which “artworld” this singularity asserts itself: an indispensable step seems the establishment of a genealogy. Through reversing the logic of origin, the identification of the immediate relationship of an artwork allows to embrace intertwined identity links, but also, and above all, these decisive differences, which allow the artwork to assert its singularity… and maybe to arouse some descendants. Different case studies make every effort to show it – texts about art written by Greenberg, Rosenberg or Judd, artworks from Warhol, Levine or Sehgal –, trying to trace, along a genealogical path, the roots of singularity
35
Beltrão, Simone de Oliveira. "Nomes próprios e filosofia da linguagem: uma análise contemporânea." Universidade Federal da Paraíba, 2014. http://tede.biblioteca.ufpb.br:8080/handle/tede/5665.
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Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-14T12:11:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1
arquivototal.pdf: 667392 bytes, checksum: 81855201a60f4021feba0aa9f9697356 (MD5)
Previous issue date: 2014-10-06<br>Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES<br>This dissertation research aims to discuss about the role of proper names in the contemporary philosophy of language. The bias that we will adopt is an internalist. To perform our research will begin by contextualizing what was the meaning that the pragmatic-linguistic turn had the philosophical field. It will try to expose some of the most important elements which characterize the importance of discussions of proper names within the philosophy of language. Given our internalist bias, seek to demonstrate two basic functions of proper names, the informational function and operational function. Possession that present two distinct streams of theories of appointment, the descritivimo and causation theory. With this route we intend to show the reader get the meaning and the role that proper names take within contemporary discussions of analytic philosophy of language imprint.<br>A presente pesquisa de dissertação tem como objetivo discorrer acerca do papel dos nomes próprios dentro da filosofia da linguagem contemporânea. O viés que adotaremos é o de um internalista. Para realizar nossa pesquisa iniciaremos por contextualizar qual foi o significado que a virada pragmático-linguística teve no campo filosófico. Disso tentaremos expor alguns dos elementos mais importantes que caracterizam a importância das discussões dos nomes próprios dentro da filosofia da linguagem. Tendo em vista nosso viés internalista, buscaremos demonstrar duas funções básicas dos nomes próprios, a função informacional e a função operacional. De posse disso apresentaremos duas correntes distintas das teorias da nomeação, o descritivimo e a teoria da causalidade. Com esse percurso pretendemos conseguir mostrar ao leitor o significado e o papel que os nomes próprios assumem dentro das discussões contemporâneas da filosofia da linguagem de cunho analítica.
36
López, Nicolás. "Metafilosofía jurídica de los siglos XX y XXI: ¿un concepto analítico de derecho?" Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2016. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/119237.
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This paper aims to offer a metaphilosophical reconstruction of Law in the analytic tradition of the twentieth and twentieth-one century first fifteen years, in order to determine the identity of the “analytic concept of law”. To do that I will usethree argumentative axes. The first will clarify the distinction between the Continental and Anglo-Saxon focuses on twentieth century analytical legal philosophy. The second axis will emphasize the methods and purposes of the latter, from the publication of Hart’s The Concept of Law’s first edition to its second edition in 1994. The third will problematize the existence or non-existence of an analytical concept of Law.<br>Este trabajo pretende hacer una reconstrucción metafilosófica del derecho en la tradición analítica, puntualmente entre el siglo XX y los tres primeros lustros del XXI, con el objeto de determinar la identidad del concepto analítico de derecho. Para dicho fin, se dispondrá de tres ejes argumentativos. El primero dilucidará la distinción entre los enfoques continental y anglosajón de la filosofía jurídica analítica del siglo XX. El segundo eje se centrará en los métodos y propósitos de esta última, desde el período posterior a la publicación de la primera edición de The Concept of Law de Hart (1961) hasta su segunda edición en 1994. El tercero problematizará la existencia o inexistencia de un concepto analítico del derecho.
37
Cook, Benjamin. "Direct Reference and Empty Names." Honors in the Major Thesis, University of Central Florida, 2013. http://digital.library.ucf.edu/cdm/ref/collection/ETH/id/944.
