To see the other types of publications on this topic, follow the link: Antitrust law (International law).

Journal articles on the topic 'Antitrust law (International law)'

Create a spot-on reference in APA, MLA, Chicago, Harvard, and other styles

Select a source type:

Consult the top 50 journal articles for your research on the topic 'Antitrust law (International law).'

Next to every source in the list of references, there is an 'Add to bibliography' button. Press on it, and we will generate automatically the bibliographic reference to the chosen work in the citation style you need: APA, MLA, Harvard, Chicago, Vancouver, etc.

You can also download the full text of the academic publication as pdf and read online its abstract whenever available in the metadata.

Browse journal articles on a wide variety of disciplines and organise your bibliography correctly.

1

Papadopoulos, Anestis. "Antitrust Law and International Companies." European Business Law Review 13, Issue 3 (June 1, 2002): 193–216. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/5086954.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
2

Fiebig, Andre. "International Trade and U.S. Antitrust Law." World Competition 31, Issue 1 (March 1, 2008): 146–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2008011.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
3

Kukovec, Damjan. "International Antitrust - What Law in Action?" Indiana International & Comparative Law Review 15, no. 1 (January 1, 2004): 1–50. http://dx.doi.org/10.18060/17830.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
4

Yu, Minggui, Yujing Huang, Huijie Zhong, and Qing Zhang. "Monopoly and corporate innovation: evidence from antitrust law." Nankai Business Review International 13, no. 1 (October 14, 2021): 58–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/nbri-03-2021-0019.

Full text
Abstract:
Purpose There are two opposite views about whether the Antitrust Law is conducive to the development of the economy. One view is that the Antitrust Law can restrain monopoly, maintain market competition and benefit economic growth. The other view is that the Antitrust Law inhibits innovation by monopolistic firms and fosters rent-seeking, which is bad for economic growth. To provide a possible perspective for clarifying the controversy, this paper aims to answer the following two questions: first, will the Antitrust Law inhibit corporate innovation? Second, does the antitrust enforcement agency discriminate against private enterprises? Design/methodology/approach Based on the samples of A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2013, the authors use the implementation of China’s Antitrust Law in 2008 as a policy shock, take the monopoly enterprises in each industry as the treatment group and competitive enterprises as the control group, using the difference-in-differences method to test the impact of the implementation of the Antitrust Law on corporate innovation activities. Findings The results show that compared with competitive enterprises, the patent output of monopolistic enterprises was significantly reduced after the implementation of the Antitrust Law, which indicates that the Antitrust Law does inhibit the innovation activities of monopolistic enterprises. Further research finds that the innovation suppression effect of the Antitrust Law is more prominent in state-owned enterprises, which means that the government does not have “selective law enforcement” against private enterprises in the process of law enforcement. Therefore, the results provide evidence for the idea that government intervention is neutral. Originality/value First, the paper enriches and expands the research on the factors affecting corporate innovation from the perspective of market structure. Second, it enriches and expands relevant research on the consequences of implementing the Antitrust Law from the perspective of corporate innovation. Third, it not only provides the relevant empirical evidence for clarifying the dispute about the Antitrust Law but also is helpful to clarify whether the Chinese Government has “selective law enforcement” against private enterprises.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
5

Hamilton, Stephen F., and Kyle Stiegert. "Vertical Coordination, Antitrust Law, and International Trade." Journal of Law and Economics 43, no. 1 (April 2000): 143–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/467450.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
6

Heil, Oliver P., and Arien W. Langvardt. "The Interface between Competitive Market Signaling and Antitrust Law." Journal of Marketing 58, no. 3 (July 1994): 81–96. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002224299405800306.

Full text
Abstract:
The authors examine the antitrust implications of certain market behavior, using recent findings from research on competitive market signaling. They show that certain behavior of a firm that is sometimes thought to raise antitrust concerns should be viewed as a natural and permissible facet of competitive interplay in the market. Conversely, they identify other market behavior that should be viewed with much more caution due to the antitrust risks of such behavior. The authors offer new perspectives on the motives and intentions that drive market behavior but may or may not raise antitrust concerns. They also show how competitive signaling research holds considerable promise for a better understanding of when serious antitrust issues are or are not triggered by particular market actions.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
7

Mazard, Camelia C., and Larry Fullerton. "International Antitrust Co-Operation Agreements." World Competition 24, Issue 3 (September 1, 2001): 405–23. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/359611.

