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Journal articles on the topic 'Antitrust, damages, private enforcement'

Author: Grafiati

Published: 14 March 2023

Last updated: 31 July 2025

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1

Wils, Wouter P. J. "The Relationship between Public Antitrust Enforcement and Private Actions for Damages." World Competition 32, Issue 1 (2009): 3–26. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2009002.

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This paper concerns the relationship between public antitrust enforcement and private actions for damages, focusing in particular on the enforcement of Articles 81 and 82 EC. In the first half of the paper, I examine the respective roles of public antitrust enforcement and private actions for damages. I argue that public enforcement should aim at clarifying and developing the antitrust prohibitions and deterring and punishing violations, whereas private actions for damages should aim at compensation. This corresponds to the approach adopted by the European Commission in its 2008 White Paper on

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2

Wolski, Dominik. "Private antitrust enforcement in digital market." Bratislava Law Review 4, no. 2 (2020): 147–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.46282/blr.2020.4.2.210.

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The increasing popularity of private antitrust enforcement in the EU is reflected by number of antitrust damages claims in the member states, following the transposition of the Damages Directive. Meanwhile, rapid growth of digitization in every aspect of social and economic life, particularly in business like commerce and services, has taken place. Recently, the above phenomenon was intensified by COVID-19. This paper aims at discussing private antitrust enforcement and antitrust damages claims in the context of digital transformation of the market. To this extent, there are several main chara

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Bajalović, Dijana Marković. "PROVING ANTITRUST DAMAGES IN CIVIL PROCEEDINGS – The Compatibility of Serbian Law with Directive 2014/104 –." Strani pravni život 67, no. 4 (2024): 643–67. http://dx.doi.org/10.56461/spz_23404kj.

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Private competition law enforcement has been a recent phenomenon in the European Union. In the past, the EU law and member states’ national laws lacked elements that contributed to the preponderance of private enforcement in the United States, such as treble and punitive damages, the procedural right of a damaged party to request discovery of evidence, collective actions, etc. The interest in private enforcement of competition law has gradually increased after Regulation 1/2003 authorised national courts to implement Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, the EU courts established private enforcement prin

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Rosso, Selene. "Ways to Promote Workable Private Antitrust Enforcement in Italy." World Competition 32, Issue 3 (2009): 305–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2009033.

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While the European Commission is retreating its proposal to import the US model of private antitrust enforcement, this is gaining ground in Italy, where double damages have been awarded in the well-known Manfredi case. Nevertheless, it is still difficult to be awarded antitrust damages by an Italian court because of several reasons: (1) the labyrinth of the Italian courts, (2) the pliability of the Government to lobbying pressures, and (3) the courts’ reluctance/inability to deploy economic concepts in calculating the amount of damages. Bearing in mind such issues, this article aims to propose

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Wils, Wouter P. J. "Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe?" World Competition 26, Issue 3 (2003): 473–88. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2003023.

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The EC antitrust prohibitions are regularly invoked in private litigation as a shield. Private parties also play an important role in public antitrust enforcement through complaints to the competition authorities. However, in marked contrast with the situation in the US, private actions for damages or for injunctive relief are rare. This article argues that this situation is a desirable one. Indeed, from the perspective of ensuring that the antitrust prohibitions are not violated, public antitrust enforcement is inherently superior to private enforcement, because of more effective investigativ

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Albors-Llorens, Albertina. "Antitrust Damages in EU Law." University of Queensland Law Journal 37, no. 1 (2020): 139–51. http://dx.doi.org/10.38127/uqlj.v37i1.4143.

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The adoption of Directive 2014/104/EU on actions for damages for infringements of the competition rules has marked the beginning of a new era in the field of the private enforcement of the EU competition rules. The arduous legislative journey leading to the adoption of the Directive, the specific aspects pertaining to the exercise of damages actions covered by it and its attempt to establish an effective coordination between the systems of public and private enforcement have already received intense attention by antitrust scholars. However, this contribution will focus on the study of the Dire

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Piszcz, Anna. "Piecemeal Harmonisation Through the Damages Directive? Remarks on What Received Too Little Attention in Relation to Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law." Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 8, no. 12 (2015): 79–98. http://dx.doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2015.8.12.4.