Full textAbstract:
The purpose of my thesis is to explore and assess recent efforts by Direct Reference Theorists to explain the phenomenon of empty names. Direct Reference theory is, roughly, the theory that the meaning of a singular term (proper name, demonstrative, etc.) is simply its referent. Certain sentences, such as negative existentials ("Santa does not exist"), and sentences in contexts of fiction ("Holmes lived on Baker Street"), present the following challenge to DR Theory: Given that the semantic value of a name is simply its referent, how are we to explain the significance and truth-evaluability of such sentences? There have been various approaches DR Theorists have taken to address this problem, including the Pragmatic Strategy, Pretense Theory, Abstract Object Theory, and the Metalinguistic Strategy. All of these views are analyzed and assessed according to their various strengths and weaknesses. It is concluded that, overall, a Metalinguistic Strategy, supplemented by the notion of pretense, best deals with negative existentials and normal-subject predicate occurrences of empty names, Abstract Object Theory best deals with empty names in meta-fictional contexts, and Pretense Theory best deals with empty names in object-fictional contexts.<br>B.A.<br>Bachelors<br>Arts and Humanities<br>Philosophy
38
Declos, Alexandre. "La métaphysique de Nelson Goodman." Thesis, Université de Lorraine, 2017. http://www.theses.fr/2017LORR0238/document.
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Cette thèse de doctorat est consacrée à la pensée du philosophe américain Nelson Goodman (1906-1998). Nous y défendons, à l’encontre de la plus grande partie de la critique, une lecture métaphysicienne de son œuvre. Il est démontré que Goodman, dans tous ses travaux, développe une métaphysique technique et méconnue, dont les piliers sont le nominalisme, le pluralisme, le perdurantisme, l’actualisme, et l’universalisme méréologique. Cette lecture permet de réévaluer l’ensemble de la pensée goodmanienne. Elle établit aussi ses liens insoupçonnés avec la métaphysique analytique contemporaine<br>This PhD dissertation is dedicated to the philosophy of Nelson Goodman (1906-1998). We defend, against most critics, a metaphysical interpretation of Goodman’s works. It will be shown that the latter developed a technical and often overlooked metaphysics, whose pillars are nominalism, pluralism, perdurantism, actualism, and mereological universalism. This reading allows for a critical reevaluation of Goodman’s views. It also brings to light his unexpected links with contemporary analytic metaphysics
39
Bordini, D. "THE TRANSPARENCIES AND THE OPACITIES OF EXPERIENCE. INTENTIONALISM, PHENOMENAL CHARACTER, AND MOODS." Doctoral thesis, Università degli Studi di Milano, 2014. http://hdl.handle.net/2434/236976.
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According to Intentionalism, what it’s like to undergo a conscious experience (i.e. its phenomenal character) is nothing over and above what that experience represents (i.e. its intentional content). This view is usually thought to be directly and strongly supported by introspective evidence and, in particular, by the following introspective datum, the so-called transparency of experience: in introspection one is not aware of the intrinsic qualities of one’s experience, but the only features one is directly aware of appear as properties of mind-independent, external objects of the world. (Harman, 1990; Tye, 1995, 2000) This suggests that all that there is about our conscious experience is nothing over and above its intentional content.
In this dissertation, I focus on and address the issue of the transparency of experience and its relations with Intentionalism. More precisely, I consider why and how transparency exactly supports Intentionalism, what is the scope of transparency, what exactly is its strength, and what are the consequences on Intentionalism in case transparency fails. In particular, I argue for these two interconnected claims: (1) experience is not transparent in the sense required by Intentionalism; (2) introspection does not support Intentionalism but, on the contrary, offers strong reasons against it.
In order to develop my argument, I consider the case study of moods, namely, affective states like anxiety, depression, elation, grumpiness, gloominess, irritation, etc.
