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Journal articles on the topic 'Anscombe'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 4 June 2021

Last updated: 14 December 2024

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1

O’Connell, Rory. "“I Do What Happens”: The Productive Character of Practical Knowledge." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50, no. 5 (April 15, 2020): 670–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/can.2020.12.

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AbstractElizabeth Anscombe introduced the notion of “practical knowledge” into contemporary philosophy. Philosophers of action have criticized Anscombe’s negative characterization of such knowledge as “non-observational,” but have recently come to pay more attention to her positive characterization of practical knowledge as “the cause of what it understands.” I argue that two recent Anscombean accounts of practical knowledge, “Formalism” and “Normativism,” each fail to explain the productive character of practical knowledge in a way that secures its status as non-observational. I argue that to do this, we must appreciate the role of know-how or skill in practical knowledge.

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2

Lawrence, Gavin. "Reason, Intention, and Choice An essay in Practical Philosophy." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 54 (March 2004): 265–300. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100008547.

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It is the famous first thesis of Anscombe's ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ that we should lay aside moral philosophy—indeed ‘banish ethics totally from our minds’! (p. 38, paragraph 36)—‘until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology’. By a ‘philosophy of psychology’ I understand Anscombe to mean grammatical investigations into various psychological concepts that hold the key to ethics. Anscombe herself instances ‘action’, ‘intention’, ‘pleasure’, ‘wanting’ (‘more will probably turn up if we start with these’). Without such an understanding, she thinks we will simply go astray.

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3

Stockton, Jim, and Benjamin J. B. Lipscomb. "The Anscombe-Lewis Debate: New Archival Sources Considered." Journal of Inklings Studies 11, no. 1 (April 2021): 35–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/ink.2021.0094.

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Meeting from 26 January 1942 through 26 May 1972, the Oxford University Socratic Club was a fixture of Oxford intellectual life for three decades. Founded by Miss Stella Aldwinckle, chaplain to undergraduate women students for the Oxford Pastorate, the club was an immediate success and quickly became a favoured venue for students and faculty alike, with C.S. Lewis serving as club president and senior member (advisor) from its inception to December 1954. One of the club's most famous papers was delivered 2 February 1948, when twenty-eight-year-old Somerville philosopher G.E.M. Anscombe presented a critique of a key argument in Lewis's recently published Miracles (1947). Most of the critical literature on the event has come from Lewis biographers. Less has been written about Anscombe's perspective, one reason being a lack of primary evidence. Following a framing discussion of the Socratic Club's early years, Lewis's persona and role in the club, and Anscombe's early biography, this article presents three unpublished pieces of primary evidence – a letter by Anscombe, a remark about Lewis by Ludwig Wittgenstein, and a full transcription of the meeting minutes – before briefly considering the light they shed on the exchange between Anscombe and Lewis.

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4

Ometto, Dawa. "Causality and determination revisited." Synthese 199, no. 5-6 (November 1, 2021): 14993–5013. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03452-6.

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AbstractIt seems to be a platitude that there must be a close connection between causality and the laws of nature: the laws somehow cover in general what happens in each specific case of causation. But so-called singularists disagree, and it is often thought that the locus classicus for that kind of dissent is Anscombe's famous Causality & Determination. Moreover, it is often thought that Anscombe's rejection of determinism is premised on singularism. In this paper, I show that this is a mistake: Anscombe is not a singularist, but in fact only objects to a very specific, Humean understanding of the generality of laws of nature and their importance to causality. I argue that Anscombe provides us with the contours of a radically different understanding of the generality of the laws, which I suggest can be fruitfully developed in terms of recently popular dispositional accounts. And as I will show, it is this account of laws of nature (and not singularism) that allows for the possibility of indeterminism.

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5

Teichmann, Roger. "The Anscombe-Lewis Debate." Journal of Inklings Studies 1, no. 2 (October 2011): 55–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/ink.2011.1.2.6.

