Journal articles on the topic 'Anarcho-capitalism'

Abstract In his infamous "Open Letter to Ayn Rand," Roy Childs, a prominent libertarian advocate of anarcho-capitalism, argued that limited government is inconsistent with Rand's philosophy of Objectivism. In the early 1980s, Childs changed his mind and rejected anarcho-capitalism as a rational political system. Despite abrief, unfinished, posthumous essay, some say that the real reasons for Childs' change of heart will always remain a mystery. However, specific comments by Childs in that essay point directly to the influence of a series of lectures on Objectivism presented by Leonard Peikoffin 1983.

This article describes the ideological outline of a broad doctrine called green anarchism. Green anarchism is one of the branches of anarchist thought, which has gained popularity in modern times, as evidenced by numerous Polish and foreign scientific and popular publications concerning the history of ecological anarchism and the emergence of radical ecological circles that share some of the values which form the basis of the classical anarchist schools (anarcho-communism, anarcho-collectivism, anarcho-individualism and anarcho-syndicalism). Ecological anarchism is a collection of many minor doctrines, philosophies and lifestyles referring to the fight against capitalism, which destroys the natural environment, the apotheosis of freedom, and the promotion of specific diets (fruitarianism, veganism, vegetarianism). The ideas of the co-founders of the green anarchist school are sometimes hostile to related factions and other doctrines (conservatism, nationalism, fascism). The article discusses the ideological profile of the three most popular and well-developed trends in ecological anarchism: anarcho-veganism, anarcho-primitivism and anarcho-naturism. Additionally, it presents excerpts of the works and views of the precursors of this rich political thought (such as Peter Kropotkin, Leo Tolstoy and Henry David Thoreau), the sources of which can be found in the 18th century. The aim of this article is to show that green anarchism is a political thought which has a rich history and is constantly being developed on many continents. It is a critique of contemporary phenomena, such as globalisation, urbanisation, industrialisation, and the destruction of nature resulting from the activities of corporations associated with certain industries.

Laissez — faire and subjective underpinnigs of Murray Rothbard’s thought. Aristotle, St. Thomas, Spanish scholastics, John Locke and Frederic Bastiat as an inspirationThe subject of this article are origins of the subjectivist view of the economic activity of man, and pre-classic themes of political economy, which are the inspirations for Murray Newton Rothbard and his thought of anarcho-capitalism. These issues, being so rarely subject to scientific interest, are crucial point of reference for classical and neoclassical economics, and laissez-faire in general. Specific influence of natural law on the sphere of economic activity and human condition also implies abroader view of the role of state institutions in the thought of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, the scholastics of the Salamanca, John Locke and Frederic Bastiat, who combined the above-mentioned laws of nature and tradition of classical economics with subjectivity, so important in Austrian School of Economics and in anarcho-capitalist thought of Murray Newton Rothbard.

AbstractThis article deals with the conception of the State defended by libertarian author Murray N. Rothbard. An American economist, Rothbard has been for more than three decades the foremost advocate and theoretician of anarcho-capitalism. The purpose of the article is to show that the theses put forward by Rothbard regarding the nature, origin and legitimacy of the State do not square with the methodological prescriptions and the fundamental axioms that he himself upholds as the ultimate judgment criteria of a theory. In fact, neither the definition of human action as end-governed, nor methodological individualism, nor the concept of demonstrated preference can be reconciled with explanations in which conspiration, manipulation and involuntary ignorance play a decisive part.

Perhaps the most remarkable event in social thought of the last twenty years has been the resurgence of various strands of individualism as political doctrines. The term ‘individualism’ is a kind of general rubric that encompasses elements of nineteenth century classical liberalism, laissez-faire economics, the theory of the minimal state, and an extreme mutation out of this intellectual gene pool, anarcho-capitalism. The term libertarianism itself is applied indiscriminately to all of those doctrines. It has no precise meaning, except that in a general sort of way libertarianism describes a more rigorous commitment to moral and economic individualism and a more ideological approach to social affairs than conventional liberalism. I suspect that its current usage largely reflects the fact that the word with the better historical pedigree, liberalism, has been associated, in America especially, with economic doctrines that are alien to the individualist tradition.

The artist run anarcho-collective Copenhagen Free University that unfolded from 2001 to 2007 in the private apartment of Henriette Heise and Jakob Jakobsen was an attempt to create a free and autonomous university for alternative and marginalized forms of knowledge outside the profit oriented, neoliberal knowledge economy. The article starts out with a presentation of Copenhagen Free University’s project and its attempt to develop a strategy of self-institutionalization fusing collective knowledge production and radical pedagogy. Hereafter follows a discussion about the similarity between Copenhagen Free University and New Institutionalism, a strategy adopted by medium-sized art institutions in an attempt to put the art institution to a progressive end. As the article points out, Copenhagen Free University could be said to have ended in a paradoxical position where it mirrored a broader development taking place within contemporary capitalism where notions like autonomy, participation, creativity, temporality and openness played a significant role in the breaking down of the barriers between work and life. The article ends by asking whether the economic crisis could result in new experimental attempts to take over the art institution, putting it to anti-capitalist purposes.

¿Por qué resulta más fácil imaginar el Fin del Mundo que el Fin del Capitalismo? Para responder a esa pregunta, dentro del marco de la (aún) hipotética disciplina de la Apocaliptología, que se dedicaría a estudiar los múltiples vínculos entre Capitalismo y Fin del Mundo, este artículo desarrolla un análisis histórico-crítico de lo que los Sobrevivencialistas norteamericanos denominan Teotwawki, como forma de meta-relato que proporciona un marco semántico a una gama de discursos políticos que abarca desde el propio Sobrevivencialismo, hasta el anarquismo insurreccional del Comité Invisible, pasando por el anarco- primitivismo del movimiento de la Ecología Profunda o ciertas visiones del Antropoceno. Desde el final de la década de 1970, en un contexto donde el Realismo Capitalista vigila las fronteras de los imaginarios colectivos, impidiendo que florezca cualquier alternativa al orden neoliberal, las estructuras narrativas centradas en el Fin-del-Mundo han venido desplazando a las que giraban en torno al Fin-del-Capitalismo, desconectando el deseo de transformación social radical de la idea de revolución, y reconduciéndolo hacia la retórica de la catástrofe y el colapso civilizatorio. Why is it easier to imagine the End of the World than the End of Capitalism? As a contribution to the (as yet) hypothetical discipline of Apocalyptology, which would be devoted to studying Capitalism’s multiple connections with the End of the World, this essay seeks to answer that question through a historical and critical analysis of what American Survivalists call Teotwawki as a meta- narrative framing for a variety of political discourses, ranging from Survivalism itself to the insurrectionary anarchism of the Invisible Committee, or the anarcho-primitivism of the Deep Ecology Movement and some accounts of the Anthropocene. Ever since the end of the 1970s, in a context where Capitalist Realism polices the boundaries of collective imaginaries, pre-empting any alternative to the Neoliberal order, end-of-the-world plots and tropes have been displacing end-of-capitalism narratives by redirecting the desire for radical social change towards the imagery of catastrophe and collapse and away from visions of revolution.

This paper analyses the work Riflessioni sulla violenza written by Georges Sorel and published in 1908. The principal aim of this paper is to present the deep relationship between myth, violence and politics in order to reevaluate how irrational forces have guided social movements and revolutions. The distinction between the notions of force and violence introduces the central thesis of Georges Sorel’s political thought, which is called anarcho-syndacalism. More specifically, George Sorel puts together Marx and Bergson in order to develop a severe criticism of the Third Republic and to theorize the role of violence in the transition from capitalism to socialism. Through the myth of the general strike, Sorel introduces his philosophical perspective on social struggles against the parlamentarism.

