Academic literature on the topic 'Apache (Attack helicopter)'

The introduction into service of the Westland manufactured Apache AH Mk1 has coincided with a thrust within the UK armed services for a greater emphasis on amphibious operations within the littoral environment. From this background has emerged a requirement for an embarked, attack helicopter capability, for which the Apache AH Mk1 has been earmarked. However, this helicopter being, by design, optimized for the battlefield environment, cannot be presumed to adapt to the naval environment without presenting certain challenges. This article describes how Westland Helicopters Ltd has sought to determine the feasibility of conducting embarked operations with Apache AH Mk1 by deriving limits to be respected during Ship Helicopter Operating Limits (SHOL) trials using a variety of analytical methods. Aspects of operation considered include aircraft lashing, landing, stability on deck with rotors running or stationary and when being towed, rotor engagement and disengagement, ground resonance, and main rotor spreading and folding. The article considers further aspects of importance to embarked operations and summarizes the trials process that results in an operational envelope for service use. It concludes that a practical operating envelope can be achieved, anticipates a successful outcome for the SHOL trials, and includes a projection for future activities to enhance the aircraft's maritime operational capabilities.

Open systems architecture (OSA) applied to rotorcraft avionics has continued to mature and evolve during the past decade. The Apache attack helicopter mission processor software architecture, networked common operating real-time environment (NCORE), was originally architected to reduce life cycle costs, minimize the time to incorporate and field new capabilities, take advantage of new software technologies, and improve the organization of existing functional capabilities. The Open Group's Future Airborne Capability Environment (FACETM) consortium is an ongoing joint industry, academia, Department of Defense initiative that is defining a new business model and reference architecture with the objective of dramatically reducing new aviation platform development costs and enabling the leveraging of common software applications across platforms: “develop once use often.” FACE technical strategies include standardizing interfaces between reference architecture segments, specifying multiple profiles, and employing a shared repository-based data model that facilitates application reuse across aviation platforms. Software reuse and integration of software components provided by multiple suppliers is discussed relative to architecture trade-offs; software component refactoring into smaller reusable elements impacts runtime performance, system complexity, and maintenance. After providing technical context, analysis leads to the overarching conclusion that the FACE reference architecture and future rotorcraft programs that leverage it can benefit from NCORE OSA–proven strategies, approaches, and decisions. Similarly, the NCORE OSA must continue to evolve and further align with the FACE reference architecture to enable both new and existing application reuse and to remain current and relevant.

The study aims at discussing the changing dynamics of conventional deterrence in South Asia especially after the Pulwama-Balakot incident of 2019. The study is evaluated through Descriptive, Exploratory and Predictive data analysis approach. For elaborating different aspects of the study, both primary and secondary data was used. The study conducted in-depth interviews of the experts on the strategic and nuclear environment of the South Asian region. The study is divided in to three parts. In first part of the study, India-Pakistan relations since their independence in 1947 have been discussed. It was followed by discussing how Indian military strategic thinking against Pakistan has been changed from being defensive in Sunderji Doctrine (SD) of 1987 to offensive in the Cold Start Doctrine (CSD) of 2004 and then to the Land Warfare Doctrine (LWD) of 2018. The study then continues on discussing how India has crossed the international border line and conducted so-called surgical strikes inside Pakistani territory after a militant attack on the Indian paramilitary troops in Indian Occupied Kashmir (IoK) in 2019 and how Pakistan responded to the Indian aggression with a military operation codenamed “Operation Swift Retort”. The second part of the study is related to the Indian acquisition of modern sophisticated weaponry from the great powers like US, Israel, Russia etc. and the possible impacts of these weapons systems on the strategic stability of Pakistan. How the weapon systems like Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system, Rafale fighter jets, Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGM), Nuclear Submarine, P8-I Antisubmarine aircraft, Apache attack helicopter, Spy satellites and the armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) will pose threats to Pakistan, was main theme of the second part of the study. The possibility of any future war between India and Pakistan was also discussed in this section. Third section of the study was related to the possible options for Pakistan to counter the growing Indian conventional superiority. It was discussed that Pakistan should improve its long-range air defense system, improve the speed, lethality and range of its missiles, acquire or develop nuclear submarine and fifth generation aircrafts, improve Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities along with the acquisition of attack helicopters and enhancing the endurance and range of armed UAVs to counter any future Indian aggression. Overall the Indian military modernization, the acquisition and procurement of modern sophisticated weaponry was discussed in the study. How negatively it will impact Pakistan and what options and choices are available with Pakistan to counter it, was the basic theme of the study. It was also thoroughly examined that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are not for wars, but it’s the guarantor of peace in South Asia. It was also examined that Pakistan will never allow any aggression to disturb its strategic stability and will never hesitate to ensure its strategic stability and the basic sovereignty as a state at any cost, even by using its nuclear weapons as a last resort in case of failure of its conventional weapons.