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On 11 June 2013, the European Commission adopted a package of measures to tackle the lack of an efficient and coherent private enforcement system of EU competition law in its Member States. In particular, a draft Damages Directive was proposed in order to meet the need for a sound European approach to private enforcement of EU competition law in damages actions. The Damages Directive was ultimately adopted on 26 November 2014. This paper explores some aspects of private antitrust enforcement which have not received sufficient attention from the EU decision-makers during the long preparatory an

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Mikelėnas, Valentinas, and Rasa Zaščiurinskaitė. "Quantification of Harm and the Damages Directive: Implementation in CEE Countries." Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 10, no. 5 (2017): 111–31. http://dx.doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2017.10.15.6.

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Quantification of harm is regarded as one of the most significant obstacles for the full compensation of harm and development of private enforcement within the European Union, including CEE Member States. Consequently, the Damages Directive establishes general rules and requirements for the quantification of harm, such as a rebuttable presumption of harm in case of cartels, the power of national courts to estimate harm as well as others, which closely interact with the principle of full compensation emphasized by the case-law of the European Union and directly established in the Damages Direct

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干雪. "中國反壟斷損害賠償訴訟的目標 <b>: </b>僅僅是賠償嗎 <b>? </b>——歐盟的視角". 國際人文社科研究 3, № 5 (2024): 15–34. https://doi.org/10.63944/rstehf64.

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The objectives provides by the Anti-Monopoly Law of China and its Judicial Interpretation concerning antitrust damages actions are too general. They cannot be achieved directly by the antitrust damages action, and in turn, such ultimate and general objectives by no means provide clear guidance for the construction and application of an effective antitrust damages action system in China. More importantly, the clarification of direct goals actively pursued by the antitrust damages action in China could also provide a benchmark to assess the appropriateness of the specific antitrust litigation me

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Sarra, Alessandro, and Alessandro Marra. "Are Monetary Incentives Enough to Boost Actions for Damages in the European Union? On the Relevance of Incompleteness of Laws and Evidentiary Requirements." World Competition 31, Issue 3 (2008): 369–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2008031.

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In this article we intend to contribute to the public debate regarding the lack of private antitrust enforcement in the European Union. The European Commission suggests to concentrate on monetary incentives to boost actions for damages (among them, granting full compensation, promoting aggregate actions, reducing the costs associated with antitrust claims, and so on). We argue that monetary incentives are not sufficient to create an efficient regime of private enforcement of law. In particular, we develop the thesis that to increase the number of effective damages actions is useful to better c

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Stanikunas, Rimantas Antanas, and Arunas Burinskas. "The Interaction of Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law in Lithuania." Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 8, no. 12 (2015): 237–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2015.8.12.11.

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This paper provides a study of the interaction between public and private enforcement of Lithuanian antitrust law. The study refers to the Damages Directive. It has been found that private enforcement depends greatly on public enforcement of competition law. Therefore, their compatibility and balance are of great importance to antitrust policy. The Lithuanian NCA prioritises cases where an economic effect on competition does not have to be proven. This creates uncertainty about the outcome of private enforcement cases. Private enforcement in Lithuania is also in need of detailed rules on the i

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Gerasymenko, Anzhelika, and Nataliia Mazaraki. "Antitrust Damages Actions in Ukraine: Current Situation and Perspectives." Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 8, no. 12 (2015): 195–213. http://dx.doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2015.8.12.9.

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The article gives an overview of Ukrainian legislation and experiences concerning antitrust damages actions. The analysis has led to a number of conclusions: private claims are rare in Ukraine due to difficulties in obtaining evidence, high legal costs, and lacking confidence in the Ukrainian court system. The paper gives examples of Ukrainian private antitrust enforcement practice and provides a statistical analysis of the dynamics of ‘compensated’ damages caused by antitrust infringements in Ukraine. The value of ‘compensated’ damages is compared to the value of the economic effect of stoppi

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Serafimova, Mariya. "Article: Quantification of Harm in EU Consumer Antitrust Actions for Damages." World Competition 47, Issue 1 (2024): 109–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2024006.