The article deals with Czechoslovak dissident culture after 1968, in particular with the movement Charter 77 and its legacy after 1989, focusing on the concept of paralelní polis (parallel polis) introduced by Václav Benda and widely discussed among dissidents: the idea of creating new and independent cultural, economic, and media structures parallel to the official structures. The study considers the paralelní polis as an instrument through which the (post-)‘68-movements led by intellectuals, artists, and theorists sought the emancipation and diversification of civil society in both capitalist and socialist countries. With the collapse of the socialist world after 1989, the history of the paralelní polis reveals that the ‘68 idea of civil society was ambivalent, while Charter 77 proved to be a heterogeneous movement. Many ex-Chartists came to believe that capitalism could better enable the existence of a civil society than socialism, while others did not accept this view. Moreover, even among the supporters of capitalism there was no unity (some were close to neoliberalism, others were critical of it). In contrast to the 1960s and 1970s, there was no dialogue between these different positions within civil society, but rather radicalization and exclusivity. The radical left, anarcho-capitalism, and Christian fundamentalism developed their particular and mutually exclusive narratives about the legacy of paralelní polis.

In this paper, we argue that EVE Online is a fruitful site for exploring how the representational and political-economic elements of science fiction intersect to exert a sociocultural and political-economic force on the shape and nature of the future-present. EVE has been oft heralded for its economic and sociocultural complexity, and for employing a free market ethos and ethics in its game world. However, we by contrast seek not to consider how EVE reflects our contemporary world, but rather how our contemporary neoliberal milieu reflects EVE. We explore how EVE works to make its world of neoliberal markets and borderline anarcho-capitalism manifest through the political economic and sociocultural assemblages mobilized beyond the game. We explore the deep intertwining of behaviors of players both within and outside of the game, demonstrating that EVE promotes neoliberal activity in its players, encourages these behaviors outside the game, and that players who have found success in the real world of neoliberal capitalism are those best-positioned for success in the time-demanding and resource-demanding world of EVE. This thereby sets up a reciprocal ideological determination between the real and virtual worlds of EVE players, whereby each reinforces the other. We lastly consider the “Alliance Tournament” event, which romanticizes conflict and competition, and argue that it serves as a crucial site for deploying a further set of similar rhetorical resources. The paper therefore offers an understanding of the sociocultural and political-economic pressure exerted on the “physical” world by the intersection of EVE’s representational and material elements, and what these show us about the real-world ideological power of science fictional worlds.

World War I can be seen as a crucial turning point in world history, leading to a transition from monarchical rule to democratic states, in particular in Europe. Since then, the concept of a representative democracy with a com- prehensive welfare state and high public expenditure quota has been thor- oughly implemented in almost all European countries. Moreover, despite the collapse of the Soviet union, the disastrous results of former fascist governments, and the current economic and political situation in countries like Venezuela, a vast majority of Europeans still seem to consider a “strong” and omnipresent government as crucial to guarantee freedom and a ‘rule of law’. The economist
 
 Hoppe strongly questions this status quo, believing that even monarchies could be more sustainable than current democracies and stating that ultimately a “private property order”, based on anarcho-capitalism, would be the best solution. By strongly questioning not only the concept of current welfare state democracies, but also by rejecting the concepts of monarchy and anarcho-cap- italism, we intend to find alternatives to protect human rights, freedom and eco- nomic prosperity, which are based on the ideas of F.A. von Hayek, Michael Polanyi, Elinor Ostrom and other liberal and libertarian thinkers.
 
 Keywords: democracy, monarchy, private property order, Hoppe, Hayek, human rights.
 JEL Classification: A12, B10, B13, B25, H10
 Resumen: La primera guerra mundial puede ser considerada un punto de inflex- ión crucial en la historia mundial, iniciando la transición de gobiernos monárqui- cos hacía los estados democráticos, particularmente en Europa. Desde entonces, el concepto de la democracia representativa con un estado de bie- nestar integral y una alta cuota de gasto público se ha implementado exhaus- tivamente en casi todos los países europeos. Además, a pesar del colapso de la Unión Soviética, de los resultados desastrosos de los antiguos gobiernos fas- cistas y a pesar de la situación económica y política actual en países como Cuba, Corea del Norte y Venezuela, una gran mayoría de los europeos todavía parece considerar a un gobierno “fuerte” y omnipresente como crucial para garantizar la libertad y el ‘estado de derecho’. El economista H. Hoppe cuestiona fuertemente este status quo, creyendo que incluso las monarquías podrían ser más sostenibles que las democracias actuales y declara que, en última instancia, un “orden de propiedad privada”, basado en el anarcocapi- talismo, sería la mejor solución. Al cuestionar enérgicamente no sólo el con- cepto del estado de bienestar democrático sino también los conceptos de monarquía y anarcocapitalismo, pretendemos encontrar alternativas para pro- teger mejor los derechos humanos, la libertad y la prosperidad económica, a través de conceptos basados en las ideas de F.A .von Hayek, Michael Polanyi, Elinor Ostrom y otros pensadores liberales y libertarios.
 Palabras clave: democracia, monarquía, propiedad privada, Hoppe, Hayek, derechos humanos.
 Clasificación JEL: A12, B10, B13, B25, H10

The current Central Planning of the Education is not only a consequence of intense political activism of the European social democracies (specifically in Spain), moreover is consequence of the absence of a clear ideological opposition by the socio-political liberalism. Therefore, the Austrian School of Economics has nowadays an obligation, rediscover and redefine the theoretical basis of freedom of education to deconstruct the current social democratic model of Central Planning of Education. There are two essential reasons: the first one, because it means a improvement for the full freedom of the private education market, more agile, less costly and more effective to coordinate the individual preferences to learning with the needs of the markets. The second one, because ethics demands defending an educational system based on liberal principles, without the meddling of a statist education. Key words: Education and Liberalism, Education and Socialism, evolutionary and anarcho-capitalism basis of the Austrian School for a free education. JEL Classification: I20, I21, I28. Resumen: La actual Planificación Central de la Educación no es solamente consecuencia del intenso activismo político de las sociales democracias europeas (muy en concreto de la española), también es consecuencia de la ausencia de una oposición ideológica clara por parte del liberalismo sociopolítico en general. Por tanto, reencontrar y en su caso redefinir las bases teóricas de la libertad de enseñanza, como es el caso de la Escuela Austriaca de Economía, para de-construir el actual modelo socialdemócrata de Planificación Central de la Educación, es hoy una exigencia. Dos son las razones fundamentales: la primera, por lo que significa de mejora para la plena libertad de los mercados privados de enseñanza, más ágiles, menos costosos y más eficaces para coordinar mejor las preferencias individuales de aprendizaje con las necesidades de los mercados. La segunda, por la eticidad que significa defender un sistema educativo basado en los principios liberales, de ausencia de coacción educativa estatista. Palabras clave: Educación y Liberalismo, educación y Socialismo, bases evolucionistas y anarcocapitalistas de la Escuela Austriaca para una educación en libertad. Clasificación JEL: I20, I21, I28.

This paper explains the origins and the theoretical concept of Ordo- liberalism, focusing in particular on one of its founders, Walter Eucken. We will focus on the political and economic concepts of Ordoliberalism in regards to interventionism, competition, monopolies, democracy and property rights. For a better understanding, we will compare its main positions and rationale with both, the concept of a social market economy, as well as with the theoretical background of the Austrian School of economics. We pretend to define how much State is necessary to assure a long-term maximization of human rights and individual liberty, while also evaluating at what stage a State becomes too big, potentially turning into a totalitarian autocracy. Keywords: democracy, Private Property Order, Hoppe, Hayek, Wilhelm Röpke, Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm, Müller-Armack, Ludwig Erhard, Ordoliberalism, Ordo, Mont Pèlerin Society, human rights, liberalism, libertarianism, Austrian school of economics, anarcho-capitalism JEL Classification: A12, B10, B13, B25, H10, H40, K11, P10, P14, P16, P26, P48, P51 Resumen: Este artículo explica los orígenes y el concepto teórico del Ordolibe- ralismo, centrándose en particular en uno de sus fundadores, Walter Eucken. Nos centraremos en los conceptos políticos y económicos del Ordoliberalismo con respecto al intervencionismo, la competencia, los monopolios, la democra- cia y los derechos de propiedad. Para una mejor comprensión, compararemos sus principales posiciones y razones con el concepto de economía social de mercado, así como con los antecedentes teóricos de la Escuela Austriaca de economía. Pretendemos definir cuánto Estado es necesario para asegurar a largo plazo una maximización de los derechos humanos y de la libertad indi- vidual. Palabras clave: democracia, propiedad privada, Hoppe, Hayek, Wilhelm Röpke, Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm, Müller-Armack, Ludwig Erhard, ordoliber- alismo, Ordo, Mont Pèlerin Society, derechos humanos, liberalismo, liber- tarismo, Escuela Austriaca de economía, anarco-capitalismo Clasificación JEL: A12, B10, B13, B25, H10, H40, K11, P10, P14, P16, P26, P48, P51

