Dissertations / Theses on the topic 'Anselme, Foi'

Anselm's argument for the existence of God in Proslogion Chap.II starts from the contention that 'lq when a Fool hears 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought', he understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his mind. This is a special feature of the Pros.II argument which distinguishes the argument from other ontological arguments set up by, for example, Descartes and Leibniz. This is also the context which makes semantics necessary for evaluation of the argument. It is quite natural to ask 'lq What is understood by the Fool, and what is in his mind? It is essential for a proper consideration of the argument to identify the object which is understood by the Fool, and so, is in his mind. A semantics gives answers to the questions of 'lq What the Fool understands? and 'lq What is in the Fool's mind? If we choose a semantics as a meta-theory to interpret the Pros.II argument, it makes an effective guide to identify the object. It is a necessary condition for a proper evaluation of the Pros.II argument to fix our universe of discourse, especially since, in the argument, we are involved in such talk about existing objects as Anselm's contention that 'when a Fool hears 'something-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought', he understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his mind. The ontology to which a semantic theory commits us will be accepted as our scope of objects when we introduce our semantic theory to interpret the Pros.II argument, and this ontological boundary constrains us to identify the object in a certain way. Consistent application of an ontology, most of all, is needed for the evaluation of the logical validity of an argument. If we take Frege's three-level semantics, we are ontologically committed to intensional entities, like meaning, as well as extensional entities. Sluga contends that Frege's anti-psychologism for meanings should not be interpreted as vindicating reification of intensional entities in relation to Frege's contextualism, that Frege's anti-psychologism with his contextualism is nothing but a linguistic version of Kantian philosophy for the transcendental unity of a judgement. There is, however, another possible interpretation of Frege's contextualism. According to Dummett, the significance of Frege's contextualism must be understood as a way of explanation for a word's having meaning. If Dummett's view is cogent, we could say that Frege's contextualism does not prevent our interpreting his semantics as being committed to intensional entities. We need not worry that Frege's over all semantics, especially with his contextualism, would internally deny the ontological interpretation of his theory. We see Anselm's argument for the existence of God in Pros.II is an invalid argument if we introduce Frege's three-level semantics, i.e. if we acknowledge meanings of words as entities in our universe of discourse. We can also employ extensional semantics for the interpretation of the Pros.II argument. According to extensionalists, like Quine and Kripke, we need not assume intensional entities, like meaning, to be part of our ontological domain. They argue that we can employ our language well enough without assuming intensional entities. If we choose extensional semantics as a meta-theory to interpret the Pros.II argument, it commits us only to extensional entities as objects in the Universe of our interpretation. In Sections 1.4 and 1.5, I show that extensional semantics makes the Pros.II argument a valid argument for the existence of God. 'lq Necessary existence is the central concept of Anselm's argument for the existence of God in Proslogion Chap.III. It has been said that, even if the argument is formally valid, it cannot stand as a valid argument for the existence of God, since 'lq necessary existence is an absurd concept like 'lq round square. And further that even if there is a meaningful combination of concepts for 'lq necessary existence, it cannot quality as a subject of an a priori argument. As objections to the interpretations which make the Pros.III argument valid, it has been argued that even if there is a concept of 'lq necessary existence which is meaningful and there is another concept of 'lq necessary existence which is suitable as a subject of an a priori argument, there is no concept of 'lq necessary existence which is meaningful and at the same time suitable as a subject of an a priori argument. In Chap.2 and Chap.3, I try to show that there can be concepts of 'lq necessary existence which are proof against these objections. Anselm's arguments for the existence of God in Proslogian Chap.II and Chap.III are logically valid arguments on some logical principles. Some fideists, K. Barth, for example, argue that Anselm's arguments for the existence of God in Proslogion are not proofs for the existence of God even if they are logically valid arguments. I raise the question how this attitude could be possible, in Chap.4 and Chap.5. Barth's fideistic interpretation of Anselm's Proslogion arguments does not find any flaw in the validity of the arguments, and it accepts the meaningfulness and truth of the premises even to the fool in Proslogion. If this is the case, i.e. if Barth's interpretation accepts the validity of the arguments and the truth of the premises, I raise the question, how can the arguments not be interpreted as proofs for the existence of God? How is it possible that the function of the arguments is not that of proving the existence of God? According to Wittgensteinian fideism, premises in the arguments should not be intelligible to those who do not believe in God's existence already, and so the real function of the arguments is the elucidation, the understanding of believer's belief, rather than proving articles of belief to unbelievers. Barth's fideistic interpretation of the arguments, however, fully recognizes the meaningfulness and truth of the premises in the arguments as well as the validity of the arguments. I argue that there could be a justification for the Barthian fideism. As Malcolm notices, there are still atheists who understand Anselm's arguments as valid, but the only possibility for the people who recognize the validity of Anselm's arguments still to remain atheists has been thought to be to challenge the truth of premises employed in the arguments. Now, of the atheistic possibility, we can change the direction of our attention, that is, to the question about the function of a logically valid argument itself. What has not been thought of in relation to Anselm's arguments is the significance of logical truth or the logical validity of an argument. We have not asked such questions as 'lq What does a logical truth say? and 'lq What does a logically valid argument guarantee with true premises? Let us assume that even the premises are accepted by atheists. Do they all convert to theism? If that were so, the disagreement between atheist and believer over the ontological arguments should turn only on the truth of premises. If that is not so, there is some point in raising this other question. If there are people who, recognizing the premises and validity of an argument, are still reluctant to accept the conclusion, we have reason to question the function of a valid argument. I argue that there is a way of being consistently reasonable while accepting the premises and the validity of the ontological arguments and yet remaining an atheist or an agnostic.