Full text
Abstract:
This article addresses recent developments in the application of national antitrust laws to cross-border business activities, and the resulting need for antitrust enforcement authorities in different countries to co-ordinate their enforcement efforts. This article attributes the increase in cross-border antitrust enforcement to four trends: the increasing globalisation of business, the increasing proliferation of new antitrust laws around the world, the increasing acceptance of the "effects" test for antitrust jurisdiction, and the increasing liberalisation of trade barriers. The article then highlights both political and practical problems that have arisen from the points of view of antitrust enforcement agencies and affected private sector interests, stemming from the increasing extraterritorial application of antitrust laws. This article presents an overview of international co-operation agreements, focusing on US bilateral and multilateral co-operation agreements, and discusses how international co-operation in this area may affect private sector interests. Companies based in Europe should understand that any cartel conduct in which they may be involved, and any merger transactions, may be subject to review by antitrust enforcement authorities in multiple jurisdictions, including the United States, to the extent that those activities may injure or threaten injury to consumers in those jurisdictions.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
8

Scott, Jonathan. "Competition law post-Brexit." Competition Law Journal 20, no. 2 (August 6, 2021): 51–54. http://dx.doi.org/10.4337/clj.2021.02.01.

Full text
Abstract:
The end of the Transition Period following the UK's exit from the European Union and COVID-19 are major catalysts for the Competition and Markets Authority's future work, including in the fields of merger control and antitrust enforcement. This article considers how these, and other events, will influence the CMA's work, including the establishment of the Digital Markets Unit and the Office for the Internal Market, enforcement priorities and international cooperation.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
9

Petrovcic, Urška. "Patent hold-up and the limits of competition law: A Trans-Atlantic perspective." Common Market Law Review 50, Issue 5 (October 1, 2013): 1363–86. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/cola2013135.

Full text
Abstract:
Patent hold-up is currently one of the most discussed antitrust topics on both sides of the Atlantic. Competition authorities in the European Union and in the United States have expressed strong concerns about the standard essential patent (SEP) owner's ability to holdup manufacturers and impose unfair and unreasonable licensing conditions. The reach competition law has in addressing cases of patent hold-up remains nonetheless unclear. By analysing the applicability of the antitrust doctrines, the article tries to identify the circumstances in which SEP owners might face a liability under EU competition law and US antitrust law. The analysis shows that the SEP owner's conduct is subject to a different legal evaluation under EU competition law and US antitrust law. The divergences however do not reflect a conflicting perspective of the competition authorities, or to the application of different legal standards, but rather to the differences in the legal provisions on undertakings' unilateral conduct. The analysis also shows that competition law does not provide a definitive solution to the problem of patent hold-up in either system. This suggests that the limitation competition law faces in addressing cases of patent hold-up are not attributable to narrow formulation of the antitrust provision, but rather to the fact that competition law generally does not have the adequate tools to provide a definitive answer to the SEP owners' opportunism.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
10

Barlow, Patricia. "Aviation antitrust – international considerations after Sunset." Air and Space Law 12, Issue 1 (February 1, 1987): 11–28. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/aila1987003.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
11

Waked, Dina. "Global Antitrust From the Global South: A Comparative Law Void." FIU Law Review 18, no. 4 (2024): 865–78. http://dx.doi.org/10.25148/lawrev.18.4.12.

Full text
Abstract:
The article examines the historical trajectory and contemporary implications of the international antitrust regime proposed in the late 1990s and early 2000s. It delves into the motivations behind calls for harmonization of competition laws worldwide, driven by concerns over the power of multinational corporations and the challenges of regulating cross-border economic activity. While some advocated for a universal set of antitrust laws, others resisted, citing the need to account for diverse national contexts, particularly in the Global South. Despite the failure to establish a singular regime, the paper argues that diffusion of antitrust laws has led to convergence, albeit with complex implications for global governance and North-South relations.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
12

Downie, Colette. "Will Australia Trust Arbitrators with Antitrust?" Journal of International Arbitration 30, Issue 3 (June 1, 2013): 221–65. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/joia2013017.

Full text
Abstract:
International arbitration has gained acceptance in many jurisdictions as a convenient method for resolving competition law disputes. In Australia, it remains unclear whether competition disputes are arbitrable, even though Australian courts and legislatures have recognized the legitimacy of arbitration as a dispute resolution process. This article outlines a model which would allow competition arbitration to operate within the Australian commercial and legal environment. Options are presented to alleviate the difficulties which continue to be experienced during US and EU antitrust arbitration proceedings and at the award enforcement stage. It is envisaged that the recommendations made by this article will enable international arbitration to become a complementary method of competition law enforcement, if Australia trusts arbitrators with antitrust.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
13

Brown, William J. T. "Arbitrating International Antitrust Disputes." World Competition 13, Issue 4 (June 1, 1990): 19–32. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco1989020.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
14

Amato, Filippo. "International Antitrust: What Future?" World Competition 24, Issue 4 (December 1, 2001): 451–73. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/390132.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
15

Galloway, Jonathan. "Moving Towards a Template for Bilateral Antitrust Agreements." World Competition 28, Issue 4 (December 1, 2005): 589–614. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2005032.