I consider that the golden rule requires that if I like a program I must share it with other people who like it. Software sellers want to divide the users and conquer them, making each user agree not to share with others. I refuse to break solidarity with other users in this way. I cannot in good conscience sign a nondisclosure agreement or a software license agreement. Richard Stallman (GNU Manifesto) There is much more to Stallman’s Manifesto […] Suffice it to say that on the surface, it read like a socialist polemic, but I saw something different. I saw a business plan in disguise. Michael Tiemann (72) The current discourse surrounding the rapid development and deployment of “free” and “open source” software and operating systems is framed by an undeniably utopian impulse. The “openness” of open source software is informed by concerns both practical (freedom from oppressive software production and licensing/copyright schemes) and ideological (the valorisation of anarchic organizational forms, communal production, and public property rights). The utopian impulse that underwrites this discourse is important for many reasons, but what I want to trace here is the trajectory from ideological position to practical action as it relates to differing forms of utopianism. The initial anarcho-socialist utopian move initiated by Richard Stallman’s GNU (GNU’s Not UNIX) Project and Free Software Foundation (FSF) is currently being transformed into an organizational utopia in the form of the Open Source Movement (OSM). The purpose here is not to take sides in the philological/philosophical debate over the definitions and relative merits of “free” versus “open source” software or to lament the passing of a missed opportunity, but to address the intimations of hope and deprival (with apologies to Grant) that can be gleaned from the relationship between utopianism and socio-technological practices. The popularity of open source development ideals and practices indicates a certain dissatisfaction with corporate technoculture on the part of some (many?) of those who work in these institutions. This dissatisfaction is clearly evident in Richard Stallman’s GNU Manifesto wherein he critiques the shift from public domain to copyrighted software development that has occurred in the last three decades. Recalling Brian Winston’s theorization of technological development, the move toward copyrighted software appears to have come as a result of the increasing diffusion of computing hardware in the 1980’s and the practical realization of software development as an economically rationalized for-profit enterprise. Prior to the broad commodification of software, programmers shared knowledge and code without worrying about software licenses and copyrights, institutionally commodified intellectual property, and non-disclosure agreements (at least according to Stallman’s experience). Stallman’s heroic effort to create the GNU system is thus not only a direct attack on commodified software production, but a consciously utopian attempt to recapture the “open” communal programming practices that existed during the 1960’s and 70’s. The utopian impulse found in this open form of software development is significant precisely because it underwrites recent efforts to reject current copyright regimes and, by extension, techno-industrial oligarchies. This potential is enabled by newly available forms of grassroots software development (code sharing and development via the Internet being the most obvious example). Stallman introduced and encouraged a licensing system that expressly prohibited the copyrighting of software developed using GNU software protocols and standards (termed “copyleft”). The lag between the initial deployment of Stallman’s early software efforts and their uptake by the wider computing community came as increases in computer literacy, technology markets, affordable personal computing power, and broadband CMC networks came along in the 1990’s. The OSM’s recent mobilization around Linux continues and parallels Stallman’s efforts via the adoption of the GNU license and copyleft. While the hallmarks of Stallman’s communal software production system remain, the overall nature of Open Source software is framed by a rather different notion of utopian openness than is evident in Stallman’s manifesto. This brings me to the broader notion of an anarcho-utopianism framed by what Bookchin has identified as the twin goals of individual liberty and social democracy. Claims are already being made that practices related to open source software development and its emergent virtually interconnected organizational form may provide the basis for (re)imagining systems of social governance while simultaneously providing the practical infrastructure by which these new forms may be manifested: The experience of open source development, or even just the acceptance of its value as a model for others, provides a real-life practice for the deeper change in perspective required if we are to move into a more networked and emergent understanding of our world. The local community must be experienced as a place to implement policies, incrementally, that will eventually have an effect on the whole. (Rushkoff 61) Suggestions that the FSF’s and OSM’s methods of software development may serve as a model for more open and democratic policy making resonates with political theory in general, and social democracy and anarchism in particular. But neither the OSM nor the FSF is a political platform. They are simply modalities of software production which find their foundations in communal forms of decision making, intellectual labour, and dissemination. A utopian impulse is nonetheless revealed in the typically vague invocations of political anarchism and social democratic ideals that accompany the discursive promotion and legitimization of these modalities. The FSF advocates a broadly social anarchistic approach allied with a desire to overturn entirely commodified software production. The OSM, on the other hand, is more concerned with a kind of lifestyle anarchism that focuses on increasing programmer and user freedom within existing frameworks of software production and use. For Bookchin, the latter form of anarchism is positive insofar it advocates individual liberty, but it ultimately undermines the broader goals of anarchism by focusing on transient notions of individualism. The result is a situation wherein “the word anarchy will become part of the chic bourgeois vocabulary of the coming century — naughty, rebellious, insouciant, but deliciously safe” (3). It is interesting to note in passim the various discursive entanglements of anarchism and the Internet that have occurred since 1995, the time of Bookchin’s statement. The utopian discourse that weaves its way through the non-technical discussions surrounding GNU, Linux, and other Open Source projects is certainly strong, but it begs the question of exactly what kinds of utopias are being offered ? Henri Lefebvre was rather suspicious of utopian thought because it is so frequently allied with efforts to legitimize nationalistic and totalitarian organizational practices. While suggesting that utopian thought was useful, he would only go so far as to warn that any such thought must avoid notions of a revolution that would simply substitute one state-sanctioned form of organized production with another, arguing instead for a “transformation of society [that] presupposes a collective ownership and management of space [we could say “society’ or even “software” here in place of “space] founded on the permanent participation of the ‘interested parties’, with their multiple, varied and even contradictory interests” (422). For Lefebvre, any useful form of utopianism is not a matter of coming up with alternative state apparatuses, but of somehow creating the conditions through which an open orientation to future possibilities might allow for the foundation of a more socially democratic society. The FSF comes closest to fulfilling this ideal—at least within the realm of computing—insofar its attendant communities are involved less in the creation of a new institutional form than in the propagation of practices and desires for more open forms of software development. As such, the FSF seems to deploy the kind of utopian thinking and practice that Lefebvre finds useful. There is hope (social and computational) in this kind of utopian orientation because its socio-institutional functioning is left forever open-ended by way of its locating productive practices in communal formations. The FSF offers an idealized mode of communally open software development while refusing to provide an overarching and institutionalized organizational form by which it is to be utilized. Borrowing heavily from the FSF’s ideals and practices, the OSM’s efforts to integrate practices of communal software development into contemporary techno-capitalism is not simply an intimation of deprival — a moment to lament the passing of the FSF’s utopian ideals — rather, the OSM constitutes what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as a moment of actualization whereby the virtual (and utopian) potential future(s) of communal software development cross the practico-material threshold to become manifest practices. Stallman’s GNU existed in the rather rarefied realm of hardcore coders for years before Torvald’s Linux took open/free software principles into the mainstream. The moment of actualization was not simply technical (available hardware, software, programmers, networks, etc.): it was the recognition that communal “copylefted” programming could “find a place” in the everyday structures of IT industries, services, and markets. It is the moment when Tiemann sees a business plan in Stallman’s “socialist polemic”. At this point that the utopian orientation and ideals promoted by the FSF transforms into an organizational utopia spearheaded by the OSM. The debate over this transformation shows few signs of abating any time soon. Stallman feels that Eric Raymond’s (the spiritual “leader” of the OSM) promotion of a potentially massive, and certainly for-profit, industry founded on the implementation and support of open source software defeats the basic (utopian) principles of free software. Echoing Bookchin’s concerns about lifestyle anarchism, Stallman worries that the OSM will simply result in the re-introduction of all of those things that drove him out of institutional software development in the first place: “the rhetoric of ‘open source’ focuses on the potential to make high quality, powerful software, but shuns the ideas of freedom, community and principle” (1999:70) . The FSF’s social utopianism thus appears to provide the productive content, but not the political form, for the more practically minded utopianism of the OSM, which offers an organizational utopia more akin to the “substitutive” utopias disavowed by Lefebvre. As Martin Parker argues, utopian thought and practice tends to be organizational in nature: “most, if not all, fictional and actual utopias rely on a re-formulation of principles of social order. They are in that sense organized, though often on different principles to the market managerial hegemony” (217-218). Stallman’s open anarcho-utopianism commits to an avoidance of market managerial hegemony. The OSM, however, not only cooperates with market hegemony, it seeks to find a place within it. This is a crucial difference. The openness introduced by the FSF is incorporated by the OSM only at the level of software production itself, thus containing and integrating its communal practices in the service of existing market needs and structures. The OSM is thus likely only a threat to Microsoft, and this only because it proffers a new business model. Indeed, the popular appeal of the OSM’s version of open source as a metaphor and model for businesses suggests that it may be an easily, and safely, appropriated set of practices. On the other hand, the FSF’s promotion of a more “socialist” approach to software production and use is based on the same basic programming practices and it will therefore be rather difficult to exact some sort of industrial control of copyright and/or intellectual property where open source software is concerned. Whether or not these two approaches are compatible, or if users will push their development into as yet unseen directions, is by no means clear at this point. With open source development poised on the verge of being the “next big thing”, the manifest expression of its anarchic utopian impulse in the form of treatises and essays is somewhat limited insofar as the community is primarily composed of programmers rather than social theorists. Nevertheless, the utopian impulse is becoming more clearly expressed where it perhaps matters most: as an emergent set of practices in the domain of software production and use. The “kernel” of openness introduced by both the FSF and the OSM thus needs to be addressed in detail, and sooner rather than later, because it is in the struggle between these two forms of anarchic utopianism that the broader sociopolitical implications of a radically different form of software production will be played out. About the Author Dale Bradley is an Assistant Professor in the Dept. of Communications, Popular Culture, and Film at Brock University, Canada. His research interests include the discursive analysis of contemporary technoculture and the historical emergence of cybersociety. Email: dbradley@brocku.ca Works Cited Bookchin, Murray. Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism. San Francisco: AK Press, 1995. Deleuze, Gilles & Felix Guattari. A Thousand Plateaus. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1987. Grant, George. Technology and Empire: Perspectives on North America. Toronto: House of Anansi, 1969. Lefebvre, Henri. The Production of Space. Trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith. Oxford UK: Blackwell, 1991. Parker, Martin. ‘Utopia and the Organizational Imagination: Eutopia’. Utopia and Organization. Ed. Martin Parker. Oxford UK: Blackwell, 2002. Rushkoff, Douglas. Open Source Democracy. London: Demos, 2003. Full text available under open source licensing at: http://www.demos.co.uk/catalogue/opensourcedemocracy_page292.aspx http://www.gnu.org/gnu/manifesto.html Stallman, Richard. ‘The GNU Operating System and the Free Software Movement’. Open Sources: Voices from the Open Source Revolution. Eds. Chris DiBona, Sam Ockman & Mark Stone. Sebastopol CA: O’Reilly & Associates,1999. Tiemann, Michael. ‘Future of Cygnus Solutions: An Entrepreneur’s Account’. Open Sources: Voices from the Open Source Revolution. Eds. Chris DiBona, Sam Ockman & Mark Stone. O’Reilly & Associates, Sebastopol CA: 1999 Winston, Brian. Misunderstanding Media. Harvard U Press, Cambridge MA: 1986 For a brief overview of the debate between Stallman and Raymond, see ‘Whence the Source: Untangling the Open Source/Free Software Debate’ at: http://opensource.oreilly.com/news/scoville_0399.html) Citation reference for this article MLA Style Bradley, Dale. "Open Source, Anarchy, and the Utopian Impulse" M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture <http://www.media-culture.org.au/0406/03_Bradley.php>. APA Style Bradley, D. (2004, Jul1). Open Source, Anarchy, and the Utopian Impulse. M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture, 7, <http://www.media-culture.org.au/0406/03_Bradley.php>

