Academic literature on the topic 'Anti-Competitive practices'
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Journal articles on the topic "Anti-Competitive practices"
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Koç, A. Ali, Gulden Boluk, and Sureyya Kovaci. "Concentration of food retailing and anti-competitive practices in Turkey." Food Economics - Acta Agriculturae Scandinavica, Section C 7, no. 2-4 (June 2010): 151–62. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/16507541.2010.531926.
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Erofeeva, Ekaterina V., Daria A. Kotova, and Anna E. Pozdnyakova. "The many faces of anti-competitive practices in digital markets." Pravovedenie 63, no. 4 (2019): 598–624. http://dx.doi.org/10.21638/spbu25.2019.404.
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This article looks at some curious examples of restrictive practices typical for digital markets. Digital markets are a unique phenomenon for the new digital economy that is structurally based on and driven by digital platforms. The largest digital platforms such as Facebook or Amazon and large digital companies such as Google, Microsoft and Apple dominate the digital markets of today and thus have a huge potential to restrict competition in these dynamic markets. This article takes an analytical approach to several restrictive practices that have recently received attention from competition authorities around the world and have largely influenced law enforcement as well as our understanding of how digital markets function. First of all, the authors consider the so-called price parity clauses. Broadly speaking, these are a particular type of arrangements that oblige suppliers to not offer more favorable terms to their business partners than those offered to digital platforms (for example hotel websites as compared to online booking platforms). However, when narrowed down to contractual relations between a platform and a supplier, price parity clauses present a much more complex case. Further, the authors look at the multitude of restrictive practices in the online search market illustrated by a series of cases initiated against Google by the European Commission. By setting its search engine in a particular way, Google prioritized its own services so that they received more consumer traffic. Notably, these series of cases is just a part of the collection of anticompetitive tendencies in this market. Finally, this article looks at a less well-known, but all the more dangerous case of geo-blocking, which occurs when IP-protected content is blocked from distribution outside the framework that is reasonably justified by the protection of exclusive rights. Such cases must be examined through the complex relationship between the individualistic nature of IP rights and public interest. The collection of practices examined in the article highlights both the need to significantly reform competition enforcement and the need to rethink the role of competition law in the new economy.
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Brown, Martin, and Peter Philips. "Competition, Racism, and Hiring Practices among California Manufacturers, 1860–1882." ILR Review 40, no. 1 (October 1986): 61–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/001979398604000105.
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This paper examines the participation of Chinese men in four California industries in the late 1800s to determine the relationship between product market structure and racist hiring practices. Because white women, a traditional source of cheap labor, were scarce in post-Gold Rush California, white employers hired Chinese men, despite widespread anti-Chinese racism. As white women became plentiful, the canning and woolen mills industries began to switch to them, whereas the more competitive shoe and cigar industries continued to employ Chinese men. Factors other than market structure, however, resulted in particularly virulent anti-Chinese attitudes in the more competitive industries, and those attitudes indirectly stimulated the exclusionary hiring practices in the less competitive industries.
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Zhevnyak, Oxana Viktorovna. "Anti-competitive practices of digital platforms and response measures in the Russian and foreign legislation." Право и политика, no. 5 (May 2021): 14–41. http://dx.doi.org/10.7256/2454-0706.2021.5.33888.
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The goal of this research is to determine whether the Russian legislation on protection of competition contains the norms that allow preventing anti-competitive practices of digital platforms, and whether it is necessary to make corresponding amendments. The subject of this research is the anti-competitive practice of digital platforms, response measures of the state, antimonopoly legislation, and recommendations on its improvement. The research methodology is based on the analysis of relevant examples of anti-competitive behavior of digital platforms on the Russian and foreign markets, and qualification of such behavior from the perspective of Russian legislation. In the course of this research, the author solves the issue on the sufficiency of legal material for conducting qualification of such behavior; describes the response measures taken by the competent government authorities of various countries, as well as the measures proposed by the researchers. As a result, the author systematizes the data regarding the antimonopoly practice of digital platforms depending on the type of violations. All examples of antimonopoly practices can be qualified as anti-competitive in accordance with the effective legislation of the Russian Federation. If they are not listed as particular violations, then fall under the general categories of acts prohibited by law, considering the non-exhaustive nature of such lists. Misuse of “the platform authority” by the digital platform, reflected in the fact that it utilizes the transaction and customer data, should be qualified as unfair competition. For preventing the anti-competitive practices of digital platforms, it is proposed to develop the system of measures aimed at minimization of risks of the clash of interests and elimination of its consequences: ban of the owner of the digital platform for joint activity of his activity with the activity conducted the clients of the platform; restrict participation of the owner of the platform in companies that conduct types of activity that compete with the clients; disclosure of information on their affiliates engaged in the activity similar to such of the clients of the platform; introduction of the criteria for such affiliation, along with the obligation to compensate for the losses of clients inflicted by the clash of interest.
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Clarke, Julian L., Simon J. Evenett, and Krista Lucenti. "Anti-competitive Practices and Liberalising Markets in Latin America and the Caribbean." World Economy 28, no. 7 (July 2005): 1029–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9701.2005.00719.x.