The discussion on moods provides the following two main results. (i) At least some moods–– e.g., undirected anxiety, objectless depression, sudden elation––are genuinely undirected, as long as they are not other-presenting experiences. This is not dependent on some deficiency/inability of the introspector, but it is a fact about their phenomenal character: it is constitutively part of what it’s like to be in those moods. (ii) The fact that those experiences are not other-presenting leads to conclude that they are also fully opaque experiences (i.e. entirely non-transparent experiences). Indeed, as I argue, one minimal condition for transparency is being other-presenting.
These two results have important consequences both on Intentionalism and on transparency. For what concerns the consequences on Intentionalism, the opacity of undirected moods is not only a mere lack of evidence in support of Intentionalism; rather, it constitutes a source of evidence against it. That undirected moods are opaque, indeed, means that their phenomenal character, as it is revealed in introspection, is such that it cannot be identified with intentional content. So, I argue, if one considers transparency as a strong evidence in support of the claim that phenomenal character is intentional content, then, and for the same reasons, one should also accept that opacity is strong evidence against that claim. Thus, Intentionalism as a theory concerning the nature of phenomenal character is to be rejected because the opacity of undirected moods offers introspective direct and strong evidence against it.
On the other hand, as for transparency, with Kind’s (2003) distinction between strong and weak transparency at hand, I argue that transparency should not be rejected altogether, but rather revised in its strength and thereby understood in terms of weak transparency, where this means the following: although difficult, it is still not impossible to be introspectively aware of the qualities of the experience. Thus, I claim, experience is not strongly transparent (i.e. the way the intentionalist would like it to be) but weakly transparent. Hence, my twofold conclusion: (1) experience is not transparent in the (strong) sense required by Intentionalism; (2) introspection does not support Intentionalism but, on the contrary, offers strong evidence against it. Although these results suggest a rejection of Intentionalism, my final suggestion is that this is to be done in a constructive way. So, in the very final paragraphs I offer some general considerations on how to make sense of an alternative view that keeps the best of the intentionalist proposal and, at the same time, drops what is wrong with it.
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Gil, Davi da Silva San. "Novos olhares sobre Viena: um estudo sobre o recente trabalho de reavaliação do positivismo lógico." Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, 2008. http://www.bdtd.uerj.br/tde_busca/arquivo.php?codArquivo=4856.
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A pesquisa que ora se apresenta consiste em uma investigação sobre o recente trabalho de reavaliação das obras de membros do chamado Círculo de Viena, que foi o primeiro e principal grupo representativo da perspectiva filosófica conhecida como positivismo lógico. Nossa pesquisa compreende três partes: a primeira parte voltada para a reconstrução histórico-conceitual do período entre o alvorecer das idéias neopositivistas e os primeiros momentos posteriores à recepção norte-americana da imigração intelectual vienense; na segunda parte do trabalho, por sua vez, lançaremos luz propriamente à natureza de tal perspectiva contemporânea, a partir de uma descrição sobre o método e o escopo temático de tal projeto revisionista; à terceira parte, por fim, além de tecer uma avaliação geral sobre o que foi feito nas duas partes que a antecedem, coube conjecturar as possibilidades de se encontrar em tal trabalho uma agenda filosófica e política própria.<br>The present work consists on an inquiry concerning the recent re-evaluation in the works of members of the so-called Vienna Circle, which became the first and main representative of the philosophical movement known as Logical Positivism. Our research comprises three parts: the first one is devoted to a historical-conceptual reconstruction of the period between the uprising of the first Neopositivist ideas and the years immediately following the North-American reception of the intellectual immigration from Vienna; the second part of the work concerns the nature of such contemporary reappraisal researches on the positivists legacy, through a description of the method and scope of such re-evaluation project; finally, the third part comprises a general review of the previous parts, and was worked out in order to conceive conjectures about the possibility of finding out in this re-evaluation project a philosophical and political agenda of its own.
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Arazam, Yannis. "Les lois logiques sont-elles révisables ?" Electronic Thesis or Diss., Strasbourg, 2024. http://www.theses.fr/2024STRAC027.