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In Anscombe’s ‘Reply’ to chapter three of Lewis’ Miracles we may discern the influence of her teacher and friend, Wittgenstein, especially in two features of it: (i) Anscombe’s insistence on the variety and diversity of types of explanation, and of senses of ‘because’; (ii) her claim that a person’s reasons for thinking something, or for that matter motives in doing something, are not to be thought of as ‘inner’ processes or events. Lewis argued that an explanation why someone believes that P which alludes to the person’s reasons (grounds) for believing that P must be incompatible with any putative ‘naturalistic’ explanation of their believing that P; but in the light of (i) and (ii), Anscombe countered that he had demonstrated no such incompatibility. Nevertheless, as her much later comments on that early debate of her career show, she thought that Lewis’s chapter, both in its original, but even more in its revised, form, was struggling with a genuine and deep problem, one which (she writes) has still not been satisfactorily dealt with.

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6

Beards, Andrew. "Assessing Anscombe." International Philosophical Quarterly 47, no. 1 (2007): 39–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/ipq200747157.

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7

Makin, Stephen. "Causality and derivativeness." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 46 (March 2000): 59–71. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100010377.

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This paper is a reflection on some of Elizabeth Anscombe's influential work on causation, in particular on some comments in her Inaugural Lecture at Cambridge, published as ‘Causality and Determination’. One of Anscombe's major concerns in that paper is the relation between causation and necessitation, and she critically discusses the cast of mind which links causality with some kind of necessary connection or with exceptionless generalisation. In place of a semi-technical analysis of causation, Anscombe identifies the obvious and yet little considered core of the causal relation as follows:

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8

McCarthy, Christine. "Concrete passions: Anscombe's material politics." Architectural History Aotearoa 8 (January 1, 2011): 20–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.26686/aha.v8i.7097.

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Edmund Anscombe (1874-1948) was an advocate of concrete as a building material, especially in relation to housing. This paper examines Anscombe's promotion of concrete, with specific reference to his patented OK blocks in the 1920s, a time when he is better known for his work on the University of Otago campus, the 1925 New Zealand and South Seas Exhibition, and his move from Dunedin to Wellington in 1928.

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9

Hokari, Toru, and Masayuki Yao. "Eliciting Subjective Probabilities in Anscombe and Aumann's Model." International Journal of Uncertainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Systems 24, no. 03 (June 2016): 405–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/s0218488516500203.

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In this note, we propose an alternative version of Anscombe and Aumann's Subjective Expected Utilities (SEU) representation theorem. In Anscombe and Aumann's model, a randomizing device with objective probabilities is available. As pointed out by Sarin and Wakker, when such a randomizing device is available, there is a natural and direct method to elicit subjective probabilities. Anscombe and Aumann did not use this method, but employed an indirect way to derive subjective probabilities. We investigate what happens if we use this direct method to elicit subjective probabilities in Anscombe and Aumann's model.

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10

Connell, Sophia. "Aristotle for the Modern Ethicist." Ancient Philosophy Today 1, no. 2 (October 2019): 192–214. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/anph.2019.0015.

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Elizabeth Anscombe and Mary Midgley discussed Aristotle's ethics as an alternative to modern moral philosophy. This idea is best known from Anscombe's 1958 paper ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’. The mainstream response has been to design a normative theory of ‘virtue ethics’ to rival deontology and consequentialism. This essay argues that that response is inadequate; it misses Anscombe's point and obscures various aspects of Aristotle's ethics, in particular his emphasis on friendship and human interconnectedness. This element of Aristotelianism was favoured by Midgley. By returning to Midgley, with the support of Aristotle, it is possible to find an alternative modern Aristotelianism in ethics.

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11

Pigden, Charles. "Anscombe on `Ought'." Philosophical Quarterly 38, no. 150 (January 1988): 20. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2220265.

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12

Grimi, Elisa. "Anscombe i Wittgenstein." Enrahonar. An international journal of theoretical and practical reason 64 (March 31, 2020): 165. http://dx.doi.org/10.5565/rev/enrahonar.1283.

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13

Estrada Pérez, Luis. "Anscombe y Wittgenstein." Revista Identidad 5, no. 5 (December 7, 2019): 35–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.46276/rifce.v5i5.592.