Disclaimer: The situation on PixelCanvas is constantly changing due to raids from both sides. The figures in this article represent the state as of April 2020. In the politicized digital environment, the superiority of the alt-right’s weaponization of memes is often taken for granted. As summarized in the buzzword-phrase “the left can’t meme”, the digital engagements of self-identified leftist activists are usually seen as less effective than the ones of the right: their attempts at utilizing Internet culture described as too “politically correct” and “devoid of humour”. This supposedly “immutable law of the Internet” (Dankulous Memeulon) often found confirmation in research.Described by Phillips and Milner, Internet culture – “a highly insular clique”, now seeping into popular culture – is by design rooted in liberalism and fetishized sight. Through its principles of “free speech”, “harmless fun”, and dehumanizing detachment of memes from real-life production and consequence, meme-sharing was enabling deception, “bigoted pollution”, and reinforcing white racial frames, regardless of intentions (Phillips and Milner). From Andersson to Nagle, many come to the conclusion that the left’s presence online is simply not organized, not active, not transgressive enough to appeal to the sensibilities of Internet culture. Meanwhile, the playful, deceptive online engagements of the alt-right are found to be increasingly viral, set to recruit numerous young rebels, hence upholding a cultural hegemony which has already transcended over to the offline world. This online right style is one where a rejection of morality and nihilistic nonconformity reign supreme – all packaged in carnivalesque laughter and identity-bending “trolling” (Nagle 28-39). Even if counterculture and transgression used to be domains of the left, nowadays the nihilistic, fetishizing landscape of online humour is popularized via alt-right aligned message boards like 4chan (Nagle 28-39).Left-wing alternatives, encompassed by Nagle in the term “Tumblr liberalism”, were often described as “fragmented” through identitarianism and call-out-culture, enclosed in echo chambers, “nannying, language policing, and authoritarian” (68-85). This categorization has been rightfully criticized for reductionism that lumps together diverse political strands, focuses on form only, and omits the importance of subcultural logic in its caricature of the censorious left (Davies). However, it would be difficult to deny that this is exactly how the online left is, unfortunately, often perceived by the right and liberals/centrists alike, evidenced by its niche quality.The solutions to the problem of the right’s dominance in the memeosphere – and their Gramscian cultural hegemony – offered by Phillips and Milner could include disavowing fetishized sight while maintaining “slapdash, quippy, and Internet Ugly” qualities to deconstruct meme culture’s whiteness; Davies suggests that “if the left is to have the same degree of success in translating online cultures into political movements then it needs to understand both the online world and its own IRL history”.Nonetheless, some strands of the online left have been rather close in style and form to the ones of the alt-right, despite their clear difference of “stance” (Shifman 367). In this article, I demonstrate an example of a multi-faceted, united, witty, and countercultural meme leftism on PixelCanvas.io (PixelCanvas): a nearly unlimited online canvas, where anyone can place coloured pixels with an obligatory cooldown time after each. Intended for creative expression, PixelCanvas became a site of click-battles between organized dichotomous extremes of the left and the alt-right, and is swarmed with political imagery. The right’s use of this platform has been already examined by Thibault, well-fitting into the consensus about the efficiency of right-wing online activity. My focus is the rebuttal of alt-right imagery that the radical left replaces with their own.With a brief account of PixelCanvas’s affordances and recounting the recent history of its culture wars, I trace the hybrid leftist activity on PixelCanvas to argue that it is comparably grounded in dissimulation and transgression to the alt-right’s. Based on the case study, I explore how certain strands of online left might reappropriate the carnivalesque, deceptive, and countercultural meme culture sensibilities and forms, while simultaneously rejecting its “bigoted pollution” (Phillips and Milner) aspects. While arguably problematic, these new strategies might be necessary to combat the alt-right’s hegemony in the meme environment – and by extension, in popular culture.PixelCanvas as a Metapolitical Platform of Culture WarsPixelCanvas affords a blend of 4chan-style open-access, no-login anonymity and the importance of organized collective effort. As described by Thibault, it is an “online ‘game’ that allows players to colour pixels ..., either collaborating or competing for the control of the shared space” (102). The obligatory cooldown period on PixelCanvas results in most of the works requiring either dedication of long periods of time or collaboration: as such, the majority of canvas art has a “shared authorship” (102). As a space for creative expression, PixelCanvas encourages expressing aspects of genuine personal identity (political views, sexuality, etc.) albeit reduced to symbols and memes that rarely remain personal. Although the primary medium of information transfer on the platform is visual, brief written catchphrases are also utilized. While the canvas is not lacking in free areas, competition for space is prevalent: between political viewpoints, nationalist groups (Bakalım), and other communities (PixelCanvas.io).Given this setup, it might be expected that battling for hegemony took over the game. The affordances of PixelCanvas as accepting anonymous unmoderated expressions of identity/political views encourage dissimulation similarly to boards such as 4chan; its immediate visual/one-liner focus overlaps with the prerequisites of meme culture. Meanwhile, the game’s competition aspect leads to large-scale organization of polarized metapolitical groups and to imagery that is increasingly larger, more taboo-breaking, and playful: meant to catch the eye of a viewer before the opponents do. PixelCanvas, as such, is a platform fitting into transgressive, trolling, fetishizing, and “liberal” affordances of Internet culture: the same affordances that made it, according to Nagle or Phillips and Milner, into a space of desensitized white supremacy and right-wing dominance.Such a setup may seem to work in favour of the 4chan-style raids and against the supposed identitarianism of “Tumblr liberalism”. One could recall the importance of united collective efforts on 4chan: from meme-sharing to Gamergate raids (Beran). Meanwhile, suggested by Citarella, a problem of the online left is its fragmentation, and its “poorly organized and smaller followings” (10). As he observed on Politigram, “DemSocs, Syndicalists, ML’s, AnComs, … and so on, all hated each other. The online right was equally divided but managed to coordinate cultural agitations” (Citarella 10).Indeed, the platform displayed the effects of alt-right virality multiple times, involving creations of self-identified Kekistanis (KnowYourMeme), anarcho-capitalists, 4chan-aligned “bronies” (My Little Pony fans), etc. However, since 2017, the left joined the game, becoming another example of a united, well-organized and strongly participatory group, which continuously resists alt-right attacks and establishes its own raids, often gaining an upper hand.Named “Battle of Pixelgrad”, the influx of leftist activity began to combat the forming Reich Iron Cross posted by “a user on 4chan's /pol/” which has caught the attention of Leftbook/meme groups and subreddits (PLK Wiki) (Wrigley). The groups involved spanned “all beliefs under a unified socialist umbrella” (Pixel Liberation Front) ranging from communism through anarchism subtypes to identity politics: all associating with the “left unity” flag that they replaced the Iron Cross with. Their efforts against alt-right raids were coordinated through Discord