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Journal articles on the topic 'Anti-Natalism'

Author: Grafiati
Published: 4 June 2021
Last updated: 27 January 2023

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1

Belshaw, Christopher. "A New Argument for Anti-Natalism." South African Journal of Philosophy 31, no. 1 (January 2012): 117–27. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2012.10751772.

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2

Magnusson, Erik. "On Risk-Based Arguments for Anti-natalism." Journal of Value Inquiry 56, no. 1 (March 2022): 101–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10790-022-09889-3.

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3

Singh, Asheel. "The Hypothetical Consent Objection to Anti-Natalism." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21, no. 5 (November 2018): 1135–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-018-9952-0.

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4

Brown, Faith L., and Lucas A. Keefer. "Anti-Natalism from an Evolutionary Psychological Perspective." Evolutionary Psychological Science 6, no. 3 (December 19, 2019): 283–91. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40806-019-00226-9.

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5

Ali, Farhad, and Ahmad Hassan Khattak. "Islam, Atheism and Anti-natalism: A critical analysis." Journal of Humanities, Social and Management Sciences (JHSMS) 2, no. 2 (December 30, 2021): 228–39. http://dx.doi.org/10.47264/idea.jhsms/2.2.17.

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The fact that every one of us in this life has to face difficulties, pain, sadness cannot be denied. Quran and Hadith also accept the presence of evil and calamities in this world. There comes the question in our mind that how is the evil present in this world although the world is created by Allah (S.W.T), and He is the merciful and controls everything in the universe. If somehow, the evil was present Allah (S.W.T) could have ended it, but we see that the reality is different. The existence of evil has been used by people as a justification for not believing in God since ages. In today’s world we see people who believe in Anti-natalism and consider life as an evil and in order to save ourselves from the evil they suggest that humans should not procreate. This article has been written after studying the arguments of people who do not believe in God and are the followers of Anti-natalism. The study concludes that evils, pains, and sadness are natural product of this world, and these evils are not a part of Allah’s (S.W.T) creations. Moreover, the changes are part of the existence of the universe and humans, and these calamities cannot be used as an excuse for not believing in God or justify believing in Anti-natalism.
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6

Overall, Christine. "My Children, Their Children, and Benatar’s Anti-Natalism." Journal of Value Inquiry 56, no. 1 (February 10, 2022): 51–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10790-022-09886-6.

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7

Benatar, David. "Misconceived: Why These Further Criticisms of Anti-natalism Fail." Journal of Value Inquiry 56, no. 1 (March 2022): 119–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10790-022-09890-w.

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8

Metz, Thaddeus. "Contemporary Anti-Natalism, Featuring Benatar’sBetter Never to Have Been." South African Journal of Philosophy 31, no. 1 (January 2012): 1–9. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2012.10751763.

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9

Benatar, David. "Every Conceivable Harm: A Further Defence of Anti-Natalism." South African Journal of Philosophy 31, no. 1 (January 2012): 128–64. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2012.10751773.

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10

Hauskeller, Michael. "Anti-natalism, Pollyannaism, and Asymmetry: A Defence of Cheery Optimism." Journal of Value Inquiry 56, no. 1 (February 17, 2022): 21–35. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10790-022-09884-8.

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11

Benatar, David. "Famine, Affluence, and Procreation: Peter Singer and Anti-Natalism Lite." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23, no. 2 (March 5, 2020): 415–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-020-10073-4.

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12

Savkin, Nikolay S. "INEVITABILITY OF REVIVAL: PRO AND COUNTER ANTINATALISM." Humanitarian: actual problems of the humanities and education 19, no. 1 (March 30, 2019): 80–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.15507/2078-9823.045.019.201901.080-088.