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El presente trabajo tiene como objeto mostrar una continuidad entre Wittgenstein y Anscombe, como críticos de la ética ymoral moderna. La primera parte estará dedicada a rastrear la concepción ética y moral de Wittgenstein basándonos enalgunos escritos donde se trabaja esta temática como el Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus, Cultura y Valor; y las Leccionesde Ética. Posteriormente, nos dedicaremos a analizar la crítica de Anscombe a la moral moderna, principalmente en lasegunda tesis de su texto Modern Moral Philosophy y algunos artículos presentes en Ethics, Religion and Politics.Finalmente, basándonos en algunas interpretaciones de la ética wittgensteniana (Answald, Johnston, Edwards) quesostienen que ésta se circunscribe al terreno de lo mostrativo, es decir, fuera del alcance del conocimiento y del lenguaje, a lavez que se otorga un papel significativo al sujeto y a las formas de vida; analizaremos de forma crítica los temas de laobligación moral y la promesa que trabaja Anscombe. Nuestra conclusión es que parte de la importancia de la crítica deambos filósofos radica en que rescatan la importancia del impulso ético en la acción humana.

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14

Garrett, Brian. "Anscombe On 'I'." Philosophical Quarterly 47, no. 189 (October 1997): 507–11. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00075.

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15

Ortiz-Millán, Gustavo. "José María Torralba, Acción intencional y razonamiento práctico según G.E.M. Anscombe y G.E.M. Anscombe, La filosofía analítica y la espiritualidad del hombre." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 39, no. 115 (December 7, 2007): 113–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.2007.514.

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16

Frey, Jennifer A. "Revisiting Modern Moral Philosophy." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 87 (June 2, 2020): 61–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246119000262.

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AbstractThis essay revisits Elizabeth Anscombe's ‘Modern Moral Philosophy' with two goals in mind. The first is to recover and reclaim its radical vision, by setting forth a unified account of its three guiding theses. On the interpretation advanced here, Anscombe's three theses are not independently intelligible; their underlying unity is the perceived necessity of absolute prohibitions for any sound account of practical reason. The second goal is to show that Anscombe allows for a thoroughly unmodern sense of ‘moral' that applies to human actions; the paper concludes with some reasons to think that this unmodern sense of ‘moral' is worthy of further philosophical attention and defense.

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17

REID, JEREMY. "Virtue, Rule-Following, and Absolute Prohibitions." Journal of the American Philosophical Association 5, no. 1 (2019): 78–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/apa.2018.43.

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AbstractIn her seminal article ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ (1958) Elizabeth Anscombe argued that we need a new ethics, one that uses virtue terms to generate absolute prohibitions against certain act-types. Leading contemporary virtue ethicists have not taken up Anscombe's challenge in justifying absolute prohibitions and have generally downplayed the role of rule-following in their normative theories. That they have not done so is primarily because contemporary virtue ethicists have focused on what is sufficient for characterizing the deliberation and action of the fully virtuous person, and rule-following is inadequate for this task. In this article, I take up Anscombe's challenge by showing that rule-following is necessary for virtuous agency, and that virtue ethics can justify absolute prohibitions. First, I offer a possibility proof by showing how virtue ethics can generate absolute prohibitions in three ways: by considering actions that directly manifest vice or that cannot be performed virtuously; actions that are prohibited by one's institutional roles and practical identities; and actions that are prohibited by the prescriptions of the wise. I then seek to show why virtue ethicists should incorporate rule-following and absolute prohibitions into their theories. I emphasize the central role that rules have in the development of virtue, then motivate the stronger view that fully virtuous agents follow moral rules by considering the importance of hope, uncertainty about consequences, and taking responsibility for what eventuates. Finally, I provide an account of what Anscombe called a ‘corrupt mind’, explaining how our understanding of virtue is corrupted if we think that virtue may require us to do vicious actions.

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18

Kenny, Anthony. "Elizabeth Anscombe at Oxford." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 90, no. 2 (2016): 181–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/acpq201621176.

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19

McEVOY, James. "Présentation de MmeG.E.M. Anscombe." Revue Philosophique de Louvain 88, no. 2 (May 1, 1990): 297–301. http://dx.doi.org/10.2143/rpl.88.2.556097.

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20

Cadilha, Susana. "Anscombe llegint a Aristòtil." Enrahonar. An international journal of theoretical and practical reason 64 (March 31, 2020): 63. http://dx.doi.org/10.5565/rev/enrahonar.1276.

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21

Bassols, Alejandro Tomasini. "Anscombe sobre la Sustancia." Tópicos, Revista de Filosofía 21, no. 1 (November 28, 2013): 103. http://dx.doi.org/10.21555/top.v21i1.318.