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Matolli, Madivalappa. "Regulation of anti-competitive trade practices associated with IPRs under the competition act, 2002." International Journal of Social and Economic Research 4, no. 1 (2014): 61. http://dx.doi.org/10.5958/j.2249-6270.4.1.009.
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Le Roy, Frédéric, Patrick Sentis, and Ariste Jerson. "The Impact of Conviction for Anti-Competitive Practices on Firm Valuation: A Contingency Approach." Managerial and Decision Economics 38, no. 4 (May 18, 2016): 534–46. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/mde.2801.
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Kostecka-Jurczyk, Daria. "Tying on the mobile apps market and competition rules." Ekonomia 25, no. 3 (November 15, 2019): 43–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.19195/2084-4093.25.3.4.
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Tying on the mobile apps market and competition rulesThe dynamic growth of digital markets is conducive to the use of anti-competitive practices by companies in order to maintain or strengthen their market position. One example of such practices is the abuse of the dominant position occupied by Google, including by tying Android with applications available on Google Play. This tying means that Google imposes on the smartphone manufacturers a “set of applications” necessary to be installed, even if they were not interested in pre-installing some of them. The study analyzes the anti-competitive practices that the European Commission accuses Google of in the decision of 18 August 2018. The purpose of the article is to examine whether tying a specific set of applications with the Android system meets the conditions for abuse of Art. 102 TFEU. This requires, first of all, an examination of whether Android is a binding product for applications available in Google Play and, if so, of whether the conditions of abuse in the form of sales binding are met. As a result, it has been shown that on digital markets, where there is dynamic competition, it is difficult to make an unambiguous assessment of anti-competitive behavior and one of the important arguments that may prejudge the abuse is the harm to end users.
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Svetlicinii, Alexandr. "The Judicial Review of the Standard of Proof in Cartel Cases: Raising the Bar for the Croatian Competition Authority Case comment to the Judgment of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Croatia No. U-III-2791/2016 of 1 February 2018 (Sokol Marić d.o.o.)." Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 11, no. 18 (2018): 311–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2018.11.18.13.
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The Security agencies case represents another example of the procedural diversity among Member States in applying national competition rules that mirror Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. In its infringement decision the Croatian NCA specified that the presence at the meeting with competitors and participation in the discussion concerning minimum prices was sufficient to impute to the parties participation in an anti-competitive agreement prohibited under the national equivalent of Article 101 TFEU. As the Croatian NCA investigated an agreement ‘by object’, it considered itself relieved of the burden to demonstrate the anti-competitive effects. The Constitutional Court has taken a different approach and held that the fact that the participants of the meeting have not publicly denounced the results of the meeting, cannot serve as evidence of an anti-competitive agreement. The court also found that the Croatian NCA did not manage to provide a reasonable explanation why the ‘hourly cost of service’ apparently discussed by competitors is the same as ‘hourly price of service’ that appears in the NCA’s decision. As a result, the Constitutional Court’s approach deviated from several substantive presumptions developed by the EU Commission and the EU courts when applying competition rules in relation to anti-competitive agreements. This places a heavier burden of proof on the Croatian NCA in cartel cases when compared to its own preceding practice or the enforcement practices of the EU Commission or other European NCAs.
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KWOK, Kelvin Hiu Fai. "Antitrust Enforcement and State Restraints at the Mainland China-Hong Kong Interface: The Importance of Bilateral Antitrust Co-operation." Asian Journal of Comparative Law 12, no. 2 (May 24, 2017): 335–69. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/asjcl.2017.6.
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AbstractThis article argues that effective co-operation between the antitrust authorities of Mainland China and Hong Kong in antitrust enforcement and the removal of anti-competitive state restraints is essential to the promotion of market competition in, as well as free trade and economic integration between, the two regions. This entails the careful design and conclusion of a bilateral co-operation agreement embracing not only comity co-peration in antitrust enforcement, but also the adoption of a diplomatic solution of mutual self-restraint for the removal of anti-competitive state restraints at the Mainland China-Hong Kong interface. This would also require the co-operation of Mainland Chinese and Hong Kong government authorities. Only with such bilateral cooperation can anti-competitive business practices and state restraints obstructing free trade and economic integration between the two regions be eliminated.
Dissertations / Theses on the topic "Anti-Competitive practices"
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Wang, Yuting. "The application of the Chinese Anti-monopoly Law to anti-competitive practices of patent owners when exploiting their rights." Thesis, University of Glasgow, 2018. http://theses.gla.ac.uk/30747/.