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Introduction. Radical pessimism and militant anti-natalism of Arthur Schopenhauer and David Benathar create an optimistic philosophy of life, according to which life is not meaningless. It is given by nature in a natural way, and a person lives, studies, works, makes a career, achieves results, grows, develops. Being an active subject of his own social relations, a person does not refuse to continue the race, no matter what difficulties, misfortunes and sufferings would be experienced. Benathar convinces that all life is continuous suffering, and existence is constant dying. Therefore, it is better not to be born. Materials and Methods. As the main theoretical and methodological direction of research, the dialectical materialist and integrative approaches are used, the realization of which, in conjunction with the synergetic technique, provides a certain result: is convinced that the idea of anti-natalism is inadequate, the idea of giving up life. A systematic approach and a comprehensive assessment of the studied processes provide for the disclosure of the contradictory nature of anti-natalism. Results of the study are presented in the form of conclusions that human life is naturally given by nature itself. Instincts, needs, interests embodied in a person, stimulate to active actions, and he lives. But even if we finish off with all of humanity by agreement, then over time, according to the laws of nature and according to evolutionary theory, man will inevitably, objectively, and naturally reappear. Discussion and Conclusion. The expected effect of the idea of inevitability of rebirth can be the formation of an optimistic orientation of a significant part of the youth, the idea of continuing life and building happiness, development. As a social being, man is universal, and the awareness of this universality allows one to understand one’s purpose – continuous versatile development.
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13

Won, Haeyoung. "A Discussion of Anti-Natalism and the Concept of Intermediate Existence." Journal of East-West Comparative Literature 54 (December 31, 2020): 309–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.29324/jewcl.2020.12.54.309.

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14

Smyth, Nicholas. "What Is the Question to which Anti-Natalism Is the Answer?" Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23, no. 1 (February 2020): 71–87. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-020-10070-7.

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15

Lynes, Philippe. "Is it Ecologically Just to Be? Anti-Natalism in Eco-Deconstruction." Oxford Literary Review 38, no. 1 (July 2016): 99–126. http://dx.doi.org/10.3366/olr.2016.0182.

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This paper attempts to respond to the environmental difficulties faced by overpopulation by adapting a question of Levinas's, ‘is it ecologically just to be?’, of which ‘is it ecologically just to make more children?’ is an important correlate. I suggest that both an affirmative account of life as deployed in affirmative biopolitics, as well as the pessimistic thought of death in anti-natalist philosophy are insufficient to respond to these questions. An eco-deconstructive account of life:death, however, allows us both to respond to the horror inspired in thinking one's life at the expense of so many others, human and nonhuman, while thinking the affirmation of life otherwise in inventing, each time uniquely, more just responses to overpopulation.
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16

Hereth, Blake, and Anthony Ferrucci. "Here’s not looking at you, kid: A new defence of anti-natalism." South African Journal of Philosophy 40, no. 1 (January 2, 2021): 14–33. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2020.1871566.

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17

Puls, Heiko. "Kant’s Justification of Parental Duties." Kantian Review 21, no. 1 (February 1, 2016): 53–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s1369415415000308.

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AbstractIn his applied moral philosophy, Kant formulates the parents’ duty to make their child happy. I argue that, for Kant, this duty is anad hocattempt at compensating for the parental guilt of having brought a person into the condition of existence – and hence also having created her need for happiness – on their own initiative. I argue that Kant’s considerations regarding parental duties and human reproduction in general imply arguments for an ethically justified anti-natalism, but that this position is abolished in his teleology for meta-ethical reasons.
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18

Singh, Asheel. "Furthering the Case for Anti-natalism: Seana Shiffrin and the Limits of Permissible Harm." South African Journal of Philosophy 31, no. 1 (January 2012): 104–16. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02580136.2012.10751771.

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19

Smuts, Aaron. "To Be or Never to Have Been: Anti-Natalism and a Life Worth Living." Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17, no. 4 (October 19, 2013): 711–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10677-013-9461-0.

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20

Miller, Lantz Fleming. "Kantian Approaches to Human Reproduction: Both Favourable and Unfavourable." Kantian journal 40, no. 1 (2021): 51–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.5922/0207-6918-2021-1-2.