ABSTRACT Introduction Neck pain among rotary-wing aviators has been established as an important issue in the military community, yet no U.S. Army regulation defines exactly what cervical spine range of motion (CROM) is adequate for flight. This lack of regulation leaves flight surgeons to subjectively determine whether an aviator affected by limited CROM is fit to maintain flight status. The U.S. Army Aeromedical Research Laboratory is conducting a study among AH-64 and UH-60 pilots to define CROM requirements in simulated and actual flight using optical head tracking equipment. Presented here is a preliminary analysis of head position data from a pilot and co-pilot in two AH-64 missions. Methods Maintenance data recorder (MDR) files from two AH-64 missions were provided by the Apache Attack Helicopter Project Management Office. Data were filtered down to three-dimensional pilot and co-pilot head position data and each data point was analyzed to determine neck posture. These neck postures were then categorized as neutral, mild, and severe for flexion/extension, lateral bending, and twist rotation postural categories. Results Twist rotation postures reached 90 degrees, particularly early in the flight; additionally, a few instances of 90-degree lateral bends were observed. Co-pilots spent more time than pilots in mild and severe twist rotation posture for both flights. Co-pilots also spend a high percentage of time in mild flexion and twist rotation. Conclusion This investigation provides a proof of concept for analysis of head tracking data from MDR files as a surrogate measure of neck posture in order to estimate CROM requirements in rotary-wing military flight missions. Future studies will analyze differences in day and night flights, pilot versus co-pilot CROM, and neck movement frequency.

Thesis (M.S. in Program Management)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2002.
Thesis advisor(s): Michael W. Boudreau, Richard G. Rhoades. Includes bibliographical references (p. 63-65). Also available online.

The U.S. military Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) restrict the use of force in armed conflict to either self-defense or “mission-specific” rules of engagement, which refer to the use of force against members of enemy armed forces or organized armed groups that have been “declared hostile.” This bifurcation of authority works well in an international armed conflict, where the enemy force is uniformed and easily distinguished. In these circumstances, the overwhelming number of engagements are against identified hostile forces. In many non-international armed conflicts, however, combatants actively attempt to camouflage their status, and U.S. forces find themselves engaging enemy forces under a self-defense framework. This creates problems. Consider, for example, a situation where three individuals of unknown affiliation launch an attack against a U.S. military convoy in Afghanistan. After a short engagement, the attackers get in a van and speed away from the attack site. The U.S. convoy is disabled, but an unmanned aerial vehicle tracks the van as it retreats into the desert. Thirty minutes later an AH-64 Apache attack helicopter arrives on scene above the still-retreating van. Can the Apache attack the vehicle? The van is retreating and poses no threat, thus self-defense principles would not allow for the use of force, despite the fact that the occupants are clearly directly participating in hostilities. This chapter addresses three questions: Why are the SROE drafted in this manner? What is the basis in the law for the SROE’s approach to self-defense? What are the problems presented by this approach?

On April 3, 2010, WikiLeaks and the Sunshine Press released the Collateral Murder video: a 17-minute clip showing a US Apache attack helicopter firing upon individuals in a Baghdad suburb. Amongst those killed by the 30mm cannon fire were two Reuters journalists. Rooted in the author’s earlier work on the use of YouTube by US soldiers to record everything from the criminal to the light-hearted to the banal, the chapter addresses how this clip (viewed over 15 million times on YouTube, and with myriad copies throughout the Internet) has been used and re-used for a variety of activist purposes over the past 4 years, and how it has contributed to a temporal extension of ‘the battlefield.’ Rather than a somewhat static memorialisation or transcription of war, the Collateral Murder video has been more fluid: entering and re-entering public consciousness as it is linked to news events as they unfold. This chapter discusses the flow and distribution of activist imagery as it is connected to the flow of news and current events.