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The thesis will examine the extent to which China’s Anti-monopoly Law effectively controls the anti-competitive practices of patent owners when exercising their patent rights. The relationship between intellectual property law and competition law is no longer contradictory but has evolved into a convergent and compatible one. The two bodies of law share the same goals to promote competition, encourage innovation and enhance consumer welfare in different ways. Therefore, it is appropriate and reasonable to apply competition law to regulate the exercise of intellectual property rights in certain circumstances. Given the specificity of patent rights and the legal and economic circumstances of China, the scope of the thesis will be limited to anti-competitive practices of patent owners when exercising their patent rights. The research demonstrates the necessity and importance for China to apply its own Antimonopoly Law to address anti-competitive exercise of patent rights. However, China’s Anti-monopoly Law came into effect in 2008 and it seems not to work as effectively as it was expected in regulating such conduct. Despite great achievements, there are still deficiencies and uncertainty influencing the effective and efficient competition enforcement in the anti-competitive exercise of patent rights. The problems not only arise from China’s internal competition enforcement system but also arise from the lack of clear guidance from the competition enforcement authorities. Facing the challenging competition concerns in the 21st century, there are no effective measures available in China. It is not clear in what circumstances the failure to disclose patent interest in the standard setting process can result in antitrust liabilities and to what extent China’s Anti-monopoly Law should intervene. It is also uncertain how to keep a balance between the protection of patent rights and the maintenance of market competition when considering the seeking of injunctions before national courts by the owners of standard essential patents or the reverse payment patent settlement agreements. Therefore, the thesis aims to provide some solutions to these problems to facilitate and improve the effective application of China’s Anti-monopoly Law to the exercise of patent rights. The proposals made in this thesis will be based on the valuable EU and US enforcement experience and case law but give significant consideration to the legal and economic context in China. The Law is stated as at 6 June 2018.
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Quintana, Sánchez Eduardo. "Hazards on sanctioning the Recommendations as an anti-competitive practice in the Peruvian Law." IUS ET VERITAS, 2016. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/123645.
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On this paper, the author disserts on the notion of recommendations as a method of collusion. First, he approaches it based on comparative law (Europe and Latin-America) and precedent case law from INDECOPI, followed by defining how the term is (and should be) understood in Peruvian regulations as a horizontal agreement (cartel). It also analyzes in which instances said application has been inaccurate and the issues surrounding it. Finally, the author illustrates the complexity of framing recommendations as vertical agreements in the absence of “collusion between two or more parties”En este artículo, el autor nos presenta la figura de las recomendaciones como práctica colusoria. Empieza por darnos una aproximación acorde a derecho comparado (Europa y América Latina) y desarrollo jurisprudencial de INDECOPI, para posteriormente definir cómo se aplica (y debería aplicarse) dicha prohibición como práctica colusoria horizontal (carteles) en nuestra legislación. En este punto, se analiza también los supuestos en los cuales dicha aplicación ha sido incorrecta y los problemas alrededor de esta. Finalmente, el autor demuestra la complejidadde enmarcar las recomendaciones como una práctica colusoria vertical debido a la falta del elemento de colusión de agentes económicos.
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Pinto, Barrios Jean Paul, and Estrada Lucía Alejandra Guzmán. "Towards a New Competition Law: Some Comments on the Reform. Interview with Dr. Alejandro Falla Jara." Derecho & Sociedad, 2016. http://repositorio.pucp.edu.pe/index/handle/123456789/118521.
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The present interview seeks to give some points of view about the reform of Competency regulation. In that line, the interviewee give us his general opinion about the reform, the main contribution to the matter and those aspects that were missed, focusing his opinion on anti-competitive practice and negative regulation of anticompetitive practices.La presente entrevista busca dar algunos puntos de vista respecto a la reforma a la Ley de Competencia. En esa línea, el entrevistado nos da su opinión general sobre la reforma, los aportes que brinda y aquellos aspectos que considera faltaron regularse, centrando su opinión en aquellos temas de combate de prácticas anticompetitivas y control de regulaciones anticompetitivas.
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Loze, Julien. "Les stratégies juridiques de l'entreprise à l'épreuve du contentieux privé des pratiques anticoncurrentielles." Thesis, Toulouse 1, 2019. http://www.theses.fr/2019TOU10037/document.
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Il s'agira de démontrer dans quelle mesure les réformes récentes relatives à l'action en réparation du dommage résultant de pratiques anticoncurrentielles influencent la stratégie de l'entreprise. Outre les stratégies destinées à contenir ce risque nouveau, cette dernière pourrait également tirer parti du contentieux privé afin d'améliorer ses performances sur le marchéFollowing the recent reforms regarding anticompetitive practices private enforcement, my research aims at studying the influence of these new rules on companies' legal strategies. If companies will have to adapt their strategy to avoid legal exposure, they can also use those very same rules as a tool to improve their performance
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De, Fontenelle Louis. "Les personnes publiques, prestataires de service marchand." Thesis, Pau, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015PAUU2006/document.
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S’il est désormais clairement établi que les personnes publiques peuvent, d’une part, prendre en charge des activités sur le marché, d’autre part, candidater à des contrats de la commande publique, les conditions dans lesquelles s’exerce la concurrence des personnes publiques sont souvent l’objet de contestations dans la mesure où on leur fait reproche d’être avantagées par leur statut de droit public. L’objet de cette thèse est de démontrer que les personnes publiques ne sont ni avantagées, ni défavorisées par leur statut mais simplement inadaptées et inadaptables au milieu concurrentiel car le statut de droit public implique structurellement une distorsion concurrentielle et donc une atteinte à l’exigence d’égale concurrence. Cette difficulté pourrait toutefois être surmontée en consolidant les sociétés publiquesIt is now established that a public law person can take over activities on the market, and apply for public procurement contracts. But the terms under which these public law persons are present on the competitive market are disputed, as their statute under public law is often criticized as an unfair advantage. This thesis aims to demonstrate that public law persons are neither advantaged nor disadvantaged by their statute, but are simply not suited – and can't be adapted – to the competitive market, as their public law statute structurally implies a competitive distortion and an infringement to the legal requirements for fair competition. That difficulty may however be overcome by consolidating state-owned enterprises
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Ndiaye, Djibril. "OMC et droit de la concurrence : le droit de l'OMC face au défi de la mondialisation des pratiques anticoncurrentielles et des opérations de concentration." Thesis, Aix-Marseille, 2015. http://www.theses.fr/2015AIXM1072/document.