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This paper analyses the development of private actions for damages as a significant pillar of private enforcement of EU competition law and discusses the quantification and estimation of harm. Since the adoption of the EU Directive 2014/104/EU on Antitrust Damages Actions, private enforcement in Europe has undergone crucial clarifications in the case law of EU courts, yet the critical issue of quantifying damages in private actions has only recently been addressed by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). This paper takes a closer look at the recent ruling in the Tráficos Manuel Fe

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Wolski, Dominik. "Can an Ideal Court Model in Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Established?" Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 11, no. 18 (2018): 115–52. http://dx.doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2018.11.18.5.

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Any discussion of private antitrust enforcement usually focuses on substantive law and proceedings applicable to private antitrust cases. Those elements are important, however, the efficacy of both public and private enforcement relies upon rules of law (substantive and procedural) along with their application. The latter constitutes a substantial aspect affecting the institutions which make decisions in private antitrust enforcement cases, namely the relevant courts. The enforcement of competition law is inextricably intertwined with the economy and markets. As a result, antitrust cases are d

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Mouton, Jeanne. "The challenges for private competition law enforcement concerning anticompetitive conducts in digital markets." YEARBOOK OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY STUDIES 15, no. 26 (2022): 9–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2022.15.26.1.

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The paper reviews literature on theories of harm in digital markets, and the specific difficulties in quantifying the damage in private enforcement of competition law. The development of a tentative case-law on private enforcement in digital markets in the European Union is studied next, in comparison to the US antitrust practice, differentiating between businesses or consumers filing damages claims. Finally, the paper raises the specific issues posed by the digital economy for competition law claims for damages, and explores the idea of extending the presumption of harm also to abuse of domin

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Massa, Claudia. "Private Antitrust Enforcement Without Punitive Damages: A Half-Baked Reform?" Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 11, no. 17 (2018): 93–111. http://dx.doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2018.11.17.5.

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Directive 2014/104/EU on private antitrust enforcement opted for the exclusion of punitive damages from the category of recoverable damages following a violation of antitrust law. This article will outline the concept of punitive damages and analyse the relevant case-law of the courts of the Member States, of the ECtHR and of the ECJ. Then, it will examine the regime laid down in the Directive and consider the possible reasons why the European legislator opted for this exclusion. Thus, the opportunity to introduce such a provision into the European legal system will be evaluated, taking into c

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Schinkel, Maarten Pieter, and Jakob Rüggeberg. "Consolidating Antitrust Damages in Europe: A Proposal for Standing in Line with Efficient Private Enforcement." World Competition 29, Issue 3 (2006): 395–420. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2006029.

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One of the lessons from US private antitrust practice is that limitation of defendants’ and plaintiffs’ rights should not be imposed lightly. Three Supreme Court decisions in Hanover Shoe, Illinois Brick and ARC America denying the pass-on defence and limiting standing to sue have resulted in a complex system of multi-district and multi-party litigation that achieves neither fair compensation nor efficient deterrence. Excluding the pass-on defence in Europe is a first step in a similarly irreversible sequence of further corollary requirements. We caution against taking this route and instead p

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Moisejevas, Raimundas. "The Damages Directive and Consensual Approach to Antitrust Enforcement." Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 8, no. 12 (2015): 181–94. http://dx.doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2015.8.12.8.

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The article focuses on the novelties introduced by the Damages Directive in the field of consensual settlements of disputes concerning private enforcement. The Damages Directive obliges Member States to ensure that the limitation period for bringing an action for damages is suspended for the duration of any consensual dispute resolution process. The Directive also establishes the main principles that govern the effect of consensual settlements on subsequent actions for damages. Since the EU framework for consensual dispute resolution of private enforcement disputes is quite new, many issues mu

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Pärn-Lee, Evelin. "Effect of National Decisions on Actions for Competition Damages in the CEE Countries." Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 10, no. 5 (2017): 177–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2017.10.15.9.

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One of the main objectives of the so-called Damages Directive (2014/104/EU) was to make antitrust enforcement more effective. Although in most EU countries private antitrust enforcement has been possible subject to general rules of civil law; the number of private antitrust litigations has remained relatively low. It is presumed that the complementary roles of public and private enforcement, as well as the synergy between them, will take effect if formal decisions taken during public enforcement will have binding effect with regard to follow-on private litigations. According to the Damages Dir

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Peyer, Sebastian. "CARTEL MEMBERS ONLY—REVISITING PRIVATE ANTITRUST POLICY IN EUROPE." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 60, no. 3 (2011): 627–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s002058931100025x.