Full text
Abstract:
Bilateral antitrust co-operation agreements are gradually becoming more prevalent in international antitrust. These agreements arguably constitute the principal tool for avoiding conflict in international antitrust given the absence of international antitrust rules. The same motivation that drives countries to conclude bilateral antitrust agreements, such as efficient and effective enforcement, could also provide the stimulus for multilateral antitrust initiatives yet does not. Countries have consistently placed greater emphasis on bilateral agreements than on multilateral initiatives such as the OECD Recommendations; often arguing that bilateral agreements reflect the specific relationship between signatories and thereby facilitate greater co-operation than a multilateral agreement could. This article engages in a comparative analysis of the principal antitrust co-operation agreements to assess whether bilateral agreements do reflect specific relationships; i.e. whether there is such a justification for not pursuing multilateral initiatives. Immediately apparent is that most bilateral antitrust agreements implement key principles, i.e. notification; enforcement co-operation and co-ordination; and primacy of domestic law. The article assesses whether the substance of these principles varies between the agreements, and concludes that a large amount of convergence has already taken place. Indeed, the article argues that the convergence achieved suggests that international antitrust has moved very close to a template for co-operation in international antitrust, and questions the rationale for the lengthy negotiation periods and the reluctance to pursue multilateral initiatives.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
16

Kirban, Elise, and H. Stephen Harris. "Antitrust Implications of International Code-sharing Alliances." Air and Space Law 23, Issue 4/5 (August 1, 1998): 166–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/aila1998023.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
17

Wang, Xiaoye, and Qianlan Wu. "Two Steps Forward and One Step Back?: US, EU and China’s Bilateral Antitrust Cooperation and International Trade." World Competition 45, Issue 1 (February 1, 2022): 53–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2022003.

Full text
Abstract:
Greater antitrust enforcement is argued to have positive correlations with the promotion of international trade. By 2019, the US, the EU and China, as global trade powers, have formed and strengthened bilateral antitrust cooperation to seek greater enforcement. However, the impact of such development on international trade has remained underexamined. The article argues that irrespective of their different legal forces, the US-EU, US-China and EU-China antitrust cooperation share convergences at the optimum and minimum levels. Based on the case study of the US, the EU and China’s regulations of the international Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) panel cartel, the article illustrates that as the effects doctrine continues to serve as the main normative value underpinning antitrust cooperation, matured competition regimes lack the incentive to share information with new regimes, competition regimes converge to apply comity restrictively and the consultation mechanism plays a limited role in holding the sides accountable under bilateral cooperation. Consequently, international antitrust remains fragmented, positing restraints to trade. The article calls for reconsideration of the effects doctrine as part of the transnational normative repertoire shaping bilateral antitrust cooperation and for devising policy tools to guarantee minimum information exchange among agencies. US, EU, China, International Antitrust, Bilateral Cooperation, Exchange of Information, Confidentiality, Comity, Consultation
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
18

Barlow, Patricia. "Aviation antitrust – international considerations after Sunset (closing part)." Air and Space Law 12, Issue 2 (April 1, 1987): 68–83. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/aila1987010.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
19

Park, Sooyoung. "Extraterritorial Application of Japanese Antitrust Law Against on International Cartels." Northeast Asian law journal 15, no. 2 (September 30, 2021): 25–49. http://dx.doi.org/10.19035/nal.2021.15.2.2.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
20

Waller, Spencer Weber. "Public Choice Theory and the International Harmonization of Antitrust Law." Antitrust Bulletin 48, no. 2 (March 2003): 427–38. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0003603x0304800206.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
21

Einhorn, Talia. "Reconciling Israeli Antidumping Law With WTO/GATT International Trade Law Rules." Israel Law Review 32, no. 1 (1998): 81–138. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0021223700015600.

Full text
Abstract:
Dumping is defined, basically, as the sale of goods to an export market at a price below that charged for comparable goods in the exporter's home market. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) does not forbid such action, not even when injurious to the competing domestic industry. However, it has taken the view that dumping constitutes an unfair trade practice. Under GATT, Article VI Contracting Parties (or Members, as they are now termed in the GATT 1994 Agreements) are authorized, as an exception to other GATT obligations, to unilaterally impose antidumping (hereinafter: AD) duties to counteract the effects of dumping. The duties should create a level playing field in which producers all over the world will be able to compete fairly with each other. The principles sound simple and straightforward, yet their application is one of the most contentious topics in international trade law.The economic coherence of AD rules is controversial. In international trade, price discrimination between national markets is typically made possible when the exporter has a powerful position in the home market and re-exportation to that market is not feasible. In the domestic arena price discrimination is countered by the laws of competition and antitrust. International trade law offers states a very different remedy, that first and foremost protects the competing local industry, regardless of the procompetitive or anticompetitive effects of dumping on the market as a whole.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
22

Grewlich, Alexandre S. "Globalisation and Conflict in Competition Law; Elements of Possible Solutions." World Competition 24, Issue 3 (September 1, 2001): 367–404. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/359612.