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En tant qu’organisation qui a vocation à réguler les échanges commerciaux mondiaux et qui promeut le libre-échange, l’OMC désigne naturellement l’une des principales, voire l’unique, structure internationale capable d’incarner l’approche multilatérale qui s’impose devant la mondialisation des pratiques anticoncurrentielles et des opérations de concentration. Les règles de concurrence présentes dans son corpus juridique, ainsi que la jurisprudence issue de leur mise en œuvre, grâce notamment à l’existence d’un mécanisme contraignant de règlement des différends, forment un droit primaire de la concurrence. Toutefois, un tel droit ne régit que les comportements des acteurs étatiques et n’appréhende les agissements des particuliers que de manière indirecte. Par conséquent, il nécessite d’être complété et adapté aux nouvelles réalités procédant de la mondialisation des économies, ce par le biais d’une adoption d’un accord multilatéral portant sur la concurrence. Le système de règlement des litiges devrait aussi subir une mutation, en renforçant ses techniques de sanction et en s’ouvrant aux personnes privéesAs an organization which goal is to regulate international trade exchanges and to promote free trade, the World Trade Organization refers naturally to one of the main international structures or even the only one which can embody the multilateral approach needed to face the globalization of anti-competitive practices and concentration operations. The competition rules mentioned in its legal corpus as well as the case law from their implementation, are a primary competition law thanks to the existence of a coercing mechanism to solve problems in particular. However, a such rule only governs the states actors’ behaviours and is not directly apprehensive of the acting of the individuals. Therefore, it needs to be completed and adapted to the new realities of the situation by proceeding the globalization of the economies by means of the adoption of an multilateral agreement over the competition. The settlement of dispute system would need some change, by strengthening its technical punishments and by opening its gates to the private individuals
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Vivanco, Carla Alejandra Ochoa. "Concentração de mercado no Equador : uma análise da intervenção por parte da entidade de regulação superintendência de controlo do poder de mercado, a partir da sua criação." Master's thesis, Instituto Superior de Economia e Gestão, 2018. http://hdl.handle.net/10400.5/15960.
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Mestrado em Gestão e Estratégia IndustrialO funcionamento dos mercados não produz resultados eficientes por si só, essas condições são conhecidas como falhas de mercado e justificam a intervenção do Estado. Os possíveis efeitos de uma operação de concentração de mercado, variam entre melhorar a eficiência para as empresas, bem como possíveis prejuízos à livre concorrência ou à sociedade. O presente estudo realiza uma análise sobre a concentração por atividade económica das empresas ativas no Equador, para os anos 2011 e 2016, destacando os resultados da intervenção por parte da entidade de regulação Superintendência de Controlo e Poder de Mercado, SCPM, que entrou em vigor no ano 2012. A partir desta informação, determina-se a alteração na concentração em cada uma das atividades económicas, no país, juntamente com a influência das políticas de regulação que contribuíram na tentativa de combater as práticas anti concorrenciais. Para isto, analisam-se os resultados no quadro geral de concentração económica do país, antes e durante a existência do SCPM, através do índice Herfindahl-Hirschman. Por outro lado, identificam-se as contribuições da intervenção da SCPM na concentração de mercado e práticas de abuso de poder, juntamente com a perspetiva dos atores da instituição que foram parte do processo de regulação. Os resultados permitem concluir que, no período observado, a economia, na análise geral por atividade económica, não apresenta resultados de concentração. Em relação às contribuições do SCPM, na análise por subactividade ou mercado relevante que a entidade realiza, existiram práticas anticoncorrenciais potencialmente prejudiciais à economia, que foram avaliadas e corrigidas no momento pela entidade.
The functioning of the markets does not produce efficient results by itself, these conditions are known as market failures and justify the intervention of the State. The possible effects of market concentration can vary between improving the efficiency and competitiveness of firms, as well as possible harm to free competition or to society. The present study analyzes the concentration by economic activity of the active companies in Ecuador, for the years 2011 and 2016, highlighting the results of the intervention by the Superintendence of Control and Market Power (SCPM), which came into force in 2012. Based on this information, the change in concentration in each of the economic activities, in the economic sphere is determined, with the influence of the regulatory policies that contributed in the attempt to combat anti-competitive practices in the Ecuadorian economic sector. For this, were analyzed the results in the general economic concentration of the country, through the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, which, determines the level of concentration. On the other hand, were identified the contributions by the regulatory intervention of the SCPM, along with the perspective of the actors were involved in the regulation process. The results allow to conclude that, in the observed period, the economy, in the analysis by economic activity, does not present concentration results between 2011 and 2016. Regarding SCPM contributions, in the sub-activity or relevant market analysis carried out by the regulator entity, there were anticompetitive practices potentially damaging to the economy, which were evaluated and corrected at the time.