Although the interpretation of Anselm's Cur Deus Homo in the tradition of Albrecht Ritschl, Adolf von Harnack and Gustaf Aulen has led to a suspicion about its usefulness for a Peace Theology, a reading through the lens of more recent scholarship, which assumes its original Catholic, sacramental and sacrificial framework, reveals a beautiful understanding of the cross in this medieval classic that is perfectly compatible with a commitment to nonviolence. Three Mennonite scholars writing in pursuit of an Anabaptist Peace Theology, John Howard Yoder, John Driver and J. Denny Weaver display varying degrees of dissatisfaction with the explanation that Anselm provided in Cur Deus Homo, and none held out many prospects for its usefulness. Yoder highlighted the weaknesses, Driver essentially repeated them, and Weaver went a step further to charge that Cur Deus Homo depicted divinely sanctioned violence and ought to be rejected. They did not demonstrate much awareness of or reliance on the contributions of scholars who have focused on Anselm's theology and context. Reading Cur Deus Homo through the lens of more recent anselmian scholarship reveals that the honour and justice of God are one with the mercy and love of God. Humanity is restored not through punishment, but through the means of satisfaction and reward, while the whole explanation is seen in a sacrificial framework. Anselm's insistence upon human participation, and on satisfaction are very congenial to certain emphases of a Peace Theology, namely, discipleship and restorative justice. The real death understood metaphorically as a sacrifice does not violate the commitment to nonviolence, but strengthens it. A rejection of Anselm's metaphysic, ontology and sacrificial framework, a failure to distinguish between punishment and satisfaction, a failure to reflect from the perspective of the guilty, and a neglect of or ambivalence about the doctrines of the two natures and the trinity all lead to a distorted impression of Cur Deus Homo, concealing the contribution Cur Deus Homo might make to a Peace Theology.

The purpose of this study was to conduct a descriptive and exploratory analysis of Riverside County's Independent Living Skills Program (ILSP) and its ability to prepare foster youth for successful adult transition. A vital component of this study was the exploration of perceived preparedness through the eyes of the participants enrolled in this program.

La période 1960 – 1990 a été agitée et féconde aux États-Unis malgré l’échec du projet de Grande Société et de lutte contre la pauvreté du président L.B. Johnson. L’Amérique a profité des retombées de sa domination économique et militaire pour financer l’éducation, le logement (G.I. Bill) ainsi que les arts (N.E.A.). De 1960 à 1990 la photographie est entrée massivement à l’université, dans les musées et dans le marché de l’art. Le paysage a toujours été un genre artistique privilégié aux États-Unis, de la peinture du dix-neuvième siècle à la photographie depuis son invention qui coïncide avec la découvertes de nouveaux territoires qui crée le pays. Le médium a documenté le développement territorial du pays puis s’est affirmé sur la scène de la photographie créative occidentale. Les années considérées vont voir la photographie créative américaine passer d’une période « romantique » tournée vers l’abstraction et le monde intérieur de l’artiste, conséquence des persécutions politiques de l’immédiat après-guerre, vers une réflexion ontologique et expérimentale, pour finalement traiter de problèmes de société tout en restant connectée aux réflexions esthétiques et philosophiques communes aux autres arts. Au sortir des années 1980, la photographie américaine de paysage, celle des grands espaces mais également celle des espaces humanisés, urbanisés, domine la scène internationale inspirant un renouveau du genre en Europe, au Canada, au Japon,…. Lancé par une exposition alors jugée mineure en 1975, le phénomène New Topographics est devenu planétaire et perdure. Ces quinze dernières années, de nombreuses expositions des paysagistes américains de cette période ont circulé à travers le monde, phénomène révélateur de leur rôle dans notre culture occidentalo – planétaire ainsi que pour l’histoire du médium
During the 1960 – 1990 period, in spite of the psychological and economical fall-outs of the various wars (Cold War, Korea and Vietnam ) undermining L.B. Johnson’s hopes and plans for a Great Society and his War on Poverty, the American government used its world supremacy and the derived wealth acquired in the wake of W.W. II (the USA was the only western country whose industrial production was impacted positively) to finance popular housing, adult education (G.I. Bill), and the arts (N.E.A.). During those years photography crashed the doors of academia, museum and art institutions, and entered the art market. Landscape has always been a major genre in the American visual arts, from the paintings of the nineteenth century (the Hudson River School, the Luminists) to photography. An interesting synchronicity can be observed between the birth, growth and coming of age of both the medium and the country. Landscape photography participated in the creation of an American identity. A century later, during what we can now call the Golden Age of American landscape photography from New Topographics in the 1970s to the advent of color photography in the 1980s, photographers turned their lenses back toward the east at the damage done and the state of the landscape left behind. The production of wall-size prints followed, competing for attention with paintings on the walls of museums and galleries that welcome them. Since the Culture Wars of the late 1980s and the 1990s, and the defunding of the arts that ensued, the rest of the world has caught up, influenced by the traveling exhibitions and publications of that generation of American photographers