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En este artículo reconstruyo la intrincada discusión de Anscombe sobre la noción de sustancia cartesiana. En particular, considero su análisis de la conexión entre cualidades secundarias y lo que sea que a ellas inhiere al tratar de evaluar su conclusión tentativa como algo que no es factible para deshacerse de la noción de sustancia.

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22

Osborne,, Thomas M. "Rethinking Anscombe on Causation." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 81, no. 1 (2007): 89–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/acpq200781149.

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23

O'Grady, Paul. "Anscombe on the Tractatus." Philosophy 71, no. 276 (April 1996): 297–303. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819100041504.

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24

Diamond, Cora. "Disagreements: Anscombe, Geach, Wittgenstein." Philosophical Investigations 38, no. 1-2 (January 2015): 1–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phin.12074.

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25

Moran, Richard. "Anscombe on ‘Practical Knowledge’." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55 (September 2004): 43–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246100008638.

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Among the legacies of Elizabeth Anscombe's 1957 monograph Intention are the introduction of the notion of ‘practical knowledge’ into contemporary philosophical discussion of action, and her claim, pursued throughout the book, that an agent's knowledge of what he is doing is characteristically not based on observation. Each idea by itself has its own obscurities, of course, but my focus here will be on the relation between the two ideas, how it is that the discussion of action may lead us to speak of non-observational knowledge at all, and how this notion can be part of the understanding of a kind of ordinary knowledge that we have reason to consider practical rather than speculative. Anscombe mentions several quite different things under the heading of ‘non-observational knowledge’, and she first introduces the notion of the nonobservational for purely dialectical purposes, associated with the task of setting out the field she wants to investigate, in a way that avoids begging the very questions she means to raise. She needs a way of distinguishing the class of movements to which a special sense of the question ‘Why?’ applies, but which doesn't itself employ the concepts of ‘being intentional’ or ‘acting for a reason’. Section 8 begins: “What is required is to describe this class without using any notions like ‘intended’ or ‘willed’ or ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’. This can be done as follows: we first point out a particular class of things which are true of a man: namely the class of things which he knows without observation.” (p. 13) She first illustrates this by the example of knowledge of the position of one's limbs, the immediate way one can normally tell, e.g., whether one's knee is bent or not. But examples of this sort are in fact ill suited to shed light on the idea of ‘practical knowledge’, which is the true focus of the idea of the non-observational in the study of action. When we see this we will be better able to see why Anscombe is concerned with the non-observational in the first place, and how this concern is tied to other characteristic Anscombian theses, for instance that an action will be intentional under some descriptions but not others, and that practical knowledge is distinguished from speculative knowledge in being “the cause of what it understands” (p. 87). And we will be able to understand how it is that an agent can be said to know without observation that he is doing something like painting the wall yellow, when this knowledge so patently involves claims about what is happening in the world, matters which it seems could only be known observationally.

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26

HURLEY, PAUL. "Davidson's Debt to Anscombe." Dialogue 59, no. 2 (June 2020): 219–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0012217320000050.

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ABSTRACTRobert Myers’ interpretation of Donald Davidson's practical philosophy gets Davidson right in many fundamental respects. Myers rightly argues that Davidson avoids inconsistencies among internalism, ethical objectivity, and the belief-desire theory by modifying central elements of the Humean belief-desire theory, and that Davidson's alternative legitimizes the extension of his interpretation and triangulation arguments into the practical sphere. But at a crucial fork in the interpretive road Myers loses his way. Davidson follows G.E.M. Anscombe down a different path, one that takes individual desires to be constituted in part by evaluative judgements.

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27

Berti, P., I. Crimaldi, L. Pratelli, and P. Rigo. "An Anscombe-Type Theorem." Journal of Mathematical Sciences 196, no. 1 (December 21, 2013): 15–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10958-013-1629-6.

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28

Alvarez, Maria, and Aaron Ridley. "The Concept of Moral Obligation: Anscombe contra Korsgaard." Philosophy 82, no. 4 (October 2007): 543–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819107000149.