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Le problème du révisionnisme logique a traversé les réflexions des auteurs majeurs de la philosophie analytique du xxe siècle, de Wittgenstein à Dummett en passant par Quine, Putnam ou Kripke. Il s’agit pour eux de traiter à nouveaux frais d’un problème qui a pris différentes formes dans l’histoire de la philosophie. Les développements en logique mathématique suivant la révolution frégéenne ou encore en physique avec la formalisation de la mécanique quantique, ont marqué le renouveau de ce problème qui se pose avec une acuité sans précédent. Y a-t-il un sens à remettre en cause certaines lois logiques classiquement admises depuis Aristote; plus simplement encore, est-il intelligible de changer de logique ? Le rejet intuitionniste du tiers-exclu ou plus généralement le développement de « logiques alternatives » marquent-ils un tournant dans l’histoire de la logique ? La difficulté soulevée tient au caractère constitutif de la logique pour penser : si ses lois sont les normes de l’intelligibilité, alors comment les remettre en cause sans abolir par là-même toute possibilité de sens ? Le présent travail retrace l’histoire de cette difficulté dans le corpus analytique classique, et en tire de nouvelles perspectives au moyen du concept de paradigme et au contact de certains développements logiques de la seconde moitié du xxe siècle<br>The problem of revising logic permeated the thinking of the major authors of the analytic tradition in the 20th century. From Wittgenstein to Dummett and through Quine, Putnam or Kripke, authors have tackled afresh a problem that has taken various forms throughout the history of philosophy. Developments in mathematical logic following the fregean revolution, or even the formalization of quantum mechanics, have both renewed and sharpened the problem. Is there any sense in questioning logical laws classically acknowledged since Aristotle? More simply put, is it intelligible to change our logic ? Are the intuitionnistic refusal of the law of excluded-middle and, more generally, the emergence of "alternative logics" constitutive of a turning point in the history of logic ? The difficulty faced stems from the constitutive nature of logic for thought : if logical laws are the norms of intelligibility, how can they be challenged without undermining the very possibility of meaning ? This work traces this difficulty back to the classical analytical corpus, and gets new perspectives out of it by means of the concept of paradigm, alongside logical developments in the second-half of the 20th century
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Mattsson, Nils-Göran. "Den moderata rationalismen : Kommentarer, preciseringar och kritik av några begrepp och teser som framlagts av Laurence Bonjour i dennes In Defense of Pure Reason." Thesis, Linköping University, Department of Religion and Culture, 2005. http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:liu:diva-4543.
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<p>The paper contains comment, clarification and criticism, even constructive criticism, of some theses that have been put forward by Laurence Bonjour in his In Defense of Pure Reason.</p><p>It presents a concept of experience that deals with the relation between cognizer and object of experience that has a great similarity to that of Bonjour. Through analysis it is shown that the concept of a priori entails that Bonjour has two concepts of a priori, a narrow and a broad one. The narrow one is, in my own words: According to moderate rationalism a proposition p is a priori justified if and only if you apprehend that p must be true in every possible world. This doesn’t mean that Bonjour doesn’t believe in an epistemological, metaphysical and semantic realm. The broad one does not mention anything about possible worlds.</p><p>Casullo in his A priori justification rejects Bonjour’s argument against Quine’s coherentism. A defense is put forward with the concept ‘an ideal of science for apparent rational insights’. The concept of axiomatic system and foundationalism is used. If we assume that the colour proposition ‘nothing can be red all over and green all over at the same time’ has the meaning that we, in this very moment, are representing a property in the world, thus we have an argument of superposition for the correctness of the proposition. The ground for this argumentation relies on the identification of colours with superposing electromagnetic waves.</p>
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Oliveri, Gianluigi. "The principles of analytical philosophy." Thesis, University of Oxford, 1988. http://ethos.bl.uk/OrderDetails.do?uin=uk.bl.ethos.303526.
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Bryson, Anthony Alan. "The view from the armchair: a defense of traditional philosophy." Diss., University of Iowa, 2009. https://ir.uiowa.edu/etd/340.