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Basséne, Yannick Boniface. "La protection du consommateur par l'action de groupe en droit de la concurrence." Thesis, Sorbonne Paris Cité, 2018. http://www.theses.fr/2018USPCB147.
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Le 19ème siècle est marqué par la mécanisation des activités humaines issues de la révolution industrielle et accentuée par l'essor du progrès technique. Cette révolution est à l'origine de la prolifération des préjudices subis par les consommateurs du fait de la défaillance des machines. De plus, d'autres dommages sont venus se greffer aux dommages corporels. Il en est par exemple les scandales de l'amiante, des cigarettes ou encore des produits médicamenteux, tels que les antidépresseurs ou le vaccin contre l'hépatite B. Ces dommages corporels qui touchaient jadis à la santé, sont de nature économique aujourd'hui. Aussi, la particularité du contexte économique participe-t-elle à accentuer cette complexité du fait notamment de la consommation de masse, de la concentration croissante des opérations économiques et de la globalisation des échanges marchands. Un tel contexte rend ainsi l'expression et le traitement des recours à caractère individuel tantôt inopérants, tantôt insuffisants, pour répondre adéquatement, sur la scène judiciaire, aux besoins légitimes de défense des intérêts individuels. En effet, la conception traditionnelle de notre système de responsabilité civile, dont la réforme est amorcée et qui est marquée par un individualisme ancestral, se révèle souvent inadaptée voire inefficace lorsqu'un même préjudice, subi par des consommateurs victimes, est d'une valeur pécuniaire relativement faible sur le plan individuel, alors même que des profits illicites importants peuvent avoir été engrangés par les contrevenants. Parallèlement à ces évolutions, un constat est fait. Les consommateurs ont changé de comportement, ils sont devenus plus soucieux de leur protection et de plus en plus revendicatifs parce qu'ils considèrent que la réparation des dommages subis est un droit. Aussi, imposèrent-ils des débats politique, judiciaire et économique de la question de la réparation des dommages qu'ils ont subis du fait des pratiques anticoncurrentielles. Face à cette situation les systèmes juridiques s'efforcent de trouver des solutions afin d'améliorer la protection de l'individu. La consommation des ménages étant un enjeu fondamental, des règles notamment l'action en représentation conjointe, furent adoptées, sans succès, avec pour finalité de rééquilibrer les relations professionnels/consommateurs et assurer la protection des consommateurs. L'action de groupe apparait dans ces cas de figure comme l'instrument juridique devant permettre aux victimes de pratiques anticoncurrentielles d'obtenir la réparation des préjudices subis. L'objectif principal de cette thèse était donc d'étudier l'effectivité de la protection du consommateur par l'action de groupe en droit de la concurrence. Pour ce faire, la démarche que nous avons adoptée nous a amené à répondre dans la première partie à deux questions importantes. La première question est relative à l'adaptation des règles de la responsabilité civile à la réparation effective des consommateurs victimes de pratiques anticoncurrentielles, qui constitue notre titre premier. L'étude de cette question nous a conduit à analyser les dispositions permettant la recevabilité de l'action en dommages et intérêts des consommateurs. Cette analyse a permis non seulement de mettre en évidence la particularité de la faute concurrentielle ainsi que le préjudice qui en découle mais également de voir à quel point il était nécessaire de procéder à un aménagement des règles qui gouvernent la responsabilité civile pour les adapter au contentieux concurrentiel. Le second titre de notre première partie a été consacré à l'aspect transnational des pratiques anticoncurrentielles. Le caractère transnational de l'action de groupe a été délibérément omis par le législateur. En effet, la DG concurrence renvoie pour l'action de groupe internationale à l'application des règles de DIP européen. (...)After several decades of doctrinal and legislative debates, the procedure of group action was introduced in French law. The excesses of the American class action has always aroused in French legislators and some specialists in the field a certain mistrust of class actions. As a result, the repression of anti-competitive practices was essentially the responsibility of the enforcement public led by the relevant competition authorities. However, the 19th century is marked by the mechanization of human activities resulting from the industrial revolution and accentuated by the rise of technical progress. This revolution is at the origin of the proliferation of the damages suffered by the consumers because of the failure of the machines. In addition, other damages were added to the bodily injury. Examples include asbestos scandals, cigarettes and drug products, such as anti-depressants or hepatitis B vaccine. These bodily injuries that once affected health are of an economic nature today. In parallel with these evolutions, a report is made. Consumers have changed their behavior, they have become more protective and more and more demanding because they consider that compensation for damages is a right. Thus, they imposed political, judicial and economic debates on the question of compensation for the damage they suffered as a result of anti-competitive practices. Faced with this situation, the legal systems try to find solutions to improve the protection of the individual. Since household consumption is a fundamental issue, rules, including joint representation, were adopted with the aim of rebalancing professional / consumer relations and ensuring consumer protection. However, in the contemporary context of mass consumption, the increasing concentration of economic operations and the globalization of market exchanges, the expression and the treatment of individual remedies prove sometimes ineffective, sometimes insufficient, to respond adequately, on the judicial scene, the legitimate needs of defense of collective interests. Indeed, the traditional conception of civil liability, marked by ancestral individualism, proves to be inadequate when the harm suffered by the victim is of a relatively low pecuniary value at the individual level compared to the illicit global profits collected by the offenders. In order to remedy the ineffectiveness of the right to compensation for damages suffered, the French legislator, through the Hamon law, has offered the consumer a degree of autonomy in the implementation of legal remedies aimed at the repression of anticompetitive practices by the exercise of a right to easy compensation, which has the effect of reinforcing its capacity as a player in the field of competition law. In fact, the provisions specific to group action seem, at first glance, to give weight and influence to the consumer from whom he was previously supposed to be without. The legislator, under the recommendations of the European Commission, wanted to give consumers the necessary weapons to no longer be condemned to suffer the impact of the additional costs imposed between professionals involved upstream. Also, since this is a matter of effectiveness in terms of private remedies due to anticompetitive practices, will this issue be used to examine the means by which the victims of anticompetitive practices may be compensated. This thesis is essentially an analysis of the mechanism of group action to answer the question of whether this procedure effectively protects consumers. Thus, the author has sought to understand how the private enforcement mechanism works to assess whether this model contributes to consumer protection
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Ormonov, Nodirbek. "International anti-competitive practices in the twenty-first century : dealing with cartelization practices affecting international trade." 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/1993/20857.