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A number of recent writers have expressed scepticism about the viability of a specifically moral concept of obligation, and some of the considerations offered have been interesting and persuasive. This is a scepticism that has its roots in Nietzsche, even if he is mentioned only rather rarely in the debate. More proximately, the scepticism in question receives seminal expression in Elizabeth Anscombe's 1958 essay, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’, a piece that is often paid lip-service to, but—like Nietzsche's work—has only rarely been taken seriously by those wishing to defend the conception of obligation under attack. This is regrettable. Anscombe's essay is powerful and direct, and it makes a forthright case for the claim that, in the absence of a divine law conception of ethics, any specifically moral concept of obligation must be redundant, and that the best that can be hoped for in a secular age is some sort of neo-Aristotelianism. Anscombe is right about this, we think. And, among those who disagree, one of the very few to have taken her on at all explicitly is Christine Korsgaard, whose Kantianism of course commits her to the view that the concept of moral obligation is central, with or without God. Here, we try to show that Korsgaard loses the argument.

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29

Erbacher, Christian, Anne Dos Santos Reis, and Julia Jung. "“Ludwig Wittgenstein” – A BBC radio talk by Elizabeth Anscombe in May 1953." Nordic Wittgenstein Review 8, no. 1-2 (December 19, 2019): 225–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.15845/nwr.v8i1-2.3556.

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Presented here is the transcript of a BBC radio broadcast by Elizabeth Anscombe that was recorded in May 1953 – the month when Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations appeared in England for the first time. In her radio talk, Anscombe provides some biographical and philosophical background for reading the Philosophical Investigations. She addresses the importance of the Tractatus and of the literary qualities of Wittgenstein’s writing. Anscombe warns that it would be fruitless to adopt slogans from Wittgenstein without insight. She also calls it a misunderstanding to think that Wittgenstein had championed something like the Ordinary Language Philosophy as it was practised at the time of the recording.

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30

Haldane, John. "A Philosopher of singular style and multiple modes." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 87 (June 2, 2020): 31–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s135824612000003x.

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AbstractElizabeth Anscombe was one of the most gifted and productive philosophers of the decades following the Second World War. Her writings present challenges to readers: some of them are very difficult to comprehend while others seem philosophically-minded yet situated outside of philosophy as such. There are also the issues of whether she had a philosophical method and of the influence of Wittgenstein on the manner of her approach. A summary and estimate of Anscombe’s enduring contributions is presented before exploring the style and aims of her philosophical work. Then two of her writings on religion are examined and their implications for her attitude to philosophy considered.

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31

Belyaev, Max. "METAPHYSICAL IDEAS OF G.E.M. ANSCOMBE." Respublica literaria, no. 1 (December 25, 2020): 71–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.47850/s.2020.1.20.

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The text examines the views of E. Anscombe on the nature of causation. According to the author, the idea of neces-sity should be kept behindthe explanations, but no reference to necessity should be made in relation to the con-nection of events itself. Then certainty will be used in two different contexts: as a characteristic of explanatory judgments (then it is identical with necessity) and as a characteristic of reality (then it has nothing to do with necessity).

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32

Garret, Brian. "Anscombe and the First Person." Crítica (México D. F. En línea) 26, no. 78 (January 7, 1994): 97–113. http://dx.doi.org/10.22201/iifs.18704905e.1994.962.

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Cavanaugh, T. A. "Anscombe, Thomson, and Double Effect." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 90, no. 2 (2016): 263–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/acpq201622479.

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34

Stainton, Robert J. "Re-reading Anscombe on ‘I’." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49, no. 1 (February 2019): 70–93. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1521695.

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AbstractAccording to a ‘Straight’ reading of Elizabeth Anscombe’s (1975) ‘The First Person’, she holds a radically non-referring view of ‘I’. Specifically, ‘I’ is analogous to the expletive ‘it’ in ‘It’s raining’. I argue that this is not her conclusion. Her substantive view, rather is that if what you mean by ‘reference’ is a certain rich and recherché notion tracing to Frege, then ‘I’ is not a referring term. Her methodological point is that one shouldn’t be ‘bewitched by language’ into thinking that ‘I’, because of its syntax, must exhibit ‘reference’ in this sense.

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35

Yin, Wenqi. "Anscombe on Sensations of Position." Journal of Human Cognition 4, no. 2 (2020): 4–22. http://dx.doi.org/10.47297/wspjhcwsp2515-469901.20200402.