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Traditional philosophy has been under attack from several quarters in recent years. The traditional philosopher views philosophy as an armchair discipline relying, for the most part, on reason and reflection. Some philosophers doubt the legitimacy of this type of inquiry. Their arguments usually occur along two dimensions. Some argue that the primary data source for the armchair philosopher--intuition--does not provide evidence for philosophical theories. Others argue that conceptual analysis, which is the preferred method of inquiry for armchair philosophers, can't yield the results the philosopher is looking for, since concepts like 'knowledge' or 'free-will' vary from culture to culture or even between persons within a culture. Finally, some philosophers argue that we should abandon the armchair program because philosophy should be an empirical enterprise continuous with the sciences.
I argue that attempts to undermine intuition fail and that one can justify the evidential status of intuition in a non-question begging way. I then argue that attacks on the belief in shared concepts do not succeed because they often conflate the nature of scientific objects with those of interest to the philosopher. However, if concepts do vary from culture to culture, I show that the philosopher need not abandon the armchair. She can still do conceptual analysis but it will be only the entry point into the philosophical dialogue. I apply this approach to epistemology arguing that the central epistemic questions ought to be the existential and the normative. This approach helps to vindicate epistemic internalism.
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Boutevin-Bonnet, Valérie. "Aspects du sujet dans la philosophie du langage ordinaire." Thesis, Bordeaux 3, 2012. http://www.theses.fr/2012BOR30022/document.
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De quelle notion de sujet avons-nous besoin rendre compte de nos pratiques et notamment de notre pratique du langage ? Cette question du sujet et de la subjectivité se pose à nouveaux frais dans le cadre de la philosophie du langage ordinaire et tout particulièrement à partir de la théorie des actes de parole de J.L. Austin. En effet, si le langage n’a de signification qu’en tant que parole, et même qu’en tant qu’acte d’un sujet qui prend la parole, le langage ne saurait être un processus sans sujet. Un acte nécessite un agent et si cet acte est un acte de parole, il faut un agent capable de comprendre la signification de ce qui est dit, en d'autres termes, il semble bien qu’il faille un sujet pensant, un sujet psychologique. C’est dans cette voie que s’engagèrent les premières interprétations d’Austin. Les actes de parole donnèrent naissance d’une nouvelle discipline : la pragmatique, où le rôle de l’intention dans la signification est primordial. Or, la philosophie du langage ordinaire se situe dans le projet initial de la philosophie analytique, tel que mené par Frege, Russell et le premier Wittgenstein, qui détachaient la signification de la subjectivité des représentations en la liant à la référence ou dénotation. Le sujet psychologique se trouve alors hors du champ de la pensée et de la vérité. Austin poursuit et radicalise ce projet : dans la théorie des actes de parole, la vérité devient la dimension d’évaluation de certains énoncés à l’intérieur de la catégorie plus générale de la félicité, évaluation qui n’est possible qu’en situant l’énonciation dans son contexte. C’est donc le contexte, et non l’intériorité du sujet parlant qui permet la compréhension. Ainsi, Le sujet des actes de paroles n’est pas le sujet intentionnel du mentalisme. C’est en fait un sujet pensant dont la pensée se lit dans le comportement, un sujet dont la pensée publique se fonde et s’exprime dans des conventions sociales qui le rendent responsables de ses paroles. Le sujet parlant est un sujet social pour qui l’enjeu est de parvenir à trouver et faire entendre sa voix alors même qu’il parle dans les mots des autres, un sujet responsable et mis en position de fragilité car il doit répondre de plus qu’il ne le voudrait<br>What kind of a notion of subject do we need in order to account for our practices, and especially our practice of language? The issue of subject and subjectivity is raised anew within the ordinary language philosophy, more particularly within J.L. Austin's speech acts theory. As a matter of fact, if language has a meaning only inasmuch as it is a speech—the speech act of a subject—language cannot be a process devoid of subject. There must be an agent to perform an act, and if the act is a speech act, the agent must be able to understand what is meant, in other words, what seems to be needed is a thinking, psychological subject. Austin's first