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Šimek, David. "Ochrana hospodářské soutěže - dohody narušující soutěž." Master's thesis, 2015. http://www.nusl.cz/ntk/nusl-337192.
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The purpose of my thesis is to analyse two issues arising out of the European and Czech competition law provisions prohibiting agreements which restrict competition. First, I shall examine the issue of distinction between prohibited agreements and allowed unilateral conduct. Furthermore, I shall explore the definition of the concerted practice as interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union and Czech administrative courts focusing again on the distinction between such practice and unilateral conduct. Second, I shall elaborate on the structure of Article 101 TFEU. As a consequence of the "more economic approach" taken by the Commission and the repeal of the individual exemption system under Article 101(3) TFEU, the distinction between the concept of object offences and the concept of effect offences is slowly disappearing while having detrimental implications for legal certainty. Moreover, the conceptual distinction between considerations of ancillary restraints under Article 101(1) TFEU and consideration of pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects under Article 101(3) TFEU is slowly disappearing as well. The economics take their role in the assessment, and that is also the reason why I chose this topic because I am interested in the overlap between law and economics. My thesis is...
Books on the topic "Anti-Competitive practices"
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Dhruveśacandra, Regmī, South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics, and Environment., and CUTS Centre for International Trade, Economics & Environment (Jaipur, India), eds. Anti-competitive practices in Nepal. Kathmandu, Nepal: South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics & Environment, 2001.
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Sudeep, Shrestha, and South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics, and Environment., eds. Anti-competitive practices in Nepal's petroleum sector. Kathmandu: South Asia Watch on Trade, Economics & Environment, 2007.
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Great Britain. Office of Fair Trading. Anti-competitive practices: A guide to the provisions of the Competition Act 1980. [London]: Office of Fair Trading, 1986.
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Network, Economic Freedom. Protection from anti-competitive practices: Competition Commission of Pakistan creating a level playing field. Islamabad: Economic Freedom Network, 2010.
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Orehov, Vladimir, Tat'yana Orehova, and Konstantin Baldin. Anti-crisis management. ru: INFRA-M Academic Publishing LLC., 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.12737/1093041.
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The anti-crisis management of the economy and national security of the Russian Federation in modern conditions (pandemics, hybrid wars, competitive restrictions and anti-Russian propaganda from the West), approaches to Western sanctions as new opportunities for the development of the Russian Federation are considered. The ways of developing an innovative economy and increasing the productivity of aggregate labor as the main sources that ensure the accelerated development of the country are outlined. Attention is paid to the peculiarities of social partnership, economic and financial crises in the trends of macro - and micro-development, the role of investment as a financial source of anti-crisis management. The theoretical and practical foundations of the insolvency (bankruptcy) of enterprises and individual entrepreneurs, the methodology of the enterprise's recovery from the crisis, forecasting the results of anti-crisis management are described.
Meets the requirements of the federal state educational standards of higher education of the latest generation.
For undergraduate, graduate, postgraduate students and teachers of higher educational institutions of economic specialties, as well as researchers, managers and managers of firms.
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Combating Anti-Competitive Practices. United Nations, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.18356/0218fc34-en.
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CUTS Centre for Competition, Investment & Economic Regulation (Jaipur, India) and Consumer Association of Malawi, eds. Spine chilling experiences of anti-competitive practices in Malawi. Jaipur, India: CUTS Centre for Competition, Investment, and Economic Regulation, 2003.
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D, Barrington, and Institute of International Business Law and Practice., eds. Due process and anti-competitive practices =: Les garanties procédurales et les pratiques anti-concurrentielles. Paris: International Chamber of Commerce, 1994.
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Parr, Nigel, and Mat Hughes. The Control of Monopolies and Anti-competitive Practices in the UK. Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, 2000.
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Azhar, Ahmad. Anti-Competitive Practices in India: Under the new Competition Law Regime. VDM Verlag Dr. Müller, 2010.
Find full textBook chapters on the topic "Anti-Competitive practices"
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Ong, Burton. "Compulsory Licences of Pharmaceutical Patents to Remedy Anti-Competitive Practices Under Article 31(k) of the TRIPS Agreement: Can Competition Law Facilitate Access to Essential Medicines?" In MPI Studies on Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 235–65. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2014. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54704-1_13.