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36

Aucouturier, Valérie. "Bien agir selon Elizabeth Anscombe." Archives de Philosophie Tome 87, no. 3 (June 24, 2024): 119–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.3917/aphi.873.0119.

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La « vérité pratique », d’après Anscombe, ne vise pas la simple capacité d’agir mais la capacité de bien agir. C’est, écrit Aristote, « la vérité qui s’accorde avec le juste désir ». Anscombe spécifie : « La vérité pratique est la vérité produite par une bonne délibération menant à une décision et à une action, et cela comprend la vérité de la description “bien faire”. » Il s’agit ici de saisir la portée éthique de ce concept qui ne vise pas simplement la structure délibérative de l’action intentionnelle, mais la détermination de ce qu’est une bonne action, et plus exactement une bonne action humaine : « La vérité pratique est une vérité créée par l’action au sens où ni les branches, ni les chiens, ni les enfants ne sont capables d’action. »

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37

Stout, Rowland. "Practical reasoning and practical knowledge." Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49, no. 4 (June 2019): 564–79. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00455091.2018.1463839.

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AbstractThe judgement that provides the content of intention and coincides with the conclusion of practical reasoning is a normative judgement about what to do, and not, as Anscombe and McDowell argue, a factual judgement about what one is doing. Treating the conclusion of practical reasoning as expressing a recommendation rather than a verdict undermines McDowell’s argument; the special nature of practical reasoning does not preclude its conclusions being normative. Anscombe’s and McDowell’s claim that practical self-knowledge is productive of action may be accommodated by identifying the content of practical knowledge not with the conclusion but with a premise of practical reasoning – a kind of practical reasoning that occurs within rather than before action.

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38

Coope, Christopher Miles. "The Bad News of the Gospel." Philosophy 86, no. 2 (March 25, 2011): 249–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0031819111000064.

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AbstractThis article discusses Elizabeth Anscombe's faith and her concept of faith, and the bearing of this on what it is for belief to be reasonable. Reasonableness requires that we make a rough distinction between what can and cannot be taken seriously. At the margin we will rightly be influenced by thinkers such as Anscombe who were well able to appreciate the philosophical consensus but were also prepared to disturb it. She disturbed it in a particular way: by asserting Christian teachings robustly inimical to peace of mind. However she rejected many traditional defences of these teachings as presupposing a faulty understanding of rationality. The article attempts to assess what a more adequate understanding might be.

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39

McCarthy, Christine. "Against ‘Churchianity’: Edmund Anscombe’s Suburban Church Designs." Architectural History 52 (2009): 169–200. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0066622x00004184.

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Edmund Anscombe (1874-1948) was an important New Zealand architect, well known for his design of the 1925 New Zealand and South Seas International Exhibition (Logan Park, Dunedin) and the 1940 New Zealand Centennial Exhibition (Rongotai, Wellington), as well as for his art deco buildings in Hawkes Bay (especially Hastings), and in Wellington.This article explores Anscombe’s contribution to New Zealand’s early twentieth-century church design by presenting new archival research and examining his distinctive use of secular imagery, notably the architectures of the house and schoolhouse. The article locates these designs simultaneously within traditions of Nonconformist architecture and within a Victorian interest in the home as productively informing a spiritual understanding of church building. While some architectural examples of this thinking were apparent in late nineteenth-century America, there are no other known examples in New Zealand. Anscombe’s use of this secular and domestic imagery in his church design enabled fashionable and theologically-informed architectures to co-exist.

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40

Aucouturier, Valérie. "Emotions, intentions and their expressions: Anscombe on Wittgenstein’s stalking cat." Enrahonar. An international journal of theoretical and practical reason 67 (November 30, 2021): 173–97. http://dx.doi.org/10.5565/rev/enrahonar.1286.

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In this paper, I explore the difference between expression of intention and expression of emotion through a discussion of a passage from G.E.M. Anscombe’s Intention, where she claims that expression of intention, unlike expression of emotion, is “purely conventional”. I argue that this claim is grounded on the fact that, although emotions can be described, expressions of emotion are not descriptions at all (e.g. of some present feeling or experience). Similarly, expressions of intention are not descriptions of a present state of mind but are rather the expression of a special sort of foreknowledge of a purported action. They are, in this respect, distinct from expression of emotion, since they are a description of some future happening (the purported action). Now, the centrally descriptive character of expressions of intention is what makes them “purely conventional”. But of course, Anscombe argues, one can have an intention without expressing it. And having an intention does not amount to having some description in mind.