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AbstractThis paper examines the current European private antitrust enforcement policy. The European Commission's White Paper of 2008, the unofficial Draft Directive of 2009 and the collective redress consultation of 2011 consider a facilitated access to private actions for all types of antitrust violations under articles 101 and 102 TFEU in order to effectively compensate the victims of anticompetitive conduct. Assuming that changes are necessary, the paper argues that it might be worthwhile to limit this policy to damages claims against hardcore violations such as cartels. This suggestion is

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Nowag, Julian, and Liisa Tarkkila. "How much effectiveness for the EU Damages Directive? Contractual clauses and antitrust damages actions." Common Market Law Review 57, Issue 2 (2020): 433–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/cola2020033.

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The Damages Directive is celebrated as a milestone for private enforcement of EU competition law; it harmonizes national procedural laws and aims to facilitate full compensation for damages resulting from competition law violations. Businesses frequently use contractual clauses that might present obstacles in obtaining compensation. Recent examples include a US case against Uber which was inadmissible because of clauses in the app’s terms and conditions; and clauses included in Ryanair’s terms and conditions. This paper explores the extent to which clauses on jurisdiction, mandatory arbitratio

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Marosi, Zoltán, and Barnabás Gergely. "Article: The Issue of Consumer Compensation Before Antitrust Authorities: Commitments, Cooperation and Competence: The Hungarian Experience." World Competition 47, Issue 1 (2024): 125–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2024008.

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The compensation of consumers for damages stemming from a breach of EU competition law rules has been in the forefront of discussions in the last years. A recent important aspect of the debate is whether a mixing of public and private enforcement efforts could enhance the effectiveness of consumer compensation. In Hungary, consumer compensation for breach of another field of EU law (unfair commercial practices) has been championed by a public authority, the Hungarian Competition Authority, which has achieved significant results to the direct benefit of consumers in this respect. This paper rev

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Cengiz, Firat. "ANTITRUST DAMAGES ACTIONS: LESSONS FROM AMERICAN INDIRECT PURCHASERS' LITIGATION." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 59, no. 1 (2010): 39–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020589309990030.

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AbstractThis article aims to draw policy lessons from the American indirect purchasers' litigation experience for the design of the European private antitrust regime in the light of the European Commission's White Paper on damages actions. The article shows that in multi-level polities procedural aspects of antitrust litigation and judicial cooperation are as crucial as the substantive standards for the success of private enforcement regimes. From this perspective the article criticizes the White Paper for the lack of procedural assessment and urges the Commission to give due consideration to

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Wils, Wouter P. J. "Leniency in Antitrust Enforcement: Theory and Practice." World Competition 30, Issue 1 (2007): 25–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2007003.

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This article discusses the theory and practice of leniency in antitrust enforcement, i.e. the granting of immunity from penalties or the reduction of penalties for antitrust violations in exchange for cooperation with the antitrust enforcement authorities. After a description of the practice of leniency in the United States and in the European Union, and of its history, the article analyses the positive effects and the possible negative effects of leniency on optimal antitrust enforcement, and the extent to which these effects can be measured. Objections of principle and institutional problems

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Davidow, Joel. "Recent Developments in US Antitrust." World Competition 28, Issue 3 (2005): 299–312. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2005019.

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A major issue for US antitrust enforcement in the last year or so has been how to achieve maximum detection and deterrence of cartels, even at the cost of weakening certain sanctions. Thus, new legislation protects first-to-confess price fixers from criminal penalties and from trebling of damages owed to customers. To the same end, US enforcement agencies have sought to cut back the ability of foreign victims of the non-US aspects of worldwide cartels to obtain damage relief in American courts. This approach has been justified primarily as facilitating the operation of leniency policies by dec

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Wolski, Dominik. "The Principle of Liability in Private Antitrust Enforcement in Selected European States in Light of the Implementation of the Damages Directive into the Polish Legal System." Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 9, no. 14 (2016): 69–95. http://dx.doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2016.9.14.3.