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Recent years have seen a surge of interest in the question of whether humans should reproduce. Some say human life is too punishing and cruel to impose upon an innocent. Others hold that such harms do not undermine the great and possibly unique value of human life. Tracing these outlooks historically in the debate has barely begun. What might philosophers have said, or what did they say, about human life itself and its value to merit reproduction? Herein it is useful to look to Kant, who wrote much on whether, by reproducing, humans do wrong or right morally. Two main arguments are put forward and assessed: one examining whether perfect or imperfect duties condone reproduction, the other whether Kant’s teleological or, in the opposite sense, his eschatological outlooks can salvage reproduction. These two arguments are essential for building the entire argument. I find that, although Kant’s arguments against reproducing are strong, some of his writing seems to support reproduction as a good. Yet, must we assume an author, even one who strove for systematicity, is consistent over an entire life’s work on every issue, especially if it is not handled directly in a single work? I conclude that Kant does not sufficiently, systematically support anti-natalism as more moral than pro-natalism. It is best for the current debate to grapple with the very dilemma that daunted Kant.
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21

Krstic, Predrag. "Negation and asymmetry: What is left of negative utilitarism." Theoria, Beograd 63, no. 3 (2020): 43–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.2298/theo2003043k.

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The beginning of the paper is dedicated to Popper?s general understanding of the scientific method, in which the moment of refutation stands out. The second part of the paper presents the application of that model to the field of ethics and ?public policy,? in the form of a suggestion to be called later ?negative utilitarianism.?. Then, attention is focused on the objections addressed to negative utilitarianism, primarily when it comes to the ?repugnantconclusion? that brings it closer to promortalism and anti-natalism. In the final part, the author strives to defend what remains of the intuition that motivates negative utilitarianism by its reduction to a principle, and not to a complete theory or a comprehensive conception.
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22

Pande, Amrita. "Global reproductive inequalities, neo-eugenics and commercial surrogacy in India." Current Sociology 64, no. 2 (December 4, 2015): 244–58. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0011392115614786.

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India’s commercial surrogacy market literally produces humans and human relationships while sustaining global racial reproductive hierarchies. The post-colonial state’s aggressive anti-natalism echoes the broader global population control agenda framing the global South’s high fertility rates as a ‘global danger’ to be controlled at whatever cost, but is at odds with the neoliberal imperative of unrestrained global fertility tourism. Womb mothers (surrogates) subvert hegemonic discourses by taking control over their bodies and using their fertile bodies ‘productively’. But in controlling their own reproduction through decisions about fertility, sterilization and abortion in order to (re)produce children of higher classes and privileged nations, they ultimately conform to global neo-eugenic imperatives to reduce the fertility of lower class women in the global South. Surrogates creatively construct cross-class, -caste, -religion, -race and -nation kinship ties with the baby and the intended mother, disrupting hegemonic genetic and patriarchal bases of kinship, but fundamentally reify structural inequality.
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23

Xydias, Christina. "This Was the One for Me." German Politics and Society 38, no. 1 (March 1, 2020): 105–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.3167/gps.2020.380106.

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Next to the Alternative for Germany (AfD)’s nationalism and anti-immigrant attitudes, natalism and support for traditional gender roles are key components of the party’s far right categorization. Women are not absent from parties like the AfD, though they support them at lower rates than men and at lower rates than they support other parties. In light of women’s lower presence in far-right parties, how do women officeholders in the AfD explain their party affiliation, and how do their explanations differ from men’s? An answer is discernible at the nexus between AfD officeholders’ publicly available political backgrounds and the accounts that they offer for joining the party, termed “origin stories.” Empirically, this article uses an original dataset of political biographical details for all the AfD’s state and federal legislators elected between 2013 and late 2019. This dataset shows that AfD women at the state level are less likely than their men counterparts to have been affiliated with a political party, and they are less likely to have been politically active, prior to their participation in the AfD. Regardless of the facts of their backgrounds, however, women more than men explain their support of the AfD as a choice to enter into politics, and men more than women explain their support of the AfD as a choice to leave another party. The article argues that these gendered origin stories can be contextualized within the party’s masculinist, natalist, and nationalist values.
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24

Peterson, Jesse M. "Is Coming into Existence Always a Harm? Qoheleth in Dialogue with David Benatar." Harvard Theological Review 112, no. 1 (January 2019): 33–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0017816018000330.