Full text
Abstract:
Discrepancies between various stances towards competition policy have a tendency to lead towards trade conflicts. Private restraints resulting from anticompetitive arrangements are perceived as becoming more prominent. In the age of globalisation it is possible to distinguish six basic approaches towards potential solutions regarding conflicts in competition law: firstly, an agreement on a binding universal antitrust code; second, a combination of minimum standards and a mechanism called international procedural initiative; third, a harmonisation of national antitrust laws; fourth, a "plurilateral agreement on competition and trade" as put forward by the EU; fifth, a strengthening of effective networks of peers (notably enforcement agencies); and sixth, a "plurilateral framework" combined with binding "positive comity" and dispute solution instruments. After consideration of pertinent transborder antitrust cases, such as Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and WorldCom/MCI, the article deals with different competition cultures and notably reviews the workability of minimum standards, non-discrimination rules, surveillance and enforcement, "positive comity", dispute settlement, "single order" or networks of peers. A basic distinction is being made between harmonisation, co-operation and "positive comity". The part on "positive comity" particularly deals with the OECD-Recommendations, the 1991/1998 EU-US Agreement, the EU's suggested WTO Competition Rules and the proposals put forward by the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee (ICPAC). A particular effort is made to assess the benefits and limitations of "positive comity".
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
23

Cohn, Stuart R. "Mergers and Antitrust Regulation in the United States." Leiden Journal of International Law 1, no. 2 (November 1988): 137–48. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0922156500000832.

Full text
Abstract:
In his article on mergers and antitrust regulation in the United States, Professor Cohn describes the intricate relationship between the two concepts. Antitrust law is analyzed along the lines of the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act and the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. Furthermore, Professor Cohn frequently refers to relevant jurisprudence in his efforts to clarify the present-day legal situation in the United States with respect to horizontal and vertical mergers. He concludes that merger law in the United States is an amalgam of state and federal law which does not account for a ‘unified set of rules governing mergers’.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
24

Lucas Rhimbassen, Maria, and Lucien Rapp. "New space property age: at the crossroads of space commons, commodities and competition." Journal of Property, Planning and Environmental Law 13, no. 2 (June 25, 2021): 88–106. http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/jppel-02-2021-0007.

Full text
Abstract:
Purpose In the absence of a clear property rights regime in outer space, commodification might bypass several legal considerations and instill a regime through customary practice, which could collide with international space law ethics, and thus, erode the corpus juris spatialis. The purpose of this paper is to find a way to prevent such an erosion. Design/methodology/approach Through an interdisciplinary review of the literature pertaining to space law, space property rights, economic goods, resources and commodities, this paper explores potential solutions to prevent further fragmentation of the corpus juris spatialis when confronted with the elusive transnational lex mercatoria dynamics and potential commodification of the space ecosystem. Findings This paper explores solutions to prevent this outcome through decentralized frameworks ranging from polycentric governance to a new “space antitrust” regime. Polycentric governance could prove very useful to address the plurality of space property rights and their complexity while space antitrust would not be precluded to intervene in a commoditized space market. Commodities benefited in the past from a certain antitrust immunity, however, due to globalization, technological development and deregulation, commodities have become more competitive, and therefore, the immunity is being gradually overturned. Originality/value This paper explores the benefits of unlocking antitrust potential forces into channeling, hand in hand with polycentricity, the development of the space ecosystem in light of international space law ethics. “Space antitrust” could become a discipline per se and better resonate with non-traditional stakeholders in the space sector in a context of commercialization and commodification of resources. Today, benefit-sharing causes debate among spacefaring nations in terms of property rights. However, it could be enforced through competition law dynamics.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
25

Kumarappan, Subbu. "Intentional and Evolutionary Visions of U.S. Antitrust Law." Journal of Industrial Organization Education 5, no. 1 (January 21, 2011): 1–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.2202/1935-5041.1027.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
26

Fox, Eleanor M. "Toward World Antitrust and Market Access." American Journal of International Law 91, no. 1 (January 1997): 1–25. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/2954138.

Full text
Abstract:
The lowered national barriers to global trade reveal opportunities for a world without parochial frontiers. One of these opportunities lies in the area of competition law. Competition law is designed to enhance the economic welfare of people by,among other things, breaking down private barriers and preventing the creation and misuse of corporate power through combinations and monopolistic strategies.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
27

Vassilopoulos, Stamatis. "Monopolies in Outer Space: Is Europe Ready?" Air and Space Law 48, Issue 4 /5 (September 1, 2023): 445–56. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/aila2023051.