servers and a public Facebook group. Soon, a Facebook page for Left Unity Fighting Front (LUFF) was set up, with the PixelCanvas flag in the banner and the description: “We decided to form the new rival of 4chan, LUFF. We are the new united front of the internet. Promoting left unity, trolling Nazis, and taking on sectarianism.”Figure 1: The ’Left Unity’ flag. Source: https://pixelcanvas.io/@-1554,3594.The concept of left unity has been criticised before, as one that would lead to “the co-optation of anarchism under a Marxist leadership”, charged with the history of anarchist-Bolshevik clashes in USSR, and marred by a “lack of willingness among some Marxists to actually engage with anarchists in legitimate debate” (Springer). Still, the PixelCanvas left unity is one of the rare instances of Marxist, anarchist, and other leftist online groups working together on rather equal grounds, without cracking down on discourse and historical contexts: which is afforded by a subcultural logic and focus on combating a common enemy. The PixelCanvas leftists support common projects, readily bending their beliefs/ identity to create an efficient community that can resist 4chan: self-identifying as an “allyship” with anonymous “soldiers”/comrades belonging together on the left side of the pixel “war” (Pixel Liberation Front). While the diversity of their beliefs is made clear through the variously aligned flags/thinkers they choose to represent with pixels, the union stands without in-fighting, emulating simplistic versions of history as a dichotomous struggle between left and right (which deliberately rejects centrism): from Nazi/communist battles to Cold War imagery. Although reductionist, this us/them thinking is especially necessary in the visual, time-sensitive, and competitive space of PixelCanvas. No matter how extreme the common projects are, what matters in the pixel war is camaraderie and defeating the enemy in the most striking manner possible. After all, the setup of the platform (and the immediacy of Internet culture) supports attention- grabbing transgression and memes better than nuanced discourse. Figure 2: Representation of the left uniting against Nazism and anarcho-capitalism. Source: https://pixelcanvas.io/@-143,-782.As of April 2020, hardly any Nazi/4chan/ancap imagery on PixelCanvas stands without being challenged by the Left Unity. Although some of the groups involved in Pixelgrad do not exist anymore, Discord servers (e.g. RedPixel) and Pixel Liberation Front (PLF) Facebook group remain, defending the platform from continued raids. These coordinating bodies are easily accessible to anyone willing to contribute (shall one wish for complete anonymity, they are also free to participate without joining the servers). Their efforts could be understood as “clicktivism” (Halupka); however, the involved leftists view it as a “war” (PLF) or “Memeolution” (Wrigley), an important way in which the “virality of right-wing populism” (Thibault) must be resisted. This use of language highlights their serious awareness of the need for combating the right’s digital hegemony, no matter how playful their activity seems.Even if this phenomenon is specific to PixelCanvas, one should acknowledge that the identity-bending unity of the left has been enough to challenge continued raids. Niche practices, as seen through 4chan, might break into the mainstream: according to Hobson and Modi, online spaces “are a rich recruiting ground for previously antithetical/apolitical young people” (345) who find refuge in memes and trolling. The agenda of the PixelCanvas left (counterplatforming activism) in this case differs from 4chan’s. However, the forms they assume to reach their goal are often “pithy, funny, or particularly striking” enough to potentially make one “pause to think, and/or laugh” (Hobson and Modi 345) regardless of political alignment.The Form, Content, and Stance of PixelCanvas Left ActivityDespite the unity in the organization of the PixelCanvas left, the approaches/strategies of its various pixel artworks are far from uniform. At the first sight, the creations of RedPixel members already appear as a multi-faceted (and potentially confusing) mixture of serious real-life agenda and playful Internet culture. Guided by Shifman’s communication-oriented typology of memes, I analyze the different “contents, forms, and stances” (367) that the PixelCanvas left displays in its creations. For analytical clarity, I distinguish three main approaches which overlap and play various roles in contributing to the collective image of RedPixel as simultaneously activist, serious, inclusive, and Internet-culture-savvy, transgressive, deceptive.The first approach of PixelCanvas leftist creations is most serious and least grounded in Internet culture. A portion of RedPixel activity directly reproduces real-life protest chants, posters, flags, murals, movement symbols, and portraits of leftist icons, with little alteration to the form other than pixelating. The contents of such creations vary, however, they remain serious and focused on real-life issues: voicing support for contemporary leftist movements (Black Lives Matter, pro-refugee, Rojava liberation, etc.), celebrating the countercultural, class-centric leftist history (anarchist, communist, socialist victories, thinkers, and revolutionaries), and representing a plethora of identities within hyper-inclusive flag clusters (of various sexualities, genders, and ethnicities). The stance of these images can be plausibly interpreted as charged with serious/genuine “keying” (Shifman 367), and “conative” (imperative) or “emotive” (367) functions. Within those images, the meme culture’s problematic affordances (“fetishization” and “liberalism” (Phillips and Milner)) are disavowed clearly: exemplified by a banner on the site suggesting that “just a meme” mentality created a shield for “meme Nazis” that led to the 2019 Christchurch mosque shooting. Although this strand of RedPixel’s works could be criticized as “humourless” and rather detached from the platform’s affordances, its role lies in displaying the connection to the real world with potential suggestions for mobilization, the awareness of meme culture’s problematic nature, and the image of radical left cooperation. Figure 3: The Christchurch memorial. Source: https://pixelcanvas.io/@-2815,3321. Figure 4: Posters and symbols in support of Rojava, Palestine liberation, and Black Lives Matter. Source: https://pixelcanvas.io/@5340,4121. Figure 5: Early Paris Commune poster reproduced on PixelCanvas. Source: https://pixelcanvas.io/@7629,2134. Figure 6: Example of a PixelCanvas hyper-inclusive flag cluster. Source: https://pixelcanvas.io/@2741,-3508.The second approach, while similar in the diversity of content, adopts memetic forms, and the light-hearted “harmless fun” of Internet culture. Through popular meme formats (molded to call for action), slang expressions, pop-cultural references (anime/cartoon/video game characters), to adopting “cutesy” aesthetics, these creations present identity politics, anti-fascism, and anti-capitalism in a light, aestheticized form. Popular characters, colourful art, and repetitive base colour schemes (red, black, rainbow) are likely to attract attention; recognition of the pop-cultural references, and of known meme formats might sustain it, urging one to focus on the only uncertain element: the politics behind it. Being visually and contextually appealing to online youth, this political-memetic imagery is well-adapted to the platform. Simultaneously, the carnivalesque forms contrast with the frequently more transgressive contents this approach employs. As a result, the tone of their work seems lighthearted even in its incitement to “kill the Nazis” and “eat the rich”. Clearly aware of the language of its opposition, RedPixel reacts similarly to how 4chan reacted to Tumblr liberalism: responding to “lightly thrown accusations” (Nagle) by intensifying them to the point where they can be seen as “owning” the labels they have been given – instead of “getting offended”. Through memes and reappropriated posters they present themselves as “Red Menace,” as a direct threat to 4channers, and as a “trigger-warning” club, using the existing criticisms to self-identify as formidable enemies of the right. While the transgression in RedPixel style often remains acceptable by radical left standards, it is certainly not the same as “virtue signalling”, “hypersensitive”, “vulnerable” Tumblr liberalism (Nagle 68–85); and it might be shocking or amoral to some. Much of their imagery is provocative: inciting violence, glorifying deeply problematic parts of communist history, using religious symbols in a potentially blasphemous way, supporting occultism/ Satanism, and explicitly amplifying (queer) sexuality. In the mix of (sometimes) extreme contents and forms that suggest a light-hearted attitude, it might be difficult to determine the keying of their stance. Although it is unlikely that RedPixel would avow politics they do not actually believe (given the activist, anti-fetishizing agenda of their first approach), their political choices are frequently amplified to their full “tankie” form, and even up to Stalin support: raising the question how much of it is serious intent masked with humour, and what could be written off as deliberate identity play, deceptive “trolling” and jokes, similar in style to 4chan’s. Figure 7: Revolution-inciting appropriation of a popular meme format. Source: https://pixelcanvas.io/@-1765,3376. Figure 8: Fictional characters Stevonnie (Steven Universe) and Cirno (Touhou) with leftist captions. Source: https://pixelcanvas.io/@-847,-748. Figure 9: Call for fighting fascism referencing a Pacman video game and Karl Marx. Source: https://pixelcanvas.io/@-712,-395. Figure 10: Joseph Stalin reimagined as a My Little Pony character. Source: https://pixelcanvas.io/@-1197,966. Figure 11: “A spectre is haunting Kekistan.” Source: https://pixelcanvas.io/@-2196,3248. Figure 12: “Trigger Warning Gun Club” badge. Source: https://pixelcanvas.io/@2741,-3508.Figure 13: “Have you heard that Nazis get vored?” anime catgirl. Source: https://pixelcanvas.io/@1684,928. Figure 14: Rainbow genitals on a former Kekistan flag. Source: https://pixelcanvas.io/@-2513,3221. Figure 15: “Eat the Rich — OK Boomer” wizard ghost. Source: https://pixelcanvas.io/@-4390,-697.The third approach can be read as a subset of the second: however, what distinguishes it is a clearly parodic stance and reappropriating of 4chan’s forms. The PixelCanvas activists, unlike the supposed “anti-free speech” left (Lukianoff and Haidt) do not try to get the alt-right imagery removed by others, and do not fully erase it. Instead, they repurpose 4chan memes and flags, ridiculing them or making them stand for leftist views. An unaware viewer could mistake their parodies of 4chan for parodies of the left made by 4chaners; the true stance sometimes only suggested by their placement within RedPixel-reclaimed areas. Communist and LGBTQ+ Pepes or Ponies, modified Kekistan flags, and even claiming that “the right can’t meme” all point to an interesting trend that instead of banning symbols associated with alt-right groups wants to exploit the malleability of memes: confusing and parodying their original content and stance while maintaining the form and style. This aim is perhaps best exemplified in the image The Greatest Game of Capture the Flag where Pepes in anarcho-communist, communist, and transgender Pride hoodies are escaping from a crying white man while carrying a 4chan flag. Interpreted in context, this image summarizes the new direction that leftists take against 4chan. This is a direction of left unity (with various strands of radical left maintaining their identities but establishing an overarching collective “allyship” identification), of mixing identity politics with classic ideologies, of reconciling Internet culture with IRL socio-political awareness, and finally, of reappropriating proven-effective play, dissimulation, and transgression from 4chan. Figure 16: Pride flag cluster with Pride-coloured Pepes. Source: https://pixelcanvas.io/@-1599,3516. Figure 17: Communist/anarchist thinkers and leaders reimagined as Pepes. Source: https://pixelcanvas.io/@-1885,3203. Figure 18: “The Right Can’t Meme.” Source: https://pixelcanvas.io/@-1885,3203. Figure 19: The reclaimed Kekistan area. Source: https://pixelcanvas.io/@-2439,3210. Figure 20: “The Greatest Game of Capture the Flag.” Source: https://pixelcanvas.io/@-1885,3203.ConclusionThe PixelCanvas left can serve as an example of a united stronghold which managed to counterplatform the alt-right: assuming dominance in 2017 to later rebuild and expand their pixel spheres of influence after each 4chan raid. Online culture wars are nowadays recognized as Gramscian in their roots: according to Burton, “the young people confronting this reactionary shift head-on with memes normalizing are … on the front lines of a culture war with global repercussions” (13). By far, this “war” for digital hegemony has been overwhelmingly evaluated as one that the alt-right is simply better at, due to the natural affordances of Internet culture. However, the “united front of the internet” “promoting left unity and trolling Nazis” (LUFF) exemplifies a possible direction which the online radical left could follow to take on 4chan’s digital dominance. This direction is complex and hybrid: with overlapping/combined approaches. The activities of PixelCanvas left include practices that are well-adapted to the immediate meme culture and those based on IRL movements; practices similar to 4chan’s problematic transgression and those that are activist, disavowing fetishized sight; serious practices and deceptive/ironic ones. Their 2017 PixelCanvas victory and later resistance persisting despite continuing raids might suggest that this strategy works, with the key to its coordination laying in the subcultural logic of an “allyship” that privileges fast-paced mobilization and swift comebacks over careful nuance: necessitated by meme culture affordances. Although only time can prove if this new left digital language will become more widespread, it has the potential to become an alternative to “hypersensitive Tumblr liberalism” and to challenge the idea that meme culture is doomed to be right-wing.ReferencesAndersson, Linus. “No Digital ‘Castles in the Air’: Online Non-Participation and the Radical Left.” Media and Communication 4.4 (2016): 53–62.Bakalım, Seyret. “Pixel io Türkiye vs Brezilya [Turkey vs Brazil] Pixel War.” YouTube, 23 June 2017. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NsPHVNpB8Hg>.Beran, Dale. “4chan: The Skeleton Key to the Rise of Trump.” Medium, 14 Feb. 2017. <https://medium.com/@DaleBeran/4chan-the-skeleton-key-to-the-rise-of-trump-624e7cb798cb>.Burton, Julian. “Look at Us, We Have Anxiety: Youth, Memes, and the Power of Online Cultural Politics.” Journal of Childhood Studies 44.3 (2019): 3–17.Dankulous Memeulon. “The Left Can’t Meme.” UrbanDictionary, 11 May 2018. <https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=The%20Left%20can%27t%20Meme>.Davies, Josh. “Tumblr Liberalism’ vs the Serious Authentic Left: On Angela Nagle’s Kill All Normies.” Ceasefire Magazine, 8 Sep. 2017. <https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/tumblr-liberalism-authentic-left-review-kill-normies/>.Halupka, Max. “Clicktivism: A Systematic Heuristic.” Policy & Internet 6.2 (2014): 115–32.Hobson, Thomas, and Kaajal Modi. “Socialist Imaginaries and Queer Futures: Memes as Sites of Collective Imagining.” Post Memes: Seizing the Memes of Production. 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Rejecting Left Unity and Raising Hell in Radical Geography.” Anarchist Studies, 28 Jan. 2018. <https://anarchiststudies.noblogs.org/whos-afraid-of-the-big-bad-anarchist-rejecting-left-unity-and-raising-hell-in-radical-geography/>.Thibault, Mattia. “A Picture of the Internet: Conflict, Power and Politics on Pixelcanvas.” Virality and Morphogenesis of Right-Wing Internet Populism. Eds. Eva Kimminich and Julius Erdmann. Berlin: Peter Lang, 2018. 102–12.TheCissKing. “Tucute.” Urban Dictionary, 17 Jan. 2019. <https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=tucute>.Wrigley, Jack. “Battle of Pixelgrad.” YouTube, 24 July 2017. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZJa1Hi2j1_E>.