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AbstractContemporary philosopher David Benatar has advanced the self-evidently controversial claim that “coming into existence is always a harm.” Benatar’s argument turns on the basic asymmetry between pleasure and pain, an asymmetry he seeks to explain by the principle that those who never exist cannot be deprived. Benatar’s import is almost incredible: humans should cease to procreate immediately, thereby engendering the extinction of the species—a view known as “anti-natalism.” According to many of his readers, the ancient Hebrew sage Qoheleth expresses a pessimistic nihilism that runs as thick as Benatar’s.Prima faciegrounding for this assertion is that Qoheleth, like Benatar, raises the issue of whether coming into existence may be a harm—and gives an affirmative answer. In two passages, Eccl 6:1–6 and 4:1–3, Qoheleth declares that an unborn hypothetical person is “better off” than their existent counterpart. Yet the meaning and implication of these words is far from obvious. Does Qoheleth imply that the non-exister’s state, and non-existence in general, is universally superior to existence? Or is he instead speaking exceptionally, of particular persons in rare circumstances? By examining the two “better”-statements in their literary context, I will argue that Qoheleth intends these examples as exceptions. He does not go so far as to make the supremely nihilistic claim that coming into existence is always, or even generally, a net harm; yet, he does concede that in certain cases, it can be. Beyond this, I will explore how the two thinkers’ divergent conclusions can be traced to a deeper difference of philosophical method. This question concerning non-existence opens a window to Qoheleth’s broader scheme of values and therefore serves as a surprisingly useful entry point by which to engage his philosophy. The paper utilizes the methodology Jaco Gericke has recently termed “philosophical criticism,” but specifically applied to Qoheleth.
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25

Moen, Ole Martin. "Pessimism Counts in Favor of Biomedical Enhancement: A Lesson from the Anti-Natalist Philosophy of P. W. Zapffe." Neuroethics, March 27, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12152-021-09458-8.

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AbstractAccording to the Norwegian philosopher Peter Wessel Zapffe (1899–1990), human life is filled with so much suffering that procreation is morally impermissible. In the first part of this paper I present Zapffe’s pessimism-based argument for anti-natalism, and contrast it with the arguments for anti-natalism proposed by Arthur Schopenhauer and David Benatar. In the second part I explore what Zapffe’s pessimism can teach us about biomedical enhancement. I make the (perhaps surprising) case that pessimism counts in favor of pursuing biomedical enhancements. The reason is that the worse we take the baseline human condition to be, the stronger are our reasons to try to alter humanity, and the weaker are our reasons to fear technology-driven extinction. The prospect of enhancement, I further argue, gives pessimists a reason to reject anti-natalism.
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26

Piller, Christian. "Benatar’s Anti-Natalism: Philosophically Flawed, Morally Dubious." Philosophia, August 3, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11406-022-00560-6.

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AbstractIn the first part of the paper, I discuss Benatar’s asymmetry argument for the claim that it would have been better for each of us to have never lived at all. In contrast to other commentators, I will argue that there is a way of interpreting the premises of his argument which makes all of them come out true. (This will require one departure from Benatar’s own presentation.) Once we see why the premises are true, we will, however, also realise that the argument trades on an ambiguity that renders it invalid. In the second part of the paper, I consider whether discussions of how best to implement the anti-natalist conclusion crosses a moral barrier. I ask whether we can, independently of any philosophical argument, raise a legitimate moral objection to discussions of how best to end all life on earth. I discuss three views concerning the role of our pre-philosophical views and attitudes in philosophical debates: the external view according to which these attitudes set moral barriers to the content of philosophical debate whilst themselves standing outside this debate; the internal view according to which our intuitions are part of the material for philosophical reflection and play no further role; and the intermediate view according to which our pre-reflective views and attitudes, without themselves requiring philosophical validation, can play an important role when it comes to issues regarding the implementation of philosophical claims.
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27

Chomanski, Bartlomiej “Bartek.” "Anti‐natalism and the Creation of Artificial inds." Journal of Applied Philosophy, July 2, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/japp.12535.

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28

Gould, Deke Caiñas. "Future minds and a new challenge to anti‐natalism." Bioethics, July 14, 2021. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bioe.12873.

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29

Lougheed, Kirk. "Future minds are not a challenge to anti‐natalism: A reply to Gould." Bioethics, November 28, 2022. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/bioe.13123.

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