interpretations actually went down that path. Speech acts gave birth to a new theory: pragmatics, in which intention plays a key role in meaning. Nevertheless, ordinary language philosophy is in continuity with the original project of analytical philosophy as conducted by Frege, Russell and the first Wittgenstein, who separated the meaning from the subjectivity of representations and linked it instead to the reference or denotation. The psychological subject is then excluded from the field of thought and truth. Austin continues and toughens that project. Within the speech acts theory, truth becomes the assessment dimension of some utterances within the more general category of felicity—such an assessment being possible only when the issuing of the utterance is inserted in its whole context. Therefore, what enables comprehension is context, not inwardness. So, the subject of speech acts isn't the intentional subject of mentalism. In fact, it's a subject whose thought is to be read in their behaviour, a subject whose public thought is based on and expressed in social conventions which make them responsible for what they say. The speaking subject is a social subject whose issue is to find their voice and make themselves heard, although they speak in other people's words, a responsible subject in a vulnerable position as they must answer for more than they care for
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Larese, Costanza. "The principle of analyticity of logic : a philosophical and formal Perspective." Doctoral thesis, Scuola Normale Superiore, 2019. http://hdl.handle.net/11384/86138.
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The subject of the present work is the principle of analyticity of logic. In order for the question ‘Is logic analytic?’ to make sense and before trying to find an answer to this problem, it is obviously necessary to specify two preliminary issues, namely, the meaning of the term ‘analytic’ and the meaning of the term ‘logic’. The former issue is somehow justified and expected: after all, analyticity represents one of the philosophical concepts par excellence and, as such, it has been at the core of a lively debate throughout the history of the discipline. But, despite possible appearances to the contrary, the second issue is probably more decisive than the former in determining the answer to the initial question: both the contents and the philosophical conceptions of logic play a fundamental role in the study of the epistemological status of this discipline. We could even say that the clarification of the concepts of analyticity and of logic constitutes in itself the decision on the analyticity of logic. This thesis studies the principle of analyticity of logic through two different, but related, methodologies, which individuate the two main parts of the work: the former offers a historical and philosophical reconstruction of the problem; the latter proposes two formal characterizations of the analytic-synthetic distinction. The reconstruction of the first part does not presume to be exhaustive and is restricted to the theories of the following philosophers: Kant, Bolzano, Frege and Hintikka. The material has been chosen according to the following criteria. First, this work aims at showing the ‘historical’ nature of the principle of analyticity of logic, which has a certain genealogy and a precise starting point. Although after the Vienna Circle this tenet has been taken for granted, there are many and significant conceptions that criticize it. Theories holding that logic is either not analytic or synthetic are the main characters of our reconstruction. This explains, for example, why we have dedicated great attention to Bolzano, while leaving little margin to the logical empiricist movement, despite the fact that analyticity is probably more fundamental for the latter’s thought than for the former’s philosophical construction. As a result of this choice, theories of meaning and their connection to analyticity are completely overlooked, since they belong to the logical empiricists’ interpretation of the analytic-synthetic distinction. In other words, the principle of analyticity of logic and the philosophers arguing for it are taken as a critical target, but the true focus is on the varieties of reactions against them. [...]
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Kamarudin, Russli. "Political philosophy of al-Ghazzali, an analysis." Thesis, National Library of Canada = Bibliothèque nationale du Canada, 1997. http://www.collectionscanada.ca/obj/s4/f2/dsk2/ftp01/MQ43890.pdf.
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Kamarudin, Russli. "Political philosophy of al-Ghazzālī : an analysis." Thesis, McGill University, 1997. http://digitool.Library.McGill.CA:80/R/?func=dbin-jump-full&object_id=28058.