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In the vast majority of European countries, private antitrust enforcement falls under general rules of civil law. One of the issues to be discussed in relation to this type of litigation is the principle of liability, which exists in the given legal system, and its presumed impact on private enforcement. This problem has been debated in the course of the implementation works on the Damages Directive into the Polish legal system. A discussion on the principle of liability has taken place at least twice in this context. First, the issue was considered by the Civil Law Codification Commission and

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Jones, Clifford A. "Private Antitrust Enforcement in Europe: A Policy Analysis and Reality Check." World Competition 27, Issue 1 (2004): 13–24. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2004003.

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The right of individuals who have suffered loss from infringements of competition rules to bring private damages claims, long a mainstay of antitrust enforcement in the United States, is increasing in viability in the European Union as a result of judgments of the European Court of Justice, new legislation such as Regulation 1/2003, and numerous policy statements by the Commission and the European Parliament. Further remedies legislation may be forthcoming at EU or Member State level. However, some feel that private antitrust cases are undesirable from an economic and policy perspective and sh

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Koenig, Carsten. "Comparing Parent Company Liability in EU and US Competition Law." World Competition 41, Issue 1 (2018): 69–100. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2018004.

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It is a well-established principle of EU competition law that parent companies can be fined for antitrust infringements by their subsidiaries. Under the new EU Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions, parent company liability is likely to be extended to private antitrust litigation. In the United States, in contrast, no fines are imposed on parent companies unless they are directly involved in an antitrust infringement. Moreover, US courts are reluctant to hold parent companies directly or indirectly liable in private damages suits. Against this background, I explore in this article the strikin

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Di Giò, Alessandro. "Contract and Restitution Law and the Private Enforcement of EC Competition Law." World Competition 32, Issue 2 (2009): 199–220. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2009020.

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In the context of private enforcement of competition law, most attention and efforts have been traditionally drawn to the area of tort law. Claims for tortious damages have recently been regarded as a crucial instrument for strengthening private enforcement also in EC antitrust law. This article aims to highlight that a significant role may also be played by contractual and restitutionary remedies. The article analyzes the following areas where such remedies might become relevant to the private enforcement of EC competition law: (1) disputes between co-contractors to an agreement prohibited by

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Galič, Aleš. "Disclosure of Documents in Private Antitrust Enforcement Litigation." Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 8, no. 12 (2015): 99–126. http://dx.doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2015.8.12.5.

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Procedural tools aimed at access to information in general, and disclosure of documents in particular, are crucial for the effectiveness of private antitrust enforcement litigation and for facilitating more genuine equality of arms. Currently, profound differences exist among EU Member States’ civil procedure laws concerning disclosure of evidence held by the opponent. The transposition of the litigation disclosure mechanism contained in the Damages Directive will undermine the existing principles of Slovenian civil procedure. However, this is due to the fact that Slovenian law is outdated wit

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Hazelhorst, Monique. "Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law: Why Punitive Damages Are a Step Too Far." European Review of Private Law 18, Issue 4 (2010): 757–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/erpl2010060.

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Abstract: In 2005, the European Commission published a Green Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules, which was followed up in 2008 by a White Paper on the same topic. In these documents, the Commission proposes measures to encourage the private enforcement of competition law. Their primary aim is to enable consumers to claim restitution of damages suffered as a result of a breach of European Union (EU) competition law. Many of the Commission’s proposals are inspired by antitrust enforcement in the United States, in particular the proposal to introduce double damages, a f

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Choi, Albert H., and Kathryn E. Spier. "Class Actions and Private Antitrust Litigation." American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 14, no. 3 (2022): 131–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/mic.20200059.

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When firms collude and charge supracompetitive prices, consumers can bring antitrust lawsuits against the firms. When the litigation cost is low, firms accept the cost as just another cost of doing business, whereas when the cost is high, the firms lower the price to deter litigation. Class action is modeled as a mechanism that allows plaintiffs and attorneys to obtain economies of scale. We show that class actions, and the firms’ incentive to block them, may or may not be socially desirable. Agency problems, settlement, fee-shifting, treble damages, public enforcement, and sustaining collusio

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Sadrak, Katarzyna. "Arbitration Agreements and Actions for Antitrust Damages After the CDC Hydrogen Peroxide Judgment." Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 10, no. 16 (2017): 77–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2017.10.16.4.