Full text
Abstract:
The liberalization of outer space in the past decades has given birth to a new market, one of crucial significance to our everyday lives. However, this new reality has created a situation where the goals of the Space Treaties are subjected to the fluctuations of market forces. An international Competition Law framework could prove indispensable in safeguarding space activities from abuse, but its fragmentation leaves such a task down to national administrations. Despite that, at the national level there exists no competition law dedicated to space activities; the latter are subject to antitrust provisions sometimes even predating the birth of the space market. Against this backdrop, the present article will attempt to examine the aptitude of the European competition framework to effectively regulate space activities with a focus on the antimonopoly provision of Article 102 TFEU. Antitrust, Competition Law, EU Law, Space Market, TFEU 102
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
28

Feinberg, Robert M. "Antitrust Policy and International Trade Liberalization." World Competition 14, Issue 4 (June 1, 1991): 13–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco1990022.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
29

Truxal, Steven. "The EU–UK Competition and State Aid Regulatory Environment for Airlines: Post-Brexit, Post-Transition." Air and Space Law 46, Special Issue (October 1, 2021): 29–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/aila2021041.

Full text
Abstract:
Following the United Kingdom’s departure from the European Union and the transition period that followed, the UK and EU have embarked upon a journey to form a new relationship. With the entry into force of the EU–UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) in May 2021, now is an opportune moment to consider what has been achieved and what is yet to come in the areas of competition (antitrust rules and merger control) and State aid. This article examines the current state of play in these important areas for ongoing and future international cross-border activity, in which international airlines play a central role. It identifies and reflects on the key ‘moving parts’ in this unchartered EU–UK regulatory environment: law reform, the competition authority’s role and future regulatory cooperation. Antitrust, Merger, State aid, Subsidy, Brexit
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
30

Nicholson, M. W. "AN ANTITRUST LAW INDEX FOR EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION POLICY." Journal of Competition Law and Economics 4, no. 4 (April 5, 2008): 1009–29. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhn009.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
31

Heil, Oliver P., and Arlen W. Langvardt. "The Interface between Competitive Market Signaling and Antitrust Law." Journal of Marketing 58, no. 3 (July 1994): 81. http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1252312.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
32

Gal, Michal S. "New Perspectives on International Antitrust." American Journal of International Law 106, no. 2 (April 2012): 401–10. http://dx.doi.org/10.5305/amerjintelaw.106.2.0401.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
33

Calvo Caravaca, Alfonso-Luis, and Javier Carrascosa González. "El Derecho internacional privado de la Unión Europea frente a las acciones por daños anticompetitivos = European Union Private International Law in front of antitrust damages actions." CUADERNOS DE DERECHO TRANSNACIONAL 10, no. 2 (October 5, 2018): 7. http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/cdt.2018.4374.

Full text
Abstract:
Resumen: Este trabajo muestra cómo el TJUE y los tribunales nacionales de los Estados miem­bros de la UE aplican los Reglamento Bruselas I-bis y Roma II a las acciones de daños por infracción del Derecho antitrust europeo. Este trabajo subraya algunas de las dificultades que está encontrado la aplicación privada del Derecho de la competencia: la frecuente inoperancia de los foros de sumisión, la peculiar interpretación del forum delicti commissi, las sorpresas derivadas del forum connexitatis y las soluciones contrapuestas a las cuestiones de legitimación procesal activa y pasiva (como, por ejemplo, la responsabilidad de la sociedad matriz por el comportamiento de sus filiales).Palabras clave: acciones para la indemnización de daños anticompetitivos, acciones autónomas, acciones de seguimiento, acciones declarativas negativas, acciones Torpedo, competencia judicial inter­nacional, daños, defensa basada en la repercusión de sobrecostes, Derecho antitrust, Derecho aplicable, Derecho europeo de la competencia, efecto paraguas, passing-on, Unión Europea.Abstract: This essay shows how the CJEU and the national courts of the EU Member States apply the Brussels I-bis and Rome II Regulations to actions for damages for infringement of European anti­trust law. This paper highlights some of the difficulties encountered in the private application of Euro­pean competition law: the frequent inoperativeness of the submission forums, the peculiar interpretation of the forum delicti commissi, the surprises derived from the forum connexitatis and the opposing solu­tions to the issues of active and passive legal standing (as, for example, the responsibility of the parent company for the behavior of its subsidiaries).Keywords: Antitrust damages actions, Stand-alone actions, Follow-on actions, negative declara­tory actions, Torpedo actions, Jurisdiction, Damages (Torts), passing-on defence, Antitrust Law, Appli­cable Law, European Competition Law, umbrella effect, European Union.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
34

Connor, John M. "Canada’s International Cartel Enforcement: Keeping Score." World Competition 39, Issue 4 (December 1, 2016): 557–92. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2016048.