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"How anti-competitive practices hurt developing country businesses." In Combating Anti-Competitive Practices, 1–7. United Nations, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.18356/69505904-en.
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Burke, T., A. Genn-Bash, and B. Haines. "A Practical Guide to Anti-competitive Practices." In Competition in Theory and Practice, 151–69. Routledge, 2018. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203702536-7.
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"Undisclosed information, unfair competition and anti-competitive practices." In A Handbook on the WTO TRIPS Agreement, 136–45. Cambridge University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781108883511.008.
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Taubman, Antony, Hannu Wager, and Jayashree Watal. "Industrial designs, layout-designs of integrated circuits, undisclosed information, anti-competitive practices." In A Handbook on the WTO TRIPS Agreement, 8. WTO, 2012. http://dx.doi.org/10.30875/f1fc8711-en.
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Marco Colino, Sandra. "16. An analysis of the principal abusive practices." In Competition Law of the EU and UK, 352–404. Oxford University Press, 2019. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198725053.003.0016.
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This chapter focuses on the most important pricing and non-pricing practices, which together constitute the larger part of the anti-competitive and exploitative abuses of dominant firms. The types of conduct considered abusive of market power are similar under most competition regimes, and include both pricing and non-pricing practices. The ‘form-based’ analysis of abusive practices is progressively shifting to an ‘effects-based approach’. In the EU and the UK, both exclusionary and exploitative abuses may fall foul of the relevant competition law provisions. Exclusionary practices are usually considered abusive when they are likely to lead to ‘anticompetitive foreclosure’. The EU and UK law and practice in relation to all these potential abuses is and will remain aligned until the UK has formally left the EU.
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Geradin, Damien, and Michel Kerf. "Levelling the playing field: is the WTO adequately equipped to prevent anti-competitive practices in telecommunications?" In The WTO and Global Convergence in Telecommunications and Audio-Visual Services, 130–62. Cambridge University Press, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511674471.007.
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Homewood, Matthew J. "8. EU competition law: Article 101 and 102 TFEU." In EU Law Concentrate, 170–204. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198854999.003.0008.
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Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibit anti-competitive business practices. The European Commission, national competition authorities, and national courts enforce Articles 101 and 102 under powers conferred by Regulation 1/2003. From time to time, the European Commission issues non-binding notices providing clarification of the competition rules. This chapter begins with an outline of Articles 101 and 102 and the rules on enforcement. It then looks at the two Treaty provisions in detail. In broad terms, Article 101 prohibits business agreements or arrangements which prevent, restrict, or distort competition within the internal market and affect trade between Member States whilst Article 102 prohibits, as incompatible with the internal market, any abuse by undertakings in a dominant position within the internal market insofar as it may affect trade between Member States. It should be noted at the outset that ‘dominance’ itself is not prohibited, but only when such dominance is accompanied with abusive behaviour that may affect trade.
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Sari, Suurnäkki, and Tomassi Paolo. "Part II Antitrust Investigations, 5 Leniency and Whistle-Blowers." In EU Antitrust Procedure. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/law-ocl/9780198839866.003.0005.
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This chapter focuses on leniency, which is an important investigative tool designed to serve the enforcement of cartel law, particularly the detection and investigation of cartel activity. In essence, leniency policy offers undertakings involved in a cartel—which self-report and hand over evidence—either total immunity from fines or a reduction of fines, which the European Commission would have otherwise imposed on them. It encourages cartel members to confess and provide first-hand, direct ‘insider’ evidence of conduct that is otherwise concealed. The leniency reward is thus essentially a cooperation incentive for undertakings that ensures detection and punishment of secret cartels. Moreover, leniency programs can help competition authorities to obtain evidence faster and at a lower direct cost, compared to other methods of investigation, and can lead to a more efficient resolution of cases. While the leniency program of the Commission is addressed to undertakings participating in a cartel, individuals can also help the Commission in the fight against cartels and other anti-competitive practices. In 2017, the Commission introduced a specially designed tool for ‘whistle-blowers’ willing to report cartel behaviour anonymously. The chapter then describes the Commission leniency and whistle-blower procedures.
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Schütze, Robert. "12. Competition Law: Cartels." In An Introduction to European Law, 282–306. Oxford University Press, 2020. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/he/9780198858942.003.0012.
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This chapter provides an overview of EU competition law through the lens of Article 101 TFEU. Article 101 outlaws anti-competitive collusions between undertakings; that is, ‘cartels’. Historically, this form of illegal behaviour has been the most dangerous anti-competitive practice. The prohibition on any collusion between undertakings to restrict competition in the internal market is thereby set out in Article 101. The European Union has given a wide jurisdictional scope to the provision, and EU competition law generally. Yet it tries to find an appropriate balance between pro- and anti-competitive considerations for every agreement. Due to the EU's historic task to create an internal market, vertical agreements have been of particular importance to EU; and distribution agreements indeed continue to occupy a prominent place within the case law of the European Courts.
Reports on the topic "Anti-Competitive practices"
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Altstein, Miriam, and Ronald J. Nachman. Rational Design of Insect Control Agent Prototypes Based on Pyrokinin/PBAN Neuropeptide Antagonists. United States Department of Agriculture, August 2013. http://dx.doi.org/10.32747/2013.7593398.bard.