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This thesis deals with the political philosophy of al-Ghazzali from an analytical point of view. It focuses its examination on his theory regarding the imamate and sultanate. This examination is based on four of his works, namely, Fad&dotbelow;a'ih&dotbelow; al-Bat&dotbelow;iniyah wa-fad&dotbelow;a'il al-Mustaz&dotbelow;hiriyah, al-Iqtis&dotbelow;ad fi'l-i'tiqad, Ih&dotbelow;ya' 'ulum al-din and Nas&dotbelow;ih&dotbelow;at al-muluk . It begins with an account of past scholarship on al-Ghazzali's political thought. Until recently scholars have focused on al-Ghazzali's theories without giving due consideration to the circumstances that led him to develop them. This thesis shows how they were shaped by his encounter with the 'Abbasid court and the Seljuq sultanate, and how his own theological and juridical concerns coloured his interpretations. The practical necessity of justifying his concept of the imamate was forced upon him by the challenge posed by the Fat&dotbelow;imid caliph in Egypt, and by the reality of power politics in Baghdad, where the caliph exercised only nominal control. Throughout his writings he demonstrates an overriding concern for a stable society in which Islam can be practiced in full, even at the cost of living under an oppressive system.
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Layek, Satyajit. "An analysis of dream in Indian philosophy /." Delhi : Sri Satguru publ, 1990. http://catalogue.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb35749320q.
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Venancio, Rafael Duarte Oliveira. "Jogo lógico e a gramática do rádio: analítica de um jogo de linguagem comunicacional e seus diferendos." Universidade de São Paulo, 2013. http://www.teses.usp.br/teses/disponiveis/27/27161/tde-06052014-150241/.
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O presente trabalho visa entender como o rádio se distingue dos demais sons do mundo. A hipótese aqui formulada é a de que o rádio, em sua definição, é uma linguagem, e não um aparelho. Dessa maneira, há a busca por uma caracterização da linguagem radiofônica seguindo as ideias implicadas em uma Estética da Linguagem (Derrida e antiessencialistas como Ziff, Weitz e Kennick). Com isso, há um estudo detalhado do rádio em seu jogo de linguagem (Wittgenstein) e em seus diferendos (Lyotard), considerados aqui enquanto parergon e ergon, ou seja, enquanto recorte e modelo operacional da linguagem em sua intersecção com o mundo. Para a investigação do jogo de linguagem, foram utilizados conteúdos relacionados à Filosofia Analítica, à Lógica Algébrica e à Teoria dos Jogos para desenvolver um método analítico denonimado Jogo Lógico, voltado para o estudo de jogos de linguagem comunicacionais. Já para a investigação dos diferendos, foram utilizadas as ideias pragmáticas acerca da performatividade e da lógica ilocucionária (Austin e Searle) para analisar os gêneros radiofônicos (a saber: musical, radiojornalismo, esportivo, variedades [talk radio], humorístico, ficção e publicidade). Essas duas investigações formam aquilo que é chamado aqui de Gramática do Rádio - considerando o conceito wittgensteiniano de gramática -, o ponto nodal que nos permite caracterizar o rádio enquanto linguagem.<br>The present work aims to understand how the radio distinguishes itself from other sounds of the world. The hypothesis formulated here is that the radio, in its definition, is a language, not a machine. Thus, there is the search for a characterization of radio\'s language following the ideas involved in an Aesthetics of Language (Derrida and anti-essentialists like Ziff, Weitz and Kennick). Here, there is a detailed study of the radio in its language-game (Wittgenstein) and their differends (Lyotard), considered in this work as parergon and ergon, i.e. as the cut and the operational model of language in its intersection with the world. For the investigation of the language-game, we used content related to Analytic Philosophy, to Algebraic Logic, and to Game Theory to develop an analytical method called Logic Game, dedicated to the communicative language-games\' study. As for the investigation of differends, we used the pragmatic concepts about the performative and illocutionary logic (Searle and Austin) to analyze the radio genres (ie: music, radio journalism, sports, talk radio, humor, fiction and advertising). These two studies form what is called here the Radio Grammar - considering the Wittgensteinian concept of grammar - the key point that allows us to characterize the radio as a language.