Paul Virilio. The Information Bomb. London: Verso, 2000. 145 pp., ISBN: 1-85984-745-5 (hardback). Born in Paris in 1932, the French political and 'technocultural' theorist Paul Virilio is the leading exponent of the idea that 'dromology' (the logic of speed) stands at the centre of the political formation and technocultural transformation of the contemporary world. Virilio is an architect of the 'Brutalist' school and political 'critic of the art of technology' as well as a Husserlian phenomenologist and post-Einsteinian analyst of technoculture. In recent years Virilio has developed his own political approach to the technocultural and experiential effects of speed and technoscience on the organisation of cyberspace and cyberculture. It is an approach that is increasingly being adopted and adapted by a variety of pre-eminent thinkers on the Left such as Jean Baudrillard, Slavoj Zizek and Andre Gorz. As the son of a Breton mother and an Italian communist father in Nazi-occupied France, Virilio spent the majority of World War II as an anxious evacuee in Nantes. In 1950 he converted to Christianity in the fraternity of 'worker-priests'. Virilio was educated at the L'École des Métiers d'Art in Paris and first became a craftsman in stained glass before becoming a sort of intellectual provocateur and co-editor of Architecture Principe, an architectural group and occasional review devoted to radical political and architectural experimentation. Between 1963 and 1966 Virilio dedicated his time to studying the architecture of war and to the construction of the 'bunker church' of Sainte-Bernadette du Banlay at Nevers. Virilio became politically active during the 1968 May revolt and this led to an irrevocable split with his partner in Architecture Principe, the architect Claude Parent. In 1969 Virilio was instated as a professor of architecture at the École Speciale d'Architecture at the behest of the students there, a position he occupied until his retirement in 1997. Virilio's major work is Speed & Politics: An Essay on Dromology (1986), written, he maintains, to raise the political question of speed as the hidden side of economic development. Virilio's recent texts such as Open Sky (1997) and now The Information Bomb can therefore be regarded as important advances in his current work on the politics of techno, or, cyberculture. As the son of a Breton mother and an Italian communist father in Nazi-occupied France, Virilio spent the majority of World War II as an anxious evacuee in Nantes. In 1950 he converted to Christianity in the fraternity of 'worker-priests'. Virilio was educated at the L'École des Métiers d'Art in Paris and first became a craftsman in stained glass before becoming a sort of intellectual provocateur and co-editor of Architecture Principe, an architectural group and occasional review devoted to radical political and architectural experimentation. Between 1963 and 1966 Virilio dedicated his time to studying the architecture of war and to the construction of the 'bunker church' of Sainte-Bernadette du Banlay at Nevers. Virilio became politically active during the 1968 May revolt and this led to an irrevocable split with his partner in Architecture Principe, the architect Claude Parent. In 1969 Virilio was instated as a professor of architecture at the École Speciale d'Architecture at the behest of the students there, a position he occupied until his retirement in 1997. Virilio's major work is Speed & Politics: An Essay on Dromology (1986), written, he maintains, to raise the political question of speed as the hidden side of economic development. Virilio's recent texts such as Open Sky (1997) and now The Information Bomb can therefore be regarded as important advances in his current work on the politics of techno, or, cyberculture. Virilio's newest political and technocultural work, The Information Bomb, is set to become an important text of intellectual and dromological analysis. On its opening page Virilio quotes Werner Heisenberg, the German physicist, chief architect of quantum mechanics and founder of the 'uncertainty principle': 'No one can say what will be "real" for people when the wars which are now beginning come to an end'. Briefly, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle states that if a simultaneous calculation is made of the location and speed of a particle then, no matter how faithful the calculations, there is always an uncertainty in the values acquired. It deals with the simultaneous calculation of energy and time. The uncertainty occurs because the act of perceiving the system interferes with it in an unpredictable manner. But uncertainty is only significant at the atomic and subatomic levels and at these levels throws the principle of causality into confusion. Virilio's The Information Bomb therefore examines the dromological and uncertain relationships between the 'reality' of the war universe, speed and, crucially, our perception of its main causalities. The key question and the first sentence of Virilio's book is: 'The civilianisation or militarisation of science?' Virilio answers by describing what he calls the catastrophes of postmodern technoscience and globalisation, Americanisation, biotechnology, Internet pornography and the advertising industry in the most uncompromising terms. Virilio's riposte to the question is already contained in the book's title. This is because, for him, since the end of World War II, the militarisation of science and the construction of two kinds of bomb have overshadowed civilian life. The first is the atom bomb, 'which is capable of using the energy of radioactivity to smash matter'. The second is the information bomb, 'which is capable of using the interactivity of information to wreck the peace between nations'. Virilio delineates the existence of the information bomb, of an explosion of mediated misery around the world, in terms of the deterioration of language and the sheer seductive power of TV and computer screens, the acceleration of history and the emergence of new inter-generational conflicts. Virilio forcefully argues that the advent of the information bomb requires the creation of a new type of social deterrence if nations are to avoid the 'fission' of their 'social cores' as they enter into the uncertain and often shocking world of chronopolitics. For this is a topsy-turvy world where neo-liberalism confronts 'cyberfeminism' and the military-scientific complex contemplates the arrival of 'cyberwar' and 'grey ecology' (the pollution of distances) under the sign of cinematic disinformation from Hollywood and the technological transformation of work through the introduction of mobile phones and 'zero-hour' contracts. Or, as Virilio says at one point in The Information Bomb: in today's 'dromocratic' capitalism, when the biotech corporation calls, 'you come running'. It would, though, be incorrect to view Virilio's political opposition to the uncritical acceptance of technoculture and the explosion of the information bomb as a wholly pessimistic stance on the spread of neo-liberalism in realms such as the multimedia. Virilio's work is, for example, in no way analogous to that of Baudrillard, the intellectual high priest of postmodernism. In truth, Virilio manifestly frames his recent writings in relation to a guarded optimism concerning what I have elsewhere called his 'hypermodern' technocultural theory: a theory involved with the acceleration and dislocation of modern forms of thought about the contemporary world and how it is depicted. It is therefore perfectly plausible to derive from Virilio's dromological texts a scientifically 'uncertain' conception of 'reality' that focusses on the concepts of hypermodernism and 'hypermodernity'. The latter is an idea centred on coming to terms with the speeding-up of historical processes and a critical analysis of modernity based on a political perception of technoculture that is catastrophic. In this way, Virilio typically conceives of the developments he documents in The Information Bomb not as the psychoanalytic problems of progress but as the technoscientific and 'excessive' displacement of them. It is a conceptualisation that is evident in his dromological and dynamic writings on the subject of 'information superhighways' and the 'full range of communications disturbances acquired over the recent centuries of technology'. 