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On May 21st 2015, the Court of Justice of the European Union in CDC Hydrogen Peroxide decided whether the application of jurisdiction clauses in actions for damages impedes the effective enforcement of EU competition law. The CJ stayed silent, however, on how to treat arbitration clauses, which similarly to jurisdiction clauses, exclude a default court jurisdiction. The question of how to interpret arbitration agreements in the event of an antitrust violation and subsequent actions for damages remains thus unanswered. In light of the foreseen increase in private enforcement of EU competition l

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Jurkowska-Gomułka, Agata. "Antitrust Damage Claims: A View From Efta Court." Market and Competition Law Review 3, no. 2 (2020): 153–70. http://dx.doi.org/10.7559/mclawreview.2019.1829.

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Articles 101 and 102 TFEU have become a pattern for competition rules provided in Articles 53 and 54 of the EEA Agreement, which entered into force on 1 January 1994. Both EU competition law and EEA competition law can be enforced before national courts. Lodging damage claims in the EU was facilitated by Directive 2014/104/EU. The so-called Antitrust Damages Directive was highly inspired by the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Although Directive 2014/104/EU has not been incorporated into the EEA law, damage claims resulting from violations of EEA competition rules a

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Benini, Caterina. "La localizzacione dell’illecito concorrenziale nel regime di Bruxelles: riflessioni alla luce della Sentenza FLYLAL II della Corte di Giustizia dell’Unione Europea = The localization of antitrust torts underthe Brussels regime: reflections in the light of the Judgment FLYLAL II of the Court of Justice of the European Union." CUADERNOS DE DERECHO TRANSNACIONAL 11, no. 1 (2019): 693. http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/cdt.2019.4641.

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Riassunto: Nella sentenza flyLAL II la Corte di giustizia dell’Unione Europea ha affermato che un calo delle vendite provocato da un illecito concorrenziale costituisce il “danno” rilevante agli effetti della individuazione del giudice competente ai sensi dell’art. 5 n. 3 del regolamento (CE) n. 44/2001 (“Bruxelles I”) e ha ritenuto che tale danno vada localizzato nel paese in cui si trova il mercato interessato dagli effetti dell’illecito. Lo scritto, prendendo spunto da questa sentenza, esamina criticamente la disciplina internazionalprivatistica europea degli illeciti concorrenziali, soffe

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Polverino, Fabio. "A Class Action Model for Antitrust Damages Litigation in the European Union." World Competition 30, Issue 3 (2007): 479–99. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2007030.

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This article reviews the legal and economic structure of the class action litigation model in the United States, as set forth by rule 23 of US civil procedure, exploring the requirements for obtaining class certification and maintaining a class action. I analyse a number of critical issues and inefficiencies connected to the adoption of class action as a tool for adjudicating controversies. The article, then, takes into consideration the issue of private antitrust litigation in the European Union, at the moment still underdeveloped. A Green Paper recently published by the EU Commission include

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Malnar, Vlatka Butorac. "Access to Documents in Antitrust Litigation – EU and Croatian Perspective." Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 8, no. 12 (2015): 127–60. http://dx.doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2015.8.12.6.

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The paper analyses access to documents in cartel-based damages cases from the EU and Croatian perspective. It considers all relevant EU and Croatian legislation and case-law primarily focusing on the expected impact of the newly enacted Damages Directive. It is argued that the new rules on access to documents provided by the Directive will not necessarily have a significant impact on damages proceedings following cartel decisions issued by the Commission. This is due to the introduction of an absolute ban on the disclosure of leniency statements and settlement submissions via a ‘maximum harmon

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Blažo, Ondrej. "Directive on Antitrust Damages Actions and Current Changes of Slovak Competition and Civil Law." Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 8, no. 12 (2015): 259–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2015.8.12.12.

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Slovak competition law enforcement can be characterized by infrequency of leniency applications and near absence of private enforcement. As a result, the adoption of the Damages D irective is not likely to cause substantial breakthrough in Slovakia, be it with respect to the rate of leniency applications or in private enforcement. A comprehensive amendment of Slovak competition law took place in 2014. Changes introduced therein reflected, among other things, the practice of the European Commission regarding access to its file. A new approach was also introduced towards damages claims submitted

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Ramos, Maria Elisabete. "Private Enforcement and Opt-out System Risks, Rewards and Legal Safeguards." Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 11, no. 18 (2018): 85–114. http://dx.doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2018.11.18.4.