Full text
Abstract:
Canada’s Competition Bureau has been a well-rated competition-law enforcer. Previously published assessments of its anti-cartel efforts tend to heap praise on the authority. Yet its antitrust performance in the past decade or so has flagged. A quantitative assessment of several dimensions of outcomes made of the Bureau’s anti-cartel enforcement activities shows an agency unable to live up to its earlier promise.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
35

Rishikesh, Deepa. "Extraterritoriality versus Sovereignty in International Antitrust Jurisdiction." World Competition 14, Issue 3 (March 1, 1991): 33–66. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco1990016.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
36

Davidow, Joel. "Recent US Antitrust Developments of International Relevance." World Competition 27, Issue 3 (September 1, 2004): 407–17. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2004023.

Full text
Abstract:
<p>During the last two years, the Antitrust policy of the United States has been one that could be dubbed ``vigorous conservatism’’. The vigour has been evidenced by an increase in anti-cartel activity and punishments, by strict review of a substantial percentage of major horizontal mergers, and by the development of some new cases against abuses of patent rights. There has also been evidence of international vigour, such as in the rapid development of the International Competition Network and in day to day coordination in anti-cartel criminal matters.</p><p>Conservatism has been evident in efforts to delimit the territorial scope of the treble damage remedy and the possibility of forced dealing by a dominant firm controlling an alleged
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
37

de León, Ignacio. "Should We Promote Antitrust in International Trade?" World Competition 21, Issue 2 (December 1, 1997): 35–63. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco1997009.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
38

Guiltinan, Joseph P. "Choice and Variety in Antitrust Law: A Marketing Perspective." Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 21, no. 2 (September 2002): 260–68. http://dx.doi.org/10.1509/jppm.21.2.260.17589.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
39

Koch, Rika, and Rolf H. Weber. "International Trade Law Challenges by Subsidies for Renewable Energy." Journal of World Trade 49, Issue 5 (October 1, 2015): 757–80. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/trad2015030.

Full text
Abstract:
Although it is widely acknowledged that the replacement of conventional ‘grey’ energy with renewable ‘green’ energy is an important pillar of climate change mitigation, the question of how governments can support this development remains highly contested. In Canada – Renewable Energy, a domestic support measure for renewable energy generation has been subject of dispute settlement proceedings before the World Trade Organization (WTO) for the first time. In this ruling, the concept of ‘relevant market’ which forms part of the subsidy analysis proved to be highly controversial. By looking at the delineation of the relevant market and the conditions justifying subsidies, this article takes up this debate and examines the degree of policy space that is conferred to WTO Members in supporting their renewable energy sector. It discusses possible solutions to overcome the legal insecurity emanating from the blurry concept of ‘relevant market’ by arguing that a comparison between the WTO law and antitrust law can yield valuable insights to establish a more consistent approach for assessing the relevant market.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
40

Davidow, Joel. "United States Antitrust Developments in the New Millennium." World Competition 24, Issue 3 (September 1, 2001): 425–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/359608.

Full text
Abstract:
US antitrust in the new millennium has been characterised both by successes and challenges. The successes include additional exposure of major international cartels, exposure of foreign corporate officials to US prison sentences for cartel activity, further adoption or strengthening of foreign antitrust systems, and deeper co-operation in regard to anti-cartel and merger control enforcement. Merger relief has become quite strict, with firm insistence on fix it first solutions that are quite certain to happen. Challenges include trying to win the Microsoft case on appeal, learning how to deal with private actions involving damages stemming from worldwide cartels and curbing the runaway proliferation of merger control systems that lay too many burdens on largely unobjectionable but highly international transactions. The new administration will undoubtedly continue many of the international initiatives of its predecessor, but is likely to be more sceptical of populist antitrust approaches such as vertical cases or predatory practice monopolisation cases.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
41

Hou, Liyang. "Reshaping market, competition and regulation in EU utility liberalization: A perspective from telecom." Common Market Law Review 52, Issue 4 (August 1, 2015): 977–1007. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/cola2015076.

Full text
Abstract:
Liberalization in utility sectors faces two legal challenges, namely institutional conflicts between the market mechanism and sector-specific regulation, and conflicts between sector-specific regulation and competition law. The former has long been dealt with by academia and legislation, but the latter attracts comparatively less attention. Recent EU antitrust enforcement in the telecom sector demonstrates acute conflicts between SSR and competition law. While the inclusion of EU competition law in the TFEU establishes its supremacy over telecom regulation, it is worth investigating whether the Commission, using its antitrust power, has encroached on Member States’ competence over telecom regulation. The article finds that the Commission has over-stretched competition rules for regulatory or political purposes, without bringing prominent added value to effective competition when compared with sector-specific regulation. It is suggested to mitigate conflicts through an amended coordination mechanism based on the current Article 7 Procedure.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
42

Calvani, Terry. "Book Review: Two Books on Merger Law: International Mergers: The Antitrust Process." Antitrust Bulletin 42, no. 1 (March 1997): 215–20. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0003603x9704200114.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
43

Perskaya, Victoriya, Lyubov Khomyakova, Dmitry Morkovkin, Tural Mamedov, Aleksandra Zvereva, and Alexander Chupin. "Prospects for the implementation of antimonopoly compliance in the EAEU law." OOO "Zhurnal "Voprosy Istorii" 2023, no. 9-1 (September 1, 2023): 92–107. http://dx.doi.org/10.31166/voprosyistorii202309statyi02.