'In this field', Virilio says, progress 'acts like a forensic scientist on us' since it violates 'each bodily orifice'. But such 'brutal incursions' do not merely influence individuals; they colonise them. For Virilio, then, progress 'heaps up, accumulates and condenses in each of us the full range of (visual, social, psycho-motor, affective, sexual, etc.) detrital disorders which it has taken on with each innovation, each with their full complement of specific injuries'. All criticism of technology having disappeared, 'we have slid unconsciously from pure technology to techno-culture and, lastly, to the dogmatism of a totalitarian techno-cult...' As can be ascertained from the above examples, Virilio's work sits uneasily with almost all the prevailing paradigms and methodological approaches currently on offer. Chasing a multitude of Foucauldian discontinuities and shape-shifting Deleuzian inflected 'lines of flight' simultaneously, The Information Bomb can thus be seen as a reflection of his self-professed 'anarcho-Christianity'. It is a methodological stance, political perspective and religious position Virilio shares to some extent with the author of The Technological Society (1964), the late Jacques Ellul. Viewed from this angle, Virilio's oppositional and overtly political writings on the 'hypermodern condition' present a comprehensible methodological outlook. It is, however, an outlook that is somewhat at odds with the political and intellectual terrain occupied by 'transpolitical' postmodernists such as Baudrillard, 'poststructuralist anarchists' like Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze and the deconstructionist and 'spectral Marxist' Jacques Derrida. Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to imagine that Virilio's rather abstract writings in The Information Bomb opposing the rise of neo-liberalism and the hypermodern condition have not touched a nerve in France. Left-leaning theoreticians and the editors of newspapers such as Le Monde Diplomatique regularly pursue Virilio's forthright opinions in the form of articles and interviews on everything from Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man (1992) to his own thoughts on the end of geography and technoculture. Virilio is therefore a very creative political theorist who articulates himself with equal ease in academic and non-specialist technocultural works. Unlike Foucault, Virilio is the personification of the 'engaged intellectual'. Rather than simply opting for the life of a professor of architecture at the École Speciale d' Architecture, Virilio has always chosen to communicate his ideas to as wide an audience as possible, a strategy that earned him a 'National Award for Criticism' in 1987. Virilio's contemporary writings thus necessarily involve a dromological, political and technocultural encounter with the militarisation of science in the shape of the Internet. Even so, unlike Virilio's earlier texts such as Open Sky (1997), in The Information Bomb Virilio does not merely concentrate his gaze on society's apparent need for speed but, decisively, on its present-day extension into pornography and advertising and their integration into the commercialisation of the art world. Describing the 1997 London Royal Academy exhibition entitled 'Sensation' ostensibly held to present young British artists, Virilio suggests that, like many others, in actuality, this exhibition was designed and presented by 'the sex-culture-advertising movement'. This is because the '110 works on display (a portrait of child-murderer Myra Hindley, casts of childlike bodies with mouths replaced by phalluses, etc.) belonged, without exception, to Charles Saatchi, one of Britain's great advertising moguls'. What is at issue here for Virilio is the recognition that, like the need for speed and the example of the Internet, the distinctions between the world of pornography, the world of art and the world of advertising have all but been obliterated in the name of nothing more profound than 'breaking down the last taboos'. However, in Virilio's hypermodern conception of the 'terminal arts', a 'confrontation between a tortured body and an automatic camera' not only signifies the coming of the 'sex-culture-advertising-complex' but, equally importantly, the onset of 'endocolonisation' or, what takes place when militarised technoscience colonises the human body with the aim of reducing every member of humanity that has 'had its day' to the status of a 'specimen'. The political critiques provided by Virilio in The Information Bomb are a welcome development. For, today, it is sometimes all too easy to criticise the discipline of cultural studies for its celebration of political, technological and cultural différance without any corresponding recognition of economic and other inequalities founded on class, gender and race. Moreover, Virilio's fervent and occasionally maniacal critique of the art of technology stands out because it stretches from political and technocultural studies to economic and film studies, sometimes in the space of a single paragraph. Taking in Hollywood directors and obvious film productions such as Jan de Bont's Speed as well as the work of French cinematic pioneers like the Lumière brothers', Virilio's The Information Bomb is an important publication. But, unlike numerous other 'cybercultural' tomes, the significance of this book is derived from the fact that it also manages to extend the scope of political and technocultural studies through the provision of often-abstruse pronouncements such as Kafka's claim that the cinema 'involves putting the eye into uniform'. The political critiques provided by Virilio in The Information Bomb are a welcome development. For, today, it is sometimes all too easy to criticise the discipline of cultural studies for its celebration of political, technological and cultural différance without any corresponding recognition of economic and other inequalities founded on class, gender and race. Moreover, Virilio's fervent and occasionally maniacal critique of the art of technology stands out because it stretches from political and technocultural studies to economic and film studies, sometimes in the space of a single paragraph. Taking in Hollywood directors and obvious film productions such as Jan de Bont's Speed as well as the work of French cinematic pioneers like the Lumière brothers', Virilio's The Information Bomb is an important publication. But, unlike numerous other 'cybercultural' tomes, the significance of this book is derived from the fact that it also manages to extend the scope of political and technocultural studies through the provision of often-abstruse pronouncements such as Kafka's claim that the cinema 'involves putting the eye into uniform'. Yet it would be wrong to think that such an individualistic political and technocultural approach cannot be extended beyond Virilio's own anarcho-Christianity or the writings of Ellul. For example, Virilio's The Art of the Motor (1995) has been an important reference point in the recent writings of imaginative Marxists as distinct as Zizek in The Plague of Fantasies (1997) and Gorz in Reclaiming Work: Beyond the Wage-Based Society (1999). It would be difficult to believe that The Information Bomb will not become another significant source in the future works of other creative radicals, offering as it does not only a provisional pathway out of the quicksand of postmodernism but also a way into the sympathies of ordinary people. Firing off political concepts and technocultural neologisms at the speed of light, Virilio's passionately argued texts do not always hit their intended targets. But for anyone seeking a hypermodern critique of the cultural logic of late militarism that ranges from the Internet and the commercialisation of art to endocolonisation and the accident, Virilio's radical political and technocultural theory of speed contained in The Information Bomb is just what you have been waiting for. Citation reference for this article MLA style: John Armitage. "The Uncertainty Principle: Paul Virilio's 'The Information Bomb'." M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 3.3 (2000). [your date of access] <http://www.api-network.com/mc/0006/virilio.php>. Chicago style: John Armitage, "The Uncertainty Principle: Paul Virilio's 'The Information Bomb'," M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 3, no. 3 (2000), <http://www.api-network.com/mc/0006/virilio.php> ([your date of access]). APA style: John Armitage. (2000) The uncertainty principle: Paul Virilio's 'The information bomb'. M/C: A Journal of Media and Culture 3(3). <http://www.api-network.com/mc/0006/virilio.php> ([your date of access]).