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The EU Antitrust Damages Actions Directive does not include provisions for collective redress. Each EU member state is free to provide national regulation on this matter. The Portuguese legal system provided regulation on actio popularis since 1995. The ‘rational apathy’ of individual consumers may lead to non-reparation of damage and be of significant benefit for the company that is in breach of the law. The opt-out models solve the crucial economic problem caused by a large number of consumers or clients who have suffered a small loss because of competition law infringements. Under those cir

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Gulińska, Anna. "Collecting Evidence Through Access to Competition Authorities’ Files – Interplay or Potential Conflicts Between Private and Public Enforcement Proceedings?" Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 8, no. 12 (2015): 161–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2015.8.12.7.

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Information asymmetry between claimants seeking damages for competition law violations and the alleged infringing undertaking(s) is a key problem in the development of private antitrust enforcement because it often prevents successful actions for damages. The Damages Directive is a step forward in the facilitation of access to evidence relevant for private action claims. Its focus lies on, inter alia, 3rd party access to files in proceedings conducted by national competition authorities (NCAs). The harmonization was triggered by the inconsistencies in European case-law and yet the uniform rule

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Nascimbene, Bruno. "Interaction between Leniency Programmes and Damages Actions in Antitrust Law: Perspectives for Collective Redress." World Competition 36, Issue 2 (2013): 269–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2013018.

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This article addresses the effectiveness of private antitrust enforcement and its relationship with public enforcement of competition law. In light of the recent initiatives taken by the European Commission, it is suggested that soft law instruments are incapable of guaranteeing a coherent approach, especially taking into consideration the need to balance the public and private interests involved in antitrust proceedings. This is particularly evident when appraising the links between actions for damages based on Article 101 TFEU and leniency programmes. The analysis of the case law of the EU c

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WU, Chunxu. "Miao Chong v. SAIC-GM: The Dawn of the Private Enforcement of Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law?" World Competition 47, Issue 3 (2024): 351–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2024021.

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Global antitrust experiences have demonstrated that plaintiffs are frequently faced with evidentiary difficulties in the private enforcement of competition law, and China is no exception. In Miao Chong v. SAIC-GM, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) of China, for the first time ever, affirmed the presumption of the truthfulness of the facts established in antitrust infringement decisions in the private enforcement of competition law, which is believed to relieve the plaintiff’s burden of proof in establishing damages claims. However, the Miao Chong ruling should not be overstated because the appl

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Wurmnest, Wolfgang. "A New Era for Private Antitrust Litigation in Germany? A Critical Appraisal of the Modernized Law against Restraints of Competition." German Law Journal 6, no. 8 (2005): 1173–89. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s2071832200014218.

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On July 1st, 2005, the 7th Amendment to the Law against Restraints of Competition (Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen – GWB) became effective. The modernization of the GWB was indispensable in bringing German law in line with Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003. Regulation 1/2003 decentralized the enforcement of EC competition rules and aimed to pave the way for effective private antitrust litigation in Europe. Thus far, private parties have invoked Art. 81 and 82 EC Treaty primarily as shield by arguing that certain agreements were void. Only in very few instances were those rules used as sword to

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Wolski, Dominik. "The Type of Liability in Private Enforcement in Selected CEE Countries Relating to the Implementation of the Damages Directive." Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 10, no. 5 (2017): 69–84. http://dx.doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2017.10.15.4.

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The article is devoted to the type of liability in selected CEE countries, namely those covered by the national reports drafted for the 2nd International Conference on Harmonization of Private Antitrust Enforcement: Central and Eastern European Perspective. The paper starts with preliminary remarks concerning the role of the type of liability in private enforcement of competition law and the Damages Directive. In the following sections of the article, the author discusses the manner of adopting the aforementioned element as a result of the implementation process in CEE Member States. The artic

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Vlahek, Ana, and Klemen Podobnik. "Provisions of the Damages Directive on Limitation Periods and their Implementation in CEE Countries." Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 10, no. 5 (2017): 147–75. http://dx.doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2017.10.15.8.