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The general objective of this study was to develop rationally designed mimetic antagonists (and agonists) of the PK/PBAN Np class with enhanced bio-stability and bioavailability as prototypes for effective and environmentally friendly pest insect management agents. The PK/PBAN family is a multifunctional group of Nps that mediates key functions in insects (sex pheromone biosynthesis, cuticular melanization, myotropic activity, diapause and pupal development) and is, therefore, of high scientific and applied interest. The objectives of the current study were: (i) to identify an antagonist biophores (ii) to develop an arsenal of amphiphilic topically active PK/PBAN antagonists with an array of different time-release profiles based on the previously developed prototype analog; (iii) to develop rationally designed non-peptide SMLs based on the antagonist biophore determined in (i) and evaluate them in cloned receptor microplate binding assays and by pheromonotropic, melanotropic and pupariation in vivo assays. (iv) to clone PK/PBAN receptors (PK/PBAN-Rs) for further understanding of receptor-ligand interactions; (v) to develop microplate binding assays for screening the above SMLs. In the course of the granting period A series of amphiphilic PK/PBAN analogs based on a linear lead antagonist from the previous BARD grant was synthesized that incorporated a diverse array of hydrophobic groups (HR-Suc-A[dF]PRLa). Others were synthesized via the attachment of polyethylene glycol (PEG) polymers. A hydrophobic, biostablePK/PBAN/DH analog DH-2Abf-K prevented the onset of the protective state of diapause in H. zea pupae [EC50=7 pmol/larva] following injection into the preceding larval stage. It effectively induces the crop pest to commit a form of ‘ecological suicide’. Evaluation of a set of amphiphilic PK analogs with a diverse array of hydrophobic groups of the formula HR-Suc-FTPRLa led to the identification of analog T-63 (HR=Decyl) that increased the extent of diapause termination by a factor of 70% when applied topically to newly emerged pupae. Another biostablePK analog PK-Oic-1 featured anti-feedant and aphicidal properties that matched the potency of some commercial aphicides. Native PK showed no significant activity. The aphicidal effects were blocked by a new PEGylated PK antagonist analog PK-dF-PEG4, suggesting that the activity is mediated by a PK/PBAN receptor and therefore indicative of a novel and selective mode-of-action. Using a novel transPro mimetic motif (dihydroimidazole; ‘Jones’) developed in previous BARD-sponsored work, the first antagonist for the diapause hormone (DH), DH-Jo, was developed and shown to block over 50% of H. zea pupal diapause termination activity of native DH. This novel antagonist development strategy may be applicable to other invertebrate and vertebrate hormones that feature a transPro in the active core. The research identifies a critical component of the antagonist biophore for this PK/PBAN receptor subtype, i.e. a trans-oriented Pro. Additional work led to the molecular cloning and functional characterization of the DH receptor from H. zea, allowing for the discovery of three other DH antagonist analogs: Drosophila ETH, a β-AA analog, and a dF analog. The receptor experiments identified an agonist (DH-2Abf-dA) with a maximal response greater than native DH. ‘Deconvolution’ of a rationally-designed nonpeptide heterocyclic combinatorial library with a cyclic bis-guanidino (BG) scaffold led to discovery of several members that elicited activity in a pupariation acceleration assay, and one that also showed activity in an H. zea diapause termination assay, eliciting a maximal response of 90%. Molecular cloning and functional characterization of a CAP2b antidiuretic receptor from the kissing bug (R. prolixus) as well as the first CAP2b and PK receptors from a tick was also achieved. Notably, the PK/PBAN-like receptor from the cattle fever tick is unique among known PK/PBAN and CAP2b receptors in that it can interact with both ligand types, providing further evidence for an evolutionary relationship between these two NP families. In the course of the granting period we also managed to clone the PK/PBAN-R of H. peltigera, to express it and the S. littoralis-R Sf-9 cells and to evaluate their interaction with a variety of PK/PBAN ligands. In addition, three functional microplate assays in a HTS format have been developed: a cell-membrane competitive ligand binding assay; a Ca flux assay and a whole cell cAMP ELISA. The Ca flux assay has been used for receptor characterization due to its extremely high sensitivity. Computer homology studies were carried out to predict both receptor’s SAR and based on this analysis 8 mutants have been generated. The bioavailability of small linear antagonistic peptides has been evaluated and was found to be highly effective as sex pheromone biosynthesis inhibitors. The activity of 11 new amphiphilic analogs has also been evaluated. Unfortunately, due to a problem with the Heliothis moth colony we were unable to select those with pheromonotropic antagonistic activity and further check their bioavailability. Six peptides exhibited some melanotropic antagonistic activity but due to the low inhibitory effect the peptides were not further tested for bioavailability in S. littoralis larvae. Despite the fact that no new antagonistic peptides were discovered in the course of this granting period the results contribute to a better understanding of the interaction of the PK/PBAN family of Nps with their receptors, provided several HT assays for screening of libraries of various origin for presence of PK/PBAN-Ragonists and antagonists and provided important practical information for the further design of new, peptide-based insecticide prototypes aimed at the disruption of key neuroendocrine physiological functions in pest insects.