Full text
Abstract:
The article analyzes the legislation of France, Great Britain, Germany and the USA in terms of the presence or absence of normative regulation of the institution of antitrust compliance for government agencies and business entities. The article also assesses the positive and negative effects of antimonopoly compliance in the EAEU member states. The authors formulated proposals for the introduction of antimonopoly compliance in the EAEU member states and at the interstate level, taking into account international experience.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
44

Goebel, Roger J. "Legal Practice Rights of Domestic and Foreign Lawyers in the United States©." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 49, no. 2 (April 2000): 413–44. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/s0020589300064216.

Full text
Abstract:
In the post-World War II international economy, with its enormous growth in transnational trade and investment, multinational legal practice has become a functional reality.1 Within the last two decades, the volume of trans-border legal practice has grown enormously in fields such as trade law, international banking and finance, international arbitration and litigation, international contractual and joint venture arrangements, transborder acquisitions and mergers, international antitrust, international tax planning, and foreign investment counselling. Domestic law firms within the leading commercial nations have not only grown substantially in size, often by merger, they have also increasingly created networks of foreign branch offices, or entered into international association or joint venture relationships with firms in other countries.2
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
45

Benini, Caterina. "La localizzacione dell’illecito concorrenziale nel regime di Bruxelles: riflessioni alla luce della Sentenza FLYLAL II della Corte di Giustizia dell’Unione Europea = The localization of antitrust torts underthe Brussels regime: reflections in the light of the Judgment FLYLAL II of the Court of Justice of the European Union." CUADERNOS DE DERECHO TRANSNACIONAL 11, no. 1 (March 11, 2019): 693. http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/cdt.2019.4641.

Full text
Abstract:
Riassunto: Nella sentenza flyLAL II la Corte di giustizia dell’Unione Europea ha affermato che un calo delle vendite provocato da un illecito concorrenziale costituisce il “danno” rilevante agli effetti della individuazione del giudice competente ai sensi dell’art. 5 n. 3 del regolamento (CE) n. 44/2001 (“Bruxelles I”) e ha ritenuto che tale danno vada localizzato nel paese in cui si trova il mercato inte­ressato dagli effetti dell’illecito. Lo scritto, prendendo spunto da questa sentenza, esamina criticamente la disciplina internazionalprivatistica europea degli illeciti concorrenziali, soffermandosi sulle ricadute negative della stessa in termini di private antitrust enforcement. Dinnanzi a questo stato delle cose, la soluzione della Corte appare perseguire l’obiettivo di garantire coerenza tra la disposizione oggetto di pronuncia e l’art. 6, par. 3, lett. a), del regolamento (CE) n. 864/2007 (“Roma II”) sulla legge applicabile alle obbligazioni extracontrattuali derivanti da atti limitativi della concorrenza. Essa inoltre agevola il private enforcement del diritto della concorrenza, contribuendo al contempo alla funzione regolatoria del diritto internazionale privato nel contesto regionale dell’Unione Europea.Parole chiave: illeciti concorrenziali, foro speciale degli illeciti, localizzazione del danno, criterio del mercato, private antitrust enforcementAbstract: In the flyLAL II judgment, the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that the loss of sales incurred as a result of antitrust tort can be regarded as “damage” for the purposes of iden­tifying the competent jurisdictional authority pursuant to Art. 5 n. 3 of the Regulation (EC) n. 44/2001 (“Brussels I”) and ruled that such damage is localized in the country whose market was affected by the anticompetitive conduct. Taking that judgment as point of departure, this article critically analyses the EU private international law regime of antitrust torts, focusing on its negative impact on private antitrust enforcement. Given this state of affairs, the solution adopted by the Court seems to pursue the goal of consistency between the provision under scrutiny and Art. 6, par. 3, lit. a), of the Regulation (CE) n. 864/2007 (“Rome II”) on the law applicable to non-contractual obligations arising from acts restricting free competition. It also promotes the private enforcement of antitrust rules, thereby enhancing the re­gulatory function of private international law in the internal market.Keywords: antitrust torts, special jurisdiction in matters relating to tort, localization of the loss, market criterion, private antitrust enforcement.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
46

Martyniszyn, Marek. "Legislation Blocking Antitrust Investigations and the September 2012 Russian Executive Order." World Competition 37, Issue 1 (March 1, 2014): 103–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/woco2014006.