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Schadow, Steffi. "Braucht die Moralphilosophie den Begriff der Verpflichtung? Über Anscombes Kritik an der Moralphilosophie der Moderne." Philosophisches Jahrbuch 128, no. 2 (2021): 246–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/0031-8183-2021-2-246.

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Abstract. In her much debated article Modern Moral Philosophy Elizabeth Anscombe is known to argue that we are best advised to abandon the concept of moral obligation from moral discourse. This paper offers a step by step analysis of her argument against the concept of moral obligation by considering all of her relevant writings in moral philosophy and action theory. In doing so, it discusses her critical account of morality which turns out to be based on a non-homogeneous theory of practical normativity that has fundamental roots in Modern Moral Philosophy. Finally, it appears that Anscombe’s arguments against central concepts of modern moral philosophy show inner inconsistencies and weaknesses that give also reason to criticize her general philosophical position.

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Abakare, Chris O. "The Revival of Virtue Ethics As an Ethical View." PINISI Discretion Review 4, no. 2 (March 31, 2021): 285. http://dx.doi.org/10.26858/pdr.v4i2.20003.

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Aristotle and Plato were the chief architects of virtue ethics, but their own formulation of virtue ethics was mostly subdued with the appearance of consequentialism as well as Kantian deontology. However, modem thinkers have attempted to revive virtue ethics in its new form and in this regard the name which is popularly known is G.E.M. Anscombe. In fact Anscombe clearly indicates in what sense virtue ethics can be revived and what was wrong with the traditional virtue ethics as expounded by Aristotle and Plato. Anscombe points out three important issues for which traditional virtue ethics perhaps lost its glory. First, moral philosophy in general cannot survive without an adequate philosophy of psychology and this thing was absent in the traditional virtue ethics. Secondly, without psychological possibility the concepts of moral obligation and moral duty, the moral sense of ought to be jeopardized. Thirdly and importantly, the differences between the well-known English writers on moral philosophy from Sidgwick to the present day are of little importance. This task of this paper is to review the revival of virtue ethics.

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Wiseman, Rachael. "Anscombe on Brute Facts and Human Affairs." Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 87 (June 2, 2020): 85–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1358246119000171.

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AbstractIn ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ Anscombe writes: ‘It is not profitable at present for us to do moral philosophy. It should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking’. In consideration of this Anscombe appeals to the relation of ‘brute-relative-to’ which holds between facts and descriptions of human affairs. This paper describes the reorientation in philosophy of action that this relation aims to effect and examines the claim that this reorientation makes possible the sort of philosophy of psychology that can provide a starting point for ethics.

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Haldane, John. "ACPQ Special Issue on Elizabeth Anscombe." American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 90, no. 2 (2016): 171–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.5840/acpq201690283.

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Melamed, Noam. "Anscombe i la unitat d’«Intention»." Enrahonar. An international journal of theoretical and practical reason 64 (March 31, 2020): 113. http://dx.doi.org/10.5565/rev/enrahonar.1275.

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O'Brien, L. F. "Anscombe and the self-reference rule." Analysis 54, no. 4 (October 1, 1994): 277–81. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/analys/54.4.277.

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CREMASCHI, SERGIO. "ANSCOMBE ON CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ABSOLUTE PROHIBITIONS." DANISH YEARBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY 47, no. 1 (May 2, 2012): 7–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24689300-90000002.

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Cremaschi, Sergio. "ANSCOMBE ON CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ABSOLUTE PROHIBITIONS." Danish Yearbook of Philosophy 47, no. 1 (August 2, 2012): 7–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/24689300_0470102.

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Rohrbaugh, Guy. "Anscombe, Zygotes, and Coming-to-be." Noûs 48, no. 4 (July 2, 2013): 699–717. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/nous.12034.

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Bradu, Dan, and Douglas M. Hawkins. "An Anscombe type robust regression statistic." Computational Statistics & Data Analysis 20, no. 4 (October 1995): 355–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0167-9473(94)00048-n.

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