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The article analyses the provisions on limitation of antitrust damages actions set out in Directive 2014/104/EU on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union. It presents (draft) implementing legislation of CEE countries from the perspective of their general rules on limitation, and the problems the Member States have faced in the process of transposing the Directive into their national legal systems. Within that, focus is placed upon the analysis of the types of limitation pe

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Rodríguez Rodrigo, Juliana. "La responsabilidad extracontractual por ilícitos antitrust en Europa. Comentario del auto del Juzgado de lo Mercantil de Madrid, de 23 mayo 2018 = The non-contractual liability from European antitrust law infringements. Commentary ofdecision of Commercial Court of Madrid, of 23 may 2018." CUADERNOS DE DERECHO TRANSNACIONAL 11, no. 1 (2019): 889. http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/cdt.2019.4664.

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Resumen: El Auto del Juzgado de lo Mercantil de Madrid, objeto de comentario en este trabajo, resuelve una declinatoria por falta de jurisdicción en un caso de reclamación de daños por un ilícito antitrust. El comportamiento anticompetitivo del que derivan los perjuicios, que ahora se reclaman, es el conocido como cártel de los camiones, que sancionó la Comisión Europea en el año 2016. Una de las víctimas de ilícito antitrust pide una indemnización por los daños y perjuicios sufridos por el hecho de haber tenido que pagar un sobreprecio en la compra de uno o varios camiones objetos del acuerdo

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Petrucci, Carlo. "Subsidiarity in Directive 2014/104 EU on Damages Actions for Breach of EU Competition Law." European Public Law 23, Issue 2 (2017): 395–421. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/euro2017023.

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The article is concerned with subsidiarity in Directive 2014/104 EU on actions for antitrust damages. After providing an overview of private enforcement of competition law and subsidiarity in EU law, it examines the arguments presented by the Commission in the relevant Impact Assessments. While most of the arguments were based on the need to prevent adverse cross-border effects, of particular interest was the argument that Member States were slow or unresponsive in providing effective measures designed to compensate antitrust victims. Subsequently, it shows that the Commission’s assessment of

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Poch, Albert. "El juego de la prescripción en el ejercicio de acciones judiciales de reclamación de daños y perjuicios derivadas de ilícitos contra la competencia = Dealing with the statute of limitation in claims for damages arising out of antitrust infringements." CUADERNOS DE DERECHO TRANSNACIONAL 11, no. 2 (2019): 727. http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/cdt.2019.5016.

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Resumen: La transposición al ordenamiento español de la Directiva 2014/104/UE, mediante Real Decreto-Ley 9/2017, ha supuesto un avance significativo en la regulación de la prescripción de las acciones de responsabilidad civil por daños derivados de infracciones antitrust. Pese a los innegables beneficios que, en términos de seguridad jurídica, introduce la nueva normativa, en el presente artículo se examinarán las dudas que actualmente persisten a raíz del régimen transitorio, así como la eventual inefectividad de la regulación de la prescripción prevista en el Código Civil, para resarcir a lo

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Piszcz, Anna. "Compensatory Collective Redress: Will It Be Part of Private Enforcement of Competition Law in CEE Countries?" Yearbook of Antitrust and Regulatory Studies 10, no. 5 (2017): 223–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.7172/1689-9024.yars.2017.10.15.11.

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The article aims to compare and evaluate solutions with regard to compensatory collective redress existing in CEE countries. The author will attempt to illuminate obstacles and challenges to using collective redress as an avenue for antitrust enforcement in CEE countries, as well as possible advantages of the scrutinised legal frameworks. Besides focusing on national provisions, the article will draw on provisions of the Damages Directive and the Commission’s Recommendation on collective redress mechanisms. It will open up the field for de lege ferenda proposals also.

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Cleynenbreugel, Pieter Van. "Private Damages Actions in EU Competition Law and Restorative Justice: Towards a New Streamlined Institutional Framework?" Market and Competition Law Review 3, no. 2 (2020): 15–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.7559/mclawreview.2019.1826.

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The transposition of Directive 2014/104 on private damages actions marks an important development in the setting up of a harmonised private competition law enforcement regime across different EU Member States. Coupled with deterrence-focused public enforcement, the European Union has taken a necessary and welcomed step towards enhancing justice for all those individuals and competitors damaged by competition law infringements. This article argues, however, that the current emphasis on balancing public and private enforcement of the European Commission focuses too little on the need and healing

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