Full text
Abstract:
This article offers a typology of so-called blocking legislation and analyses its development, functions and legality under international law. It also presents and discusses the new Russian blocking Order, issued in September 2012, focusing on its possible effects on the European Commission's investigation of Gazprom's business practices (in light of EU competition law) as well as, more broadly, on foreign operations of Russian strategic enterprises.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
47

Santaolalla Montoya, Cayetana. "La interpretación necesaria del derecho de la competencia desde un enfoque ius internacional privatista = The need to consider antitrust law from a private international law approach." CUADERNOS DE DERECHO TRANSNACIONAL 11, no. 1 (March 11, 2019): 527. http://dx.doi.org/10.20318/cdt.2019.4631.

Full text
Abstract:
Resumen: Tradicionalmente, el Derecho de la competencia se ha interpretado desde el Derecho administrativo y el Derecho mercantil, pero cada vez resulta más necesaria la interpretación desde el Derecho Internacional privado, para determinar el juez competente y la ley aplicable, cuando concurran elementos transfronterizos. Desde un punto de vista calificatorio, las infracciones a las normas de defen­sa de la competencia, se consideran materia extracontractual (a pesar de que hay casos contractuales), lo que remite al artículo 7.2 del Reglamento Bruselas I bis y al Reglamento Roma II. Por su parte, los artículos 101 y 102 TFUE son leyes de policía. La jurisprudencia del TJUE resulta esclarecedora y cru­cial, mientras no se apruebe un Reglamento europeo que confirme la naturaleza de las infracciones a las normas de competencia.Palabras clave: derecho de la competencia, derecho internacional privado, extracontractual, ley de policía, cartel damage claims.Abstract: Traditionally, Antitrust Law has been interpreted from administrative law and commer­cial law, but it is increasingly necessary interpretation from private international law, to determine the competent judge and the applicable law, when cross-border elements concur. From a qualifying point of view, breaches of the rules of defense of competition are considered matters relating to tort, delict or quasidelict (although there are cases relating to contracts), which refers to article 7.2 of the Brussels I recast and the Rome II Regulation. Besides, articles 101 and 102 TFEU are overriding mandatory rules. The jurisprudence of the CJEU is enlightening, pending the adoption of a European Regulation confir­ming the nature of the infringements of the competition rules.Keywords: antitrust law, private international law, relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, overriding mandatory rule, cartel damage claims.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
48

Hemphill, Thomas A. "Modernizing U.S. Antitrust Law: The Role of Technology and Innovation." Business Economics 40, no. 2 (April 2005): 70–74. http://dx.doi.org/10.2145/20050208.

Full text
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
49

Goldsmith, Aren. "Arbitration and EU Antitrust Follow-on Damages Actions." ASA Bulletin 34, Issue 1 (March 1, 2016): 10–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.54648/asab2016003.

Full text
Abstract:
This article addresses the subject of whether, when and how EU antitrust follow-on damages actions, which seek civil remedies for harm alleged to have been suffered from the infringement of European antitrust law rules, may be submitted to international arbitration. The article begins by tracing the development of follow-on damages litigation in Europe, and then addresses the anticipated growth of such actions as a result of the EU Damages Directive. Next, the article considers certain procedural obstacles that may be encountered when parties seek to arbitrate follow-on claims. The relevant challenges relate to case law in certain European jurisdictions that has interpreted agreements to arbitrate narrowly in relation to followon claims, and to the complex nature of follow-on actions. Despite such challenges, the article argues that there are reasons why corporate users may prefer to avail themselves of international arbitration in relation to follow-on disputes. The article therefore explores mechanisms for maximizing arbitral options in the follow-on setting, including through drafting techniques, ex post submissions and undertakings before regulators.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
50

Kalesná, Katarína. "Attention Markets and European Competition Law." European Studies 9, no. 2 (December 1, 2022): 234–42. http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/eustu-2022-0022.

Full text
Abstract:
Abstract Summary Following the economic literature attention initially treated as „fictious commodity“ became an important component of the market; in attention market users supply time for content they are interrested in. Attention market differs from conventional market in several aspects and becomes a new challenge for antitrust. The article therefore analyses attention markets from competition point of view. Starting with economic background it discusses different approches to the relevant market analysis and the tools used for relevant market assessment (SSNIP, SSNIC and SSNDQ test). It explores also changes in identification of market power and new forms of anticompetitive behaviour in these prevalently zero-price markets. Attention is drawn also to the benefits of functioning competition. Outcomes of analysis are summed up in the conclusion.
APA, Harvard, Vancouver, ISO, and other styles
We offer discounts on all premium plans for authors whose works are included in thematic literature selections. Contact us to get a unique promo code!

To the bibliography