Academic literature on the topic 'Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907'

This thesis examines British Foreign Office views of Russia and Anglo-Russian relations prior to the 1907 Anglo-Russian Entente. British diplomatic documents, memoirs, and papers in the Public Record Office reveal diplomatic concern with ending Central Asian tensions. This study examines Anglo-Russian relations from the pre-Lansdowne era, including agreements with Japan (1902) and France (1904), the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05, and the shift in Liberal thinking up to the Anglo-Russian Entente. The main reason British diplomats negotiated the Entente was less to end Central Asian friction, this thesis concludes, than the need to check Germany, which some Foreign Office members believed, was bent upon European hegemony.

Chapter One describes Britain's nuclear and conventional defence policy towards the United States during 1957-1959. Britain's nuclear policy during these years was based on reconciling British independence with Anglo-American cooperation and cost effectiveness. The British government reduced Britain's conventional forces, but Britain's force strength In Europe had to be adjusted as the Americans began to support calls for a build-up of conventional forces in Europe. Chapter Two deals with Macmillan's policies on SKYBOLT, POLARIS and the NATO MRBM force during 1960. The British government was keen on getting both missiles from the Americans, aiming at a deal that would leave Britain with a maximum degree of independence for her deterrent. The Eisenhower Administration's support for SACEUR's NATO MRBM force proposals thwarted British attempts to get POLARIS. Chapter Three describes Macmillan's attempt at reconciling Britain's nuclear cooperation with the United States with British offers of military cooperation with France during 1961-1962. Such options were considered in order to prevent Britain's deterrent from being subsumed within a multilateral force. An Anglo-French nuclear alignment was one possible alternative to a more obvious example of alliance interdependence, a NATO nuclear force backed by the United States. In Chapter Four Britain's efforts to reduce her conventional forces during the years 1960-1962 are discussed. These efforts coincide with American pressure to build up conventional forces in Europe in the wake of the Berlin crisis. Anglo-American discussions over the conventional force strength issue culminated in the Nassau meeting of December 1962. The general British debate on future commitments and deployments overshadowed the coordination of efforts with the Americans on conventional forces overseas. Chapter Five describes Britain's nuclear relationship with the United States in the aftermath of Nassau. This centred on the drafting of a POLARIS Sales agreement and finding some common ground on the NATO multilateral force issue. On the former, the British position was challenged by American efforts at renegotiating the Nassau agreement. On the latter, the British government was divided over if and to what extent it should cooperate with the Americans on the MLF. The US Administrations under Kennedy and Johnson were only half-hearted in their support for the mixed manned multilateral force. Macmillan meanwhile remained hesitant about suggestions to embark upon a nuclear rapprochement with France. Chapter Six follows Britain's attempt to reach a decision on commitments and conventional force deployments during the years 1963-1 964. Members of the British government were inclined to look at the division of defence tasks between Brita n and the United States in areas outside NATO as another form of Anglo-American interdependence at work. During Douglas-Home's premiership, Britain's role in out-of-NATO areas assumed greater significance.